Legalization and Leverage: How Foreign Aid Dependence Conditions the Effect of Human Rights Commitments

Transcription

1 Legalization and Leverage: How Foreign Aid Dependence Conditions the Effect of Human Rights Commitments Daniela Donno Assistant Professor Dept. of Political Science University of Pittsburgh

2 Research Question Under what conditions can external actors influence states human rights practices? Tools of influence: Legalization Human rights commitments Economic leverage Foreign aid dependence External relations of the European Union

3 Literature Human rights commitments Agreement design matters (c.f., Hafner-Burton 2005) But enforcement is rare Effect depends on domestic politics (c.f., Simmons 2009; Hathaway 2005) Variation in vulnerability to intl. pressure Foreign aid Greater political conditionality since end of Cold War (c.f., Dunning 2004; Lai 2003; Bearce and Tirone 2010) But: - Which types of human rights violations are punished? - How do international actors signal intent to exercise conditionality?

4 Argument Account for both: (1) Donor s incentives to enforce (2) Recipient s vulnerability Human rights commitments function as implicit threats Signal the possibility of enforcement by withholding economic benefits Supply of enforcement: Low Greater in responses to violations of political rights Cost of enforcement higher in aid-dependent states Hypothesis: human rights commitments are associated with improved human rights practices as the country s aid dependence increases

5 EU External Relations Economic cooperation agreements Association, Partnership, Cooperation Framework for promoting integration and trade; distributing aid Human rights clauses By 2005, more than 80% of non-oecd countries E.g., Cotonou Agreement, Article 9 (essential elements): Respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law, which underpin the ACP-EU partnership, shall underpin the domestic and international policies of the Parties and constitute the essential elements of this Agreement. Article 96 (suspension): Failure to fulfill obligations can lead to consultations, followed by appropriate measures

6 EU Human Rights Enforcement in the African-Caribbean-Pacific Coups and elections provide focal points for evaluation Lomé/Cotonou Article 96 consultations 14 cases: coup or unconstitutional seizure of power 7 cases: flawed elections, violations of democratic norms Concerns about other rights may be bundled in E.g., Zimbabwe (2001-ongoing) Primary motivation: preparation for upcoming elections Dialogue also covered: political violence, illegal land occupation E.g., Liberia ( ) Lack of opposition activity in run-up to 2003 elections Human rights violations by security forces

7 EU Leverage EC Aid as Percent of GDP, by Region Africa Central/East Eur. Former Soviet Asia Lat. Am. MENA EC Aid U.S. Aid

8 Data Unit of analysis: country-year 112 countries D.V.s 1-year change in Freedom House political rights index (1-7) Quality of electoral and political competition 1-year change in CIRI physical integrity rights index (1-8) Torture, disappearance, killings, political imprisonment Independent variables EU human rights clause EU aid as percent of GDP (2-year average) Controls Agreement design, Aid dependence, Global HR treaties, EU membership candidate, GDP per capita, Population, Trade dependence, Civil war, International war, Region dummies

9 Determinants of Changes in Political Rights and Physical Integrity Rights Linear regression with panel-corrected standard errors, lagged dependent variable 1 2 Political Rights CIRI Lagged DV 0.87** -0.42** (0.00) (0.00) Human Rights Clause (0.84) (0.77) EC Aid Percent GDP (0.67) (0.42) Suspension Clause (0.05) (0.60) ODA Percent GDP (0.09) (0.08) HR Cooperation Clause (0.66) (0.72) ICCPR * (0.78) (0.03) CAT (0.34) (0.74) EU Membership Incentive (0.32) (0.10) GDP pc (log) ** (0.09) (0.00) Population (log) ** (0.48) (0.00) Trade Percent GDP (0.99) (0.50) Civil War ** (0.20) (0.00) Fatal MID Count (0.93) (0.29) Region dummies (not reported) Constant ** (0.37) (0.00) Observations Number of ccode p values in parentheses + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% n.s. n.s. n.s./ -

10 0 Change in CIRI Index Change in Political Rights Index Dependent Variable: FH Political Rights The Conditional Effect of Human Rights Commitments Above significance threshold: Albania, Armenia, Bosnia, Burkina Faso, Burundi, CAR, DRC, East Timor, Ethiopia, Guinea- Bissau, Guyana, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Montenegro, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, Serbia, Sierra Leone, EC Aid as % of GDP Marginal Effect of Human Rights Clause 95% Confidence Interval Dependent Variable: CIRI Physical Integrity Rights EC Aid as % of GDP Marginal Effect of Human Rights Clause 95% Confidence Interval

11 Conclusions Economic foundations of normative influence Human rights commitments as implicit threats Agreement design less important than material leverage When enforcement is rare, effect of aid on human rights is limited

12 -.5 0 Change in CIRI Index Change in Political Rights Index 0.5 Dependent Variable: FH Political Rights The Conditional Effect of Suspension Clauses? - At least 7 cases of electoral enforcement without invoking Article 96 - Primarily used for coups - Not necessary for enforcement EC Aid as % of GDP Marginal Effect of Suspension Clause 95% Confidence Interval Dependent Variable: CIRI Physical Integrity Rights EC Aid as % of GDP Marginal Effect of Suspension Clause 95% Confidence Interval

13 0 Percent of Countries Human Rights and Suspension Clauses Over Time Human Rights Clause Suspension Clause

14 5 As Percent of ODA EU Leverage EC Aid as Percent of Total ODA Year EC Aid U.S. Aid