Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) Political Stability and the Role of Security Institutions in Restoring Peace South Africa

Transcription

1 Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) Political Stability and the Role of Security Institutions in Restoring Peace South Africa This document has been distributed in the form in which it was received, without any editing. The opinions expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of ESCWA.

2 - 2 - Foreword This background paper will be presented during the Inter-Regional Seminar on Participatory Development and Conflict Resolution: Path of Democratic Transition and Social Justice, to be held on November 2011, in Beirut. It will be discussed under the first theme of the Agenda addressing a successful democratic transition experience for exchange of ideas, experiences and lessons learned. ESCWA acknowledges the contribution of Mr. Peter Gastrow, Director of Programs at the International Peace Institute, towards enriching the deliberations of the Seminar. ESCWA also aspires that his intervention based on issues addressed in this paper will deepen the discussions among participants and will shed insights on the transition from a racial political system to a democratic one as well as building national consensus in countries undergoing transition.

3 - 3 - Table of Contents Executive Summary Pre-transition South Africa Page Transition from apartheid to a non-racial democracy... 8 Dialogue and negotiations during efforts to maintain stability The role of security forces.. 16 Shaping the new constitution.. 18 Conclusion: Lessons learned, and recommendations... 20

4 - 4 - Executive Summary Transitions from authoritarian rule to a democracy are unique to the specific society that is undergoing the transition. South African s transition from apartheid to democracy was unique and can therefore not be successfully transplanted to other parts of the world. When political parties were unbanned and Nelson Mandela released in February 1990, it had become clear that a political and strategic deadlock between de Klerk s minority government and anti-apartheid forces had developed. Violent conflict loomed. Negotiations for compromises and a new constitution seemed a possibility but the increase in political violence prevented that from happening. This led to civil society religious, business, and labour organizations - paving the way for a comprehensive National Peace Accord in September The rules that would apply during the transition were agreed upon in the Accord, including a code of conduct for the police. They also received new training to handle public protests, and a Police Board was established to improver police/community relations. Police and the military significantly containing on-going violence, but they were also accused of fuelling some of it. Constitutional negotiations were held over two years followed by peaceful elections in April Factors that enabled South Africa s transition to succeed: Interdependence between white and black citizens for future peace and stability Political and strategic deadlock between political forces required a way out Balance of forces between ANC and de Klerk s government improved chances for negotiations and compromise Strong civil society with influential labour unions, media, business, human rights etc. Strong leaders: Mandela, de Klerk, Buthelezi, Constand Viljoen, Chris Hani etc. Long preparatory phase before elections to develop policies and confidence building Long preparatory phase to prepare for elections and the levelling of playing field National Peace Accord facilitated negotiations and providing a neutral forum for all It was an indigenous process which gave South Africans ownership and confidence International pressure contributed to achieving compromises Strong institutions were in place to continue effective administration A professional police and military with effective command and control was in place Six lessons from the South African transition: 1. Conflict and violence are an inherent part of a political transformation; the challenge is to achieve a broad national consensus on how to contain and reduce it and to find agreement on what the rules of conduct during the transition should be. 2. An apparent political and strategic deadlock between opposing forces can create opportunities for compromise and negotiations 3. Transitions requires time to properly prepare all for the elections and develop policies 4. Early steps should be taken to transform and rehabilitate the police and their conduct 5. Political transition should be accompanied by socio-economic transition

5 Reforms and transitions should be internally generated to enhance ownership

6 Pre-transition South Africa Introduction Transitions from authoritarian rule to a democracy are always unique to the specific society that is undergoing the transition. No two countries or peoples have an identical history or social, ethnic, racial, or religious compositions, and the economic and developmental needs differ from country to country. That is why it should be stressed at the outset that the South African transition from apartheid to democracy was unique to that country and to the environment at the time. It cannot be successfully transplanted to any other part of the world. However, human beings across the globe often respond to conflict and adversity or to new political challenges in similar albeit not identical ways. Mechanisms to channel such responses towards achieving an accommodation of the differences that exist form the essence of what political transitions are about. That is why there may be value for countries currently undergoing a transition to examine the South African experience. Elements of the South African transition may be of relevance, but such elements will then have to be reshaped and augmented to make them relevant to the unique challenges that other transitions have to face. The way in which security forces, whether the military, police, or non-state forces, conduct themselves during a transition can make the difference between success and failure. They are always amongst the key role players in a transition but they are not necessarily the most important ones. They have to interact with and respond to political and other actors and their role should therefore not be looked at in isolation from the other drivers of a transition. Therefore, in examining the role played by security forces during South Africa s transition, this paper endeavours to sketch the role played by the all the main actors, one of them being the security forces. By focusing on the role played by all the key actors it may be instructive to identify how the security forces interacted with and related to different initiatives and pressures. This paper therefore does not address the role played by security forces in isolation from the role played by other key actors. Pre-transition in South Africa Violent political conflict has been part of South Africa s history for centuries. During pre-colonial times, struggles over the control of land between indigenous population groups constituted the main underlying reason for conflicts. Once European settlers arrived in Cape Town in the mid-seventeenth century the nature of political conflicts changed. Violent battles for subjugation were waged as the new colonizers increasingly moved into and occupied the interior of the country, suppressing any opposition that they met. The Dutch and British colonial governments that followed excluded South Africa s black population from government and rendered them second-class citizens, largely confined to tribal reserve areas. By the time colonial rule gave way to greater South African autonomy in 1910,

7 - 7 - white supremacy had become firmly entrenched and black resistance against white minority rule was mounting. The introduction of the apartheid system in 1948 further refined legislated racial segregation and exclusion. Political opposition to this system from disenfranchised black South Africans increased but remained mainly nonviolent in the 1950s and 1960s. However, nonviolent strikes and protest actions were increasingly met with violent state oppression. It was only in the 1970s and 1980s that state violence was increasingly met with popular insurrection and with violent responses, sometimes directed from exiled opposition groups. Similar to the experience in some North African countries, South Africa s minority government responded with coercive security measures, arresting and detaining thousands, but without addressing the underlying causes of the revolts. By the end of the 1980s South Africa s population was about 40 million, with Black South Africans constituting about 75 per cent of the population, Whites 14.1 per cent, Indians 2.6 per cent and Coloureds 8.5 per cent. 1 The country was racially polarized and within South Africa s black population, made up of about ten different ethnic and language groups, political differences were sometimes a cause of conflict. The late 1980s increasingly evidenced grim scenes of killings and burning of property that almost became a daily occurrence. The death toll from political violence 2 during 1989 was 1,403 persons. 3 Political violence had become a permanent feature of South African political life with frequent clashes taking place between township dwellers and apartheid security forces. International sports and cultural sanctions were in place and a partial economic boycott was applied. Many predicted a massive explosion, a devastating race war, and the destruction of South Africa, as it was then known. Underlying factors contributing to instability and violence Even though the underlying factors that made South Africa a conflict-prone society are probably unique to that country, there are aspects that are common to societies elsewhere. Three main reasons can be provided for the fragile nature of South African society in the 1980s and for its susceptibility to violence. The first is that South Africa is a deeply divided society, characterized by significant racial, religious, ethnic, and linguistic divisions. 4 Such societies are notorious for their political instability. Groups with a specific identity and a common set of grievances tend to mobilize support by appealing to those who identify with them culturally, racially, or on religious grounds. The second characteristic of South African society that made it more susceptible to instability and violent conflict was the modernization process to which its people had been subjected for 1 Development Bank of Southern Africa as cited on p. 9 in South Africa 1993, a pocket handbook issued by the South African Foundation. 2 In order to distinguish political violence from common criminal violence, the definition of political violence adopted for the purpose of this paper defines it as violent behavior, which is intended in some way to influence the political process. See Maxwell Taylor, The Fanatics: A Behavioural Approach to Political Violence (London: Brassey s, 1991), p. 7. See also Peter Gastrow, Bargaining for Peace: South Africa and the National Peace Accord (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995), p Gastrow,Bargaining for Peace, p Anthony S. Mathews, Freedom, State Security and the Rule of Law: Dilemmas of the Apartheid Society (Cape Town: Juta, 1986)

8 - 8 - several decades and which is still continuing today. The essential features of modernization have been described as rapid economic growth and the absorption of the masses into a modern economy accompanied by disruption of the traditional patterns of life, by urbanization and by large jumps in literacy, education and media exposure. 5 Modernization heightens the potential for disruption and violence in a deeply divided society because the many people who relocate to the more developed urban areas experience a new awareness of improved forms of life. They become aware of their relative deprivation. Traditional values, family life, and social institutions are disrupted and loose their binding influence. A third reason why South Africa in the 1980s was prone to conflict and political violence relates to the political developments that were taking place. The 1980s saw a change in the political mood in the country. It became increasingly clear that the apartheid system of racially based minority rule could not last. The reform measures introduced by the apartheid government during the 1980s were regarded by many as desperate ad hoc attempts to retain power whilst tinkering at the edges. The government had run out of options and there were increasing expectations that change was bound to occur. Black South Africans had raised expectations and felt that their circumstances would improve. White South Africans, on the other hand, became increasingly anxious about their security and about loosing their privileged positions. In the minds of the populace a transition had commenced, the nature and outcome of which no one could predict. There was no official signal that a political transition was on the way. The main antagonists, the National Party dominated government headed by President de Klerk and the range of opposition groups supported by black South Africans, were still firmly dug into their trenches without offering any substantial compromises that could break the deadlock. And yet, the political power equations were changing. The combined consequences of deep divisions, modernization, and political change therefore posed a serious threat to South Africa s stability. Political and strategic deadlock By1990 it had become increasingly clear that a political and strategic deadlock between the government and anti-apartheid forces had developed and that there appeared to be no way out of it. De Klerk s white minority government controlled substantial resources and had its hands on the levers of state power, but it had little public support or legitimacy and was isolated internationally. On the other hand, the leading political force opposing apartheid, the African National Congress (ANC), was still banned, had meagre resources, and was unable to get its hands on the levers of state power, but it enjoyed broad legitimacy, public support, and wide international recognition and backing. It became clear to the government that its coercive security option would not provide lasting solutions, and the ANC realized that its armed struggle was not capable of delivering victory. For both the government and the ANC the realization that they were moving into a political and strategic cul de sac was a gradual one. The key question that South Africans were asking themselves was: how do we get out of this dead end without civil war and destruction? 5 Mathews, Freedom, State Security, p. 284.

9 - 9 - What only became public years later was that secret informal contacts between the white minority government and ANC leader Nelson Mandela had been established 1984 while he was still in prison. In 1988 the first secret meeting took place between the Head of National Intelligence of the South African Government and imprisoned Mandela. They spoke about possible negotiations, but discussions were inconclusive. On the international level, dramatic developments such as the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War, were warning signals to South African political leaders that global power equations were changing and that it had become necessary for them to also adjust their thinking and their strategies. Release of Nelson Mandela While the unofficial political transition period in South Africa probably commenced during the mid-1980s, the official process of transition towards a democratic South Africa commenced on 2 February That was the day when President de Klerk opened Parliament and announced the unbanning of liberation movements such as the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), the release of political leaders from prison, and free political activity for all. The release of Nelson Mandela a few days later fuelled expectations of possible constitutional negotiations that would extricate South Africa from its political deadlock. But how could negotiations get off the ground after so many decades of bitterness, oppression, and revolt? The security responses attempted by the apartheid government had failed to address the underlying causes of tensions. Political responses were required. Experts argued that the instability inherent in a socially pluralistically society needed to be addressed through the introduction of constitutional mechanisms designed to reduce intergroup conflict and to maximise intergroup cooperation. 6 As far as the impact of modernization is concerned, the conflict that it generated needed to be anticipated and defused through deliberate political programs to incorporate the newly mobilized groups into political decision making at all levels. Many had their doubts as to whether a transition from a racially exclusive apartheid system towards a constitutional democracy would be possible after centuries of oppression. The role players 2. Transition from apartheid to a non-racial democracy After Mandela s release in February 1990 there was optimism that more stable times lay ahead. This optimism was soon bashed. The opposite happened. The unbanning of political groups and release of Mandela were followed by a dramatic increase in political violence. Fierce clashes between ANC supporters and supporters of the largely Zulu-based Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) took place. In many cases security forces played a sinister role of fuelling such 6 Mathews, Freedom, State Security, p. 284.

10 conflicts. They were generally more sympathetic towards the IFP because the ANC was regarded to be under the influence of communists and a threat to the future of white South Africans replaced 1989 as the worst year of political violence in modern South African history, with 3,699 persons killed- a 163 per cent increase over South Africans had to face the hard reality that a robust and high-risk transition lay ahead. Who were the main actors that were going to shape the transition towards democracy? President De Klerk s government De Klerk certainly had the support of the majority of whites and potions of minority Indian and Coloured groups. He had a powerful military and police force under his control and the business elites were closer to de Klerk than to the ANC. African National Congress (ANC) The ANC had been banned in the country since the 1960s and now, upon its return from exile, had to start afresh in establishing itself as a viable political organization internally. While in exile the ANC had mounted international campaigns against the apartheid government, but it had also kept close contact with powerful internal opposition groups such as labour organizations and the United Democratic Front, a coalition of civil society organizations. This enabled the ANC to associate itself with the widespread internal protests and popular insurrections from exile. The military wing of the ANC, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) or Spear of the Nation had substantial numbers of trained members based in various African states when the ANC was unbanned in MK had started with guerrilla attacks against government installations after its formation in 1961 but was soon declared to be a terrorist organization and banned by the South African government. Members of Umkhonto we Sizwe thereafter carried out numerous bombings of civilian, military, industrial and infrastructural sites. Its overall striking power did, however, not constitute a threat to the South African Defence Force, but significant resources were spent to counter its activities. Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) The third significant political factor was the IFP, which had its main support in the province of Kwa-Zulu Natal. Chief Minister Buthelezi, its leader, was head of a nominally selfgoverned territory inhabited mainly by members of the Zulu ethnic group. The ANC regarded Buthelezi as a sell-out to apartheid while Buthelezi resented the ANC s hegemonic approach. Civil society Civil society organizations constituted a powerful and vibrant sector in South Africa during the 1980s.They were independent but in general they were supportive of a negotiated new constitution, which would introduce a non-racial democracy with equal rights for all. This was what the ANC was standing for. They therefore tended to support ANC positions and strategies rather than those of the minority government. Their influence was significant. 7 South African Institute of Race Relations, Race Relations Survey 1991/92 (Johannesburg, 1992), p. 485.

11 Powerful labour unions with large black membership and strongly aligned to the liberation struggle, had already played a powerful role during the 1980s in mobilizing for mass strikes and stay-aways. Religious organizations such as the South Africa Council of Churches had also played an active role in mobilizing opposition to apartheid rule. Archbishop Desmond Tutu and other church leaders led defiance campaigns against apartheid laws such as segregated beaches. Human rights organizations provided legal assistance to victims of racial exclusion and challenged actions of authorities in courts. A debate about a new South Africa with equal rights for all and with a non-racial democracy had commenced in earnest within civil society. New energies were released and the commitment for change grew.universities and think tanks became involved in exploring policy options for the future, including new approaches towards policing and how to transform the military. The one component of civil society that was not necessarily sympathetic to the ANC was the business community. Overwhelmingly white, representative business organizations tried to straddle the gap between the ANC and the de Klerk Government by pushing for a middle road. However, as South Africa s economy was relatively developed and integrated into the international economy despite sanctions, the business sector had significant influence. The Police At the time of Mandela s release from prison in 1990, there were eleven police forces in South Africa, each governed by its own legislation and operating under its own separate mandate. 8 The largest of these was the South African Police (SAP) with approximately members. This was the so-called apartheid police force, which had played such a controversial role in enforcing apartheid policies. The remaining ten police forces were much smaller and were so-called homeland police forces, based in the patchwork of quasi independent states within South Africa created by the apartheid government. In total there were over police members in place in South Africa by in The SAP had over many decades developed into a force that focused on regime policing, with a specific task of containing and controlling black South Africans by keeping them subjugated. As a result the majority of South Africans had littletrust in the police.in general, white South Africans did not share the critical assessment of the police which the majority of black South Africans had. During the 1980s policing became strongly militarized with a focus on border control to ward off incursions by members of liberation armies based outside the country and on riot control within the country to counter internal insurrections. The greatest number of deaths and injuries during the 1980s occurred during confrontations in townships between protesting black South Africans and police contingencies intent on containing them with armoured vehicles and riot control methods that often involved violence. During this period, only one in ten members of the force were engaged in detecting and investigating real crime. The rest were busy with regime maintenance. 9 8 Janine Rauch, Police Reform and South Africa s Transition, Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconstruction, Johannesburg, 2000, p. 1. Available at 9 Mark Malan, Police Reform in South Africa: Peacebuilding without peacekeepers, African Security Review Vol 8 No 3, 1999, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria. Available at

12 It is important to stress that South Africa s security forces, primarily the police and the military, had throughout their history been strongly influenced by the British concept of professionalism and service dedicated to the government of the day. This had remained ingrained in many members of the police and the military. As a result of the historical impact of the British on South Africa s civil service, their influence on police discipline and policing culture, remained in place even though often in weak and distorted forms. This remained true despite South Africa s history of police abuses, racism, and political partisanship. It meant that relatively strong command and control over the police and the military was in place. The police served the government of the day and were not attached to de Klerk and his ruling party. However the personal sympathies of the overwhelmingly white Afrikaner-led police were either with de Klerk s government or to the right of it. The Military The South African Defence Force (SADF) was by far the dominant force in South Africa by The seven other ethnic homeland military forces were dwarfed in comparison and they tended to be pro South African government in any event. There were fears within the ANC that the military had the potential of undertaking a coup or of derailing the transition, but the professional command that was in place kept strictly out of the political wrangling and became involved only when security requirements determined that it should provide a back-up for the police. The military was therefore a powerful background factor. The challenge that lay ahead for the South African Defence Force was how to integrate members of the exiled liberation armies and the homeland armies into a new South African National Defence Force. But that was to be the subject of negotiations that lay ahead. Political violence, the police and civil society When Mandela was released there were on-going calls by some for the armed struggle against the apartheid regime to continue, while white right wing forces mobilized to block possible negotiations with the ANC,if necessary by force. 10 The calls from hardliners in both sides for an all or nothing approach did not enjoy broad support. The majority of South Africans preferred a negotiated settlement. However, before negotiations could commence, both de Klerk and Mandela faced a very different crisis that they had to attend to, namely the escalating political violence in the country. Supporters of the ANC and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) were involved, often fuelled by de Klerk s security forces. It became clear that none of the leaders of those implicated in the violence were able to discipline their supporters. In the face of these developments, the embarrassed political leadership began realising that they were incapable of stemming the violence on their own. For example, one day after Mandela and IFP leader Chief Minster Buthelezi met and announced a watershed agreement effectively outlawing violence, intimidation, and political intolerance among their followers a fierce battle between more than supporters of the ANC and the IFP took place in the province of Natal. At least 8 people 10 Throughout this paper I have relied, amongst others, on the content of an 8-page chapter that I contributed to a publication: People Building Peace: 35 Inspiring Stories from Around the World, published by the European Centre for Conflict Prevention, The Hague, May 1999, available at

13 were killed and about 56 houses burned to the ground. De Klerk faced growing allegations of third force involvement and of the active participation and fuelling of conflict by his security forces, something he denied. In bilateral meetings between him and Mandela they confirmed, our main concern was the on-going violence. 11 Three days after one such announcement, newspaper headlines proclaimed 100 dead in eight days of unrest on East and West Rand. The main leaders, Nelson Mandela (ANC), President de Klerk (National Party government), and Chief Minister Buthelezi (IFP), all had a similar concern, namely that the impact of the increasing violence was undermining their standing as leaders, albeit in different ways. Prior to 1990, the political violence had been relatively easy to explain because it in essence resulted from a revolt by disenfranchised black South Africans against the white minority government and its security apparatus. After the unbanning of political movements and the release of Nelson Mandela and other leaders in February 1990, the nature of the violence took on a very different shape. The state and its agents were no longer the prime targets although, as it has turned out, state agents linked to security forces of the government continued to influence and fuel the violence. Escalating political violence occurred in townships and some rural areas, increasingly pitting black supporters from rival political groups against each other. Increasingly the victims were black South Africans with hardly any white casualties. In addition, by mid-1990, the political violence spread from the province of Natal, where it had been shaped by clashes between ANC-supporting youth and Inkatha supporters, to other provinces. Clashes between rival groups were characterised by political intolerance, with both the ANC and the IFP establishing numerous no-go areas in which they had established hegemony and would not tolerate open political activity by the opposing political group. The ANC, which was struggling to find its feet after decades of being banned, underground, and in exile, therefore experienced the violence as debilitating and undermining of its attempts to establish grassroots structures. Frene Ginwala, at the time the Head of Research for the ANC, reflected on these events and concluded that: Apart from the human aspect, the frightening violence made it difficult for the ANC to organise. It worked, and still works to intimidate and frighten people from showing their political allegiance or expressing their views, and it undermined the climate of free political debate that was required for negotiation. 12 As the death rate rose during 1990, political, business, and religious leaders became increasingly desperate at the seeming inability by government and political leaders to curb the spiralling political violence. Constitutional negotiations had not yet commenced and it was clear political leaders would have to manage the coming transition more effectively, and that rules of conduct would have to be agreed upon. The frustration among influential sectors of civil society was illustrated in a statement issued by the South African Council of Churches describing political leaders as impotent to stop the violence an embarrassment to any political leader keen to project power and influence over supporters. In this environment leaders of the conflicting 11 Gastrow, Bargaining for Peace, p Norman Etherington, ed., Peace, Politics and Violence in the New South Africa, Hans Zell Publishers, London, 1992, p. 9

14 parties could not commence with serious constitutional negotiations. That is why they focused on the violence and instability during their bilateral meetings. With political leaders apparently helpless in the face of the violence, the initiative to try and save the political situation was taken by religious groups, business, and labour leaders. They proceeded to facilitate an amazing process which brought in the diverse political leadership of South Africa, and which led to the drafting and signing in September 1991, of a National Peace Accord. 3. Dialogue and negotiations during efforts to maintain stability Overshadowed by the growing political violence in the country, various initiative were launched to try and stem it and to develop a transition that would enable constitutional negotiation to begin. Some of the more important initiatives were the following: Bilateral meetings between political leaders (throughout 1990) A number of bilateral meetings were held between apartheid government (de Klerk) and the ANC (Mandela), the ANC and the IFP (Buthelezi), and between government and IFP, to discuss how tocreate a climate conducive to constitutional negotiations. However, they focused mainly on the political violence and hardly any progress was made with the central issue of constitutional negotiations and the political transition. Suspension of the armed struggle (August 1990) Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK)suspended armed operations on 1 August 1990 in preparation for the dismantling of apartheid and in anticipation of their integration into a new South African National Defence Force. The de Klerk government had regarded the possibility of armed operations by MK as a threat to peaceful negotiations. Religious groups attempt a national intervention (March 1991) Failure by political leadership to stem the violence lead to the South African Council of Churches (SACC), an umbrella body of many churches, to call for an urgent national meeting of all leaders of strife-torn communities in March However, the meeting failed to take place because the SACC, for many years a strong critic of apartheid, did not represent conservative Afrikaner churches and was distrusted by political opponents of the ANC, including Chief Minister Buthelezi, leader of the IFP. Facilitation by Business Community (March-May 1991) South Africa s mainly white business community was increasingly alarmed by the impact that political violence and the failure to commence negotiations had on economic prospects for the country. One interest group within the business community, namely the Consultative Business Movement (CBM) took up the challenge to seek a way out of the deadlock. CBM was a voluntary organization of senior and more progressive South African Business leaders who supported the need for fundamental transformation in the country. This was something that the much larger umbrella organization that represented commerce and industry nationwide, namely the South African Chamber of Business, was not very enthusiastic about.

15 Between March and May 1990, and in a low-key manner, CBM met to discuss the violence in the country with the ANC, South African Communist Party, IFP, cabinet ministers of the ruling National Party, and leaders of the main labour federations in the country. Nothing concrete emerged from the meetings but CBM was now considered to be a trustworthy dialogue facilitator. Failed Peace Summit by de Klerk (May 1991) De Klerk invited all political groupings in the country to a Peace Summit scheduled for May 1991 to discuss the alarming levels of violence. However, some major political forces such as the ANC declined to participate. They saw de Klerk as part of the problem of violence. His inability to deal with the violence through his government s security forces had highlighted his impotence. The Peace Summit was a non-event. Religious organizations and business open up a multi-track approach (May-June 1991) No bilateral meetings or single-organization-initiatives had until then succeeded in bringing South Africa s main political leaders together to talk peace. In informal and low-key discussions, leaders of the South African Council of Churches and the CBM explored options with civil organizations, labour unions, President de Klerk, Chief Minister Buthelezi, and with Afrikaner churches that had influence over the Afrikaner establishment. What they were seeking was an understanding for the need to call an inclusive peace meeting through the joint offices of the religious organizations and business. Despite some initial sceptical responses, broad acceptance was obtained for a June 1991meeting, referred to as a think tank for peace to which all relevant political groups and others would be invited. June Peace Meeting: the start of a national consensus(june 1991) While the violence was increasing, the Peace Meeting of 22 June 1991 was held behind closed doors in Johannesburg with business and religious leaders facilitating often-heated discussions. Participation was beyond expectation. Never before in South Africa s history had so many diverse political groupings met in one venue to talk about peace. For the first time representatives from the ANC, IFP and government were sitting around the same table to jointly talk about the violence. Only three small white right wing parties declined the invitations. Archbishop Tutu played a prominent role in the outcome: the acceptance of a programme that would result in a National Peace Convention being called to sign and ratify a national peace agreement. A preparatory committee was established and five working groups were appointed to address the following issues: - Group 1: Code of conduct for political parties - Group 2: Code of conduct for Security Forces - Group 3: Socio-economic development - Group 4: Implementation and monitoring - Group 5: Process, secretariat, and media There was an increasing realization that unless the National Peace Convention planned for September 1991 was successful, the chances of starting with constitutional negotiations were slim and so were the chances of peace and stability

16 National Peace Convention and National Peace Accord (September 1991) The National Peace Convention held in Johannesburg on 14 September 1999 was an extraordinary success. With the exception of three white minority right-wing parties, the national leaders of all South Africa s political groups attended. This had never happened before. For the first time Mandela, de Klerk and Buthelezi were together in one room, actually sitting next to each other. Many other leaders were present: trade unions, business community, diplomatic corps, traditional leaders, and newspaper editors. Political leaders signed the National Peace Accord in each other s presence and undertook to make it work. 13 The Accord provided for the establishment of a network of representative peace committees at national, regional, and local levels throughout the country.key for the purpose of this paper was that each regional and local peace committee was required to havepolice and military representatives on it.this initially created tensions but police presence on the committees was soon accepted as an asset. There were examples of political activists on the peace committee suddenly recognizing the police member on the committee as the person who had tortured or abused him in the past. The Accord further provided that basic democratic norms would have to be abided by during the transition, political intolerance would not be allowed, and dispute resolution mechanisms were built in, and a code of conduct was provided for political parties. Of great significance too, was a whole chapter in the National Peace Accord focusing on the manner in which the security forces were expected to operate during the transition. The fact that de Klerk, Mandela and Buthelezi were prepared to endorse and abide by these provisions was amazing. One should bear in mind that the police and military were key levers of power for de Klerk,while for Mandela and the ANC the police denoted a force involved in oppression and persecution. The code of conduct for the police set new agreed standards against which their conduct could in future be assessed.(chapters 3 and 4 of the Accord dealing with police conduct are annexed) By the time that the elections took place April 1994, more than two and a half years later,there were 250 local peace committees, 11 regional peace committees and 1 national peace committees in place in South Africa -a remarkable achievement. December: Constitutional negotiations commence(december 1991) Within three months after the signing of the National Peace Accord, political leaders turned their attention to constitutional negotiations. In December 1991, multiparty negotiations commenced with the first meeting of the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA), a forum of nineteen parties. The peace process leading to the signing of the Peace Accord had played an important role in getting the political groups that far. 13 The National Peace Accord is available at

17 The role of security forces The military were very much in the background during the transition period except for occasions where they were brought in to provide back-up to the police in the event of violence exploding. When a national day of protest was called, the military were in the background at mass rallies. In some areas, such as in the province of Kwa-Zulu Natal, the army was often preferred to the police when violent clashes between supporters of the ANC and IFP threatened to occur. When it became necessary for the security forces to prevent a threatening march of IFP supporters to an ANC area, the military were often regarded as more likely to stop the attack than the police. Many saw the police as sympathetic and partial to the IFP. Police conduct and the role of the police therefore remained controversial and polarizing throughout the transition. However the code of conduct for the police and the grievance procedures set out in the National Peace Accord (NPA) contributed to containing abuses and led to an increased use of agreed channels to lodge complaints and to discuss how to avoid violence in future. Despite the signing of the NPA, political violence escalated significantly and the police were increasingly being tasked to intervene when political rivalry between ANC and IFP supporters led to violence. These violent clashes remained concentrated in two regions where the political rivalry between the two political groupings was at its fiercest. A particularly brutal massacre occurred in June 1992 in which 48 people, mainly women and children were killed. In a night attack on shack dwellers inhabitants of Boipatong, a poverty stricken shack area south of Johannesburg, IFP supporters attacked residents indiscriminately. There were allegations that the police could have acted to avoid the high fatalities but did nothing to do so. The ANC was outraged by the massacre and withdrew from the negotiation process. It took to the streets involving hundreds of thousands in protest marches with a programme of "rolling mass action". This action met with tragedy when in September 1992, the army of the nominally independent "homeland of Ciskei opened fire on protest marchers, killing 28. This brought a new urgency to the search for a political settlement. Massacres similar to the Boipatong massacre occurred in other areas, often by unknown attackers. The involvement of a third force, intent on fanning violence for its own political purposes was often suspected but no concrete evidence was available. Elements of the police or the military were suspected of constituting such a state sponsored third force. These massacres contributed to an increase in the death toll during the year after the signing of the NPA.A total of 3,404 persons died in South Africa from political violence during the year after the signing of the National Peace Accord compared with 2,649 deaths the year before. 14 In addition to the code of conduct for the police, the National Peace Accord provided for the establishment of a structure that aimed at promoting more effective policing and better relations between the police and communities. A Police Boardwas proposed which would be composed of members of the public and police officers in equal numbers. The Police Board did not have a role 14 Gastrow, Bargaining for Peace, p. 77.

18 in the day-to-day functioning of the police but it could look at policing policies and practices and make recommendations to the minister in charge of the police that would improve the relations between the police and communities. The Police Board therefore complemented the code of conduct and further strengthened police accountability during the transition. Because the composition of the local and regional peace committees included members of the police and the military, the committees were often able to rely on cooperation from the police in defusing or avoiding violent conflicts. Examples of where local peace committees successfully addressed conflicts that could have resulted in violence included taxi wars between rival operators, consumer boycotts in some regions, hospital strikes, squatter problems in another region, civic municipal disagreements, church disputes, opposition to rate increases, disputes over grazing rights for cattle, and the many protest marches and other mass political gatherings throughout the country. For the first time in South Africa one saw local community and political leaders sitting down with the police to plan for the orderly running of a mass rally or protest march. A good example would be the role that the local peace committee and the police in Warmbad, a small conservative town in a rural area, played in defusing a conflict in April 1993 that could have resulted in bloodshed. Tensions in the adjoining black township of Bela-Bela ran high as a result of dissatisfaction with poor basic services and the rates that the white local authority of Warmbad had imposed for such services. A protest march by residents of Bela-Bela, organized by the local branch of the ANC, was planned to proceed from the township across the railway line to the municipal buildings in the white town of Warmbad. Permission for the march had been refused by the local authority of Warmbad and armed right-wing vigilante groups belonging to a white supremacist group, the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging (AWB) ( Afrikaner Resistance Movement ), threatened to use violence to prevent any march from crossing the railway line. On a Friday morning thousands of black residents marched towards Warmbad. Since a violent clash between the protesters and the armed right-wingers was expected, about fifty policemen were stationed at the railway line between the oncoming crowd and scores of supporters of the AWB. The right-wingers were threatening to call for reinforcements from the farmers and other supporters who had gathered in the town. Frantic members of the local peace committee managed to persuade the leaders of the march to pause shortly before they reached the railway line to attempt last-minute negotiations with the police and officials from the local administration. For ten hours thereafter the facilitator and members of the local peace committee criss-crossed the railway line in an attempt to facilitate an agreement that could defuse the impending clash. On a number of occasions the impatient crown threatened to proceed with the march, while the right-wingers waited, ready for action. Finally, at 6pm, an agreement was reached to postpone the payment of service rates. Armed with this agreement, members of the local peace committee managed to persuade the crowd, still in the thousands, to turn back to Bela-Bela. A crisis had been defused, the police had cooperated, no violence had taken place, and nothing was reported in the media as far as the public was concerned it had been a nonevent.

19 A major threat from conservative and right wing Afrikaners developed in March These groups had not participated in negotiations as they labelled the talks a sell-out to majority rule and the ANC. In the run-up to the elections, the radical right wing had significant support and posed a real threat. In March 1994 it came close to an outbreak of armed violence by thousands of disaffected Afrikaners. At that time, a retired former Chief of the South African Defence Force, Constand Viljoen, had the power to mobilize some 50,000 trained military personnel, capable of taking over large parts of South Africa. 15 In March 1994 he led several thousand white militia to protect one of the black homeland leaders against a popular uprising. The initiative failed because of the unexpected intervention of the small white supremacist group, the AWB. Constant Viljoen withdrew with his men and decided to participate in the forthcoming April elections. Many believe that his decision to take part in the election probably prevented a violent uprising of Afrikaners. Shortly before the April 1994 election, during March and early April 1994, a serious escalation of political violence suddenly occurred. With a nod from the ANC, de Klerk declared a state of emergency in the Province of Kwa-Zulu Natal and security forces were placed on alert. This is an example of security forces, although still overwhelmingly under the control of de Klerk s government, played a critical stabilizing role. An inexplicable change in the patterns of violence occurred during the last week before the election was due on 26 April Violence subsided. The four voting days that followed witnessed an almost eerie absence of political violence and death. This was a triumph for the transition. Shortly afterwards, at a grand inauguration ceremony where Nelson Mandela was inaugurated as South Africa s new president, the military provided the guard of honour and performed ceremonial duties including a fly-past of air force planes. The defence force, still under the same white leadership as under apartheid, now swore loyalty to the new black majority government. However, fundamental changes were awaiting both the military and the police in the years after Shaping the new constitution When constitutional negotiations, involving twenty-six political groups commenced at the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) in December 1991, there was still no clarity about the nature of the constitution that the main parties were striving towards. The twoyear constitutional negotiations under CODESA often became bitter and protracted. Disruptions such as the following almost led to the collapse of the talks: 15 John Battersby, Caroline Hooper-Box and Gill Gifford, Soweto bombs may have just been a dry run, IOL News, 2 November 2002, available at and Don Boroughs, Proving that one Man can make a Difference, US News and World Report, 16 May, 1999, available at