U.S. Challenges and Choices in the Gulf: Iran After the War in Iraq

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1 Policy Brief #13 The Atlantic Council of the United States, The Middle East Institute, The Middle East Policy Council, and The Stanley Foundation U.S. Challenges and Choices in the Gulf: Iran After the War in Iraq This policy brief is based on presentations and discussions at the 15th in a series of jointly sponsored offthe-record congressional staff briefings on "U.S. Challenges and Choices in the Gulf. The views and opinions expressed in this policy brief do not necessarily represent those of the sponsoring organizations. To receive information on future briefings, please contact Susan Roggendorf, at address: sroggendorf@stanleyfoundation.org. The war in Iraq has changed the context of U.S.-Iranian relations by increasing both the threat Iran perceives from the United States and Iran s ability to undermine U.S. interests in the region, especially with regard to the internal stability of Afghanistan and Iraq. This new dynamic underscores the desirability if not necessity of a pragmatic approach to U.S.-Iranian relations, including damage control in the short-term and building a basis for strategic cooperation in the longer-term. I. The War in Iraq Changed Threat Perception Prior to the war in Iraq and the international fight against terrorism that followed the al Qa eda attacks of 11 September 2001, Iranian leaders (both reformist and conservative) listed Saddam Hussein s Ba athist regime in Baghdad, the Taliban regime in Kabul, the growing presence of U.S. forces in the Gulf, and a nuclear-armed Israel among the major external threats to Iran s security. By and large, Iranians considered themselves surrounded by enemies (Iraq, Afghanistan, U.S. Forces in the Gulf), strategic competitors (Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Azerbaijan), and not-necessarily-reliable partners (Russia, Armenia). A concomitant sense of isolation prompted Iran to seek advanced weaponry and nuclear technology both of which were justified, Iranian leaders argued, by Iran s legitimate interests in selfdefense and self-reliance. Why then, with the removal from power of both the Taliban and Saddam Hussein, and with efforts to move toward a settlement between Israel and the Palestinians, should Iran still perceive itself so threatened as to need to pursue a clandestine nuclear weapons capability, as many in the United States and Europe suspect? A large part of the answer is that Iranian leaders consider the United States whose troops now surround Iran almost entirely as the single biggest threat to its security. In addition, Iranian leaders increasingly cite Pakistan as an important threat, though they separately admit having purchased technology for their nuclear programs from Pakistani sources. Iran s nuclear programs are also driven by its desire for recognition of its leadership position in the Gulf region and to bolster Iranian national pride.

2 Lessons Learned In view of the fate of Saddam Hussein, the Iranian leadership seems to have concluded that the only way to ward off any hypothetical U.S. attempt at military coercion is to acquire a strong military capability and thus raise to an unacceptable level the potential costs to the United States of an armed conflict. In fact, just after the U.S.-led war on Iraq, the Iranian Ambassador to the United Nations in Vienna, Ali Akbar Salehi, said that it was clear that the Bush administration, entertains the idea of invasion of yet another territory, as they aim to re-engineer and reshape the entire Middle East. 1 Accordingly, those in Tehran who favor Iranian development of nuclear weapons make the argument that the United States would be forced to deal with a nuclear-armed Iran as it is (i.e. with its current government) rather than as a putative candidate for regime change. This line of reasoning includes the assumption that North Korea s position vis-à-vis the United States is much stronger than that of Iran because of the former s budding nuclear arsenal. The war in Iraq (along with the publicly disseminated National Security Strategy of the United States) appears to demonstrate the conviction in the U.S. administration that it must, where necessary, take preemptive action to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 2 This suggests that the security strategies of Iran and the United States may be steering the two countries along a dangerous collision course. However, the U.S. and Iranian governments share an understanding of the importance of Iraq to future security in the Gulf region. For both governments, the reconstitution of Iraq will be a complex and problematic undertaking. In particular, the political future of Iraq s Kurds and Shi a will have serious consequences for Iran, Turkey, Syria, and others. II. One Step Forward, Two Steps Back Despite a common desire to avoid open conflict, recent episodes of collaboration between the United States and Iran have failed to generate the political will for sustained strategic cooperation. Instead, each side views the other s policies as self-serving and inconsistent. U.S. officials were impressed with Iran s behavior in the months following September 11 th. They took note of Iran s rounding up of al Qa eda operatives and of its positive contributions to the formation of a post-taliban interim government in Afghanistan. 3 The Bush Administration likewise noted Iran s offer, in advance of the Iraq war, to help in search-and-rescue operations. The United States benefited from 1 Reuters, U.N. Agency Sets Deadline for Iran to Reveal Nuclear Plans, New York Times, 12 September On the internet at: 2 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America is available in print, or on the internet at: The key passage relating to preemption reads as follows: The gravest danger our Nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology. Our enemies have openly declared that they are seeking weapons of mass destruction, and evidence indicates that they are doing so with determination. The United States will not allow these efforts to succeed. We will build defenses against ballistic missiles and other means of delivery. We will cooperate with other nations to deny, contain, and curtail our enemies efforts to acquire dangerous technologies. And, as a matter of common sense and self-defense, America will act against such emerging threats before they are fully formed. We cannot defend America and our friends by hoping for the best. So we must be prepared to defeat our enemies plans, using the best intelligence and proceeding with deliberation. History will judge harshly those who saw this coming danger but failed to act. In the new world we have entered, the only path to peace and security is the path of action. 3 The UN conference on Afghanistan, in which Iran is considered to have played a constructive role, was held in Bonn, Germany, from 27 November to 7 December 2001.

3 Iran s policy of active neutrality during the conflict. 4 At the same time, however, U.S. officials have accused Iran of harboring senior Taliban and al Qa eda fugitives, encouraging factional fighting in Afghanistan, refusing to promote Shi i cooperation with U.S. authorities in Iraq, and developing clandestine weapons of mass destruction. This perceived mix of cooperative and non-cooperative policies has exacerbated distrust of Iranian intentions within the U.S. administration. Similarly, many Iranians (including large parts of the reformist leadership) were surprised by and upset at Iran s inclusion in President Bush s axis of evil, despite Iran s attempts to play productive roles in restoring security to Afghanistan. Iran s government denies U.S. accusations that it is sheltering al Qa eda leaders implicated in the May 2003 suicide bombings in Saudi Arabia, while criticizing what it perceives as a consistent U.S. refusal to disarm an Iranian opposition group based in Iraq, the Mujahedine Khalq, even though this group is on the U.S. State Department list of terrorist groups. 5 This recent cycle of perceived potential and tacit disappointment has left both sides cynical vis-à-vis the possibility for constructive bilateral relations in the short and medium terms. III. Roles of Others Though the likelihood of a full, bilateral resolution to the current crisis in U.S.-Iranian relations appears small, recent events notably the International Atomic Energy Agency s (IAEA s) voicing of concern over Iran s uranium enrichment program provide opportunities for more concerted multilateral efforts. Rising Concern in the EU The recent finding of enriched uranium in samples taken by IAEA inspectors near Iran s nuclear facility at Natanz has prompted the European Union and individual members to reevaluate their positions on Iran. As part of this reevaluation, the EU has halted its negotiation of a potentially lucrative Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) with the Iranian government. European leaders seem increasingly sympathetic to the U.S.-held notion that allowing Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT) signatory states to develop an independent, full fuel cycle though technically permitted by the treaty is unacceptable. It puts these states in a position to pull out of the NPT with only 90-days notice and to develop a nuclear weapons capability rapidly with the technology they gained legally though membership in the treaty regime. Furthermore, European leaders have begun to worry that Iran has already used the technology transfers allowed by the NPT to develop clandestine weapons programs. Many experts argue that the effective usefulness of the NPT regime will have come to an end if this concern proves founded. A More Useful Role for Russia? Russia, too, appears to be in the process of reevaluating the dangers of its long-standing cooperation with Iran to develop the latter s light-water reactor at Bushehr. Increasingly concerned about the implications of a nuclear-armed Iran on its doorstep, the Russian government has stipulated that it will only ship a planned five tons of nuclear fuel to the Bushehr plant once it has finalized with Iran an agreement on 4 Mendenhall, Preston, War Offers Iran Ticket Off Axis of Evil, MSNBC, 28 February On the internet at: 5 Slavin, Barbara, Mutual Terror Accusations Halt U.S.-Iran Talks, USA Today, 21 May On the internet at:

4 returning all spent fuel to Russia. 6 In addition, despite recent disagreement over Iraq, the Bush Administration has closer bilateral relations with Russia than any other U.S. administration in recent memory, suggesting that bilateral consultations on Iran s nuclear ambitions could well foster mutual interests. IV. Charting the Difficult Road Ahead The road ahead looks difficult because mutual suspicion renders infeasible otherwise desirable options for reducing tension. Any coherent strategy for the future will have to account for two widely held convictions: in the United States, that the current Iranian regime cannot be trusted and that only a new regime could be a viable partner for negotiation; and in Iran, that the United States is determined to dominate the Gulf at the expense of legitimate Iranian interests. Despite the seeming intractability of this impasse, alternative approaches must be explored in view of the enormous costs and risks of a continuing, and perhaps worsening, confrontation. One alternative approach is to consider actions that could be encouraged in the short, medium, and longer terms to defuse current U.S.-Iranian tension while laying groundwork for a more stable, constructive relationship. Such actions, many of which may have to be unilateral at least initially, must be concrete and clear if the two countries are to have a chance to break free of the current dangerous cycle characterized by mistrust, uncertainty, and unfulfilled checklists of demands and expectations. The Short-Term: Damage Control In the short-term, Iran must quickly and directly address both U.S. accusations that it is harboring al Qa eda operatives and growing world unease over the intentions and status of its nuclear programs. As attention to WMD proliferation mounts and a 31 October 2003 IAEA deadline looms for Iran to prove that it is not secretly developing atomic weapons Iranian obfuscation in responding to international concerns does little to defuse tension or build confidence. 7 Concretely, Iran should sign, ratify, and implement the additional protocol to the NPT, which would build its international bona fides by allowing the IAEA to conduct anytime, anywhere inspections. Indeed, the head of Iran s Atomic Energy Organization, Gholamreza Aghazadeh, has declared that Iran considers signing the protocol necessary, though the Iranian government desires further negotiation with and clarifications from the IAEA before it will do so. 8 To help this process along, the European Union might specify that it will not conclude a Trade and Cooperation Agreement with any state not party in good standing to the NPT, and the U.S. government could make clear that it will not use nuclear weapons against verifiably non-nuclear states. Meanwhile, both sides might consider an agreement in principle, similar to that reportedly made between the United States and North Korea after the recent six-party meetings in Beijing, to avoid provocative actions before a future round of multilateral diplomacy or negotiation. Nevertheless, both governments 6 Iran-Russia Agreement on Return of Spent Fuel to be Signed Soon: Official, Payvand, 21 June On the internet at: 7 For more details on the issues surrounding the highly enriched uranium found at Natanz, see: Warrick, Joby, Iran Admits Foreign Help on Nuclear Facility, Washington Post, 27 August On the internet at: 8 Iran Welcomes Signing Additional Protocol to NPT: Aqazadeh, Payvand, 3 July On the internet at:

5 could work toward the establishment of a U.S.-Iranian red phone or hot line to allow for the management of crises. The Medium-Term: Building Habits of Strategic Cooperation The challenge for the medium term will be building U.S.-Iranian strategic cooperation against a background of mistrust and mutual accusations. There is no shortage of possible avenues for such cooperation. Both countries stand to reap substantial benefits from collaboration in investigating crimes, joint patrolling of the Gulf for smugglers, mutual assistance in drug interdiction, and coordination of efforts to monitor and secure Afghanistan s western borders. For some of these initiatives to succeed, Iran will have to take unilateral action without an apparent quid pro quo. For others to succeed, the U.S. government will have to become convinced that working with Iran on areas of mutual concern need not necessarily compromise its opposition to Iran s behavior in other areas (e.g. weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles.) The Long-Term: Regional Security The course of U.S.-Iranian relations will have a tangible impact on long-term security in the Gulf and beyond. As such, the two countries need a long-term vision of the Middle East to guide and to provide a context for their short and medium term policies. This vision might include continued Iranian rapprochement with the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the establishment of a Middle East nuclear-weapons-free zone, and eventually the formation of a pan-regional organization similar to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). None of these ideas is likely to be realized in the immediate future. However, constructive short and medium term policies can be even more useful if they provide a foundation for future cooperative security in the Gulf. A Tree Falling in an Empty Forest If any of these initiatives are to spark a real improvement in U.S.-Iranian relations, they must be seized upon by both sides as opportunities and not simply ignored or dismissed as insignificant, insufficient, or disingenuous. A first step is to foster common appreciation of short-term dangers and long-term possibilities, lest a rising tide of confrontation prevent the achievement of shared goals such as ensuring stability in Iraq and promoting security and prosperity in the entire Gulf region.