Governance of Food Security. Rima Al-Azar World Bank INT/PSU Rome, 6 December 2011

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1 Governance of Food Security Rima Al-Azar World Bank INT/PSU Rome, 6 December 2011

2 Outline 1. Governance and Anti-Corruption (GAC) at the World Bank 2. GAC in agriculture/rural development 3. Cross-cutting factors for improving GAC 4. World Bank indicators

3 Principles of Engagement on Governance and Anticorruption 1. The focus on GAC is rooted in its mandate to reduce poverty - a capable and accountable state creates opportunities for the poor. 2. GAC work must be country-driven. 3. Implementation is adapted to individual country circumstances. 4. The World Bank will remain engaged even in poorly governed countries so the poor do not pay twice. 5. The World Bank aims to engage in its GAC work with a broad array of stakeholders. 6. The World Bank will strive to strengthen, not by-pass, country systems. 7. The World Bank will work with governments, donors, and other actors at the country and global levels to ensure a harmonized and coordinated approach.

4 GAC at the World Bank World Bank Engagement on Governance and Anticorruption: An Evaluation of the 2007 Strategy and Implementation Plan, IEG PREM SDV Sectors Operations INT Public sector Judiciary Demand for good governance Grievance Redress Mechanisms Human Development (e.g., Education, Health Infrastructure (e.g., Roads) Financial Management Procurement GAC-in-Projects Investigations Prevention (PREM, SDV, Sectors, Operations)

5 30 years ago Amartya Sen Most recent famines have been caused not because food wasn't available but because of bad governance -- institutional failures that led to poor distribution of the available food, or even hoarding and storage in the face of starvation elsewhere As Sen put it, "No substantial famine has ever occurred in any independent and democratic country with a relatively free press. Amartya Sen (1982)

6 Possible reasons for operational lag Food security is an outcome and not a sector Complexity and multi-sectoriality Decrease in investments in the last couple of decades Low capacity of government institutions Lack of awareness of staff Lesser voice of beneficiaries (tend to be poorer, illiterate, less access to information, etc ) Hungry people have other things to do then demonstrate P However, commitment to MDG 1 (to halve hunger by 2015), renewed interest due to increase in agriculture investment, higher food prices, political instability

7 Agriculture and Rural Development (ARD): conceptual stage World Development Report (2008) Agriculture for Development Currently, Agriculture Risk Assessment and Management Governance and corruption as a sub-set of risk assessment and management and not a stand-alone initiative Next steps: Concept Note Review and Knowledge Product Other relevant products: Lessons Learned in CDD Operations (INT); Guidance Note on CCTs (INT); Global Food Crisis Response Program (INT); Does Participation Work (DEC), several ongoing case studies on DFGG FAO s initiative is welcome and long-needed; look forward to working with FAO and other Rome-based agencies

8 Agriculture Risk Matrix Production risks Mitigation Transfer Cope Irrigation Earth work and drainage Improvement in agronomic practices Livestock vaccination programs Drought and disease resistance varieties Early warning systems/disaster preparedness Agriculture insurance Weather derivative products Social safety nets programs CDD programs Emergency/relief funds Market risks Staggering production Promoting back-to-back sale of physical commodities and forward sales Investment in storage Hedging in commodity exchanges (futures and options) Price stabilization funds Enabling environment risk Land policies Advocacy for better legislation Sanitary and phyto-sanitary controls Political risk cover Decentralization policies

9 Zooming from the forest to the tree

10 Cross-cutting governance issues Policy formulation Decision-making and coordination at al levels (risk of conflict of interest, e.g., weather derivative products; governance of coordinating bodies) Targeting (risk of elite capture) Value-chain analysis (seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, tools, transport, storage corruption and how it leaves people worse off) Capacity building (virtuous or vicious cycle: to participate, to implement and to increase understanding of rights)

11 GAC throughout the Project Cycle Policy formulation Oversight Decisionmaking M&E Targeting Capacity building Implementa tion

12 Governance Risks: Conflict a special challenge Government institutions and rule of law particularly weak Should efficiency trumps governance? educating donors Security issues: lack of access to land due to landmines; difficulty of oversight Population displacement (away from their own land and unable to cultivate it; or on other people s land preventing them from cultivating it) Special challenge of relief distribution in a conflict zone and the diversion of aid to unintended beneficiaries

13 Cross-cutting factors for improving governance Design of activities as well as mitigating measures according to context: no one-size-fits-all rather good fit ; importance of political economy analysis Transparency at all levels (donors, central government, decentralized structures) Linking supply-side (e.g., laws, financial management systems) with demand-side measures (social accountability, grievance redress mechanisms) Capacity building M&E Improved oversight (supervision and audits): donors and beneficiaries Use of new technologies (ICT: e-governance computerized land records, cameras with GPS, mobile phones, etc ) Donor coordination and alignment (policies, implementation, information)

14 Example: Risk-based oversight Nodes are not connected Fictitious roads were added to the national road map Vict oria Villa Santiago Sant o T o m as Dungo (Osmena) San Salvador Cofcaville San Bernabe Divisoria Sur (Bisangal) Alicia Villa Hermosa Norte Villa Hermosa Sur Balligui MADDELA San P edro P edlisan Dumabato Norte Diduyon Manglad Cabua-a Santo Nino Dipintin The roads were supposed to be 22% longer than the works implemented and paid for

15 M&E: World Bank Indicators A composite index based on aggregating perception data from various sources, constructing 6 broad governance indicators: Control of corruption Rule of law Voice and accountability Political stability and the absence of violence Regulatory quality Government effectiveness

16 4 criteria for second-generation governance indicators 1. Generated through a transparent process Should be replicable through a well-documented process. The data should be based on publicly available data and come from sources that are politically acceptable. 2. Available across many countries and over time Broad country coverage is necessary for testing relationships between indicators and valued outcomes. Ideally an institutionalized procedure is in place or could reasonably be set up to collect data on the proposed indicators in the future. 3. High quality and accurate Should be measured in a consistent manner across countries and values should reflect what he indicator purports to measure. 4. Specific Should measure either a particular set of governance institutions or a defined output.

17 Second generation: actionable governance indicators (examples) Examples: change in $$$ agriculture investment/change in % of food insecure population equitable distribution of agriculture land (sort of a GINI coefficient for land); civil service numbers passing of specific laws on land tenure publication of MinAgri detailed budget and budget allocation at decentralized level Timeliness of audited financial statements publication of targeting criteria and number of beneficiaries/district setting up a hotline at MinAgri and number of complaints received household surveys, (Global Corruption Barometer Land governance questions, Afro/Asia/Latinobarometer, Gallup International Voice of the People ) etc

18 Thank you Any comments/questions?