Iranian Nuclear Deal and Its Aftermath

Transcription

1 Iranian Nuclear Deal and ıts Aftermath Page 1 Iranian Nuclear Deal and Its Aftermath Experts and politicians have started to debate the pros and cons of the Iranian nuclear deal that was signed on the 14th July This analysis aims to assess the arguments and predictions about its likely future. by Nurşin ATEŞOĞLU GÜNEY The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) will come into force ninety days after UN Security Council passes a resolution that approves the accord. The good news about the deal is that Iran s break-out capacity of 2-3 months is now extended to a year. Moreover, the Iranian delegation s demands for the lifting of sanctions that previously banned the sale of conventional weapons in general have been rejected. The six powers involved in negotiating this deal have decided to limit the duration of sanctions on the sale of ballistic missiles for eight more years, whereas for other conventional weapons it will be for another five years. One of the main achievements of this deal for the Iranian regime was of course the recognition of Tehran s legitimate right to nuclear enrichment 1 as already stated in Article 4 of the NPT Treaty- by the P5+1. However, this newly recognized stock of Iranian enriched uranium was restricted to a limit of not more than Previously, 6 major world powers demanded from Iran to have no nuclear uranium enrichement as one of the conditions to get a deal with Tehran regime. percent purity. It is a well-known fact that the level of enrichment required to make a nuclear weapon is 90 percent. Previously, the Tehran regime has enriched its uranium to 20 percent, and by accepting this new restriction Iran was in fact giving an important signal to the world community that since its nuclear program has been put under IAEA control its aim is for purely civilian purposes. Another positive restriction that has been imposed on Iran relates to the status of Iran s Fordow nuclear underground facility. According to the agreement, in the next fifteen years the Fordow nuclear site will be turned into a scientific research facility. Furthermore, a deal has also been reached about the number of gas centrifuges, which had been one of the most controversial issues. With this new agreement, Tehran is now is required to lower its current centrifuge capacity from to Consequently, the six powers by introducing these restrictions and a new verification system with the assistance of Wise Men Center for Strategic Studies (BILGESAM) Mecidiyeköy Yolu Caddesi, No:10, Şişli -İSTANBUL bilgesam@bilgesam.org Phone: Fax: All rights reserved. No portion of this publication may be reproduced, copied, transmitted without the written permission of BILGESAM.

2 Iranian Nuclear Deal and ıts Aftermath Page 2 the IAEA, aimed to cap Iran s stockpile of lowenriched uranium by reducing it by almost 98 percent. 2 What is more interesting is that Russia, during the negotiations has acted in concert within the negotiations of P5+1 group, in direct contrast to its behavior in other issues like that of Ukraine and Syria. The major reason behind this change in Russia s behavior is associated with basic power politics in that all five nuclear powers of the NPT Treaty and UN Security Council have a common interest in preserving the exclusivity of the nuclear club. Hence, it is certain that all of the five powers of the UN Security Council are determined the curb nuclear proliferation globally with a determination to upgrade the credibility of the NPT Treaty. That is why the five nuclear powers have shown convergence on Iran attaining nuclear weapon capability. 3 What is more striking is that the P5+1 countries by accomplishing this deal with Iran, have proved that it is possible to counter and solve major proliferation issues through diplomacy rather force and where both sides can benefit from a win-win situation. For Obama and his team, the Iranian nuclear agreement is regarded as a real diplomatic success as JCPOA proves that it is still possible to use diplomacy in order to bring a renegade country back into compliance with the nuclear nonproliferation regime. It is not then surprising to observe that both Ilan Goldenberg and Avner Golov described this moment in the US journal The National Interest as a seminal achievement in 2 This reduction process was aimed to be made either diluting uranium or by shipping it from the country. 3 It is a reality that, Saudi Arabia has alraedy demanded to acquire the similar rights that Iran recently attained with JCPOA. the history of nuclear nonproliferation negotiat ions. 4 American and Israeli politicians as well as experts on nuclear issues have based their concerns mostly on the technical weakness of the deal. Dennis Rose for example believes that the P5+1 has succeed in bringing crucial limitations to Iran s current nuclear program whilst on the other hand the treaty guarantees that Iran will remain at the nuclear threshold. In the light of Iran s previous record of non-compliance, some politicians and experts have ongoing concerns about the life span of the treaty set for years. They argue that this is a considerable period and no one can be sure about Iran s future behavior. This pessimistic view asserts that there is a likelihood that Iran may attempt to deceive the parties on the agreed clauses over the duration of the treaty. Those who feel uneasy about the deal have not avoided describing it as either a historical mistake or a bad agreement, basing their arguments on the fact that none of Iran s nuclear enrichment infrastructure is to be dismantled. Whilst it is correct that, Tehran will be free to acquire a nuclear programme of whatever size it chooses when the treaty conditions expire, it is not possible to predict Iran s future intentions. Moreover, according to the JCPOA, Iran is expected to abide by the conditions regarding the sale of conventional weapons and ballistic missiles restrictions for about 8 and 5 years respectively. Accordingly, any legitimate barrier to selling the S-300 air-defense system to Tehran will not limit the Russians, although Russia 4 Massimo Calabresi, Iran Rises: Tehran Trades Nuclear Standoff for Regional Clout, Time, 27 July 2015, pp

3 Iranian Nuclear Deal and ıts Aftermath Page 3 will not be permitted to sell any strike aircraft or tanks. Critics of the new JCPOA do not accept the argument that the international community will have breathing space for the next decade and a half because of the treaty s limitations on Iran. Those against the deal doubt whether Iran will be restricted from continuing its industrial scale enrichment capacity once the treaty expires. They are not convinced that Iran s likely expansion of its nuclear program at the end of the treaty would be more transparent than before since it would be scrutinized by a new IAEA verification mechanism. Those who criticize 5 the Iranian nuclear deal in general believe that the agreement threatens to destabilize the region and encourage nuclear proliferation at the same time. In contrast to the critics, there are also many proponents of this deal among the eminent figures of the IR community. The Obama administration legitimately considers the JCPOA as a success in diplomatic negotiations and promotes the deal to be a win-win result. Proponents of the deal in general have welcomed the deal cautiously, accepting that it is not risk free. Most of the supports seem comfortable on the basis of United States supremacy in the field of nuclear deterrence. They are convinced that if Iran is found either hedging or cheating on the terms of the Treaty, it will not be difficult for the US to destroy Tehran s nuclear infrastructure. Moreover, according to the CIA, Iran abandoned any plans to build a nuclear weapon after witnessing the US intervention in Iraq in Iran s fear that 5 Republicans and even some Democrats in the US Congress and of course Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and some the leading figures from Saudi Arabia stand very much against the Iranian deal. The Iranian Accord: Making the World a Bit Safer, The Economist, 18 July 2015, pp it would become the next US target of American intervention which was the game changer stopped Tehran s attempt to develop nuclear capability. 6 Supporters of the deal have rejected the argument that the deal will lead to nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. Gawdat Bahgat has recently explained why Egypt, Turkey and Saudi Arabia, who might be first ones to react to Iran s nuclear program and retaliate by attaining nuclear capability will not be interested in a nuclear in response. Bahgat argues that Egypt is already pre-occupied with serious political and economic problems and attaining nuclear capability is not a priority nor is it seen to be in its national interest. Likewise, Bahgat believes that there is no need for Turkey to develop nuclear capability since she is both a NATO country and therefore under the cover of the Alliance s security umbrella. He also asserts that Saudi Arabia is unlikely to become a proliferant country for two reasons. First because it is highly unlikely that the Saudis will buy nuclear bombs from Pakistan and secondly despite to its financial resources, Riyadh still lacks both the human and technical resources needed to develop nuclear capability. 7 Other commentators who share similar views consider it unlikely that the Kingdom will follow the Iranian path into a state of non-compliance with the NPT conditions or that Riyadh will dare to become a pariah just in order to develop nuclear weapons capability. 8 6 Joe Klain, Why Iran Deal is a Risk Worth Taking, Time, 27 July 2015, p Gawdat Bahgat, Iran s Nuclear Deal: Implications of the Joint Comphrensive Plan of Action, International Relations and Security Network ( ISN), Zurich, 27 July 2015, Detail/?lng=en&id=192562, last visited on 29 July Ibid. See: also, Making the World a Bit Safer..., ibid.

4 Iranian Nuclear Deal and ıts Aftermath Page 4 On the other hand, proponents of the JCPOA, in the face of Israel s prime minister Netanyahu s criticisms, and being aware of Israel s current military weight, which is by no means a match or deterrent to any nascent nuclear capability in Tehran, have continued to assert that the deal is to the advantage of everyone. Proponents believe that it is better to have this deal rather than not given that Iran currently keeps a nuclear break-out capacity of 2-3 months. Besides, there is great expectation among the advocates of the deal that Tehran following the lifting of the sanctions is likely to behave in-line with other countries in the international system, especially those who are not only integrated into global and regional systems, but are also more inclined to show/have more interest in promoting political stability and economic prosperity than engage in conflictual behavior. 9 The international community is now in anticipation of re-engaging Iran on the eve of the signature of JCPOA. So, the jury is out on whether Iran will meet expectations in this regard. Certainly, in the aftermath of the sanctions relief, there will be considerable economic opportunities which can motivate Iran to re-engage with both the regional and global economic order. At the end of re-engagement under the JCPOA, the international community is hoping that creation of pockets of win-win situations in the Middle East can be realized and where conditions of relative stability can overtake the current volatile conditions in the region. However, until both Tehran and its neighbors can develop the political will and drive to act in a cooperative manner, rather 9 Bahgat, Iran s Nuclear Deal, ibid, See: also, Etel Solingen, Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in Asia & Middle East, Princeton University Press, 2007,pp.4-5 than in a balance of power mind set, the likelihood a positive outcome in the Middle East would be beyond anyone s reach. Conclusion Following the Iranian nuclear deal, Western and Middle Eastern experts seem to be divided on whether the agreement to cap Iran s nuclear program is opening new opportunities to potentially curb nuclear proliferation in the Middle East as well as simultaneously creating conditions of stability. Today, the international communities current worry is the question of what will happen when the Iranian nuclear deal expires after years. Views are therefore mixed as a result. For instance, according to Bahgat, if Iran implements [and abide with the conditions of] the nuclear deal then Tehran s regime will not only be reintegrated into the global system but it will also fray the long-standing partnerships between the moderate Arab states and the Western powers. 10 Those who have given support for the nuclear deal in general believe that the world could be a safer place than it is today at least till the expiration date of agreement. US in attempting to allay the worries of its partners and allies in the Middle East in the face any deception by Iran regarding its nuclear program is now trying to re-assure both Israel and the GCC countries. Under present circumstances, during the life span of the Iranian nuclear agreement, American nuclear extended deterrence is likely to stand as the key mechanism against a breakout scenario. Hence, it is no surprise that 10 Bahgat, Iran s Nuclear Deal, ibid.

5 Iranian Nuclear Deal and ıts Aftermath Page 5 America s close partners in the Gulf, in the face of Iran s nuclear threshold status are insisting that US extended deterrence be up-graded in order to match Tehran s newly gained status after the JCPOA. There is always a possibility that Iran may choose to hedge its promise of putting a cap on its nuclear program either during the period or even after the expiration date. Only time will show whether Tehran continues to integrate into the existing global economic and political order or if she will reject these benefits and instead incline back towards its previous hedging strategy. Although the international community cannot yet forecast the future behavior of Tehran, there has been some diplomatic success in the form of the Iranian nuclear deal. The real test for the Iranian regime will be at the end of the treaty s expiration date. Until then, the international community, by extending Tehran s breakout capacity through this deal including newly introduced verification measures has bought time and deferred the issue of what to do about the possibility of living with Iran s brinkmanship. Since diplomatic negotiations in Vienna gave way to the signature of JCPOA, option to use force has potentially been deferred at least for the next years.

6 Iranian Nuclear Deal and ıts Aftermath Page 6 About BILGESAM Established in 2008, the Wise Men Center for Strategic Studies (BILGESAM) is one of the leading think tanks in Turkey. As a non-profit, non-partisan organization BILGESAM operates under the guidance of a group of well-respected academics from different disciplines, retired military generals and diplomats; and aims to contribute regional and global peace and prosperity. Closely following the domestic and international developments, BILGESAM conducts research on Turkey s domestic problems, foreign policy and security strategies, and the developments in the neighbouring regions to provide the Turkish decision-makers with practical policy recommendations and policy options. About Author Nurşin Ateşoğlu Güney is professor of international relations and head of international relations department at Yildiz Technical University in Istanbul. Prof. Güney is security and nuclear energy fellow at the Wise Men Center for Strategic Studies (BILGESAM). She has extensively published on Middle East, security studies, American foreign and security policies, EU, NATO and arms control and disarmament issues. Some of her latest publications include; Turkish Nuclear Security after Iranian Nuclearization, Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 33/3, December 2012 and The current Stalamate on the Iranian Nuclear Crisis: Is there a way out of this Impasse?, Ortadoğu Analiz Dergisi, Orsam, Mart 2013, Vol.5, No. 51, pp