Industrial crisis and the change in industrial policy by local municipalities

Transcription

1 Industrial crisis and the change in industrial policy by local municipalities Henrik Lindberg The Ratio Institute, Stockholm, Sweden

2 Abstract The change in local industrial policy during the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s from a reactive and mostly passive policy into a more proactive policy with heavy involvement from the local municipalities in Sweden is often supposed to be of major importance. It was a significant institutional change that enhanced the local authorities, politicians and bureaucrats, to respond to industrial downturns. Municipalities and regions gradually got more involved in the industrial policy and in one dimension this could be seen as a response to the insufficient effect of the national industrial and regional policy. Why this specific policy changed is, however, not a well-understood phenomenon and neither is policy change on a more general level, despite the large amount of theories. One of the mainstream theories about policy learning makes clear that the crucial factor behind policy change is new ideas and concepts. In order to change the established paradigm for a policy area the basic premises must be challenged. This paper discusses how the formulation of a local industrial policy took place in a small industrially dominated Swedish municipality Söderhamn in the late 1970s and early 1980s. It is based on theories of policy learning under uncertainty and an underlying hypothesis that the policy change was preceded by a change in the prevailing ideas and concepts among the policymakers. Structural economic conditions are of major importance as a precondition for a policy change in this field but not the decisive factor. When the economic environment in Sweden changed and an economic crisis arouse this was a precondition for a more active industrial policy at the municipal level. However the restrictions for such a proactive policy were threefold. Firstly the juridical possibilities were quite limited. Second the capacity and resources were lacking and thirdly there were restrictions concerning the ideas and concepts about the crisis. The policymakers had to adapt to a new environment and a new view on economic growth, structural rationalization and the role of a local industrial policy in contrast to the role of the government. Since policymakers usually get their inspiration from and learn from their own experiences, the most recent events are naturally of most interest. These policymakers, politicians and bureaucrats, often act according to their perceptions of a similar happening. Decisions are not only made from rational judgments when different alternatives are judged from their consequences but also from rules and routines that are based on expectations and common norms inside the local community. Keywords: Industrial decline, policy change, ideas, industrial policy, local government, Söderhamn, Sweden. 2

3 Introduction 1 New ideas and policy change Ideas have an impact of political decisions in many ways (Blyth, 2002). First, ideas can serve as cognitive locks that help reproduce the existing institutions and policies over time. This is based on Peter Hall s often-cited work (1993) of policy paradigms and degrees of institutional change. Second, ideas serve as policy blueprints that provide political actors with a model for reform. The ideas offer a basic understanding of actors interests, institutional opportunities and the economic pressures at stake and this model helps actors to coordinate their efforts and build coalitions around common economic, social and political objectives. Third, ideas also constitute a powerful ideological weapon that allows agents to challenge the existing institutional arrangements (Blyth, 2001). Ideas may thus create a framework that changes the collective understanding of an existing policy, but they could also create a framework that helps the existing policy to reproduce over and over. The latter tend to be more common. Politics is not only power and a constant struggle between rival political or interest groups that fight for their own interests. It is also a product of uncertainty and some collective puzzlement. Actions are then often seen as correctives of perceived failings of previous politics. This leaves room for the policy middlemen bureaucrats and administrators that act as mediators for policy ideas and are adopting new techniques and adapting to domestic and foreign experiences (Heclo, 1974), (Greenaway, 1998). Periods of rapid change and crisis provide a window of opportunity for the introduction of new ideas and innovative policy instruments. This argument, made by Kingdon (1995) for example, in his policy streams model illustrate that some key policy entrepreneurs, i.e. people that are willing to invest resources in pushing proposals or problems onto the agenda can make a change in a short time. But the policy window may on the other hand not stay open 1 This paper is an attempt to draw more theoretical conclusions from a dissertation Att möta krisen. Politikbyte på lokal nivå under industrikrisen i söderhamn (2002). Therefore, much of the source material that is referred there is only mentioned as sources, and interviews here in this paper. 3

4 for long. This stresses the interrelationship between ideas and possible policy solutions in the context of an economic or political crisis. The literature on political learning or the term lesson drawing according to Rose (1993) or Heclo (1974), studies different historical events or processes, mostly on defense and foreign policy issues. This literature analyzes questions like how politicians learn, what type of information they learn from and what consequences these learning processes have. It points at the role for new ideas as a prerequisite for policy change. Policy learning takes place when those responsible for the goals or techniques of policy adapts in response to past experience and new information. Policy changes are the result of this learning process (Hall 1993). Thus, the change in behavior will be the indicator and we may only know that learning takes place because policy change takes place. (Bennett Howlet, 1992). According to Borchardt (1985), it would be absurd to assume that we never are able to learn from history. Instead expectations are formed from past events and institutions developed within the historical context. Uncertainty, the lack of knowledge and the case Politics takes place in a milieu that is filled with uncertainty. The consequences of your actions often cannot be anticipated. Ever since Herbert Simon (1957) it has been explicitly known that agents face uncertainty about the future and costs in acquiring information in the present. These factors limit the extent to which agents can make a fully rational decision, thus they possess only bounded rationality in Simon s terms. One of the reasons for this huge uncertainty is a basic lack of knowledge. This lack is partly explained by the severe restrictions on the decision-makers. There is seldom enough time to penetrate an issue and there is also the problem with the hasty changes in the surroundings that makes even the near future predictable. So the best and most used policy is status quo. Therefore there is a constant need for ideas and concepts that help people and primarily decision-makers to interpret this constantly changing milieu, decrease the lack of knowledge, and provide more reliable answers to the new policy issues. Ultimately this view is rationalistic, believing administrative decisions may be interpreted in terms of nested hierarchical structures where decision-makers decompose large problems into a series of smaller ones and routinize their solution through limited search strategies In short: Policy-makers, given 4

5 the inevitable limits on rational decision-making, nevertheless strive for making not the optimal decision but a satisfying decision (Simon, 1957). The case: The policy change and formulation of new ideas in Söderhamn This paper concerns the question of policy change at the local level in the small Swedish municipality Söderhamn. The issue at stake was the downturn in the major industries, paper, pulp and wood industry, which led to a crisis in the local economy and most notably a huge loss of industrial jobs during the 1970s and 1980s. This is the chief structural change in the political realm. In the early 1980s an institutional change in the form of major policy change took place in Söderhamn when, at the local level, an ambitious industrial policy evolved. This was also common in other Swedish municipalities of similar background and development, which also makes this case interesting from a more general perspective (Pierre, 1991). The objective of this paper is to look upon new ideas and the centrality of learning as the key-mediating variable between structural change and institutional change. From earlier research we know that the municipal capacity to perform a local industrial policy increased in the 1980:s. There was a decentralization of power from the central to the local level and parallel to this process many municipalities also took own initiatives. Some of the literature claims that this was because of the signals that were sent to the local authorities from the Government (Pierre 1992). This paper is an attempt to deeper investigate the formulation of a local industrial policy and the search for new ideas, by a case study 2, of the developments in Söderhamn in the late 1970:s and early 1980:s. Söderhamn and the industrial crisis in the 1970s Industrialization, economic expansion and the forest industry The Swedish economy, and the local economy of Söderhamn, seems to follow a cyclic pattern with returning structural crisis every 40-th or 50-th year. These structural crisis uses to tear down established structures in business and weaken established interests. The earlier expansive industries lack ability to transform or rationalize and soon become industries in 2 A good introduction to the method of case studies is Stake (1995). A defense for the method is Flyvbjerg (2003) 5

6 crisis with a need for political support, i.e. subventions, or drastic cost cuts to survive. This pattern has, according to Schön (2000), been a distinguishing feature for the Swedish economy during the late 19-th and 20-th century and there are clear traces of a similar pattern in Söderhamn. There, the forest industry had been in the center for the industrial and economic development since the latter half of the 19-th century. The small-scale sawmill industry that had been a minor sideline for farmers in the region became the basis for a major expansion in the 1850s. A few large-scale export-oriented sawmills expanded along the coastline as steam power was introduced in the industry. Just before the turn of the century the expansion continued with a new branch of the forest industry, paper and pulp mills that in many aspects, financially and technically, were followers to the old sawmill-companies. Around this period the Labour movement was established and in the early 1920s it came to power. In the 1930s the industrial expansion was directed towards the domestic market but still with the base in the forest industry. The domestically oriented sawmills, joinery shops and other forms of wood processing were a natural expansion as the old saw mills gradually were closed down. The paper and pulp industry expanded even more after the end of the Second World War. A cluster of interrelated companies and industries was developed where many of the engineering workshops and other of the non-forest companies were heavily tied to the forest industry in the region (Lindberg, 2002). The development in the 1970s and onwards showed a partly new pattern. Just like the crisis in the 1930s the industrial downturn in the 1970s was far-reaching. Between 1975 and 1995 the municipality Söderhamn lost more than half of its industrial jobs net. The lion s share of this was because of the restructuring in the forest industry and the enterprises connected to it. Not all sectors lost jobs and a small part of the industry also expanded the working force, but the destruction of old enterprises was much larger than earlier (Lindberg, 2002). 6

7 Table 1. Numbers of workers and the relative size of industries in Söderhamn Year Wo Wo % Wo Wo % Wo Wo % Wo Wo % Wo Wo % Mining , Food industry 124 2,5 84 1,9 40 1,1 41 1,5 56 2,3 Tex/ Clothes Wood industry , , , , ,1 Pulp/paper , , , , ,9 Chemistry 113 2, , , , ,8 Minerals 15 0,3 14 0,3 8 0,2 17 0,6 0 0 Metal/machine , , , , ,8 Other Total Source: Primary statistics from the Industrial statistics (IS) SCB The economic history of Söderhamn is in many aspects similar to the Swedish case and almost analogous to many other Swedish industrial communities. In essence it could be called a Sweden in miniature in these aspects. From the late 17:th century the economy was dominated by a small number of large firms inside the forest industry and enterprises connected to them as suppliers. Structural crisis had repeatedly caused rapid adaptations. But before 1970 the solution had always been inside the old established industries and been a part of something already known with the exception of the relocation of the wing F15 in 1945 and the component factory for LM Ericson in 1947 (Lindberg, 2002). Reaction to the crisis Before the industrial downturn in the mid 1970s the municipality Söderhamn had an underdeveloped local industrial policy and what existed was mainly a wish to attract skilled workers, rather than new enterprises. The future prospects were not ugly in any way according to the collected planning at the regional and local level. This may have been a factor that affected the plan of action (Lindberg 2002). The necessity of having the appropriate knowledge is often stressed in the literature; see for example Alsén Nilsson (1984). The way you act depend on how you estimate the future prospects. In general the prognosis gave support for an optimistic outlook, but in fact they often were more of visions than based on reliable data. In the middle of the 1970s the planning and prognosis thinking were at its heights in Sweden and until then there was a distinct growth 7

8 orientation and future optimism that was not to be challenged. The few industrial shutdowns in the early 1970s were not seen as a hunch of a coming crisis and even the unions showed no signs of concern or alarm. On the contrary the shutdowns in the forest industry in Söderhamn were seen as inevitable and part of a rationalization process directed towards large scale-factories and destruction of smaller units (Lindberg, 2002). The lack of reaction was evident and there were no defensive reactions in order to stop the shutdowns. Except for the Country Governor, Hans Hagnell none of the more influential regional or local policy-makers showed any concern or acted in a proactive way. Even the labour unions at the affected companies and workplaces were calm and awaited the changes without protesting or showing a more general concern of the jobs. The former quarter of a century had been so successful that a coming crisis was not expected (Lindberg, 2002). The initial phase confusion and lack of crisis instinct The literature on historical institutionalism seeks to explain how new ideas, once successfully institutionalized, affect policy outcomes. Through the mechanism path dependency policy making becomes possible mainly in terms of these ideas. There will be lock-in effects and the path dependency is an ideational rather than an ideational phenomenon (Blyth, 2001). So, what were the ideas that formed the mindsets of the policy-makers in the municipality of Söderhamn in the 1970s? In many ways it was a bunch of ideas that were dominant not only in Söderhamn, but also in Sweden as a whole. First, there was an inherent optimism about the future and economic prospects and this development optimism was dominant among both policymakers and business people. Second, the faith in large-scale production and big business in general was dominant. An underlying theme during 1930:ies and onwards among the Social Democrats and unions had been the promotion of business concentration and the encouragement of large-scale units in industry. This belief was also shared by the non-socialist parties, possibly except for the Centre party, and among the business elite, because of the wealth and growth promoting effects that it was supposed to have. Third, this large-scale model was also industry centered. The focus was on rationalization of all sectors, for example agriculture and handicraft that was not expected to contribute that much to the welfare and wealth in Sweden. Fourth, this model was also centered on an active and interventionist state. The ability to mobilize steer and control resources was seen as central in or- 8

9 der to promote both growth and equality, in regional and class terms (Lindberg, 2002). The arguments for a fast structural rationalization also had parallels in other parts of society, for example agriculture as Flygare Isacson (2003) has showed. The vision was a modern industrial society with production by large-scale units and coordination from above according to Magnusson (2000) and Benner (2002). As the information about continuing shutdowns and mergers in Söderhamn started to get more frequent in the late 1970s, protests emerged in a somewhat larger scale in the region. A merger between the two dominant enterprises in the forest industry Bergvik & Ala and Stora Kopparberg 1975 may be seen the starting point a period of great turbulence with occurring shutdowns. By then the shutdowns were interpreted as signs of a temporary slump in the local economy. In general this was also the major interpretation of the Swedish crisis at that time. In written memos, PM and forecasts there were little discussion locally concerning the nature of the crisis or if there was a mixture of structural reasons and temporary fluctuations in the market. Neither was there a search for knowledge among the local actors such as politicians, labor unions and other influential policy makers. In the initial phase the local authorities seems to have interpreted their role as an intermediary between local demands, mostly presented by the unions and politicians at a central level and enterprises. The vision among the local policy-makers in Söderhamn was not how to handle an upcoming crisis. It was in no way part of their conception, their preparation for a general economic decline was almost non-existent and there was no recent crisis to get inspiration from (Lindberg, 2002). The merger between Bergvik & Ala and Stora Kopparberg 1975 was the major starting point for the industrial crisis according to many sources, mostly interviews, and it is evident that the activities from the local policymakers as well as the local MP and country Governor was filled with concern (Lindberg, 2002). Critique started to spread about the real objectives from the large enterprises. The management at the large forest companies was accused as responsible first hand and the government in second hand. Examples of a restructuring in Wikmanshyttan where the management, also belonging to the Stora Kopparberg group, had spent large sums in creating replacement jobs, was often mentioned in the debate and used as a tool to put pressure on local policymakers and the forest companies (Lindberg, 2002). 9

10 Looking for help from big business and the state The crisis management could not start to evolve until the major actors in Söderhamn had accepted that the industrial decline was a fact. Until then no action could evolve. The ability to adapt to a new environment and respond to radically new challenges is in one sense dependent on the amount of information and how well it fits in with your general conception on the world. In periods of great uncertainty ideas may well reduce this uncertainty for under such conditions it is not obvious where the different agents, policymakers and interest groups for example, may actually lie and therefore what policy or type of institutions that may serve those interests. (Blyth, 2001), (Blyth, 2002). The overall thinking inside the industrial society of Söderhamn in the mid and late 1970:s was based upon some pillars that were tightly interconnected. The large-scale industrial companies and workplaces, centrally planned and managed, with an interventionist and supportive state was based on former experiences in Söderhamn during the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s. It may be hard to measure this in quantitative terms but the central municipal documents supported by interviews with the main policy-makers should make a good case. But this was also the typical reaction in general when local economies were struck by closures that led to a loss of jobs. The first defensive reaction tended to be heavy protests and attempts to stop the processes of closure or cuts in production. The local actors use to put pressure on those companies and, if that didn t seem to help, turn to the central authorities. Often a regional coalition was formed by politicians from the major parties, unions and other actors. In the next phase the government was put under pressure to assist with replacement jobs for those affected by the closures (Henning, 1987), (Mossfeldt, 1987), (Dahlgren Mårtensson, 1983). In Söderhamn this phase occurred after the initial mobilization of the actors. Generally it was the labour unions that first mobilized to meet the threat of job-losses. Soon demands were directed towards the large industries and the critique also affected the government that didn t do enough to stop to closures. After the unions the local politicians acted, but mostly together with the unions. Demonstrations were arranged and this was obviously the way the local municipality assumed they could influence. Few demands were directed towards the local politicians whereas influences from a similar industrial town (Vikmanshyttan) gave support for the view of a Government responsibility (Lindberg, 2002). 10

11 What were the forces that changed the overall ideas about the industrial crisis? Earlier research has often pointed at major crisis that in some way turn the tables and reshape the conditions (Jonung, 1999). The perhaps most robust result is that decision-makers tend to learn from earlier experiences (Jervis, 1976). The centrality of learning and search for new ideas in Söderhamn If the most important source of learning that takes place can be contributed to lessons from past experiences. Then: what is the character of this lesson drawing? Who is supposed to learn and what? Policymakers tend to be most likely to search for new ideas when there is significant public dissatisfaction with current policy, and start searching across space when structural change undermines the viability of doing everything that was done in the past (Rose, 1993). The stronger and more serious crisis, the more willingness to learn from the policymakers and the use of history, own or others, is a viable method to order the information flow and reduce uncertainty as well as costs for decisions and concrete measures. (Jervis, 1976). The crux is that history in itself does not give clear-cut lessons. Decisionmakers must interpret history from ideology, preconceived opinions etc. In Söderhamn the politicians and bureaucracy step by step became aware of the industrial crisis. Since they were informed of further close-downs or cuts in production and employment, their vision of the crisis a part of a recession started to be questioned. Whereas the Country Governor, Hans Hagnell, already from the beginning talked in terns of structural crisis, from 1978 and onwards these were the new currents in the debate. The first actor to point at this fact was the Social Democratic organization in Ljusne, besides one of the most affected villages in the municipality. Later that year the municipality talked in similar terms (Lindberg, 2002). However, there was no plan of what to do, or how to solve the problems yet. So far the only reliable plan seemed to be demands on the government and/or the big business in the municipality. The overall idea seems to have been to attract complementary industries that would compensate for the job losses inside the same sectors and from the same companies. The most useful idea was to have a paper mill built to get new jobs in replacement for the old lost ones. Since this question affected the main actors in Söderhamn, the unions, the politicians the local social democratic party and the municipal bureaucracy the planned paper 11

12 mill can be seen as the overall goal for their activities. The local government and the unions attempted in almost every possible way to persuade the central government to give its permission and convince or force the large forest companies to start building (Lindberg, 2002). The theory about policy learning to speak with Peter Hall (1993), makes clear that the crucial factor behind such change are new ideas and concepts that challenge the established paradigm. As long as the established paradigm in Söderhamn and the rest of Sweden see Benner (2002) claimed that industrial growth accompanied by of large-scale industrial production and central government involvement was the way to progress, the traditional local industrial policy was enough. Focusing on the forest industry and the large-scale production initially according to the sources (interviews with local union leaders) was also supported. But gradually it became obvious that the plans of a paper mill would not be continued. This failure was a terrible blow for the whole strategy in the local community. To continue expanding and processing the forest industry was no longer a serious alternative (Lindberg, 2002). Input of new ideas can also come from other sources then a major crisis. An unexpected such event happened in 1979 when a group of researchers with Marxist influences from the Royal institute of Technology (KTH) gave rise to a number of new ideas and concepts in the municipality. Their objective was to make a case study of the place and look for how municipalities with a dependence on large-scale industries would manage. How would they be affected by slumps and industrial downturn? They questioned and mistrusted the government as well as the large companies, and meant that the solutions of this structural crisis depended on local involvement. Their scenario was rather dismal and although the leading politicians repudiated their claims, local media high lightened their results and gave support (Maunsbach Philipson Eklund, 1980a), (Maunsbach Philipson Eklund, 1980b). In local study groups the KTH-report was discussed among mostly union-members, and some politicians also referred to the report and the KTH-group in their arguing for a more active local industrial policy, but without any trust in the central planning or demands for replacement jobs. Thus the result of their efforts was that people in organizations connected to the unions and Social Democratic party was mobilized. They started to discuss the causes of the crisis itself and possible solutions more frequently (Lindberg, 2002). 12

13 So, the search starts at a time when the old solutions had failed. And that was not before the old paradigm about industrial growth within a framework of large-scale industrial production and central government involvement had been questioned. In the following years, 1979 and 1980, the role of the local government was heavily debated. The unions and the party organization from the most hurt villages in Söderhamn had doubts about the prevailing strategy to solve the crisis. When the fundaments of the old more reactive and passive policy had been removed new ideas started to occur. The opponents argued that the local government should take more active measures to strengthen to local industry (Lindberg, 2002). Another source of learning or new ideas is supposed to be experiences abroad or in this case then experiences in other municipalities. Although this is supposed to be of less importance there is plenty of evidence for policy import or policy export. This phenomenon, called policy transfer can occur through either convergence emulation, where officials copy action taken elsewhere or some kind of elite networking, where convergence results from, for example, transnational policy communities (Bennett, 1991). After the former consensus cracked in Söderhamn in the early 1980:s considering the nature of the crisis and the possible solutions there are clear signs of a awakening interest in other municipalities and their efforts to become more active in their local industrial policy. Conferences were held with the Swedish Association of Local Authorities, which was a formal association of Sweden s primary local governments with the aim to provide them with services and promote inter-municipal co-operation (Pierre, 1994). The courses and conferences they attended in 1978 and 1981 was primary directed towards local industrial policy and economics director in the municipality of Söderhamn, Karl-Evert Nordin, in interviews claimed that these courses were an important source of new information and new ideas. Furthermore the exchange at an elite level with other municipalities also took other forms. Study trips were arranged and the local policy makers went to other municipalities that also were hurt by the industrial downturn. The lack of documentary along with the visits around Sweden with the purpose of meeting with others in the same situation hinders the interpretation but also here the interviews makes clear that impulses to a more active local industrial policy were the aims with these trips (Lindberg, 2002). 13

14 Conclusion and reflection According to Breslauer (1991), the highest magnitude traumas directly experienced are the main driving forces and the most analogous such events in Söderhamn may well have been the shutdowns. Since the history of Söderhamn was so tightly connected with industrial success, growth and the formation of new jobs in the forest industry it must have come as a shock when the crisis of the 1970:s did not grow weaker but instead only got worse. From the interviews made and the written source material as memos, PM and letters there is no dramatic change in any event but since the economic crisis and loss of jobs was so severe and deep the incentives to reformulate the overall plan of action rapidly grew stronger in the late 1970s. Before a new policy can be implemented the major decision makers, mainly in the local government must be prepared mentally. The attempts to think different about the ongoing crisis, the possible solutions and the role of local politics took place at the same time as the municipality acted to promote a more active local industrial policy. This occurred as the incitements to or driving forces to learn and make a policy change was strengthened. Primarily the decision-makers, and this was a tiny but tightly interconnected group, was gradually aware that the crisis was structural. Secondly, the experience of the earlier policy with attempts to stop the processes of closure was more or less a failure. They tried to catch a straw with the paper mill, but after that the established interests in Söderhamn had no emergency exit. Considering local politics, and politics in general, as a process of solving puzzles in a world of uncertainty the reactions of the major decision-makers in Söderhamn makes sense. Status quo is the rule and policymakers are reluctant to all challenges to the old policy. If new insights and new experiences change old assumptions there is, under some circumstances, room for innovations and renewal in the policy area. The harsher the experiences are, the more challenges to the existing policy. The culture of decision-making in the municipality was, from many reasons, inclined towards consensus. In terms of a local identity based on common ideals and firm ethical standards, the process of a policy change went easily and smoothly. The small numbers of important policymakers made it easy to change policy and adapt quickly. 14

15 Literature and sources Alsén, Göran Nilsson, Anders (1984), Den kommunala handlingsrepertoaren ur Leif Melin (red) Kommunerna och näringslivet. Ett näringslivspolitiskt dilemma, Stockholm. Benner, Mats (2002), Kunskapsmetropolerna tar revansch på den politiska makten Axess 2002:3. Bennett, Colin J (1991), Review article: What is Policy Convergence and what causes it?, British Journal of Political Science Vol. 21, No. 2 (Apr., 1991), p Bennett, Colin J Howlet, Michael (1992), The Lessons of Learning: Reconciling Theories of Policy Learning and Policy Change, Policy Sciences 25, p Blyth, Mark (2001), The transformation of the Swedish model: economic ideas, distributional conflict and institutional change, World Politics, vol 54, no 1: p Blyth, Mark (2002), Great Transformations: Economic Ideas and Institutional Change in the Twentieth Century. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2002 Borchardt, Knut (1985), Can societies learn from economic crisis in German Yearbook on Business History 1984, p Breslauer G. W. (1991), What have we learnt about learning? Chap 21 in (ed) G. W. Breslauer and P. E. Tetlock. Dahlgren, Lars Mårtensson, Bo (1983), Sårbarhet och självtillit tankar om krisen och lokalsamhället, Oslo. Flyvbjerg, Bent (2003), Fem missförstånd om fallstudieforskning Statsvetenskaplig Tidskrift 2003/4:3 Hall, Peter (1993), Policy paradigms, social learning and the state. The case of economic policymaking in Britain. Comparative politics 25. Heclo, Hugh (1974), Modern Social Politics in Britain and Sweden. From relief to Income maintainance, Yale, New Haven and London. Henning, Roger (1987), Näringspolitik i obalans, Stockholm. Isacson, Maths Flygare, Irene (2003), Jordbruket i välfärdssamhället, Det svenska jordbrukets historia band 5, Natur & Kultur. Jervis, Robert (1976), Perception and Misperception in International Politics, Princeton University Pressm New Jersey. Johansson, Anders L Magnusson, Lars (1998), LO under andra halvseklet, Stockholm. Jonung, Lars (1999), Med backspegeln som kompass om stabiliseringspolitiken som lärprocess ESOrapport DS 1999:9. Stockholm. Jordan, Andrew Greenaway, John (1998), Shifting Agendas, Changing Regulatory Structures And The 'New' Politics Of Environmental Pollution: British Coastal Water Policy, , Public Administration 76:4, p Lindberg, Henrik (2002), Att möta krisen Politikbyte på lokal nivå under industrikrisen i Söderhamn , Ekonomisk-historiska institutionen, Uppsala universitet, Uppsala. Magnusson, Lars (2000), Sveriges ekonomiska historia, Stockholm. Maunsbach, Tore Philipson, David Eklund, Peter (1980a), Framtidsplanering i kommuner med strukturproblem Rapport 2, KTH, Stockholm. Maunsbach, Tore Philipson, David Eklund, Peter (1980b), Framtidsplanering i kommuner med strukturproblem rapport 3: Söderhamn: nuläge och framtid, KTH, Stockholm. Mossfeldt, Peter (1987), Bevarande eller förnyelse om aktörsroller och inflytande vid industriavveckling, Forskningsrapport 5 Arbetslivscentrum, Stockholm. Pierre, Jon (1991), Kommunernas näringspolitik (ed) Jon Pierre Självstyrelse och omvärldsberonde. Studier i lokal politik, Lund. Pierre, Jon (1992), Kommunerna, näringslivet och näringspolitiken Sveriges lokala politiska ekonomier, Stockholm. Pierre, Jon (1994), Den lokala staten den kommunala självstyrelsens förutsättningar och restriktioner, Stockholm. Rose, Richard (1993), Lesson-drawing in Public Policy. A Guide to Learning across Time and Space, Chatham House Publishers, New Jersey. Schön, Lennart (2000), En modern svensk ekonomisk historia: tillväxt och omvandling under två sekel. Stockholm. Simon, Herbert (1957), "A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice", in Models of Man, Social and Rational: Mathematical Essays on Rational Human Behavior in a Social Setting. New York: Wiley. 15

16 Stake, Robert E. (1995), The Art of Case Study Research. Thousend Oaks, Sage. Public statistics Sveriges officiella statistik (SOS), Primary statistics from the Industrial statistics (IS)