KEMALISM AND THE NARRATIVE OF TURKISH MODERNITY. philosophy which owes its debt to the ideas that had emerged during the late 18 th to early 19 th

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1 J.D. Lombardo KEMALISM AND THE NARRATIVE OF TURKISH MODERNITY My favorite word in Turkish is istiklâl. The dictionary says it means independence, and that alone is enough to win it a place of honor in any language. It has a special resonance in Turkey [ ] It wants to break away from its autocratic heritage, from its position outside the world s political mainstream [ ] Most of all, it is trying to free itself from its fears fear of freedom, fear of the outside world, fear of itself. [emphasis added]. - Stephen Kinzer, Turkish historiography has been for the most part a discourse on Kemalism, a political philosophy which owes its debt to the ideas that had emerged during the late 18 th to early 19 th centuries in Europe beginning with the French Revolution 2 in 1789 through the Spring of Europe revolutions of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, from whom this eponymously-named philosophy was derived, has been, as Ottoman historian Erik J. Zürcher 3 notes, celebrated as a benevolent iron-fisted progressive throughout numerous publications on modern Turkish history. A working definition of Kemalism must be provided in order to grasp what lies at the heart of this ideology that dominates the discourse of modernization in Turkey: [Kemalism is] the realization of a modern Turkish state and society, and society [ ] The Kemalist principles of republicanism, nationalism, populism, secularism, étatism, and revolution [ ]. In short, Kemalism constituted the ideological basis of the commitment to complete modernization, and the reforms involved the practical application of the basic principles of this ideology 4. 1 Stephen Kinzer. Crescent & Star: Turkey Between Two Worlds (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2001), p Erik J. Zürcher. Ottoman sources of Kemalist Thought. Late Ottoman Society: The Intellectual Legacy. Ed., Elisabeth Özdalga (London: Routledge, 2005), p Erik J. Zürcher. Turkey: A Modern History (London; New York: I.B. Tauris, 2004), p Zürcher purports himself to be among the first to challenge the Great Man Theory in Turkish historiography. 4 Suna Kili. Kemalism in Contemporary Turkey. International Political Science Review/Revue internationale de science politique Vol. 1, No. 3, Political Ideology: Its Impact on Contemporary Transformations (1980), pp. 387.

2 Lombardo 2 Kemalism as a native ideology, as the state religion of Turkey does indeed embody the core aspirations of certain social segments within the Turkish population throughout the country s 85 years of existence. These aspirations have been historically class-specific and are adequately captured in the introductory quote by New York Times journalist Stephen Kinzer s Crescent & Star. A closer look reveals the deeper psychological underpinnings of the secular classes in Turkey that indeed view Kemalism as the country s natural path to modernization. Therefore, any departure from Kemalism is equated with a departure from modernization and serious violations have often resulted in military interventions. Using aspects of South Asia historian Dipesh Chakrabarty s work Provincializing Europe in the discussion of modernization projects in the developing world, this essay intends to examine some of these points of departure by either dissenting individuals or wayward government policies. Case examples of how the military acts independently of the elected government will be provided in order to demonstrate how the military deals with perceived threats against Kemalism. The Kulturkampf phenomena and the Menemen Event Prior to the political establishment of the Republic of Turkey on October 29 th, 1922, it is important to note two areas of consciousness that have more or less been ingrained in the Turkish historical memory. The first was the fight against the European Triple Entente occupation of the Ottoman heartland of Anatolia, the second being the counterrevolutionary activities of Ottoman loyalists who sought to reestablish Sharia (Şeriat) law in the wake of the Turkish War of Independence. Together these events become part of the larger narrative of modernization in Turkey, although the nationalist struggle against Ottoman loyalists and Islamists is considered to be the starting point of the modernization process. Political Scientist Ersin Kalaycõoğlu

3 Lombardo 3 describes this process or struggle as the Turkish equivalent of the German term kulturkampf 5. Thus one may characterize the present in Kemalist doctrine in terms of inkilâpçilik or permanent revolution when discussing the Islamic-Kemalist kulturkampf. One such site of struggle occurred in December of 1930 in the village of Menemen just east of the Aegean port city of Izmir. The end of the Kemalist one-party state dominated by the Republican People s Party (RPP) paved the way for the election of the newly-formed Republican Free Party (RFP, or simply Free Party) in October of Under Free Party administration, the government set forth an aggressive program to uproot political Islamic and Ottoman cultural vestiges in the unstable young republic. Skirmishes between Kurdish nationalists, Turkish Islamists and Kemalist troops spread throughout Anatolia though most of the fighting occurred in the Kurdish east. On 23 December 1930, in the village of Menemen members of an outlawed dervish group led by a sheikh known as Mehmet congregated in the village center and began to spout anti- Kemalist rhetoric, while behind him hung a green banner declaring the restoration of Şeriat law 6. According to secondary sources, a young lieutenant named Kubilay approached the growing mob of supporters and demanded that Mehmet and his followers cease their attack against Kemalism. The mob chided Lt. Kubilay and proceeded to tie him down and behead him 7. They impaled Kubilay s head on a long pole and gave a procession in the village center until a division of gendarme units got word of the incident and opened fire, killing Mehmet and 15 other participants in the protest 8. Local Free Party officials reacted swiftly, arresting thousands of 5 Ersin Kalaycõoğlu. Turkish Dynamics: Bridge Across Troubled Lands (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005), p Erik J. Zürcher, p Bernard Lewis. Islamic Revival in Turkey. International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) Vol. 28, No. 1, (Jan. 2, 1952). 8 IBID.

4 Lombardo 4 people in Menemen and executing an additional 28 accused ringleaders of the demonstration 9. What was to be called the Memenen Event resulted in harsher measures against Islamist and Kurdish groups that were viewed as threats not only to state authority 10, but to Kemalism and its vision of a unified, modern (read secular ) nation-state. The details of the Menemen Event located in secondary sources have been explicit in leveling the criticism of the Kemalist state based in Ankara against the rest of the country. Through the lens of historicism, the Menemen Event may also be considered a political stumbling block as part of the broader vision of Turkey as a modern(-izing) Islamic nation, an exalted specimen of how the possibility for other Islamic and Middle East nations can and should be able to progress beyond their own autocratic pasts. For the Menemen dervishes, they had reacted at a time when the Kemalist regime was relatively weak and plagued with constant Islamist- and Kurdish-led rebellions. To contextualize further, the Caliphate which had been revered especially in the rural parts of Anatolia, had been swiftly abolished only six years prior to the Menemen Event in Kemalist intelligentsia had been largely urban-based, thus establishing the Islamic-Kemalist kulturkampf in spatial terms such as the notion of the centerversus-periphery paradigm that is still applied in Turkish historiography. That modern Turkish historiography presupposes the peripheral Anatolian peasant as the primary target of Kemalist enlightenment bodes striking similarity with Chakrabarty s discussion of the Indian peasant under the dichotomy of bourgeoisie versus prebourgeoisie 11. One gets the impression that for the Turkish peasants, specifically those professing to be observant Muslims, time and speed are factors in assimilating the peasant from an illiterate consumer to an educated citizen in order to 9 Walter F. Weiker. Political Tutelage and Democracy in Turkey: The Free Party and its Aftermath (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1973), p Robert Olson. The Kurdish Rebellions of Shaikh Said. Welt des Islams New Ser., Vol. 40, Issue 1 (Mar., 2000), p Dipesh Chakrabarty. Provincializing Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), p. 15.

5 Lombardo 5 become part of the larger Kemalist project of modernization. If they refuse or resist, any attempts to negotiate their position within the rapid-paced tempo of modernization will be violently challenged by Kemalist modernizers. The Turkish Coup Vanguard of Kemalism In order to provide some context to this section, the Ottoman Tanzimat Period will be briefly touched upon. The Tanzimat Period ushered in rigorous efforts by the Ottoman Porte to modernize their military after a string of defeats to increasingly powerful European adversaries. From the mid-19 th until the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the Tanzimat Period had a number of far-reaching effects, particularly on the reformation of the military 12. Atatürk and his cohorts all had been high-ranking officers in the Ottoman army. Thus one may see the connection of modernization via favoritism of the military within the framework of the modern Turkish nationstate. Ironically, the importance of the military as a bearer of political power in Kemalism is absent. Despite his life-long career in the military, Atatürk divorced the historical closeness between the state and military that had often sparked internal conflicts during the Ottoman periods 13. In light of events during the reign of Atatürk and continuing through to the late 20 th century, military action seemed to have safeguarded Turkey s project of modernization embodied in Kemalism. The action itself, which is usually manifested by as a coup d etat therefore does not necessarily contradict the Kemalist aim of modernization despite the military s non-role in preserving its political, social and economic integrity. A brief look into the events leading up to some of the coups which occurred during the Cold War will attempt to 12 Walter F. Weiker. The Ottoman Bureaucracy: Modernization and Reform. Administrative Science Quarterly Vol. 13, No. 3, Special Issue on Organizations and Social Development (Dec., 1968), p D.A. Rustow. Political Modernization and the Turkish military tradition. Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey. Eds., Robert E. Ward; Dantwart A. Rustow. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), p Rustow states that [After] the War of Independence Atatürk was seen only once in uniform during an acute foreign policy crisis and İnönü never; İnönü in 1927 applied for his retirement from the army. This withdrawal of the military from politics was facilitated by the advent of a period of peace of unprecedented duration.

6 Lombardo 6 provide a better understanding of aggressive modernization as a means of realigning Turkey with its purported raison d etre, namely, Kemalism. The Election of 1950 in Turkey was watershed; known as the White Revolution 14, for the first time Turkish citizens were able to freely elected a religiously-inclined, Anatolian-based conservative party into office, the Democrat Party. Adnan Menderes, the party s leader and the country s first self-styled non-kemalist 15 acted quickly to slow down the rapidity of progress which he viewed was not in line with the attitudes of much of his Anatolian base. Of the minor reforms Menderes did reverse was the ezan, or call to prayer from Turkish to its traditional Arabic. Menderes began to make more serious forays into sacred ground when in August of 1951 the Democrats abolished the People s Houses and Rooms movement, a collective of schools and education facilities. The People s House and Rooms was considered to be the primary vehicle of Kemalist indoctrination that penetrated into the conservative Islamic bastions of rural Anatolia 16. After winning another landslide election again in 1957, much of the Democrat Party s success at improving the economy began to dwindle; the press was muzzled in the face of mounting opposition and Republican People s Party members were beginning to feel harassment throughout the countryside. Menderes and the Democrats had attempted to hold talks with demonstrating university students and professors, however their offer was rebuffed. 14 Ersin Kalaycõoğlu., p. 74. White Revolution referring to the bloodless nature of the transition from the monolithic Kemalist one-party system to free elections marked by the election victory of the Democrat Party on 14 May By non-kemalist I am referring to one who doesn t strictly interpret the tenants of Kemalism but does not necessarily oppose their existence. Anti-Kemalism is perhaps closer in line with the later crypto-islamist parties of the early- to mid-1990s where overtures towards a Sharia-based Turkish state were more profiled in political speeches and outlawed Islamist literature. 16 Sina Akşin. Turkey from Empire to Revolutionary Republic (London: Hurst & Company, 2007), p According to Akşin, the Democrats were committed to their own version of nationalization which excluded some important Kemalist institutions such as the People s House and Rooms movement. At the time Turkey was committed to forging friendship with the Western Bloc and received massive financial aid from the United States through the European Economic Recovery Program. Akşin s view of the People s House and Rooms movement reveals her colors as a Kemalist in her noted disappointment at their abolishment: Unfortunately, the [Democrat] administration seems to have been more motivated by its desire to weaken the power of the [Republican Worker s Party] than by a commitment to Turkish enlightenment [emphasis added].

7 Lombardo 7 The Democrats soon lost patience with the more orthodox elements of the Kemalist elite and began to further restrict their rights. In addition, the Democrats resorted to violence, organizing a loose collection of Islamists, radical Turkish nationalists that were to be known the Patriotic Front, which were reportedly stoning RPP entourages and were engaged in the aforementioned countryside harassment of officials 17. Eventually, a young cadre of junior officers stepped in to not only save their beleaguered Kemalist supporters, but reestablish a more hard-line approach to Kemalism, one that was to be from then on, safeguarded by the military. The 27 May 1960 Coup was arguably the most hostile towards an elected Turkish government; Menderes and several of his cohorts were tried and sentenced to hang on the island of Yassõada off the cost of Istanbul the same year. The military immediately injected itself into the political life of Turkey, as officers redrafted a new constitution in 1961and began fill in positions formerly held by elected officials 18. A similar pattern would soon follow the other Turkish coups and Atatürk s original intention of separating the roles and duties of the military and politics in Turkey was forever altered. The decade of the 1960s was a period which saw more activism in the political life, and though the Democrat Party had been officially outlawed and broken up by the army, splinter factions arose to fill the gap for the larger conservative voting base. As an interest in politics rose, so did the militancy to which some parties began to be caught up in the zeitgeist sweeping other Western Bloc countries, particularly student movements in France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States 19. Economic instability also contributed to further disaffection of the youth resulting in an increase in militant leftist groups which clamored for broader social and 17 Ersin Kalaycõoğlu, p Ersin Kalaycõoğlu, p Sina Akşin, p Akşin specifically references the great 1968 world revolution that had led to the radicalization of certain leftist youth organizations at the university level.

8 Lombardo 8 economic equality to be brought into law. The Justice Party, the largest of the conservative splinter organizations that were established in the wake of the defunct Democrat Party, began to develop a counter model for modernization in Turkey, while still claiming to uphold the principles of Atatürk. The conservative intellectuals which devised what is now known as the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis 20 (a concept that would gain more currency the 12 March 1971 Coup), were called the Hearth Movement: The Hearth, while praising Atatürk, also accuses Kemalism of turning its back on centuries of Turkish history, inflicting grievous damage to national culture and thereby exposing the country to the massive political and social crisis of the 1970s 21. Süleyman Demirel, leader of the Justice Party, eventually stepped down amiss the mounting crisis by an army decree and control was retained by the RPP by the military. Members from militant leftist groups as well as the right-wing had been arrested, both having been perceived a threat to the progress of Kemalism 22. The last of the Cold War coups and arguably the bloodiest of the three was the 12 September 1980 Coup. This coup paradoxically may have actually struck a blow to Kemalist s claim that the coups were a means of defending Kemalism. The election of left-wing candidate Bülent Ecevit on 14 October 1973 temporarily placated the Kemalists, yet armed conflict grew worse during the 1970s. In addition to suffering paralysis by striking workers, the country was literally gripped in a quasi-civil war between left-wing and right-wing factions. Ecevit s ability to govern vis-à-vis the rising tide of Kurdish separatism in eastern Anatolia started to come 20 Erkan Akin; Omer Karasapan. The Turkish-Islamic Synthesis. Middle East Report No. 153, Islam and the State (Jul., 1988), p IBID. 22 Erik J. Zürcher. Turkey: A Modern History, pp Zürcher notes that the 12 March 1971 Coup, [ ] demanded that a strong credible government by formed that would be able to end the anarchy and carry out reforms in a Kemalist spirit [ ] Many on the left at first greeted the ultimatum with hope, interpreting it as a 1960-type coup against a right-wing government. This soon proved to be a dreadful mistake. [ ] About 5000 people were arrested, among them many leading intellectuals (writers, journalists and professors), all the leading members of WPT and many prominent trade unionists.

9 Lombardo 9 under question among members of the military 23. This may or may not have contributed to what journalist Mehmet Ali Birand as immortalized as the Generals Coup that was led in similar fashion by primarily top-brass officers that was rumored to have been orchestrated by CIA operatives 24. Modernization efforts under Kemalism at this juncture were soon to be abandoned with the election of Turgut Özal, who would eventually become an ally to both UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and US President Ronald Reagan during the 1980s. Critics of Özal and his plans for widespread privatization claim that he had in halted Kemalism, while some in the political science field such as Birol Ali Yeşilada 25 claim that the election of Özal was part of introducing political modernization that began in Indeed whether or not the 12 September 1980 was tantamount to preserving Kemalism is uncertain; if anything it had crushed domestic unrest within Turkey and eliminated much of the oppositionist groups to the state, which at the time purportedly backed neither the right nor left. Thus the Turkish Coup as a defensive act on the part of the military to preserve and defend the integrity of Kemalism has been for the most part true. The last of the coups, which took place in 1997 and called the postmodern coup 26 as it was completely bloodless and did not bring any troops out of their barracks. The 1997 Coup however, was more ideologically in line with Kemalism as it ousted a crypto-islamist Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan. The 1980 Coup presents a different challenge to the problem as to whether or not military coup d etats are enacted in the best interests of restoring Kemalism. This problem falls under the broader modernist traditionalism/traditional modernism debate with regards to Turkish kulturkampf 23 Erik J. Zürcher, p Daniele Ganser. NATO s Secret Armies: Operation Gladio and Terrorism in Western Europe (London; New York: Frank Cass, 2005), p Birol Ali Yeşilada. Problems of Political Development in the Third Republic. Polity Vol. 21, No. 2 (Winter, 1988), p While Yeşilada referred to 1946 as watershed for democratic plurarism, I would argue that real change materialized with the election of Adnan Menderes in Menderes had taken sufficient steps to critically exam orthodox Kemalism while still trying to maintain Kemalism s goal of modernization. 26 Aslõ Aydõntaşbaş. The Malaise of Turkish Democracy. Middle East Report No. 209 (Winter, 1998), p. 32.

10 Lombardo 10 previously proposed by Ersin Kalaycõoğlu within the context of popular versus will versus the rule of law: This move brings us back to one of the perennial paradoxes of Turkish democracy: Elected governments are met with popular demands, which contradict the constitution, laws, regulations, and court decisions. The governments are in no place to alter those legal constraints, but, their supporters at the polls pressure them to deliver what they had been promised during the campaign 27. Just as gendarme units acted against a peacefully-protesting crowd in Menemen in 1930, the military has sought to ensure Kemalism is uncontested and absolute. The most recent attempt at the military s saber-rattling occurred as recently in April of 2007, when the current ruling party, the Justice and Development Party (AKP in Turkish) wish to hold popular referendum at the legislative level to elect the president as opposed to having him or her appointed by the government. Given AKP s Islamist roots (though they claim to have abandoned them in the last decade or so) the military was extremely concerned and knew that if the nomination of the president were to be chosen by the people, it would be from among the conservative MP s of AKP. As Turkey continues to attempt to secure an entry bid into the European Union, the military will come under more pressure to allowing for alternative models to Kemalism, a model that would challenge the military s traditional duty of forcing that system of modernization on Turkish citizens. Conclusion Kemalism has been intrinsically linked to the advancement of modernization in Turkey and any departure from it, be it from the citizen or the state itself, has been often met with extreme violence, intimidation or a combination of the two. The military in Turkey has 27 Ersin Kalaycõoğlu, p Kalaycõoğlu s argument can be read deeper than just a debate over post-election negligence or authoritarian tendencies; the Damoclean sword of military intervention hangs over politicians in Turkey constantly, and for the examples provided in this essay, it is often in favor of state-sponsored Kemalism.

11 Lombardo 11 historically carried out since the Tanzimat Period in Ottoman history an allegedly progressive role by its adaptation of Western-style reforms such as secularization and bring them before the people. From small-scale suppression by the military against Kemalist modernization in such places as the village of Menemen near Izmir or at the national level in the various coups of the 20 th century; any departure from Kemalism has been equated as a departure from modernization. The Kemalist intelligentsia or others who profess a sense of historicism in reading into Turkish historiography have often argued that these are cultural misunderstandings, or regressive tendencies that in actuality will be overcome through either broader reforms or acts of violence. Can modernity in Turkey be resolved in such a way as through force? Are the Turkish people incapable of attaining the goals and aspirations of one man, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk because of their backwardness? Such questions are replete in contemporary historiography of Turkey, and have often been put into the dichotomy of (as Ersin Kalaycõoğlu has done) modernism versus traditionalism. The recent debate over the headscarf debate is an extension of the tyrannical duality of tradition versus modernization; whether or not young women can wear the hijab a sign of Islamic piety to a place of business (or even school). This debate has radicalized both sides, however, both sides the secularists, who claim that such a practice is equated with fundamentalist Islam, an ideology that is contrary to Kemalism and the religious conservatives, who point back to Atatürk s first wife, Latife Hanõm who wore the hijab. Both must negotiate within the discourse of Kemalism so as to not be accused of being against modernization. The opening quote by Stephen Kinzer is aimed at urban parvenu aspirations and fears, equating them with the hopes and fears of the urban parvenu of Turkish society. The only possible outcome for Kemalism as a mode of modernization, if it indeed wrests on the dreams of

12 Lombardo 12 the elites and the military, will be through persistent and aggressive violence. Freedom has a very different sort of connotation in Turkey s increasingly pluralistic society, a definition that should not be taken for granted as belonging to one particular group, or doctrine like Kemalism. WORKS CITED Akin, Erkan; Omer Karasapan. The Turkish-Islamic Synthesis. Middle East Report No. 153, Islam and the State (Jul., 1988). Akşin, Sina. Turkey from Empire to Revolutionary Republic. London: Hurst & Company,

13 Lombardo Aydõntaşbaş, Aslõ. The Malaise of Turkish Democracy. Middle East Report No. 209 (Winter, 1998). Chakrabarty, Dipesh. Provincializing Europe. Princeton: Princeton University Press, Ganser, Daniele. NATO s Secret Armies: Operation Gladio and Terrorism in Western Europe. London; New York: Frank Cass, Lewis, Bernard. Islamic Revival in Turkey. International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) Vol. 28, No. 1, (Jan. 2, 1952). Kalaycõoğlu, Ersin. Turkish Dynamics: Bridge Across Troubled Lands. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, Kili, Suna. Kemalism in Contemporary Turkey. International Political Science Review/Revue internationale de science politique Vol. 1, No. 3, Political Ideology: Its Impact on Contemporary Transformations (1980). Kinzer, Stephen. Crescent & Star: Turkey Between Two Worlds. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, Rustow, D.A. Political modernization and the Turkish military tradition. Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey. Eds., Robert E. Ward; Dankwart A. Rustow. Princeton: Princeton University Press, Olson, Robert. The Kurdish Rebellions of Sheikh Said. Welt des Islams New Ser., Vol. 40, Issue 1 (Mar., 2000), p. 21. Weiker, Walter F. The Ottoman Bureaucracy: Modernization and Reform. Administrative Science Quarterly Vol. 13, No. 3, Special Issue on Organizations and Social Development (Dec., 1968). Yeşilada, Birol Ali. Problems of Political Development in the Third Republic. Polity Vol. 21, No. 2 (Winter, 1988) Political Tutelage and Democracy in Turkey: The Free Party and its Aftermath. Leiden: E.J. Brill, Zürcher, Erik J. Turkey: A Modern History. London; New York: I.B. Tauris, Ottoman sources of Kemalist Thought. Late Ottoman Society: The Intellectual Legacy. Ed., Elisabeth Özdalga. London: Routledge, 2005.

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