George Kennan (right), author of the "Long Telegram," standing with Soviet officials. Reproduced by permission of AP/Wide World Photos.

Transcription

1 Kennan, George F. Cold War Reference Library, Vol. 5, Excerpt from the "Long Telegram" Reprinted from Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) 1946, Volume VI Eastern Europe; "The Soviet Union," published in 1969 "In summary, we have here a political force committed fanatically to the belief that with US it is desirable and necessary that the internal harmony of our society be disrupted, our traditional way of life be destroyed, the international authority of our state be broken, if Soviet power is to be secure." On February 3, 1946, U.S. newspaper reports stunned the American people. They revealed that a Soviet spy ring had been sending secrets from the U.S. atomic bomb project, "The Manhattan Project," to Moscow. Furthermore, on February 9, the evening before elections to the Supreme Soviet (the Soviet legislative body), Soviet leader Joseph Stalin ( ) delivered his threatening "Two Camps" speech. The speech reflected traditional Marxist thought that the Soviet Union would inevitably have to wage war on capitalism. Stalin contended that capitalism and communism were incompatible. Alarmed and taken aback, U.S. State Department officials turned to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. They wanted clarification of the speech and an explanation of why Stalin would have made it. George F. Kennan (1904 ), the Soviet expert in the embassy, responded with an eight-thousand-word telegram. Kennan's official position was Chargé d'affaires, that of a diplomat who is literally "in charge of affairs." Kennan first apologized for the length of the document but stated an "analysis of our international environment" can hardly be expressed "in a single, brief message." George Kennan (right), author of the "Long Telegram," standing with Soviet officials. Reproduced by permission of AP/Wide World Photos. To do so, Kennan explained, would be "oversimplification"; so he asked his readers to bear with him in the lengthy telegram (hence the name the "Long Telegram"). Step by step, Kennan led his readers through a "post-war Soviet out-look"; a history of Soviet thought and why it evolved as it did, embracing the teachings of communism by Karl Marx ( ); and his practical predictions of where Soviet policy in regard to the United States was going next. The first two excerpted paragraphs show Kennan taking readers back to the start of communism, or Marxism, in Russia. He explained why its teachings were so believable to the Russians, a "peaceful agricultural people" constantly buffeted through history by various invaders.

2 After Kennan's insightful comments on Russian thought, the excerpt skips to the last part of the telegram, "Practical Deductions from Standpoint of U.S. Policy." Kennan used some of his most startling language, saying the Soviets will not feel secure until "our [the United States] traditional way of life [is] destroyed." He recognized that they were a very powerful nation despite their war losses; however, if the United States and Western European powers stood firm, he believed the Russians would back down. Strongly stressing education of the American public as to understanding the "Russian situation," Kennan stated "there is nothing as dangerous or as terrifying as the unknown." He also emphasized practical help for war-torn Europe to rebuild their countries and their lives because if the United States did not the Russians surely would. Things to remember while reading "The Long Telegram": During the 1920s and 1930s, neither the capitalist United States nor the communist Soviet Union was a world power. They emerged as world powers only after World War II ( ). The United States and the Soviet Union were allies during World War II, joined in their common effort to defeat Nazi Germany. The Soviets suffered mightily at the hands of the Nazis but ultimately prevailed. The Red Army and Stalin were praised in Europe and the United States. After the war, most Americans, and even many U.S. officials, thought of Russians as a brave, suffering people and certainly had not considered warring against them. Kennan understood Stalin and the Soviets probably better than any other American. In the telegram, he urgently tried to impart this understanding to U.S. officials. Excerpt from the "Long Telegram" SECRET Moscow, February 22, P.M. [Received February 22 3:52 P.M.] At bottom of Kremlin's neurotic view of world affairs is traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity. Originally, this was insecurity of a peaceful agricultural people trying to live on vast exposed plain in neighborhood of fierce nomadic peoples. To this was added, as Russia came into contact with economically advanced West, fear of more competent, more powerful, more highly organized societies in that area. It was no coincidence that Marxism, which had smoldered ineffectively for half a century in Western Europe, caught hold and blazed for first time in Russia. Only in this land which had never known a friendly neighbor or indeed any tolerant equilibrium of separate powers either internal or international, could a doctrine thrive which viewed economic conflicts of society as insoluble by peaceful means. Part 5: [Practical Deductions from Standpoint of US Policy] In summary, we have here a political force committed fanatically to the belief that with US it is desirable and necessary that the internal harmony of our society be disrupted, our traditional way of life be destroyed, the international authority of our state be broken, if Soviet power is to be secure. This political force has complete power of disposition over energies of one of world's greatest peoples and resources of world's richest national territory, and is borne along by deep and powerful currents of Russian nationalism. In addition, it has an elaborate and far flung apparatus for exertion of its influence in other countries, an apparatus of amazing flexibility and versatility, managed by people whose experience and skill in underground methods are presumably without parallel in history. This is admittedly not a pleasant picture. Problem of how to cope with this force in [is] undoubtedly greatest task our diplomacy has ever faced and probably greatest it will ever have to face. It should be approached with same thoroughness and care as solution of major strategic problem in war, and if necessary, with no smaller outlay in planning effort. I cannot attempt to suggest all answers here. But I would like to record my conviction that problem is within our power to solve and that without recourse to any general military conflict. And in support of this conviction there are certain observations of a more encouraging nature I should like to make: (1) Soviet power, unlike that of Hitlerite Germany, is neither schematic nor adventuristic. It does not work by fixed plans. It does not take unnecessary risks. Impervious to logic of reason, and it is highly sensitive to logic of force. For this reason it can easily withdraw and usually does when strong resistance is encountered at any point. Thus, if the adversary has sufficient force and makes clear his readiness to use it, he rarely has to do so. If situations are properly handled there need be no prestige-engaging showdowns.

3 (2) Gauged against Western World as a whole, Soviets are still by far the weaker force. Thus, their success will really depend on degree of cohesion, firmness and vigor which Western World can muster. And this is factor which it is within our power to influence. For these reasons I think we may approach calmly and with good heart problem of how to deal with Russia. (1) Our first step must be to apprehend, and recognize for what it is, the nature of the movement with which we are dealing. We must study it with same courage, detachment, objectivity, and same determination not to be emotionally provoked or unseated by it with which doctor studies unruly and unreasonable individual. (2) We must see that our public is educated to realities of Russian situation. I cannot over-emphasize importance of this. Press cannot do this alone. It must be done mainly by Government, which is necessarily more experienced and better informed on practical problems involved. In this we need not be deterred by [ugliness?] of picture. I am convinced that there would be far less hysterical anti Sovietism in our country today if realities of this situation were better understood by our people. There is nothing as dangerous or as terrifying as the unknown. (3) Much depends on health and vigor of our own society. World communism is like malignant parasite which feeds only on diseased tissue. This is point at which domestic and foreign policies meet. Every courageous and incisive measure to solve interna problems of our own society, to improve self-confidence, discipline, morale and community spirit of our own people, is a diplomatic victory over Moscow worth a thousand diplomatic notes and joint communiqués. (4) We must formulate and put forward for other nations a much more positive and constructive picture of sort of world we would like to see than we have put forward in past. It is not enough to urge people to develop political processes similar to our own. Many foreign peoples, in Europe at least, are tired and frightened by experiences of past, and are less interested in abstract freedom than in security. They are seeking guidance rather than responsibilities. We should be better able than Russians to give them this. And unless we do, Russians certainly will. (5) Finally we must have courage and self-confidence to cling to our own methods and conceptions of human society. After all, the greatest danger that can befall us in coping with this problem of Soviet communism, is that we shall allow ourselves to become like those with whom we are coping. KENNAN What happened next As soon as the senior officials of the State Department read the telegram, its importance was obvious. It was distributed through many government offices in Washington and reported in the press. The transmission confirmed the worries of some U.S. officials that the Soviets could not be trusted as friends: U.S. foreign policy would have to change immediately. The first evidence of change came in a situation with Iran. Since 1941, both British and Soviet forces occupied Iran in the Middle East, keeping an eye on its vast oil reserves. Both had agreed to withdraw all troops by March The British troops left, but seemingly confirming Kennan's predictions, the Soviets decided to stay. Secretary of State James Byrnes ( ) condemned Soviet actions and on February 28 made a speech confirming the new tough stance and confrontational approach of the United States in its foreign policy. The speech is considered by many historians as a declaration of the Cold War. He sent the USS Missouri, the world's most powerful warship, into position by Turkey as a warning and demanded Moscow pull back its troops from Iran. After only a few weeks, the Iranian crisis was over. Just as Kennan had predicted, when the Soviets were faced with force, they pulled back. On March 5, Winston Churchill ( ) delivered his famous "Iron Curtain Speech" (see next excerpt) in the state of Missouri with U.S. president Harry S. Truman ( ; served ) at his side. Churchill warned the still-disbelieving Americans that indeed the Soviets were occupying large territories in Eastern Europe with no intention of leaving. Americans still wondered if Kennan and

4 George Kennan, speaking to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in Kennan continued to study and monitor international politics into the twenty-first century. Reproduced by permission of the Corbis Corporation. Churchill could indeed be correct, and their fear of spreading communism increased greatly. In July 1947, Kennan authored "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," which became known as the "X" article (see box). The "X" article restated some points of the "Long Telegram" and expanded others. The term "confrontational" that Secretary Byrnes had spoken of in 1946 turned with the "X" article's publication into a "policy of containment," or not allowing communism to spread and take over any more countries. The policy of containment essentially remained the basis of U.S. foreign policy throughout the Cold War. Did you know During the 1930s and World War II, Kennan saw the United States appease the Soviets, making concession after concession to the Soviet government as the two countries cooperated to defeat Germany's Adolf Hitler ( ) and his Nazi army. Kennan was dismayed at his nation's lack of firmness with the Soviets and its eagerness to please Joseph Stalin. According to Kennan, his policy of containment had been misunderstood from the start. He had meant political or diplomatic containment, not military containment. In his view, the misunderstanding led to an unnecessary nuclear arms race. The Iran flare-up and resolution foreshadowed just how accurate Kennan's overall assessment of the Soviet viewpoint in the "Long Telegram" was. The Soviets would constantly test and push the United States until it stopped short, stood firm, and generally threatened military action. At that point, the Soviets would back down. In reality, neither the Soviets nor the United States wanted to start a superpower war. This pattern continued through much of the Cold War. Consider the following Explain what Kennan meant by "there is nothing as dangerous or as terrifying as the unknown." In reality, few Americans studied or came to understand the Soviets as Kennan had hoped. Research and report on the resulting "Red Scare" that swept America between 1947 and Consider the first two paragraphs of the Kennan excerpt. If you had lived in an agricultural society that through history had been invaded by aggressive groups, where would your security level be? Do you think the Russian insecurities that directed their Cold War policies were justified? Why, for how long, and to what extent? If you do not think they were justified, why not? For More Information Books Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) 1946, Volume VI, Eastern Europe; "The Soviet Union." Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, Isaacson, Walter, and Evan Thomas. The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World They Made: Acheson, Bohlen, Kennan, Harriman, Lovett, McCloy. New York: Simon and Schuster, Kennan, George F., and John Lukacs. George F. Kennan and the Origins of Containment, : The Kennan-Lukacs Correspondence. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, Miscamble, Wilson D. George F. Kennan and the Making of American Foreign Policy, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992.

5 Web Sites "A CNN Perspectives Series. Episode 4: Berlin." CNN Interactive. /04/documents/cominform.html (accessed on September 10, 2003). Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies. (accessed on September 10, 2003). Contrasting Viewpoints: United States Versus the Soviet Union The "X" article, originally titled "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," was published in the quarterly journal Foreign Affairs in July The author was George F. Kennan. Since Kennan was still a member of the U.S. State Department, and at the time the departmen did not wish to display an overt, or open, anti-soviet policy, the article's author was simply noted as "X." However, readers soon figured out that the author was Kennan, and so it became known as his "X" article or "Article X." In Article X, Kennan repeated and expanded parts of the "Long Telegram." He used the term "containment" not allowing communism to spread further several times when speaking of how to deal with the Soviet Union, who by that time seemed intent on spreading communism throughout Europe and perhaps the whole world. Kennan wrote: It is clear that the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies. Soviet pressure against the free institutions of the western world is something that can be contained by the adroit [skillful] and vigilant application of Counter-force. Soviet society may well contain deficiencies which will eventually weaken its own potential. This would of itself warrant the United States entering with reasonable confidence upon a policy of firm containment, designed to confront the Russians with unalterable counter-force at every point wher they show signs of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world. With the "X" article, the policy of containment was firmly established. In many interviews with Kennan through the following decades, he constantly said this policy was completely misinterpreted by U.S. officials and in his estimation led to the unnecessary buildup of nuclear arms. He explained this misunderstanding was his fault but said he intended a diplomatic containment only. Kennan explained that the support of Western European nations through the Marshall Plan was the kind of policy he had in mind to help contain the spread of communism. (The Marshall Plan was a massive U.S. plan to promote Europe's economic recovery from the war; it was made available to all nations, though communist countries rejected it.) In 1946 and 1947, the Soviets were in a greatly weakened postwar state. Kennan knew they had no desire to enter into more military conflicts and could be stopped by firm diplomacy. He never dreamed he had to say this he thought that was obvious to all Unfortunately, his containment policy was viewed as calling for military counterforce. Kennan was never able to change that viewpoint. "Report on the International Situation to the Cominform" On September 22, 1947, Andrei Zhdanov ( ) issued a report to counteract the "X" article. Zhdanov, a member of the Politburo, the key policy-making body in the Soviet Communist Party, gave the report to the first gathering of Cominform. Cominform had been established by the Soviet Union to promote communism internationally, and members included communist leaders from Soviet-dominated Eastern European countries. Zhdanov stated that the Soviet Union had "always honored [its] obligations." The United States believed it clearly had not: since its forces still occupied the countries of Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union had imposed communist rule and not allowed free elections. Nevertheless. the world was in two distinct camps and set for the Cold War, as explained by Zhdanov: A new alignment of political forces has arisen. The more the war recedes into the past, the more distinct becomes two major friends in postwar international policy, corresponding to the division of the political forces operating on the international arena into two major camps: the imperialist on the one hand, and the anti-imperialist on the other. Zhdanov defined the imperialist countries as the United States, Great Britain, France, Belgium, Holland, Turkey, Greece, China, an "Near Eastern" and "South American" countries. Imperialism refers to one nation extending its rule over another, often by force. Zhdanov continued:

6 The cardinal purpose of the imperialist camp is to strengthen imperialism, to hatch a new imperialist war, to combat [communism] and to support reactionary regimes and movements everywhere. Soviet foreign policy proceeds from the fact of the coexistence for a long period of the two systems capitalism and socialism [communism]. From this it follows that cooperation between the U.S.S.R. [Soviet Union] and countries with other systems is possible, provided that the principle of reciprocity [a mutual exchange] is observed and that obligations once assumed are honored. Everyone knows that the U.S.S.R. has always honored the obligations it has assumed. The Soviet Union has demonstrated its will and desire for cooperation. Obviously, from the radically differing viewpoints of "Article X" and the report to the Cominform, the United States and the Soviet Union sat in opposing camps. COPYRIGHT 2004 U*X*L, COPYRIGHT 2006 Gale, Cengage Learning Source Citation: "Kennan, George F." Cold War Reference Library. Ed. Sharon M. Hanes, Richard C. Hanes, and Lawrence W. Baker. Vol. 5. Detroit: U*X*L, Global Issues In Context. Web. 6 Dec Document URL tabid=t0011&prodid=gic&docid=cx &source=gale&usergroupname=42gass&version=1.0 Gale Document Number:CX