Arms Control in a Changing Middle East (13 14 November 2011) INSS Conference Review / Nadav Kedem

Transcription

1 Arms Control in a Changing Middle East (13 14 November 2011) INSS Conference Review / Nadav Kedem The conference analyzed the influence of recent major events in the Middle East (ME) on various proliferation and arms control (AC) issues. INSS Director Dr. Oded Eran opened the conference by urging a responsible approach, as the ME has become even more unstable and unpredictable due to recent events. Prof. Asher Susser (Moshe Dayan Center, Tel Aviv University), Prof. Dr. Erzsébet N. Rózsa (Hungarian Institute of International Affairs HIIA), and Brig. Gen. (ret.) Shlomo Brom (INSS) set the background, with a look at the so called "Arab spring 1 " and potential additional internal trends in the Arab world. Susser proposed an alternative analytical paradigm for understanding the recent flux in the political atmosphere in various Arab countries. He argued that the true factors underlying the outburst are deficits in political freedom, education, and women's rights; together the three are at the root of the economic crisis of the non oil producing Arab states. Susser explained how several factors, including relatively low levels of education, low levels of women's participation in the workforce, and the relatively high birthrates create the combination of huge populations and failing economies, and ultimately, instability. This is a long term process that culminated recently, rather than a result of the recent rise of a computer savvy younger generation. Susser added that a major difficulty as far as analyzing the events in the ME results from a built in reluctance to speak about "the otherness of the other," recognizing the validity of culture as a political force, lest you be accused of being an Orientalist or a racist. He explained why this is a mistake, and described how the Arab world came to be the way it is today, largely in response to Western influences. Susser believes that religious, sectarian, and tribal forces predominate in all the recent cases of internal turmoil in Arab states. 1 Many of the speakers expressed their reservation with the prevailing term "Arab spring." 1

2 In addressing the question of whether Islam can coexist with democracy, Susser raised four main questions that must be addressed: 1. the implementation of the sharia; 2. the equality of minorities; 3. the equality of women; and 4. freedom of opinion and conscience freedom from and of religion. His view is that the Arab spring is creating greater openness and at the same time is more open to the Islamists though this does not necessarily mean less democratic regimes. Rózsa agreed with Susser, arguing that it was not the Arab spring that changed the context of the situation in the region, and that indeed these changes were already on their way. She noted that the regional dynamic in the ME has become much more important than great power politics. Rózsa examined potential political models for the Arab world in general, and for Egypt in particular. The two main poles are the Turkish Ataturk model and the Iranian model. According to Rózsa, the Ataturk model is too specific, while the Iranian model has failed. Most likely, a set of different Arab models will develop in the region. Islamist parties are increasingly telling the outside world that they are like the AKP, but it doesn't seem to be the case. Arab societies are still patrimonial, with decisions made according to traditions and real power dependent on the closeness to the core of the regime. Religion is still highly important. Moreover, the AKP model is spoken about more by Europeans than Arabs. Arabs don t like the Erdoğan model, as secularism in Arabic is has a contemptuous connotation, equal to atheism. During the open discussion following the first panel, Prof. Dr. Nurşin Güney (Yildiz Technical University, Turkey) strongly supported Rózsa, arguing there is no Turkish model and that generalizations are problematic. In fact, the Turkish model was not so attractive without economic success, and that means a full free market system, which is unlikely in the Arab world. Nevertheless, there is a good chance that the centrality of the military is part of the nature of the regime in Egypt that will last. In fact, this is the old Turkish model. On the other hand, Brom argued that everyone understands what the Turkish model in the context of the Arab states means: it means Islamic parties playing a dominant role in the framework of a democratic state. It does not mean exact emulation of the Turkish situation. Rózsa argued that though the Arab countries will have to adapt to international norms, it is a long process. In fact, Islamic reform 120 years ago meant finding a route to modernity. The 2

3 question for the Islamists is not about going back to the 7th century, but going to modernity through an Islamic prism. Rózsa analyzed the degree of loyalty of sectarian groups to the nation states. According to her, there are two fundamental contradictory trends since the defeat of pan Arabism: 1) the territorial state Eyptianism, Tunisianism, etc; and at the same time 2) political Islam filling the shoes pan Arabism has left behind. Currently, the nation state competes with Islamism: playing sectarian politics but not dismantling the state is the new game. Dr. Zvi Bar'el (Haaretz Newspaper), Prof. W. Pal Sidhu (Center on International Cooperation, New York University, US), Amb. Jeremy Issacharoff (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israel), Mr. Robert Silverman (US embassy, Tel Aviv), Brom, Susser, and Rózsa all analyzed the potential ramifications of the turmoil in the ME to regional dynamics, as well as the way it is likely to affect Iranian strategic choices. In addition, Dr. Ephraim Asculai (INSS) reviewed Iran's recent nuclear advances. Brom focused on the emerging role of the so called "Arab street" over the past year. The Arab public has an anti Western, anti Israel sentiment. As a result, engagement of Israel and the West with Arab states will be much more complicated, leaving much less freedom of action, whether in the military realm or the political realm. Brom also referred to the developing competition between Turkey and Iran. Though his outlook on the situation was rather bleak, he noted that the situation of transition is also an opportunity to have some influence on the shaping of the future of the new ME that will be born out of this turmoil. Susser noted that the three leading states in today's ME are non Arab states (Turkey, Iran, and Israel). In this context, Rózsa pointed to the relationship between Turkey and Iran. Though the Turkish Iranian relationship seems to be improving, there will soon be a collision of interests between them. On the one hand, the Turkish relationship with the Arab world is surprisingly good, though there is a limit to that. On the other hand, Iran is an emerging regional power, but its limits have already been reached even if it has the potential of posing very serious concerns. Rózsa reported that many of her Arab colleagues feel a new sense of pride and a sense of newly developed Arab unity. This sense leaves less space for Iranian influence. Bar'el analyzed Iran's outreach in the ME during the months of turmoil in Arab states. According to him, neither Iran nor any other state or group of states can be considered a ME hegemonic power. In fact, the ME is not monolithic and there are no longstanding alliances. 3

4 At the moment, realpolitik prevails. Iran is received more favorably in Egypt after Mubarak, yet Egypt still eyes Iran as a suspected meddler in its affairs. Bar'el agreed with Rózsa that Iran has reached its limits in the ME. Bar'el identified several main topics that dominate current (Arab) hegemonic ME discourse: anti American involvement in internal affairs, rejection of religious radicalism, anti pan Arabism, acceptance of Israel and the Israeli Palestinian conflict as permanent elements in the ME, and suspicion of Iran. These elements limit Iran's policy flexibility. Moreover, major policy changes are unlikely in Iran. Even a regime change will not necessarily end Iran's nuclear bid it is an issue of national pride that cuts across parties. Bar'el concluded by underscoring the need to take Iran's perspective into account. Or, as he put it: "We should learn how respect is spelled in Farsi." Sidhu focused on the internal Iranian point of view. He identified four approaches within Iran to its nuclear project: 1. "Build the weapon now" the military is pushing this approach, as are some nuclear weapons scientists. 2. Opposition to nuclear weapons endorsed by some religious leaders, maybe even Khamenei. 3. The Japanese option striking a deal before crossing the nuclear threshold and getting something in return for not crossing it. Ahmajinedad may be the strongest advocate because he seemed to be one of the key drivers behind the Turkey/Brazil deal. 4. The North Korean option striking a deal (before and) after crossing the nuclear threshold. Asculai presented a detailed explanation of the IAEA report on Iran of early November Iran wants to have enough enriched uranium to produce four cores, the minimum amount needed for a country wishing to be a nuclear power. Asculai stressed the high reliability of the report, which is grounded in evidence. He views the report as a "game changer" because it is now very difficult for international players to ignore Iran's program. It is clear that Iran is engaged in the first two steps (out of three; the third being a development of a warhead) of nuclear weapons development: enrichment and weaponization. According to Asculai, Iran will probably keep enriching a large amount of uranium from the 3.5 percent to 20 percent level. Twenty percent can still be considered as designated for civilian uses. However, enrichment to 20 percent (from 0 percent) amounts 4

5 to percent of the overall work required for enrichment to a military level of 90 percent. This leaves Iran with a potential for a quick nuclear weapons breakout. Asculai estimates that it will take Iran about one year (give or take few months) to produce its first core (given a political decision to do so). Iran will probably break out slowly as the IAEA diplomatic process goes on. One has to remember that even after completing the first two steps (enrichment and weaponization), Iran will still have to pack the nuclear device into a warhead. Nevertheless, Asculai maintains that the chance of stopping Iran now is unlikely. Various alternatives to confront the Iranian threat, as well as potential trends in nuclear non proliferation and arms control in the ME were discussed. Dr. Emily Landau (INSS) set the historical and comparative background for the debate. Landau asked: what is the future for nuclear non proliferation in the wake of proliferation challenges of the last 20 years, and especially in the wake of the failure of efforts to deal with Iran and North Korea over the past decade? She speculated that we may see new approaches that integrate more coercive elements, or a shift to regional solutions, and argued that the future direction of nuclear non proliferation efforts has taken on new urgency. There is a range of coercive measures that can be taken, even in the military realm (as will be elaborated bellow). Landau described the limitations of the NPT and the issue of how Iran has exploited the weaknesses in the treaty to buy time in moving toward its nuclear weapons goals. Sidhu presented five options available for the international community: the military option, sanctions, some kind of dialogue (perhaps a dialogue aimed at agreement similar to the Brazil/Turkey deal) and a Middle East WMD free zone (WMDFZ). Sidhu concluded that although the status quo has served all states in the region for the last 40 years, it is changing. Most speakers, including Silverman (who presented the position of the US administration) and Issacharoff, agreed that a dual approach is necessary, in other words, keeping the military option on the table for dealing with Iran while trying to solve the problem through diplomacy backed by sanctions and a credible military option. At the same time, most speakers were pessimistic regarding the likelihood of sanctions to stop Iran. Sidhu argued that a limit to sanctions was reached except for the oil and gas industry. However, potential sanctions for this sector are difficult and painful for the international community. Dr. Ephraim Kam (INSS) cited assessments of Chinese scholars who believe sanctions won't work. Maj. Gen. (ret.) Giora Eiland (INSS) believes that only a US Russia 5

6 grand bargain could bring enough political pressure on Iran to effect a real change of policy. However, the US must make some extraordinary concessions to bring Russia on board. Thus, both Kam and Eiland concluded that any solution to the problem by the international community seems unlikely, while the military option comes more to the fore. Issacharoff explained that two main documents are expected to dominate the discourse over the next year: the November IAEA Director General's report on Iran, which will comprise a tremendous part of Israeli diplomacy in the very near future; and the final document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference specifically regarding the 2012 WMDFZ conference. According to Issacharoff, the current situation vis à vis Iran is also a measure of success. However, it doesn t mitigate the fact that many of the elements of Iran's program are still moving forward. Departing somewhat from many other speakers, Issacharoff added that Iran is not impervious to pressure; as such, the diplomatic option can provide either a full answer or at least a delay, although little time for that remains. Achieving a mutually agreedon paradigm over regional security between Arab states and Israel is highly complicated and requires much political will. Thus, the Iranian issue will take precedence. The military option in facing the Iranian nuclear challenge was considered by Kam, Eiland, Sidhu, Landau, and Bar'el. Though some of the speakers were not fully clear regarding their preferences, it seems that some viewed a military attack by Israel as a real possibility, as long as certain conditions are met, while others were more cautious and did not see the cost effectiveness of an Israeli attack. Kam and Eiland presented some questions that should be answered regarding an Israeli attack: Do we have sufficient and qualitative intelligence of nuclear sites? What is the Israeli capability? How successful could such an attack be (what kind of knowledge exists in other sites that will not be hit)? Kam asked additional questions, some of which were answered tentatively by Eiland: What will be the Iranian response? How long can we wait? What is the timetable? What is the US position? And finally, what is the alternative? Eiland assumes that the US will not veto an Israeli military strike and maintains that the immediate Iranian military responses is something Israel can tolerate. He sees the risks involved with a military strike as the lesser evil (in comparison to a nuclear Iran). Nevertheless, Eiland stipulated possible consequences of a military strike: Iran may use conventional weapons to attack Israel, though the threat is not as significant as some think 6

7 and can mostly be intercepted. Though explosives will fall in Israel, an attack of this nature is tolerable, and certainly preferable to the existential threat that a nuclear Iran will pose; Hezbollah will probably respond, but this is a threat that can be exercised everyday regardless of Iran. Anyhow, Israel can probably cope with Hezbollah; Eiland assumes that if the Israeli strike is a success, potentially problematic political ramifications will be negligible. Interestingly enough, Eiland did not mention potential terror activities in Israel and the world as a possible Iranian response. Sidhu finds some potential advantages to the military option: it may work to disarm Iran, and if it doesn t it may still buy time. It may also trigger a favorable domestic political response within Iran and will present a political message internationally. However, a successful Israeli strike may be infeasible. Though the US might be capable of attacking, it is unlikely to move without a UNSC resolution, which is highly unlikely, especially because of Iraq and Libya. Moreover, even if the US attacks, it may not actually achieve its objective. Landau also stressed that a delay of Iran's military program (due to a military strike) is more likely than full elimination. This will come into play when assessing the usefulness of a military attack and its timing. While several other speakers were also cautious regarding a military strike, Bar'el clearly advocated against the military option. The possibility of convening a conference on a WMDFZ in 2012 was discussed by Mr. Camille Grand (Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, France), Amb. Shimon Stein (INSS), and Güney. Most speakers agreed that it is irrelevant to the current Iranian challenge. Grand explained how the idea for a WMDFZ in the ME has become part of the global nonproliferation regime bargain as a tool to address security challenges. Still, he explained that there are very important stumbling blocks to the prospect of a WMDFZ in the ME: security concerns of the countries in the region, including Arab concerns about Israel; and very different expectations and priorities of key players, which has engendered expression of preconditions. When contemplating the way forward, Grand stated that though there are difficultie, beginning discussion now is worthwhile precisely because it is so difficult. He added that the security dimension of this debate cannot be overlooked, and issued a few recommendations to achieve the goal of the conference in 2012: adopting an incremental approach (confidence building measures etc.), using existing flexibility among key players about the negotiation framework, trying to make progress in meetings with small groups, and adopting 7

8 mutually reinforcing approaches: bilateral, multilateral, unilateral, regional, and international discussions. However, Grand was cautious, understanding how problematic such a constellation is for Israel. He stressed that any Iranian attempt to link its program with Israel's is unacceptable to the international community. As a confidence building measure, only Iran should be addressed. While Grand advocated cautious advancements of a WMDFZ, Stein and Landau were inclined against it, as it seems not to be within the Israeli Interest (at least according to the expected outline of the conference). Stein referred to a WMDFZ as an agreement made by those who are not really interested in that zone. He stated that the initiative is in fact a euphemism, and that the Egyptians are interested only in Israel adhering to the NPT. The conference seeks to constrain Israel. He then went on to detail why in fact Israel could not attend such a conference. Not only Israel is not a member to the NPT, but also the terms of reference for a WMDFZ conference deal with only part of the security dilemma Israel faces. The issue of strategic border threats from conventional arms is not addressed. Stein concluded that instead, Israel should be interested in a regional engagement. The agenda for such an engagement must be far reaching confidence building measures, conventional weapons, and WMD. The facilitator will have to find a way to reconcile between the two parties. Landau joined Stein in expressing concern. According to her, the only hope for the WMDFZ conference is if it addresses inter state relations and means of improving them. Only in a very changed regional atmosphere would there be any hope of actually moving in the direction of a WMDFZ. Now the conference lacks strong leadership and necessary political clout, which Finland may not possess. Moreover, Landau estimated that Iran will probably join Egypt wholeheartedly in an anti Israel campaign during the WMDFZ conference. Iran will most likely be willing to sit with Israel at the table in 2012 because it will be able to use the framework in a cynical manner that will serve its interests of placing all emphasis on Israel and deflecting attention from itself. In contrast, official US support for the conference was expressed by Silverman. According to him, the US supports the idea as an achievable long term goal after a comprehensive peace in the ME, Syria, and Iran. 8

9 Güney offered a more optimistic voice, arguing that this conference presents an opportunity to build trust and confidence. She expressed hope that at the conference the existence of the "self" and "other" will be suppressed in favor of a Middle Eastern "we ness." Güney stated that what is needed is the establishment of a cooperative mindset and that the opportunity at the 2012 conference should not be missed. She reiterated that Turkey supports the calls for the 2012 conference and encourages calls for a WMDFZ in the ME. Sidhu added that despite Israeli reservations, a WMDFZ may provide Israel with an opportunity to engage with Iran and additional states on chemical, biological, and other issues. The final panel of the conference considered the scenario of a failure in stopping Iran's nuclearization. In this regard, potential deterrence and extended deterrence regimes were discussed by Prof. Yair Evron (INSS/Tel Aviv University), Dr. Ariel (Eli) Levite (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, US), and Prof. Dr. Carlo Masala (Bundeswehr University, Munich, Germany). In many ways, the panel raised more questions than provided answers, illustrating the relatively limited academic discourse on this topic when compared to the extensive discourse on the possibility of stopping Iran's nuclearization. The speakers were skeptical of potential future stable deterrence regimes in the ME. Evron laid the theoretical and historical background for the debate. He reminded the participants that deterrence in general is fraught with uncertainty and mostly not proven in reality. Evron reviewed critically the school of thought (mostly referred to Waltz) that argues that introducing nuclear weapons into a region stabilizes it. Based on two major historical models (the superpowers during the Cold War and India Pakistan), Evron highlighted several basic elements that affect stability in nuclear relations: second strike capabilities, command and control systems, cognitive factors, favorable regional structures, and learning processes (how to react in nuclear relations). His conclusions were grim, in that these elements are mostly absent in the ME. Furthermore, Evron asked what would happen if a crisis emerges via Hezbollah or Hamas? How would the leaders react, knowing the other side has nuclear capabilities? He added that the Iranian regime itself is not sufficiently stable. How would Israel react if the Revolutionary Guards took control of Iran's nuclear weapons? Levite concurred with Evron on this point, and emphasized that mutual nuclear deterrence works well only when certain conditions are met. He added that revisionist countries (like 9

10 Iran) are not a side to the deterrence regime, and both sides accept their own vulnerability. Masala also presented the school of thought (Waltz) that argues that "more might be better" (more states with nuclear weapons), yet even if the theory has some validity, it is very difficult to persuade policymakers to accept this idea. While questioning stable deterrence within the ME, Evron sees a potential for stable extended deterrence. This was a main point of contention with Levite, who was highly skeptical of working extended deterrence, and Masala who was ambivalent on the topic. Evron estimated that the US could play a constructive role through formal alliances between it and countries in the region (a "nuclear umbrella") that will contain Iran. The US could be instrumental in avoiding escalation. Contrary to Evron, Levite found the model of potential extended deterrence to be fuzzy at best. Levite asked: Who extends deterrence to whom? Against whom? To which means is it extended (cyber warfare, missiles, nuclear, etc.)? How is it extended (formal/informal alliances? military assets? funds? facilities, etc.)? Moreover, Levite reminded the participants that in the past extended deterrence in the ME has not taken the form of a treaty, but has occurred rather by secret understandings, mobilizing forces (US Navy in the Gulf), forming military bases, etc. On the other hand, it was never extended by nuclear weapons. Lastly, though the US has several motivations for extending deterrence (oil prices, arms sales, pressure of domestic lobbies), it is unlikely to commit to such a policy, as it is obligated to promote disarmament, burdened with an economic crisis, and overstretched with various military interventions. Masala largely agreed with Levite, saying that the two functioning models of extended deterrence (the Asian and the European) will not work for the ME due to several major unknowns: how will Iran behave once it is nuclear? Will it be in a defensive or aggressive mode? How would extended deterrence be tailored when taking into account the division between Israel and the Arabs? Will the Arabs count on external foreign powers? How can it be ensured that Israel, and to a larger extend the Arab countries, rely and trust external assurances? Masala ruled out multilateral agreements, like US Russian guarantees to the entire region. It is unclear how Israel or the Arab states would respond to such agreements. He considers formal bilateral agreements to be problematic as well. For example, will Israel take as 10

11 credible a formal agreement that the US will defend Israel with nuclear weapons? Moreover, will it restrict the maneuvers of Israel in other matters? Lastly, there is no easy answer to the question of how to ensure that policymakers and public opinion will trust the agreement. Nevertheless, Masala concluded that bilateral signals/declarations by the US to the different parties of the ME might be the best first step towards functional extended deterrence in the ME. 11