Why Japan is focusing on Central Asia

Transcription

1 With its rules and codes on freedom, the West has difficulty in working with this area of the globe. Japan is better at it and is now trying to pass from a phase of intense bilateral relationships to a Why Japan is focusing on Central Asia by Fernando Orlandi stage that sees it as a pivotal alliance. Not only are economics at stake, international antiterrorism initiatives and drug trafficking are also involved

2 W hen the USSR collapsed, Central Asia was for Japan and the rest of the world nothing more than one of the remote regions of the Soviet empire. At the beginning of the Nineties, with the appearance of five new states, a number of situations hatched. Doubting their ability to hang on to independence, various analysts feared them falling in the sphere of Iran. The Iranian threat did not materialise and Shiite militant Islam did not take root. Russia remained the most influential player, though competition for influence never disappeared. To the point that few observers cited a new Great Game. At the time, Japan s role was decidedly marginal. The opportunity that Tokyo _The issue of the exploitation of energy resources of Far Eastern Siberia and the Kuril territories from the end of the 1980s was a tricky phase with difficult negotiations initially tried to seize concerned Russia and two longstanding unfinished issues: the energy resources of the far eastern Siberia and the Kuril islands (that the Japanese call the Northern Territories ). From the Japanese point of view these two questions have always been closely linked. Siberia against Kuril Starting from the Eighties, it was clear that Moscow, to exploit the energy resources of far eastern Siberia, needed technology and capital it did not have. To the west there had already been the war conducted by Washington against the gas pipeline towards Europe, but eastwards the situation was less tense though in any case complex. Tokyo was suspicious of the US, when you think that Henry Kissinger, in reapproaching communist China, not only played up the Soviet threat but included a possible threat from Japan. The Kremlin Corbis Corbis

3 WHY JAPAN IS FOCUSING ON CENTRAL ASIA did not let the opportunity pass them by, with Moscow unexpectedly willing to reopen negotiations concerning the disputed territories. During discussions, the PCUS secretary Leonid Brezhnev proposed cooperation to jointly exploit the natural resources of Siberia. In some ways also the Soviets had accepted the link between investment and the Kuril islands. It was quite a fluid situation, from which unexpected developments were possible. But nothing happened, not even under Mikhail Gorbachev. Paradoxically, the man responsible for perestroika took a very rigid stance towards Tokyo, turning Soviet-Japanese relations into a real anomaly in the new architecture of international relations that Moscow was trying to set up. Except with Japan, relations improved with every other country, even South Korea. For Gorbachev the question had been solved with the war: I see no need in bringing up questions that are now part of history, he said categorically in May 1988 to the disconcerted leadership of the Japanese Socialist Party Takako Doi. The issue continued in post-soviet Russia, with repercussions even for Boris Yeltsin, who precisely for the Kuril question, was forced to cancel a long planned state visit in the summer of In this context, when Tokyo began looking towards Central Asia, it did so through the prism of the relations that had settled down with Moscow. Responding positively to pressure from France and Germany to increase assistance and investment in the postsoviet regions, Japan provided funds. If it wanted to make a point, the message to Moscow was clear: had you accepted to return the islands, Russia would have benefited from significant financial resources. Following a series of diplomatic missions to Central Asia, Japanese interest changed. In February 1993, Tokyo made it known that its priorities in diversifying energy supply had changed: in place of the possible fields in far eastern Siberia it now focused on Central Asia, in particular Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Kazuo Ogura, director of Economic Affairs at the _Japanese Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda and Russian President Vladimir Putin met in April to discuss the G8, the Kuril islands and the growth of trade contacts Foreign Office, was explicit: in light of territorial disputes, there is a limit to cooperating with Russia. Shortly afterwards, the powerful MITI (Ministry of International Trade and Industry) published a white paper that supported the passage from petrol to natural gas and moreover invited large Japanese conglomerates and industries of the energy sector to invest in Central Asia. 22

4 Euro-Asian Diplomacy In 1997 Tokyo started a new phase: the strategy of Euro-Asian Diplomacy. The results obtained from 1992 to 1997 were not thrilling and through Euro-Asian Diplomacy Tokyo moved away from the old paradigm that inexorably linked any potential technological and financial investment to the return of the Kurils. With this new outlook, achieving stability and development in Central Asia became an autonomous single objective, while Japan was starting to see itself as an Asian model for those States. This phase started in the spring, with the first high-profile visit to Central Asia by the Foreign Office Minister Michio _The issue of the Kuril islands continued in post-soviet Russia, with repercussions even for the then President Boris Yeltsin (seen here at a meeting in 1999 with the then Prime Minister of Japan Ryutaru Hashimoto) Watanabe. As a result of his trip, a strategy was drawn up of financial assistance for development, specifically concerning the countries of that region. In October a second high-level delegation went to Central Asia. In the same month the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development), thanks to strong pressure from Tokyo, decided to include the five new States of Central Asia in an official assistance programme. At the same time Tokyo exercised strong pressure so that the same countries were admitted to the Asian Development Bank, despite them already being part of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. For these States this was a privileged and unique situation: they can get credit from both institutions. Pushed by the government, which prepared an aid package aimed at economic and environmental development in Central Asia, the large Japanese conglomerates intervened to obtain prospecting rights for hydrocarbons and establish important joint ventures with local companies. In this phase Tokyo fostered great expectations, yearning to have its presence recognised in Central Asia. And the government of those states were not indifferent. Relations were excellent. Taking stock However, these excellent relations did not translate into opportunities and privileged access for Japanese companies. Some objective factors hampered the projects. Among these were the region s instability and the low purchasing power of the locals, plus Japanese managers inclination to avoiding taking any type of risk. In spite of a superficial sense of cultural affinity, the inability to understand the political-cultural situation and the local business mechanisms led to generalised losses for all the Japanese companies. Above all the government s strategic objective, concerning energy security, did not bear fruit. At the time of taking stock, a well-known analyst, Tomohiko Uyama, wondered whether there really was a real national strategy. Certainly Tokyo had underestimated the challenges linked to entering the region s energy sector, just as it had underestimated the political and technical obstacles linked to transporting the hydrocarbons to Japan. The gap between expectations, objectives and results obtained made the country aware that it did not have a clear strategy. As a matter fact, more than based on a comprehensive project, the Japanese strategy was built around some characters who held a role or had 23

5 WHY JAPAN IS FOCUSING ON CENTRAL ASIA particular influence with regard to powerful bureaucratic mechanisms. Undoubtedly strong people, who made use of their impressive offices and leveraged on worthy personal relationships, thus prevailing over the guidelines of national foreign policy. For example, for Uzbekistan Chino Tadao, a high ranking official of the Ministry of Finance and later Chairman of the Asian Development Bank, Magosaki Ukeru, first Japanese ambassador in Uzbekistan, and Shima Nobuhiko, an influential man in television. For Kyrgyzstan: Edamura Sumio, former ambassador in Russia, and Tanaka Tetsuji, a high ranking official of the Japanese central bank, then becoming personal adviser to the president of Kyrgyzstan Askar Akaev, and a lobbyist in the home country. In conclusion, the Japanese strategy of was not well thought out and moved along uncoordinated and sometimes naive routes. The lessons learnt from this period, together with the awareness of the growing geopolitical importance of Central Asia and the positive role in any case played by Japan in stabilising the region, gave rise to a new policy. An alternative approach In the summer of 1996, Kazuiko Togo, at the time one of the two general vice directors of the Department of European Affairs of the Foreign Office, concluded that the stability of Central Asia and the surrounding countries constituted a pillar of Japan s security interests. These considerations became public the following year, thanks to an important interview with Koji Watanabe, former ambassador to Moscow and at the time executive adviser to the Japanese Federation of Economic Organisations: Japan had to greatly assist the development of the States of Central Asia, also as a consequence of the potential role these could play as a buffer region to keep peace in the Eurasian continent. The Foreign Office took these incentives and began to define a more sophisticated response. From 2 to 9 July, the Minister Keizo Obuchi went to Central Asia as the head of a highly qualified delegation of sixty political managers and business people. A few days later, the Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto, when not by chance speaking to an audience of managers from large companies and conglomerates, announced the new policy to Eurasia. An influential analyst noted that Hashimoto recognised the evidence, often neglected in western political circles, that the silk road also went eastwards. Relations with Washington remained the cornerstone of the country s foreign policy to maintain stability in the Asia- Pacific region, but the time had come for Japan to develop an alternative approach to the same objective, that would have to include Russia, China, Central Asia and the Caucasus. This new Euro-Asian Diplomacy would be founded on a new diplomatic stand point, in any case maintaining the same aim of keeping peace and prosperity in the Asia- Pacific region. With respect to the Asia central-caspian region, Hashimoto recognised that energy resources would play an increasingly important role for the global situation of gas and oil supplies. The financial commitment of Japan in Central Asia would be based on the development of the energy sector, as means to increase the region s prosperity. Finally the Prime Minister underlined the Asian approach rather than western. Central Asian countries responded positively to Tokyo s Euro-Asian Diplomacy. Furthermore, this long-term prospect was particularly appreciated by the large Japanese companies and conglomerates, with their fondness for long-term investments and not just in energy. A consolidated mode of operation was also added to the equation: the coordinated action on many levels and in differentiated markets. From this point of view Japanese companies enjoy a relative advantage over western investors, who almost exclusively focus on hydrocarbons. Hashimoto s foreign policy towards Central Asia became an alternative Asian approach. While western companies concentrate on ROI and on earning profits in the shortest time possible, the Japanese focus on long-term results. 24

6 _Above: Chino Tadao, a high-ranking Finance Ministry official and Chairman of the Asian Development Bank. Right: Koji Watanabe, Ambassador to Moscow and a member of the board of the Japanese Federation of Economic Organisations While western governments generally use foreign policy as a tool to promote the interests of its companies abroad, in Japan the opposite occurs: the government uses its companies as a tool of foreign policy to promote national political interests. What about human rights? In turn the governments of Central Asia have fallen for the charm of the Japanese modernisation model, and have declared so openly. The western offer to these authoritarian societies has been viewed with fear: too many reforms to be undertaken in the political and legal systems. And especially too many human rights and the feared threat of coloured revolutions. Instead Tokyo has kept an extremely low profile, that goes well beyond caution. Even the massacre of Andijan (the fourth city in Uzbekistan) did not change Japanese policy. Human rights are not on the Japanese agenda. A new phase opened in Tokyo made a new addition to its already serious commitment by establishing the Central Asia plus Japan initiative. Basically the idea was to pass from the bilateral relations between Japan and the individual states of the region to a greater dialogue and interdependency among the same countries of Central Asia, with Japan in the role of facilitator. Energy resources were not at the centre of this initiative, but rather it concerned water, transportation, fighting crime (drug trafficking in particular) and antiterrorism. Tokyo s prerogative is to achieve longmedium term results. By stating that thirty years were necessary for ASEAN to obtain great results regarding regional cooperation, high-level officials of the Foreign Office made it known that they expected the first fruits to be seen in ten or twenty years time. 25