This report is available on the ISS website and can be viewed together with Thematic Reports on the work of the PSC at

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1 CONTENTS OF THIS ISSUE No. 6, January 2010 Early Warning Issues for January 1 Pending PSC Issues 2 Mission Analysis: UNAMID 2 PSC Retrospective AU High Level Panel 5 Country Analysis: Western Sahara 8 PSC Retrospective PSC and NATO 9 Country Analysis: Liberia 14 Spotlight on the the AMANI-AFRICA Exercise 18 Important Forthcoming Dates 19 This report is available on the ISS website and can be viewed together with Thematic Reports on the work of the PSC at PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL PROTOCOL The PSC shall encourage non-governmental organisations to participate actively in the efforts aimed at promoting peace, security and stability in Africa. When required such organisations may be invited to address the Peace and Security Council Article 20 of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the PSC of the African Union. Early Warning Issues for January The scheduled Rotating Chair of the African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council (PSC) for the month of January is Tunisia. In the absence of a country s representation at ambassadorial level, an alternate member will chair the Council for the month. UNAMID: On 21 July 2009, the PSC issued a communiqué PSC/PR/ COMM(CXCVIII) in which it considered the Report of the Chairperson of the Commission SC/PR/2(CXCVIII) on the situation in Darfur as well as statements made by the Commissioner for Peace and Security, the Joint Special Representative of UNAMID and the Government of the Sudan. The communiqué also extended UNAMID s mandate for a further period of 12 months. The security situation in Darfur remains relatively unpredictable and violent confrontation between the Sudanese army and the armed resistance forces is sporadic but unabated. In addition, civilians remain at risk and peacekeepers are routinely targeted by armed resistance forces and harassed by government forces. More than 20 UNAMID personnel have been killed since the mission deployed in early The potential for crisis escalation in the region is relatively high and continues to pose a serious challenge to UNAMID s effectiveness. Western Sahara: In a statement issued on 4 December, 2009 the AU Commission expressed its concern on developments and the human rights situation in Western Sahara with a specific reference to the case of the expulsion of Mrs. Aminatou Haidar, a Saharawi human rights activist. Western Sahara was also the subject of the Report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission SP/ASSEMBLY/ PS/RPT(I) to the Special Session of the Assembly of the Union on the Consideration and Resolution of Conflicts in Africa, on 31 August 2009, in Tripoli, Libya. The report stated that the dispute over Western Sahara continues to remain stalled as a result of the polarized positions of the parties. The standoff is a threat to the peace and security of the region and in the absence of genuine political dialogue and negotiations, tension could further escalate the crisis. Liberia: On 18 August 2006, the PSC acknowledged the report presented by the AU Commission on the situation and the post-conflict reconstruction efforts in Liberia PSC/PR/2(L). Liberia continues to make progress towards consolidating peace. However, the situation in the country is still fragile particularly with reference to the establishment of security, the rule of law, institutions and >>page 2 LIVINGSTONE FORMULA Civil Society Organisations may provide technical support to the African Union by undertaking early warning reporting, and situation analysis which feeds information into the decision-making process of the PSC PSC/PR/ (CLX), 5 December 2008, Conclusions of a Retreat of the PSC on a mechanism of interaction between the Council and CSOs. This Report is an independent publication of the Institute for Security Studies. 1

2 Early Warning Issues for January (continued) creating employment opportunities. The 2011 elections will be a critical milestone for the country with regards to democratic transition and a test of the viability of its national institutions. The Liberian Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) issued its report which has generated a degree of political tension. Unless there is a persistent engagement with the peacebuilding efforts in Liberia there is a potential for the decline in the stability and security situation of the country. MISSION ANALYSIS UNAMID Previous AU/PSC Communiqués and Recommendations: On 21 July 2008, the AU PSC convened at a Ministerial level and requested the AU Commission through its communiqué, PSC/ MIN/COMM(CXLII) Rev.1, to establish an independent AU High Level Panel on Darfur (AUPD) in an effort to bring long lasting peace and stability to the troubled region. Between 1 and 3 February 2009, the AU convened its 12th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government Assembly/AU/Dec.221XII) in Addis Ababa, and reaffirmed the PSC decision. Subsequently, on 29 October 2009, the PSC met at the level of Heads of State and Government, in Abuja, Nigeria, and endorsed the 124-page Report of the Panel entitled Darfur: The Quest for Peace, Justice and Reconciliation PSC/AHG/2(CCVII). In this Report the Panel considered the role and status of the Joint AU and UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). The PSC expressed its appreciation of the efforts of the Panel. The Security Council Issues pending for the Council include: The PSC issued a communiqué PSC/PR/Comm(CCI), on 25 August 2009, on the implementation process of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), signed between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People s Liberation Movement/Army on 9 January The PSC requested the AU Commission to expeditiously dispatch a preelection team to Sudan to meet with the Sudanese officials involved in the preparations for the elections. The Council requested the Commission to provide it with a report of the pre-election assessment visit. The PSC is yet to issue a communiqué acknowledging this report. is expected to review the Hybrid Operation in Darfur in early Prior to this, on 21 July 2009, the PSC had issued a communiqué PSC/PR/COMM(CXCVIII) in which it considered the Report of the Chairperson of the Commission SC/PR/2(CXCVIII) on the situation in Darfur as well as statements made by the Commissioner for Peace and Security, the Joint Special Representative of UNAMID and the Government of the Sudan. The communiqué also extended UNAMID s mandate for a further period of 12 months. In this communiqué the Council expressed its concern over the recurrence of armed clashes and the lack of progress in the talks between the Government of the Sudan and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) in the Doha, in Qatar. Crisis Escalation Potential: The security situation in Darfur remains relatively unpredictable. In early 2009, the UNAMID s PENDING PSC ISSUES The PSC issued a communiqué PSC/PR/COMM (CC), on 21 August 2009, following a briefing that it received from the Director of the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa (UNREC), on the disarmament agenda of the United Nations, the activities of the Centre with regards to Africa, and closer collaboration between the UNREC and the AU. The PSC requested the AU Commission to strengthen collaboration with UNREC through the AU-Regions Small Arms and Light Weapons Steering Committee. The Council also called upon member states to support UNREC s activities. The PSC is yet to issue a communiqué acknowledging whether its request to the Commission has been implemented. former Force Commander, General Martin Agwai, pre-emptively stated that the six-year conflict in Darfur was essentially over. According to General Agwai, the violent incidents in Darfur were low intensity in nature and included: robbery, burglaries and clashes over livestock pasture and watering holes. However, this rhetoric did not reflect a comprehensive and definitive cessation of hostilities between the belligerents. In fact, the above assessment was contradicted by two 2009 reports (S/RES/1870 and S/2009/352), issued by the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, who reaffirmed that violent confrontation between the Sudanese army and the armed resistance forces continued unabated. In addition, civilians remain at risk and peacekeepers are routinely targeted by armed resistance forces and harassed by government forces. Towards the end of 2009 the threat to UNAMID and international staff in Darfur has increased. There has been a continuous spate of 2

3 kidnappings as well as the ongoing military confrontation between the National Congress Party (NCP)-dominated Government of Sudan and the armed resistance forces, as well as between Chad and Sudan. On 5 December 2009, two Rwandanese UNAMID peacekeepers in Darfur were shot dead and another was wounded. This was the second attack on their contingent in as many days. In this particular incident, UNAMID stated that unidentified gunmen in traditional robes opened fire on the soldiers as they distributed water at a refugee camp. Prior to this, three Rwandan soldiers were killed in an ambush as they escorted a water tanker. Following this incident, the Chairperson of the AU Commission, Jean Ping, issued a statement, on 6 December 2009 strongly condemning the attack. The UN Secretary-General also issued a statement through his spokesperson, expressing his condolences to the families of the deceased peacekeepers and reiterating his appreciation for their service and commitment to the search for peace in Darfur. More than 20 UNAMID personnel have been killed since the mission deployed in early In July 2007 a joint police and military patrol deployed by the AU Mission in Darfur (AMIS), the predecessor to UNAMID, was ambushed by a force of 200 attackers, which resulted in the death of seven peacekeepers and 22 critically wounded personnel. In 2009, a spate of incidents revealed the precarious nature of UNAMID s mission. In May 2009, one official was killed in South Darfur; in August 2009 two UNAMID civilian staff members were kidnapped and are still being held in West Darfur; in October 2009, three peacekeepers were shot and wounded. UNAMID has initiated an investigation into the motives of the attackers and has called on the Sudanese Government to identify the perpetrators, arrest them and bring them to justice. In addition to these problems, Khartoum places restrictions on the movements UNAMID s peacekeeping missions in Darfur which continues to undermine efforts to stabilize the region. There are still approximately two million displaced Darfurians and insecurity remains significantly high. UNAMID is currently the only guarantor of security in the region, but it is still beset by a lack of adequate resources. In addition, the mission which is entering its third year of operation is only at 69 per cent of its authorized troop strength. Unless the Sudanese national elections are postponed, they will take place this year. Whether the poll will be convened in Darfur remains a key challenge because the comprehensive peacemaking process has effectively stalled, without any significant progress in terms of addressing the underlying grievances. Since the eruption of the violence in Darfur in 2003, Sudan and Chad have engaged in mutual recrimination and accused each other of supporting armed resistance movements based in their territories. Therefore, the potential for crisis escalation in the region is relatively high which continues to pose a serious challenge to UNAMID s effectiveness. Key Issues and Mission Dynamics: UNAMID was deployed to Darfur to replace the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS), which was decommissioned on 31 December UNAMID has experienced some of the challenges that confronted AMIS throughout its existence. UNAMID s initial deployment was marred by insecurity, logistical challenges, intransigence from Khartoum with regards to the launch of the Mission, and political sensitivities pertaining to the composition of the force. In mid-2007, Khartoum acquiesced to the deployment of a successor to AMIS. The Security Council invoked Chapter VII of the UN Charter and issued Resolution 1769, of 31 July 2007, which authorised UNAMID in the areas of its deployment to: protect its personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, and to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its officials and humanitarian workers; support the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement, deter armed attacks, and protect civilians, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of Sudan. In establishing UNAMID s mandate, the Security Council also made reference to paragraphs 54 and 55 of the Report of the Secretary- General, and the Chairperson of the AU Commission, of 5 June 2007 (document S/2007/307/ Rev.1). UNAMID s operational tasks are to support the peace process; promote security; the rule of law, democratic governance, and human rights; as well as provide humanitarian assistance. The situation on the ground has become more complex for UNAMID to deal with. When conflict ignited in Darfur early in 2003, there were only two major rebel groups - the JEM and the Sudanese Liberation Movement (SLM). Since then the insurgents have splintered into a confusing array of competing factions. Currently there are more than two dozen of groups pursuing their own interests in Darfur. This has effectively negated on going attempts to keep the peace. The intermittent attacks against UNAMID s assets and personnel have also undermined the Mission s mandate. On 8 November 2009, UNAMID called on the Sudan Liberation Movement/Abdul Wahid 3

4 faction (SLA/AW) to desist from impeding the work of UNAMID in Darfur. This request was precipitated by an incident on 4 November 2009 in which armed SLA/AW elements surrounded a UN helicopter with UNAMID personnel when it landed in Deribat, East Jabel Marra, in South Darfur, and prevented it from proceeding with its field assessment mission in the area. UNAMID issued a statement in which it lamented the deliberate attempts to obstruct the operations of the Mission. In the long term, these acts are inimical to attaining overall peace and stability in Darfur and would have an adverse impact on efforts to improve the humanitarian situation in the region. Reports of ongoing fighting between the Government and the rebel groups, the JEM and the SLA/ Abdul Wahid faction leading to the deaths of civilians demonstrate that the key parties have not made a full commitment to a political solution to the Darfur crisis, which will only further complicate UNAMID s mission. In January 2009, the JEM took over a small town known as Muhajiriya and its evacuation heightened the tension with Khartoum. According to the Report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission PSC/ PR/2(CXCVIII), of 21 July 2009, there have been altercations between JEM and the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), including the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA-Minawi), around Karnoi and Um Buru localities. A Report of the UNSG presented to the Security Council, on 16 November 2009, noted that UNAMID s troop complement is 14,638 military personnel and 4,449 police, but it is not yet at its full authorized capacity. In addition, the force still lacks key logistical assets, including two medium transport units, a level II hospital, an aerial reconnaissance unit, and 18 medium utility helicopters. UNAMID s peacekeeping efforts throughout have been complemented by a political peacemaking initiative. Until mid- 2008, this initiative was led by the UNSG s Special Envoy for Darfur, Jan Eliasson, and the AU Special Envoy for Darfur, Salim Ahmed Salim. On 30 June 2008, Djibril Yipene Bassole, the former Foreign Minister of Burkina Faso, was appointed as the new joint AU-UN Chief Mediator for Darfur. Currently, Bassole conducts his mediation efforts from El Fasher, the capital of North Darfur state and the site of UNAMID s field headquarters. On 18 November 2009, the peace talks resumed in Doha, Qatar, with the participation of civil society organisations from Darfur. This was a continuation of earlier talks that were held from 27 May to 18 June 2009 between the Sudanese government and the JEM who met in Doha, to discuss the implementation of the Agreement of Goodwill and Confidence-Building. This meeting sought to build upon the previous agreement brokered through the auspices of the Joint African Union- United Nations Mediation and the Government of Qatar which was signed on 17 February These meetings have sought to advance the peace process through the: exchange of prisoners; cessation of hostilities; and the elaboration of a framework agreement that would define the areas that would subsequently be discussed during comprehensive negotiations. The rapprochement between JEM and Sudanese government is significant because there have been no direct peace between Khartoum and the Movement since the failure of the now moribund Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) signed in May The pursuit of international justice in Darfur could potentially impact upon UNAMID s mission. On 4 March 2009, the ICC issued an arrest warrant against the President of Sudan, Omar Al-Bashir, for war crimes and crimes against humanity which has added another dimension to the resolution of the crisis in Darfur. On 19 October 2009 the ICC initiated its confirmation hearing against Bahr Idriss Abu Garda, the first Darfur rebel suspect to appear before the ICC. He is accused of war crimes allegedly committed against the AU peacekeeping mission in Sudan in Meeting immediately after the ICC s decision, the PSC issued a communiqué PSC/PR/COMM. (CLXXV) on 5 March 2009 which lamented that this decision came at a critical juncture in the ongoing process to promote lasting peace in the Sudan. The PSC expressed its regret over the Security Council s failure to exercise its powers of deferral and effectively postpone any ICC action. Consequently, on 3 July 2009 at its Thirteenth Annual Summit of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government held in Sirte, Libya, the AU decided not to cooperate with the ICC in facilitating the arrest of Al-Bashir. However, this was not a unanimous position and some countries expressed their reservations, with Botswana publicly stating its disagreement with this decision. Whether or not the pursuit of international justice will impact upon UNAMID s operational effectiveness remains to be seen. Scenario Planning: Scenario 1: UNAMID s presence in Darfur would continue to be required if the region continues to witness a cyclical production of signed agreements between the government and the factionalised armed militia, without addressing the underlying issues that are fuelling the crisis. >>page 6 4

5 PSC RETROSPECTIVE AU High Level Implementation Panel The PSC meeting PSC/AHG/ COMM.1(CCVII), held on 29 October 2009, at the level of Heads of State and Government, in Abuja, Nigeria, considered the Report of the AU High Level Panel on Darfur (AUPD), also known as the Mbeki Panel. The Council endorsed the Report of the Panel, Darfur: The Quest for Peace, Justice and Reconciliation PSC/AHG/2(CCVII). The Council urged all AU Member States and partners to fully support the implementation of the recommendations of the AUPD. The AU accepted the Report of the Panel and commended the model developed by the Panel which it viewed as an initiative that could be used to address other conflict situations in Africa. The Council meeting highlighted that the Report advanced potential solutions to the crisis of the Sudan as manifested in Darfur particularly in the way it addressed issues pertaining to peace, justice and reconciliation in an integrated way. The PSC further stressed that the Panel s methodology of undertaking a broad consultation with all stakeholders notably in Sudan and in the Darfur region and its clear definition of the problems it sought to address made the Panel s Report a valuable learning tool. It was also stated that the Report which reaffirmed the AU s commitment to combat impunity will serve as a guide for African initiatives, in partnership with the international community, to address the situation in Darfur. The Abuja PSC meeting requested the Chairperson of the Commission to establish an AU High Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP) with an initial mandate of one year. The AUHIP would include three former African Presidents, Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, who was also the chairperson of AUPD, and President Abdulsalami Abubakar of Nigeria and Pierre Buyoya of Burundi, who were the other former Presidents on the Panel. The Council requested the Mbeki Panel be given the mandate to assist in the implementation of all aspects of the AUPD recommendations. The Council also requested that AUHIP also support and facilitate the continued engagement by Sudanese parties in the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and other related processes, as part of the democratic transformation of the Sudan. Subsequently, the Chairperson of the AU Commission endorsed the request of the Council and the inaugural meeting of the new Panel took place on the 2 December 2009 at the headquarters of the AU Commission in Addis Ababa. The Implementation Panel which also includes the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security, Ramtane Lamamra, officially started its proceedings on the same day. With reference to the request of the PSC at the Abuja meeting, the Chairperson of the Commission was requested to submit quarterly reports on the implementation of the AUPD recommendations and the activities of the AUHIP. The Chairperson of the Commission was also requested to formally relay the PSC decisions in Abuja to the relevant Sudanese stakeholders, as well as to the UN Security Council and other AU partners, in order to combine to coordinate the activities of the partners with those of the Implementation Panel. One of the Panel Report s major recommendations was the establishment of hybrid courts consisting of Sudanese judges as well as judges appointed by the AU to investigate, prosecute and adjudicate the war and other crimes committed during the Darfur conflict. The Mbeki Panel did not take a position on whether the hybrid court would replace the International Criminal Court (ICC) cases which the UN Security Council referred to the judicial body. However, it would appear that this was a consideration based on the fact that the issues that the proposed hybrid courts would address are similar to those that the ICC is attempting to engage with in a number of African countries. The PSC reiterated its call to the UN Security Council to respect the AU s request for a delay in the execution of the arrest warrant by ICC against President Omar Hassan Al Bashir, in the interest of peace, justice and reconciliation. However, this attempt to relocate the judicial process initiated by the ICC to hybrid courts has been challenged by some of the armed resistance groups such as Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). The fact that the PSC requested the Chairperson of the Commission to urgently establish an Implementation Panel to support the realization of the recommendations of the Mbeki Panel is indeed an encouraging development which sets a precedent for the Council s proactive approach. The quarterly reports of the AUHIP will enable the Council to closely monitor and follow the implementation process. However, the controversy generated by the recommendations of the Mbeki Panel suggests that their implementation will face a degree of resistance from a number of quarters. 5

6 Scenario 2: UNAMID would continue facing an array of political and logistical challenges given the fact that the conditions for promoting peace in the region are not optimal. This would include the multiplication of armed militia groups with no coherent common position and multiple grievances. Scenario 3: The peace process in Darfur could become subsumed or marginalised by other political dynamics. These include the pending ICC arrest warrant against the country s sitting President, the forthcoming national elections and the scheduled referendum for the south Sudan in The dynamic unleashed by these separate but inter-locking processes may compel Khartoum either to postpone the elections, sabotage the Southern referendum, or continue to suppress the rebellion in the Darfur. This would further complicate UNAMID s mission as well as its capability and resources. Early Response Options: Option 1: The PSC could assess how the recommendations of the AU Panel on Darfur can be duly implemented with respect to UNAMID s operations. Specifically, this would require achieving a comprehensive and durable resolution of the Darfur conflict and adopting an inclusive strategy that will bring together all key political factions, or at the very least the main armed groups. The Council could, therefore, set a timetable to monitor the implementation of the recommendations of the Report and urge member states to cooperate. Option 2: UNAMID could develop a comprehensive strategy to protect civilians within its mandate in a politically changing environment increasingly defined by attacks against peacekeepers and aid workers. Option 3: The PSC working with UNAMID through the Joint Special Representative as well as the Government of Sudan and armed militias could ensure that humanitarian organisations have access to continue delivering assistance to the vulnerable populations in the region, notably the two million IDPs. Option 4: The PSC and the international community could adopt an integrated regional strategy to address the situation in Darfur, with a specific focus on the tensions between Sudan and Chad. Geo-Political Dynamics: Pan-African and RECs Dynamics: Regionally, the majority of African countries would prefer that the Darfur issue be dealt with as a matter of priority. The fact that it has dragged on since 2003 and brought in the ICC as a key actor in the continent s affairs has been met with collective apprehension by a number of African states. On 24 November 2009, a delegation of AU PSC members traveled to the war-affected Darfur and met with regional Government officials, community leaders and UNAMID staff. The delegation was headed by Ambassador Joseph Nsengimana of Rwanda in his capacity as Chair for the PSC for the month of November. The delegation was in El Fasher to gain a first-hand assessment of the security situation and to take part in discussions with UNAMID officials on matters related to the implementation of the Mission s mandate. The delegation s assessment report is expected in due course. The seven-member AU Panel on Darfur which included three former African Presidents, Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, who also served as the chairperson, Abdulsalami Abubakar of Nigeria, and Pierre Buyoya of Burundi noted in its report that the people of Darfur had endured extreme violence, serious violations of human rights and have seen the fabric of their society torn apart by the conflict. The stability in Darfur is also intimately linked and affected by the hostilities between Chad and Sudan. This has the potential to create a trans-african regional conflict system because various states across the continent are partial to, or have national interests allied to, either Sudan or Chad. In mid-july 2009, Sudan s military accused Chad of conducting air strikes on a range of targets in West Darfur. While in early May 2009, Sudanese-based Chadian armed militia launched a failed assault on N djamena before being repulsed back across the border. UN Dynamics: On July , the Security Council extended UNAMID s mandate by another year until end of July The resolution emphasised the importance of achieving realistic targets against which the progress of UN peacekeeping operations can be measured. On 2 December 2009, the UN Secretary-General appointed veteran Nigerian diplomat Ibrahim Gambari as the new head of the joint AU-UN peacekeeping mission in Darfur. Gambari s appointment as the Joint Special Representative of UNAMID became effective on 1 January In his latest Report on UNAMID, Ki-moon stated that the increased threats to international staff, including kidnappings; military action by Chad, Sudan and the rebels; and the Sudanese Government s restrictions of the 6

7 movements of peacekeepers continued to hamper efforts to stabilise the region torn apart by nearly seven years of war. On 25 November 2009, more than 300 former combatants in Darfur, including women and disabled persons, participated in a UN-backed demobilisation programme organized by the Government of Sudan with support from the UNAMID. The programme is expected to be extended to other parts of Darfur, targeting a total of 5,000 former combatants affiliated with signatories to the 2006 DPA who were demobilized and disarmed in July 2008, when they formally surrendered their weapons. The Government is providing cash payments of around US $150, for each participant, to be followed by food vouchers and other services after two months. UNAMID is offering logistical support to the exercise, including security, transport and health services. Beneficiaries of a similar programme recently concluded in the North Darfur capital of El Fasher include members of the Sudanese Armed Forces, People s Defence Forces, and the Sudan Liberation Army/Mother Wing. Wider International Community Dynamics: On 6 October 2009, Bassole briefed a meeting of Special Envoys of EU as well as those of the Permanent Members of the UN Security Council, namely, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China, and Russia. That meeting chaired by Mikhail Margelov, the Special Envoy for Sudan of the President of the Russian Federation, reviewed developments in the Sudan including efforts towards the full deployment of UNAMID, but it also noted the fundamental challenges still confronting the Mission. The group issued a statement in which it underlined the essential role of UNAMID, as well as other regional organizations and neighboring states, in supporting the peace process in Darfur. The meeting also called for greater coordination with regards to international appointments to ensure coherence in any joint UN/AU leadership efforts. On 30 July 2009, the US Special Envoy to the Sudan, Scott Gration, stated that there was no evidence to support the continued listing of Sudan on a US list of states sponsoring terrorism. On 3 December 2009, Gration appeared before a Congressional panel on Africa to defend a recently announced policy shift, which includes an offer of improved relations with the Sudanese regime. The US administration continued defending its new policy of engagement with Sudan despite persistent criticisms from its political opponents in Washington who accused it of is placating war criminals. UN diplomats and analysts suggest China s opposition to UN sanctions on Khartoum will prevail. Beijing can wield its veto as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, to prevent any resolution that it deems contrary to its interests. Civil Society Dynamics: The search for lasting peace and security in Darfur requires the sustained engagement of civil society in peacemaking, particularly at the grassroots level. Civil society in Sudan is also taking the initiative and proceeding with its own peacebuilding effort despite the lack of significant progress at the official level. The National Elections Commission (NEC) has pledged to permit and enable civil society groups operating in Darfur to undertake voter education activities ahead of the poll scheduled for April However, the effectiveness of this will depend on the security situation in the region. The AUPD has recommended the establishment of a new hybrid court consisting of Sudanese judges and be judges appointed by the AU to investigate, prosecute and adjudicate the war and other crimes committed during the Darfur conflict. The AUPD further recommended the establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission to lay the foundations for societal healing. On 1 December 2009, Sudanese youth groups campaigned for change in what will be for many of them the first multi-party elections in their lifetime. The youth groups urged the opposition to unite against the current government by distributing orange leaflets appearing all over the capital, in defiance of a long-standing state ban on anti-government papers since the current government took power in a coup more than 20 years ago. The youth have also called on the splintered opposition to unite at all levels to contest the presidential and parliamentary in their polls against the ruling National Congress Party (NCP). Opposition parties have accused the government of intimidation and a number of individuals have fled the country. In 2009, unidentified militia abducted more than 14 foreigners, including two International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) staff, in Darfur. On 3 December 2009, the ICRC indicated that it would scale down relief work across Sudan s strife-torn Darfur region to protect its staff from the spate of kidnappings. On 25 October 2009, the UNAMID Police Team including the Sector South Police Commander established a Security Safety Committee in the Duma IDP camp, in South Darfur. Members of the committee include: the UNAMID Police Adviser, nomads, IDPs, local leaders and Government of Sudan security officials from both the police and the military. The meeting aims at establishing a monthly forum to enable the Civilian Affairs Section 7

8 (CAS) to receive updates from the civil society organisations on their initiatives, as well as provide a space for them to raise any concerns about issues relating to the peace process in Darfur. Documentation: Relevant AU Documents: PSC/PR/COMM(CXCVIII) (21 July 2009) Communiqué on the situation in Darfur PSC/PR/2(CXCVIII) (21 July 2009) Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the situation in Darfur Assembly/AU/6(XIII), Report of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union on its Activities and the State of Peace and Security in Africa, Assembly of the African Union, Thirteenth Ordinary Session, 1-3 July 2009, Sirte, Libya PSC/PR/COMM(CLXXXV) (6 April 2009) Communiqué on the situation in Darfur and Mauritania PSC/PR/COMM(CLI) (22 September 2008) Communiqué on the implementation of Communiqué of 142nd meeting of the PSC, on the Sudan Interim Report, the situation in Mauritania and the situation in Somalia PSC/PR/BR(CXLII) (21 July 2008) Communiqué on the ICC indictment of Sudanese President Al Bashir PSC/PR/2 (CXXXVI) (12 June 2008) Communiqué on the situation in Darfur and the Republic of Djibouti and the State of Eritrea PSC/PR/2(CXII) (28 February 2008) Communiqué on the situation in Darfur. PSC/PR/COMM.(LXXIX) (22 June 2007) Communiqué on the situation in Darfur PSC/PR/COMM.(LXXV) (4-5 April 2007) Communiqué on the situation in Darfur PSC/PR/COMM.(XLVIII) (6 April 2006) Communiqué on Inter-Sudanese Peace Talks on the situation in Darfur PSC/PR/COMM.(XVII) (20 October 2004) Communiqué on the situation in Darfur PSC/PR/COMM.(XVI) (17 September 2004) Communiqué on the situation in Darfur and Somalia PSC/PR/COMM.(XIV) (9 August 2004) Communiqué on crisis in Darfur PSC/PR/COMM.(X) (25 May 2004) Communiqué on decisions in crisis in Darfur, Somaila and Côte d Ivoire PSC/PR/COMM.(V) (13 April 2004) Communiqué on the international conference on the Great Lakes region, AU liaison office in Liberia, crisis in Darfur, situation in Cote d Ivoire and DRC UN Documents: S/2009/592 (16 November 2009) Report of the Secretary- General on the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID). S/RES/1891 (13 October 2009) extended the mandate of the Darfur Sanctions Panel of Experts for one year S/RES/1881 (30 July 2009) Resolution extending the mandate of UNAMID until 31 July 2010 S/2009/352 (13 July 2009) Report of the Secretary- General on the deployment of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur S/RES/1870 (20 May 2009) Report of the Secretary- General on the Sudan S/RES/1828 (31 July 2008) renewing UNAMID S/RES/1769 (31 July 2007) establishing UNAMID S/RES/1593 (31 March 2005) referring the situation in Darfur to the ICC UNAMID/Mission documents: UNAMID Statement (6 December 2009) condemning attacks on its forces (the Rwandese contingent) UNAMID Statement (8 November 2009) Calling on SLA/AW to desist from impeding the Mission s work COUNTRY ANALYSIS Western Sahara Previous AU Statements and Recommendations: In a statement issued on 4 December, 2009 the AU Commission expressed its concern on developments and the human rights situation in Western Sahara with a specific reference to the case of the expulsion of Mrs. Aminatou Haidar, a Saharawi human rights activist. The AU Commission called upon the Moroccan authorities to allow Haidar to return to Western Sahara in the face of the growing tension between the parties to the Western Sahara negotiations. Western Sahara was also the subject of the Report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission SP/ASSEMBLY/ PS/RPT(I) to the Special Session of the Assembly of the Union on the Consideration and >>page 10 8

9 PSC RETROSPECTIVE The PSC and NATO On 18 December 2008, the PSC was briefed by a Delegation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) PSC/PR/ BR (CLXII). This meeting was convened within the context of the operationalisation of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and the role of external partners. In a statement that followed the briefing the Council acknowledged NATO s support towards the deployment of AU peace support operations. Specifically, NATO has provided assistance to the now defunct African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS); the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) in Sudan, and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The PSC also noted NATO s support to the implementation of certain components of the continental security architecture, specifically to the establishment of the African Standby Force (ASF). The basis for the partnership and working relationship of the PSC and NATO is Article 17 of the PSC Protocol which outlines the Council s working relations with the United Nations and other international institutions. Article 17(4) stipulates that the Council shall cooperate and work closely with other relevant international organizations on issues of peace, security and stability in Africa. According to the Protocol such organizations may be invited to address the PSC. In the aftermath of the end of the Cold War, NATO has been struggling to define its role in the absence of its nemesis the Warsaw Pact. Given NATO s extensive professional expertise and logistical capabilities it can clearly play a role in supporting the fledgling security institutions of the African Union. However, the precise nature of this support has to be delineated given that NATO s original mandate was to offset any threat to its members, and was thus predicated on a defensive and reactive posture. Playing the role of peace supporter in Africa is therefore a new venture and an unknown quantity for NATO. The AU s collaboration with NATO was inaugurated in 2005, following a request from the AU for NATO to provide it with support for the now defunct African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). NATO has provided airlift services to AU peacekeepers to and from Darfur, when there was a shortage of cargo capacity as well as helicopters. Between July and October 2005, NATO coordinated the strategic airlift of about 5,000 peacekeepers from African troopcontributing countries to Darfur. When AMIS was terminated in December 2007, NATO subsequently became involved in the UNAMID operations. To date NATO has provided airlift to total of approximately 24,000 African Union peacekeepers. NATO also provided training to AMIS personnel. Training initiatives focused on strategic level and operational planning issues. In particular, the training imparted insights into how AU assets could be deployed in an optimal way to ensure that they enhance the overall operational initiatives. In total, 184 AU officers benefited from this training initiative. In 2007, NATO also responded to the AU s request to assist in Somalia with AMISOM by providing airlift support to the peacekeeping mission. NATO is also part of the international counter-piracy effort at the coast off Somalia and has escorted a naval vessel dedicated to the AU, which was transporting Burundian military equipment to one of its battalions in Somalia. The cooperation between AU and NATO has also extended to the areas of air logistical coordination and military manpower management. NATO has also assisted with supporting the operationalisation of the African Standby Force. Specifically, NATO undertook a study on the evaluation and assessment of the operational readiness of the ASF brigades to assess the peacekeeping capabilities and operational readiness of the force. On 2 March 2007, the former AU Commissioner for Peace and Security Ambassador Said Djinnit, visited NATO s headquarters in Brussels. Djinnit who met with the then NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, also addressed NATO s principal decisionmaking body, the North Atlantic Council, and acknowledged that the cooperation between the two institutions had been very positive. During this visit the two parties agreed to explore the possibilities for extending the ongoing co-operation to capacity building support for the African Union. In particular, the PSC could also utilise the relationship to build the capacity for its Military Staff Committee (MSC). Analysts have questioned whether NATO is the appropriate organization to be supporting APSA and peace operations in Africa. A key concern is whether NATO will be utilised to surreptitiously project power on the continent and undermine the sovereignty of the African countries. The argument in favour of engagement is that NATO s expertise in the Balkans and Afghanistan can clearly provide insights to the AU s security >>page 10 9

10 PSC RETROSPECTIVE The PSC and NATO (continued) institutions on the challenges of peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions. So long as the relationship between NATO Resolution of Conflicts in Africa, on 31 August 2009, in Tripoli, Libya. The report stated that the dispute over Western Sahara continues to remain stalled as a result of the polarized positions of the parties, and more recently, because of Morocco s insistence that its proposal for autonomy be the only basis of negotiations in the talks with the Polisario.The Report reaffirmed the need for a referendum to enable the people of the territory to choose between the option of independence and that of integration into the Kingdom of Morocco. The Chairperson s Report also urged for progress towards a definitive resolution of this dispute, which for decades has been detrimental to the people of Western Sahara and the regional cooperation in the Maghreb. Crisis Escalation Potential: The crisis in Western Sahara is one of the longest running disputes on the African continent. Despite the various peace initiatives through the years the parties to the conflict continue to express strong differences on the fundamental issues at stake. Morocco proposes an autonomy-based political solution as a basis for any negotiations. The Polisario Front maintains that the solution of the conflict has to be predicated on the convening of a referendum on self-determination that will provide the Saharawis with a choice of independence, in addition to autonomy, or integration with Morocco. Given the fact that both sides having unyielding positions, it is likely that the conflict will persist. The standoff is therefore a threat to the peace and security of the region. The absence of genuine political dialogue and negotiations in addition to lack of trust and the recent tension could further and the AU APSA is predicated on partnership rather than paternal patronage, then the relationship could potentially be mutually escalate the crisis. Key Issues and Internal Dynamics: The question of Western Sahara has historically been defined as an issue relating to the right of the population of the territory to self-determination, by both the AU and the UN. However, Rabat views Western Sahara which is endowed with strategic minerals as an integral territory of its kingdom, which was legitimately recovered. The crisis over Western Sahara emerged in the early 1970s when Spain withdrew from the territory. In the administrative vacuum that was created by this withdrawal, in February 1976, the Kingdom of Morocco and Mauritania sent troops to occupy what was then called Spanish Sahara claiming that those sections of the territory had been part of their countries well before the Spanish occupation in Prior to the Spanish evacuation, in 1973, a local resistance the Frente Popular para la liberación de Saguia el-hamray Río de Oro (the Popular front for the liberation of the Saguia el-hamra and Rio de Oro, commonly known as the Polisario Front) had led a campaign for freedom against Spain. Subsequently, the Polisario Front focused its resistance against Morocco and Mauritania. In 1976, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the predecessor to the AU, recognised the Polisario Front as a liberation movement entitling it to the full diplomatic support of continental body and its member states. The Saharawis consider themselves ethno-culturally distinct and are nomads of mixed Berber, Arab and black African decent. On 15 October 1975, a UN field reinforcing and useful for both institutions. mission stated that the Saharan population favoured political independence. Subsequently, the International Court of Justice, based at the Hague, ruled in favour of self-determination for the Western Sahara. Following the ruling, King Hassan staged the Green March, in which some 350,000 Moroccan civilians were recruited to cross the frontier into the Spanish Sahara as a demonstration of the popular will in Morocco to reclaim the Sahara. Meanwhile, on 27 February 1976 the government of the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) was unilaterally proclaimed by the Polisario Front, in Tindouf an area in Western Algeria and inside Western Sahara itself with the support and recognition from Algeria. In 1979 following internal political instability and heavy loses inflicted by the Polisario, Mauritania withdrew from the sections of Western Sahara which it had occupied, these was subsequently annexed by Morocco. Historically, there have been repeated efforts to resolve the crisis. In 1984, Morocco withdrew its membership of the OAU (and consequently it is also not a member of the AU) in protest at the continental institution s decision to admit the SADR as a member state. The OAU and AU have therefore not been viewed by Morocco as impartial to the crisis. The UN has effectively led the mediation efforts between the parties. In September 1991, the parties signed an UN/OAU ceasefire agreement. As part of this agreement, the UN established its Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) to prepare for the referendum envisaged in the accord. A UN Special Representative of the 10

11 Secretary-General (SRSG) was also appointed with sole and exclusive authority over all matters relating to the organisation of the referendum. MINURSO s mandate has periodically been renewed but there has been minimal political progress in resolving the key issues. The absence of genuine debate within Morocco and amongst the Saharawi s was recently transformed by the events surrounding Morocco s travel restrictions against Haidar. Key issues that have undermined progress include the precise identification of the electorate for the proposed referendum. Initially, the two parties had reached an agreement to conduct the referendum based on the electorate defined by the 1974 census of the territory when it was still under Spanish control. However, Morocco subsequently insisted that the voter rolls should be expanded to include people who had long been settled in Morocco. Even though Morocco grudgingly accepted the principle of self-determination it was strategically maneuvering to ensure that the outcome of the referendum would be in its favour. Confronted by Rabat s strategy, the Polisario has periodically complained that over the years it has made too many compromises. The Polisario Front claims that in 1991, it gave up its claim for unconditional independence; in 1994 it rescinded its demand to utilise the 1974 census; in 1997 allowed the identification of other ethnic groups as part of the electorate; and in 2003 it acquiesced to Moroccans voting in the referendum which would on one level negate its original purpose which was to gauge the popular will of the people of Western Sahara. In January 1997, former UN Secretary General Koffi Annan appointed former US Secretary of State, James Baker, as his personal envoy and chief negotiator to the Western Sahara dispute. Before he resigned in June 2004, Baker had overseen a series of negotiations which yield a range of peace plans, however, no significant progress was made in resolving the underlying grievances to the dispute. On 11 April 2007, the Moroccan government submitted a new proposal, the Moroccan Initiative for Negotiating an Autonomy Status for the Sahara, to the new Secretary- General, Ban Ki-moon proposing a Sahara Autonomous Region, which would enjoy a measure of self-government within the framework of the Kingdom s sovereignty and national unity. Aware of Rabat s initiative, the Polisario transmitted to Ki-moon a counter proposal, one day before Morocco s submission, which it titled a Proposal of the Frente Polisario for a Mutually Acceptable Political Solution Assuring the Self-Determination of the People of Western Sahara. In an attempt to offset a potential impasse, the UN in its Resolution 1754 of 30 April 2007, requested the parties to enter into negotiations without preconditions, with a view to achieving a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution that would lead to the self-determination of the Sahrawi people. These talks were convened by the UN and came to be known as the Manhasset negotiations, named after the New York suburb where they are convened. The four rounds of talks which also included the representatives of Algeria and Mauritania did not foster a rapprochement between the parties. The Personal Envoy of the UN Secretary General to Western Sahara and chief facilitator of the Manhasset talks, Peter van Walsum, who left the office in 2008, stated in the print and broadcast media and before the Security Council that the territory s independence, as advocated by the Polisario, was not a realistic solution. Not surprisingly, Polisario questioned Walsum s bias, and the viability of continuing to pursuing negotiations through the UN framework. Morocco continues to control most of the territory and has the support of at least two permanent members of the UN Security Council namely, France and the US. The Polisario Front continues to claim the legal basis for its call for independence and enjoys the support of several key African states. In fact, the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic is a member of the African Union. Concomitantly, Morocco is the only African country which is not a member of the AU. The crisis remains one of the longest running conflicts on the continent and continues to divide opinion. Scenario Planning: Scenario 1: Both parties could continue to rejecting proposals which diverge from their rigid positions, further perpetuating the impasse and increasing tension in the region. Scenario 2: Based on Haidar s protest the next generation of Saharawis are likely to adopt a more militant stance with regards to what they perceive as Rabat s intransigence. The persistence of suspicion, mistrust and national pride on both sides could escalate the confrontation destabilising the territory, the Kingdom and the wider Maghrab region. Scenario 3: Rabat could concur with international opinion and convene a referendum based on the principle of self-determination, including the option of independence. Scenario 4: Polisario finding itself entrenched in its role as a liberation movement, a state and a population in exile, and having achieved none of its stated goals may rethink its strategy and accept limited autonomy. 11