Assessing Russian Domestic Developments on the Eve of the Democratic Party Primary Season

Transcription

1 Vincent Rampino Next Generation Conference on U.S.-Russia Relations, /31/2019 Assessing Russian Domestic Developments on the Eve of the Democratic Party Primary Season In the opening weeks of 2019, the New York Times reported that the FBI has investigated US President Donald Trump as a potential national security threat due to concerns over his possible relationships with Russian government figures, 1 the Washington Post reported that Trump had gone to extraordinary lengths to conceal details of his conversations with Russian President Vladimir Putin, 2 and Roger Stone was indicted in the Mueller investigation. 3 In the frenetic American news cycle, intrigue concerning Russia s interference in the 2016 presidential election continues to play a starring role. With a handful of candidates already having announced their candidacy and the first debate slated for June this year, we are also in the early stages of what promises to be a long Democratic Party presidential primary and general election season. Amid the continually unfolding drama around the 2016 election, Democratic Party opinion concerning Russia is quite low and Republican views are not much more favorable. 4 Democratic candidates may feel that advocating for a muscular policy against Russia is a political winner. However, I argue that restraint is likely the most appropriate approach in 1 Adam Goldman, Michael S. Schmidt, Nicholas Fandos "F.B.I. Opened Inquiry Into Whether Trump Was Secretly Working on Behalf of Russia." New York Times. Jan. 11, Greg Miller, "Trump has concealed details of his face-to-face encounters with Putin from senior officials in administration," The Washington Post. Jan. 13, Mark Mazzetti, Eileen Sullivan, Maggie Haberman, "Indicting Roger Stone, Mueller Shows Link Between Trump Campaign and WikiLeaks," New York Times. Jan 25, Jacob Poushter, "6 Charts on how Russians and Americans view each other." Pew Research Center. 1

2 US-Russian relations at this moment in time. While it may be popular and politically expedient to seek contrast with a "soft on Russia" President Trump, US military policy and congressional action have already led to significant steps in response to Russia. Meanwhile, domestic developments in Russia over the last couple of years indicate a shifting political atmosphere that, due to the uncertainty of its development and increasing pressure from US and international actions, suggests the merit of a patient approach. US Military and Congressional Actions Since the annexation of Crimea in 2014, the United States has stepped up its activity in Europe through NATO. Under the European Deterrence Initiative (formerly the European Reassurance Initiative) and Operation Atlantic Resolve, the United States has pursued a vigorous course of exercises in the Eastern European territories of NATO. In March 2015, armored vehicles from the 2nd Cavalry Regiment of the US Army moved from the Baltic region to Germany in a demonstration of the commitment of the US to its NATO allies. 5 In May 2016, the 2nd Cavalry Regiment performed Dragoon Ride II on the way from its base in Vilseck, Germany to the Saber Strike 16 exercises in Estonia. 6 The Trident Juncture exercises were also conducted for the first time in Spain, Italy, and Portugal in November The second iteration of the exercises was conducted in 5 Dan Lamothe, "In show of force, the Army s Operation Dragoon Ride rolls through Europe." The Washington Post. March 24, Staff Sgt. Jennifer Bunn, "2CR Dragoon Ride II begins," U.S. Army. May 27, "Trident Juncture shows NATO capabilities 'are real and ready.'" NATO. Nov. 4,

3 October and November 2018 in Norway and was billed as "the largest NATO exercise since the Cold War," in US Department of Defense media. 8 In 2017, the US participated in the deployment of the NATO Enhanced Forward Presence agreed to at the 2016 Warsaw Summit. Within this structure, the US leads the multinational battlegroup based in Poland, while battlegroups in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are led by the United Kingdom, Canada, and Germany, respectively. This brief accounting is quite limited, merely listing some key elements of US actions in Europe since 2014, but the point remains that the US has increased its military presence and activity in Europe, adopting a more assertive posture at the very least, despite rhetoric from the White House critical of the alliance. Congress has also taken real steps to counter Russia, primarily through sanctions. In 2017 and 2018, despite friction with the White House, both houses of Congress have voted to solidify and expand sanctions against Russia. In the context of the looming Democratic Party primaries, the specifics of these pieces of legislation do not matter quite as much as their symbolic effect. The efficacy of the sanctions also has relatively less importance here, as the mere fact of congressional action in contrast to a recalcitrant executive branch and against an adversary is likely the more relevant message in the context of the coming primary campaign. Russian Domestic Developments Frustrations over social policies and economic conditions have become more prominent in the Russian domestic political situation in the last year. As the Russian 8 Staff Sgt. Megan Friedl, "US Joins 30 Other Nations for Largest NATO Exercise Since Cold War." Department of Defense. Nov. 8,

4 economy has stagnated, economic wellbeing for the average Russian has declined, with real disposable incomes falling in each of the last five years. 9 As the economic situation has worsened, the Russian government has had to make difficult decisions about how to manage the state budget. The choice to change the pension age, and the response to this policy, has been perhaps the most visible manifestation of this dynamic. On June 14, during the World Cup, Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev announced that the Russian government intended to increase the retirement age for men from 60 to 65 and from 55 to 63 for women. 10 This announcement was followed by significant protest activity encompassing a broad spectrum of the Russian political sphere. Despite the softening of the policy and a nationally televised appeal by President Putin to the Russian people, protests continued and Putin's approval rating dropped to its lowest point since 2014, ultimately bottoming out around 66%. 11 Evidence of this dissatisfaction can be seen fairly clearly in other recent public polling. In end-of-the-year polling done by Levada-Center asking respondents to indicate what they felt were the most important events of the previous year, the second most common response was pension reform, following the opening of the Crimean Bridge. 12 In June 2018, the proportion of Russians saying that the country was on the wrong path reached its highest point since 2014, while the proportion indicating their belief that 9 Yuliya Starostina, "Реальные доходы россиян упали пятый год подряд." РБК. Jan. 25, Andrey Biryukov and Anna Andrianova, "World Cup Gives Russia Cover for Unpopular Pension-Age Increase." Bloomberg. June 14, "Putin's Approval Rating," Levada-Center. Accessed Jan. 30, "Events and Evaluation of the Past Year" Levada-Center. 4

5 Russia was on the right path hit its lowest point since the same period. 13 Ultimately, these indicators do not seem to signify an imminent social movement for political change in Russia. However, along with the protests in response to the pension reform plan, they do illustrate the narrower space within which the Russian government is maneuvering as it negotiates between the limitations caused by economic stagnation and the demands of its citizens. As there does not appear to be relief for this tension close at hand, we can expect the Russian government to be faced with more tough decisions in the near to mediumterm future. Conclusion So how ought Democratic presidential candidates approach foreign policy toward Russia in the coming campaign? While the political benefits of further confrontation with Russia may be tempting, especially when considering the array of military, diplomatic, and economic levers available to the United States government, it would prudent to adopt a posture of attentive restraint. Policies of deterrence and sanction have been set in motion, and their products continue to unfold. These processes should be allowed to play out while the corresponding processes of adjustment proceed in the Russian government. 13 "оценка текущего положения дел в стране," Levada-Center. Accessed Jan. 30,