STATE BUILDING IN THE FACE OF INSURGENT ISLAM

Transcription

1 Central Asia 199 CENTRAL ASIA STATE BUILDING IN THE FACE OF INSURGENT ISLAM Gregory Gleason ABSTRACT The moderate Muslim states of Central Asia have a critical role to play in the war on terrorism. Notwithstanding their importance, the establishment of U.S. bases, expanded U.S. aid programs, and the conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom has not been sensitive to these countries political agendas. Lingering instability in Afghanistan poses crucial problems for eliminating terrorist networks in Central Asia, as well as confronting the northward flow of drugs. Following several years of close ties with the United States, Central Asian states have indicated a willingness to work among themselves to solve regional problems, while at the same time reorienting their strategic relationships toward Russia. U.S. policy should continue to support Central Asian states in their struggle against terrorism, and increase emphasis on the vital importance of normalization of Afghanistan for Central Asian stability. Gregory Gleason is a Professor of Political Science and Public Administration at the University of New Mexico and Faculty Associate at the Center for Middle Eastern Studies at the University of Chicago.

2 200 Strategic Asia Introduction The five Central Asian states Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan became independent following the collapse of the Soviet Union in The United States was among the first to recognize the sovereignty of these new states, and began providing foreign aid, mainly humanitarian and economic assistance. Gradually it expanded programs of military and security cooperation as well. Much of the motivation for U.S. security assistance centered on the problems of Afghanistan and threats to international security in the South Asian region. With the September 11 terrorist attacks, U.S. assistance to the Central Asia region accelerated rapidly, and was warmly welcomed. The Central Asian countries were quick to demonstrate their support for the U.S.-led coalition that launched Operation Enduring Freedom to liberate Afghanistan from the Taliban. Pledging to set high standards for themselves and to work against extremism in governance while promoting civil rights and economic openness, the Central Asian states entered into a coalition of the committed in the war on terrorism. Nearly three years after the start of the war on terrorism, this coalition has begun to show signs of stress. In many respects the Central Asian states have fulfilled their commitments in the struggle against political extremism and terrorism. They have been stalwart allies in opposing terrorist movements, made their airspace available for Afghanistan-related military operations, and two Central Asian countries Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan have made their territory available for military bases for these operations. The Central Asian countries have collaborated in key international security initiatives such as NATO s Partners for Peace program, they have been willing to share information, and they have generally worked cooperatively against the common threat of terrorism. But the Central Asian countries have also interpreted many of their commitments in ways that differ from Washington. The Central Asian countries, particularly Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, have adopted expansive definitions of terrorism that often cover other political opponents as well. Uzbekistan s energetic anti-terrorism campaign prompted international criticism and pressure. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) concluded in April 2004 that Uzbekistan had failed to make sufficient progress toward democratic ideals, and discontinued certain forms of lending. The U.S. State Department announced in July 2004 that it could not certify Uzbekistan s compliance with human rights standards and also discontinued certain forms of assistance. 1 The Central Asian governments have reacted diffidently to U.S. criticism of their poor record in human rights and political liberalization, often to the point of accusing Western countries of excessive zeal in de-

3 Central Asia 201 fending human rights. 2 More recently, the Central Asian states have begun to reappraise their international relationships in ways that suggest their willingness to seek new solutions to their regional security problems. The participation of the moderate Muslim countries of Central Asia in the anti-terrorism alliance is important. To defeat terrorism, the United States must succeed in its military operations. But victory on the battlefield is not enough. The political doctrines that stand behind the terrorists must be overcome if the war on terrorism is to succeed. As moderate Muslim societies, these Central Asian countries offer the Muslim world a moderate alternative to Muslim extremism. This chapter analyzes the role of the Central Asian states in the war on terrorism, both in terms of how the countries are influencing the war and the effects of the war on the countries themselves. Beginning with a survey of Central Asia prior to the events of September 2001, it asks what the U.S. interest in the region was prior to the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom. The next section assesses the status of the war on terrorism within Central Asia. It describes the insurgency in Central Asia, the counter-insurgency efforts mounted by the Central Asian states, and the political agendas of the terrorists. The chapter concludes with a consideration of the future challenges in the struggle against terrorism, emphasizing three key challenges facing policymakers: normalization in Afghanistan, maintaining the momentum of the moderate Muslim countries in their struggle to combat terrorism, and devising more innovative attempts to promote regional security cooperation in Asia. On balance, U.S. policy generally has been insensitive to the complexity of the countries agendas in cooperation in the war on terrorism. This has led to misperceptions and unrealistic expectations on the part of all parties. U.S. policymakers should not assume that other countries accurately interpret U.S. actions. The discussion of Georgia s Rose Revolution that took place in Russian-language publications within Central Asia portrayed the United States as responsible for engineering the succession. 3 This interpretation of Georgian events, as a leading U.S. policymaker acknowledged, had huge reverberations throughout Central Asia and is one example of how U.S. actions can be misconstrued. 4 U.S. policy has also underestimated the role of Russia in the region. Russia has a positive role to play, and a well-designed policy should take this into account. More important, Russia has resources that enable it to play a spoiler in a way inimical to U.S. interests. Finally, U.S. policy in Central Asia continues to underestimate how critically important normalization in Afghanistan is for economic and political development in the Central Asian states. Access to world markets is

4 202 Strategic Asia the path to development in Central Asia. It is more than a decade since the Iron Curtain has been drawn open for the Central Asian states, but they are still hemmed into the old Soviet space by lack of infrastructure and by disorder in Afghanistan. Pacification in Afghanistan will do far more to help the Central Asian states that any other form of assistance. Central Asia Before the War on Terrorism Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan were conceived during the Soviet period. None of these republics existed as independent states prior to that time. These socialist republics were regions managed by Moscow s political authorities. Little republic-to-republic interaction took place, and the region was physically separated from the rest of the world by nearly impassible southern and eastern Soviet frontiers and by decades of northward-oriented infrastructure development. Central Asia is linguistically and culturally diverse. The largest ethnolinguistic groups are the Turkic-speaking peoples, the Karakalpak, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Uzbek, Uighur, and Turkmen. Uzbekistan and Tajikistan also have a large population of Farsi-speaking Tajik. Russian-speaking Slavs also comprise a significant population in the region. There are politically charged separatist and irredentist demands in the region, particularly the Uighur population centered in the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region of China. There is determined effort at national consolidation in each of the countries, but there is still little correspondence between ethnographic and political boundaries. There are many other ethno-linguistic groups in Central Asia, including Iranians, Kurds, Chinese, and Koreans. Often the national or ethnic identity appears to be less important than clan, tribal, regional, or even village association. When the Soviet Union came apart in December 1991, the collapse was celebrated less in the Central Asian countries than in Moscow. A popular referendum conducted in all the republics in March 1991 had expressed strong support for maintaining the Soviet Union. While there were nationalist stirrings in Central Asia during the latter years of the Soviet Union, these were hardly political independence movements or anything that resembled the determined nationalism of the Baltic countries. Initially, political development was oriented toward liberalization and modernization. Each of the republics communist party leaders quickly donning robes of nationalist protectors of the interests of the newly independent states spoke out in favor of the establishment of secular, democratic, independent governments, market economic relations, and foreign relations recognizing international standards. Kazakhstan s Nursultan Nazarbaev was the most forthright of the leaders in this regard, explaining to his colleagues and

5 Central Asia 203 fellow citizens that the rejection of communism and the adoption of international standards was merely common sense. 5 The countries became members of major multilateral international organizations, joining the United Nations, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund in All five nations joined the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development in 1992, and all but Turkmenistan joined the Asian Development Bank. The countries engaged in the process of accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO). 6 Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan made progress toward adopting international standards of good governance, including tax laws and civil codes that were considered to be among the best of the post-communist world. Uzbekistan, despite a continuing inability to liberalize prices and adjust its currency to international practice, strove energetically to develop a commercially-oriented welfare state. Tajikistan, torn by war and internal divisions, moved in the direction of national reconciliation following a series of ceasefire agreements with the opposition and then, in June 1997, the signing of a peace accord and a pact for national reconciliation. Even Turkmenistan, the least successful in making the transition to an open, modern society, made some headway in attempting to harmonize its laws with international practice. While important elements of economic and structural reform were put in place, true democratic reform proved elusive for the countries. Today presidents govern all the states of Central Asia, 7 and each country holds regularly scheduled elections. However, none of the governments have satisfied international standards for free and fair elections, nor do any have an independent judiciary or a functioning legislature with true powers of the purse. Even in the most open and liberal of the countries Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan the parliaments have been routed by presidential decree. Central Asian states were not similar in their paths of political and economic backsliding. The Uzbekistan government, under the leadership of former party chief Islam Karimov, adopted a populist authoritarianism. Announcing the goal of establishing a market economy and democratic form of government, the Karimov regime went on to adopt paternalist social policies, protectionist economic policies, and rigid, authoritarian political policies. The government pursued foreign economic policies that stressed a gradual, step-by-step approach to the adoption of macroeconomic reform and market-oriented structural reforms. A political opposition did emerge, but the leading faction of beneficiaries of the old Soviet system used their established influence to quickly brush the opposition aside. The constitution adopted in December 1992 merely institutionalized the existing power structures and political system. A decade after independence, politics is far from pluralistic or competitive in Uzbekistan.

6 204 Strategic Asia Kazakhstan at independence set out on a reform-oriented course, withdrawing from the ruble zone, eliminating subsidies, liberalizing prices, and privatizing most of the economy. It adopted a modern civil code, setting the framework for commercial transactions and property rights, and establishing a modern banking system, a securities exchange system, bankruptcy legislation, and a system of public utilities management. The Russian default in 1998 had immediate consequences for Kazakhstan, but despite pressure, the Nazarbaev government maintained support for post-communist reform. At the critical juncture following the Russian financial collapse, when some Central Asian politicians were arguing for the adoption of a neo-mercantilist Asian path, Nazarbaev held firm to the reform programs, pledging to continue the promising advances toward an independent, open and free market economy. 8 Nevertheless, Nazarbaev came under criticism for monopolizing political power, not curbing corruption, and giving in to clanism and Suhartoism. 9 Kyrgyzstan also adopted a liberalizing, pro-democratic posture at independence. The country s pro-reform leader, Askar Akaev, quickly established an impressive record of encouraging political and economic liberalization. In foreign trade liberalization, Kyrgyzstan s early record of achievement was unmatched. Kyrgyzstan was the first ex-soviet republic to follow the advice of the international donor community and withdraw from the ruble zone. It was also the first to adopt a Western-style civil code and a modern legal and regulatory framework, to liberalize prices, overhaul its financial and banking system, privatize large industrial facilities, and adopt a relatively open, competitive political system. 10 In 1998 a constitutional change made Kyrgyzstan one of the first post-soviet republics to sanction private ownership of land. It was also the first post-soviet country to join the WTO. Largely thanks to the efforts of Akaev, Kyrgyzstan s proreform posture quickly made the country a favorite of the international donor community. But even with large levels of foreign aid, the promised benefits of rising prosperity remained elusive for the majority of the country s citizens. 11 Were it not for foreign aid, Kyrgyzstan s domestic reform efforts might not have been politically sustainable. Tajikistan is the smallest and most constrained of the Central Asian states, and after independence the country entered a downward spiral of conflict and economic travail that has made it one of world s poorest countries. 12 The country divided along regional lines in 1992, and Russia and Uzbekistan intervened to support a coalition from the north and south led by Imomali Rakhmonov. With Russian support Rakhmonov managed to retain power in the capital throughout a period of tense standoff with the opposition that controlled outlying regions of the country. The standoff

7 Central Asia 205 Table 1. Population and Labor Force Distribution (m), 2001 Kazak. Kyrgyz. Tajik. Turk. Uzbek. Total Population Labor Force Employed Agriculture/Forestry Industry Other sectors Source: Compiled from Key Indicators 2003: Education for Global Participation, Manila: Asian Development Bank, was resolved in a UN-engineered peace settlement in June In that agreement, the government reached an accommodation with key opposition leaders, signed a peace accord, and established a process of national reconciliation. The civil war compressed an already collapsing economy, which is today based primarily on subsistence agriculture, foreign assistance from donor organizations, barter relations with neighbors, and the commercial export of a few commodities. As much as 80 percent of Tajikistan s foreign exchange earnings result from sales of three commodities: aluminum, cotton, and illegal drugs. Russian troops have remained in Tajikistan since helping Rakhmonov gain power. Under a 1993 agreement, a Russian-controlled force (the Russian 201st Motorized Division) polices Tajikistan s 1,350 km border with Afghanistan. While the 201st was originally made up primarily of Russians, over the years the number of Russians has declined to the point where the bulk of the soldiers, probably 80 percent, are Tajik citizens. The Tajikistan government has been pressuring for a re-negotiation of the arrangement. The current plan is for control of the border to be handed over fully to the Tajikistan government by May Turkmenistan was one of the most underdeveloped regions of the Soviet Union. But with an estimated 71 trillion cubic feet in natural gas reserves, Turkmenistan is the second largest natural gas producer in the former Soviet Union and the tenth largest in the world. 13 The country s gas revenue provided the basis not for broad-based prosperity but rather for an intense, highly personalistic nationalism revolving around the country s Soviet-era communist boss, Sapuramat Niyazov. Niyazov adopted an assertive posture of national self-reliance based on its gas and oil wealth, which he termed Turkmenistan s positive neutrality. Despite this, much of Turkmenistan s population (48 percent by World Bank estimates) is living below the poverty level. 14 The international development community has not been satisfied with Turkmenistan s progress toward the adoption of democratic norms of policy and practice. In April 2000 the EBRD took

8 206 Strategic Asia the unprecedented step of suspending its public-sector lending programs to Turkmenistan on the basis of the government s unwillingness to implement agreed upon structural reforms. 15 Changing U.S. Interests in Central Asia Soviet Central Asia had long been of interest to U.S. foreign policy planners because of the geo-political relations between the Soviet Union and its southern neighbors. From a strategic point of view, America s interest in the region grew less significant after the Cold War. The United States opened embassies in each of the new capitals, but their roles were limited, primarily oriented toward routine consular affairs and overseeing humanitarian assistance and other aid. The purpose of foreign aid freedom support was to help in the post-communist transition and provide a mechanism for Washington to remain engaged in some minimal way. 16 Soon after independence, Kazakhstan returned its stockpile of Soviet-era strategic nuclear weapons to Russia and destroyed many of its military facilities. In the other Central Asian states many military facilities fell out of use and into disrepair. U.S. economic ties with Central Asia did not play a major role, nor, with the exception of the energy sectors in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, were they expected to play an important role in the future. U.S. assistance policy was Russo-centric in the early post-communist period, guided by two apprehensions. First, there was a fear of communist recidivism in the early period of transition. The Russian transition was center stage; what happened in Central Asia was less significant. If the Russian transition failed, the fate of democracy in the Central Asian countries would probably be sealed anyway. The fear of Russian recidivism soon proved unfounded. Second, there was an apprehension that Russia would reassert control over the near-abroad former republics. U.S. policymakers routinely underscored their support for independence and sovereignty, meaning the right of the newly independent states to live without fear of Russian domination. As the years passed and neither communist recidivism nor Russian domination led to confrontations in Central Asia, Washington s focus on the region waned. 17 The September 11 attacks transformed U.S. policy toward Central Asia virtually overnight. The United States requested and received offers to use a logistical base in southern Uzbekistan (dubbed K2 ) near the Afghanistan border at a former Soviet-era air base near Karshi, at Khanabad. The United States was also offered a base located at the Manas International Airport near Bishkek. 18 According to official figures, Ganci Air Base has about 1,500 soldiers, but the figure is much higher than that as troops transit in and out of Afghanistan.

9 Central Asia 207 The United States invited Kazakhstan s Nazarbaev, Uzbekistan s Karimov, and Tajikistan s Rakhmonov to the White House. Kazakhstan concluded a new strategic partnership with the United States, having previously concluded one in While the Central Asian countries faced very different development and foreign policy challenges, they were united in supporting U.S. resolve to fight terrorism and address what they viewed as the legacy of Afghanistan. Legacies of Afghanistan From the point of view of the Central Asian states, the war on terrorism is a guerrilla struggle against insurgents. This struggle has its origins in Afghanistan. Following the overthrow of King Zahir Shah of Afghanistan in 1973 and six years of political instability, the Soviet government forcibly intervened in 1979 to create an Afghan government loyal to Moscow. Facing mounting costs, however, and unable to cultivate a stable, pro-moscow government, the Soviet Union withdrew its troops in Afghanistan quickly collapsed into civil war and regained only partial unity when the Taliban rose to power in the mid-1990s. Opposition to the Taliban remained active, however, particularly in the northern and eastern part of the country. Commander Abdul Rashid Dostam s National Islamic Movement, consisting heavily of ethnic Uzbeks, controlled several north-central provinces. After the September 11 attacks, these Northern Alliance leaders were able for the first time to secure U.S. military assistance in addition to previous Russian, Iranian, and Indian support aid that in conjunction with Operation Enduring Freedom would lead to the final demise of the Taliban leadership in Kabul. The years of Taliban rule have had a major impact on Central Asian affairs. Fear of Taliban s extremist doctrines was one of the key factors in resolving the Tajikistan civil war in The Taliban s provision of sanctuary for Uzbek insurgents helped to forge a consensus for regional cooperation among the Central Asian powers. And the Taliban made partners of Russia and the United States the joint sponsors of UN Resolutions 1267 and 1333, which demanded the elimination of opium production and the extradition of Osama bin Laden. Armed with the support of their Taliban patrons, the Uzbek insurgents who had been training in Afghanistan began returning to Central Asia with the intention of overthrowing the Uzbekistan government. The return of the Uzbek insurgents followed a period of extreme tension between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. In the fall of 1998 a former commander in the Tajikistan civil war attempted to take control of the city of Hujand in northern Tajikistan. The coup was crushed but gave rise to acrimonious claims

10 208 Strategic Asia that Uzbekistan officials had supplied the Hujand mutiny. In the context of this animosity between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, rebels returning from Afghanistan gathered in Tajikistan and planned a take-over of the Uzbek government. Calling themselves the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), insurgents exploded a series of bombs in downtown Tashkent in February 1999, killing sixteen. If the government s account of the events is accurate, a bomb narrowly missed claiming the life of President Karimov. In the summer of 1999 IMU chief Juma Namangani led a brigade of insurgents from Tajikistan into staging areas in Kyrgyzstan in preparation for a major assault on Uzbekistan s Fergana Valley. 20 As they moved down through the Altaisky mountain range into the ill-defined border areas of Kyrgyzstan, the rebels captured a number of Kyrgyz villages, taking villagers hostage and, inadvertently, a group of four Japanese traveling geologists who were in the area at the time. The seizure of foreign hostages quickly escalated into an international incident, focusing the attention of major world governments on the potential for instability in the region. Following a tensely negotiated bargain, the hostages were released, the rebels reportedly received a ransom, and Tajikistan government troops reportedly gave the insurgents safe passage through Tajikistan to Afghanistan. The following summer, in August 2000, IMU insurgents again returned through Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, advancing to within 100 km of Tashkent where they were repulsed. Months later reports circulated that the insurgents had established a staging area in a remote region of central Tajikistan. 21 The Tajikistan government denied the reports, but the tone of the denials gave credence to the idea that members of the former United Tajikistan Opposition who remained sympathetic to the rebels goals were secretly aiding the rebels. Throughout the spring of 2001 Central Asian governments were anxiously developing plans for a coordinated interstate program to repulse new terrorist attacks. Many of these terrorists were originally from Central Asia and returned after receiving training in Afghanistan. They had common cause with other opposition members and formed coalitions against the secular governments of Central Asia. The War on Terrorism and Battles with the Opposition The travail in Afghanistan produced the seeds and provided fertile ground for the development of terrorist and extremist opponents. In Central Asia, the IMU insurgents and other extremist groups, however, have had only limited effect. They have not formed coalitions with any legitimate political opposition, but the likelihood of such coalitions grows as the political opposition finds that other avenues beside extremism are not available, and that any legitimate political opposition is likely to be labeled extremism.

11 Central Asia 209 Table 2. U.S. Budgeted Assistance, 2003 ($m) Kazak. Kyrgyz. Tajik. Turk. Uzbek. Democracy Programs Economic/Social Reform Security/Law Enforcement Humanitarian Assistance Cross Sectoral Initiatives Total Assistance Source: Compiled from State Department Country Background Notes, The essence of the political confrontation between the state and its opponents in Central Asia is that the institutions of government in the first decade of independence were manipulated to eliminate competition within the political system. Consequently, although institutions of democracy and market capitalism economics were adopted in all the Central Asian countries, they were undercut by easily monopolized informal arrangements. If there was a missed opportunity in the early post-communist stage of transition, it was that no pluralism of interests emerged to insist upon fair rules of competition over the management of public processes. Because no real pluralism of interests emerged in any of the Central Asian countries during the early period of transition, the government and the state have become almost indistinguishable. There is little political space in which a loyal opposition can function. Any challenge to the government is interpreted as a challenge to the state. All proponents of change, from reformists urging incremental reorientation of administrative practices to violent extremists urging destruction of the society, are grouped together in the category of opposition. Major political opposition in all of the Central Asian countries may be placed in two categories: the reformist opposition and the insurgent opposition. The distinguishing feature of the reformist opposition is that it advocates the removal of the present leadership but maintains, in broad measure, the framework of secular government in the region. The reformist opposition seeks to reassign functions and establish new beneficiaries of the political process, but to undertake this in the context of a reformed Central Asia within the framework of the existing state structures. 22 The reformist opposition lacks a competing doctrine of government and a unified ideational or informational base. Such movements are not united along religious or ethnic lines. Sporadic efforts of individual reformist opposition leaders have not succeeded nor have they garnered wide-spread public support or sympathy. The reformist opposition is basically self-interested and opportunistic. The reformist opposition is the more resourceful form of opposition, and is the most likely to spearhead a change in

12 210 Strategic Asia government leadership in Central Asia. Moreover, should a traumatic domestic event (such as the death of a leader) or an external event (such as a national security crisis) precipitate a struggle over political succession, the reformist opposition stands a good chance of capturing power in any one of the Central Asian countries. On the other hand, the insurgent opposition favors a transformation of Central Asian society and perhaps even the abandonment of national sovereignty in favor of some supranational movement. The reformist opposition consists of a wide variety of groups and movements united by the desire to replace the present government structures of Central Asia and fueled by a drive to displace the particular political leadership. The Central Asian insurgent opposition advocates rebellion and revolution. Tajikistan s political opposition was shaped by its recent civil war. Tajikistan was the conduit for an insurgency during the early period of independence and, given Tajikistan s geographic, linguistic, cultural, and commercial linkages with northern Afghanistan, is destined to remain on the frontline of the war on terrorism. Long before independence, Tajikistan was fragmented along regional lines. During the Soviet period, remote regions of the country were united in presenting a single face to Moscow and the outside world, but inwardly the country had many conflicting personalities. Independence simply made it possible for these conflicts to emerge. In August 1991 a pro-russian former communist party chief, Rakhmon Nabiev, took over power in the capital before he lost control to crowds in the street and resigned at gunpoint in September Escalating tensions culminated in clashes between armed groups in the streets, and the Islamic Revival Party (IRP) seized control of the government. With help from Moscow and Tashkent, a coalition of northern and southern politicians sponsored an uprising to retake the capital in October The IRP forces retreated into the hills. The intense fight over the capital was followed by sporadic gunfights in the rural areas that by early 1993 resulted in a tense standoff. The former communist party official and pro-russian leader, Imomali Rakhmonov, was established as provisional head of the government. Military commanders divided the regions among themselves. The opposition groups eventually gained the name UTO, the United Tajikistan Opposition. They were scattered in the mountain areas to the north and north-east of the capital. The government was well ensconced in the capital but had little control over the outlying areas except by virtue of compromises with the military commanders. 23 The June 1997 peace agreement brought the Tajikistan government and the UTO to the bargaining table. They signed a peace accord, and the opposition is now an active part of the political process in Tajikistan. 24

13 Central Asia 211 Uzbekistan s political opposition has been gradually harassed, neutralized, or eliminated. No real competition of power exists, and there are no genuine competing political parties or alternative agenda. The IMU s revolutionaries claimed from the beginning that their goal was to sweep away the Karimov government which they regard as an illegitimate remnant of the Soviet-era, and establish in its place an Islamic caliphate uniting the Muslim faithful throughout Central Asia. The bulk of the IMU fighting force probably was drawn into the defense of the Taliban after September Many are said to have perished there in late While the more violent opposition seems to have been neutralized by imprisonment or by death in Afghanistan, a broader, more popularly supported insurgent political opposition, Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HT), continues to gain influence in Central Asia. HT does not openly counsel armed insurrection but does favor revolutionary political change. As such, it was identified in 1995 by the Uzbekistan government as a threat to the stability of the state. Beginning in 1996 the Uzbekistan government began carrying out extensive campaigns against the movement s wahhabis or political extremists. The Uzbekistan government argued that Hizb-ut-Tahrir had links to the Palestinian Hamas, Egypt s Muslim Brotherhood, and other Islamist extremists. The Uzbekistan government began a series of campaigns to isolate and neutralize all ideological opponents, branding them as criminals and political fanatics. In the view of many human rights organizations, the government s counter-insurgency campaign cast a wide net, ensnaring legitimate and illegitimate opponents alike. International human rights organizations have reported numerous cases of violations of human rights and civil law at the hands of Uzbekistan law enforcement authorities. There is a very real threat of political extremism in Uzbekistan, and President Karimov has long been an advocate of counter-terrorist action, warning of the contagion effect of disorder in Afghanistan. Counter-terrorist activities began in the Fergana Valley as early as In November 1999 Uzbekistan had already begun placing land mines along its borders in the valley to prevent incursions from Tajikistan through Kyrgyz territory. In the summer of 2000 Uzbekistan reportedly extended the mine fields to include the border with Tajikistan. Uzbekistan established a cordon sanitaire with Afghanistan, to the point that the entire 130-mile stretch of border was reinforced with barbed wire and electric fences. 25 Turkmenistan President Niyazov often claims publicly that there is no political opposition in Turkmenistan. He may mean to suggest his regime enjoys broad popular appeal, but he may also mean that the opposition leaders have been eliminated. If the past is any indication of the future, political opposition will most likely arise from within the government it-

14 212 Strategic Asia self. In March 2002 Niyazov fired the head of the Turkmenistan secret police on charges of corruption. Subsequently more than 100 senior members of the country s security agency were imprisoned. In September 2002 another wave of scandals swept through the country as President Niyazov announced that the new security head too would be removed. Then, in November 2002, events in Turkmenistan took a truly bizarre turn. The state media announced that an assassination attempt on the president on November 25 had been foiled and that former Minister of Foreign Affairs Boris Shikhmuradov had confessed to masterminding the coup attempt. Although official accounts are contradictory, the Turkmenistan government has claimed that four former government ministers organized an armed attack on the president. A government spokesperson later claimed that Shikhmuradov directed the assassination attempt with the help of the Uzbek ambassador to Turkmenistan, Abdurashid Kadyrov. On December 25 President Niyazov announced that Shikhmuradov had been captured. Four days later national television aired footage of Shikhmuradov confessing to the assassination attempt. 26 In the aftermath of these events, Turkmenistan authorities detained hundreds of relatives of those implicated in the plot, some of whom were physically abused and denied access to medical treatment. They also lost their jobs, were dismissed from universities, and were evicted from their homes. 27 Kyrgyzstan has a lively political debate, but each time the political opposition appears to be entering into competition, the situation suddenly changes and the opposition is disgraced, discredited, jailed, or otherwise eliminated. The practice of neutralizing the opposition began with the disbanding of parliament by the Kyrgyzstan President in October 1994 to avoid a vote of no-confidence and the initiation of judicial proceedings against a leading political opposition figure, Felix Kulov. The U.S. Department of State observed on January 24, 2001, that the seven-year sentence handed Kulov by the closed military court contravenes international standards of human rights and has the appearance of being politically motivated. 28 Kazakhstan s political opposition is dominated by palace intrigue and insider contests for power rather than insurgency movements. One example of an opposition figure is Akezhan Kazhegeldin, who served as prime minister from October 1994 until October 1997 and was removed from office amid charges of corruption. Kazhegeldin then tried to run against Nazarbaev in the 1999 presidential elections, but political maneuvering excluded him from the ticket. He then went into exile, taking up an active campaign against the Kazakhstan government. Shortly afterward, the Kazakhstan prosecutor-general reopened a tax evasion and money laundering investigation against him. But the trail of malfeasance opened up by this investigation

15 Central Asia 213 indirectly led back to Kazakhstan officials and, eventually, to a U.S. Justice Department case being filed against a U.S. businessman, James Giffen. Giffen was charged with violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act involving kickbacks to high Kazakhstan government officials. Another example is that of Rakhat Aliev, husband to President Nazarbaev s daughter Dariga Nazarbaeva. Aliev served for a period as head of the Almaty tax police, establishing himself as an anti-corruption campaigner by combating sugar and vodka scalpers. His efforts at getting to the bottom of these activities were so successful that he ended up personally controlling the trade in these commodities. Aliev then gained a reputation for managing to take control of the Pavlodar Oil Refinery after forcing out foreign investors. Aliev eventually came into competition with another powerful Kazakhstan businessman, Timur Kulibaev, also son-inlaw to the president. Kazakhstan internal politics is dominated by these kinds of family intrigues, which are certain to have implications for succession when the president steps down as he has announced he will do in But there is no significant insurgent activity in Kazakhstan. Does the relationship between domestic opposition and insurgency in the various countries of Central Asia have implications for the durability of these countries war on terrorism? The relationship between legitimate political opposition and insurgency is at best a marriage of convenience. The groups are disparate and have radically different agendas in the different countries. They are united rhetorically by the goals of raising domestic standards of living, reducing what is seen as foreign exploitation, and developing more accountable and natural forms of government. But beyond this, the agendas of the insurgents and the reformists are very different. The Central Asian states are engaged in their own struggles against political opposition and terrorism, which sometimes overlap with U.S. objectives and goals but are not always conjoined. U.S. policy has generally been insensitive to the complexity of these countries agendas in their cooperation with the war on terrorism. Russia, the United States, and the Logic of Coalition Reflecting over the past decade of independence, the most salient aspect of the relations among the former Soviet republics is their inability to cooperate with one another. 29 Since independence, the Central Asian states have pursued policies that were uncoordinated and frequently conflicting. The countries promoted, signed, and adopted many regional cooperation agreements that were designed to lead to forms of equitable and mutually beneficial cooperation. 30 But because the countries moved toward a market economy at different rates and relied upon different measures, market

16 214 Strategic Asia competition and political animosity developed. 31 The list of failed Eurasian cooperation attempts speaks volumes: the CIS itself, the CIS Collective Security Treaty, the Central Asian Union, the Black Sea Forum, the Belarus- Russian Union, the Minsk Group, the Caucasus Four, the Caspian Five, the Central Asian Cooperation Organization, and the Shanghai Five. 32 These failures are understandable; such cooperation agreements are rarely self-implementing and self-enforcing. They depend upon some glue to keep the parties cooperating. That glue usually comes in the form of some single power with the will to enforce cooperation, the goal to do it fairly, and the legitimacy to induce compliance without having to compel it. Russia was the natural candidate for this role. Although able to supply the will, and perhaps able to do it fairly, Russia finally could not manage to gather the legitimacy for this undertaking. Its efforts at promoting cooperation in the region led to intimidation to gain control over oil and gas development; coercion and surreptitious support for coups and armed conflicts in Azerbaijan and Georgia; the invasion of Chechnya in 1994; wresting basing rights in Armenia, Georgia, and Turkmenistan; intransigence on the division of rights to Caspian littoral resources; blocking the transport of Kazakhstan oil and gas exports; and retaliation against independent-minded Uzbekistan through establishing a permanent Russian military outpost in neighboring Tajikistan. These heavy-handed Russian attempts to regain control were usually unproductive and often counterproductive, inclining Moscow s south Eurasian partners to seek stratagems of self-help and greater independence. Russia s grand policy toward Central Asia and the Caucasus in the first years of independence gradually devolved into numerous parallel but not always complementary bilateral foreign policies. 33 Sometimes this enabled Russia to keep its neighbors divided to its benefit; more often it simply meant that none of the countries succeeded in even the most basic forms of infrastructure and commercial cooperation. Eventually dwindling intra-regional trade, the failure of international policy harmonization, and a growing concern with threats of insurgency and lawlessness persuaded Moscow to acknowledge that its approach to Central Asia was fragmented, ad hoc, and unsuccessful. 34 By the time Boris Yeltsin stepped down as president of Russia, a consensus had already formed in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that some new approach toward Central Asia was necessary. President Vladimir Putin s public statement in late 1999 that Russia was, after all, a Eurasian power set the stage for a reexamination of Russia s strategy toward Central Asia. The Russian National Security Strategy of January 2000 and the Russian Foreign Policy Strategy of July 2000 formalized Russia s reassessment. 35 By the summer of 2000, Russian officials abruptly shifted their position on

17 Central Asia 215 proposals for greater cooperation with the Central Asian states. In October 2000 presidents of five states gathered in Astana to sign the foundation documents creating a Eurasian Economic Community. The organization was formally brought into being in May The reassessment of relations with the United States following September 11 simply provided additional momentum to efforts to improve relations with the Central Asian countries. Putin saw the challenge of an increased U.S. presence in the region as an invitation to use Russia s comparative advantages rather than to seek to contain U.S. influence. Putin raised no objections to U.S. overflights in the Central Asian countries or the basing of troops at Khanabad and Ganci. He softened his position with respect to NATO enlargement and U.S. national missile defense systems. He also announced his intention to close Russian facilities in Cuba and Vietnam. But Washington may be confusing acquiescence with consent. At the same time Putin set out to develop more proactive, hard-headed and effective Russian policy in the Central Asian region. 36 In the past year in particular Russia has sought out expansion of trade and energy and investment ties with the Central Asian countries, signing major contracts for new deals in hydroelectric generation, gas and oil exploration, and agricultural production. Russia is also Central Asia s top destination and source for both exports and imports. Purpose and Principle The Central Asian states share common interests with the United States, but they do not always share common interpretations of how to pursue these interests. This raises the question of how much dissonance U.S. policymakers are prepared to accept. How can Washington accept actions by partners that contravene fundamental principles of human rights? Will a cynicism take root that justifies the advocacy of larger strategic objectives via questionable means in the pursuit of unquestionable ends? In supporting the Central Asian countries, is Washington facing the choice of defending non-democratic leaders for other policy purposes? 37 U.S. diplomats argue that the basic rationale of engagement with the Central Asian governments, even when they fail to conform to the standards expected of them, is to demonstrate how the observance of human rights standards is in their interest. 38 But critics argue that there is a moral hazard in helping countries that cannot demonstrate clear progress toward higher standards of governance. As Charles William Maynes expressed it: The governments of the [Central Asian] region are all authoritarian and increasingly estranged from their own populations. Washington thus runs the risk that it will be perceived as favoring these governments and an unsatisfactory status quo. 39

18 216 Strategic Asia All of the countries of Central Asia have received low marks from human rights monitoring organizations, but the greatest concern focuses on Uzbekistan. International human rights groups and others reported numerous violations of human rights and Uzbek law at the hands of law enforcement authorities. In November 2000 the U.S. House of Representatives expressed concern over human rights violations and the use of terrorism as a pretext for political repression. A UN report released in April 2003 claimed the use of torture in Uzbekistan s prisons was institutionalized, systematic, and rampant. The Uzbekistan government initially reacted hostilely to the allegations, but eventually agreed to develop a plan for addressing abuse in its prisons. The Uzbekistan government also began allowing the International Committee of the Red Cross to visit prisons and other detention facilities. Human rights groups, dissatisfied with the Uzbekistan government response, appealed to international organizations to demand improvement in the Uzbekistan government s human rights practices as a condition of international development assistance. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, one of the major international financial institutions providing assistance to the former communist countries, responded by initiating a review of Uzbekistan s progress toward democracy. The EBRD concluded that there had been very limited progress and that it was no longer possible for the EBRD to conduct business as usual. 40 The U.S. Department of State investigated Uzbekistan s compliance with commitments articulated in the 2002 Strategic Partnership agreement between Uzbekistan and the United States. According to the legislation for various U.S. assistance programs, the Secretary of State is required to certify compliance before certain assistance funds can be made available. 41 A State Department finding on the progress of the Uzbekistan government was expected in the early spring of 2004, but was postponed as the Secretary of State studied the situation. 42 In July 2004 the State Department announced that based on Uzbekistan s overall record of reform, the country cannot be certified as making substantial and continuing progress in meeting its commitments under the 2002 Strategic Partnership Framework, including respect for human rights, establishing a genuine multiparty system, and ensuring free and fair elections, freedom of expression, and the independence of the media. The State Department reiterated, however, that This decision does not mean that either our interests in the region or our desire for continued cooperation with Uzbekistan [have] changed. 43 Critics of Uzbekistan s counter-insurgency measures viewed some of these as counterproductive, adding to the potential for greater militancy and instability. 44 Excessive government measures against terrorism, critics