This report is available on the ISS website and can be viewed together with Thematic Reports on the work of the PSC at

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1 CONTENTS OF THIS ISSUE No. 2, September 2009 Early Warning Issues for September 1 Pending PSC Issues 2 Country Analysis: Darfur (Sudan) 2 PSC Retrospective PSC and the UN Security Council 5 Country Analysis: Chad 7 PSC Retrospective PSC and the African Standby Force 9 Country Analysis: Central African Republic 10 Country Analysis: Republic of Guinea 12 PSC Retrospective PSC and the Pan-African Parliament 13 Country Analysis: Comoros 16 Spotlight on the PSC 18 Important Forthcoming Dates 19 This report is available on the ISS website and can be viewed together with Thematic Reports on the work of the PSC at PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL PROTOCOL The PSC shall encourage non-governmental organisations to participate actively in the efforts aimed at promoting peace, security and stability in Africa. When required such organisations may be invited to address the Peace and Security Council Article 20 of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the PSC of the African Union. Early Warning Issues for September The scheduled Rotating Chair of the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) for the month of September is Mali. In the absence of a country s representation at ambassadorial level, an alternate member will chair the Council for the month. Darfur (Sudan): The PSC communiqué PSC/PR/ COMM(CXCVIII) issued on 21 July 2009, considered the Report of the Chairperson of the Commission PSC/PR/2(CXCVIII) on the situation in Darfur. The communiqué also extended UNAMID s mandate for a further period of 12 months. There are still approximately two million displaced Darfurians and insecurity remains significantly high in the region. The national elections are due to take place in 2010, but an inclusive dialogue and peacemaking process has effectively stalled. Therefore the potential for crisis escalation is relatively high. Chad: AU PSC communiqué PSC/PR/ COMM(CX) of 18 February 2008 condemned attacks by rebels as an attempt to unconstitutionally change the government. It also called on Chadian parties to unconditionally renounce the use of force and engage in constructive dialogue and to implement the agreement of 13 August The potential for ongoing attacks by externallybased armed militia on Chad remain relatively high. Central African Republic: The Chairperson of the AU Commission submitted his report PSC/PR/2(CXCV) on 17 June 2009 to the PSC on the situation in the Central African Republic (CAR). Subsequently, the Council issued a communiqué PSC/PR/ COMM.3(CXCV) on the same day in which it commended the modest progress of the Inclusive Political Dialogue (IPD) in CAR but voiced its concern at the upsurge of armed attacks in several parts of the country. Republic Of Guinea: The PSC communiqué PSC/PR/ COMM(CXCVII) issued on 10 July 2009, took note of the Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the situation in the Republic of Guinea PSC/PR/2(CXCVll) tabled on the same day. The current situation in Guinea is fragile. The opposition parties are organised primarily on an ethno-regional basis and their politicians are divided on the nature and duration of the transition period. The national army is not immune from ethnic rivalry and the prospects of a mutiny or counter-coup is ever present. Comoros: The PSC communiqué PSC/PR/ Comm(CXXIV) of 30 April 2008 extended the mandate of the AU Electoral and Security Assistance >>page 2 LIVINGSTONE FORMULA Civil Society Organisations may provide technical support to the African Union by undertaking early warning reporting, and situation analysis which feeds information into the decision-making process of the PSC PSC/ PR/(CLX), 5 December 2008, Conclusions of a Retreat of the PSC on a mechanism of interaction between the Council and CSOs. This Report is an independent publication of the Institute for Security Studies.

2 Early Warning Issues for September (continued) Mission (MAES) to assist the central government undertake post-conflict reconstruction. Legislative elections were due to be held in August 2009, though originally set for July However, they have now been extended to a later date. The tensions arising from the irredentism of Mayotte have not been fully addressed and President Sambi has to reconfigure the country s political landscape in order to secure the stability of the country. COUNTRY ANALYSIS Darfur (Sudan) Previous PSC Communiqués and Recommendations: The PSC communiqué PSC/PR/ COMM(CXCVIII) issued on 21 July 2009, considered the Report of the Chairperson of the Commission PSC/PR/2(CXCVIII) on the situation in Darfur as well as the statements made by the Commissioner for Peace and Security, the Joint Special Representative of the African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) and the Government of the Sudan. The communiqué also extended UNAMID s mandate for a further period of 12 months. In this communiqué the Council expressed its concern over the recurrence of armed clashes and the lack of progress in the talks between the Government of the Sudan and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) in the Doha talks, in Qatar. The Council expressed its appreciation of the efforts of the AU High-Level Panel on Darfur led by former President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, and urged the UN Security Council to heed the AU s call for the deferral of the process initiated by the International Criminal Court (ICC) against President Omar Al Bashir. Issues pending for the Council include: Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC): The PSC issued communiqué PSC/ PR/COMM.(CLV) on 31 October 2008 urging the countries in the Great Lakes Region to continue to support the peace and national reconciliation process in the DRC. It also expressed its full support to the United Nations Mission in the DRC (MONUC) and stressed the urgent need to reinforce it through additional troops and equipment to enable it to fully discharge its mandate. The PSC is yet to issue a communiqué acknowledging these actions. Madagascar: The PSC issued communiqué PSC/ PR/COMM.(CLXXXI) on 20 March 2009 requesting the Chairperson of the AU Commission to work closely with the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) and all AU partners, notably the United Nations (UN) and its Security Council, the European Union (EU) and the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie (OIF) to contribute to the rapid restoration of constitutional order, and to take all the initiatives he deems necessary to this effect. The PSC is yet to issue a communiqué on this request. Crisis Escalation Potential: The level of violence in Darfur has decreased but this does not signal a cessation of hostilities. There have been sporadic eruptions of violence, including a recent incident in which the JEM takeover of a small town known as Muhajiriya in January 2009 and led to its evacuation shortly thereafter. In addition, there has been fighting between JEM and PENDING PSC ISSUES Somalia: The PSC issued communiqué PSC/PR/COMM.(CXC) on 22 May 2009 which welcomed the pledge by Sierra Leone to contribute one battalion to AMISOM and urged AU Member States and partners to provide the required logistical support for the early deployment of this battalion. The PSC is yet to issue a communiqué on this request. Mbororo Nomadic Pastoralists: The PSC issued communiqué PSC/ PR/COMM.(CXIX) on 11 April 2008 on the Report of the Fact- Finding Mission on Migrations of Mbororo Nomadic Pastoralists in which it requested the AU Commission, within the framework of the AU Border Programme, in collaboration with Regional Economic Communities (RECs), to facilitate the elaboration of cooperation projects between member states for the management of cross-border migratory movements, in particular nomadic pastoralists. The PSC also requested the Chairperson of the AU Commission to continue to monitor the evolution of the situation, including sending periodic fact-finding missions to the countries concerned and to keep the Council regularly informed. The PSC is yet to issue a follow-up communiqué on the management of cross-border migratory movements. the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), including the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA-Minawi), around Karnoi and Um Buru localities, according to the report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission PSC/PR/2(CXCVIII). There are still approximately two million displaced Darfurians and insecurity remains significantly high. UNAMID is currently the only guarantor of security in the region, but it is still beset by a lack of adequate personnel and equipment.

3 The national elections are due to take place in 2010, however the inclusive dialogue and peacemaking process has effectively stalled. Therefore the potential for crisis escalation is relatively high. In addition, Sudan and Chad have engaged in mutual recrimination and accused each other of supporting their respective rebel movements, based in their territories. This is also a potential source of tension which could foment the deterioration of the security situation in the Darfur region. Key Issues and Internal Dynamics: When conflict broke out in Darfur early in 2003, there were only two major rebel groups - the JEM and the Sudanese Liberation Movement (SLM). Since then the insurgents have splintered into a confusing array of competing factions. Currently there are around twenty six groups pursuing their own interests in Darfur. This has made a peace deal infinitely more difficult to achieve. From 27 May to 18 June 2009, the Sudanese government and the JEM met in Doha, to discuss the implementation of the Agreement of Goodwill and Confidence-Building. This meeting sought to build upon the agreement brokered through the auspices of the Joint African Union-United Nations Mediation and the Government of Qatar which was signed on 17 February 2009 to address the situation in Darfur. Through these agreements the parties discussed ways of advancing the peace process forward by building confidence, with an emphasis on: the exchange of prisoners; the cessation of hostilities; and the elaboration of a framework agreement that would define the areas that would subsequently be discussed during comprehensive negotiations. The most persistent challenge to resolving the crisis in Darfur is the multiplication of armed militia groups with no coherent common position and multiple grievances. This fact notwithstanding, the rapprochement between JEM and Sudanese government is significant because there have been no direct peace between Khartoum and the Movement since the failure of the now moribund Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) in May But the Agreement has not yet managed to foster a cessation of hostilities. Indeed, following the issuance of the arrest warrant against Bashir and the ensuing expulsion of a number of international NGOs from Sudan, the JEM suspended its participation in the Doha talks in June The Movement specifically accused the government of breaching the Goodwill Agreement and cited Khartoum s failure to reinstate the international NGOs and to carry out an exchange of prisoners as an indication of its refusal to uphold its commitments. On 19 June 2009, the talks were formally suspended based on JEMs insistence on the release of prisoners prior to any political dialogue as well as the cessation of hostilities by the Government. As far back as October 2008, President Al-Bashir had initiated the Sudan People s Forum (SPF) in an effort to find an inclusive and durable political solution to the Darfur crisis. This dialogue initiative was still-born because some of the non-signatory armed movements chose not to participate. Nevertheless, the SPF brought together senior leaders of some of Sudan s main political parties and a selection of representatives from Darfur. The outcome document of that meeting attempted to address the main elements of the conflict as a basis for further negotiations. On 12 November 2008, Al-Bashir announced a unilateral ceasefire, which was greeted by a degree of suspicion by his opponents and some members of the international community. In recognition of this apparent change of heart, the PSC communiqué PSC/PR/ COMM.(CLVII) issued on 14 November 2008, acknowledged the cease-fire and called for a consolidation of the peace process. However, the relevant recommendations of the SPF fell short of expectations of the variegated militia groups in Darfur and mainly because they were short on detail with regards to implementation process. In the meantime, the issuance on 4 March 2009 by the ICC of an arrest warrant against Al-Bashir for war crimes and crimes against humanity has added another dimension to the resolution of the crisis in Darfur. Meeting immediately after the ICC s decision, the PSC issued a communiqué PSC/PR/ COMM.(CLXXV) on 5 March 2009 which lamented that this decision came at a critical juncture in the ongoing process to promote lasting peace in the Sudan. The Council expressed its regret over the Security Council s failure to exercise its powers of deferral and effectively postpone any ICC action. Consequently, on 3 July 2009 at its Thirteenth Annual Summit of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government held in Sirte, Libya, the AU decided not to cooperate with the ICC in facilitating the arrest of Al-Bashir. However, this was not a unanimous position and some countries expressed their reservations, with Botswana publicly stating its disagreement with this decision. Scenario Planning: Scenario 1: Darfur will continue to witness a cyclical process of signing of one agreement after another between the government and the factionalised armed militia, without any genuine progress in addressing the underlying issues that are fuelling the crisis. Scenario 2: Despite the international and domestic pressure to address the situation in Darfur, Khartoum will convene national elections planned in 2010 even though the conditions are far from optimal in the region.

4 Scenario 3: The peace process in Darfur becomes subsumed or marginalised by other political situations. These include the pending ICC arrest warrant against the country s sitting President, the forthcoming national elections and the scheduled referendum for the south of the Sudan in The dynamic unleashed by these separate but inter-locking processes may compel Khartoum either to postpone the elections, sabotage the Southern referendum, or continue to suppress the rebellion in the Darfur. This would further undermine the stability and integrity of Sudan and generate increased pressure for secession within its regions. Scenario 4: The pending ICC arrest warrant against Bashir might continue to divide opinion among the AU member states, including some of the governments that initially approved of the AU Assembly decision not to cooperate with the Court. This could prompt and compel elements within the Sudanese government, including key actors in the military and security apparatus, to attempt to remove Bashir from power. Early Response Options: Option 1: The PSC, working with international partners notably the UN, could continue to support the effort to achieve a comprehensive and durable resolution of the Darfur conflict. This however requires an inclusive strategy that will bring together all key political factions, or at the very least the main armed groups. It would also require the institutionalisation of effective post-agreement monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. Option 2: The PSC could maintain the pressure on key actors to work toward a negotiated settlement of their outstanding issues and draft a new comprehensive and inclusive Darfur agreement. Option 3: The PSC and the international community could adopt an integrated regional strategy to address the situation in Darfur, with a specific focus on the tensions between Sudan and Chad. Option 4: The PSC working with UNAMID through the Joint Special Representative as well as the Government of Sudan and armed militias could ensure that humanitarian organisations have access to continue delivering humanitarian assistance to the vulnerable populations in the region, notably the two million IDPs. Geo-Political Dynamics: Pan-African and RECs Dynamics: Botswana was the first country to publicly distance itself from the AU decision shortly after the Summit in Sirte. Subsequently, on 3 August 2009 South Africa formally announced that it would not abide by the recent AU resolution to halt cooperation with the ICC in arresting Sudanese president Al- Bashir. The statement issued by the South African Foreign Ministry stated that if Pretoria complied with the AU decision this would violate its own constitution. The Foreign Ministry also revealed that the ICC s Bashir arrest warrant was received and endorsed by a domestic magistrate, which meant that if President Al-Bashir travels to South Africa he could be subject to arrest. This could explain Bashir s absence at the inauguration of the third postapartheid President of South Africa, Jacob Zuma. Politically, Pretoria is also concerned that upholding the AU Assembly Decision would negatively impact on the country s international reputation and stature. However, South Africa s stance, and its influence within the AU, may encourage other wavering African countries to adopt a similar position. Even though the AU Commission and the PSC are trying to revive the stagnant peace process in Darfur, it is evident that the organisation s member states are not necessarily in agreement about how to advance the cause of peace in the region. Towards the end of July 2009, the Joint Chief Mediator for Darfur, Djibril Bassolé, traveled to Tripoli, Libya, where he met a number of Darfur rebel movements willing to engage in peace talks with the Sudanese Government. The stability in Darfur is also intimately linked and affected by the hostilities between Chad and Sudan. This has the potential to create a trans- African regional conflict system because various states across the continent are partial to, or have national interests allied to, either Sudan or Chad. In mid-july 2009, Sudan s military accused Chad of conducting air strikes on a range of targets in West Darfur. While in early May 2009, Sudanese-based Chadian armed militia launched a failed assault on N djamena before being repulsed back across the border. UN Dynamics: On July , the Security Council extended UNAMID s mandate by another year until end of July The resolution emphasised the importance of achieving realistic targets against which the progress of UN peacekeeping operations can be measured. It also requested the UN Secretary-General to submit a work plan containing benchmarks so the Council can track UNAMID s progress in implementing its mandate. Wider International Community Dynamics: The US Special Envoy to the Sudan, Scott Gration, on 30 July 2009 stated that there was no evidence >>page 6

5 PSC RETROSPECTIVE The PSC and the UN Security Council The PSC communiqué PSC/PR/ COMM.(XVIII) issued on 14 December 2006, highlighted the establishment of a Coordination and Consultation Mechanism between the African Union Peace and Security Council and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). The PSC committed itself to undertaking extensive consultations within the AU system, so as to examine the legal aspects of such a Mechanism. The Council would then outline a strategy on how to establish a mechanism of cooperation and coordination between the PSC and the UNSC. Article 17 of the PSC Protocol states that the Council shall maintain close and continued interaction with the UNSC in the fulfillment of its mandate to promote and maintain peace, security and stability in Africa. The Protocol recognises that the UNSC has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and that it does not seek to usurp this role in Africa. Article 17 also stipulates that, where necessary, recourse will be made to the UN to provide the necessary financial, logistical and military support for the PSC. Similarly, Chapter VIII of the UN Charter identifies cooperation between UNSC and regional and sub-regional organisations as an important pillar of the international system of collective security. With regards to Africa, the UN has recognised the need to ensure effective coordination and collaboration, given that more than 60 percent of the Security Council s agenda focuses on crisis situations on the continent. Following the inauguration of the PSC in March 2004, UNSC adopted two presidential statements; S/PRST/2004/27 of 20 July 2004 and S/PRST/2004/44 of 19 November 2004 renewing its commitment to cooperation between the Council and regional organisations. In December 2008, a Panel headed by the former Prime Minister of Italy, Romano Prodi, issued a report on the modalities for support to African Union peacekeeping operations (see A/63/666 S/2008/813) stating that the role played by regional organisations in promoting peace and security is indispensable to the work of the UN Security Council. The key areas where there is a convergence of interest and action between the PSC and the UNSC is in the establishment of the regular exchange of information and views; in the coordination of joint factfinding and assessment missions in potential crisis situations; in the coordination of mediation efforts; and in the design, planning and implementation of peace operations. The deployment of the AU / UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) is a current example of the convergence of interests between the PSC and the UNSC. There were clearly challenges in the deployment of UNAMID, specifically in the design and planning phases and currently operational effectiveness still faces some constraints. It is too early to adjudicate as to whether UNAMID is the appropriate model for the cooperation between the PSC and the UNSC, not least because the situation in Darfur is far from being adequately resolved (see the Country Analysis on Darfur in this Issue). The difficulties facing UNAMID at the strategic level of coordination between the PSC and the UNSC should serve as a catalyst for reviewing and improving the working relationship between both bodies. Ultimately, the relationship between the two bodies should be clearly articulated and characterised by mutual respect, legitimacy as a basis for operational effectiveness. Currently, there are sentiments among some key members of the UNSC that it should not entertain or encourage the perception that the PSC and the Security Council are equal partners in form and substance. A recent meeting between the UNSC and the PSC in Addis Ababa, in May 2009, spent an inordinate amount of time discussing whether the two bodies were engaged in an informal or formal meeting. The issue implicit in this debate was whether the UNSC and the AU PSC were in effect equal partners. Essentially, as the only body officially mandated to oversee international peace and security, some key members of the UNSC prefer to see their counterparts in the AU PSC as playing a subsidiary role and function to their initiatives. This has implications for the PSC s decision-making processes, and is a tacit critique of the AU s trend towards a certain degree of unilateral action, notably the deployment of AMISOM in Somalia. Obviously, given the longevity of the UNSC, one cannot discount its experience and institutional memory in addressing crisis. Nevertheless, the PSC has now asserted its right to intervene in crisis on the African continent. Given the UNSC s perverse prevarication during the Rwandan genocide in 1994, it is just and appropriate for the PSC to continue to assert this right to intervene in crisis situations in Africa. The UNSC has to respect and recognise the AU s important function as a partner, and revise its stance and working relationship with the PSC in the maintenance of peace and security in Africa. Members of the AU, the PSC and the UNSC could also take individual initiatives to strengthen >>page 6

6 PSC RETROSPECTIVE The PSC and the UN Security Council (continued) the relations between the two bodies. Uganda for instance is member of both bodies and was the chair of the UNSC for the month of July Some useful initiatives to enhance the working relationship between the PSC and the UNSC could include inviting the country presiding over PSC to attend the UNSC s regular and closed sessions where African issues are being addressed (without the right to vote) in accordance with Article 37 of UNSC provisional rules of procedures. This could increase the degree of coordination and harmonisation on how to address crisis on the African continent. It would also enhance the buy-in by African states and the international community of key actions to resolve crisis on the continent. The PSC can also reciprocate this gesture, in accordance with Article 17 of its Protocol, by issuing an invitation to the country presiding over UNSC to attend PSC meetings where African issues of common concern are to be discussed. Ultimately, such a series of exchanges can only augur well for the working relationship between both bodies as well as also contribute towards the operationalisation of the coordination and consultation mechanism between the AU PSC and the UNSC. to support the continued listing of Sudan on a US list of states sponsoring terrorism. This apparent thawing of relations between Washington and Khartoum may be a calculated attempt to inject renewed impetus into the peace process. Khartoum reciprocated the US overture by welcoming the statement. However, it did not follow this up with a renewed statement of its commitment to the peace process. Civil Society Dynamics: The search for lasting peace and security in Darfur requires the sustained engagement of civil society in peacemaking, particularly at the grassroots level. Civil society in Sudan is also taking the initiative and proceeding with its own initiative despite the lack of significant progress at the official level. The National Elections Commission (NEC) has pledged to permit and enable civil society groups operating in Darfur to undertake voter education activities ahead of the poll scheduled for April However, the effectiveness of this will depend on the security situation in the region. Meanwhile, more than 130 civil society and human rights groups across Africa issued a statement, in Zambia on 30 July 2009, urging governments to express their support and willingness to cooperate with the ICC. Civil society groups based within, as well as outside of Darfur, are therefore actively engaged in lobbying AU Member States to follow South Africa and Botswana in rescinding their support for the Assembly decision not to facilitate the arrest of Bashir. Documentation: Relevant AU Documents: PSC/PR/COMM(CXCVIII) (21 July 2009) Communiqué on the situation in Darfur PSC/PR/2(CXCVIII), Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the situation in Darfur Assembly/AU/6(XIII), Report of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union on its Activities and the State of Peace and Security in Africa, Assembly of the African Union, Thirteenth Ordinary Session, 1-3 July 2009, Sirte, Libya. PSC/PR/COMM(CLXXXV) (6 April 2009) Communiqué on the situation in Darfur and Mauritania PSC/PR/COMM(CLI) (22 September 2008) Communiqué on the implementation of Communiqué of 142nd meeting of the PSC, on the Sudan Interim Report, the situation in Mauritania and the situation in Somalia PSC/PR/BR(CXLII) (21 July 2008) Communiqué on the ICC indictment of Sudanese President Al Bashir PSC/PR/2 (CXXXVI) (12 June 2008) Communiqué on the situation in Darfur and the Republic of Djibouti and the State of Eritrea PSC/PR/2(CXII) (28th February 2008) Communiqué on the situation in Darfur. PSC/PR/COMM.(LXXIX) (22 June 2007) Communiqué on the situation in Darfur PSC/PR/COMM.(LXXV) (4-5 April 2007) Communiqué on the situation in Darfur PSC/PR/COMM.(LXX) (12 February 2007) Communiqué on the relations between Chad and Sudan PSC/PR/COMM.(XLVIII) (6 April 2006) Communiqué on Inter- Sudanese Peace Talks on the situation in Darfur PSC/PR/COMM.(XVII) (20 October 2004) Communiqué on

7 the situation in Darfur PSC/PR/COMM.(XVI) (17 September 2004) Communiqué on the situation in Darfur and Somalia PSC/PR/COMM.(XIV) (9 August 2004) Communiqué on crisis in Darfur PSC/PR/COMM.(X) (25 May 2004) Communiqué on decisions in crisis in Darfur, Somaila and Cote d Ivoire PSC/PR/COMM.(V) (13 April 2004) Communiqué on the international conference on the Great Lakes region, AU liaison office in Liberia, crisis in Darfur, situation in Cote d Ivoire and DRC UN Documents: S/RES/1870 (20 May 2009) Report of the Secretary-General on the Sudan. S/2009/352 (13 July 2009), Report of the Secretary-General on the deployment of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur. COUNTRY ANALYSIS Chad Previous PSC Communiqués and Recommendations: The PSC communiqué PSC/PR/ COMM.(CX) of 18 February 2008 condemned attacks by rebels as an attempt to unconstitutionally change the government. It also called on Chadian parties to unconditionally renounce the use of force and engage in constructive dialogue and to implement the agreement of 13 August 2007, signed in N djamena between the parties of the presidential majority and the democratic opposition, as well as the 25 October 2007 agreement, signed in Sirte, Libya, between the Government and armed movements. The communiqué also stressed the need for the urgent deployment of MINURCAT and EUFOR in order to facilitate humanitarian assistance. Crisis Escalation Potential: The potential for ongoing attacks by externally based armed militia on Chad remain relatively high. However, mobility and the accessibility of roads is currently constrained by the rainy season. Key Issues and Internal Dynamics: The Political Accord in Chad, signed on 13 August 2007, was designed to re-enforce the democratic process in the country. A total of 95 political parties signed the Political Accord. The Accord seeks to address two key issues: the electoral process and the stabilisation of the political situation. The Accord calls for an electoral census, an updated and transparent electoral register and the formation of an Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) to organise and supervise the forthcoming poll. It also provides for the use of single ballots, for the security forces to vote one day before the rest of the population and for nomads to vote on the day of the election, instead of prior to the polling day, which was the tradition in the past. To create the optimal conditions for elections, the Accord calls for the depoliticisation and demilitarisation of the administration; the freedom of expression; the independence of the judiciary; and a social pact to ensure the security of citizens. In order to allow time for an adequate period of time for the agreement to be implemented, the parliamentary elections were delayed to the end of 2009 and the mandate of the existing national assembly would also be extended until then. Substantively, four important laws have been adopted by the Chadian National Assembly including: the law establishing the Independent Electoral Commission; laws relating to the constitutional court and to the electoral code; and an amendment of law relating to the Supreme Court. The difficulty of the process in implementing the law establishing the IEC and the new electoral code reveals that some of the parties to the Accord are positioning themselves to gain political advantage at the expense of their opponent. This goes against the spirit of the Political Accord and suggests that implementing all of its provisions will be a challenge. Domestically, as far as the implementation of the Accord is concerned Chad is scheduled to conduct parliamentary elections by the end of The government seems intent on convening the elections even though key components of the Political Accord have not been implemented. Regionally, in order to ensure the necessary internal stability the Chadian government has not engaged the armed militia groups stationed outside of its borders which are intent on toppling the regime in N djamena. For the time being the government has military superiority over the armed militia. Thus, most of its overtures to the externally-based armed militia has focused on co-opting them by granting the leadership of these groups ministerial portfolios and positions into the army. President Idriss Deby s government is not prepared to relinquish its grip on power and has even accused the Sudanese government of financing and supporting the armed militia which are seeking to topple it. As a consequence, Chad and Sudan are effectively engaged in a proxy war. Darfur and eastern Chad have become an extension of Chad and Sudan domestic political theatre because of co-ethnic and cultural linkages. The governments in N djamena and Khartoum have provided sanctuary to each others rebel armed militia groups.

8 Scenario Planning: Scenario 1: N djamena will continue to contain the recurring incursions by externally-based armed militia groups, particularly across its eastern border with Sudan. However, if these incursions continue this will have a negative impact on the humanitarian situation in eastern Chad. Scenario 2: The Chadian government s military supremacy will negate any meaningful political dialogue with the externally-based armed militia and limit any genuine political concessions that it might extend to its domestic opponents. This might further undermine the implementation of the 13 August 2007 Political Accord. Scenario 3: The discord with the regime of Chadian President Deby may foment attempts at dislodging him from power. Early Response Options: Option 1: The PSC could continue with its efforts to compel the Chadian government to implement the provisions of the 13 August Political Accord and enter into negotiations with the externally-based armed militia through the deployment of a Special Envoy of the Chairperson of the AU Commission. Option 2: The PSC, in close coordination with international partners, could also promote and support dialogue amongst the key political actors in Chad to ensure that the forthcoming elections are held in optimal conditions. Option 3: The PSC, working with the UN and other international partners, could assess innovative ways of enhance stability in eastern Chad, such as the establishment of a demilitarised zone between Chad and Sudan. In addition, the international community could explore ways of preventing the flow of illicit weapons into Chad and Sudan by imposing an arms embargo. Option 4: The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1778 of 25 September 2007 deemed the situation in the region of the border between the Sudan, Chad, and the Central African Republic as constituting a threat to international peace and security. In addition to addressing the situation within Chad, the PSC could examine how to ensure an integrated regional approach to the crisis. Geo-Political Dynamics: Pan-African and RECs Dynamics: The regional dimension of domestic instability in Chad has encouraged a number of African countries to strive for a peaceful resolution of the grievances in the country. However, given the number of international actors engaged in the situation in Chad, the AU and its key member states are not always in a position to exert the necessary leverage on the Chad situation. The regional economic communities that Chad belongs to CENSAD and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) could play a more pronounced role in managing the crisis. UN Dynamics: There is general agreement among the members of the UN Security Council of the need to maintain MINURCAT s mandate to protect of civilians and to contain the spillover of the Darfur conflict into Chad. Council members remain concerned with the difficulties of generating the necessary troop levels as well as sourcing other military assets to ensure the capacity of its operations in Chad and the region. The UNSC is concerned about the increasing tension between Chad and Sudan, but its members have not proposed or discussed the enhancement of MINURCAT s mission mandate to enable it to monitor the border between the two countries. Wider International Community Dynamics: The Political Accord of 13 August 2007 was signed after months of negotiations and a significant degree of pressure, including technical and financial support, from the international community. Specifically, the EU, the OIF and the US were actively engaged in ensuring the signing of this Accord. A number of key countries such as France, US, China and EU have geo-strategic interests in the region, including access to oil, and would like to contain the situation in Chad so that it does not threaten those interests. Some members of the international community have chosen to view the crisis in Chad as a spillover effect from the situation in Darfur. However, this might be an erroneous position to take as it ignores the real domestic challenges and ethnic tensions within Chad. Such a stance will not necessary advance the cause of peace and the consolidation of democratic governance in Chad or in its neighbouring region. Documentation: Relevant AU Documents: PSC/HSG/COMM(CXXXVIII) (29 June 2008) Communiqué on post-conflict situations in Africa PSC/PR/2(CX) (18 February 2008) Communiqué on Chad >>page 10

9 PSC RETROSPECTIVE PSC and the African Standby Force Article 13 of the Protocol Establishing the Peace and Security Council of the African Union envisages the establishment of an African Standby Force (ASF). The ASF is an integral component of the African Peace and Security Architecture and will play a critical function in enabling the PSC to fulfill its mandate in the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. According to the 2003 Policy Framework for the Establishment of the ASF and the Military Staff Committee (MSC) and the 2005 Roadmap for the operationalisaiton of the ASF, subsequently supplemented by Roadmap II, the ASF is to be developed in two phases and inaugurated in At the end of Phase II in 2010, the ASF is supposed to be operationally ready for deployment including for complex peacekeeping operations and intervention in response to grave circumstances war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide - as defined under Article 4 (h) of the Constitutive Act of the AU. Practically, this would require the AU to have a coherent policy is with regards to the mandating and coordination of the ASF. The key function of the PSC and other institutions within the AU in this context also has to be clear. In this context, the final definition and articulation of the decision-making process and how the AU Planning Element interfaces with the RECs and Regional Mechanism (RM) also has to be concluded as a matter of urgency. In addition, the AU s technical competency has to be enhanced, and issues such as the Rapid Deployment Capability (RDC) and logistical infrastructure of the ASF has to be in place to enable the activation of Regional Brigades. The PSC communiqué PSC/PR/ BR(CLXVI) issued on 16 January 2009, commended the Commission for the activities undertaken within Roadmap II and more specifically welcomed the efforts deployed and the progress made towards the full operationalisation of Regional Brigades, the implementation of the ASF Training Plan through the initialisation conference of the AMANI Africa Exercise and the Rapid Deployment Capability. Additionally, the PSC requested the Commission to undertake further work to implement the ASF Policy Documents and to develop and finalise the additional documents and submit proposals on those areas to Ministers of Defence and Security, for their early action towards the implementation of the ASF by After the PSC adopted the communiqué, the AU submitted a report in May 2009 on progresses made at the 6th Meeting of African Chiefs of Defence Staff (ACDS) and Heads of Safety and Security, which followed the Experts Meeting of ACDS. The Declaration adopted by the African Chiefs of Defence Staff and Heads of Safety and Security noted the ongoing efforts to improve upon the Rapid Deployment Capability Concept, the Continental Logistics Bases (CLBs), work on the Strategic Lift Capability Concept, the Formed Police Unit (FPU) Concept, development of the Civilian Dimension and the elaboration of an ASF Training Plan , as well as the various training efforts. The Experts Meeting noted that a key challenge was the lack of common understanding between the AUC and the RECs / RMs on mandating of missions. This is an issue that results from the way the ASF was designed and is currently being operationalised. As conceptualised in the relevant ASF Policy documents and further institutionally developed, the ASF is a force organised into five Regional Brigades composed of multidisciplinary contingents on standby in their country of origins. The Brigades that together constitute the ASF are raised and maintained by the five Regional Economic Communities /Regional Mechanisms (ECOWAS, NARC, EASBRICOM, ECCAS, and SADC) which serve as building blocks of the peace and security architecture of the AU. This structural organisation of the ASF suggests that there are at least two entities having authority over the use and deployment of the ASF. This raises four crucial issues pertaining to the role and authority of the AU, and in particular the PSC, and RECs/RMs. Firstly, with regards to the mandating and deployment of the ASF brigades there is the issue of whether the AU, and the PSC, have the supreme authority or whether the RECs/RM share in this function as a co-authority. Secondly, it is also unclear whether the AU PSC and the AU Commission need to deal directly with member states in which the contingents composing the regional brigades or whether they have to correspond and liaise with RECs/RMs. Thirdly, further clarity is required as to whether the AU and PSC can deploy the brigade of a particular REC/RM in another geographically distinct region from where it generates its troops. Finally, it is not yet clear whether RECs/RMs can deploy ASF Brigades independently of the AU and the PSC. Despite the MoU signed between the AU and RECs/RMs, these issues remain unresolved. In the absence of the clarification of these issues the AU PSC will face obstacles in its efforts to deployment of the ASF as a means of conflict management and resolution, even if the ASF is operationally ready in terms of personnel, institutional and management structures and infrastructural capability by >>page 10

10 PSC RETROSPECTIVE PSC and the African Standby Force (continued) The PSC is monitoring the operationalisation of the ASF through reports and making recommendations on the development and finalisation of the necessary documents as well as technical and institutional requirements. The PSC might need to play more active part particularly in clarifying some of the politico-legal issues raised above. Indeed, as the highest standing decision-making organ on matters of peace and security, the PSC is strategically positioned to play a defining role in terms of providing policy guidance on these issues. In this regard, the PSC has two options. Firstly, the PSC could adopt a communiqué or a statement directly addressing and clarifying the uncertainty raised by these issues. The secondly the PSC could request the Commission to either submit proposals on these matters, in consultation with RECs/RMs, for consideration and adoption by the Council itself or by the AU Executive Council of Ministers. In the absence of a resolution of these issues the political date set for the operationalisation of the ASF, in 2010, will approach without the Force being able to deploy effectively to manage crisis situations on the continent. PSC/PR/COMM.(LXX) (12 February 2007) Communiqué on the relations between Chad and Sudan PSC/PR/COMM.(XLIX) (13 April 2006) Communiqué on the situation in Chad UN Documents: S/RES/1861 (14 January 2009) renewed MINURCAT s mandate until 15 March 2010 and authorised the deployment of a military component to replace EUFOR S/RES/1778 (25 September 2007) Establishing MINURCAT and authorising the EUFOR S/2009/199 (14 April 2009) Report on MINURCAT S/2008/601/Add.1 (15 September 2008) Statement on the financial implications for the establishment of a UN military force S/2008/532 (7 August 2008) Report on children and armed conflict in Chad S/PV.6029 (3 December 2008) Briefing by John Holmes, the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, on the situation in Chad and the Sudan Useful Additional Resources: Chrysantus Ayangafac Resolving the Chadian Political Epilepsy: An Assessment of Intervention Efforts Institute for Security Studies, Situation Report, 1 June International Crisis Group Chad: Powder Keg in the East, Africa Report, No.149, 15 April Tchad: Accord Politique en vue du Renforcement du Processus Démocratique, 13 August Rapport d activités, juillet à décember Comité de Suivi et d Appui de l Accord en vue du Rénforcement du Processus Démocratique au Tchad. Tchad - Loi Portant création d une Commission Electorale Nationale Indépendante (CENI). COUNTRY ANALYSIS Central African Republic Previous PSC Communiqués and Recommendations: The Chairperson of the AU Commission submitted his report PSC/PR/2(CXCV) on 17 June 2009 to the PSC on the situation in the Central African Republic (CAR). Subsequently the Council issued a communiqué PSC/PR/ COMM.3(CXCV), on the same day, in which it took note of the Report together with statements made by the Special Envoy of the AU Chairperson of the Commission for CAR, representatives of the UN, ECCAS, the European Union and OIF. In this communiqué the PSC commended the modest progress of the Inclusive Political Dialogue (IPD) in CAR but voiced its concern at the upsurge of armed attacks in several parts of the country. Crisis Escalation Potential: The situation in the CAR remains highly volatile. Notably, the armed rebellion in the north of the country, the weak condition of state institutions, and lack of implementation of the recommendations adopted in the IPD are indicators of a relative instability. Specifically, the situation in the north-eastern corner of the country remains precarious after recent attacks by armed rebels and bandits against civilians. The level of insecurity remains high due to the absence of a robust national defence and security 10

11 force. The vacuum created by the absence of these forces has created a permissive environment for the formation of autonomous armed groups. A senior UN official recently warned that fear is very evident amongst the people and aid operations are suffering because of the insecurity which could have a knock-on effect and further lead to the deterioration of humanitarian situation. Key Issues and Internal Dynamics The CAR has been an unstable country since its independence from France in In the aftermath of the Bokassa s regime in 1979, the country experienced several coups and counter-coups. The current President, Francois Bozize, was formerly a coup leader who is now confronted by instability from mercenaries who helped him to ascend to power in Bozize tried to end military rule by convening a presidential election in May 2005 in which he won more than 64 percent of the vote. However, decades of instability have undermined public confidence in the political process as well as in the country s ailing economy. Violence has spilled over from Sudan and Chad and illicit small arms continue to flow across CAR s borders. The unrest in the northeast of the country has displaced tens of thousands of Central Africans and many of them have crossed the border into Chad. Some progress was made as a result of the Inclusive Political Dialogue held in Bangui from 8 to 20 December Since then efforts have been undertaken to implement the recommendations emerging from the IPD, including the establishment on 19 January 2009, of an inclusive Government open to representatives of the political and armed opposition. Another outcome of the IPD was the adoption of the Military Programming Act for the period of In 2008, efforts to address the dispute were made, and peace talks led to an agreement committing two of the main rebel groups: the Movement of Central African Liberators for Justice (MLCJ) and the Central African People s Democratic Front (FDPC) to disarming themselves. The process culminated with the creation of a government of national unity incorporating two rebel leaders in early The crisis in CAR will continue to have serious repercussions on neighboring states. The in-fighting between the different factions has generated refugee flows to neighbouring countries as well as internally displaced persons. CAR shares a border with the Darfur region of Sudan as well as Chad and the overlapping conflicts in each of these countries have had a mutually destructive effect on each other. Scenario Planning Scenario 1: Failure to implement the recommendations emerging from the IPD may lead to a resumption of violent conflict. This is exacerbated by an increase in inter-ethnic divisions and competition over natural resources notably water resources as well as arable and grazing land. Scenario 2: The systemic instability generated by the CAR-Sudan-Chad axis of crisis leads to an escalation of violence. Given this scenario efforts to resolve the disputes in CAR become intimately linked to similar efforts in Darfur and Chad. Scenario 3: The IPD lays the foundation for the further consolidation of relative political calm in CAR and creates conditions that allow for the constitutionally scheduled elections to take place in 2010, which enables the country to begin the long journey towards democratic governance. Early Response Options: Option 1: The AU PSC could engage and follow-up on the implementation of the provisions of the IPD and monitor the transition of the country towards democratic governance. Option 2: The PSC and key stakeholders, like the UN Peacebuilding Support Office, could ensure that there is adequate logistical and planning assistance to ensure the convening of inclusive, transparent and peaceful elections. Option 3: The PSC could provide strategic guidance with other key partners to ensure that CAR adopts a programme for disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR), security sector reform (SSR) as well as employment and wealth creation initiatives to ensure sustainable development in the short to medium-term. Geo-Political Dynamics: Pan-African and RECs Dynamics: Due to the complex conflict system created by the CAR-Sudan-Chad axis of crisis, key African countries in the region have continued to support the restoration of peace and security in CAR. Specifically, the ECCAS Peace Building Mission (MICOPAX) has endeavored to contribute towards stabilising the country since it was deployed in July 2008 as a replacement of the CEMAC Multinational Force (FOMUC). MICOPAX has a mandate to contribute towards consolidating peace and stability by supporting the strengthening of the Central African Republic s defence and security forces. Since 2003, a Pan-African military 11