Saving Democracy from Politicians. Do We Need Professional Representatives?

Size: px

Start display at page:

Download "Saving Democracy from Politicians. Do We Need Professional Representatives?"

Annabel Knight
5 years ago
Views:

1 Saving Democracy from Politicians. Do We Need Professional Representatives? #LSEdemocracy Valentino Larcinese Professor of Public Policy in the LSE Department of Government Chair: Oriana Bandiera Professor of Economics and Director of STICERD Hosted by LSE Department of Government

2 Saving Democracy from Politicians On populism and inexperienced legislators Valentino Larcinese Inaugural lecture 6th December 2018 London School of Economics and Political Science

3 "Indirect despotism occurs when the people are no longer truly represented or when the legislative body becomes too unequal to them [Condorcet 1789]

4 Pietro Chiesa, member of the Italian parliament

5 Do you trust the politicians of your country?

6 Trust in politicians has been plummeting in Southern Europe GER SWE GB FRA ESP IT GR Average scores from the European Social Survey where 0=min 10=max (for GR 2012)

7 Trust in professions in 11 European countries (Data from GFK Verein 2016)

8 Politicians are the least trusted profession everywhere

10 Where does the revolt come from? Legitimacy of elites is questioned when things do not go well Deteriorated economic conditions and emerging demand for protection by losers of globalization & technological innovation protectionism control of immigration new role for the State in the economy

11 But economics does not explain.. why existing political elites are not delivering these policies why distrust of mainstream politicians has led to the rise of both populist and technocratic parties

12 Mainstream parties, Italy 2013

13 Mainstream parties, Italy 2013

14 New entrants, Italy 2013

15 Average ideological positions by group

16 The political market Anthony Downs' economic theory of democracy: demand and supply of policy competition generates responsiveness to demand For Downs the politician is a specialist in "discovering, transmitting and analysing popular opinion" Advantages of professionalization: labour division experience learning by doing incentives & career concerns

17 Responsiveness to whom? (source: Martin Gilens, The Monkey Cage)

18 The populist view Politicians not responsive to the majority of the electorate. Elites collude instead of competing: the establishment the people vs the elite politicians should be replaced by "common people" all policy should be directly accountable to "the people" distance between citizens and policy makers should be minimized

19 Responsiveness representation Your representative owes you, not his industry only, but his judgement; and he betrays, instead of serving you, if he sacrifices it to your opinion [Edmund Burke 1774]

20 Responsiveness representation Representation: the representative acts in the interest of the represented A representative often has superior competence and better information than the represented => it is possible to act in the best interest of the represented by NOT responding to their demands But then how do I know if my representative is working for me?

21 The technocratic view Politicians excessively responsive to the electorate they pander to the demands of misinformed/short sighted voters experts preferable to politicians insulation from the electorate is desirable (for some policy areas) distance between citizens and policy makers is positive

22 Knowledge and democracy Elitist approach (Plato). Knowledge is concentrated. A trade off between representativeness and competence. Information aggregation approach. "There is this to be said for the Many. Each of them by himself may not be of a good quality; but when they come together it is possible that they may surpass collectively and as a body the quality of the few best" [Aristotle]

23 Credibility and descriptive representation Representatives cannot commit to act in the interest of the represented We want representatives like us Generates demand for descriptive representation But what is "like us"?

24 What is "like us"? Political parties simplify descriptive representation by reducing it to ideological representation But when the ideological link between voters and politicians is weak we look for "someone like us" in socio demographic dimensions

25 Representativeness and competence: the Plato trade off quality of collective decisions representativeness

26 Representativeness and competence: the Aristotle win win quality of collective decisions representativeness

27 Are you Platonic or Aristotelian?

28 Inexperienced politicians in parliament: Italy New MPs usually selected from a pool of potential candidates with substantial political experience Founded in 2009, the Movimento 5 Stelle came out as the largest party in the 2013 election. M5S candidates selected through online primaries Unexpected success propelled into parliament completely unknown MPs with very diverse professional experiences Almost none of the M5S MPs had any political or admin experience Highly unusual composition of the Italian parliament

29 Left Coalition Political experience of elected MPs (Italy 2013) Berlusconi Coalition M5S Monti Coalition Other Re elected Admin & Party None or negligible

30 Profession of MPs in the Italian Parliament ( ) Left Right Monti M5S intellectuals politics routine non manual managers/entrepreneurs professions other Blue collar Unemployed Out of the labor force & others

31 Profession of Elected Legislators aristocracy manager/entr. profess intell politician routine non manual other Data collected by the author, except , made available by CIRCaP

32 Profession of Elected Legislators: Italy aristocracy manager/entr. profess intell politician routine non manual other Data collected by the author, except , made available by CIRCaP

33 120 MPs' occupational status Left Coalition Right Coalition Monti Coalition M5S Italian labour force Party & Unions High Intermediate Low Other

34 Mean income of newly elected MPs Italy M5S LN SEL PD PDL SCPI

35 MPs' gross income: percentiles Italy M5S Other new MPs p25 p50 p75 p90

36 120 MPs' education level Left New MPs Coalition (Left) Right New MPs Coalition (Right) Monti New MPs Coalition (Monti) M5S Italy Below High School High School University Postgraduate

37 Unemployment ( ) and M5S voting

38 Income per capita ( ) and M5S voting

39 Voting by occupational status and age High Intermedi Low High Intermedi Low M5S Abstain Other Parties

40 250 Average MPs' legislative activity Berlusconi PD Monti M5S (Activity measured using Openpolis productivity index)

41 MPs' legislative activity: 20th percentile Berlusconi PD Monti M5S

42 MPs' legislative activity: median Berlusconi PD Monti M5S p20 median

43 MPs' legislative activity: 80th percentile Berlusconi PD Monti M5S p20 median p80

44 MPs' legislative activity: 90th percentile Berlusconi PD Monti M5S p20 median p80 p90

45 MPs' legislative activity: 95th percentile Berlusconi PD Monti M5S p20 median p80 p90 p95

46 Cumulated legislative activity over time

47 In the first year, M5S lags behind

48 After that, they catch up 13 months 36

49 By the end they also outperform incumbents New M5S always outperform other new MPs

50 Amateurs turned politicians: what do the data say? Many indicators suggest that the amateurs turned politicians didn't do too bad as legislators, relative to other parliamentary groups However, we do not know if this holds for other roles, in particular the executive

51 Is populism a threat to democracy?

The paradox of Europanized politics in Italy

The paradox of Europanized politics in Italy Hard and soft Euroscepticism on the eve of the 2014 EP election campaign Pietro Castelli Gattinara 1 Italy and the EU: From popular dissatisfaction 2 Italy