IR Theory in Brazil: a cri&cal appraisal. Dr. Marco Cepik UFRGS BRAZIL Third Global Interna&onal Studies Conference Porto 2011

Transcription

1 IR Theory in Brazil: a cri&cal appraisal Dr. Marco Cepik UFRGS BRAZIL Third Global Interna&onal Studies Conference Porto 2011

2 Dr. Marco Cepik Compara&ve Poli&cs and Security Studies Associate Professor (UFRGS- Brazil) Senior Researcher at the Center for the Study of Strategy and Interna&onal Rela&ons (NERINT) Director of the Center for Interna&onal Studies on Government (CEGOV) Member of the ISA, AAS, LASA and IPSA 2

3 The author would like to thank Fernando Sebben, Igor Castellano and Airton Mar&ns for their extraordinary insights and research assistance. The author is also thankful to the Brazilian Na&onal Council for Scien&fic and Technological Development (CNPq) for suppor&ng this research. 3

4 Contents 1 The problem: IR Theory à la carte? 2 Our way: Against RelaLvism and Parochialism 3 A case study: Copenhagen receplon in Brazil 4 PracLcing Lakatos: Southern Africa RSC 5 Concluding Remarks 6 References 4

5 1 The problem: IR Theory à la carte? Much of what is produced within Brazilian IR field s&ll lacks any clear theore&cal orienta&on. The negligence with theory entails lack of proper methodological care, engendering descrip&ve, conjunctural and opinionated results. Enfeebled theore&cal / methodological grasp is an important cause of the absence of big empirical IR research projects in Brazil. Underfunding and insufficient administra&ve support are addi&onal causes. 5

6 1 The problem: IR Theory à la carte? Even when there is theore&cal concern, the Brazilian prac&ce is characterized by the choice of theories à la carte (Elman and Elman 2003). It is easy to find those who believe that is possible and desirable to throw IR theories into the great blender (Elman and Elman 2003, 59). The selec&ve use of theories to jus&fy the selec&on of cases to be observed and the selec&ve use of empirical evidence to corroborate the chosen theory is self- indulgent and prevents relevance and progress. 6

7 1 The problem: IR Theory à la carte? a) How do we know when a theory is superior to another? b) How do we know when a theory lacks explanatory power? c) How can we know if the successive efforts of research have been relevant? 7

8 1 The problem: IR Theory à la carte? Kuhn: changes of paradigm according to criteria of adhesion of scien&sts to new systems of theore&cal- methodological beliefs. [irra&onal] Popper: empirical and successive tests of deduc&vely formulated hypotheses seek to and are enough to falsify theories. [penny- pinching] Lakatos: the progressiveness of a research program depends on the capacity of the theories to explain "heuris&c new facts". The proposed model (research programs, hard core, protec&ve belt, heuris&cs, anomalies, changes of problem) has problems but seems superior. [ra&onal and generous] 8

9 According to Bennef (2003, 456), IR theory suffers due to the excessive focus on the "isms" (realism, liberalism, construc&vism, post- modernism, etc.). In favor of the isms: they allow pedagogical genealogies of knowledge and some explicita&on of the theore&cal general ideas. Against the isms: focused on principles (hard core of Lakatos) instead of problems (protec&ve belt of Lakatos). 9 1 The problem: IR Theory à la carte?

10 1 The problem: IR Theory à la carte? RecommendaLon: to focus on the solu&on of enigmas, on the resolu&on of conceptual and empirical problems star&ng with a systema&c and ra&onal dialogue between the research programs (e.g. democra&c peace, interna&onal coopera&on, causes of the wars) and the schools of thought organized around the isms. 10

11 2 Our way: Against RelaLvism and Parochialism a) RelaLvism: the correct refusal of Popperian posi&vism has led several researchers to adopt strictly pragma&c and/or radically rela&vis&c posi&ons. b) Parochialism: the denouncement of the social contexts and interests behind the theories with universal pretensions has led many researchers to defend other sorts of parochialisms (na&onal, social, epistemological). 11

12 2 Our way: Against RelaLvism and Parochialism For example, according to Brazilian author Amado Cervo (2008), theories are intrinsically problema&c: He believes their universal claims are designed to conceal the true interests, values and paferns of behavior of the countries in which they are devised. Therefore, we ought to denounce the imposture of all established IR theories using a cri&cal form of Sociology of Knowledge. 12

13 2 Our way: Against RelaLvism and Parochialism Instead of theories, Cervo supports the use of concepts. Such concepts should be explicitly based on values, cultures, and na&onal and regional interests without the pretension of an explanatory global reach. Induc&ve methods of research should be preferred to achieve thick descrip&ons and promote emancipatory policies. 13

14 Brazilian Concepts? 2 Our way: Against RelaLvism and Parochialism Since regions, na&onal socie&es or even epistemic communi&es are also composed of dis&nct interests and values of millions of individuals and groups, concepts too need social and epistemological valida&on criteria. The twins (rela&vism and parochialism) pretend to offer unique descrip&ons, but since they do not leave room for comparison or explana&on one has to faithfully accept their claims. 14

15 2 Our way: Against RelaLvism and Parochialism Instead of surrender to rela&vism and parochialism, we believe in systema&c logical and empirical assessment of any theories and concepts. Norma&ve proposi&ons, for instance, form a crucially important part of IR corpus. (Snyder 2003), In order to decide which ones are befer/worthwhile/ correct/valid one needs to engage not only in ethical debates but also in contextual, counterfactual, and cause and effect analysis. Logical consistence and empirical corrobora&on mafer to norma&ve proposi&ons. Examples: Lijphart x Horowitz about consensual and majoritarian models of government; value and impact of humanitarian interven&ons, etc. 15

16 3 A case study: Copenhagen receplon in Brazil In the area of Security Studies, the Copenhagen School has obtained an excellent recep&on in Brazil since the 1990 s because of the following key reasons: 1) Poli&cally, this perspec&ve allowed an alterna&ve to the authoritarian and func&onalist character of the Na&onal Security Doctrine related to the Brazilian military dictatorship ( ). 2) At the same &me, the Copenhagen School was an alterna&ve against the individualis&c neoliberal security policies in La&n America 16

17 3 A case study: Copenhagen receplon in Brazil 3) Regarding Human Security, the Copenhagen School offered an important set of analy&cal tools to avoid uncri&cal acceptance of its expanded conceptual blanket. (cf. Cepik 2001; Villa & Santos 2010). 4) Theore&cally, it underscored the importance of the regions as a level of analysis in a &me of strong globalist convic&on. 5) Methodologically, the Copenhagen School represented an alterna&ve to both Popperian posi&vism and the rela&vis&c/parochialis&c intellectual capitula&on. 17

18 3 A case study: Copenhagen receplon in Brazil Strengths of the Regional Security Complex Theory: State centered and the importance rendered to the regional level of analysis (geography mafers). Serious effort to combine the structural analysis of capabili&es distribu&on (polarity) with the strategic/ processual analysis of security interac&ons (polariza&on). Framework to describe levels of analysis (domes&c, regional, interregional, and global) and types of actors (individuals, social groups, states, firms, interna&onal organiza&ons, etc.). 18

19 3 A case study: Copenhagen receplon in Brazil Weaknesses of the Regional Security Complex Theory: Polarity: RSCT needs criteria to ascertain power (super, great and regional powers). Regional distribu&ons of power as described by RSCT (unipolar, bipolar, mul&polar, and centered) do not bestow explanatory power to the theory PolarizaLon: RSCT needs a befer taxonomy of complexes (subcomplex, proto- complex, pre- complex, and supercomplex). The three levels of conflict (currently misnamed security community, security regime and conflict forma&ons) need clear indicators and compara&ve 19 effort.

20 3 A case study: Copenhagen receplon in Brazil Borders: RSCT offers no clarity regarding which elements are part of and originate a RSC (common threats, power projec&on capability of states, regional ins&tu&ons, etc). Likewise, it is difficult to separate their global agenda (penetra&on) from their regional agenda. 20

21 3 A case study: Copenhagen receplon in Brazil Regional Security Complexes: ComparaLve Table (part 1) RSC QuanLty of borders with other RSC Type of Complex Polarity PolarizaLon Middle East 4 Standard Mul&polar High Southern Asia 3 Standard Bipolar High Eastern Asia 2 Standard Mul&polar High South America 2 Standard Mul&polar Medium North America 1 Centered Unipolar Low Ex- USSR 4 Centered Unipolar Medium Sub- Saharan Africa 1 Standard Mul&polar Medium West Africa 3 Centered Unipolar Medium Southern Africa 2 Standard Bipolar Medium Horn of Africa 3 Standard Unipolar High Europe 3 Centered Ins&tu&onal Low 21

22 3 A case study: Copenhagen receplon in Brazil Regional Security Complexes: ComparaLve Table (part 2) RSC Degree of PenetraLon Level of Interregional RelaLons Capacity of IntegraLon (Transport/CommunicaLons) Predominant Type of State(average) Middle East High High Medium Developing Southern Asia High High Low Developing Eastern Asia High High Medium Developing South America Medium High Low Developing North America Low High High Developed Ex- USSR Medium High High Developing Sub- Saharan Africa Medium Low Low Less developed West Africa High Low Medium Less developed Southern Africa Low Low Low Less developed Horn of Africa High Medium Low Less developed Europe High High High Developed 22

23 3 A case study: Copenhagen receplon in Brazil Regional Security Complexes: ComparaLve Table (part 3) RSC QuanLty of Subcomplexes Number of regional security org. Number of Great Powers Number of Regional Powers Middle East Southern Asia Eastern Asia South America 1* North America Ex- USSR Sub- Saharan Africa West Africa Southern Africa Horn of Africa Europe

24 4 PracLcing Lakatos: Southern Africa RSC The RSCT applied to Africa: What are the borders? All the con&nent, Sub- Saharan Africa, 3 or 4 complexes? How to evaluate weak States, with predominantly domes&c threats and reduced capability of power projec&on beyond the capitals of the countries. On the other hand, the existence of common threats and the power projec&on capability of some regional powers (South Africa, Nigeria, Libya, Ethiopia) enable connec&ons between the different regions in the con&nent. For now the discussion remains open. Specific problems: (i) West Africa as pre- complex (reduced dynamics); (ii) Horn of Africa as proto- complex (reduced interdependency); (iii) existence of a RSC of the Great Lakes of Central Africa; and (iv) unipolarity of the Southern Africa RSC. 24

25 4 PracLcing Lakatos: Southern Africa RSC Task: Reassess the borders of the Southern Africa RSC and its polarity in the last decade. Hypothesis: 1. Inexistence of a Great Lakes RSC. 2. The rise of Angola: (asymmetric bipolarity with South Africa 3. Common demographic vulnerabili&es and risks of penetra&on 25

26 4 PracLcing Lakatos: Southern Africa RSC Analysis: The DRC is inseparable from the region (sociological origin, prac&ce of conflicts, and historical and current performance). The current conflicts in the region stem directly from the Second Congo War, a war in which much of the belligerents were part of the Southern Africa RSC. Tanzania and Zambia are part of the region and par&cipate of the nego&a&on processes; and Angola and South Africa are out of the Great Lakes region, but they parlcipate aclvely in the securitarian dynamics. 26

27 4 PracLcing Lakatos: Southern Africa RSC Borders: a Southern African RSC 27

28 4 PracLcing Lakatos: Southern Africa RSC Polarity: South Africa concentrates the industrial and the energy and transporta&on infrastructure networks in the region, in addi&on to possessing a developed financial sector and a diversified economy. Those are logis&cal requirements to sustain a Great Strategy. Angola generates significant economic growth since the end of the civil war and the rising prices of commodi&es (oil). The partnership with China also allows the construc&on of tranport infrastructure, which suggests con&nued growth at least un&l the end of the current decade. Result: Angola has, in the last decade, surpassed the other countries in the region in economic terms and posi&oned itself as an intermediate power between South Africa and the others. 28

29 4 PracLcing Lakatos: Southern Africa RSC 350,000,000, ,000,000, ,000,000, ,000,000, ,000,000, ,000,000, ,000,000, Southern Africa: GDP, (current USD) Source: WB, 2011; Author: CASTELLANO, 2011 South Africa Angola Tanzania Uganda Zambia Botswana DR Congo Mozambique Namibia Zimbabwe Rwanda Malawi Swaziland Lesotho Burundi 29

30 4 PracLcing Lakatos: Southern Africa RSC Southern Africa: Military personnel, 2007 (thousands) Source: COW, 2011; Author: CASTELLANO,

31 4,500 Southern Africa: Military expenditure by country, higher than USD 200 million, (constant 2009 USD, million) 4,000 3,500 3,000 million USD 2,500 2,000 1,500 1, South Africa Angola Botswana Uganda Namibia Zambia Source: SIPRI, 2011; Author: CASTELLANO,

32 4 PracLcing Lakatos: Southern Africa RSC Polarity: Rise of Angola in military terms In spite of the numerical and qualita&ve superiority of South Africa with regard to naval forces and military technologies, the capabili&es of both countries are less asymmetric in the case of the air forces (fighters with similar capabili&es) and ground forces (rela&vely equivalent MBTs). Angolan Forces: Focus on building the na&onal army with conven&onal and irregular capabili&es. Armed forces focused on the conven&onal warfare and the use of human and mechanical mass for the war of afri&on and fric&on. The experience of irregular warfare made possible the use of rapid forces with great mobility. South- African Forces: Focus on peacekeeping and on technological build- up. Comprehensive program of moderniza&on in the 2000s (navy and air force), but constrained by regional concerns, personnel layoffs and by pressures for cost containment. 32

33 Angola and South Africa: A comparalve perspeclve of the military and the inventories Inventory Angola South Africa IISS, 2010 JANES, 2009 IISS, 2010 JANES, 2009 Military Forces Army Tanks (MBTs) Armored Vehicles Ar&llery An&- tank Air Defense UAVs Navy Patrol Submarines Frigates Fast Patrol Crat - Coastal Naval Avia&on Coastal Defense Mine Countermeasures Landing Crat - U&lity Air Force Aircrats Mul1- role Fighter A>ack Transport Trainer U1lity Helicopters Assault A>ack Support U1lity Air Defense (SAM) 12 Types 8 Types 4 Types 5 Types Note: Cells in light blue correspond to higher capaci&es. Sources: IISS, 2010; JANES, 2009a e 2009b Author: CASTELLANO,

34 4 PracLcing Lakatos: Southern Africa RSC Common VulnerabiliLes: demographics Southern Africa and Work Force: Growth of the PopulaLon aged 15-59, ,000,000 60,000,000 50,000,000 40,000,000 30,000,000 20,000,000 10,000,000 0 DR Congo Tanzania Uganda Angola Mozambiq ue Malawi Zambia Rwanda Zimbabwe South Africa Burundi Namibia Botswana Swaziland Lesotho Source: UNDATA, 2011; Author: CASTELLANO,

35 4 PracLcing Lakatos: Southern Africa RSC VulnerabiliLes: Angola: excessive focus on internal security (na&onal). Interven&ons in regional mafers only when they threaten Angolan na&onal security. South Africa: Concept of human security and of non- interven&onism, except for mandates backed by interna&onal organiza&ons. Common challenge: To construct a concept of Regional Security. Address wars of aggression in the region, providing regional alterna&ves to interven&ons from outside the region, and helping in military tasks to wage counterinsurgency opera&ons against destabilizing na&onal and transna&onal groups. 35

36 5 Concluding Remarks POLARITY The criterion of material capabili&es, acknowledged by Buzan and Waever (2003) but not properly explored, allowed the discovery that the RSC is not unipolar but rather asymmetrically bipolar. Angola presents itself as rising power. In Lakatosian terms, this finding (heuris&c new fact) could be considered as a component of posi&ve heuris&c. The rise of Angola is an apparent anomaly for the model of Buzan and Waever. However, with the improvement of the criterion of capabili&es, the anomaly becomes the corrobora&on. Such a heuris&c development allows an enhancement of the protec&ve belt of the RSCT, that is, a reformula&on about the role of the material capabili&es for the dynamics of the Regional Complex. With that, the research program of the RSC acquires greater explanatory power, even when compared with compe&ng programs, and it can, therefore, also foresee new facts in other regions of the globe. 36

37 5 Concluding Remarks BORDERS The security dynamics analysis of the countries in the Great Lakes of Central Africa (DRC par&cularly) revealed the necessity to revise the borders of the Southern Africa RSC. The analysis of the RSC borders allowed progress in descrip&ve terms, because it was made from a new assessment of the security dynamics in the region. In addi&on, the analysis of the borders adopts specific criteria (threats and power projec&on capability of the States) to determine the limits of the RSC. At the same &me, the analysis discards the mere existence of regional security ins&tu&ons as a determining factor for the delimita&on of borders (Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi are not part of SADC). 37

38 5 Concluding Remarks IR Theory: to avoid choosing epistemologies and theories à la carte Lakatos s: research programs focused on problems instead of isms The School of Copenhague and its recep&on in Brazil: beyond construc&vism, back to basics 38

39 POLARIZATION 5 Concluding Remarks The analysis of par&cipa&on of the regional players in the main armed conflicts in the region serves as an important index of polariza&on profile. NEW BORDERS Future studies are necessary to assess the existence of a single Sub- Saharan RSC, which would contain, supposedly, three subcomplexes (one in West Africa, one in the Horn of Africa, and one in Southern Africa). 39

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