Without Strings: Chinese Foreign Aid and Regime Stability in Energy Exporting Countries
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1 Without Strings: and Regime Stability in Energy Exporting Countries Huan-Kai Tseng and Ryan Krog Department of Political Science George Washington University November 11, 2015
2 Outline Question Introduction China s Foreign Aid and Government-Sponsored Investment Activities The determinant(s) of China s FAGIA and political regimes in Table of contents 1 Question 2 Introduction Received Wisdom: The political effects of foreign aid Puzzles 3 China s Foreign Aid and Government-Sponsored Investment Activities China: A rising aid donor China s FAGIA Patterns Implications 4 The determinant(s) of China s FAGIA and political regimes in Africa China s FAGIA and its political effect 5 Theory Argument Hypotheses Conceptualization 6 Statistical Analysis SUR ATET and Endogenous Treatment Effects Model 7 Conclusion
3 Outline Question Introduction China s Foreign Aid and Government-Sponsored Investment Activities The determinant(s) of China s FAGIA and political regimes in Research question Does China s foreign aid reduce the democracy-promotion effect of Western aid in recipient countries?
4 Outline Question Introduction China s Foreign Aid and Government-Sponsored Investment ReceivedActivities Wisdom: The political determinant(s) effects of foreign China said FAGIA Puzzles and political regimes in Does aid promote democracy?
5 Outline Question Introduction China s Foreign Aid and Government-Sponsored Investment ReceivedActivities Wisdom: The political determinant(s) effects of foreign China said FAGIA Puzzles and political regimes in Paradigm shift: from alliance politics to democracy-promotion With the disappearance of Soviet influence, Western donors began to attach political conditionality to aid allocation. USAID, U.K., and France: Political freedom and democratic reforms as important aid allocation criteria.
6 Outline Question Introduction China s Foreign Aid and Government-Sponsored Investment ReceivedActivities Wisdom: The political determinant(s) effects of foreign China said FAGIA Puzzles and political regimes in Paradigm shift: from alliance politics to democracy-promotion With the disappearance of Soviet influence, Western donors began to attach political conditionality to aid allocation. USAID, U.K., and France: Political freedom and democratic reforms as important aid allocation criteria. World Bank (2001) and UN Millennium Development Goals (2000): Good governance and development.
7 Outline Question Introduction China s Foreign Aid and Government-Sponsored Investment ReceivedActivities Wisdom: The political determinant(s) effects of foreign China said FAGIA Puzzles and political regimes in Paradigm shift: from alliance politics to democracy-promotion With the disappearance of Soviet influence, Western donors began to attach political conditionality to aid allocation. USAID, U.K., and France: Political freedom and democratic reforms as important aid allocation criteria. World Bank (2001) and UN Millennium Development Goals (2000): Good governance and development. OECD Accra Agenda for Action
8 Outline Question Introduction China s Foreign Aid and Government-Sponsored Investment ReceivedActivities Wisdom: The political determinant(s) effects of foreign China said FAGIA Puzzles and political regimes in Paradigm shift: from alliance politics to democracy-promotion With the disappearance of Soviet influence, Western donors began to attach political conditionality to aid allocation. USAID, U.K., and France: Political freedom and democratic reforms as important aid allocation criteria. World Bank (2001) and UN Millennium Development Goals (2000): Good governance and development. OECD Accra Agenda for Action Western aid becomes more effective at inducing democratic reforms in Sub-Saharan African states in the post-cold War period (Dunning 2004).
9 Outline Question Introduction China s Foreign Aid and Government-Sponsored Investment ReceivedActivities Wisdom: The political determinant(s) effects of foreign China said FAGIA Puzzles and political regimes in The State of the Literature Empirical evidences can be found that both support or refute the alleged positive political conditionality effect of Western aid. Western aid tends to promote democratic reforms in recipient countries: Crawford (2001), Goldsmith (2001), Dunning (2004), Finkel and Seligson (2007), Hyde and Boulding (2089), Lebovic and Voeten (2009).
10 Outline Question Introduction China s Foreign Aid and Government-Sponsored Investment ReceivedActivities Wisdom: The political determinant(s) effects of foreign China said FAGIA Puzzles and political regimes in The State of the Literature Empirical evidences can be found that both support or refute the alleged positive political conditionality effect of Western aid. Western aid tends to promote democratic reforms in recipient countries: Crawford (2001), Goldsmith (2001), Dunning (2004), Finkel and Seligson (2007), Hyde and Boulding (2089), Lebovic and Voeten (2009). Western aid has no or negative effect on recipients democratic development: Van de Walle (2001), Bräutigam and Knack (2004), BDM and Smith (2007), Rajan and Subramanian (2007), Djankov (2008), Morrison (2007, 2009), Moyo (2009), Scott and Steele (2011).
11 Outline Question Introduction China s Foreign Aid and Government-Sponsored Investment ReceivedActivities Wisdom: The political determinant(s) effects of foreign China said FAGIA Puzzles and political regimes in The State of the Literature Empirical evidences can be found that both support or refute the alleged positive political conditionality effect of Western aid. Western aid tends to promote democratic reforms in recipient countries: Crawford (2001), Goldsmith (2001), Dunning (2004), Finkel and Seligson (2007), Hyde and Boulding (2089), Lebovic and Voeten (2009). Western aid has no or negative effect on recipients democratic development: Van de Walle (2001), Bräutigam and Knack (2004), BDM and Smith (2007), Rajan and Subramanian (2007), Djankov (2008), Morrison (2007, 2009), Moyo (2009), Scott and Steele (2011). Conditional effect (Good governance): Williams (1996), Alesina and Dollar (2000), Armah and Nelson (2008), Djankov (2008). Conditional effect (Donor attributes): Neumayer (2003), Bermeo (2011).
12 Outline Question Introduction China s Foreign Aid and Government-Sponsored Investment ReceivedActivities Wisdom: The political determinant(s) effects of foreign China said FAGIA Puzzles and political regimes in More recent findings Suggest the endogeneity between donors and recipients regime types and the implications for regime change. Democratic donors allocate more aid to democratic recipients (Nielson and Nielson 2010).
13 Outline Question Introduction China s Foreign Aid and Government-Sponsored Investment ReceivedActivities Wisdom: The political determinant(s) effects of foreign China said FAGIA Puzzles and political regimes in More recent findings Suggest the endogeneity between donors and recipients regime types and the implications for regime change. Democratic donors allocate more aid to democratic recipients (Nielson and Nielson 2010). Aid tends to amplify the democratic (authoritarian) tendency of democratic (authoritarian) recipients (Dutta et al. 2011)
14 Outline Question Introduction China s Foreign Aid and Government-Sponsored Investment ReceivedActivities Wisdom: The political determinant(s) effects of foreign China said FAGIA Puzzles and political regimes in Will the presence of other rising donors affect the political conditionity effect of Western aid and, subsequently, democratic development in recipient countries?
15 Outline Question Introduction China s Foreign Aid and Government-Sponsored Investment ReceivedActivities Wisdom: The political determinant(s) effects of foreign China said FAGIA Puzzles and political regimes in Will the presence of other rising donors affect the political conditionity effect of Western aid and, subsequently, democratic development in recipient countries? Any endogenous, (recipient) country-level attributes at work in influencing this relationship?
16 Outline Question Introduction China s Foreign Aid and Government-Sponsored Investment China: AActivities rising aid donor The determinant(s) China s FAGIAofPatterns China s FAGIA Implications and political regimes in China as a rising aid donor In keeping with its rising political and economic prowess, China has emerged as a rising international aid donor. China s FAGIA spanned across 161 countries and 30 int l organizations, totalling RMB billion. The geographical distribution shows a comparatively even coverage.
17 Outline Question Introduction China s Foreign Aid and Government-Sponsored Investment China: AActivities rising aid donor The determinant(s) China s FAGIAofPatterns China s FAGIA Implications and political regimes in Scope and Trends: Comparatively even coverage revisited According to Kobayashi (2008), Lum et al. (2009), Wolf et al. (2013), and AidData project: Geographic distribution: Africa (over 50%)
18 Outline Question Introduction China s Foreign Aid and Government-Sponsored Investment China: AActivities rising aid donor The determinant(s) China s FAGIAofPatterns China s FAGIA Implications and political regimes in Scope and Trends: Comparatively even coverage revisited According to Kobayashi (2008), Lum et al. (2009), Wolf et al. (2013), and AidData project: Geographic distribution: Africa (over 50%) > Latin America
19 Outline Question Introduction China s Foreign Aid and Government-Sponsored Investment China: AActivities rising aid donor The determinant(s) China s FAGIAofPatterns China s FAGIA Implications and political regimes in Scope and Trends: Comparatively even coverage revisited According to Kobayashi (2008), Lum et al. (2009), Wolf et al. (2013), and AidData project: Geographic distribution: Africa (over 50%) > Latin America > Central Asia (small but growing fast).
20 Outline Question Introduction China s Foreign Aid and Government-Sponsored Investment China: AActivities rising aid donor The determinant(s) China s FAGIAofPatterns China s FAGIA Implications and political regimes in Scope and Trends: Comparatively even coverage revisited According to Kobayashi (2008), Lum et al. (2009), Wolf et al. (2013), and AidData project: Geographic distribution: Africa (over 50%) > Latin America > Central Asia (small but growing fast). Sectors: Energy resources and
21 Outline Question Introduction China s Foreign Aid and Government-Sponsored Investment China: AActivities rising aid donor The determinant(s) China s FAGIAofPatterns China s FAGIA Implications and political regimes in Scope and Trends: Comparatively even coverage revisited According to Kobayashi (2008), Lum et al. (2009), Wolf et al. (2013), and AidData project: Geographic distribution: Africa (over 50%) > Latin America > Central Asia (small but growing fast). Sectors: Energy resources and infrastructure development.
22 Outline Question Introduction China s Foreign Aid and Government-Sponsored Investment China: AActivities rising aid donor The determinant(s) China s FAGIAofPatterns China s FAGIA Implications and political regimes in Scope and Trends: Comparatively even coverage revisited According to Kobayashi (2008), Lum et al. (2009), Wolf et al. (2013), and AidData project: Geographic distribution: Africa (over 50%) > Latin America > Central Asia (small but growing fast). Sectors: Energy resources and infrastructure development. Allocation decision-making: MOFCOM
23 Outline Question Introduction China s Foreign Aid and Government-Sponsored Investment China: AActivities rising aid donor The determinant(s) China s FAGIAofPatterns China s FAGIA Implications and political regimes in Scope and Trends: Comparatively even coverage revisited According to Kobayashi (2008), Lum et al. (2009), Wolf et al. (2013), and AidData project: Geographic distribution: Africa (over 50%) > Latin America > Central Asia (small but growing fast). Sectors: Energy resources and infrastructure development. Allocation decision-making: MOFCOM EXIM Bank
24 Outline Question Introduction China s Foreign Aid and Government-Sponsored Investment China: AActivities rising aid donor The determinant(s) China s FAGIAofPatterns China s FAGIA Implications and political regimes in Scope and Trends: Comparatively even coverage revisited According to Kobayashi (2008), Lum et al. (2009), Wolf et al. (2013), and AidData project: Geographic distribution: Africa (over 50%) > Latin America > Central Asia (small but growing fast). Sectors: Energy resources and infrastructure development. Allocation decision-making: MOFCOM EXIM Bank Chinese firms
25 Outline Question Introduction China s Foreign Aid and Government-Sponsored Investment China: AActivities rising aid donor The determinant(s) China s FAGIAofPatterns China s FAGIA Implications and political regimes in Scope and Trends: Comparatively even coverage revisited According to Kobayashi (2008), Lum et al. (2009), Wolf et al. (2013), and AidData project: Geographic distribution: Africa (over 50%) > Latin America > Central Asia (small but growing fast). Sectors: Energy resources and infrastructure development. Allocation decision-making: MOFCOM EXIM Bank Chinese firms recipient governments
26 Outline Question Introduction China s Foreign Aid and Government-Sponsored Investment China: AActivities rising aid donor The determinant(s) China s FAGIAofPatterns China s FAGIA Implications and political regimes in Implications Trade and overseas investment are the primary driving forces behind China s recent FAGIA: commercial incentive dominates political objective.
27 Outline Question Introduction China s Foreign Aid and Government-Sponsored Investment China: AActivities rising aid donor The determinant(s) China s FAGIAofPatterns China s FAGIA Implications and political regimes in Implications Trade and overseas investment are the primary driving forces behind China s recent FAGIA: commercial incentive dominates political objective. China s FAGIA are concentrated in recipients energy and infrastructure sectors.
28 Outline Question Introduction China s Foreign Aid and Government-Sponsored Investment China: AActivities rising aid donor The determinant(s) China s FAGIAofPatterns China s FAGIA Implications and political regimes in Implications Trade and overseas investment are the primary driving forces behind China s recent FAGIA: commercial incentive dominates political objective. China s FAGIA are concentrated in recipients energy and infrastructure sectors. Most significantly in Africa.
29 Outline Question Introduction China s Foreign Aid and Government-Sponsored Investment China s FAGIA Activities and its Thepolitical determinant(s) effect of China s FAGIA and political regimes in Is China using its aid to promote authoritarianism? China as an authoritarian financier
30 Outline Question Introduction China s Foreign Aid and Government-Sponsored Investment China s FAGIA Activities and its Thepolitical determinant(s) effect of China s FAGIA and political regimes in Is China using its aid to promote authoritarianism? China as an authoritarian financier China is using aid to promote its own version of authoritarianism in neighboring countries (Diamond, 2008; Koesel and Bunce, 2013).
31 Outline Question Introduction China s Foreign Aid and Government-Sponsored Investment China s FAGIA Activities and its Thepolitical determinant(s) effect of China s FAGIA and political regimes in Is China using its aid to promote authoritarianism? China as an authoritarian financier China is using aid to promote its own version of authoritarianism in neighboring countries (Diamond, 2008; Koesel and Bunce, 2013). Rogue aid (Naím, 2007).
32 Outline Question Introduction China s Foreign Aid and Government-Sponsored Investment China s FAGIA Activities and its Thepolitical determinant(s) effect of China s FAGIA and political regimes in Is China using its aid to promote authoritarianism? China as an authoritarian financier China is using aid to promote its own version of authoritarianism in neighboring countries (Diamond, 2008; Koesel and Bunce, 2013). Rogue aid (Naím, 2007). No significant effect China s aid allocation is independent of recipients regime types (Dreher and Fuchs, 2011).
33 Outline Question Introduction China s Foreign Aid and Government-Sponsored Investment China s FAGIA Activities and its Thepolitical determinant(s) effect of China s FAGIA and political regimes in Is China using its aid to promote authoritarianism? China as an authoritarian financier China is using aid to promote its own version of authoritarianism in neighboring countries (Diamond, 2008; Koesel and Bunce, 2013). Rogue aid (Naím, 2007). No significant effect China s aid allocation is independent of recipients regime types (Dreher and Fuchs, 2011). Actually helps to promote development (Davies et al., 2008; Foster et al., 2009; Bräutigam).
34 Outline Question Introduction China s Foreign Aid and Government-Sponsored Investment ArgumentActivities Hypotheses The determinant(s) Conceptualization of China s FAGIA and political regimes in Argument Previous analysts failed to consider the competing relationship between Western and Chinese aid and their arguments have not been rigorously tested.
35 Outline Question Introduction China s Foreign Aid and Government-Sponsored Investment ArgumentActivities Hypotheses The determinant(s) Conceptualization of China s FAGIA and political regimes in Argument Previous analysts failed to consider the competing relationship between Western and Chinese aid and their arguments have not been rigorously tested. We argue that China s FAGIA are driven primarily by its desire for energy resources acquisition.
36 Outline Question Introduction China s Foreign Aid and Government-Sponsored Investment ArgumentActivities Hypotheses The determinant(s) Conceptualization of China s FAGIA and political regimes in Argument Previous analysts failed to consider the competing relationship between Western and Chinese aid and their arguments have not been rigorously tested. We argue that China s FAGIA are driven primarily by its desire for energy resources acquisition. This aid allocation pattern may be more observable in recipients whose economies depend heavily on energy resources export.
37 Outline Question Introduction China s Foreign Aid and Government-Sponsored Investment ArgumentActivities Hypotheses The determinant(s) Conceptualization of China s FAGIA and political regimes in Hypotheses
38 Outline Question Introduction China s Foreign Aid and Government-Sponsored Investment ArgumentActivities Hypotheses The determinant(s) Conceptualization of China s FAGIA and political regimes in Hypotheses H1 Unlike Western aid (which is often often attached to some political and economic reform agenda), China s aid allocation is associated with recipients energy resource wealth but does not come with political conditionality.
39 Outline Question Introduction China s Foreign Aid and Government-Sponsored Investment ArgumentActivities Hypotheses The determinant(s) Conceptualization of China s FAGIA and political regimes in Hypotheses H1 Unlike Western aid (which is often often attached to some political and economic reform agenda), China s aid allocation is associated with recipients energy resource wealth but does not come with political conditionality. H2a By reducing recipients financial dependence on Western aid, China s aid attenuates the positive political conditionality effect of Western aid on recipients democracy.
40 Outline Question Introduction China s Foreign Aid and Government-Sponsored Investment ArgumentActivities Hypotheses The determinant(s) Conceptualization of China s FAGIA and political regimes in Hypotheses H1 Unlike Western aid (which is often often attached to some political and economic reform agenda), China s aid allocation is associated with recipients energy resource wealth but does not come with political conditionality. H2a By reducing recipients financial dependence on Western aid, China s aid attenuates the positive political conditionality effect of Western aid on recipients democracy. H2b This effect is more likely to be identified in more resource-dependent recipient countries.
41 Outline Question Introduction China s Foreign Aid and Government-Sponsored Investment ArgumentActivities Hypotheses The determinant(s) Conceptualization of China s FAGIA and political regimes in Conceptualization of causal paths. Recipient s democracy = Western aid + Energy Resources + X Energy Resources = China s aid β 1 : Political conditionality effect (+) β 2 : resource curse ( ) π: Determinant of China s aid flows (+) t: Amplification effect (of π) on β 2
42 Outline Question Introduction China s Foreign Aid and Government-Sponsored Investment ArgumentActivities Hypotheses The determinant(s) Conceptualization of China s FAGIA and political regimes in Conceptualization of causal paths. β 1 Recipient s democracy = Western aid + Energy Resources + X Energy Resources = China s aid β 1 : Political conditionality effect (+) β 2 : resource curse ( ) π: Determinant of China s aid flows (+) t: Amplification effect (of π) on β 2
43 Outline Question Introduction China s Foreign Aid and Government-Sponsored Investment ArgumentActivities Hypotheses The determinant(s) Conceptualization of China s FAGIA and political regimes in Conceptualization of causal paths. β 2 β 1 Recipient s democracy = Western aid + Energy Resources + X Energy Resources = China s aid β 1 : Political conditionality effect (+) β 2 : resource curse ( ) π: Determinant of China s aid flows (+) t: Amplification effect (of π) on β 2
44 Outline Question Introduction China s Foreign Aid and Government-Sponsored Investment ArgumentActivities Hypotheses The determinant(s) Conceptualization of China s FAGIA and political regimes in Conceptualization of causal paths. β 2 β 1 Recipient s democracy = Western aid + Energy Resources + X Energy Resources = China s aid π β 1 : Political conditionality effect (+) β 2 : resource curse ( ) π: Determinant of China s aid flows (+) t: Amplification effect (of π) on β 2
45 Outline Question Introduction China s Foreign Aid and Government-Sponsored Investment ArgumentActivities Hypotheses The determinant(s) Conceptualization of China s FAGIA and political regimes in Conceptualization of causal paths. β 2 β 1 Recipient s democracy = Western aid + Energy Resources + X t Energy Resources = China s aid π β 1 : Political conditionality effect (+)
46 Outline Question Introduction China s Foreign Aid and Government-Sponsored Investment ArgumentActivities Hypotheses The determinant(s) Conceptualization of China s FAGIA and political regimes in Conceptualization of causal paths. β 2 β 1 Recipient s democracy = Western aid + Energy Resources + X t Energy Resources = China s aid π β 1 : Political conditionality effect (+) β 2 : resource curse ( )
47 Outline Question Introduction China s Foreign Aid and Government-Sponsored Investment ArgumentActivities Hypotheses The determinant(s) Conceptualization of China s FAGIA and political regimes in Conceptualization of causal paths. β 2 β 1 Recipient s democracy = Western aid + Energy Resources + X t Energy Resources = China s aid π β 1 : Political conditionality effect (+) β 2 : resource curse ( ) π: Determinant of China s aid flows (+)
48 Outline Question Introduction China s Foreign Aid and Government-Sponsored Investment ArgumentActivities Hypotheses The determinant(s) Conceptualization of China s FAGIA and political regimes in Conceptualization of causal paths. β 2 β 1 Recipient s democracy = Western aid + Energy Resources + X t Energy Resources = China s aid π β 1 : Political conditionality effect (+) β 2 : resource curse ( ) π: Determinant of China s aid flows (+) t: Amplification effect (of π) on β 2
49 Outline Question Introduction China s Foreign Aid and Government-Sponsored Investment SUR ATET Activities and Endogenous The determinant(s) Treatment of China s Effects Model FAGIA and political regimes in Data: AidData, Polity IV, SWIID, Oil-Gas Rent Data preparation Methods: SUR, ATET, Endogenous Treatment Effects Model
50 Outline Question Introduction China s Foreign Aid and Government-Sponsored Investment SUR ATET Activities and Endogenous The determinant(s) Treatment of China s Effects Model FAGIA and political regimes in SUR: Identifying the determinants of Western and Chinas aid Table 1 : SUR results Western aid China s aid Variable Coef. (Std. Err.) Coef. (Std. Err.) Polity 3.17*** (0.731) (6.55) GDP (0.002) (0.014) Resource (1.16) 4.29*** (1.04) dependence Subsample (North & Sub-Saharan Africa) Polity (3.48) (1.81) GDP *** (0.006) (0.003) Resource (4.24) 5.75** (2.21) dependence
51 Outline Question Introduction China s Foreign Aid and Government-Sponsored Investment SUR ATET Activities and Endogenous The determinant(s) Treatment of China s Effects Model FAGIA and political regimes in Putting the causal paths of the theoretical model into perspective.
52 Outline Question Introduction China s Foreign Aid and Government-Sponsored Investment SUR ATET Activities and Endogenous The determinant(s) Treatment of China s Effects Model FAGIA and political regimes in Probing the political effect of China s aid Table 2 : Results. DV: Polity Score ATET Endogenous π: China s aid Variable Coef. (Std. Err.) Coef. (Std. Err.) Western aid 0.483** (0.1751) 0.810*** (2.302) Oil Gas Exp *** (0.531) *** (0.571) Inequality *** (0.127) (0.030) ELF *** (0.084) 0.467*** (0.098) GDP (0.532) (0.532) t(resource *** (0.099) ** (0.3425) dependence = 1) China s aid 0.771*** (0.193)
53 Outline Question Introduction China s Foreign Aid and Government-Sponsored Investment SUR ATET Activities and Endogenous The determinant(s) Treatment of China s Effects Model FAGIA and political regimes in The real political effect of China s aid Figure 1 : Coefficient Plot Outcome model Western aid Oil Gas Exp Inequality ELF GDP Treatment model Resource dependence π China's aid Coefficient ATET Endogenous effects
54 Outline Question Introduction China s Foreign Aid and Government-Sponsored Investment SUR ATET Activities and Endogenous The determinant(s) Treatment of China s Effects Model FAGIA and political regimes in When and where do China s aid hinder recipients democracy The sign of ρ (= 0.444) indicates the effect of the endogenous variable (China s aid) on recipients democracy tends to occur when China s aid increases resource-dependence of recipient countries.
55 Outline Question Introduction China s Foreign Aid and Government-Sponsored Investment Activities The determinant(s) of China s FAGIA and political regimes in Thank You Contributions Direction for future research Questions/Comments
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