Patronate-Based Elites in African Societies: Responsive or. Reactive?

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1 Patronate-Based Elites in African Societies: Responsive or Reactive? Piskunova Natalia, Associate Professor, Higher School of Economics Russia Elites are considered to be a personalized type of political players. It is common knowledge that the role of elites in the development of a country is projected in economic sector, in political and social spheres. Elites exhibit their role as actors in a complex of intertwined economic, political and social interactions between citizens. Modern economic and political elites conduct activity in a new global configuration, produced by the emerging post-westphalia world order. The present state of affairs suggests changes and challenges posed to the present international system most evidently, by the gradual decline of state as a key player in the chessfield of international affairs. The shift of focus is thus evident, as domestic economy, which is one of the classic domains of state prevalence now is likely to come to the hands of new players. The Post-Westphalian era creates a new framework of action for elites, as the role of the State as a key player has been decreased. The State as a player gradually steps away from the intense market interactions in certain areas, and this gives way to the activisation of alternative players. In developed economies, this new configuration contributed to the expansion of the role of political and economic elites in post-westphalia conditions, whereas in underdeveloped economies the situation is not so obvious. In underdeveloped political systems, the structure of industries and markets is still largely dependent on the State as a regulator of economic transactions. These markets exist in conditions of traditional society, where the component of personal interaction may at times be more important than the rule of conduct, introduced by the State.

2 Evidently, the type of economic and political elite in a given country depends largely on the regime type, which exists in it (Schedler 2002; Spears 2002). The type and essence of regime predetermine the type of governance in the country, which, in its turn, influences the functioning of the country s economy in general. In underdeveloped economies, major economic subjects - elites conduct their economic activity under strong influence of the system of interactions, which is typical for traditional societies. In these traditional economies, patronate-based elites play the role of key economic and political actors on both the economic market and the political arena. Globalization increases elites competition and widens the prospects of modernization in these economies. The governments are induced to maintain the opening of these societies, develop the economy and thus limit the regulating capacity in a country (Kaiser 1998, p.3). However, this entails a potential of fragmentation of a weak state, because, as Martin Doornboos noted, in many post-colonial African states their survival as independent states would have come to a halt had it not been for the international recognition of their sovereignty (Doornboos 2002, p.809; also see Jackson 1990). Africa is associated with particular political and economic development mechanisms. The internal security configuration in Africa is under strong influence of clientelism, which may be defined as dissemination of ethnic, religious, clan-based, family-based and other liaisons in the political sphere. Clientelism remains one of the basic principles of recruitment of elites in underdeveloped countries (such as Somalia and Ethiopia). Political and economic tradition still plays a foremost role in these societies. In countries of Africa in general the process of statebuilding has never been accomplished according to western standards. As a result, it is these countries where all mistakes and miscalculations of governance are most visible (see Zartman

3 1995). Studying elites as political and economic actors in Africa can be conducted within the framework of discussing personalized actors of intra-societal interaction. In Somalia, the analysis of elites is complicated, because a single economic subject may be represented in different elite strata. This results in constant internal uncertainty and hinders economic development. In underdeveloped societies polarized elites rest on the same social base, and this contributes to permanent instability in the political sphere. One of the key differences between western and oriental practices of creating intra-state political structure is visualized in the tradition of recruiting the ruling elite through political parties competition. Political parties in African societies are often formed on the basis of patron-client relationship, which excludes the consideration of political platforms and manifestos of the parties. The political relations between parties are substituted by the vulnerable system of personal and often family- or relative-based relations between leaders and party members. In certain cases, this system is based on relationship between ethnical clans, local communities and religious groups, which are related neither with party policy, nor with party manifesto. Organizational structure in such societies is based on authoritarian principles. The key political leader (often an incumbent president) creates a ruling presidency clan an informal network of professional politicians and businessmen, who hold key posts in the government. This structure rests on the system of personal relations between its members, which may be based on religious, ethnic, family unity, as well as on connection in business liaisons and common political interests. Internal security configuration in these countries is haunted by the problem of power distribution and means of adapting traditional institutions of regulating national economies to

4 new formats. During the whole postcolonial period traditional economic and political institutions of these societies have been transforming in order to adapt to liberalized markets, fast-track democratization and structural transformation of political and economic systems of these countries. Nonetheless, political elites failed to deal with the focal problem of power transfer, which is crucial for maintaining the process of democratic liberalization and opening of national economies. Political elites were eventually substituted by alternative elites that is, patronatebased elites, which were formed on the basis of clan relationships between different ethnic groups. In Somalia, ethnic clans act as non-traditional non-state actors in the whole system of political controversies in this area (and even beyond the territory of former Somalia). Clans represent a type of an internal actor in the sub-state system, and they often perform their activities as mediators between local population, military bands and formations, economic enterprises and traditional general jurisdiction courts in form of court of sharia. As seen in Somalia, clans are determined by patrilineal descent and membership can be as large as several hundred thousand members. Within the larger clan structure, smaller groups, known as diyapaying groups, also exist (Coyne 2006, p.347). Also, clans in former Somalia represent a type of the emerging patronate-based elite. It is visible that political parties in many failing societies are often formed on the basis of patronclient relationship, which excludes the consideration of political platforms and manifestos of the parties. The political relations between parties are substituted by the vulnerable system of personal and often family- or relative-based relationships between leaders and party members. In certain cases, this system is based on relationship between ethnical clans, local communities and

5 religious groups, which are related neither with party policy, nor with party manifesto (see Fortes and Evans-Pritchard 1940). Several decades after gaining independence from colonial powers it becomes clear that in majority of cases the first leaders of newly independent states did not realize that their states, in fact, were mere conglomerates of incohesive local communities with diverging schemes of subjection (power-sharing); neither had they considered the limits of available resources and possibilities (for detailed discussion see Austin 1984). Attempts to ruin patronate-client-based system of governance, which appears to be natural for oriental societies, prove to be senseless, as they do not contribute to the dissemination of liberal market norms and principles. In this sense, colonialism, which induced the westernized system of governance and market interactions to African countries, failed to root these new systems into the basis of traditional-type governance, which was authentic to the colonized territory (Kreijen 2004, p.66). In modern conditions PBE (patronate-based elites) act as alternative elites, which substitute market-created elites. PBEs are based on deeply rooted interrelations between clans or ethnic groups in underdeveloped economies. The influence of PBE on development of economy in these countries can be both positive and negative. Moreover, the impact of PBE on economic development of underdeveloped countries is closely connected with political transformations in these states. In a failed state situation, PBE act as alternative elites, or alternative market players. PBEs use the status-quo of power vacuum and non-existence of state-imposed regulation to create new conditions for both economic and political market.

6 As noted previously, in war-torn Somalia, the substitution of elites by clans in political sphere reveals the most acute political problems. In fact, this substitution has contributed to the process of state failure by creating a parochial mechanism of resource distribution: In the Somali case, it was inability to accommodate conflicting interests, often articulated on a clan basis, and the instrumental use to which the state apparatus was put in the pursuit of this inter-clan violence, that caused the disintegration of the fragile system. For all its repressive qualities, the Somali state had a relatively weak presence within the society, which meant that it could all the more easily collapse and be thrown off when inter-clan conflict and repression came to a head (Doornboos 2002, p.801). In Somalia, in the patronate-based elites have been applying for international financial and humanitarian aid on behalf of the state of Somalia. International funds and agencies have provided the requested aid to these recipients; however, there was no outcome in terms of development of the country. As the United Nations Development Programme does not assess the Human Development Index for Somalia, it is difficult to consider exact data of aid inflow and redistribution of foreign aid between the leading clans in former Somalia. In the recipients of international aid have distributed these resources between different clans according to the hierarchy of clans. The extensive scale of this distribution is obvious, since the whole Somalian society is based on a hierarchy of ethnic clans. Practically the whole amount of international aid has gone to clans, which formed the patronate-based elites in Somalia. These elites used the power vacuum, which was created in conditions of state failure, to establish a scheme of acquiring international financial aid without providing any warrants. As

7 credits and loans to Somalian agencies have thus been abstracted from any state guarantees, the investment climate in the country has deteriorated. Major international investors started to abandon the country and eventually the majority of international assets were withdrawn from Somalia. This led to the decrease of social spending and, as a result, the level of poverty soared. Somalia: conflict situation At present, in Somalia there are 5 parallel conflicts 1 : 1) Federal Government of Somalia versus non-state violent conflict actors of islamist groups al-shabaab and Hizbul Islam over ideology and national power issues, which started in 2006 and up to 2013 has been defined by Conflict Barometer as all-out War; 2) Puntland self-proclaimed authority versus Somaliland selfproclaimed authority over territory and subnational dominance issues, which started in 1998 and is characterized as non-violent dispute; 3) Puntland self-proclaimed authority versus Federal Government of Somalia over Puntland autonomy issue and status, which is ongoing since 1998 within a non-violent format; 4) Somaliland versus Khatumo State Autonomy over subnational predominance and power, which is ongoing since 2009 and is currently a violent crisis; 5) Federal Government of Somalia versus Somaliland over secession, territory, and power, which is ongoing since 1991 with a present non-violent status (however, the status has changed over last 24 years). Due to grave security conditions, UNDP does not provide Human Development Index for Somalia. The political configuration of state failure in Somalia is largely triggered by the de-facto creation and development of independent proto-state units, which claimed authority over several 1 As defined in the Conflict Barometer 2013 Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIIK), University of Heidelberg, Germany, pp.62-64

8 territories of Somalia. This was partly endowed by the government of former Somali Republic in 1960, when political affiliations quickly developed along clan-based lines The majoritarian parliament created a set of incentives that led to constant struggles where clans would attempt to form coalitions and then create disputes among other clans in order to control a majority (Coyne 2006, p.348). In 1991 the northern territories of Somalia (former British Somaliland) claimed independence of Somaliland. In 1998 in the north-eastern parts of Somalia the Majeerteen ethnic clan claimed independence for the autonomy of Puntland. ( ) In south-western Somalia the territories including Bay, Bakuul, Jubbada Dexe, Gedo, Shabeelaha Hoose, and Jubbada Hoose declared independence from Somalia and in 1998 the creation of independent Jubaland was declared. All these independent units were created by clans, or patronate-based elites, which also established limited markets for the exchange of goods and services on these territories. Some of these attempts were rather successful, and they were noted in the Report of the Secretary-General of the UN as prerequisites for calm conditions in the situation of a chaos and anarchy in the rest of the former Somalia (Report of the Secretary-General of the UN S/2001/1211 December 19, 2000, paragraph 34; Report of the Secretary-General of the UN S/2001/1201 October 25, 2002, paragraph 55). One of these successful attempts was exercised by Somaliland, which while not recognized by any foreign government as a legitimate state has remained stable with the creation of a constitution (Coyne 2006, p.349). An ongoing standoff between Somaliland and Puntland, fostered by competition for power and resources between patronate-based elites, results in the status-quo of non-recognition of neither of these units as states on the international arena. An ongoing territorial dispute, fostered by the struggle for power in the territories of the former state of Somalia, is actually

9 developing as a full-scale war with new political entities emerging as a result of it (Conflict Barometer, 2007, p.31). This creates another inherent security threat for the regional system of inter-state interactions, as what is seen in these circumstances is in fact a process of statebuilding which appears consistently to exacerbate instability and armed conflict (Menkhaus 2002, p.18). Both sides claimed the provinces of Sanaag and Sool as part of their respective territory. The conflict started in 2003, when Puntland took control of Sool s provincial capital, Las Anod. In April, both sides engaged in skirmishes in the province of Sanaag, which later declared its independence from Puntland as well as its allegiance to the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia, forming the autonomous entity of Maakhir. Another example may be drawn from other non-recognized proto-state units on the territory of former Somalia the regions of Sanaag and Bari, where the Maakhir ethnic clan has declared autonomy over their territories in In Maakhir-controlled lands, the political and business markets exist as a result of constant conflict (and bargaining) between Somaliland and Puntland. However, the territory of south-eastern and southern Somalia, where the majority of population is concentrated, remains in political and economic chaos, sustained by the competition between patronate-based elites. In structural terms, this territory is a vacuum of power territory, with no elements of sustained governance even in local communities. In this way, patronate-based elites, which control the local markets and communities in view of an ongoing civil strife, prevent the inflow of investors to these territories and restrict normal business and political interactions with the international environment.

10 Activisation of non-state actors, such as clans (patronate-based elites) and radicalized religious organizations in newly created proto-state units has contributed to the sustaining of a situation of a de-facto absence of a unified central government in Somalia for the last 10 years. The interim (Transitional) government tries to control parts of southern Somalia from its capital in Baidoa, however, it is not deemed legitimate by the majority of Somalians. In this situation of chaos, the future of security configuration in a failed state of Somalia remains an open question. However, at this stage it is evident that new developments, demonstrated by the Somalia case, show the rise of new actors and trends, which may have an ambiguous influence on the process of state-building in these territories. It is visible that the current condition of state failure remains a threat to the system of regional inter-state system, given the conditions of the emerging post- Westphalia order. Somalia Clans and their characteristics What is a Clan and why is it assessed as a political actor in Somalia conflict situation? The answer was best given by G.Lewis: The clan (often 20 generations) can act as a corporate political unit, and do tend to have some territorial exclusiveness, following their regular seasonal movements for pasture and semi-permanent settlements. Clan-members derive their identity from their common agnatic descent rather than the sense of territorial belonging. The clan is in other words the upper limit of political action, has some territorial properties, and is often led by a clan-head, but remains without centralised administration or government. The most distinct descent group within the clan is the 'primary lineage', defined as the lineage to which a person describes himself as a member (most often between 6 and 10 generations). Marriage is usually

11 outside the primary lineage, and links them together, which functions to reduce the otherwise endless feuds between primary lineages 2. As defined by the ACCORD and the Red Cross, The Somali kinship structure is based on an agnatic (patrilineal) lineage type known as clan. Genealogies define the belonging of kinsmen to certain clans, according to the ancestor from whom they stem 3. The main Somali clans are Darod, Dir, Hawiye and Issak clans that comprise what is called the Samale group, and the Rahaweyn clan (includes sub-clans of Digile and Mrifle), which is known as the Sab group 4. Hawiye Clan The Hawiye clan includes Habargedir, Abgal, Murusade, Hawadle, Galjel, Moblen, Sheikal, Djijele, Badi Adde, and Ajuran 5, with Abgal referred to as the most dominant and strongest of all clans 6. Judging its conflict capacities, this clan positions itself as the ruling clan and has already played a leading role in ousting the former President Siad Barre from power 7, with many Somalis viewing them the most violent and warlike clan, with strict hierarchy of lords and organized local governance schemes. It is the major clan in terms of numbers and they have been at war since Currently this clan is controlling the southern regions of Somalia, most of Puntland (the Majerteen subclan) and its interest in the conflict is to legitimize its control in the area with Puntland autonomy recognized, as well as parts of Central Somalia. In case of aggravation of conflict, this clan could become the leading insurgent drive and engage the 2 Lewis, I.M.: A Pastoral Democracy: A Study of Pastoralism and Politics Among the Northern Somali of the Horn of Africa, London: James Currey, 1961, Reprint 1999, p.5 3 Clans in Somalia, published December 2009, Austrian Red Cross, ACCORD, p.7 4 For clans origins see last accessed August 3, Lineage identity is central organizing force in Somalia, accessed on August 3, Clans in Somalia, published December 2009, Austrian Red Cross, ACCORD, p.19 7 Clans in Somalia, published December 2009, Austrian Red Cross, ACCORD, p.11

12 country in all-out war once again, as it was the Hawiye clan which defeated the US marine operation in This clan s interest in the current conflict is its quest for the return of ancestral rights to rule in this area and legitimization of their authority and control in Puntland. Key relations and divergence point here is not between Hawiye and other clans, as perceived by the Hawiye themselves (however there is a certain dispute with the Darood clan over prime control of several southern areas), but with the government, which by law of a unitary state of Somalia, is the only authority in the country and thus would not allow to sede its own legal power to control the South. Potential peace cleavage and peace agenda with Hawiye can be found if this clan accedes to power in the regions of southern and central Somalia: The Hawiye are not as present in the other areas, and would generally be content with control over South Central Somalia 8. As the state of unitarism was accepted in the 1960s-70s under direct authoritarian rule and has never been reviewed since the ousting of Siad Barre and dissolution of his regime, a major revision to this issue may present the necessary Hawiye clan peace incentive with both the government and the Darood with ideas of coalition local governments in Gedo area and provide leverage for making peace with the Hawiye by introduction of wider autonomy rights or prospects of federalization with recognition of Puntland s autonomy. The Darood clan The Darood clan comprises of Ogaden, Marehan, and Harti clan groups. Importantly, The Harti are composed of the Majerteen who now are found in Puntland mainly, and the Dulbahante and Warsangeli who mainly live within the borders of Somaliland. Puntland almost entirely overlaps with the Majerteen clan family 9. The Marehan clan members inhabit South-Central Somalia, dominating Gedo region and the Ogaden can be found in Southern Somalia areas of Lower and 8 Clans in Somalia, published December 2009, Austrian Red Cross, ACCORD, p.11 9 Clans in Somalia, published December 2009, Austrian Red Cross, ACCORD, p.12

13 Middle Juba where, over the last years, they have gained control. This clan s capacity to influence the conflict is very strong, as it is as numerous as the latter and is present in the North, in South-Central Somalia as well as inside Ethiopia, and Kenya. Moreover, Darood are seen as strong nationalists with acceding to any means, including violence, to promote their stake. The Darood is believed to be the dominant clan in Somalia and constantly recruiting new members, as it is composed on the principles of confederation, unlike other clans. The Darood clan is seen as a politically successful one as it has produced two presidents and three prime ministers since 1960, including Siad Barre and its members have also held many other key government posts and continue to play a key role in Puntland and the incumbent government. The relations with other clans are instigated by the conflict with Hawiye clan over control and political dominance in Gedo area of the South, with other clans accepting Daroods numerousness and ability to rule. The clan s prime interest in Somalia conflict is to secure its predominance in the North and to secure key government posts to grasp power in the state overall. This clans positive capacity to negotiate with other clans and seek compromise both within the clan groups and outsiders may been seen as a part of its peace agenda, which comprises of having several governmental posts secured by the Darood which would thus aknowledge their ancestral ruling rights and having its control of the North Somalia legitimized. With this agenda, a possible peace incentive for this clan would lie in revision of Somalia unitary law and status with prospects of wide autonomy rights in parallel to setting a coalition a proportionate regional and local governments and councils in disputed Gedo area with the Hawiye. The Dir Clan The Dir clan, which inhabits what is now known as Somaliland and South-Central Somalia, is composed of clan groups such as Issa, Gadabursi, and Biymaal. The Dir sub clans

14 include Biyamal, Gadsan, Gadabursi, Fiqi Muhumud, Samaron,Qubeys, Werdai and Akishe 10. Their area of inhabitance is primarily the North-West of Somalia, with many members of the clan dispersed all over the country with no major stake in reuniting and\or forming a territorialpolitical unity. The capacity of this clan to influence the Somalia conflict is scarce, as this clan is not numerous and scattered, with no major political stake. Relations with other clans are rigid and even remote, as the Dir were suppressed by the Hawiye in Lower Shabelle, Middle and Lower Juba areas, as well as by the Darood clans. Thus, the Dir generally ask for protection from oppression by other clans or non-clan violent insurgents and looters, with the request of protection for security and development reasons is their primary interest in the Somalia conflict. However, its peace agenda is to receive protection from government or other clans, which makes it possible to encourage a peace incentive and move towards peace for this clan by introduction of governmental guarantees of security for the North-West and representations of the Dir in parliament for these reasons and possibly with other clans agreeing to provide protection for the Dir without casting any suppression over it. The Isaaq clan Isaaq as a clan is a disputed one some claim that Isaaq are part of the Dir clan. The Isaaq are known as the primary inhabitants of Northern Somalia and North-West of Somalia in Somaliland and hence their interest in the current conflict in Somalia is vested in gaining recognition for Somaliland autonomy (if not independence, as it was previously claimed by them) and being equally represented in the government. The relationship with other clans is grimed by a controversy with the Darood and Hawiye over authority and equal power distribution, which is exhibited in the form of Somaliland-Puntland conflict. Their positive 10 Lineage identity is central organizing force in Somalia, accessed on August 3, 2014

15 capacity to influence the overall conflict in Somalia is manifested in their confirmed ability to manage the governance in Somaliland since the beginning of the overall country conflict, as they have established a workable system of protection, distribution of good and communication channels. However, it is also they who have a capacity to negatively influence the state of affairs in Somalia by urgently calling for a status of an independent State from the UN, and, if the claim is not accepted, advance to violent means to secure it de-facto and sede all relations with other clans. Peace agenda of the Isaaq lies with recognition of their rights to access to power in Somaliland with recognition of the autonomous status of this area both by the government and internationally. The peace incentive for the Isaaq may come from the government that would revise its outdated status and provisions of unitarism of the state which will lead to granting wide autonomy rights to Somaliland, with an agreement with the Darood and the Hawiye to establish local coalitional governance groups or councils with government s guarantees of security and equality. Conclusions In Somalia, ethnic clans act as non-traditional and non-state actors and stakeholders in the process of peacemaking. Clans represent a type of an internal actor and stakeholder in the substate system, and they often perform their activities as mediators between local population, military bands and formations, economic enterprises and traditional general jurisdiction courts in form of court of sharia. In Somalia, clans are determined by patrilineal descent and membership can be as large as several hundred thousand members. Within the larger clan structure, smaller groups are also present. The political relations between parties across Somalia are substituted by the vulnerable system of personal and family-based relationships between leaders and party members. In other words, this system is based on relationship between ethnical clans, which are

16 related neither with any party policy, nor manifesto. Clientelism remains one of the basic principles of recruitment of elites in Somalia and political and economic tradition still plays a foremost role. A thorough analysis of these tribal actors elites - is difficult, because the same political-economic subject may be represented in different elite strata with opposing stances to peace and conflict resolution. This results in constant internal uncertainty and hinders conflict resolution attempts. In Somalia polarized elites clans - rest on the same social base, which contributes to permanent instability in the political sphere. Organizational structure in Somali clans is based on authoritarian principles and nepotism. The key political leader (as well as any elected Somali president) creates a ruling presidency clan based on his clan of origin. This structure rests on the system of personal relations between its members, which is applied to all spheres of political, economic and social life and thus is both a primary source and instrument for conflict management in Somalia. In Somalia, ethnic clans act as non-traditional non-state actors in the whole system of political controversies in this area (and even beyond the territory of former Somalia). Clans represent a type of an internal actor in the sub-state system, and they often perform their activities as mediators between local population, military bands and formations, economic enterprises and traditional general jurisdiction courts in form of court of sharia. While no single recipe can be offered, policymakers and researchers may consider the following recommendations while addressing the tribal dimension of Somalia conflict: 1) The 4 major clans are the Actors of the conflict, and not the parties; 2) The issue of secession of Somaliland, Puntland, Jubalend and other claiming territories comes from inter-clan controversies, and thus 3) Inter-clan controversies can be dealt with by reviewing the unitary status of the state of Somalia, which has not been reviewed since 1970s while the political and

17 economic situation exhibit a pressing need for this, 4) In inter-clan oppositions, it is mostly the issues of Status, Rights and Recognition of ancestral\hereditary legacies, that are at stake, which calls for a stronger government support for the clans in the form of providing workable guarantees for security for the oppressed clans and ensuring the equal representation of all clans in the parliament and the government; Where territorial and power rights are disputed, the role of coalition local governments with guarantees of state monitoring and support is needed; 5) for all tribal actors clans an additional guarantee of security and peace is needed in the form of international support of any agreements between clans and between clans and the government. With these 5 aspects of inter-tribal relationships, their stakes and visions of peace, a broader and a more secure pathway to Somalia peace may be found. Conclusions Despite a growing need to address the current trends of political and territorial development in situation of state failure, there is a lack of a multidisciplinary approach that would merge disperse views on state-building attempts under negative security conditions. As demonstrated in the case of former Somalia, self-proclaimed territorial and political entities may exhibit a potential of advancing to self-governance. However, these attempts are hindered by the negative conditions of security configuration, largely dependent on the ongoing civil strife. These trends carry both positive and negative consequences not only for the failed state, but for the region in general. A positive consequence may be the development of new forms of statehood with patronate-based elites being the pioneers of the process. A negative consequence

18 may be the intensification of activities of radicalized organizations, which may hinder the process of stabilization of political situation in this region. Finally, a situation of the complicated process of initial statebuilding in situation of a negative security environment of a failed state may be viewed as first and unique attempt to create states in modern configuration of the system of International Relations. This calls for a response of the scholars of International Relations discipline, in order to offer a theoretical comprehension of these practical developments. References 1. Austin, D. (1984). Politics in Africa, 2 nd ed. Hannover: University Press of New England 2. Background Briefing, The Mo Ibrahim Foundation, (2006), retrieved May 12, 2009,from 3. Clapham, C. (1996). Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival. New York: Cambridge University Press 4. CONFLICT BAROMETER (2008), Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, retrieved June 10, 2009, from 5. Coyne, C. (2006). Reconstructing weak and failed states: foreign intervention and the nirvana fallacy. Foreign Policy Analysis, 2, Crawford, Y. (2007).The Creation of States in International Law. Oxford University Press

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