This action is funded by the European Union. Support to the stabilisation of Yemen

Transcription

1 EN This action is funded by the European Union ANNEX of the amendment to Commission Implementing Decision C(2012)5619 of on the Annual Action Programme 2012 (Part 1) in favour of the Republic of Yemen to be financed from the general budget of the Union Support to the stabilisation of Yemen Former title: Democracy and State Building Supporting Yemen's Transition Substantial amendment to DECISION 2012/ INFORMATION FOR POTENTIAL GRANT APPLICANTS WORK PROGRAMME FOR GRANTS This document constitutes the work programme for grants in the sense of Article 128(1) of the Financial Regulation (Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012) in the following sections concerning grants awarded directly without a call for proposals: sections Title/basic act/ CRIS number 2. Zone benefiting from the action/location 3. Programming document 4. Sector of concentration/ thematic area 5. Amounts concerned CRIS number: DCI-MED/2012/ Former title: Democracy and State Building Supporting Yemen's Transition, financed under the Development Cooperation Instrument. Revised title: Support to the stabilisation of Yemen. Republic of Yemen The action shall be carried out where security allows it, and in particular at the following location: Yemen. No programming document/special Measure Individual measure DEV. Aid: YES Total estimated cost: EUR Total amount of EU budget contribution: EUR out of which EUR were already contracted. This action is co-financed by grant beneficiaries for an indicative amount of EUR [1]

2 6. Aid Project Modality modality(ies) and implementation Direct management: grants direct award modality(ies) 7 a) DAC code(s) Main DAC codes: Local government administration; Security system management and reform; Civilian peacebuilding, conflict prevention and resolution; Multisector aid for basic social services; Formal/semi-formal financial intermediaries. b) Main Delivery Channel 8. Markers (from CRIS DAC form) 9. Global Public Goods and Challenges (GPGC) thematic flagships Direct award of grants, including to an EU Member State Agency Channel Code: 9000 General policy objective Not targeted Significant objective Main objective Participation development/good x governance Aid to environment x Gender equality (including Women x In Development) Trade Development x Reproductive, Maternal, New born x and child health RIO Convention markers Not targeted Significant objective Main objective Biological diversity x Combat desertification x Climate change mitigation x Climate change adaptation x Human Development 10. SDGs Goal 8 Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all Goal 16 Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels SUMMARY The initial objective of this decision was to enhance state-building and democratic development in the context of Yemen's political transition. Two service contracts were signed for a total of EUR 905, Given the present crisis and the impossibility to implement the project, the action needs to be revised. [2]

3 The main objective of the revised action is to contribute to the stabilisation of Yemen. More specifically, this initiative will focus on the peace process, security and reducing youth vulnerability to radicalisation. Considering the difficulties connected with working at central level and the absence of single national institutions, special attention will be dedicated to the local level. The action will be developed in three main components: 1. Peace process support initiative. This component will aim to support the peace process at different levels: community, district, governorate and, where possible, central level. Local peace capacity will be strengthened through Yemeni Civil Society Organisations and peaceful coexistence projects will be supported, targeting decision makers at local level, youth, women and vulnerable groups. Women s participation in the peace process will be enhanced and the coordination of peace efforts will be supported through mapping of similar initiatives, information sharing and updates of peace opportunities. 2. Local Security. This component will improve inclusive local security approaches and structures at local level. Discussions on local security principles and frameworks will be supported in 4 cities, tentatively Aden, Mukalla, Sana a, Hudaidah. The capacities of local key security providers from the judiciary and the law enforcement sphere and selected community leaders will be strengthened through targeted training. 3. Reduce vulnerability of youth to radicalization through economic development. This component will support youth in their economic activities, thus giving them hope for a better future and distance them from terrorist groups. A micro-grant scheme will be established for youth between 18 and 35 years old. Also, technical assistance will be provided to a Yemeni micro-credit institution that will distribute the grants and training on the business will be given to youth. 1 CONTEXT 1.1 Sector/Country/Regional context/thematic area After more than two years, the war in Yemen has created enormous challenges with regard to the humanitarian, security and economic situation all over the country. According to the last figures 1 18,800,000 people are in need of humanitarian assistance (70% of the overall population), 17,000,000 are food insecure, out of which 6,800,000 are at emergency level, 2,000,000 are Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). The civilian infrastructure is largely destroyed or damaged. The sub-national administrative structures have almost completely collapsed. The civilian selfhelp systems and relevant local administrative structures that would be needed to rebuild the country, and to provide a safety net for particularly vulnerable households and support them, have been destroyed by the conflict or are no longer operational. Ongoing efforts to bring the parties involved in the conflict to a negotiated settlement have so far failed. The UN Security Council adopted several resolutions on Yemen, including one establishing the Special Political Mission for Yemen. The UN Special Envoy supports Yemen s return to a peaceful political transition in accordance with the Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative, the outcomes of the National Dialogue and Security Council resolutions. A round of 1 Emergency Response Coordination Center DG ECHO Daily Map, 24/04/2017. [3]

4 UN-brokered talks in Switzerland in January 2016 failed to make any headway and a 72-hour cease-fire starting on 20 October 2016, following calls from the US, the EU and the UN, wasn t renewed with both sides accusing the other of violations. Since the breakdown of the latest peace talks in 2016 violence has slowly escalated. There is however, informal recognition by both parties of the human and socio-economic costs of the war and of the need to reach a peace deal acceptable to both parties. Agreements on Cessation of Hostilities vary substantially in their content and degree of formalization, but also in the degree by which conflict parties are respecting their terms. Dispute settlement mechanisms as well as monitoring mechanisms are very weak, if not entirely missing, hence threatening the sustainability of such agreements and leading to considerable risks to the civilian population and fighters alike. The complexity of the situation inside Yemen is increased further by the fragmentation and multiplication of fighting (and negotiating) parties, including the intervention of foreign informal fighters and terrorist groups, al-qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and Daesh (or the so called Islamic State) and non-yemeni conventional armed forces from the Saudi-led coalition. The multiplication of violent actors present in Yemen does also have an impact on mediation and local negotiation processes. Consequently, preparations for a nation-wide ceasefire have to be seen in the context of local conflict dynamics and taken into account when trying to enhance the perspectives of a broader Peace Process to come about in Yemen. As a result of the weakness of the central government or rather governments, considering the de facto authorities to provide sufficient security and basic services to citizens, local actors, stakeholders and governance structures (mostly at the level of governorates or cities) have to take over these responsibilities. In some parts of the country, especially in the South, efforts are currently underway to improve local security. Yet security for citizens remains volatile and fragile; challenges relate to the weakness of the police structures, the difficulties in reactivating the judiciary and a lack of resources for strengthening the rule of law. Competition among local security actors, the proliferation of weapons and the lack of reintegration perspectives for members of non-statutory forces will create further challenges in ongoing attempts to enhance local security. Without a doubt, a political agreement at national level will be key to end the conflict and to revitalize an overall political dialogue and complete the transition process in Yemen. In this context, security and stability at local level will be very important not only for the implementation of a future peace agreement but also for enhancing the prospects of a subsequent broader peace and reconciliation process. However, security organs are often perceived as means of repression and the citizens' trust is low in their capacities and commitment to provide safety and security for them. Yemeni youth is particularly suffering from the current crisis. The lack of perspectives and the presence of various radical groups in the country from Al-Qaida in the Arab Peninsula (AQAP) to Daesh or so called Islamic State (IS) constitute a very dangerous combination of elements for this social group A weak economy, aggravated by the conflict, has led to unemployment and underemployment particularly in urban areas. According to a 2012 World Bank report, the unemployment rate among youth (18-35 years old) was approx. 60%. After years of conflict, this figure should be probably negatively updated. Moreover, public servants have not received their salaries for several months; as a consequence many schools are now closed due to the absence of teachers [4]

5 and in some cases they are used to host Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). For this reason many young people, while unable to attend school, are now faced with the unsurmountable challenge of finding a source of income for themselves and for their own families. The absence of any economic development together with the lack of education, media propaganda, radical religious leaders and other factors is leading many desperate young people to join the numerous militias present on the Yemeni territory. The main challenges confronting economy and employment growth in Yemen are the destroyed basic infrastructure, the lack of security, a high proportion of the informal sector, a poor enabling environment for the private sector and the lack of skilled labour, among others. Since March 2015, MSMEs 2 have been facing a sharp decline in their customer base, loss of skilled and unskilled labour, limitations in getting access to financing, interrupted energy supply and often physical damages to productive assets and infrastructure 3. In February 2016, the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC) published an update 4 on Yemen's private sector, with an overview of the sector before the war, and the implications of the war. Below is a summary of the key points from this update: Pre-Conflict Status of the Private Sector Contributed about 53.7% of GDP, and 75% of gross investment Political instability, poor electricity services and rampant corruption were main obstacles for businesses In the Doing Business Report, Yemen dropped from 165 in 2015 to 170 in 2016, out of 189 economies Implications of the Conflict on the Private Sector Between March and August 2015, 26% of businesses closed in most conflict-affected areas; and 42% of women-owned enterprises by Sept 2015 By Sept 2015, 95% of closed enterprises reported physical damage as the main reason for closure Enterprises in most affected areas lost over 70% of clientele Working hours have reduced by 50.6% from 13.5 hours/day before March 2015, to 6.7 hours/day By Oct 2015, 41% of enterprises laid off 55% of their workforce Public Policy Assessment and EU Policy Framework The EU policy documents serving as reference documents in the formulation of this action are numerous. The Communication of the European Commission on the New European Consensus on Development [COM(2016) 740 final] adopted in November 2016 provides a framework for action as it brings together coherently the security dimension and other elements of stabilisation 2 Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises. The definition of micro enterprise varies from country to country. In Yemen the maximum number of employees could be up to 10 employees. For small enterprises, from 10 to 50. For medium enterprises, from 50 to Doing Business Survey 2016, the World Bank Group. 4 Ministry of Planning & International Cooperation, "Yemen Socio-Economic Update 2016," February 2016, accessed from: [5]

6 such as the economic development, investment opportunities and employment for youth, as well as specific financial support to civil society with an anti-radicalisation dimension. The Consensus focuses on the 5 Ps, in line with the 2030 Agenda: people, planet, prosperity, peace and partnership. The building blocks and drivers for EU's development policy have been identified therein as sustainable growth and job creation, renewable energy/climate change, mobility/migration and the security-development nexus. Gender, youth, and resilience deserve particular attention as drivers and enablers. The EU Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy, adopted last June, is another key pillar. The Global Strategy on the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy (EUGS) was released in June This Action substantively contributes to the Agenda 2030 and to the progress towards achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). In particular Goal 16 aims to promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels in particular in developing countries, to prevent violence and combat terrorism and crime; but also Goal 8 is relevant because it aims to promote progress towards sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all. Another important document for this action is the EU Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism, which was revised in May The revised strategy identifies priority areas for EU action, both within and outside of the EU. It calls for a joint effort between relevant stakeholders at local, regional, national and international levels to support vulnerable countries to counter terrorist recruitment and to build community resilience to radicalisation. The European Agenda on Security, adopted by the Commission on 28 April 2015, set out the main actions to ensure an effective EU response to security threats over , including the external dimension. Delivering on its European Agenda on Security, the European Commission presented in June 2016 further steps in preventing and countering violent radicalisation leading to terrorism, stating that the EU will assist third countries facing similar challenges in addressing radicalisation Stakeholder analysis This action will provide links and coordination between a wide range of stakeholders. The actors that will have a stake in this action include but are not limited to: - The Yemeni de facto authorities that aim to stabilize the country through the initiatives proposed in this action. These may include the representatives of selected governorates and districts where the activities will take place. - Local law enforcement representatives. These include police officers but also local security actors at large. - Local representatives of the judiciary. These will include officials working for local courts. - Yemeni youth, who are struggling for their future but represent 70% of the population, therefore have an important stake in this initiative. - Village leaders. Mostly represented by the local sheikhs and aqil 5. 5 The aqil is the neighbourhood representative and it seems to be the most trusted local "institution" in Yemen. As he comes directly from the neighbourhood and represents it towards other actors. (See Yemen Polling Center security survey data from 2012 and 2017). [6]

7 - Religious leaders. Their importance is undisputed in some areas. - Civil Society representatives. This will include those NGOs that are active on the ground in various fields, including human rights protection, promotion of communities' dialogue, protection of vulnerable groups, women associations, businessmen groups, etc. - The Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen. The Mission focuses on supporting Yemen s return to a peaceful political transition in accordance with the Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative, the outcomes of the National Dialogue and Security Council resolutions. - The Deutsche Gesellschaft für Zusammenarbeit (GIZ). Germany is one of the few EU Member States directly involved in Yemen. Its contribution to the peace and dialogue component will be fundamental for the stability of the country. - The Berghof Foundation. This German no-profit organisation has a long-standing experience in dialogue, mediation and peace support structures, including a number of initiatives on security in Yemen. - Silatech. This non-profit organization headquartered in Qatar works to enable jobs and expand economic opportunities for young Arabs, promotes large-scale job creation, entrepreneurship, access to capital and markets, and the participation and engagement of young people in the economic and social development of their communities while deterring their participation in any extremist movements (see Appendix 1 for more detailed information). - The Al-Amal Bank (AMB) 6. The mandate of this Yemeni no-profit organisation focusing on Islamic microfinance is to help the poor engage in productive activities (micro-entrepreneurship) to improve their living standards through self-employment, and saving initiatives (see Appendix 1 for more detailed information). The benefits for these stakeholders will go beyond the national arena since this component will tackle global concerns and contribute towards the fulfillment of the SDGs that were established by the UN in 2015 and include the promotion of inclusive and sustainable economic growth, employment and decent work for all Priority areas for support/problem analysis The priority areas for the revised initiative are three-fold: support to the peace process; enhance security at local level; stabilise economy and reduce vulnerability of youth to radicalisation through economic development. 1 Local stabilization and peaceful political transition through dialogue and reconciliation Since the breakdown of the latest peace talks in 2016 violence has slowly escalated. There is however, informal recognition by both parties of the human and socio-economic costs of the war and of the need to reach a peace deal acceptable to both parties. Agreements on Cessation of Hostilities vary substantially in their content and degree of formalization, but also in the degree by which conflict parties are respecting their terms. Dispute settlement mechanisms as well as 6 AMB was established in 2002, as a partnership between the Government of Yemen represented by the Social Fund for Development (SFD) and the AGFUND. AMB envisions inclusive financial systems for all the Yemenis. Its mission is to improve the economical and social conditions of the low/limited income households, particularly, the micro and small entrepreneurs of Yemen, through the direct and indirect provision of exemplary financial services that suit their needs and to become a pioneer and sustainable microfinance institution. [7]

8 monitoring mechanisms are very weak, if not entirely missing, hence threatening the sustainability of such agreements and leading to considerable risks to the civilian population and fighters alike. The multiplication of violent actors present in Yemen does also have an impact on mediation and local negotiation processes. Consequentially, preparations for a nation-wide ceasefire have to be seen in the context of local conflict dynamics and taken into account when trying to enhance the perspectives of a broader Peace Process in Yemen. As direct Track I 7 negotiations have broken down since the start of hostilities, Track II 8 initiatives are useful in stimulating ripeness. A party that is unwilling to come to the negotiating table may nonetheless be open to a third-party consultation to guide them in developing or expanding their thinking on interests and positions. An intimate understanding of the conflict landscape including knowledge of the decision-making dynamics within the parties is essential if these actors are to accurately identify entry points for Track II efforts that can serve to nudge the situation toward ripeness. In order to feed into negotiations, the project will support Track II initiatives focused on cross-line activities and implementation of local or nationwide ceasefires as well as national dialogue. Facilitation of local dialogue and peace-building initiatives inside Yemen will be considered in support of the above field. Mapping the stakeholders and updating existing context analysis are a necessary prerequisite for any Track II planning. Beside providing safe spaces for open discussions and for peaceful dialogue, Civil Society needs to be supported as a pillar for social cohesion. In this context social cohesion refers to the ties which hold people together within a community, including the degree to which they interact, share common cultural, religious or other social features and interests; and/or are able to minimize disparities and avoid marginalization. 2 Supporting local security After more than two years, the war in Yemen has created enormous challenges with regard to the humanitarian, security and economic situation all over Yemen. As a result of the weakness of the central government (or better: central governments, as there are currently two, one in Aden, one in Sana a) to provide sufficient security and basic services to citizens, local actors, stakeholders and governance structures (mostly at the level of governorates or cities) have to take over these responsibilities. In some parts of the country efforts are currently underway to improve local security. Yet security for citizens remains volatile and fragile; challenges relate to the weakness of the police structures, the difficulties in reactivating the judiciary and a lack of resources for strengthening the rule of law. Competition among local security actors, proliferation of weapons and lack of reintegration perspectives for members of non-statutory forces will create further challenges in ongoing attempts to enhance local security. Without a doubt, a political agreement at national level will be key to end the war and to revitalize an overall political dialogue and complete the transition process in Yemen. In this context, security and stability at local level will be very important not only for the 7 Track I diplomacy: Official discussions typically involving high-level political and military leaders and focusing on cease-fires, peace talks, and treaties and other agreements. Source: United States Institute of Peace. 8 Track II diplomacy: Unofficial dialogue and problem-solving activities aimed at building relationships and encouraging new thinking that can inform the official process. Track 2 activities typically involve influential academic, religious, and NGO leaders and other civil society actors who can interact more freely than high-ranking officials. Some analysts use the term track 1.5 to denote a situation in which official and non-official actors work together to resolve conflicts. Source: idem. [8]

9 implementation of a future peace agreement but also for enhancing the prospects of a subsequent broader peace and reconciliation process. However, security organs in the past were often being perceived as means of repression and trust was low in their capacities and commitment to provide safety and security for the citizens. Efforts to strengthen local security for citizens therefore need to take a balanced approach. On the one hand, support would need to be provided to (re)build effective law and law enforcement systems. On the other hand, restoring local security structures provides an opportunity to complement these efforts with support for establishing more inclusive and accountable local security frameworks and mechanisms which contribute to the safety of communities and citizens alike. 3 Reduce vulnerability of youth to radicalisation through economic development Following the escalation of the conflict since 2015 and the resulting humanitarian and economic crises, Yemen now faces uncertain political future and a shaky economic outlook with repercussions mainly on youth. In this context a micro-grant scheme for young people could be the right solution to give hope to what many already call a lost generation. Micro-credit programmes have proved to have positive social and economic impacts on conflict settings by building trust and social capital, facilitating reconstruction and expanding economic opportunities. Also, support through grants will enable youth to activate or re-activate businesses, making them stronger for the future and eligible for possible future loans with financial institutions, thus increasing the overall sustainability of this action. Gainful employment opportunities for youth in particular in the current economic decline are almost non-existent and marginalization of youth is a concern for all parties. One critical concern is that youth who lose hope for a better future and remain without any source of income start joining various radical militias. In practical terms this horrendous choice allows them to cover minimum living expenses for themselves and for their families and gives them a hope in life, despite the consequences. The failure of the democratic process ignited by the 2011 "Arab spring" protests, the destabilisation of the traditional tribal system, the on-going war, the airstrikes and the blockade of Yemeni sea-ports by the Saudi-led Coalition increased the pressure on the economy and lowered economic, social and political perspectives for the Yemeni youth even more. This makes them more vulnerable to radicalization and encourages some of them to actively engage in the conflict. Joining a militia is considered one option among few perspectives for the future. By unlocking financial and non-financial support targeting specifically the youth, opportunities will be seized and job creation will grow both in size and magnitude. This will contribute to the creation of an environment that enables young people to succeed, citizens to have a stake in the economy, and a sense of hope for the future to flourish. This will be a key factor in fighting terrorism and poverty. 2 RISKS AND ASSUMPTIONS Risks Security situation: a deteriorating security situation would impact on the Risk level (H/M/L) H Mitigating measures Flexibility in terms of activities' location is required. Due to the volatile security situation, [9]

10 implementation capacity. This may further reduce the scope of interventions that are possible with partner institutions under tremendous stress and the possibility for real collaboration acutely diminished. Corruption: potentially one of the main obstacles is widespread corruption and the project must ensure effective ways to avoid it at local and central level. Perception of inequity: perception of inequity of benefits among regions, communities or involved project participants The project might be seen as strengthening local administration visà-vis national government and thus be criticized as further undermining the central level Prolonged negative stalemate: with uncertainty regarding any peace negotiations the prospects for peace in the coming years are uncertain. This could negatively impact on the project. Risks related to financial services and credit. Assumptions other locations may be selected. Contingency plan will be developed during the inception phase. H Applying strict practices and procedures will help mitigate the risk of corruption effectively. Monitoring and evaluation tools and processes effectively utilised and deployed. M The selection of participants, communities and regions will be done on equitable basis following an objective needs assessment and will consider the representation of different groups within the community. Inclusive participatory processes will be utilised. M It is important to engage the national level from the beginning and to underline that the outcomes will be beneficial also for the country as a whole. Outreach, coordination and consultations with stakeholders and eminent personalities at national level will be sought throughout the implementation. Senior political leaders and government officials (including, e.g., the Minister for Local Administration in Aden) have underlined that there is no alternative to strengthening the local level when it comes to service provision and local security 9. M Contingency planning will allow implementing the project despite political uncertainty and instability. M Less reliance on international staff for project delivery in the project design; the importance of national non-governmental, active local authorities and civil society organisations has already been elevated and substantively engaged in the project design. Contingency plans: The Al-Amal Bank runs its operations through a contingency plan aimed to withstand the crisis. Capitalizing on its experience in managing the 2011 crisis, it strengthened its management capacity to predict the 2015 crisis indicators at a quite early time. Further, the Bank will award the grants in areas less affected by crisis and armed clashes. 9 According to UNDP, the current Minister of Interior in Sana a is supportive to UN efforts to revitalize the police forces in Sana a and other cities. Source: the Berghof Foundation. [10]

11 The national and local security situation allows limited international personnel, partners and stakeholders to safely implement operations on the ground. The perception of the implementing partners as a neutral and impartial actor remains. Communities and individuals are receptive of the programme and its activities without fearing repercussions from peers. Local and national authorities support, engage and take ownership of project activities and interventions and perceived as beneficial to the country and its people. Authorities demonstrate a sense of ownership in the project and fully support the overall implementation. 3 LESSONS LEARNT, COMPLEMENTARITY AND CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES 3.1 Lessons learned The EU has a long record of partnership with Yemen: supporter of the political transition in Yemen since 2011, supporting the GCC initiative as a member of G-10 and the Yemeni National Dialogue. The EU has actively supported the different rounds of the UN-led negotiations and has contributed to the Capacity Building of the De-escalation Committees agreed to implement the Cessation of Hostilities during the longest period of cease fire since the beginning of the conflict. The EU has equally a long record of partnership with Gulf countries and shares their concerns about: the need for stability in the region, the need for enhanced security in the critical Red Sea Maritime Route and the urgency to tackle the increasing grip of terrorist groups (AQAP, ISIS and other jihadist groups) which represents a threat for the future of Yemen, of the region and of more broadly of the international community, as proven by the terror attacks in different countries. For what concerns peace and dialogue, a number of initiatives saw the light since the conflict broke out. The EU signed contract EIDHR/2016/ called "Development, Social and Economic Priorities in Yemen during the Conflict and Post-conflict Period. A Track II Initiative" with a German NGO called CARPO 10, DeepRoot and the Sana'a Centre for Strategic Studies. The project is an effort to enhance dialogue, representation and participation of all parts of society to positively influence local, regional and international development agendas in Yemen. Through a number of structured meetings called "champions' forum" for Yemeni development experts, a series of policy briefs and white papers on key economic, social and development priorities are being developed. This contract is co-financed with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, one of the few EU Member States directly involved in Yemen. Worth to mention are also the 2012 Political Development Forum (PDF) and the National Dialogue Support Programme, established by the Berghof Foundation. The Foundation also developed negotiation training and strategy building for lead negotiators or negotiation teams. With regard to local security in Yemen, in 2016 and 2017 a number of initial discussions on local security among Yemeni stakeholders (politicians, security providers, government and local administration officials, judges, community and NGO representatives) were facilitated. 10 Center for Applied Research in Partnership with the Orient [11]

12 Numerous Track II activities, especially focussing on the Southern issue and local governance were organised. In April 2017 the topic of local security has also been discussed in detail with representatives from Hadhramaut (governor s office, local security director, policeman, judges and community representatives) during a three-day workshop in Beirut. These discussions underlined that in some regions of Yemen, there are first efforts undertaken (led by local security officials) to rebuild trust in the security agencies and the judiciary; and that there are traditions of community participation that could be revitalized. It seems that this is especially true for the South, where neighbourhood committees had existed and where the role of women in security was much more systematic and widespread than in the Northern parts of Yemen. As for micro-credit, this sector had made significant progress in the last decade until the start of the conflict: the number of active clients increased by 100% in one year (2010) to reach over 60,000 projects, serving approximately 300,000 citizens. The conflict has obviously paused this positive trend. Conditions to access financial services have tightened for the poor. The Al-Amal Bank (AMB) was established in order to provide integrated financial services to the economically active poor micro-entrepreneurs and focus on the groups most deprived of financial services, particularly women and young people. The Bank has achieved positive results, making it one of the leading microfinance service providers in less than two years. More information on the bank and on the other actors of the third component are available in the Appendix 1 at the end of this document. 3.2 Complementarity, synergy and donor coordination The EU is playing a crucial role in setting the agenda for Yemen peace building and recovery. A number of initiatives 11 have been launched recently to respond to a continuously changing political context. These events respond to the need of concerting the international community's effort to respond to the humanitarian crisis, the institutional meltdown and economic collapse of Yemen. They were also crucial to reiterate the EU central role in the future of the country and its prominent function within donors. Regular meeting are organised with major players like the United Nations UNDP, FAO, UNICEF and UNESCO are among the most active agencies and the World Bank. Together with the EU, the Berghof Foundation is an important partner in the field of dialogue and peace process. Its work is based on two pillars: an initial mandate from the Yemeni government (provided by President Hadi in 2012) and the collaboration with the UN Office of the Special Envoy for Yemen. A series of high-level informal meetings, in collaboration with the UN and supported by Germany, have been organised since 2015 and the efforts on local security are also agreed upon with the UN and its team of security advisors (led by M. Gen Mohammed al-farghal). 11 Launching of track II on socio-economic issues and first "Champions' Forum" in Amman (April 28 th ); Presentation of track II initiatives on informal political dialogues with UNSE, US,UK and German Ambassadors (Amman 3 rd May); Conference at management level of the UN-World Bank-EU Platform for Yemen Crisis Response ( 3 rd May); Co- chairs of DDR Working group. (Meeting in Amman May 3 rd ) EU presented the proposal to address a report to the Conference for Yemen Reconstruction held 10 th may in Riyadh; "Rethinking Yemen", event at the EU Parliament on 9 th may to present EU initiatives in Yemen; "Rethinking Yemen 2" an experts' meetings at the EEAS with over 70 participants from Yemen, MS, NGOs and international organizations to discuss alternative thinking for Yemen peace building and recovery (may 10 th ). [12]

13 In addition, UNDP has started to work on security assessments and activation of police forces. Both UNOSESGY and UNDP have participated as observers in Track II activities on local security. Among EU Member states, Germany (Auswärtiges Amt - AA) has supported the intra-yemeni peace talks in Geneva and Kuwait through the Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative. In addition, Germany (Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung - BMZ) is supporting a peace enhancement initiative in Yemen aimed at creating a favourable environment for conflict transformation. It revolves around five fields of action. The first one aims at strengthening local peace capacities. The second one contributes to the strengthening of selected NGOs and academic institutions in their capacity to position themselves with regards to human rights, democracy and state-building. In the third field of action, the project sensitizes the participating citizens to the importance of the topics of human rights, democracy and gender within a nationwide publicity campaign. The fourth field of action is aimed at strengthening the participation of women in the peace process. Within the fifth field of action the project promotes the use of conflict-sensitive communication in everyday social life as well as in media coverage. During the implementation of the different projects within this action, the EU Delegation will make sure that all stances coming from different stakeholders are gathered and discussed. Regular meetings will be organised not only with other multilateral donors but also in collaboration with those EU Member States directly involved in Yemen mainly Germany, the Netherlands and the UK. 3.3 Cross-cutting issues Conflict sensitiveness: since Yemen is currently suffering from its political-security-development nexus, neither can the conflict be omitted from the preliminary analysis nor its inter-linkages can be underestimated. Furthermore, Yemen is affected by a diverse range of conflicts, including at local level. The project will exercise constant awareness and sensitivity at the local level based on Do no harm principles. By focusing on inclusion and practical rights, it is expected that the project will contribute to social justice and social peace. Intervention will be implemented where a certain degree of security and access can be ensured. Social cohesion: social cohesion will be enhanced through targeted initiatives addressing dialogue, diversity and reconciliation. Different groups from different political and religious affiliations will be involved in their community of origin. Special focus will be given to engaging women, youth and civil society. Gender and support to women s economic empowerment: Yemeni women are particularly disadvantaged. For the seventh consecutive year the country ranked last in the Global Gender Gap index for women s equality of the World Economic Forum. The project activities will actively pursue their specific needs by enhancing their role in peace dialogue, economic empowerment, improving livelihoods and creating employment opportunities. Whenever feasible, data will be disaggregated by gender to track the progress and impact. In addition, it will be ensured that results for female beneficiaries translate into transformational change, allowing for empowerment through self-reliance in the social sphere. Youth: this action will promote the economic empowerment of youth through targeted activities. It will also support their active participation in the local peace process and dialogue. [13]

14 4 DESCRIPTION OF THE ACTION Under this decision already two contracts were signed and concluded: / "Supporting Yemen s Transition reinforcing democratic structures and practices". This project would provide technical assistance to the Supreme Commission for Elections and Referenda (SCER) and the Committee for Political Parties (CPP) of the Republic of Yemen to strengthen democratic development in the Yemeni transition process but was terminated in The EU contribution was EUR 746, / "Needs assessment for development of Civil Register in Yemen". Aim of this project was to contribute to the national roll-out of a full-fledged civil registry system in the Republic of Yemen by developing IT solutions, identifying training needs, preparing technical requirements. The EU contribution was EUR 158, The revised action proposed focuses on the stabilisation of Yemen. In order to tackle this issue, three projects will be supported at the same time on: the peace process, the local security, the economic development for youth to reduce their vulnerability to radicalisation. First project. In a country tormented by an ongoing conflict special attention will be dedicated to the peace process. In this regard a series of initiatives will be carried out to support it at different levels (community, district, governorate and national if conditions will allow it). The role of Yemeni Civil Society will be crucial to increase the inclusivity of peace negotiations and its capacity will be strengthened though capacity building activities including seminars and workshops. Also, Civil Society will be encouraged and supported to build a platform for peace that facilitates peaceful coexistence projects targeting local decision makers, women, youth and vulnerable groups. Mapping similar initiatives, encouraging information sharing and updates of peace opportunities will contribute to defusing local tensions. Coordination of activities with other partners will be sought in order to create synergies and avoid overlaps. Special attention will be devoted to women and their participation in the peace process. A women s platform will be supported in order to strategize and be ready to play a role once peace talks will resume. Second Project. No stabilisation is possible without the minimum requirements in terms of security. Not having national institutions or bodies that effectively control the whole Yemeni territory, the main focus will remain at local level. Discussions on local security principles and frameworks that take into account human rights and freedom of expression will be supported in 4 cities, tentatively Aden, Mukalla, Sana a, Hudaidah. The capacities of local key security providers from the judiciary and the law enforcement and selected community leaders will be strengthened through targeted training. Such training will combine debates and theoretical elements with practical challenges. Knowing better about security frameworks will give them the opportunity to better assess situations, plan for different options and take informed decisions. The end goal of this component is to allow the beneficiaries design and be able to implement local security strategies. The concept of citizens and community security should replace the regime security concept, thus underlining how the latter is very distant from Yemeni people. The outcomes of this initiative will be transferred to the national level with the relevant results and lessons learned once implemented. Moreover, consultations with the national level are foreseen in order to enhance coordination among different levels and awareness raising. Third project. No security is viable and no stabilisation is reachable if armed militias controlling various parts of the country are recruiting young people on a daily basis. Therefore reducing the vulnerability of the youth to radicalization is crucial to tackle this issue and economic development combined with job creation should be one of the possible antidotes. This component [14]

15 will support Yemeni youth in their economic activities, thus giving them hope for a better future, and prevent their affiliation to radical groups. A micro-grant scheme will be established for youth between 18 and 35 years old. Technical assistance to better target this section of the society will be provided to a Yemeni micro-credit institution that will award the grants, and training-on-thebusiness will be given to the youth. To increase the sustainability of this component, the institution managing the grants may use, at the end of the project, its own capital to disburse loans to those youth who received training on business matters and successfully implemented the micro-grants. 4.1 Objectives/results The overall objective of this revised action is to support the stabilisation process of Yemen. This will be achieved through three main specific objectives: 1. Support the peace process and dialogue at local level. 2. Improve inclusive local security approaches and structures. 3. Reduce vulnerability of youth to radicalization through economic development. Expected results For specific objective/project 1: Result 1. Capacity of civil society organisations is enhanced in peace-building initiatives and selected mediation programmes; Result 2. Ad-hoc meetings among relevant Yemeni and international stakeholders are organised to broaden consensus and increase the inclusivity and representativeness of peace talks; Result 3. Regular analysis papers on peacebuilding opportunities are produced and shared with other relevant actors; Result 4. A women's platform is established and its members' capability to play a role in future peace dialogue is enhanced. For specific objective/project 2: Result 1. Yemeni-led inclusive discussions on local security principles, frameworks and concepts in 4 cities (tentatively Aden, Mukalla, Sana a, and Hudaidah) is initiated and supported. Result 2. Capacity of key local security providers, representatives of the judiciary and selected community representatives is strengthened to assess, plan and implement different options of inclusive local security approaches. Result 3. Strategic frameworks on inclusive local security in 4 cities which a) provide hands-on support to the respective authorities (governor, security director) how to implement pilot activities and b) improve outreach and donor coordination are elaborated. For specific objective/project 3: Result 1. Up to 10,000 young entrepreneurs will have benefitted from access to micro grants Result 2. Up to 5,000 young entrepreneurs are trained and technically supported Result 3. The current percentage of women with has access to financial support and technical assistance doubles [15]

16 Result 4. Up to 42,000 direct employment opportunities are created This programme is relevant for the Agenda It contributes primarily to the progressive achievement of SDG Goal 16 Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels, but also promotes progress towards Goal 8 Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all. This does not imply a commitment by the country benefiting from this programme. 4.2 Main activities For objective/project 1 Support the peace process and dialogue at different levels The tentative activities that will be implemented to reach the project objectives are: Providing support to Track II initiatives, notably those which are focusing on transitional issues such as future constitutional reform, electoral reform, and national dialogue, security sector reform. Provide logistical support to future intra-yemeni talks, through the Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative 12. Organising conferences and seminars, including training on topics related to peace building at local level; Supporting the establishment of a women s platform to strategize and prepare to play a role once peace talks resume in line with UN SC Resolution 1325 (2000); Mapping similar existing initiatives, actively encouraging information sharing and providing updated analysis of peace-building opportunities; For objective/project 2 Improve inclusive local security approaches and structures The tentative activities that will be implemented to reach the project objectives are: Carry out mappings and studies of local security approaches, actors, security needs and perceptions in 4 selected cities (tentatively Aden, Mukalla, Sana a and Hudaidah), These mappings and studies will be done in cooperation with local authorities and communities and, where applicable, they will build on and supplement other similar studies and mappings. A constant update during the course of the project is planned, especially for what concerns security needs and perceptions; Organise dialogue meetings and experts' workshops on concepts, objectives, principles and mechanisms of inclusive local security (i.e. community policing, community safety approaches). These meetings aim at providing space for discussions on these topics in order to improve practical knowledge and political support. They will include representatives of local governance structures, security providers (office of the security director, head of police, senior judges, etc.), eminent personalities (community leaders, businessmen/women, sheikhs) and community representatives (women, youth, civil society). While most of these meetings will take place inside Yemen, a few experts' workshops will take place outside to allow for interaction with international 12 Building on the interventions already carried out with the support of European Resources for Mediation Support (ERMES) [16]