United Services Automobile Ass'n v. Evelyn Goodman

Transcription

1 The following is a real-time transcript taken as closed captioning during the oral argument proceedings, and as such, may contain errors. This service is provided solely for the purpose of assisting those with disabilities and should be used for no other purpose. These are not legal documents, and may not be used as legal authority. This transcript is not an official document of the Florida Supreme Court. United Services Automobile Ass'n v. Evelyn Goodman MR. CHIEF JUSTICE GOOD MORNING AND WELCOME TO FRIDAY'S ORAL ARGUMENT CALENDAR AT THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT. THE, WE ARE ESPECIALLY PLEASED TO HAVE THE STUDENTS FROM PEMBROOK PINES CHARTER HIGH SCHOOL ON THEIR ANNUAL VISIT TO THE CAPITAL. I UNDERSTAND THAT YOU ARE UP HERE TO VISIT THE LEGISLATURE, AND WE ARE PLEASED TO HAVE YOU, ALSO, OVER HERE AT THE SUPREME COURT. MISSIEST CONTINUE LANE IS THEIR -- MISS CHRISTINE LANE IS THEIR TEACHER, WHO IS THEIR SPONSOR FOR THIS TRIP, SO WE WILL PROCEED THIS MORNING, WITH ORAL ARGUMENT IN THE CASE, CONSOLIDATEDSES WHICH ARE THE UNITED STATES, UNITED SERS AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION VERSUS GOOD. WHO IS GOING TO LEAD HERE? MR. ENGLAND? YES, YOUR HONOR. MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT. MY NAME IS ARTHUR ENGLAND. I AM HERE ON BEHAF OF STATE FARM AND THE LAW FIRM OF LEWIS AND ASSOCIATES. WITH ME IS MR. HATCHER, MS. O'CONNOR AND MS. GOODING'S. WE ALSO HAVE PETITIONER COUNSEL WHO ARE HERE WITH US. I NOID NOTIFIED YOU I AM GOING TO -- I NOTIFIED YOU THAT I AM GOING TO SPEAK, AND IF SOMETHING GOES WRONG, THEN HE WILL TAKE OVER, BUT OTHERWISE I WILL -- MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WHO IS GOING TO DECIDE THAT? I WILL IN THE FIRST INSTANCE. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE CHEE WE DO HAVE A MANDATORY EIGHT COUNT. I WILL RESERVE FIV MINUTES FOR REBUTTAL. YOUR HONORS, THIS INVOLVES THREE CASES IN MIAMI-DADE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT. BEFORE YOU GET TO YOUR ARGUMENT, WOULD YOU EXPLAIN TO US WHAT BROUGHT THIS SITUATION TO THE ATTENTION OF THE TRIAL COURT. DID SOMEONE FILE A MOTION INVOLVING THESE ATTORNEYS OR -- NO. YOUR HONOR, IT WAS HIS OWN REVELATION. HE SAYS THAT, IN THE FIRST HEARING OF THIS, AND THIS IS ON PAGE 3 OF THE JUNE 7 HEARING, I AM HERE ON MY CONCERN, HE SAID, WHETHER THE LOSSES OF TIMOTHY HARRINGTON WERE CREATED FOR THE PURPOSES OF DEFRAUDING THE COURT. IT SIMPLY CAME TO THAT, YOUR HONOR, THAT IT CAME TO HIS ATTENTION THAT THERE WAS A LAW OFCE WHH WAS STAFFED BY EMPLOYEES OF AN INSURANCE COMPANY THAT HAD THE NAME LAW OFFICES OF TIMOTHY HARRINGTON. HAD THIS PRACTICE GONE -- HOW LONG HAD THIS PRACTICE GONE ON? FROM THE BEGINNING OF TIME. NOT REALLY. IT HAD GONE ON A LONG TIME INDEED, AND JUDGE SIEGEL SAID ON THE RECORD, I WAS PRACTICING LAW AND I HAVE BEEN ON THE BENCH TEN YEARS, AND I NEVER EVEN KNEW THAT THERE WERE LAWYERS WHO WERE EMPLOYEES OF AN INSURANCE COMPANY WHO REPRESENTED POLICYHOLDERS, WHICH, OF COURSE, WAS FROM MY POINT OF VIEW VERY HELPFUL, BECAUSE OBVIOUSLY THERE WAS NO PROBLEM DURING ALL THAT PERIOD OF TIME THAT WOULD HAVE WARRANTED HIS ATTENTION. NO. THIS HAS BEEN GOING ON A LONG TIME, BUT I THINK THE SERIOUS PRACTICE IN FLORIDA, AND BY THE WAY IT IS

2 HAPPENING ALL OVER THE COUNTRY, THAT THIS OCCURS, AND WE CAN GET INTO THE REASONS WHY THESE OFFICES ARE SET UP, BUT IN FLORIDA, I GUESS ONE CAN TRACE THE REAL GROWTH IN THIS FROM 1998, WHEN THE BAR PROMULGATED OPINION 98-3, AND SAID ESSENTIALLY, THAT THE CONCERN THAT PEOPLE HAVE NEEDS A SAFE HARBOR IN FLORIDA. AND THAT IS, WHEN THERE IS DISCLOSURE OF TE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE EMPLOYEE LAWYER, THE LAW FIRM REPRESENTING A POLICYHOLDER, THAT THAT IS SUFFICIENT, SO JUDGE SIEGEL INITIATED THIS ENTIRELY ON HIS OWN. MR. ENGLAND, IT SEEMS -- I AM SORRY. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE JUSTICE LEWIS, GO AHEAD. IT SEEMS THAT THERE IS A TEN OR, A -- A TENOR, AN UNDERLYING CURRENT, ABS THE OTHERS, OF COURSE, OF SOME MISREPRESENTATION GOING ON IN A COURTROOM, AND RATHER THAN JUST COMING OUT OF THE THIN AIR, IT SEEMS THAT WAS A CONCERN. AM I MISTAKEN? THAT WAS THE TENOR OF THE ORDER? THERE WAS NO MISREPRESENTATION. AND IF YOU RECALL WHAT HAPPENED IN THAT CASE, HE ISSUED A SHOW-CAUSE ORDER WHEN THIS IDEA OF THE STAFF CAME TO HIS ATTENTION. HAD HE A HEARING ON IT. HE POSED HYPOTHETICALS OF HOW ARE INSURANCE EXPERTS GOING TO ANSWER QUESTIONS AND BE TRUTHFUL BUT THE FACT OF THE 3459 MATTER IN THAT CASE IS -- THE FACT OF THE MATTER IN THAT CASE IS LATER RECALLED IN THE ORDER OF JUNE 15 WHEN WHAT HAPPENED IN THAT ORDER IN THAT PARTICULAR CASE WAS, A QUESTION WAS ASKED. WE DON'T KNOW WHAT IT WAS. AN ANSWER WAS GIVEN. INSURANCE WAS MENTIONED, BECAUSE THE EXPERT APT APPARENTLY DISCLOSED THAT -- THE EXPERT APPARENTLY DISCLOSED THAT HE WAS HIRED BY AN INSURANCE COMPANY. THE JURY WAS INSTRUCTED TO DISREGARD THE ASPECT OF INSURANCE AND THERE WAS A VERDICT, SO THE FACTS, THE ONLY FACTS THAT WE HAVE ARE IS IT CAME UP AFTER HE INSTITUTED THIS PROCESS IN THAT PROCEEDING, BUT THERE IS NOTHING, YOU SAW, BY THE WAY, JUSTICE DAVIS, JUSTICE LEWIS, YOU SAID EXACTLY THE RIGHT THING. THAT WAS THE TENOR OF THE FIRST ORDER, AND THEN IN THE SUBSEQUENT ORDERS WHICH BROUGHT ALL OF THE REST OF US IN, HE BACKED AWAY FROM THAT AND SAID I DON'T HAVE THE FACTS TO BE ABLE TO GET INTO THE ISSUE OF TRUTHFULNESS, AND THAT IS NOT AN ISSUE BEFORE ME. I AM CONCERNED, AND HIS TO BASIC RULINGS, ACTUALLY THERE ARE THREE, TWO BASIC RULINGS ARE THE LAW FIRM NAME, THE TRADITIONAL NAME, LEWIS AND ASSOCIATES, OR THE LAW FIRM OF TIMOTHY HARRINGTON, IS INHERENTLY, PER SE, DECEPTIVE, MISLEADING, EVEN IF IT HAS THE DISCLOSURE, WHICH ALL OF THESE DO THAT THEY ARE EMPLOYEES OF AN INSURANCE COMPANY. THE SECOND ORDER IS I AM GOING TO REQUIRE THE IDENTIFICATION OF INSURANCE COMPANY COVERAGE, AND I AM GOING TO IDENTIFY THAT ON EVERY PLEADING FILED IN MY COURT AND THEN THE THIRD ORDER, WHICH IS PERHAPS THE MOST TROUBLING. BOTH OF THOSE ARISE OUT OF AN ETHICAL VIOLATION THAT HE PERCEIVED IN THE USE OF THESE NAMES. THE THIRD IS THAT THE MERE USE OF STAFF ATTORNEY LAWYERS TO DEFEND A POLICYHOLDER INSURED IS A WAIVER OF ANY OBJECTION TO MENTION OF INSURANCE IN A TRIAL! THAT CANNOT BE. THAT FLIES IN THE FACE OF YOUR STETURE CASE, WHICH SAYS YOU ONLY, ONLY MENTION INSURANCE TO A JURY IF THERE IS A JUST TISSUE TISSUEABLE -- IF THERE IS A JUSTICIABLE ISSUE. IN THE TRIAL, DID THE COURT, THEN, SAY, THAT I WANT TO YOU KNOW THAT THIS LAW FIRM, THE LAWYERS THAT WORK THERE ARE SALARIED BY AN INSURANCE COMPANY AND -- HAVE NO INDICATION THAT HAS EVER HAPPENED. COULD YOU JUST GO RIGHT TO THE HEART OF WHAT IS HAPPENING HERE AND WHY YOU PERCEIVE THAT THERE IS NO PROBLEM, AND TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE, WHAT THE STATUS OF THIS

3 MATTER IS WITH THE BAR, TOO. THAT IS I ASSUME THAT THIS IS DONE OUT OF ECONOMICS, AND THAT, IN OTHER WORDS THAT THE INSURANCE COMPANIES HAVE PERCEIVED THAT THEY CAN DO THIS MUCH MORE ECONOMICALLY AND EFFICIENTLY BY DIRECTLY SALARYING LAWYERS THAT THEY CHOOSE, AND THAT THEY PERCEIVE IT TO BE NO DIFFERENT THAN IF THEY WENT OUT AND RETAINED A LAWYER TO PAY FOR THIS. JUSTICE ANSTEAD THAT, LATTER IS EXACTLY CORRECT. THEY DON'T PERCEIVE IT AND OF COURSE IT IS NOT DIFFERENT. PAYING FOR A LAWYER IN THE COURTROOM, THAT THAT WOULD NOT BE DISCLOSED, YOU KNOW, TO THE JURY. EXACTLY. IT DOESN'T MATTER. IT SHOULDN'T MATTER AND IT CAN'T MATTER WHETHER AN ATTORNEY DEFENDING AN INSURED, IN A COURTROOM, IN A TRIAL PROCEEDING IS COMPENSATED WITH A RETAINER FOR A YEAR'S WORTH OF WORK AS AN INDEPENDENT LAWYER OR AS A SALARY OR ON AN HOURLY BASIS. IT HAS NO BEARING ON WHAT IS HAPPENING IN THE COURTROOM. IS THERE ANY ISSUE HERE WITH REFERENCE TO THE ALLEGIANCE OF THE LAWYER TO THE INSURED? NO, THERE IS NOT. AS OPPOSED TO THE CARRIER IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, AND WHAT SAFEGUARDS, IF ANY, HAVE BEEN PUT IN PLACE TO ASSURE THAT THAT IS NOT A PROBLEM OR AN ISSUE, JUST AS HOPEFULLY, IT HAS NOT BEEN A PROBLEM BEFORE? THERE IS NO ISSUE OF THAT IN THIS CASE. IN FACT, IT IS THE PRACTICE OF LAW BY DEFENSE COUNSEL, WHETHER INDEPENDENT OR OF A LAW FIRM STAFF OFFICE, IS IN DISTINGUISHABLE IN THE COURTROOM. IT IS IN DISTINGUISHABLE. THE SAFEGUARD, THE ONLY ONE, AFTER A YEAR'S STUDY THAT THE BAR HAS HAD ON THE SPECIFIC PRACTICES OF INSURANCE COMPANIES AND THE CREATION OF THESE OFFICES, IS PENDING IN FRONT OF YOU. THERE IS A PROPOSAL TO AMEND RULE AND ADD A NEW SECTION F THAT REQUIRES A STATEMENT OF CLIENT'S RIGHTS NOT JUST FOR STAFF OFFICE REPRESENTATION BUT FOR EVERY DEFENDANT ATTORNEY WHO IS REPRESENTING POLICYHOLDERS. BROAD-BASE PROPOSAL. LET ME ASK THIS. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT, FROM WHAT YOUR OPPOSITION IS SAYING, IS THAT, REALLY, WHAT THIS COMES DOWN TO IS WHETHER THIS IS AN ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE DOCKET IN THIS DIVISION OR WHETHER IT IS A RULE, WOULD BE A LOCAL RULE OR SOME OTHER TYPE OF RULE, AND WHY ISN'T THIS JUST AN ORDER BY TRIAL JUDGE TO CONTROL THE DOCKET IN THAT TRIAL JUDGE'S DIVISION? YOUR HONOR, WHEN YOU STARTED BY SAYING WHAT YOUR OPPOSITION SEALS TO BE SAYING. -- SEEMS TO BE SAYING. THE PEOPLE WHO RESPONDED TO YOUR SHOW-CAUSE ORDER IN THIS HAVE NEVER SAID THAT. THEY HAVE NEVER SAID IT IS NOT A RULE. IT IS ONLY JUDGE SIEGEL WHO SAID I AM NOT MAKING A RULE, BUT HE ALSO SAYS, IN PARAGRAPH 8 OF HIS AUGUST 17 ORDER, THIS IS A PLEADING REQUIREMENT IN MY COURT SO THE ANSWER TO YOUR QUESTION IS THREE-PART ANSWER. NUMBER ONE, THE JUDGE HAS FIRST CREATED AN ETHICAL VIOLATION. IT VIOLATES THE ETHICS OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, AS DEFINED BY YOU, TO HAVE A LAW FIRM NAME. HE HAS TAKEN THAT ETHICAL VIOLATION, AND HE SAID I AM NOT GOING TO HAVE ANY PLEADINGS OR PAPERS IN MY COURT THAT DON'T HAVE DISCLOSURE, BECAUSE THAT IS AN ETHICAL VIOLATION, NOT SAYING SO. IS THAT A RULE? OF COURSE IT IS. YOU HAVE SPECIFIED. FIRST OF ALL, YOU HAVE THE EX-CLUES I HAVE AUTHORITY TO PROMULGATE RULES. THAT IS IN THE CONSTITUTION. SECONDLY, YOU HAVE SAID WHAT PLEADINGS SHOULD REQUIRE. YOU HAVE SPECIFIED THEM IN RULE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, 2.060, AND YOU HAVE NOT INCLUDED ANYTHING REGARDING

4 STATUS OF AN ATTORNEY. THIS IS ONLY ONE STATUS. I WOULD ASK THE HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION WHY WOULD A NOTICE OF HEARING FOR SOME KIND OF A MOTION BE REQUIRED TO HAVE, ON IT, A STATEMENT THAT THIS IS AN ATTORNEY WHO IS AN EMPLOYEE OF AN INSURANCE COMPANY? MR. ENGLAND, ARE WE HERE BECAUSE THE COUNSEL THAT ARE HIRED BY ALLSTATE OR STATE FARM OR EMPLOYED BY THEM, HAVE TO PUT THAT ON A NOTICE OF HEARING, OR ARE WE HERE BECAUSE THE CONCERN IS THAT THE JURY, IN CASES THAT ARE TRIED, ARE GOING TO HEAR I AM PER MISERABLY, AT -- HEAR, IMPERMISSABLY, AT LEAST IN THE MINDS OF THE INSURANCE COMPANY, FACTS NOT IN EVIDENCE, IF YOU SAY I AM TIMOTHY HARRINGTON, AND I AM WITH THE LAW OFFICE OF ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY. THAT IS ONE THING, OR I AM TIMOTHY HARRINGTON, AND DO ANY OF YOU KNOW ME, THE LAW OFFICES OF TIMOTHY HARRINGTON? YOU KNOW, THERE ARE SEVERAL PLACES IN A TRIAL WHERE THIS BECOMES POTENTIALLY EITHER APPROPRIATE FOR THE JURY TO KNOW ABOUT OR TOTALLY INAPPROPRIATE, AND I GUESS I AM TRYING TO SEPARATE OUT -- CORRECT. -- WHAT, YOU KNOW, WHETHER, HOW A NOTICE OF HEARING IS FILED CERTAINLY MAY EITHER BE AN ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEM OR AN ETHICAL ISSUE, BUT, REALLY, FOR THE, FOR THIS JUDGE, AND IN THE CONDUCT OF THE TRIAL, HIS CONCERN MAY LEGITIMATELY BE THAT THERE ARE INAPPROPRIATE NONDISCLOSURES GOING ON THAT ARE SOMEHOW AFFECTING THE FAIRNESS, LIKE WHAT YOU ASK, YOU KNOW, WHO EMPLOYEES AN IME DOCTOR OR THOSE TYPES OF THINGS. BUT -- THE ANSWER TO YOUR QUESTION IS TWO PART. JURISDICTIONALLY YOU ARE HERE BECAUSE HE HAS PROMULGATED A RULE, AND HE HAS DEFINED A CATEGORY OF ETHICAL CONDUCT, WHICH HE FOUND TO BE UNETHICAL. BOTH A LAW FIRM NAME AND A FILING IN HIS COURT WHICH DOES NOT HAVE THESE IDENTIFICATIONS. YOU ARE SAYING THAT ONLY THIS COURT CAN REGULATE. OKAY. SO THAT IS BASICALLY JURISDICTION. AND HE HAS DONE THAT ONLY FOR THIS COURTROOM, WHICH IS EXACTLY ANTITHETICAL TO WHAT YOU DO WITH A UNIFORM RULE. YOUR CONCERN AND EXACTLY THE ONE I DESCRIBE IS, FOR WHAT REASON DOES HE WANT THESE DISCLOSURES? CERTAINLY THE JUDGE CAN CONTROL TRUTHFULNESS IN HIS OR HER COURTROOM. CERTAINLY THEY MUST IN INDIVIDUAL CASES, BUT TO PROMULGATE A BROAD-BASED RULE, WHICH SAYS EVERY PAPER THAT COMES INTO THIS COURT WHICH HAS A LAW FIRM ATTORNEY FROM THE STAFF, MUST HAVE THIS DISCLOSURE IS NOT TO ADVANCE ANYTHING WITH REGARD TO THE TRUTH OF THE PROCEEDING, YOUR HONOR, BECAUSE THE PEOPLE IN THE COURTROOM WHO SEE THOSE PAPERS ALREADY KNOW ABOUT THE STAFF RELATIONSHIP. THE COURT, OPPOSING COUNSEL, AND CLIENT. AND THE ETHICAL RULES ARE DESIGNED TO PROTECT THOSE -- ACTUALLY THE PUBLIC AND CLIENTS. SO WHAT DOES THIS ACCOMPLISH? IT CREATES THE POTENTIAL FOR EXACTLY WHAT YOU HAVE POSED AS THE DIFFICULTY. JURORS KNOWING OF INSURANCE WHEN YOU HAVE SAID THEY MAY NOT! ABSOLUTELY MAY NOT, UNLESS ESSENTIAL TO THE CAUSE. NONE OF THE CASES WE ARE TALKING ABOUT, NONE OF THE INSTANCES THAT WERE USED IN THESE EXAMPLE, NONE OF WHOM WERE CITED BY JUDGE SIEGEL, HAD ANYTHING TO DO WITH JUSTICIABLE ISSUE OF THE INSURANCE IN THE PROCEEDINGS. I THOUGHT THE FIRST ONE SAID THE JURY, THERE WAS A QUESTION OF WHO HAD HIRED THE IME, AND THERE WAS AN ANSWER THAT IT WAS REALLY THE LAW OFFICES OF TIMOTHY HARRINGTON. THAT WAS HIS HYPOTHETICAL TO MAKE SURE THAT JURORS ARE TOLD THE TRUTH. THAT IS NOT --

5 THAT ISSUE, THAT IT IS APPROPRIATE, IF ALLSTATE HIRES THE IME, THAT THE JURY KNOW ABOUT THAT. IT IS NOT AN ISSUE IN FRONT OF US. AND JUDGE SIEGEL HAS SAID THAT IN HIS ORDERS. HE HAS SAID I DO NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT INFORMATION WITH REGARD TO THE IME. THAT IS IN FRONT OF US. I AM PROPOSING A BLANKET PLEADING REQUIREMENT. I WANT EVERY INSURANCE COMPANY WHICH HAS A STAFF OFFICE TO IDENTIFY ITSELF ON EVERY PAPER AND PLEADING. BEFORE YOU SIT DOWN, YOU GO AHEAD. BEFORE YOU SIT DOWN, WOULD YOU, DO YOU KNOW WHAT HAPPENED IN THE GOODMAN CASE? AS I UNDERSTAND, THAT HAS ALREADY GONE TO TRIAL. HOW DID THE ATTORNEYS HANDLE IT IN THAT PARTICULAR CASE? THERE IS NO EVIDENCE IN THIS RECORD AS TO HOW IT WAS HANDLED. THE GOODMAN CASE WAS, AS YOU KNOW, BECAUSE THE STATE REQUESTED, AND IT WAS TRIED ON DAMAGES. THERE WAS A HIGH/LOW SETTLEMENT AND IT CONCLUDED. I DON'T KNOW IF ALL PAPERS HAVE BEEN SIGNED BUT IT HAS BEEN CONCLUDED. WE HAVE NO INDICATION OF WHAT QUESTIONS WERE ASKED OF THE IME EXPERT OR IN ANY OTHER ASPECT OF THAT CASE. YOUR HONORS, I JUST HAVE TO SAY I AM INTO MY REBUTTAL TIME, AND I DON'T WANT TO USE IT ALL HERE. AGAIN, I WANT TO YOU FOCUS -- MR. CHIEF JUSTICE JUSTICE ANSTEAD HAD A QUESTION. JUSTICE LEWIS. I AM SORRY. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE ANSTEAD. THE BROADER ISSUE THAT THE BAR IS LOOKING INTO, AND THAT IS THAT THIS FORM OF PRACTICE OF LAW, WHAT IS YOUR VIEW ABOUT THAT? THAT IS THAT THIS IS A NEW FORM OF PRACTICE OF LAW. NOT REALLY. I AM -- IT IS MORE VISIBLE TODAY THAN IT USED TO BE. I WANT YOU TO ADDRESS THAT, IN TERMS OF, AND IT TOUCHES A LITTLE BIT ON THE JUDGE'S CONCERN ABOUT FRAUD, THAT IS THAT TRADITIONALLY, IF YOU HAVE THE NAME OF JACK JONES, ATTORNEY AT LAW OR THE LAW OFFICE OF, WHAT THAT CONJURES IN OUR MINDS IS AN INDEPENDENT LAWYER PRACTICING LAW. IT DOESN'T CONJURE, SO WHAT DOES -- PLEASE REMEMBER WHAT WE ARE TALKING ABOUT THAT THE RECORD IS COMPLETE HERE, THAT IN EVERY INSTANCE WHERE IT IS LAW OFFICE OF OR SOME ASSOCIATES THERE, IS AN IDENTIFICATION OF ASSOCIATE EMPLOYMENT. EVERYONE. THE BAR, IN 1969 WANTED TO PROHIBIT THIS PRACTICE AND THIS COURT SAID NO. IN SUBSEQUENT YEARS THE BAR HAS RAISED THIS ISSUE AND NEVER GOT IT PAST THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS. IN '99 A SPECIAL COMMISSION OF THE BAR WAS APPOINTED WHICH ISSUED A REPORT, AND OUT OF THAT STUDY, TO STUDY THE PRACTICES OF LAW OFFICE AND INSURORS, IN REGARD TO REPRESENTATION, TRUTHFULNESS TO THE COURT, CONFLICT OF INTEREST, THAT COMMISSION CAME OUT WITH, BY THE WAY, HAD NO INDICATION IN ITS RECORD, NONE OF ANY HARM TO ANY CLIENT TO ANY MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC, OR TO ANYONE ELSE, ANY COURT, WITH RESPECT TO STAFF OFFICES OF LAW FIRMS. THAT IS IN THE REPORT THAT YOU HAVE IN FRONT OF YOU, IN CASE AND THAT REPORT OF THE BAR CONCLUDED ONLY ONE THING IS NECESSARY. ALL ATTORNEYS OUGHT TO GIVE A CLIENT

6 EVERY INSURANCE CLIENT, A STATEMENT OF RIGHTS. NO SINGLING OUT OF STAFF OFFICES. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE YOU ARE GOING TO USE ALL YOUR REBUTTAL. OKAY. AND THEN THERE IS THE CURRENT STUDY THAT IS PRESENTLY PENDING BEFORE THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS, WHICH IS COMMISSIONED BY THE PRESENT PRESIDENT OF THE BAR TO LOOK, AGAIN, AT THESE ISSUES, AND THE BAR HAS SAID TO YOU PERHAPS YOU WANT TO WAIT FOR THAT. I WOULD LIKE TO, IF JUSTICE ANSTEAD'S QUESTION PERMITS ME ONE MINUTE OF REBUTTAL, I WILL COME BACK AND PERHAPS YOU WILL GRANT ME THAT LEAVE. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE THANK YOU. MR. SU NMENT NDECK. THANK YOU. MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT. I AM RICHARD SUNDECK. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE LET ME ASK YOU THIS FIRST. THIS JUDGE PROMULGATED AN ORDER AND THEN ANOTHER ORDER, AND THEN HE SENT OUT AND REQUESTED IN 134 SOME FORM, COMMENTS ON WHAT HE WAS DOING -- IN SOME FORM, COMMENTS ON WHAT HE WAS DOING. CORRECT? ON THE ORDER? URNS, I HAVE READ THROUGH -- YOUR HONOR, I HAVE READ THROUGH ALL THE TRANSCRIPTS AS WELL. I AM NOT THE TRIAL COUNSEL IN THE MATTER BUT I HAVE READ THROUGH ALL THE TRANSCRIPTS, AND IT IS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT JUDGE SIEGEL FIRST BROUGHT THIS TO THE ATTENTION OF THE LAWYER IN THE PARTICULAR CASE THAT TROUBLED HIM, AS WE TALKED ABOUT FRAUD AND PERJURY IN S COURTROOM AND THEN EVERYTHING BROKE LOOSE AND ARMIES OF LAWYERS DESCENDED ON JUDGE SIEGEL'S COURTROOM, REPRESENTING ALL OF THE VARIOUS INSURANCE COMPANIES IN THE STAUFL AS WELL AS THE VARIOUS TRADE ASSOCIATIONS, AND THERE WERE HEARINGS THAT LASTED ENDLESSLY, IN WHICH TESTIMONY WAS TAKEN, IN WHICH THERE WAS LENGTHY ARGUMENT PRESENTED. I HAVE EIGHT BOXES OF PETITIONS AND PAPERS THAT WERE FILED IN THE VARIOUS PROCEEDINGS. LET ME GET TO MY, RIGHT TO MY CONCERN. WHY ISN'T THIS A ROOIL? WHY -- WHY ISN'T THIS A RULE? WHY ISN'T THIS A RULE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION THAT VARIES FROM THE RULE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION OF 2.060, WHICH SAYS THAT A LAWYER, IN ORDER TO PRACTICE LAW IN FLORIDA, HAS TO BE A MEMBER OF THE FLORIDA BAR, AND PRESCRIBE THE PLEADINGS REQUIREMENTS. IF I MAY, CHIEF JUSTICE WELLS. YES. CERTAIN ASPECTS OF WHAT HAS BEEN RAISED HERE OUGHT TO BE THE SUBJECT OF RULE- MAKING, AND I AM GOING TO ASK THE COURT, AT THE END OF MY ARGUMENT, TO REFER CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THIS TO THE RULES OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION COMMITTEE. CERTAIN ASPECTS OF IT MIGHT BE CONSIDERED BY THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE COMMITTEE. CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THIS, AS HAS ALREADY BEEN OBSERVED BY JUSTICE PARIENTE, WERE THE CONCERN OF JUDGE SIEGEL, THAT FRAUD AND PERJURY WAS GOING ON IN HIS COURTROOM, AND THAT IT IS ABSOLUTELY THE DUTY AFTER TRIAL JUDGE TO REGULATE HIS COURTROOM, SO THERE ARE RULE-MAKING ASPECTS TO THIS. THERE ARE, FRANKLY, THE ISSUE OF HOW LAWYERS HOLD THEMSELVES OUT TO THEIR CLIENTS AND TO THE PUBLIC, IS AN ISSUE THAT JUDGE SIEGEL WAS UNABLE TO DEAL WITH, BECAUSE THAT IS WELL BEYOND HIS ROLE, BUT IT IS PRECISELY WHAT IS THE DUTY AND RESPONSIBILITY OF THIS COURT, AS THE SEOUL, AS HAVING THE SOLE JURISDICTION OVER THE REGULATION OF THE PRACTICE OF LAW, TO DEAL WITH, AND WHETHER - - AS THE SEOUL, -- AS THE SOUL, OVER THE REGULATION OF THE PRACTICE OF LAW, TO DEAL WITH, AND WHETHER THIS COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE REGULATION AND I WOULD ASK THIS COURT TO ADDRESS AND DEAL WITH ALL ISSUES BECAUSE THEY ALL DEAL WITH THE

7 FUNDAMENTAL PRACTICE OF LAW IN THIS STATE. YOU ARE NOT CONTESTING, THERE IS DISCUSSION IN THE BRIEFS ABOUT WHETHER THIS COURT SHOULD EXERCISE ITS ALL-WRITS JURISDICTION, BUT AS I HEAR YOU SAYING, THIS COURT OUGHT TO EXERCISE ITS ALL-WRITS JURISDICTION. WHAT I AM SAYING, CHIEF JUSTICE WELLS, IS WHETHER IT IS ALL-WRITS JURISDICTION OR JURISDICTION IN FURTHERANCE OF THE PRACTICE OF LAW, THIS COURT SHOULD ADDRESS ISSUES THAT ARE RAISED HERE AND THAT ARE PROPERLY, AND THAT HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED. AS FAR AS THE ISSUES THAT YOU SAY JUDGE SIEGEL PROPERLY COULD HAVE CONSIDERED, THAT IS WHETHER THERE WAS FRAUD IN, GOING ON IN HIS COURTROOM, DO WE HAVE ENOUGH OF A RECORD? USUALLY THIS WOULD COME UP IN A SPECIFIC CASE, WHERE THERE WOULD BE A QUESTION ON VOIR DIRE OR THERE WOULD BE A QUESTION DURING A TRIAL, AND THEN THERE WOULD EITHER BE OBJECTION, AND THE JUDGE WOULD EITHER SAY, YES, YOU HAVE GOT TO DISCLOSE THIS AND THERE WOULD BE AN APPEAL, AND YOU WOULD HAVE THE CASE IN CONTROVERSY. HOW CAN WE BROADLY DECIDE, YOU KNOW, WHAT TYPES OF QUESTIONS ARE PERMISSIBLE IN VOIR DIRE OR NOT, WHETHER THE JURY SHOULD KNOW THAT THE LAWYER IS ACTUALLY STAFF COUNSEL FOR PROGRESSIVE OR NOT, WHEN THEY ARE NOT THE PARTY OR THE IME, YOU KNOW, THE IME DOCTOR, T IS ONLY A CERTAIN NUMBER OF PLACES WHERE IT COULD POTENTIALLY COME OUT. HOW CAN WE DO THAT IN THIS CASE, WITHOUT RENDERING AN ADVISORY OPINION? I HAVE TO GIVE AWE LONG ANSWER TO THAT, AND MY ANSWER IS GOING TO START WITH THE QUESTION THAT BRINGS ALL THIS UP, WHICH IS WHEN YOU ARE STAFF COUNSEL, AN EMPLOYEE OF AN INSURANCE COMPANY, REPRESENTING INSUREDS, CAN YOU CREATE THIS FICTITIOUS NONENTITY, QUOTE, LAW OFFICE OF ROBERT SUNDAG, AND TELL THE INSURED AND TELL YOUR CLIENT AND TELL JUDGE SIEGEL AND TELL EVERYBODY THAT YOU ARE SOMETHING THAT YOU ARE NOT. BUT THAT IS THE ISSUE OF THE REGULATION OF THE PRACTICE OF LAW, AND THAT IS NOT SOMETHING, THE QUESTIONSHETHER JUDGE SIEGEL SHOULD HAVE MADE A RULING ON THAT, BUT, SO, ASSUME THAT, AND WE HAVE TO FIRST DECIDE THAT CASE. I WOULD ASK THE COURT, FIRST, TO ADDRESS THAT ISSUE, AND THE REASON, AND I WOULD ASK THE COURT TO AFFIRM JUDGE SIEGEL ON THAT ISSUE. ACTULY I SHOULDN'T SAY THAT WE HAVE TO DO THAT. EVEN IF THIS TYPE OF REPRESENTATION IS PERMISSIBLE, ISN'T THE JUDGE STILL AT LIBERTY TO DECIDE, IN A GIVEN CASE, WHETHER A QUESTION THAT WOULD BE ASKED TO AN IME DOCTOR, FOR EXAMPLE, IS PERMISSIBLE OR NOT, WHETHER THEY ARE REPRESENTING ALLSTATE OR EMPLOYED BY ALLSTATE CERTAIN SITUATIONS MAY ARISE, WHERE THE JURY SHOULD KNOW THAT ALLSTATE IS PAYING THE BILL, AND I ASSUME IN MANY CASES THEY DO, SO HOW DOES THAT AFFECT WHETHER THE LAWYER IS, HAS A SEPARATE LAW FIRM OR IS STAFF COUNSEL? I GUESS I JUST, AND HOW DO WE, AGAIN, HOW DO WE, WE CERTAINLY CAN'T ADDRESS THAT SECOND ISSUE, OR WE, BEFORE WE LOOK AT THE FIRST ISSUE. I WOULD ASK THE COURT TO LOOK AT THE FIRST ISSUE. THE FIRST ISSUE, THS ISSUE OF WHETHER, IN FLORIDA, THE, JUSTICE ANSTEAD REFERRED TO AS THE NEW CONCEPT OF CALLING YOURSELF A LAW FIRM WHEN YOU ARE NOT, WHEN YOU ARE REALLY AN EMPLOYEE OF AN INSURANCE COMPANY WHETHER THAT IS PERMISSIBLE, WHETHER THE COURT IS GOING TO SAY AS IT HAS CONSISTENTLY SAID IN THE PAST, THAT WE ARE NOT GOING TO PERMIT SOMETHING LIKE THAT, BECAUSE IT IS MISLEADING, BECAUSE IT IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE CONCEPT THAT ONLY CERTAIN TYPES OF CORPORATE ENTITIES OWNED AND CONTROLED BY LAWYERS ARE ALLOWED TO HOLD THEMSELVES OUT AS BEING A LAW FIRM. THAT ISSUE NEEDS TO BE ADDRESSED FIRST.

8 WHY IS THAT AN ISSUE? WHY SHOULDN'T IT JUST BE I AM SAM JONES, AND I REPRESENT THESE PEOPLE HERE AT THIS TABLE. AND THAT IS ALL THAT THE JUDGE AND THE JURY NEEDS TO KNOW, AS LONG AS THERE IS NOTHING ILLEGAL OR WHATEVER OR IMPROPER ABOUT WHAT IS GOING ON THERE, AND THEN AFTER THAT, YOU GO ON. WHETHER THAT SAM JONES HAS BEEN HIRED OR AN HOURLY RATE OR WHETHER SAM JONES IS PAID A SALARY, WHY SHOULD THE JUDGE OR THE JURY BE CONCERNED, AND AS I SAY, UNLESS THERE IS SOMETHING ELSE GOING ON? WHY DO WE EVEN GET TO AN ISSUE OF SAM JONES, A PART OF THE LAW GROUP OF? BECAUSE THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY HAS CHOSEN TO DO IT THAT WAY, AND BECAUSE JUDGE SIEGEL BELIEVES, AND I BELIEVE HE IS CORRECT, THAT THAT IS INAPPROPRIATE. BUT WHY DOES JUDGE SIEGEL, BEYOND SAM JONES REPRESENTING THE PEOPLE AT THAT TABLE, WHY WOULD HE BE INVOLVED IN THAT AT ALL? THE JURY KNOWS THERE IS A LAWYER IN THE COURTROOM REPRESENTING ONE OF THE PARTIES, NOW, THAT, OF COURSE, IS IMPORTANT. THAT PARTY HAVE REPRESENTATION. NOW, THERE IS ALL, WHY DO WE GO BEHIND THAT, IN TERMS OF HOW THAT LAWYER IS COMPENSATED? WHY DOES A JURY NEED TO KNOW THAT OR WHY DOES THE JUDGE NEED TO KNOW THAT? WHY IS THAT A PROBLEM IS WHAT I AM ASKING YOU? WELL, THAT, I WOULD, I DON'T BELIEVE ANY OF US WOULD BE HERE, IF ALL THAT HAPPENED WAS AN INDIVIDUAL LAWYER WHO WORKED FOR ALLSTATE ENTERED AN APPEARANCE THAT SAID ROBERT S PRESIDENT U -- ROBERT SUNDAG, WITH MY ADDRESS, AS OPPOSED TO WHAT THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY HAS ORGANIZED AS THESE FICTITIOUS LAW FIRMS, AS OPPOSED TO SAYING ROBERT SUNDAG, THE LAW OFFICE OF ROBERT ENGLAND, AND CONCEALING WHO THEY REALLY ARE, NOT ONLY FROM JUDGE SIEGEL AND THE JURY BUT ALSO FROM THOIRN CLIENTS. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE JUSTICE QUINCE HAD A QUESTION. IF WE GET BACK TO THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THEY SHOULD BE ABLE TO DO, FORM THIS KIND OF ASSOCIATION, ISN'T THERE A QUESTION HERE ABOUT DOESN'T THAT KIND OF PRACTICE FACILITATE SOME OF THE THINGS THAT ACTUALLY GO ON IN TRIAL, SUCH AS IF YOU ARE SAYING I AM PEGGY QUINCE, ATTORNEY, AT THE OFFICE OF TIM CHINARIS, AND THEN I ASK THE JURY HAVE YOU EVER BEEN, HAS ANYONE HERE EVER BEEN REPRESENTED BY SOMEONE IN THAT LAW FIRM, AND INSTEAD OF HAVING TO GO THROUGH THE PROCEDURE OF MAYBE NAMING EVERYONE THAT YOU HAVE ANY KIND OF ASSOCIATION WITH, I AM HAVING A HARD TIME TRYING TO UNDERSTAND WHY THIS PRACTICE SHOULD BE OF CONCERN TO THE TRIAL JUDGE. I GUESS IT GOES BACK TO JUSTICE ANSTEAD'S QUESTION. ISN'T THERE SOME BENEFIT IN HAVING THIS KIND OF ASSOCIATION? THERE MAY BE A BENEFIT, AND MR. ENGLAND, IN HIS PETITION, EXPOUNDED ON THE BENEFITS OF PRACTICING LAW TOGETHER, WHICH I AGREE WITH, BUT THERE IS NO BENEFIT TO CALLING YOURSELVES, THESE, THIS GROUP OF PEOPLE, CALLING YOURSELVES SOMETHING THAT YOU ARE NOT, BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT. THEY ARE NOT A LAW FIRM. THEY ARE STAFF EMPLOYEES OF AN INSURANCE COMPANY, AND THEY ARE PARADING AROUND AS THOUGH THEY WERE A PRIVATE LAW FIRM. WHAT DO YOU CONTEND, THEN, IS THE HARM THAT SOMEONE IN THE PUBLIC GETS FROM THINKING THAT THESE PEOPLE OR BELIEVING THAT THESE PEOPLE ARE IN SOME KIND OF ASSOCIATION TOGETHER? WHAT HARM IS THERE IN THAT, WHEN THEY, IN FACT, ARE ALL IN THE SAME PLACE, DOING THE SAME KIND OF JOBS, AND MAYBE ON OCCASION, COVERING A MOTION HEARING FOR EACH OTHER OR WHATEVER. SO WHERE IS THE HARM TO THE PUBLIC FROM THAT? THE HARM TO THE PUBLIC IS THAT, UNLIKE THE SITUATION 33 YEARS AGO, WHEN THIS COURT HAD THE IN RE WALLS DECISION, AND THIS COURT SAID WE ARE NOT GOING TO FLATLY PROHIBIT

9 THE USE OF STAFF ATTORNEYS REPRESENTING INSUREDS HIRED BY INSURANCE COMPANIES, UNLIKE THAT SITUATION 33 YEARS AGO, TODAY WE HAVE A SITUATION, AS DOCUMENTED BY THE REPORT OF THE INSURANCE PRACTICE AND SPECIAL STUDY COMMITTEE THREE YEARS AGO THAT IS ATTACHED TO MR. ENGLAND'S PAPERS THAT HE MADE REFERENCE TO, DO WE HAVE THE PRACTICE OF INSURANCE COMPANIES EXERCISING AN UNDUE DEGREE OF CONTROL OVER HOW LAWYERS REPRESENT THE INSUREDS IN THESE CASES? AND THAT PRACTICE, THAT -- HOW DOES THAT DIFFER FROM, IF THE INSURANCE COMPANY WENT OUT AND GOT XYZ CORPORATION OR LAW FIRM TO ACTUALLY HANDLE EACH INDIVIDUAL POLICYHOLDER? IT DOESN'T. IT DOESN'T. IT IS THE SAME EVIL, AND IT IS THE SAME THREAT THAT WE HAVE IN EITHER INSTANCE. SO WHAT ARE YOU SUGGESTING WE DO? WHAT I AM SUGGESTING THAT THIS COURT DO IS, ON THE ISSUE OF FICTITIOUS LAW FERPS, I WOULD ASK THIS COURT TO TAKE THAT ISSUE AND -- ON THE ISSUE OF FICTITIOUS LAW FIRMS, I WOULD ASK THIS COURT TAKE THAT ISSUE AND DEAL WITH IT, BECAUSE THE AUTHORITY TO DO THAT. I WOULD ALTERNATIVELY ASK THIS COURT TO DO WHAT IT HAS DONE IN THE PAST WHEN IT HAS FACED THESE TYPES OF PROBLEMS AND EITHER APPOINT AN AD HOC COMMITTEE TO COLLECT THE INFORMATION AND REPORT BACK TO THE COURT, AS IT HAS DONE, FOR INSTANCE, IN ONE OF THE ADVISORY OPINIONS, THE HRS NONLAWYER COUNSEL SITUATION OR AS I UNDERSTAND YOU HAVE DONE RECENTLY ON THE SENIOR JUDGE ISSUE, OR ALTERNATIVELY, REFER THESE MATTERS TO THE EXISTING COMMITTEES, THE JUDICIAL RULES COMMITTEE, THE CIVIL RULES COMMITTEE, THE ETHICS COMMITTEE, AND THE UNLICENSED PRACTICE OF LAW COMMITTEE, THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON UNLICENSED PRACTICE OF LAW, WHICH HAS, WHICH IS WHAT THIS COURT IS SET UP TO BEGIN WITH, TO DEAL WITH THESE ISSUES, BECAUSE, AND I MENTIONED THE UNLICENSED PRACTICE OF LAW COMMITTEE, BECAUSE THE JUSTIFICATION, JUDGE SEEING KEPT ASKING THESE LAWYERS WHY -- JUDGE SIEGEL KEPT ASKING THESE LAWYERS WHY ARE YOU DOING IT THIS WAY, AND THAT IS THE QUESTION THAT I WOULD LIKE YOU TO ASK. WHY ARE THEY ALL DOING IT THIS WAY? SHOULDN'T THAT ALL COME THROUGH THE COURSE OF GOING THROUGH THE BAR COMMITTEE, COMING THROUGH THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS, BEING PRESENTED TO THIS COURT AS A PETITION? I STILL COME BACK TO MY ORIGINAL CONCERN HERE, IS TO WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THE OMNIBUS ORDERS THAT WERE ENTERED BY JUDGE SIEGEL, AND ISN'T THE PROBLEM WITH WHAT HE HAS DONE IS WE HAVE GOT ONE DIVISION IN THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT, THAT HAS ENTERED AN ORDER WHICH IS, IN SOME NATURE OF EITHER A LOCAL RULE OR AN AMENDMENT TO THE RULES OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION OR RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, AND ISN'T THAT, REALLY, WHAT THIS COURT, TODAY, HAS TO ANALYZE, AND IF THAT HAS HAPPENED, TELL THAT SINGLE CIRCUIT JUDGE THAT HE CAN'T DO THAT? I KNOW IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM, I, RECENTLY AT A MEETING IN WHICH THEY SAID THERE ARE OVER 6,000 LOCAL RULES. AND THEY ALL CONFLICT WITH EACH OTHER. AND THEY ALL CONFLICT WITH THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. IT MAKES PRACTICING LAW IN FEDERAL COURT JUST AWFUL, AND YOU ARE RIGHT. THAT HAVING UNIFORM RULES IS A TREMENDOUS BENEFIT IN THE COURTS OF THIS STATE, AND I DON'T DISAGREE THAT THERE ARE ELEMENTS HERE, SUCH AS THE ISSUE OF FILING PLEADINGS THAT HAVE THE RULE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION LURKING THERE, AND THAT IS WHY THE RULES OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION COMMITTEE OUGHT TO TAKE A LOOK AT THIS. BUT THIS COURT, HAVING NOW SEEN, IN THIS RECORD, THAT THERE ARE ISSUES FUNDAMENTAL TO THE PRACTICE OF LAW IN THIS STATE, AND THERE ARE ISSUES AS TO HOW LAERS ARE CONDUCTING THEMSELVES IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW, IN REPRESENTING INSUREDS. THIS COURT, I DON'T BELIEVE, SHOULD SIT

10 BACK AT THIS POINT, AND SAY, WELL, WE WILL WAIT UNTIL SOMEBODY BRINGS IT TO US. BUT AS FAR AS JUDGE SIEGEL IS CONCERNED, IF HE THOUGHT THERE WAS AN ETHICAL VIOLATION GOING ON, HE CAN REPORT IT TO THE FLORIDA BAR, AND THE FLORIDA BAR INVESTIGATES IT. YES. MY CONCERN IS, IF YOU TAKE A SITUATION AND THE BAR SAYS OR WE SAY IT IS APPROPRIATE TO HAVE A SEPARATE LAW FIRM, MOFFET AND TANSY, AS LONG AS THEY HAVE A DISCLOSURE SAYING ALL STAFFERS AND SALARIEDMPLOYEES ARE OF PROGRESSIVE SOUTHEAST INSURANCE COMPANY, THAT STILL DOESN'T ANSWER THE QUESTION AS TO WHETHER, EITHER IN VOIR DIRE OR IN THE COURSE OF A TRIAL IF IT COMES UP WHO EMPLOYED A PARTICULAR WITNESS OR, AS JUSTIC QUCEAID WHO, IS THIS LAW FIRM, WHETHER IT IS APPROPRIATE TO MENTION THAT THIS LAW FIRM ARE ATTORNEYS AND STAFF ARE SALARIED EMPLOYEES ARE PROGRESSIVE, AND SO WHETHER IT IS APPROPRIATE OR NOT, UNDER THIS RECORD, WE ARE NOT GOING IT TO GET TO THE CORE ISSUE AS TO WHETHER OR NOT THE JURY IS ENTITLED TO KNOW ABOUT THIS. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THE ONLY ISSUE THAT SHOULD HAVE CONCERNED JUDGE SIEGEL IN THE COURSE OF THE CASES IS WHETHER DECEPTION WAS GOING ON, AND IF HE WANTED TO HAVE DISCLOSURE, ALL HE HAD TO DO IS SAY, WELL, WHEN YOU GIVE VOIR DIRE, YOU ARE GOING TO SAY YOU ARE THIS FIRM, BUT YOU ARE ATTORNEYS AND, OF, EMPLOYED BY PROGRESSIVE, AND THEN THAT ISSUE WOULD HAVE BEEN DECIDED, I GUESS, BY THE THIRD DISTRICT, AS TO WHETHER THAT WAS A DEPARTURE FROM THE ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS OF LAW, TO MAKE THE ATTORNEY GIVE THAT FACT THAT WOULD INJECT INSURANCE. JUSTICE PARIENTE, JUDGE SIEGEL, AS I READ IT, WAS STRUGGLING WITH TWO CONFLICTING PUBLIC POLICIES IN THIS STATE. THE PUBLIC POLICY OF KEEPING THE INFORMATION FROM THE JURY AS TO THE FACT OF INSURANCE, BECAUSE IT MAY BE PREJUDICIAL, AND THE OTHER PUBLIC POLICY WHICH, IN SOME SENSES IS EVEN A STRONGER PUBLIC POLICY IN THE STATE OF CANDOR IN THE TRIBUNAL, AND PREVENTING CHAR AIDS IN COURT. AS THIS COURT MOST RECENTLY EXPRESSED IN THE LANDS VERSUS GEICO SITUATION, SO WE HAVE TWO STRONG PUBLIC POLICIES. JUDGE SIEGEL WRAS LINK WITH THEM AND WAS TRYING TO HARMONIZE THEM. I GUESS I AM, AGAIN, SAYING THAT AS LONG AS THE DISCLOSURE IS THERE, THE ISSUE AS TO WHETHER IN A EN CASE, JUDGE SIEGEL WOULD HAVE REQUIRED AN ATTORNEY TO SAY THIS IS MY LAW FIRM AND THIS IS WHO I AM EMPLOYED BY, IS A DISCREET QUESTION FOR AN INDIVIDUAL CASE, AND THEN SOMEBODY CAN, WE COULD RULE ON THAT ISSUE IN THAT CASE, BUT THAT SEEMS TO ME THAT, WHETHER, AGAIN, WHETHER THE PRACTICE IS THAT MOFFET HAS TO SAY IT IS NOT MOFFET AND TANNY. IT IS MOFFET, EMPLOYED BY PROGRESSIVE, ISN'T GOING TO CHANGE, WHETHER THAT IS STILL PROPRIETOR INAPPROPRIATE TO LET THE JURY KNOW THAT, WHEN PROGRESSIVE IS NOT A PARTY, AN ACTUAL NAMED PARTY TO THE LAWSUIT, AND WHEN WE STILL HAVE A NONJOINDER STATUTE. I AGREE WITH THAT. JUDGE SIEGEL WAS CONCERNED THAT THE POLICY AGAINST DISCLOSING THE EXISTENCE OF INSURANCE MIGHT IN HIS COURTROOM, CREATE PERJURY OF THE IME DOCTOR SITUATION, AND HE WAS TRYING TO WRESTLE WITH WHAT TO DO WITH THAT SITUATION. HE WAS EQUALLY CONCERNED WITH A PROBLEM THAT APPEARED IN HIS COURTROOM OF LAWYERS INTRODUCING THEMSELVES TO HIM AT HEARINGS AS SOMETHING THAT THEY ARE NOT! AND THAT IS INAPPROPRIATE. AND THIS IS HARMFUL, BECAUSE THE VERY JUSTIFICATION FOR IT THAT HAS BEEN, THAT HAS BEEN USED IN THE HEARINGS BEFORE JUDGE SIEGEL AND IN THE, IN TWO OF THE PETITIONS, THE PROGRESSIVE PETITION AND THE U.S.A. A PETITION, THE JUSTIFICATION FOR DOING IT THIS WAY IS THAT TO ADMIT TO THE TRUTH -- AND THE USAA PETITION, THE JUSTIFICATION FOR DOING IT THIS WAY IS THAT TO ADMIT THE TRUTH IS DEALING WITH UNLICENSED PRACTICE OF LAW, BECAUSE IN DEALING WITH UNLICENSED PRACTICE OF LAW THAT

11 INSURANCE COMPANIES HAVE OVER THEIR COUNSEL, THEN YOU CAN'T DISGUISE THAT BY DISCHRIS GUISING WHO YOUR EM-- BY DISGUISING WHO YOUR EMPLOYER IS AND JUST SAY THE PROBLEM HAS GONE AWAY. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE MR. SUNDAG, YOUR TIME IS UP. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE HOW MUCH TIME DOES MR. ENGLAND HAVE? I WILL SPEAK RAPIDLY. I HAVE TO CORRECT MR. ENGLAND. HE SUGGESTS THERE IS COVERTMENT THAT HAPPENS BETWEEN A JUDGE AND CLIENTS THAT HAPPENS IN HIS COURT. THAT IS NOT TRUE. THE JUDGE WAS TOLD AT THE VERY FIRST PLEADING THAT THESE ARE STAFF ATTORNEYS AND THE CLIENT IS TOLD AND LETTERS ARE SENT OUT. THE RECORD IS CLEAR. THERE IS NO DECEPTION, AND I CANNOT ACCEPT THE NOTION OF A FICTITIOUS LAW FIRM. THERE IS NO DISTINCTION BETWEEN MY FIRM OF GREENBERG TRAURIG, MR MR. SON DAGS AND TIMOTHY HARRINGTON. WE ARE LAWYERS. WE PRACTICE IN THE COURTROOM. WHO PAYS US IS IMMATERIAL. LET ME ASK YOU WHAT RELIEF IN THIS CASE, BECAUSE HE SAYS YOU SHOULD DO SOMETHING IN A BROAD SENSE. YOU HAVE AN ARM CALLED THE FLORIDA BAR, WHICH IS ALREADY LOOKING AT THIS FOR THE SECOND TIME IN A MAJOR STUDY. WE RESPECTFULLY RESPECT YOU VACATE THESE THREE RULE-MAKING ETHICS-SETTING ORDERS AS BEYOND JUDGE SIEGEL'S CONTROL, AND UNSUPPORTED BY THE RECORD. WE ASK YOU TO FURTHER HOLD AS A MATTER OF LAW, AND THIS IS VERY IMPORTANT, THAT THE MERE USE OF STAFF ATTORNEYS TO DEFEND POLICYHOLDERS DOES NOT WAIVE THE RIGHT TO KEEP FROM THE JURY THE FACT THAT THERE IS INSURANCE KOUF RAJ. JUDGE SIEGEL HAS SAID THIS DOES WAIVE IT. YOU MUST HOLD THAT THAT IS INCORRECT. BASED ON THE RECORD OF THIS PROCEEDING, YOU HAVE A CHOICE. YOU MAY, D WE WOULD HOPE YOU SAY LAW FIRM NAMES REPRESENT WHAT THESE ARE. LAW FERPS. THEY ARE NOT FICTITIOUS. AND I HOPE YOU WILL SAY THAT THERE IS NO REQUIREMENT TO PUT ON EVERY PIECE OF PAPER AND EVERY COURT FILE, AND JUDGE SIEGEL OR ANYWHERE ELSE, THE I HAD PHYSICIAN OF -- THE IDENTIFICATION OF INSURANCE COVERAGE, ANY MORE THAN YOU WOULD PRIVATE ATTORNEYS HIRED BY INSURANCE COMPANIES TO DEFEND. ALTERNATIVELY WE WOULD ASK YOU TO WITHHOLD THOSE JUDGMENTS, JUST STRIKE JUDGE SIEGEL'S ORDERS AND LET THE BAR COMMITTEE REPORT COME TO YOU WHICH IS BEING CONSIDERED BY THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS RIGHT NOW, WHICH WAS CREATED TO ADDRESS ALL OF THE QUESTIONS THAT BOTHER MR. SON DAG. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE THANK YOU. THANK YOUR HONORS FOR YOUR ATTENTION. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE THANK YOU ALL FOR YOUR ATTENTION IN THIS MATTER. THE COURT WILL BE IN RECESS.