CENTRAL EUROPE IN 2018: STATE CAPTURE, ANTI-MIGRANT ATTITUDES AND TWILIGHT OF DEMOCRACY. Peter Plenta

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1 CENTRAL EUROPE IN 2018: STATE CAPTURE, ANTI-MIGRANT ATTITUDES AND TWILIGHT OF DEMOCRACY Peter Plenta

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3 Country EU average Italy 96 % Czechia 89% Portugal 77% Slovakia 76% Poland 70% Hungary 68% Greece 67% GDP PER CAPITA (2017)

4 Central Europe is a strange place today In Hungary, prime minister Orban builds authoritarian regime with support of absolute majority of Hungarians In Poland, President and government organized a celebration of 100 years of Polish republic together with Nazi groups

5 In Czechia, prime minister Babiš let kidnap own son and sent him to Crimea to prevent him talk about the father s frauds In Slovakia, (Ex)prime minister is living in luxury apartment own by tax fraudent, his neighbour is arrested for ordering murder of journalist and his lover is exgirlfriend and business partner of the Slovak chief of Ndrangheta

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10 1. Anti-migrants attitudes (particularly from MENA) 2. State Capture- merging organize crime, politics, media and economy into one entity 3. Turn to Illiberal Democracy/Soft authoritarianism

11 ANTI-IMMIGRANT ATTITUDES AND POLITICS The V4 s approach stood against the open-door policy attributed to Germany (and the European Union) Germany s welcome culture towards refugees had encouraged terrorism and spread fear radical right-wing parties became stronger by acquiring higher percentages of support in the general elections

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15 Immigrants are breeding ground for spreading terrorism in Europe and world There are problems with the gypsies, but they are still our citizens. Better a gypsie, than an incomer We will accept not even one immigrant!...slovakia is not Africa We refuse to do national suicide! No Vacancy sign should be put up at Europe s borders Put the immigrants on the military boat and send them back home

16 Migrants brought syphilis Migrants already rape our women It s impossible to integrate Muslims Slovakia will never allow formation of a united Muslim community No to veils in Czech schools

17 Orbán along with Slovak Prime Minister Fico presented migrants as dangerous strangers who are economic migrants and not refugees Similarly the PiS leader Kaczyński warned before migrants as they already brought diseases like cholera and dysentery to Europe as well as all sorts of parasites

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21 Surveys in 2015 revealed that 39.7 percent of Slovaks considered refugees to be the biggest problem facing the country despite the prevalent negative framing, the increased media attention for the extremist party made neo-fascist party highly salient and visible in the public debate facilitating so his electoral success

22 year Asylum applications Asylum granted

23 QUOTAS FOR MIGRANTS preserve the voluntary nature of the EU measures" concerning migrants and that any proposal leading to introducing mandatory and permanent quotas... would be unacceptable Slovakia and Hungary even filing a court case against it

24 They declare themselves ready to provide financial aid, experts and technical equipment Slovakia, nonetheless, offered spots for location, emphasizing the voluntary nature of its contributions

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26 popularity of hoaxes and fake news on migration migration typically returns to the agenda at times of important events or political developments abroad- Global Compaq for migration (Marakesh declaration)

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30 REASONS BEHIND THE ATTITUDE 1) objective reasons Integration of some migrant groups in the West is problematic Integrate big immigrant groups, particularly Muslims, would be very challenging in central European societies (still not able to integrate Romas) monocultural and monoethnic identity Pro-local mentality in Slovakia

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32 2) Fear of unknown Attitudes towards migration are unrelated to personal experiences Often no personal experience only 28% of Poles declared to have had contact with a foreigner in 2016

33 Economic threat stealing of our jobs + they are not working Security threats immigrants are terrorists and criminals Demographic threats end of our nation state + population explosion Cultural threats sharia law, failure of multiculturalism and unwillingness to accept our laws and norms

34 3) Political instrument In Western Europe, far-right and anti-establishment groups have driven the increase in these sentiments in the Visegrad countries, the refugee crisis blurred the boundaries between the far-right and right-wing populist forces mainstream parties have exploited fears and anti-immigrant sentiment for their political purposes

35 4) role of media Immigrants were described as a threats by mainstream media Huge impact of social networks and fake news information

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37 DISCUSSION QUESTIONS 1. Why has the V4 so opposed the mainstream EU approach to the migration crisis? 2. Put Visegrad group itself on a dangerous path of questioning their EU membership due to opinion in migration issue? Belgian Prime Minister Charles Michel said 14 December 2018: EU countries that show no solidarity in the management of migration should be ousted from the Schengen area.

38 3. Visegrad wants to help the war refugees, but they refuse to compromise the safety and security of their own citizens. Do you agree? 4. Instead of attacking the nations of Visegrad, the leaders of the European Union must start listening to them (?)

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40 STATE CAPTURE strongest form of political corruption and the most dangerous for a democratic state political corruption which damage the functioning of a state and its institutions network structure in which corrupt actors to act collectively in pursuance of their private goals

41 state-business-media-organized crime nexus - state officials, high administrative officeholders, politicians, private business, and media actors When a public organization is captured by private interests, it loses its autonomy to act in maintenance of public goals

42 Weak institutions allows stronger party control that may result in capturing both polity and the economy institutions and civil control could not effectively limit state influence that aimed at favoring clients through selective measures

43 post-communist state building and party formation provided ideal conditions for the renewal of party patronage as a valuable political resource privatisation, regulation, government contracts, tax and trade concessions, EU subventions public private partnerships Weakening of business state boundaries, providing politicians with a growing range of opportunities for direct relationships

44 STATE CAPTURE IN SLOVAKIA Rise of powerful financial groups and oligarchs lead by family relatives of businessmen who gained advantage from privatization, grey economy and organized crime during 1990s gradually received control over Slovak economy, media, political parties, and strong influence in regulation institutions, police, prosecutor office, judiciary system

45 Two all-mighty financial groups in Slovakia, works via influence and information rather than through breaking the law Numerous oligarchs still avoid or directly violate the law

46 Smer-Social Democracy (Direction) Róbert Fico Dominant party political In power since 2006

47 MURDER OF JOURNALIST JÁN KUCIAK AND HIS FIANCE Ján Kuciak investigated ties between organized groups and ruling political parties state-business-mediaorganized crime nexus was challenged by mass protests

48 2 version who is behind the murder A) foreign organized criminal group (Italian Ndrangheta, Albanian Mafia) connected with the SMER-SD B) slovak organized criminal group connected with the SMER-SD

49 MÁRIA TROŠKOVÁ Finalist of Miss Slovakia Model for men s magazine Assistant and lover of the Prime minister Working for the governmental office in the high administration position Ex girlfriend and business partner of the chief of Slovak Ndrangheta Italian mafia had access to the prime minister office and bed

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54 Prime Minister Assistant Chief of State Security Dep. (ex)prime Minister Antonio Vadala EU funds and farmland frauds with members of SMER-SD Minister of Inferior Police Chief Criminal Agency Chief

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56 Ex Prime Minister Bašternák (businessman) Neighbours Kočner (businessman) Business partners

57 Few months after change of key personalities in the police, they arrested Slovak businesman Marián Kočner for ordering murder of journalist Closely connected with the SMER-SD Were often used for discreditation of opposition representatives and journalists

58 Bašternák was sentenced for 5 years for tax frauds Kočner is in prison, investigated for ordering the murder and numerous tax frauds

59 LIGHT AT THE END OF TUNEL? Prime minister and minister of inferior resigned Some businessmen closed to (ex)prime minister are in prisons 2 ex-ministers were sentenced for 9 and11 years for corruption in November 2018 (just white horses)

60 NOT REALLY Smer-SD is still the most popular party State capture and corruption scandals continue Just a few people were tossed overboard to calm public

61 NEW PRIME MINISTER PELLEGRINI Was not able to explain finance for his new apartment that he bough from a financial group

62 TWILIGHT OF DEMOCRACY (?) Sign of decline of democracy State capture Weakening of state institutions Rise of populism, extremism, Euroscepticism Attacks on civil society, media and academic freedoms Most of societies did not fully accept liberal democracy values Political leaders has turned to non-democratic narratives

63 ANTI-SOROS CONSPIRACY THEORIES HAS BECOME THE MAINSTREAM OF CENTRAL EUROPEAN POLITICS MIGRANTS, NGOS, OVERTHROWN OF GOVERNMENTS

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74 Visegrád countries have been regarded as forerunners of political and economic transition in the 1990s and early 2000s political democracy and market economy were established and fine-tuned why do post-communist elites undermine the very democratic institutions they helped create?

75 In 2013, the EU announced that some member states regularly violated the rules and values of the EU Fidesz party in Hungary has systematically been taking over the country s previously independent institutions: the presidency, the state audit office and the media council

76 In Hungary the crisis of the democracy has taken place most markedly in both aspects of democracy formal democratic institutions - violating the procedural democracy with rule of law, and the checks and balances system in their public performance (backsliding in the countrymanagement)

77 the European Commission in December 2017 claimed that that there is a clear risk of a serious breach of the rule of law in Poland in April 2018 the EP stated that there is a systemic threat to democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights in Hungary

78 Democratic backsliding has definitely become a trend in Hungary and Poland in Slovakia and the Czech Republic did not result in deeper changes to the institutional system mainly due to proportional system and fragmentation of party system (8-9 parties in parliaments)

79 The key traits of the Orbán and the Kaczyński regimes are that they are authoritarian, exclusionary in a sense that they reject pluralism and depict critical actors independent of these governments Authoritarian populist tendencies are also present in Slovakia and the Czech Republic but to a lesser extent

80 The main difference between the Hungarian and the Polish model are stronger and more independent institutions in Poland Jarosław Kaczyński is rather an ideologue aligned with the Polish Catholic Church Viktor Orbán is a pragmatic non-ideologue aligned with oligarchs

81 REASONS A) historical Heritage of communism (systematic corruption) Mistakes during transformation period due to enormous challenges economic, political and state-building transformation Collapse of traditional social-left parties (corruption, incompetence, absence of charismatic leaders)

82 B) external Membership in the European Union Unrealistically high expectations to achieve a Western welfare state overnight Feeling of disappointment and injustice from the membership Idea of poor relatives exploit by old member states

83 Various crises Economic/Euro crisis- rise of populist and Eurosceptics Migration crisis- rise of far-right parties and movements

84 C) Systematic trust in the institutions and the political elite has declined rapidly democratic institutions have been targeted and weakened Looking for alternatives- often in extremist and anti-system parties

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87 Democratization as a elite-driven process distinction between democracy as emerging from struggle and maturation over centuries and democracy as established over a relatively short term by the actions of political elites beliefs and citizen trust in democracy are undermined

88 Political elites turned to non-democratic practices and masses follows them (?) Masses has turned against democracy and elites follow them (?)

89 In Slovakia, 45-50% of voters in election regularly support populist, authoritarian, nationalistic and extremist parties Clearly democratic and pro-western parties have only 30-35% of votes

90 FUTURE It is possible to reverse the illiberal course in Central Europe (like Slovakia did in 1990s) a) if raise new political generation that return trust to institutions and democratic values b) if there would be no external shock/crisis c) if the EU would not push further federalization of the EU in next years

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92 DISCUSSION QUESTIONS 1. Should we label Hungary and Poland as non-democratic/ authoritarian countries? 2. Despite the Visegrad countries membership in the EU and NATO, their place in the West is not settled for good. Do you agree?

93 3. How should European People s Party react to Orban turn to illiberal/christian democracy? 4. Orban also warned EPP and other member states that if they don't follow Hungary's and Austria's lead, they could be swept away by voters.do you agree?

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