Concept note for Regional Programme for Africa (Africa Programme for Peace IV),

Transcription

1 Concept note for Regional Programme for Africa (Africa Programme for Peace IV), Context of the regional programme In 2018, a further commitment amounting to 180 million DKK is planned for support to African multilateral organisations with mandates to respond to solutions to peace, security and governance challenges in Africa. This new programme is expected to continue the focus and build on experience from previous phases of the Africa Programme for Peace (APP), currently in Phase III. A recent review of APP-III concluded that well-targeted external support can be expected to remain highly relevant for the peace and security and governance architectures in Africa i. The programme will promote peace and security and good governance in Africa, through the strengthening of key African organisations with a mandate in these strategic areas, thereby contributing to sustainable development and poverty reduction, and in this way also support Danish development, foreign and security policy interests. The threats to national, regional and international stability require coherent and targeted responses and the African multilateral organisations have a distinct role to play given their mandate and legitimacy. Africa has seen some progress towards reducing violent conflict, and the African institutions response to crises through the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA ii ) has significantly improved (as recently seen in for example The Gambia and Burkina Faso), as have the institutions normative basis for human security and good governance iii. However, while the organisations have grown markedly stronger, and the African leadership in addressing challenges has increased, Africa is still the region with the highest number of violent conflicts, and the last five years have seen an increasingly negative trend iv. Weak governance and difficult democratic transitions have enhanced this trend v. Thus the African Governance Architecture (AGA vi ), although much less developed than APSA, also plays an important role in relation to the programme s overall objective. The challenges negatively affect the continent by hampering sustainable development and economic growth, as well as contributing to the conditions that support violent extremism and irregular migration vii. In short, this environment recommends the continuation of efforts to build on the achievements of previous Danish, and other, support to the African organisations and the positive trajectory the organisations are actively pursuing to address the challenges Africa is facing. The programme addresses the aims in Denmark s strategy for development cooperation and humanitarian action (The World 2030) of promoting peace, security and protection, and of promoting values human rights, democracy and gender equality, and directly targets the strategy s vision that the regional organisations must act increasingly decisively with a view to promoting peace, security and political transition, especially the African Union and the regional organisations in Africa viii. The programme will focus on Sustainable Development Goals 16, peace, justice and strong institutions, where it directly addresses several of the 12 sub-goals, and 17, partnerships for the goals, by creating partnerships with African organisations that mobilize and share knowledge, expertise, and financial resources, to support the achievement of the sustainable development goals. In addition, the prevention of conflict and promotion of good governance in Africa serve several Danish foreign and security policy interests. In the long run, it will complement other Danish engagements and contribute to making Europe s southern neighbours more stable and address some of the root causes of violent extremism and irregular migration (cf. the Valletta Summit s action point 1.3 on addressing instability and crisis which emphasise the need to reinforce the support to the different 1

2 subregional initiatives and mechanisms for conflict prevention and management, as well as to development and implementation of the African Peace and Security Architecture and the African Governance Architecture ). This concept note is based on an identification carried out as part of the mid-term review of APP III. Further identification was conducted as part of the ongoing cooperation and dialogue with the African institutions led by the embassy in Addis Ababa. Primary questions considered during the identification have been: How can Danish policy objectives best be pursued with the partners in the region? How can further support to APSA and AGA contribute to this? How can support be organised in the most efficient manner? Should the support become even more focused and targeted than in previous phases? Lessons learned from previous phases have also informed the identification ix. These include the choice of organisations that also reflect Danish foreign policy priorities. For example, while earlier phases supported SADC, this organisation was not part of APP III, as Danish priorities had shifted further north in Africa. The proposed phase IV suggests even further prioritisation between partners and thematic areas, also because the financial portfolio of the programme has been significantly reduced x. Within the organisations, lessons learned include which thematic areas see traction and added value (examples include elections and mediation). Focusing on areas that have seen traction, rather than underperforming areas, is necessary to achieve results. Funding and support modalities have also been refined and Joint Financing Agreements (JFA) and a targeted use of technical assistance (TA) have proved to be efficient ways of delivering support xi. Moreover the importance of continuous political dialogue has been proven has been increased during phase III xii. A stronger synergy between other Danish interventions has been a guiding principle in the identification. Denmark is currently programming a number of peace and stabilisation initiatives across Africa. Apart from this proposed programme it includes the Danish regional Sahel peace and stabilisation programme (tentative ) and the peace and stabilisation programme for the Horn of Africa (tentative ) as well as components in the bilateral country programmes in Mali, Niger and Somalia. To ensure a comprehensive approach the programming is carried out in close coordination across the different initiatives and activities to maximize the complementarities and exploit the different levels of engagement while avoiding overlap of funding to partners. When selecting the partner organisations, the capacity and relevance of the organisations concerned and how certain organisations speak more to Danish priorities than others has been taken into account. The programme will focus on organisations that are an integral part of APSA, i.e. the African Union (AU) and the regional economic communities (RECs): 1) AU, as the central and most important organisation, 2) the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and 3) the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD). Consideration is also being given to including a limited number of African civil society organisations that have demonstrated capacity and traction in conducting advocacy, research and capacity development of the African organisations in the field of peace and security, good governance, and human rights. Policy dialogue is as important as financial support. Denmark has established close links with the organisations. Especially the AU is increasingly an indispensable partner due to its growing influence on continental issues. Denmark thus cooperates with the African organisations in three ways that are mutually supportive: 1) Financial and technical support, 2) dialogue and 3) information sharing (refer to annex E). 2

3 The support will be closely coordinated with other partners. EU is by far the largest partner. As an EU member state, Denmark has direct influence on the planning and implementation of EU activities, which allows for increased coherence and complementarity. The separate Danish support, complementing EU support, will ensure that specific Danish priority areas are supported. Also Germany, the other Nordic countries, the Netherlands, the US and the UK are important partners. A well-developed partner coordination set-up exists, which the programme will continue to be part of. 2. Theory of change and overall objectives The theory of change of the programme is based on the assumption that peace and security and good governance are basic foundations for sustainable development, poverty reduction and human rights. Secondly, the programme builds on the assumption that a strong continental architecture of organisations working with peace and security and good governance in Africa is a corner stone in addressing these issues. Based on these assumptions, the overall theory of change is that if Denmark, along with other partners, contributes to the strengthening of the key African organisations in selected, strategically relevant areas, then they will increasingly be able to address peace and security and governance issues, including through influencing their member states to act in accordance with continental and regional standards and norms and taking robust political, military and other action where necessary, including with global actors such as the UN. If this transpires there will be fewer or less severe conflicts, eventually improving the peace and security situation in a way that can form the basis for sustainable development, poverty reduction and human rights in Africa and address some of the root causes to violent extremism and irregular migration. This leads to the overall objective of the programme: promote peace and security and good governance in Africa, through the strengthening of key African organisations with a mandate in these strategic areas, thereby contributing to sustainable development and poverty reduction. To achieve this, the immediate objectives are: 1) To strengthen the African Peace and Security Architecture, and 2) to strengthen the African Governance Architecture. The major risk to these assumptions is that the African organisations will not be able to address the key peace, security and governance issues, or will only be able to do so partially. This risk, however, is mitigated by the relative and increasingly positive trajectory most of the organisations have seen in the last 10 years xiii and the increasing linkages between them and global actors. 3. Focus of the programme A guiding principle in previous and future Danish support through the APP has been to keep the organisations themselves in the driving seat. This means supporting (financially and politically) the organisations own priorities where they align with Danish priorities, rather than the other way around, and use political dialogue where we disagree (ICC being a case in point). It also means using the organisations own management systems, even though this might require additional oversight. Focus will be on strengthening APSA and AGA at AU level and in certain of the AU s regional counterparts. The current balance between APSA and AGA (in APP III) has been assessed xiv to be about right. Despite being less developed, AGA is poised to play an increasingly important role, especially in democracy and human rights promotion. Previous phases also had a focus on institutional capacity development. As other partners have stepped into this field with substantial financial portfolios (not least EU and WB) and as future Danish support would have to be limited due to financial constraints, it is suggested to leave institutional capacity development to other partners. An 3

4 exception will be targeted short term TA, such as in results monitoring or financial management, as needs are identified during the implementation. A number of thematic areas will receive special attention during formulation and are expected to be included in the new programme. This will also contribute to better communication on results, as this can be done on specific areas rather than on the more overall objective. The thematic areas will be chosen based on considerations such as: where the organisations have demonstrated political will and traction, where Denmark has a specific foreign policy interest, where Denmark has a comparative advantage due to a history of supporting the organization in that area, where Denmark has a particular expertise, and where high potential for results can be identified (such as areas with particular buy-in from the organisations or with individual change agents present). Areas chosen will all be DAC-able. Preliminary identification has highlighted thematic areas currently supported under APP III that could be continued, including: preventative diplomacy, mediation, early warning, gender (UNSCR 1325), AU-UN cooperation (including in peace operations), and election support. These have all shown traction in phase III (differing depending on organisation) and fit with Danish foreign policy priorities. Three new areas will be investigated further: 1) Preventing/countering violent extremism, P/CVE. Possible support in this area will observe engagements in other Danish programmes and by other partners, and reflect the comparative advantages and roles of the regional organisations. A study has been launched to further inform the proposed programme and the two stabilisation programmes undergoing formulation. Any support to P/CVE will be based on a clear division of labour between various Danish programmes. 2) Migration, where the recommendations of the EU/Africa Valletta Summit will be taken into account. This support would be indirectly through the support to APSA and AGA, to keep the overall peace, security and governance focus of the programme. The different approach to the migration agenda from especially AU and Denmark/EU needs to be carefully considered. 3) Youth, both as a benefactor of increased stability (linked with migration) and as a destabilising factor (linked with CVE). Further investigation is needed to determine how this thematic area can be addressed indirectly through the support to APSA and AGA. 4. Possible partners AU continues to be the most important driver of APSA and AGA implementation and should continue to be the major partner under the programme. ECOWAS has shown that it is an indispensable organization for peace and security and in governance issues in West Africa, which also encompasses the Danish priority area of the Sahel. IGAD has, despite capacity constraints, an important role to play in APSA in the Danish priority area of the Horn of Africa. It is suggested to support a few (2-3) African think tanks and CSOs that play a crucial role in advocacy, research and/or capacity development under APSA and/or AGA. The following organisations will be further explored: West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP), supported during previous phases of APP, continues to be a crucial partner in in West Africa due to its vast network of CSOs. Institute for Peace and Security Studies (ISS), has provided valuable analysis and training to especially the AU on peace and security. Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD) and Institute for Peace and Security Studies (IPSS) will also be investigated further. Other Danish support to these organisations need to be taken into account and their contribution to APP objectives would need to be very clear. 4

5 Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre, KAIPTC, supported in APP III, remains an important partner for training and research in peace and security, and Danish support remains relevant. However, as funding in the proposed programme is limited, and KAIPTC is not an integral part of APSA (although it contributes to APSA objectives in relation to peacekeeping training), alternative funding sources should be explored. The three other Danish supported African peacekeeping training centres (IPSTC, FDRE PSTC, EMP xv ) are currently funded under the Peace and Stabilisation Fund (PSF), and this option, among others, could be further explored. 5. Development engagements Based on the above considerations the programme is foreseen to have four development engagements: Development engagement 1: The African Union (AU) Through its key normative role, its successful interventions in peace and security issues, and a general organisational strengthening in recent years, the AU has proven to remain the most important part of APSA and AGA xvi. The recently (January 2017) adopted reform proposal for the organisation led by President Kagame (including the Kaberuka proposal on financing, see bleow), the APSA road map , and the new commission elected in January 2017 are expected to further strengthen the AU s APSA and AGA related work and its important link to the RECs. AU will thus be the primary partner of the programme politically as well as financially. The outcomes of this development engagement will be (based on the AU s own results framework): 1) APSA road map implemented (from APSA road map ) 2) Peace and stability, good governance, democracy and human rights as foundations for development and stable societies promoted (from AGA results framework) The two outcomes are anchored in specific departments in the AU: APSA in the Department for Peace and Security, AGA in the Department for Political Affairs. During formulation specific outputs will be agreed with the relevant departments, based on AU s own planning tools. Monitoring will be based on this framework and be done in cooperation with other partners. In both areas, JFAs are in place. These will be utilized to the greatest extent possible. The results of the engagement will, to the furthest extent possible, be monitored through the AU s own results based management system. Financial monitoring will be done in cooperation with AU s Programming, Budgeting, Finance and Accounting Department and with other partners, primarily EU that has a very comprehensive financial management system in place. The suggested budget for this engagement is 105 million DKK. Development engagement 2: Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) ECOWAS plays an indispensable role in peace and security and governance in West Africa, despite capacity constraints, and continues to take a pro-active role in relation to conflict prevention and political crisis in the region xvii. The recent interventions in The Gambia and Burkina Faso are cases in point. A new ECOWAS President and new Commissioners are now in place, and observers are generally positive. The ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) Secretariat and the Mediation Facilitation Division, both established with Danish support, have strengthened ECOWAS work in conflict prevention considerably something that should be built upon. 5

6 The outcome of this development engagement will be (based on ECOWAS own results framework): 1) Effective leadership in peace and security issues affecting the West African sub-region provided by ECOWAS. In ECOWAS, APSA and AGA are incorporated in the Department for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) under one commissioner and partner support is coordinated through the ECPF Secretariat. During formulation, specific outputs, based on ECOWAS own ECPF, will be formulated in cooperation with the Secretariat. This will allow the programme to focus on specific thematic areas, such as preventative diplomacy, mediation, early warning, gender, and possibly P/CVE. There are no JFAs in ECOWAS. The modality of core support coordinated through the ECPF secretariat is suggested to be continued. The secretariat has close coordination with other relevant actors in ECOWAS, such as the Directorate for Gender. The results of the engagement will, to the furthest extent possible, be monitored through ECOWAS own ECPF. However, as ECOWAS has limited capacities in this area, close results monitoring will be necessary. Potentially ECOWAS could receive limited TA in this area. The suggested budget for this engagement is 30 million DKK. Development engagement 3: Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) Denmark has been a long-term partner of IGAD based on the recognition that the organisation occupies an important political role in the Horn of Africa, a region that displays serious peace and security challenges. IGAD has demonstrated a relevant political role in a number of regional crises (particularly Somalia and South Sudan), despite being severely hampered by political rivalry between and within its member states and by capacity constraints xviii. During the life of the proposed programme, the EU is expected, via the migration trust fund, to make a significant financial input to IGAD (EUR 40 million over four years to peace and security alone). This builds on previous partner support, not least Danish, and needs to be taken into account when planning possible future Danish support. If it reinvigorates IGAD, then future Danish support would need to be considered in the light of it. Conversely, if IGAD fails to absorb the input, then IGAD s inclusion in the programme will need to be re-considered. A specific Danish niche, complementing the EU support, could be identified. The outcome of this development engagement will be (based on IGAD s own results framework): 1) IGAD s role in promoting, achieving, and sustaining good governance, peace, security, and stability in the region strengthened (from IGAD Peace and Security Strategy ) The support will focus on APSA related matters, anchored in IGAD s Peace and Security Division (headquartered in Addis Ababa). The AGA component of IGAD is also anchored in this division, but has seen very little progress. During the formulation of the programme specific outputs, based on IGAD s own monitoring and evaluation framework, will be formulated. Monitoring will be based on this framework and will be done in cooperation with other partners. There is a JFA in place for peace and security, and support should continue through this. It will still allow for specific thematic prioritizations, as the JFA partners decide specific allocations in cooperation with IGAD. Thematic areas to be considered include preventative diplomacy, mediation, early warning, and P/CVE all areas where IGAD has shown progress of late and where there are, in some areas, strong linkages to other Danish engagements including the PSF s activities in the Horn of Africa. 6

7 Due to the uncertainty of the impact of the upcoming EU funding, which cannot be fully assessed until after the commencement of the new programme, and due to concerns regarding IGAD s capacity to absorb and manage funds, the funding should be split in two, with the remaining funding ( ) being dependent on a review conducted in mid The suggested budget for this engagement is: 8 million DKK ( ) with the option of further 7 million DKK ( ), should the review in 2019 recommend this. Otherwise these funds should be distributed among the other engagements as the review might suggest. Development engagement 4: Inclusion of civil society and think tanks The programme will introduce a focus on inclusion of African civil society and think tanks, an aspect which has been limited in APP III. The purpose will be to ensure that key institutions in APSA and AGA are taking the views of civil society into consideration (i.e. rights holder approach). This will serve as a way to promote HRBA in a context that is normally dominated by state (duty bearer) interest. The organisations chosen can have different roles vis-à-vis AU, ECOWAS and IGAD, in for example advocacy, research and training. Several organisations already have MoUs with the organisations. The outcome of this development engagement will be: 1) The involvement of civil society in APSA and AGA implementation strengthened. During formulation specific outputs will be formulated, based on the organisations chosen and their own monitoring and evaluation framework. Should the organisations own monitoring and evaluation framework be too weak, a separate framework will be developed. Which organisations to support will be decided based on further investigations and the budget available. Due consideration to procurement rules will be taken. The organisations to be further investigated are WANEP, ISS, and possibly CHD and IPSS. The funding modalities will be through a JFA, separate bilateral agreements or through soft-earmarked (to work with AU, ECOWAS and/or IGAD) core contributions. It is envisaged to initially engage with one organisation and to expand the CSO portfolio (to maximum three) based on specific needs identified by AU, ECOWAS or IGAD during implementation (such as specific input to a mediation effort etc.). This approach would enhance the ability of the programme to respond to emerging situations. The suggested budget for this engagement is 20 million DKK. The division of this budget between the chosen institutions will be decided during formulation. Technical assistance, studies and research, monitoring, reviews and evaluations: A budget line will be allocated to TA, monitoring, reviews and evaluations, with due adherence to procurement rules. This will be used to cover the mandatory reviews, and ad hoc monitoring as required. It will also be used for targeted TA to the organisations in areas identified as needing special attention. This could be organisational, such as in financial management, results based management and monitoring (a main priority), or thematic such as hiring short term assistance with specializations such as election observation or mediation. The budget line can also be used to fund studies and research in areas requested by the partners. Danida Fellowship Centre courses will used for trainings. Any costs associated with communication can be paid from the TA budget line. The suggested budget for this engagement is 10 million DKK. 7

8 6. Application of human rights-based approach The assumptions from APP III regarding the application of human rights-based approach still hold: The operationalization of APSA and AGA provides wide opportunities to take forward UNSCR 1325, gender equality issues, and promoting a rights-based approach. These include the inclusion of women in preventative diplomacy and the promotion of democratic elections, which has been enhanced in both AU and ECOWAS due to Danish support. This focus will continue in the proposed programme. 7. Communication on results Communication of results achieved by the Danish support will be an integrated part of the programme. For each development engagement a communication plan will be outlined, based on each relevant target group: 1) Stakeholders in Denmark (decision makers (incl. Danish defence) and general public), 2) African decision makers in/outside the organisations (including in Danish priority countries in Africa), and 3) thought leaders in Africa and Denmark (think tanks, civil society, academia, experts). A variety of media will be used to disseminate results. For results on outputs (e.g. a successful seminar, a successful mediation) Internet, Facebook and Twitter will be used to post short success stories. For larger results, for example on objective or outcome level, communication channels could be longer newspaper articles (op-eds) in African or Danish newspapers, lectures targeting think tanks or academia, or an entire seminar dedicated to discussing results with a variety of stakeholders. 8. Sustainability and exit strategy A thorough investigation of a possible Danish exit is needed. This will be done during formulation and as a requirement in the mid-term review (foreseen in 2019). Phase I to III has shown a good degree of sustainability, as is seen by the continuously growing capacity of the organisations in general, and in specific areas targeted by Danish support, such as AU s election monitoring set-up and ECOWAS mediation facilitation. In various areas sustainability has been reached by the organisations themselves taking over responsibility and in some instances by other partners stepping in. This sustainability stems a lot from the insistence from the Danish side on full ownership to the areas supported keeping the organisations in the driving seat and of course to a relatively constant flow of partner support. During implementation the Kaberuka proposal on African financing of the AU will come into effect. This will have a major impact on sustainability, as it will, should it be implemented as envisioned, mean that AU member states will finance 75 % of the AU s programme budget vs. around 10 % now. This will of course limit the need for donor support. The Kaberuka proposal is crucial for the AU and support to this could be considered. ECOWAS is nearly 90 % financed by member states, so sustainability considerations here are more linked to institutional anchoring of capacities being built with Danish support. This will require close dialogue with ECOWAS when designing the specific areas of support. IGAD will most likely be nearly fully dependent on donor support in the implementation time frame. Sustainability and exit will here be tied to the coming on board of new donors (EU) and close dialogue to maintain progress made and ownership from IGAD s side. 9. Management set-up The programme will be fully managed from the embassy in Addis Ababa. This has worked well, and the continental status of Addis ( Africa s diplomatic capital ) makes it possible to manage the continental areas that the organisations cover. JFAs will be sought where possible. Denmark will seek a lead partner 8

9 role in at least one area in each organisation, such as governance in AU and peace and security in IGAD, in order to strengthen Danish influence and access. The programme officer(s) in charge of the programme at the embassy will at the same time be the main political officer(s) in charge of dialogue and information sharing with and about the organisations. This way the synergy between development cooperation and foreign policy will be optimised (see annex E). No programme support mechanisms are envisaged, as the programme is of a manageable size. However, assistance in specific areas, such as report monitoring/reporting and financial management can be called in on an ad hoc basis, using the TA budget line. Financial management of the support will be handled from the Embassy, based on the organisations own financial management systems. These systems are of variable quality, differing from organisation to organisation, though often relatively weak and require close monitoring. The Embassy will work closely with other partners to ensure strict financial management, not least EU, that is, through its seven pillar system, monitoring the organisations closely on this matter. In order to ensure that capacities from Africa, think tanks and regional civil society, partners, Danish academics and other experts, representatives from the Danish MFA and Danish security sector can interact, a dialogue mechanism is proposed. This will provide a platform for policy dialogue, help to create greater policy synergies, and secure a strong link to Danish foreign policy priorities. The mechanism should include conducting seminars. A partner under engagement 4 could be tasked with managing the dialogue mechanism. The Africa Department will be responsible for hosting bi-annual coordination meetings (VC) across the entities engaged in peace and stabilisation in Africa. This includes embassies as well as departments in Copenhagen and the Ministry of Defence. The meetings will provide a platform for binding coordination across the units by allowing for updates on the implementation of the different programmes, ensuring synergies between partners, securing a strong link to Danish foreign policy priorities and harmonising policy dialogue across the region. The meetings will supplement the Inter- Ministerial Steering Committee by providing coordination at a broader level. 10. Budget Preliminary budget Regional Programme for Africa (Million DKK) Dev. eng. Partner Outcome Budget 1 African Union 1 APSA 70 2 AGA 35 2 ECOWAS 1 APSA 30 3 IGAD 1 APSA 15 4 TBD (CSOs etc.) 1 APSA and AGA 20 TA etc. TBD - 10 Total Annexes A. Process Action Plan; B. Preliminary Results Framework on outcome level; C. Preliminary Risk Management Matrix; D. Background Analysis Matrix; 9

10 E. Framework for Danish Cooperation with the African Union. i Mid Term Review of Africa Programme for Peace, Phase III (APP III) (Danida, 2016). ii The main elements of APSA are: AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC), Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), African Standby Force (ASF), Panel of the Wise (PoW) and AU Peace Fund. Each element is in various stages of implementation. iii For an analysis, see APSA Impact Report The state and impact of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) in 2015 (GiZ, 2016), and Mid Term Review of Africa Programme for Peace, Phase III (APP III) (Danida, 2016). iv South Sudan and the increase in asymetric threats in the Sahel and Somalia being examples. v As documented in various research, e.g. by Africa Center for Strategic Studies (2016). vi The main objective of AGA is to promote peace and stability, good governance, democracy and human rights as foundations for development and stable societies. vii EU-Africa Valletta Summit reaffirmed the importance of APSA and AGA as fundamental to address the migration issues. viii Verden Danmarks udviklingspolitiske og humanitære strategi (Danida 2016), p. 21. ix Space does not permit a thorough analysis of lesson learned in the concept note. This will be expanded in the programme document, based upon, among other things, the reviews of phase II and III. x Where APP III had a financial portfolio of 230 million DKK (incl. 20 million that came from APP II) the proposed programme has a budget of 180 million DKK, thus requiring strict prioritization among partners and thematic areas selected. xi The utility of JFAs has also been documented through recent non-danish reviews of this mechanism. xii See annex E for considerations about the Danish cooperation with the AU. xiii See endnote i and ii. xiv Mid Term Review of Africa Programme for Peace, Phase III (APP III) (Danida, 2016). xv In Nairobi, Addis Ababa and Bamako, respectively. xvi The Political Economy of Regional Integration, The African Union, (ecdpm, 2016) and APSA Impact Report The state and impact of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) in 2015 (GiZ, 2016). xvii The Political Economy of Regional Integration, ECOWAS, (ecdpm, 2016) and and Mid Term Review of Africa Programme for Peace, Phase III (APP III) (Danida, 2016). xviii The Political Economy of Regional Integration, IGAD, (ecdpm, 2016) and various assessments (USAID, EU and JFA) of IGAD conducted during

11 Process Action Plan (PAP) for Africa Programme for Peace IV Time Programme Documentation Consultant(s) KFU involvement Status November - December 2016 Planning of design and formulation. Identification done as part of mid-term review. Process Action Plan. Process Action Plan for programme development up to signing of commitments. Done December 2016 February 2017 Formulating ToR and procuring consultant(s) ToR and contract with consultant(s) Comment on ToR Done February 27 March 2017 Drafting concept note and annexes Final concept note Comment on concept note/help finalize Comment on concept note Done February April 2017 Conduct CVE study (AFR/Jonas, focal point) CVE study delivered Ongoing 23 March 2017 Discussion of concept note in Embassy s Internal Programme Committee 27 March 2017 Submitting concept note to Programme Committee and public consultation of Concept note Draft concept note Concept note with annexes Receives final concept note Done Done

12 Time Programme Documentation Consultant(s) KFU involvement Status 20 April 2017 Meeting in Danida Programme Committee. 26 April 2017 Draft Inception Report delivered 28 April 2017 Embassy comments on draft Inception Report 2-16 May 2017 Field mission, Addis, Djibouti, Abuja, Accra, including consultations with possible partners on DEDs 31 May 2017 Delivery of draft Programme Document and Development engagement Documents 5-9 June 2017 Consultations with Embassy and MFA on draft documents 23 June 2017 Delivery of full set of Programme Document and Concept note and annexes. List of received responses from the consultation and summary conclusions from Danida Programme Committee. Draft Inception Report Comments on draft Inception Report Draft Development of Programme Document and Development engagement Documents Programme Document and Development engagement Documents Draft Inception Report Field mission Draft Development of Programme Document and Development engagement Documents Deliver documents Possibly comment on report KFU participation in formulation mission Comment on draft documents

13 Time Programme Documentation Consultant(s) KFU involvement Status Development engagement Documents 30 June 2017 Comments from Embassy and MFA on full set of documents 7 July 2017 Delivery of revised programme documentation (quality assured and ready for appraisal) September 2017 ToR for appraisal forwarded to KFU All draft documentation for programme forwarded to KFU Revised programme documentation (quality assured and ready for appraisal) Deliver revised programme documentation (quality assured and ready for appraisal) Comment on full set of documents ToR Assist with ToR Assist with ToR, hire consultant Draft Program Document KFU does appraisal incl. Development engagement Documents and associated partner documentation 2 October 2017 Appraisal process finalized 2 13 October 2017 Revise Programme Document and DEDs (quality assured and ready for Council for Development Policy) and appropriation cover sheet 11 October Possible presentation Appraisal Report, recommendations summary Revised Programme Document and DEDs (quality assured and ready for Council for Development Policy) and appropriation cover sheet Update programme and DEDs, quality assurance KFU does appraisal

14 Time Programme Documentation Consultant(s) KFU involvement Status (orientation) of programme for Whole-of- Government Steering Committee (Samtænkningsstyregruppen) 13 October 2017 Programme Documentation with appropriation cover sheet forwarded to KFU 15 November 2017 Presentation to the Council for Development Policy December 2017 The minister approves December 2017 or January 2018 Q Q the programme Presentation to the Parliamentary Finance Committee Signing of legally binding agreements (commitments) with partner(s) Register commitment in MFA s financial systems within budgeted quarter. Programme Document, annexes, Development engagement Documents and appropriation cover Minutes from Council for Development Policy Document for Finance Committee (Aktstykke) Legally binding agreements KFU receives updated programme document

15 Crosscutting: Continuous coordination with Peace and Stabilisation Fund programming (HoA and Sahel) ongoing Q to Q

16 Regional Programme for Africa (Africa Programme for Peace IV), Annex B: Preliminary Results Framework on outcome level The programme uses the organisations own results framework in order to align the Danish support as much as possible to the organisations own priorities to achieve better results and to ensure sustainability. The final results framework, on output level, will thus be agreed with the organisations during formulation. Below follows the preliminary results framework on outcome level, as deduced from the organisations framework. The theory of change of the programme is based on the assumption that peace and security and good governance are basic foundations for sustainable development, poverty reduction and human rights. Secondly, the programme builds on the assumption that a strong continental architecture of organisations working with peace and security and good governance in Africa is a corner stone in addressing these issues. Based on these assumptions, the overall theory of change is that if Denmark, along with other partners, contributes to the strengthening of the key African organisations in selected, strategically relevant areas, then they will increasingly be able to address peace and security and governance issues, including through influencing their member states to act in accordance with continental and regional standards and norms and taking robust political, military and other action where necessary, including with global actors such as the UN. If this transpires there will be fewer or less severe conflicts, eventually improving the peace and security situation in a way that can form the basis for sustainable development, poverty reduction and human rights in Africa and address some of the root causes to violent extremism and irregular migration. This leads to the overall objective of the programme: to promote peace and security and good governance in Africa, through the strengthening of key African organisations with a mandate in these strategic areas, thereby contributing to sustainable development and poverty reduction. To achieve this, the immediate objectives are: 1) To strengthen the African Peace and Security Architecture, and 2) to strengthen the African Governance Architecture. The outcomes on development engagement level are: Development engagement 1: The African Union (AU): 1) APSA road map implemented (from APSA road map ) 2) Peace and stability, good governance, democracy and human rights as foundations for development and stable societies promoted (from AGA results framework) Development engagement 2: Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS): 1) Effective leadership in peace and security issues affecting the West African sub-region provided by ECOWAS. Development engagement 3: Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD):

17 1) IGAD s role in promoting, achieving, and sustaining good governance, peace, security, and stability in the region strengthened (from IGAD Peace and Security Strategy ) Development engagement 4: Inclusion of civil society and think tanks: 1) The involvement of civil society in APSA and AGA implementation strengthened.

18 Regional Programme for Africa (Africa Programme for Peace IV), Annex C: Preliminary Risk Management Matrix Contextual risks Risk Factor Likelihood Impact Risk response New emerging (and Likely Minor Flexibility in relapsing) violent Danish (and conflicts appear that other require the partners ) organisations support to attention. respond to emerging Implementation of AU decisions and charters in AU member states continue to be weak. Democratic gains in Africa are severely rolled back, causing the organisations to lose traction on this issue. crises. Likely Minor Continuous lobbying (through EU) in AU member states to implement decisions. Unlikely Major Continuous support to the normative democracy work of the organisations. Background to assessment Africa has seen a deteriorating trend in conflicts recently. This will likely continue and put pressure on the organisations resources to respond. Lack of implementation of AU decisions is one of the major challenges for AU. However, the impact is minor, as the organisations have learned to work around it. However, the impact on the credibility of the organisations in the populations of the member states could be major, if this issue is not addressed. Denmark will work with other partners (EU, UNDP) to find ways of contributing to better implementation on the ground. Africa has seen significant progress in democratization, despite still having a large number of not free countries. The last few years have seen a continuation of this trend especially in West Africa (Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Ghana, The Gambia), but also reversals. Overall a slight positive trend is to be expected. Should the rollback be significant, the Danish support to AGA needs to be reconsidered (increased or lowered depending on the

19 situation). Programmatic risks Risk Factor Likelihood Impact Risk response Background to assessment Partner support to the organisations is significantly lowered. The proposed reforms (Kagame and Kaberuka) are not implemented as planned. The new AU commission fails to deliver on its mandate. Institutional risks Unlikely Major Reallocate support to areas that still see traction and withdraw support from areas that grind to a halt due to diminished partner support. Likely Minor Allocate support to areas that still see traction despite lack of reforms. Unlikely Major Reconsideration of Danish support to AU. The African organisations, especially AU, have a relatively diverse partner makeup. Thus should a few key partners (such as EU or US) significantly lower their support, support from other partners (and member states) should still be able to keep momentum. Support from EU, by far the most important partner, is expected to continue in the foreseeable future, at the same high level. It is likely that a (big) part of the proposed reforms of AU will not be implemented, either due to lack of political will or lack of capacity. Should this occur, the impact will only be minor, as Danish support is already used to work in an environment, where reforms are not implemented. Observers have high hopes for the new AU Commission, and it might be difficult to live up to those. Should the new Commission lose credibility and fail to deliver on its mandate, it could have major impact on Danish support, if Danish priority areas see a loss of traction. Risk Factor Likelihood Impact Risk response Background to assessment Denmark gets associated with human rights abuses in peace operations mandated Unlikely Minor Support to the area affected will immediately be Through the proposed programme, Denmark primarily works with the normative side of peace

20 by the organisations. Denmark s financial contributions are misused. The organisations administrative and financial management capacities are not improved during implementation. withdrawn. Public communication to limit reputational damage. Unlikely Minor Immediate stop of Danish funding in the area effected. Unlikely Minor Continuous use of external monitoring (audits) and close cooperation with EU on financial monitoring. operations, such as developing human rights standards etc., so the risk of a specific mission involved in abuses having received Danish funding is limited. Though the organisations have limited capacity in financial administration, fraud and misuse is very rare. All funds a regularly externally audited. Should it happen in a specific area/department, support will immediately be redirected. The organisations continuously improves on financial management, though slowly. This improvement will most likely continue during implementation of the programme, not least due to common EU pressure and related to EU s seven pillar assessment.

21 Regional Programme for Africa (Africa Programme for Peace IV), Annex D: Background Analysis Matrix During identification and as part of the ongoing cooperation and dialogue with the African organisations led by the embassy in Addis Ababa, the below analysis matrixes have been developed. The matrixes have been amended to reflect the fact that regional organisations are supported, rather than governments or countries through a country programme, and to reflect the thematic areas of the programme (peace and security and governance). Please note that the matrix on Inclusive sustainable growth, climate change and environment has not been included, as the relevance to this particular programme is limited. 1. Overall development challenges, opportunities and risks Briefly summarise the key conclusions from the analyses consulted and their implications for the programme regarding each of the following points: - General development challenges. The threats to national, regional and international stability require coherent and targeted responses and the African multilateral organisations have a distinct role to play given their mandate and legitimacy. Africa has seen some progress towards reducing violent conflict, and the African institutions response to crises through the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) has significantly improved (as recently seen in for example The Gambia and Burkina Faso), as have the institutions normative basis for human security and good governance. However, while the organisations have grown markedly stronger, and the African leadership in addressing challenges has increased, Africa is still the region with the highest number of violent conflicts, and the last five years have seen an increasingly negative trend. Weak governance and difficult democratic transitions have enhanced this trend. The challenges negatively affect the continent by hampering sustainable development and economic growth, as well as contributing to the conditions that support violent extremism and irregular migration. In short, this environment recommends the continuation of efforts to build on the achievements of previous Danish, and other, support to the African organisations and the positive trajectory the organisations are actively pursuing to address the challenges Africa is facing. While the organisations have seem commendable progress in the last decade, more work is still needed to make them able to fully implement their mandates. A recent review of Danish support to the organisations also concluded that well-targeted external support can be expected to remain highly relevant for the peace and security and governance architectures in Africa - Development in key economic indicators. The African organisations are still suffering from limited financial support from their member states. This is most pronounced in AU and IGAD, whereas ECOWAS is somewhat better situated. External support is thus necessary to continue in the short to medium term perspective. AU is currently undergoing important reforms, under the lead of president Kagame of Rwanda.

22 The recently elected AU commission, which took up office in March 2017, seems to be dedicated to implement the suggested reforms. On the financial side, the Kaberuka proposal on African financing of the AU, which is now part of the Kagame reforms, will come into effect in the coming years. Should it be implemented as envisioned, it will mean that AU member states will finance 75 % of the AU s programme budget vs. around 10 % now. However, the extent to which this is implemented in a time plagued by the commodity crash and general slowing economic growth in Africa remains to be seen, and the timeline envisaged by the AU commission must be deemed relatively optimistic. - Status and progress in relation to SDGs, in particular those that are special priorities for Denmark. The support under the proposed programme will specifically target Sustainable Development Goals 16, peace, justice and strong institutions, where it directly addresses several of the 12 subgoals, and 17, partnerships for the goals, by creating partnerships with African organisations that mobilize and share knowledge, expertise, and financial resources, to support the achievement of the sustainable development goals. While Africa has seen some progress towards reducing violent conflict, it is still the region with the highest number of violent conflicts, and the last five years have seen an increasingly negative trend, so continued focus in this area is required. - Political economy, including drivers of change (political, institutional, economic). The African organisations are the sum of its member states. Strong organisations in themselves is thus not the only solution to peace and security and governance challenges, the member states need to be actively on board. Recently ECDP has conducted a series of very thorough political analyses of each of the African organisations, which, among many other things, pointed out that strict partner alignment with the organisations own priorities is the best approach to secure results, as it takes into account the political economy within the organisations and between their member states. Each organisation has a number of drivers of change, often based on individuals, which the Danish support will aim at supporting. Under previous Danish support this has included areas like election observation and preventive diplomacy in the AU, mediation and gender in ECOWAS, and interventions in Somalia in IGAD. List the key documentation and sources used for the analysis: - Dr. Matlosa: The African Union s African Governance Architecture Linkages with the African Peace and Security Architecture (GREAT insights Magazine, 2014) - African Peace and Security Road Map Deepening Democracy: The African Governance Architecture & Platform, 2014 report - International Crisis Group: Implementing peace and security architecture (I): Central Africa (2011) - International Crisis Group: Implementing peace and security architecture (II): Southern Africa (2012) - African Union Outcome Report of the 26 th African Union Summit (EU COREU) - The State of the African Union in 2016 (EU COREU)

23 - African Union Handbook (2017) - APSA Impact Report. The State and impact of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) in 2015 (GIZ, 2016) - African Governance Architecture Framework (AU) - Mid Term Review Africa Programme for Peace, phase III( APP III). Review Aid Memoire (DANIDA, 2016) - The African Union: Regional and Global Challenges. Policy Research Seminar Report (Centre for Conflict Resolution, 2016) - Amanda Lucey and Berouk Mesfin: Not than a chip off the block. Strengthening IGAD-AU peacebuilding linkages (ISS, 2016) - Turbulent elections in Africa in 2016: The need for truth telling from the AU (ISS, 2016) - Amanda Lucey: How ECOWAS got peacebuilding right (ISS, 2016) - Report to the Secretary-General on strengthening the partnership between the United Nations and the African Union on issues of peace and security in Africa, including the work of the United Nations Office to the African Union (UN, S/2016/780) - AU Commission elections and reform in the spotlight at the January 2017 summit (ISS, 2016) - Report of the joint African Union-United Nations review of available mechanisms to finance and support African Union peace support operations authorized by the United Nations Security Council (UN, S/2016/809) - Jan Vanheukelom: The Political Economy of Regional Integration in Africa: The African Union (ECDPM 2016) - Bruce Byiers: The Political Economy of Regional Integration in Africa: Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) (ECDPM 2016) - Jean Bossuyt: The Political Economy of Regional Integration in Africa: The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) (ECDPM 2016) - Christina Krippahl: New head of the AU commission: Who is Moussa Faki Mahamat? (Mail Guardian, 2017) - APSA Impact Assessment Methodology, Findings and Indicative Analysis Presentation, Open Session Peace and Security Council at the African Union, Addis Ababa, 30 November Community Strategic Framework , ECOWAS (n.d) - Evaluation of the Operationalisation of the ECPF at the level of ECOWAS Directorates from 2013-June 2016 Presentation by Daniel K.B. Inkoom (n.d.) - Evaluation of the Operationalisation of the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) at the Level of ECOWAS Directorates from 2013-June 2016 Daniel K.B. Inkoom (Dec 2016) - Follow-up Action on the Report of the Evaluation of the Operationalization of the ECPF Presentation ECPF Secretariat, 16 February Formulation of IGAD Regional Strategy and Medium-Term Implementation Plan IGAD (n.d) - IGAD Peace and Security Strategy Volume 1: The Framework, IGAD (Dec 2015)

24 - IGAD Peace and Security Strategy Volume 2: Implementation Plan, IGAD (Dec 2015) - Why Do We Need the African Union? Conference report, European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) 28 September 2016 (2016) - African and Europe A New Partnership for Development, Peace and a Better Future: Cornerstones of a Marshall Plan with Africa, Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (Jan 2017) - The Political Economy of Regional Integration in Africa What Drives and Constrains Regional Organisations? Vanheukelom, J. et al. (Jan 2016) Are additional studies / analytic work needed? How and when will it be done? The role and political economy of the organisations have been thoroughly investigated as part of the ongoing cooperation with the organisations Danish and otherwise. During formulation the focus will thus be on updating the analysis in the view of the important changes especially the AU is experiencing, including the role and visions of the new commission and the Kagame (and Kaberuka) reforms. Also projection of future support from other partners need to be further investigated. The formulation field mission will conduct this. 2. Fragility, conflict, migration and resilience Briefly summarise the key conclusions and implications for the programme of the analysis of the below points: - Situation with regards to peace and stability based on conflict analysis and fragility. The programme itself is aimed at addressing peace and stability issues, continent-wide. Fragility assessment of specific situations and countries are thus part and parcel of the ongoing work during implementation; but done by the partners rather than by Denmark. For a general assessment of the situation in Africa, see 1, overall challenges. - Identifying on-going stabilisation/development and resilience efforts and the potential for establishing partnerships. While the programme itself has a continental scope, specific focus will be on the Danish priority areas of the Horn of Africa, South Sudan and the Sahel. Thus to supplement the partnership with AU, partnerships will also be made with ECOWAS and IGAD, as they address issues in the specific Danish priority areas. Also specific thematic areas with special Danish interest has been identified, where partnerships will be focussed: Preventative diplomacy, mediation, early warning, gender (UNSCR 1325), AU-UN cooperation (including in peace operations), election support, preventing/countering violent extremism, migration, and youth. - Issues and concerns of relevance to Danish interest in the area of security and migration. As stated by the Valetta summit action plan (point 1.3), reinforcement of the support to the different subregional initiatives and mechanisms for conflict prevention and management, as

25 well as to development and implementation of the African Peace and Security Architecture and the African Governance Architecture, will in itself address some of the root causes for irregular migration. In addition the programme will aim at including P/CVE as a thematic area, as a specific Danish priority. - Identify where Denmark has comparative advantages that may lead to more effective and efficient programming and better results including where Denmark may contribute with deployment of specific expertise and capacities. Denmark has distinct comparative advantage by being a flexible partner, able to respond to emerging crises at short notice, until bigger donors step up. This can include reallocation of funds from planned activities to sudden needs for preventive diplomacy in a given situation. Also Denmark has specific expertise in for example P/CVE that can be deployed. The strict Danish alignment with the organisations own frameworks and strategies (where they align with Danish priorities), increases ownership and sustainability and increases the chances of achieving results. - Considerations regarding the humanitarian situation, migration, refugee and displacement issues, including the need to integrate humanitarian-development linkages and long term strategies. The programme will work indirectly with humanitarian issues through the organisations (by targeting the root causes; peace and security and governance issues) rather than working directly with the organisations work on humanitarian issues. Thus the programme will complement, rather than implement, humanitarian action. - Relevant issues and considerations related to radicalisation and violent extremism and the potential for Danish engagement to prevent and counter violent extremism (P/CVE). AU, ECOWAS and IGAD all have P/CVE frameworks in place, and the programme will work directly with P/CVE at the normative level, as a thematic area to be supported through the organisations. List the key documentation and sources used for the analysis: - Programmer med skrøbelighedsdimensioner i Afrika, n.a. (n.d) - CSO-Oversigt lande og organisationer, n.a. (n.d.) - DK Humanitær bistand i skrøbelige lande i Afrika, n.a. (n.d.) - Mapping Regional Interventions, n.a. (n.d) - IGAD Regional Strategy for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism in Horn and Eastern Africa, IGAD (Nov. 2016) Logical Framework of Programmes and Activities, African Governance Architecture and Platform (2015) - APSA Roadmap , African Union Commission, Peace and Security Department (2015) - Executive Summary to Final Report Mid-Term Evaluation Sustaining and Strengthening African Union s Liaison Offices in Post-Conflict Countries, Cécile Collin et al. (2017) - Final Report - Mid-Term Evaluation Sustaining and Strengthening African Union s Liaison Offices in Post-Conflict Countries, Cécile Collin et al. (2017)

26 - APSA Impact Report The State and Impact of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) in 2015, GIZ (2016) Are additional studies / analytic work needed? How and when will it be done? Further analysis of exact modalities on how to address migration and P/CVE through the organisations will be done during formulation, through dialogue with the organisations and other involved partners. 3. Assessment of human rights situation (HRBA) and gender Briefly summarise the key conclusions and implications for the programme of the analysis of the below points: The operationalization of APSA and AGA provides wide opportunities to take forward UNSCR 1325, gender equality issues, and promoting a rights-based approach. These include the inclusion of women in preventative diplomacy and the promotion of democratic elections, which has been enhanced in both AU and ECOWAS due to Danish support. This focus will continue in the proposed programme. Human Right Standards (international, regional and national legislation) The African organisations are generally well advanced (and progressive) in the normative framework regarding human rights. However, this often does not translate to national level in the member states. Identify key rights holders in the programme The key right holders are the population in Africa, generally speaking, as the programme aims at continental promotion of human rights, through the promotion of peace and security and good governance in Africa, through the strengthening of key African organisations with a mandate in these strategic areas. Identify key duty bearers in the programme The duty bearers are the African organisations themselves, and the programme will thus primarily work directly with duty bearers. This will be supplemented by targeted CSO support, which will enhance the rights holder approach. Gender The programme has amble opportunity to include gender aspects of peace, security and governance in its work. Examples include UNSCR 1325, the inclusion of women in preventative diplomacy and in the promotion of democratic elections, which has been enhanced in both AU and ECOWAS due to previous Danish support, and have shown good results. Not least the AU and ECOWAS is well advanced in the gender area, and offers good opportunities for cooperation, whereas IGAD is less developed and could need additional support in this field.

27 List the key documentation and sources used for the analysis: Relevant references and guidance may include: - Deepening Democracy: The African Governance Architecture & Platform, 2014 report - African Governance Architecture Framework (AU) - Turbulent elections in Africa in 2016: The need for truth telling from the AU (ISS, 2016) - Community Strategy Framework , ECOWAS (n.d) - 3 rd AU High Level Panel on Gender Equality & Women s Empowerment, The Contributions of Maputo Protocol on Women s Rights in Achieving Gender Equality in Africa: Stocktaking, Opportunities and Accountability, AU Year of Human Rights. Concept Note. AU, 2016 Are additional studies / analytic work needed? How and when will it be done? During formulation potential emerging gender related support areas will be investigated through the organisations and by consulting partners specifically involved in this area (Sweden, Canada). 4. Capacity of public sector, public financial management and corruption Briefly summarise the key conclusions and implications for the programme of the analysis of the below points: - Capacity of the public sector for policy making, enforcement and service delivery. AU, ECOWAS and IGAD have financial and administrative management systems of variable quality, though often weak, which requires close monitoring. All three organisations are in the process of passing the EU s seven pillar assessment, which is expected in late 2017 or early AU has achieved IPSAS status in accounting and financial management. IGAD is expected to achieve this status in early In short the organisations own management systems can to a large part be used to manage the Danish funding, but it requires close monitoring, and external financial monitoring at regular intervals. The embassy will work closely with the EU that has extensive financial monitoring mechanisms in place for all the organisations. - Quality and capacity of PFM, including budget credibility, comprehensiveness and transparency as well as control and external scrutiny / audit in all phases of the budget process as well as participation of citizens / CSOs in monitoring public budgets and corruption. The partners are an integral part of the budget process in the organisations, which provide a platform for budget scrutiny. All organisations are externally audited yearly on the overall level, and conducts a series of specific external audits of partner funds every year (the AU, for example, conducts more than 100 external audits of partner funding yearly). - The corruption situation and relevant anti-corruption measures and reforms.

28 The risk of corruption is assessed to be low. Though external audits of the organisations repeatedly point to areas in need of improvement, these are almost always aimed at limited knowledge, or lack of, internal rules and regulations, rather than intentional fraud or corruption, and very rarely points to loss of resources. List the key documentation and sources used for the analysis: - Ulf Engel: The African Union Finance How does it work? University of Leipzig, Mid Term Review Africa Programme for Peace, phase III( APP III). Review Aid Memoire (DANIDA, 2016) - AUC-EC Aide Memoire on administrative capacity development, Administrative Capacity Building Needs Securing Predictable and Sustainable Financing for Peace in Africa, AU Peace Fund (2016) - ECPF Internal Steering Committee Meeting, Presentation, 16 February Internal Steering Committee Meeting on the Implementation of the ECPF, ECOWAS, 16 February, Intergovernmental Authority on Development Self-Assessment Final Report, IGAD (Aug. 2015) - Risk Assessment Report on the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) USAID/Kenya and East Africa, EY (2016) - Implementing the AU Peace Fund Decision, Presentation by Colonel-Major Cheick Dembele, AU Peace Fund Task Force (n.d.) - Information Sheet: European Union Support to the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) III, Delegation of the European Union to the African Union (Jan 2017) - EU-APSA Support Programme, Presentation from AU Partners Group (AUPG) meeting, 24 March 2017 (2017) - Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) International Public Sector Accounting Standards (IPSAS) Conversion Inception Report on Development of a Road Map for Implementation of IPSAS, KPMG Kenya, 2016 Are additional studies / analytic work needed? How and when will it be done? The administrative capacity of the organisations is very well known by the embassy and other partners, and all organisations regularly undergo a vast range of assessments. The formulation of the programme will be based on these assessments and no new analyses in this area are envisaged. 5. Matching with Danish strengths and interests, engaging Danish actors, seeking synergy Briefly summarise the key conclusions and implications for the programme of the analysis of the below points: Identify: - where we have the most at stake interests and values, - where we can (have) influence through strategic use of positions of strength, expertise and experience, and The programme addresses the aims in Denmark s strategy for development cooperation and humanitarian action (The World 2030) of promoting peace, security and protection, and of promoting values

29 - where we see that Denmark can play a role through active partnerships for a common aim/agenda or see the need for Denmark to take lead in pushing an agenda forward. human rights, democracy and gender equality, and directly targets the strategy s vision that the regional organisations must act increasingly decisively with a view to promoting peace, security and political transition, especially the African Union and the regional organisations in Africa. Denmark is a long term and trusted partner of the African organisations especially AU and IGAD. This gives relatively good access, which can be used to further Danish priorities. The EU is by far the main partner financially and politically of the African organisations. As a member state, Denmark has direct influence over the EU s cooperation and dialogue, and this will be utilized. - Brief mapping of areas where there is potential for increased commercial engagement, trade relations and investment as well as involvement of Danish local and central authorities, civil society organisations and academia. The programme does not offer itself to increased trade, but could involve Danish local and central authorities through an amended form of myndighedssamarbejde. The programme envisages to fully engage Danish academia through a proposed dialogue mechanism. This mechanism will also include representatives from the Danish security sector. A stronger synergy between other Danish interventions has been a guiding principle in the identification. Denmark is currently programming a number of peace and stabilisation initiatives across Africa. Apart from this proposed programme it includes the Danish regional Sahel peace and stabilisation programme (tentative ) and the peace and stabilisation programme for the Horn of Africa (tentative ) as well as components in the bilateral country programmes in Mali, Niger and Somalia. To ensure a comprehensive approach the programming is carried out in close coordination across the different initiatives and activities to maximize the complementarities and exploit the

30 different levels of engagement while avoiding overlap of funding to partners. - Assessment of the donor landscape and coordination, and opportunities for Denmark to deliver results through partners including through multilaterals and EU; Well-functioning donor coordination mechanisms are in place for support to the organisations and the support will be closely coordinated with other partners. EU is by far the largest partner. As an EU member state, Denmark has direct influence on the planning and implementation of EU activities, which allows for increased coherence and complementarity. The separate Danish support, complementing EU support, will ensure that specific Danish priority areas are supported. Also Germany, the other Nordic countries, the Netherlands, the US and the UK are important partners. A welldeveloped partner coordination set-up exists, which the programme will continue to be part of. Denmark will seek a lead partner role in at least one area in each organisation, such as governance in AU and peace and security in IGAD, in order to strengthen Danish influence and access. List the key documentation and sources used for the analysis: - Verden Danmarks udviklingspolitiske og humanitære strategi, Danida Programmer med skrøbelighedsdimensioner i Afrika, n.a. (n.d) - CSO-oversigt lande og organisationer, n.a. (n.d.) - DK humanitær bistand i skrøbelige lande i Afrika, n.a. (n.d.) - Mapping Regional Interventions, n.a. (n.d) - Information Sheet: European Union Support to the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) III, Delegation of the European Union to the African Union (Jan 2017) Are additional studies / analytic work needed? How and when will it be done? The donor landscape is already well established, and further analysis will mostly be on the exact modalities of how Denmark continues to plug into it, including possible JFAs. The formulation of the proposed programme will be made in close coordination with formulation of other Danish initiatives.

31 Horn of Africa Sahel South Sudan

32 AU is an important partner when addressing challenges of common concern and when promoting Danish values. Through dialogue and diplomatic tools, Denmark works often together with likeminded partners to convey messages to African decision makers on issues like migration, peace and security, human rights, climate change, the International Criminal Court etc. In this work the EU is an indispensable vehicle for strengthening the voice of a country like Denmark, and a big part of the Danish dialogue will be done through or in close coordination with the EU. The dialogue takes place at many levels and takes many forms: Through Danish ministerial participation in AU summits, that grants direct access to numerous high level African decision makers, through the permanent Danish representative to the AU s (the ambassador) dialogue with AU commissioners and through the day-today exchanges on a more technical level (counsellor, programme officer) between the embassy and the AU. It can also be by expressing Danish views through Danish embassies in African countries or through the UN. Civil society organisations and think tanks can also be used as vehicles for dialogue. Public diplomacy is an important tool and can be used to promote Danish values and Danish candidacies to a broad African audience. The dialogue will often be connected to the financial and technical support. Peace & Security Peacekeeping Operations CVE AMISOM Capacity Building AU Liaison Offices