Error! Report on Wilton Park Conference 965 EXIT STRATEGIES AND PEACE CONSOLIDATION IN STATE-BUILDING OPERATIONS. Thursday 13 Sunday 15 March 2009

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1 Error! Report on Wilton Park Conference 965 EXIT STRATEGIES AND PEACE CONSOLIDATION IN STATE-BUILDING OPERATIONS Thursday 13 Sunday 15 March 2009 Organised in cooperation with the Centre for International Studies, University of Oxford and with support from the Folke Bernadotte Academy, Stockholm, Carnegie Corporation of New York, Norwegian Peacebuilding Centre, Oslo and NATO s Public Diplomacy Division Summary Leading academics and policy analysts on state-building, practitioners from field operations, headquarters-based representatives of international and regional organisations and policy makers met to consider how to think about and shape exit strategies and how to measure progress. Some of the key points that emerged were: an exit strategy is a plan for withdrawing from a country or territory, ideally having attained the goals that inspired the original international engagement. If the goals have been attained, a good exit strategy will envision follow-on measures to consolidate the gains. If the goals have not and cannot be attained, then a different set of considerations will govern the formulation of an exit strategy; exit is not usually an event but a process of transition. An exit is facilitated by successful mandate implementation (if the mandate is suitably designed and resourced) and the ability to refine the mandate to fit the circumstances on the ground as they evolve. This requires a degree of flexibility and coordination that is often difficult to achieve in large, multi-national operations; it is important to develop meaningful measures of progress to inform transitional and exit planning, including reliable quantitative and qualitative indicators of how stable a peace is; Page 1 of 10

2 the role of economic recovery in exit strategies needs to be identified; exit strategies are often synonymous with the departure of military components, yet civilian agencies remain and need long-term support. Introduction 1. There is much analysis of how best to construct international peace support operations to maintain a stable peace and rebuild war-torn societies. Less attention has arguably been paid to the difficulties for peace consolidation when international interventions are ending. When and under what conditions can exit be successfully achieved? The conference sought to examine: circumstances in which peace operations with a state-building mandate are brought to a close; what follow-on arrangements are made; the contextual and operational factors that favour successful exit; and what criteria or performance indicators are needed to evaluate success, thus facilitating formulation of an appropriate exit strategy. How do entry strategies affect exit? 2. Entry strategies are based on mandates. These range from forced regime change, as in Afghanistan and Iraq, transitional administration such as Timor Leste, directed and collaborative state-building, for example in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Haiti, providing security to enable humanitarian action, as in Sudan, and creating political space, as occurred in Lebanon and Cyprus. The type of entry affects the scope, whether temporal or spatial, its intensity and ambition, the shape of the presence, ranging from extensive to light footprint and the rules of engagement. Entry strategies have a strong bearing on exit: when formulating entry strategy, consideration must be given to what constitutes the end state, as all flows downstream from this. Having the end state in mind also provides assurance for political elites, which can input towards and build a stake in the prospective end objective. 3. Peace strategies thus flow from the type of intervention. Most commonly, the aim is broadly liberal intervention, an effort to build statehood according to a liberal blueprint, wherever this is not present, or reshape it such that it fits the liberal agenda where some form of statehood is present. In essence, however, this requires Page 2 of 10

3 redefining the fabric of a society and rethinking the way society functions, to enable openness and competition, and developing the infrastructure for a market democracy. It is not just a question of writing laws or building institutions. An essential component in such a strategy needs to be a conflict-sensitive approach. Moreover, assumptions must be questioned; nothing will be neutral, and potential political impact needs to be taken into account even though such impact is not intended. 4. The liberal model, which assumes ideal statehood as a norm, fails to capture the reality in many parts of the world, raising unrealistic expectations of what statebuilding can achieve. With pressure on budgets and limitations in political attention span, the imperative is often to look for quick wins or fixes. Enabling sustainable peace and a framework for economic recovery and development also requires national ownership. Locals have their own agency and their own exit strategies, which can be at variance with international plans. There will likely be divergence between local actors and spoilers, although actors may accept a deal with spoilers to hasten an exit, action often unpalatable to internationals. With these challenges, as well as inevitable UN overstretch and the need for prioritisation, the result is often unintended consequences and hybridity in peace strategies. While hybridity is not necessarily an undesirable outcome, what it means in practice needs to be much better understood. Lack of familiarity with local conditions should encourage a greater degree of modesty in the aims of intervention. What are the circumstances in which peace support operations are brought to an end? 5. The process by which peace support operations depart can range from abrupt to phased termination, with or without a handover to a successor operation. Similarly the quality of departure, relative to the mandate in particular, can vary significantly. Short of complete success, problems can be attributed to: process, when there is difficulty to find the troops, police or civilian expertise required for the mission, as in Darfur; substantive, with a failure to meet the mission goals; diminished donor, public and/or political support for peacekeeping; and funding shortfalls in critical, Page 3 of 10

4 related development support. The process of departure does not in itself dictate success or failure. 6. The main factors driving mission exit strategies derive from the nature of the mission and its mandate (see paragraph 2) as well as external factors beyond these considerations, such as achieving local, regional and international recognition of the legitimacy of institutions created. Obstacles to success generally find their origin in one of three sources: the host state, which may sometimes wilfully obstruct, or have fungible resources under factional control, if corruption is endemic, zero-sum ethnic or religious divisions, or meddlesome neighbours; the mission itself, which has a poorly-informed strategy, or delays in deploying key components, national caveats restrict operability, or police and/or military are poorly trained or equipped; and lastly, other international elements, including poorly-informed or coordinated relief or development strategies, competitive programming, lack of programme endurance, or lack of major powers political attention to peace-building. Increasingly peacekeepers are sent into complex situations, for example in Somalia, which are not ripe for resolution, but feature a glaring need to protect civilians. There are also instances when the political imperative to leave does not correspond to operational requirements. 7. While military and civilian efforts should be integrated, it is nevertheless generally considered useful to distinguish their functions: the military are primarily present to stabilise the security situation, while civilians are to help build capacity. A blurring of functions may lead to a perceived militarisation of state-building, as some would contend has occurred in Afghanistan, despite military competencies in security sector reform. The effect may be to deter development actors and create difficulties for the humanitarian community. Exit is often perceived in terms of the departure of peacekeeping forces; yet civilian agencies will often remain. All problems cannot be resolved simultaneously, and time is needed. Yet lack of local ownership, consultation and participation leads to frustration. If confidence-building measures or mechanisms can be built into strategies to enable local people to have faith that something is being done, even if the product cannot be delivered in a short timeframe, this will provide them with routes to follow and sustain their trust. Page 4 of 10

5 What are the follow-on arrangements to exit? 8. The majority of peace support operations have local and/or international follow-on arrangements. Ideally most of an international mission s responsibilities should be handed back to national authorities, although in practice this is not often the case. Rather than exit signalling disengagement, it is a process whereby the relationship between international and local actors changes, together with the degree of intrusiveness of the international presence. The prominence of follow-on arrangements may highlight concerns that continued international engagement is needed, if in a different form and intensity. At the same time, it is arguably also the consequence of an unwillingness to take the risk of leaving. 9. Follow-on measures address four issues in post-conflict environments: problems of trust between different societal groups and former conflict parties, and resolution of security dilemmas; problems of capacity of state institutions, especially with regard to the provision of security and the impartiality of state capacity in relation to different social groups; prevention of renewed outbreak of conflict, or of involvement of outside spoilers; and not over-staying one s welcome, thereby making the relationship with the host government easier by having a less intrusive presence while not abandoning state-building or peace consolidation efforts. They may also need to manage the perceived failure of the original mission, or accommodate donor fatigue. 10. A number of different actors have taken on follow-up arrangements, including the UN, regional organisations and development agencies. Among the challenges they face are: differences in organisational culture, which are often manifest in relations with local authorities; the need for a transfer of knowledge; a potential gap in mandates; and the need for a greater degree of coordination or cooperation among organisations than is sometimes shown by the turf-battles which ensue. Follow-on arrangements may also perpetuate a degree of dependence and diminished responsibility of local actors. Some suggest a form of strategic overwatch may be preferable, with advisers offering guidance remotely and through occasional visits, but with the ability to return if the situation deteriorates. There are Page 5 of 10

6 difficulties to envisage how this might be defined in an operational mandate. Some question the role of development agencies, such as UNDP, in follow-on arrangements: capacity building is an inherently political activity, and whether UNDP is sufficiently independent of host governments to fulfil such a function is not clear. How to measure progress? 11. Benchmarking is a technocratic project to identify and analyse key factors in causal relationships in a complex, and difficult, social, economic and military situation. Benchmarks are intended to enable systematically coordinated planned action, for example the reconfiguration of foreign assistance and the initiation of corrective actions to prevent the recurrence of violence. The value of this is selfevident. In the UN context, benchmarking enables the Security Council to work on the basis of what is happening on the ground: the mandates, draw-downs and exits are brought together with the realities of peace-building and consolidation, and how societies transition and change. The Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) will also employ benchmarks when it brokers a strategic framework for peace consolidation between a host country and the international community. A sound transitional strategy for an integrated peace operation requires measures of effectiveness. Existing UN system planning frameworks need to be simplified, harmonised and applied more uniformly. Technical guidance is needed on minimum standards for a monitoring mechanism with a clear division of international and national responsibilities. Reliable quantitative and qualitative indicators of how stable a peace is need to be developed. 12. UN missions have made progress in the application of benchmarking and results-based indicators in Liberia, Burundi and Haiti, for example, in consultation with national governments and communities. In Liberia, core benchmarks were linked to the mission mandate, and draw-down. At first, just a few indicators were identified, with only the Liberian military involved on the part of the host country. Subsequently, a bigger range of indicators, linked with conflict analysis, were used, and the process was enlarged and democratised with civil society involvement. Benchmarking was also used in the Kosovo Standards Implementation Plan in 2004 and in the Afghanistan Compact in Page 6 of 10

7 13. Frameworks are being improved and, to some extent, integrated. The UN s Peace Consolidation Benchmarking Handbook is being developed for use by UN strategic planners and monitoring and evaluation specialists. However, there are still multiple approaches and only slow convergence. Some fundamental issues need to be resolved. These include: how to ensure that universal, standard benchmarks and templates are not used, but a menu of benchmarks and indicators is on offer; how to operationalise benchmarks successfully, particularly if there are too many indicators; how to ensure mutual accountability between the international community and host government local ownership remains a vexed question; how planning and measuring processes can be sufficiently flexible to take account of emergent developments on the ground, and adjust to circumstances; how to avoid an inevitable degree of subjectivity, despite efforts to be a technocratic process; who measures delivery, and what pressure or influence may be brought to bear, given judgments and decisions taken in donor capitals will be political and made on qualitative grounds. Criteria and measurement are needed, but data should not be used dogmatically. Some question whether there is not a limit, perhaps temporary, to human ability to analyse complex human situations, with all their emergent properties. What developments among institutional actors in peace-building? 14. Since 1992 and the publication of the UN s Agenda for Peace there have been major developments in creating international architecture for peace-building: the creation of the PBC and the Peace Building Support Office (PBSO) at the United Nations, together with a Peace Building Fund, as well as innovative changes in missions in the field. There is now an instrument or framework for engaging on peace-building. There is also political recognition for three types of peace-building: following on from a peacekeeping operation; when there has been a UN facilitated peace agreement; and when new leaders have taken power by force. 15. The PBC evaluates its success by rough and ready criteria of political judgment. Has engagement with the PBC deterred or prevented relapse into conflict? Do countries on the PBC agenda see it as useful? Are more countries approaching the PBC for assistance? Is the leverage of the PBC mobilising Page 7 of 10

8 additional financial resources? Most of these criteria are considered to have been met, although extra resources have been obtained only partially. 16. The African Union (AU) established a new policy on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development. It is underpinned by five core principles: African leadership; national and local ownership; inclusiveness, equality and nondiscrimination; cooperation and coherence; and capacity building for sustainability. Six self-standing and cross-cutting indicative elements highlight the political objectives to be pursued and base-line actions needed: security; humanitarian or emergency assistance; political governance and transition; socio-economic reconstruction and development; human rights, justice and reconciliation; and women and gender. It represents a holistic approach to peace support operations and peace consolidation. Financing such operations, however, presents a serious challenge. 17. European Union missions are typically post-conflict. They are generally small and mostly civilian; the military missions undertaken have been modest in scope. The ambition of EU missions is to undertake multiple interventions, with the support of EU instruments such as political and development assistance, remaining flexible and of short duration. Capacity shortfalls continue to hinder EU effectiveness. 18. NATO has undertaken some 15 to 20 missions since 1992 ranging from peace enforcement, to air exclusion zones, maritime embargoes, humanitarian and security assistance. It was often not prepared for these operations, as it has no doctrine or concept of operations. All took place in complex circumstances, requiring different planning processes. NATO s uniqueness lies in it being a standing military force, so it can take on a bridging role between two operations or an extraction force. Yet this may also impel a fire brigade scenario, reacting without sufficiently careful planning and a longer-term outlook. As a treaty-based organisation, it acts as a collective. However can an alliance-based organisation agree an exit strategy, such as in Afghanistan, when it needs to take account of public opinion and varying degrees of commitment? Page 8 of 10

9 19. Institutional cooperation, including through formal mechanisms, has improved, although tensions remain. Some question the added value of different organisations in a crowded policy space. There is also a lack of coherence of approach on substantial issues, for example in the vital area of security sector reform and justice. What constitutes success? 20. While the requirements for a stable peace should not be generalised, but identified in the context of a country s needs, there are some common standards for peace-building success. War recurrence, the most salient marker of peace-building failure, is a necessary but insufficient indicator. Preventing war recurring often depends on the presence of peacekeeping forces, but the post-conflict state should itself become the agent responsible. At the same time, in some instances, is there a level of violence that is acceptable? 21. Another approach is to examine whether root causes for a conflict have found redress. This may set the bar too high since root causes may include endemic poverty and absence of basic human rights which are unlikely to be resolved in the duration of a peace support operation. More attainable, perhaps, is whether a legitimate regime or effective state has been established. This comprises not only the holding of free and fair elections, which for some is more of a performative aspect of state-building. A war concluded and elected government does not necessarily result in sustainable peace; it may lead to single party dominance and exclusion of others. Power-sharing is important, and can only be brought about through reconciliation and dialogue. At the same time, the significance of elections should not be de-emphasised for some: the premium of legitimacy over democracy is felt to constitute external engineering. If elections are credible, why should this not be a target met? For political legitimacy, however, there has to be both a participatory democracy and state capacity, for example to carry out the minimal functions of a state through providing law and order, and delivery of services. The political and institutional elements that indicate state capacity for resolving social conflicts peaceably need to be present. Moreover the level of economic recovery, while not a standard in itself, needs to be taken into account, especially in relation to the nonrecurrence of conflict. Page 9 of 10

10 22. There are perennial tensions with peace support operations: which cases are unique and which conform more to a regular template? Quite frequently, the template approach has been adopted, with the same components to state-building included, such as disarmament, demobilisation and integration, security sector reform, and rule of law programmes without these being more individually moulded. A mechanism for ending peace support operations is needed, and in the UN context the PBC was created for this. But this does not constitute exit, only military departure. 23. Operating in a complex environment means anticipating the unexpected, preparing for unintended consequences and coordinating among multiple actors. There is no single recipe for a successful exit. Isobelle Jaques October 2009 Wilton Park Reports are brief summaries of the main points and conclusions of a conference. The reports reflect rapporteurs personal interpretations of the proceedings as such they do not constitute any institutional policy of Wilton Park nor do they necessarily represent the views of rapporteurs. 1 Should you wish to read other Wilton Park reports, or participate in upcoming Wilton Park conferences, please consult our website To receive our e-newsletter and latest updates on conferences subscribe to Page 10 of 10