SAEED TALEBI, : S1 12 Cr. 295 (LTS) a/k/a Al, a/k/a Allen Talebi, : Defendant. : GOVERNMENT S SENTENCING MEMORANDUM

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1 Case 1:12-cr LTS Document 18 Filed 02/11/13 Page 1 of 20 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK x UNITED STATES OF AMERICA : - v. - : SAEED TALEBI, : S1 12 Cr. 295 (LTS) a/k/a Al, a/k/a Allen Talebi, : Defendant. : x GOVERNMENT S SENTENCING MEMORANDUM PREET BHARARA United States Attorney Southern District of New York Attorney for United States of America Shane T. Stansbury Assistant United States Attorney - Of Counsel

2 Case 1:12-cr LTS Document 18 Filed 02/11/13 Page 2 of 20 PRELIMINARY STATEMENT The Government submits this memorandum in advance of the defendant s sentencing scheduled for February 13, 2013, and in response to the defendant s sentencing memorandum dated February 1, 2013 ( Def. Mem. ). For the reasons set forth below, the Government respectfully submits that a sentence within the applicable United States Sentencing Guidelines ( U.S.S.G. or Guidelines ) range of 46 to 51 months imprisonment would be sufficient but not greater than necessary to achieve the sentencing objectives enumerated in Title 18, United States Code, Section 3553(a). BACKGROUND A. The Sanctions Against Iran The International Emergency Economic Powers Act ( IEEPA ) gives the President broad authority to regulate international transactions in times of national emergency. See 50 U.S.C. 1702(a)(1). IEEPA controls are triggered by an executive order declaring a national emergency based on an unusual and extraordinary threat which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy or economy of the United States. 50 U.S.C In 1995 and again in 1997, President Clinton issued a series of three Executive Orders prohibiting, among other 2

3 Case 1:12-cr LTS Document 18 Filed 02/11/13 Page 3 of 20 things, the exportation, reexportation, sale, or supply, directly or indirectly, to Iran of any goods, technology, or services from the United States or by a United States person. See Exec. Orders (Aug. 19, 1997), (May 6, 1995), and (Mar. 15, 1995) (collectively the Executive Orders ). President Clinton s Executive Orders directly referenced the unusual and extraordinary threat posed by Iran and directly targeted, among other things, petroleum development in Iran. See 60 Fed. Reg (Mar. 17, 1995). By their terms, these Executive Orders applying to Iran are broad and allencompassing, with extremely narrow exceptions. The Executive Orders authorized the United States Secretary of the Treasury to promulgate rules and regulations necessary to carry out the Executive Orders. 1 Pursuant to this authority, the Secretary of the Treasury promulgated the Iranian Transaction Regulations ( ITR ), implementing the sanctions imposed by the Executive Orders. 2 Thus, IEEPA and the ITR which the defendant 1 At all times relevant to this case, the President has continued the national emergency with respect to Iran and Executive Orders 13059, 12959, and 12957, given that the actions and policies of Iran continue to threaten the national security and foreign policy and economy of the United States. The most recent continuation of this national emergency was on August 15, See 77 Fed. Reg (Aug. 16, 2012). 2 In 2012, the ITR were replaced by the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations ( ITSR ). See 31 C.F.R. Part

4 Case 1:12-cr LTS Document 18 Filed 02/11/13 Page 4 of 20 acknowledges he conspired to violate constitute national security controls of vital importance to the United States. B. The Defendant s Procurement Of Supplies For Iranian Petrochemical Companies Over a period of several years, the defendant worked with others to ship industrial parts and goods from United Statesbased firms to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and other locations, acting through a company that was identified in the Superseding Information as Company-1. These items were then to be sent to various petrochemical companies in Iran including petrochemical companies owned and controlled by the Iranian government. The defendant s blatant violation of United States export laws extended to a variety of products for use in some of the most important petrochemical companies in Iran. For example, as indicated in an attachment to the defendant s sentencing submission, in early 2010, the defendant sought to obtain approximately $390,000 worth of various electrical components and industrial hardware, including a sophisticated digital turbine control system for use in the petrochemical industry. (Def. Mem., Ex. K, at 1; see also United States Probation Office s Presentence Investigation Report ( PSR ) 9). As the defendant admitted at his guilty plea allocution, one of the companies that the defendant sought to supply was Fajr 4

5 Case 1:12-cr LTS Document 18 Filed 02/11/13 Page 5 of 20 Petrochemical Company, a subsidiary of Iran s state-run National Petrochemical Company ( NPC ). 3 (Sept. 26, 2012 Plea Tr., at 22). The defendant s conduct was no aberration and extended well beyond one transaction. As indicated in the PSR, within a relatively narrow timeframe of April through October 2011, the defendant (who frequently used aliases and multiple accounts) sought similar industrial parts and components from at least three additional suppliers again all for the purpose of supplying various Iranian petrochemical companies, in violation of explicit United States export laws. 4 (PSR 10-13). C. The Defendant s Guilty Plea And The Guidelines Calculation The defendant pleaded guilty on September 26, 2012, pursuant to a plea agreement, to conspiring, from at least in or about 2008 through in or about December 2011, to violate IEEPA and the regulations promulgated thereunder, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 371. Under the terms of the plea agreement, the defendant and the Government agreed that 3 NPC, a subsidiary of the Iranian Petroleum Ministry, is whollyowned by the Government of Iran. NPC is responsible for the development and operation of Iran s petrochemical sector and is the second-largest producer and exporter of petrochemicals in the Middle East. See (last visited February 9, 2013). 4 Among the other parts the defendant conspired to ship to Iran from the United States (many of which were actually shipped) were gas-liquid separators, pressure transmitters, turbocompressors, and other petrochemical hardware. 5

6 Case 1:12-cr LTS Document 18 Filed 02/11/13 Page 6 of 20 the applicable Guidelines range is 46 to 51 months imprisonment. Consistent with the parties calculations, the Probation Office has determined that, pursuant to Section 2M5.1(a)(1)(B) of the Guidelines, because the offense involved financial transactions with a country supporting international terrorism, the defendant s base offense level is (PSR 18). Based on the defendant s timely acceptance of responsibility, the Probation Office has calculated a total offense level of 23. (PSR 26; see also U.S.S.G. 3E1.1(a) and (b)). Based on a total offense level of 23 and a Criminal History Category of I, the Probation Office has calculated an applicable Guidelines range of 46 to 51 months imprisonment. (PSR 53). ARGUMENT An analysis of the sentencing factors enunciated in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) demonstrate that a sentence within the applicable Guidelines range would be appropriate. Such a sentence would be reasonable given (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; and (2) the need for the sentence imposed (A) 5 Section 2M5.1 of the Guidelines, which applies to IEEPA offenses, provides that an offense level of 26 applies if (A) national security controls... were evaded; or (B) the offense involved a financial transaction with a country supporting international terrorism. U.S.S.G. 2M5.1(a)(1). As discussed below, under either provision only one of which need apply the correct base offense level is 26. 6

7 Case 1:12-cr LTS Document 18 Filed 02/11/13 Page 7 of 20 to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; and (B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct. 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)(1), (2)(A)-(B). A Guidelines sentence would also be appropriate given the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities. Id. at 3553(a)(6). A. The Nature and Circumstances Of The Offense Weigh In Favor Of A Guidelines Sentence The Sentencing Commission has acknowledged the seriousness of arms export and embargo violations by assigning a base offense level of 26 to all export offenses that implicate national security concerns and by not differentiating among those offenses according to the nature of the goods involved. See U.S.S.G. 2M5.1. The nature of the goods being exported is immaterial in that any violation of the Iranian embargo inherently involves the United States national security. United States v. Hanna, 661 F.3d 271, 294 (6 th Cir. 2011) (emphasis added) (defendant s shipment of telecommunications and navigation equipment to Iraq in violation of the IEEPA warranted a base offense level of 26 under U.S.S.G. 2M5.1). See also United States v. McKeeve, 131 F.3d 1, 14 (1 st Cir. 1997) (finding export of computer equipment to Libya was evasion of national security controls and that [S]ection 2M5.1(a)(1) applies to any offense that involves a shipment (or proposed shipment) that 7

8 Case 1:12-cr LTS Document 18 Filed 02/11/13 Page 8 of 20 offends the embargo, whether or not the goods shipped actually are intended for some innocent use. ). 6 The current Guidelines for export crimes implicating national security interests appropriately reflect the Government s enhanced efforts in recent years to enforce the sanctions and embargos against countries such as Iran that pose serious threats to the national security of the United States. The Executive Branch has determined as a matter of foreign and national security policy that the threat posed by the government of Iran is so severe that only a complete trade embargo is adequate to protect the interests of the United States. Congress has acted in kind. Prior to March 2006, IEEPA carried a maximum sentence of 10 years imprisonment for individuals and a fine of $10,000 (or twice the pecuniary gain or loss resulting from the offense) for each violation. On March 9, 2006, the President 6 As the Second Circuit recently observed: By design... the [Iranian] embargo is deliberately overinclusive. Thus, for example, the ITR prohibit the exportation of not only advice on developing Iranian chemical weapons but also advice on developing Iranian petroleum resources, see ; not only services to the Iranian government but also services to Iranian businesses, see ; and not only bombs but also beer, see In other words, to reform the actions of the government of Iran, Executive Order 12,959 and the ITR adopt a blunt instrument: broad economic sanctions intended to isolate Iran. United States v. Banki, 685 F.3d 99, 108 (2d Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). 8

9 Case 1:12-cr LTS Document 18 Filed 02/11/13 Page 9 of 20 signed into law the USA Patriot Act Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, which increased the criminal penalties under the IEEPA to a maximum sentence of 20 years imprisonment for individuals and a fine of $50,000 per violation. On October 16, 2007, the penalties were increased even further as the President signed into law the IEEPA Enhancement Act, which called for up to 20 years imprisonment and a $1,000,000 for each violation. These enhanced penalties which apply regardless of the nature of the products involved are a direct response to the elevated threat that Iran poses to United States national security interests, and are consistent with other aggressive steps taken by the President and Congress. For example, in 2010, Congress passed, and the President signed into law, the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, which further strengthened United States sanctions for a variety of transactions involving Iran. Pub. L. No , 124 Stat (2010) (codified in part at 50 U.S.C 1701 (note)). Among other things, the Act codified the prohibitions on the exportation of goods, services, and technology to Iran that had already been in effect under executive orders promulgated pursuant to IEEPA. Id. Significantly, the Act also imposed broad and far-reaching sanctions upon individuals and entities that seek to aid Iran s petroleum sector precisely 9

10 Case 1:12-cr LTS Document 18 Filed 02/11/13 Page 10 of 20 the sector that stood to benefit from the defendant s actions in this case. 7 Id. Against this backdrop, the defendant s argument for a timeserved sentence because the materials he conspired to sell to Iran s petrochemical industry were not military items is unpersuasive. (Def. Mem. at 16). In support of his argument, the defendant cites Application Note 2 to Section 2M5.1 of the Guidelines, which provides: In determining the sentence within the applicable guideline range, the court may consider the degree to which the violation threatened a security interest of the United States, the volume of commerce involved, the extent of planning or sophistication, and whether there were multiple occurrences. Where such factors are present in an extreme form, a departure from the guidelines may be warranted. 7 The 2010 Act is the latest incarnation of a longstanding effort by the United States to target Iran s energy industry. In 1996, for example, Congress passed the Iran Sanctions Act, Pub.L. No , 110 Stat (1996) (codified in part at 50 U.S.C (note)), which mandated the imposition of specified sanctions against foreign firms that reached threshold levels of involvement with Iran s energy sector. See id. at 3 ( The Congress declares that it is the policy of the United States to deny Iran the ability to support acts of international terrorism and to fund the development and acquisition of weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them by limiting the development of Iran s ability to explore for, extract, refine, or transport by pipeline petroleum resources of Iran. ). Indeed, this longstanding recognition that there is a direct link between Iran s petroleum industry and U.S. security interests (including Iran s ability to support acts of terrorism and/or to fund the development of weapons of mass destruction) demonstrates that the defendant is misguided in his lengthy attempt to detach his conduct from the core conduct contemplated in U.S.S.G. 2M5.1. (See, e.g., Def. Mem ). 10

11 Case 1:12-cr LTS Document 18 Filed 02/11/13 Page 11 of 20 U.S.S.G. 2M5.1, cmt., App. n. 2 (emphasis added). But contrary to the defendant s argument, Application Note 2 bears directly on his conduct and counsels in favor of a Guidelines sentence. The plain language of the Application Note shows that the Sentencing Commission contemplated a departure from the Guidelines only if the enumerated factors were present in an extreme form. That directive is just as instructive here, where the defendant seeks a variance pursuant to the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a). Nothing about the defendant s conduct places him outside the mainstream of cases contemplated by Section 2M5.1. The defendant, who concedes he meets the requirements for the application of U.S.S.G. 2M5.1(a)(1), in fact meets both alternative requirements for the applicability of that provision, in that national security controls were evaded, see 2M5.1(a)(1)(A), and the offense involved a financial transaction with a country supporting international terrorism, namely Iran. See 2M5.1(a)(1)(B). That is, the defendant plainly, and knowingly, evaded the strict embargo prohibiting the types of industrial equipment that the defendant and his coconspirators sought to supply petrochemical companies in Iran. 8 8 All courts that have reached the issue have made clear that a trade embargo against a state sponsor of terrorism is intended as a national security control for the purposes of Section 2M5.1(a)(1)(A). See McKeeve, 131 F.3d at 14 (addressing embargo 11

12 Case 1:12-cr LTS Document 18 Filed 02/11/13 Page 12 of 20 In doing so, the defendant also committed an offense involving a financial transaction with petrochemical companies controlled by the Iranian government, as both the Probation Office observed and as the defendant acknowledged in his plea allocution. (See PSR 18; Plea Tr., at 22). 9 Although the application of Section 2M5.1(a)(1) is not in dispute here, the seriousness of his offense is underscored by the fact that the defendant s conduct falls squarely within the scope of both types of offenses contemplated under that provision. The defendant claims that his conduct implicates none of the factors that the Sentencing Commission has stated, in against Libya); accord United States v. Elashyi, 554 F.3d 480, (5th Cir. 2008) ( Every court to consider the issue has held that the evasion of sanctions against state sponsors of terrorism are national security controls. ); United States v. Sevilla, No. 04 CR 0171, 2006 WL , at *2 ( N.D. Ill. Nov. 29, 2006) (addressing Iran embargo); United States v. Min, No. 99 Cr. 875 (KTD), 2000 WL (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2000) *66 (Duffy, J.) (North Korea). This is so even if the offending transactions are otherwise innocent. See, e.g., McKeeve, 131 F.3d at 14 ( [S]ection 2M5.1(a)(1) applies to any offense that involves a shipment (or proposed shipment) that offends the embargo, whether or not the goods shipped actually are intended for some innocent use. ); Min, 2000 WL , at *2 (defendant's assertion that the goods in question do not threaten national security is misplaced. ). 9 Thus, the defendant s argument that U.S.S.G. 2M5.1(a)(1)(B) does not apply (Def. Mem. at 36) is simply incorrect. In fact, the defendant s conduct involved transactions involving a number of other state-controlled oil companies in Iran other than the company mentioned in his plea, including, among others, Jam Petrochemical Company and Khorasan Petrochemical Company. The Government is prepared to provide more information in this regard should the Court determine it is necessary. 12

13 Case 1:12-cr LTS Document 18 Filed 02/11/13 Page 13 of 20 Application Note 2, that a court may consider in determining the sentence within the applicable Guidelines range. U.S.S.G. 2M5.1, cmt., App. n. 2. (See Def. Mem. at 16). But, as discussed, the defendant s conduct plainly threatened a security interest of the United States through the evasion of a set of export laws that have been carefully constructed to combat a threat posed by a country that the President has deemed an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States. Exec. Order No. 12,959, 60 Fed. Reg. 24,757, 24,757 (May 6, 1995). And while the defendant dismisses the gravity of his actions by making comparisons to such trade violations as the trading of ballpoint pens (Def. Mem. at 16 n.37) and purchasing an Iranian carpet while on vacation (Def. Mem. at 26), the defendant s actions involved the supply of critical components to the petrochemical industry in Iran an industry with obvious implications for the national security of the United States. Moreover, contrary to the defendant s characterizations of his conduct as an aberration or a lapse in judgment (Def. Mem. at 15, 26), his offense plainly involved multiple occurrences and, necessarily, a level of planning and sophistication. U.S.S.G. 2M5.1, cmt., App. n. 2. The conspiracy to which the defendant pleaded guilty spanned from 2008 through 2011; and in a mere one-and-a-half-year period, 13

14 Case 1:12-cr LTS Document 18 Filed 02/11/13 Page 14 of 20 from approximately April 2010 through approximately October 2011, the defendant arranged transactions with at least three U.S.-based suppliers for the shipment of parts and equipment destined for multiple Iranian petrochemical companies. (PSR 9-13). The defendant, admittedly aware of U.S. export laws prohibiting such transactions, worked with others to carry out these transactions by, among other means, falsifying the endusers on official documentation, shipping the goods through intermediate destinations (e.g., the UAE) to avoid detection, and using a variety of aliases. 10 These are not the actions of an individual who has made a one-time lapse in judgment. Rather, they show that the defendant was fully aware of the export laws that the United States has imposed with respect to Iran s petrochemical industry and that he deliberately chose to violate those laws on repeated occasions. In short, the defendant s criminal conduct in this case was serious: he deliberately facilitated the transmission of hundreds of thousands of dollars worth of critical and sophisticated industrial equipment to state-owned petrochemical companies in Iran, in obvious defiance of this country s export 10 The defendant s conduct was also brazen, as evident in his communications with customers and co-conspirators. In one e- mail highlighted in the PSR, for example, the defendant addressed a customer s concerns about a delay by requesting additional time because of the problems... for shipment to Iran as per U.S. Embargo [sic]. (PSR 12). 14

15 Case 1:12-cr LTS Document 18 Filed 02/11/13 Page 15 of 20 laws. Even if the intended purposes of the transfers were, as the defendant claims, completely legitimate, the end result was that the equipment was to be used to strengthen a critical part of the Iranian economy and a sector that has been directly targeted by recent U.S. sanctions. These actions are exactly what the Iranian embargo was designed to avoid. See United States v. Homa International Trading Corp., 387 F. 3d 144, 146 (2d Cir. 2004) ( The obvious purpose of the order is to isolate Iran from trade with the United States.... This broad export ban reflected the President s appraisal of the nation s interest in sanctioning Iran s sponsorship of international terrorism, its frustration of the Middle East peace process, and its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. ) (quoting United States v. Ehsan, 163 F.3d 855, 859 (4th Cir. 1998)). B. A Sentence Promoting Respect For The Law And Serving As A Deterrent For Future Violations Of The Export Laws Is Appropriate As the Probation Office has observed, it is difficult to assess the defendant s risk of recitivism. (PSR at 16). Nevertheless, in light of the nature and seriousness of the defendant s crime, the sentence imposed should reflect the need for general deterrence the promotion of respect for the rule of law. 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)(2)(A), (B). Export cases are situated uniquely in that Guidelines sentences can have a real and demonstrable deterrent effect on other like-minded conduct. 15

16 Case 1:12-cr LTS Document 18 Filed 02/11/13 Page 16 of 20 That deterrent effect is particularly warranted in cases such as this, involving the petrochemical industry, which has been the subject of increasingly stringent sanctions by the United States and has serious ramifications for U.S. security interests. A sentence reflecting the serious nature of the crime will serve as a warning to others seeking to bypass the Iranian embargo. By contrast, a variance of the type urged by the defendant will send precisely the wrong message: that such conduct, whatever its implications for the United States, may indeed be worth the risk. C. A Guidelines Sentence Would Avoid Unwarranted Sentencing Disparities The defendant seeks to distinguish his circumstances from the mainstream of cases in which courts have imposed significant sentences. Most strikingly, the defendant attempts to create a bright line at 24 months imprisonment by asserting that a sentence of 24 months is reserved for cases where the export has explicit military applications.... (Def. Mem. at 17-18). The defendant s manufactured standard disregards the numerous cases in which courts have imposed significant sentences where the goods were not explicitly military in nature. 11 See, e.g., United States v. Hajian, 12 Cr. 177 (M.D. 11 The defendant also brushes over the wide array of facts and circumstances at issue in the cases that he cites, many of which do not have published sentencing decisions or a complete set of 16

17 Case 1:12-cr LTS Document 18 Filed 02/11/13 Page 17 of 20 Fl. 2012) (defendant received a Guidelines sentence of 48 months imprisonment for exporting computers and related equipment to Iran over several years); United States v. Amirnazmi, 08 Cr. 429 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (defendant received 48 months imprisonment after marketing software program to Iranian actors, including a state-owned chemical company, to facilitate the construction of multiple chemical plants); 12 United States v. Dawn Hanna, 07 Cr (E.D. Mich.) (defendant sentenced to a facts publicly available. For example, in at least one case the defendant cites, where the defendant received a term of probation, United States v. Khan, 04 Cr (E.D.N.Y.), the defendant cooperated with the Government and received a Section 5K1.1 letter prior to sentencing. 12 The defendant seeks to distance his case from Hajian and Amirnazmi, but the defendant s conduct is not materially different from the offenses in those cases. In Amirnazmi, the defendant marketed a software program to various Iranian entities, including the NPC the parent company of one of the petrochemical companies the defendant sought to supply in the instant case. Although Amirzazmi took substantial steps such as meeting with state officials to further his venture, the nature and value of the products involved were not materially different from the products at issue here. See United States v. Amirnazmi, 645 F.3d 564, (3d Cir. 2011). Likewise, Hajian exported computers and related equipment (including, but not limited to, a server and array ) over a period of several years. Although the defendant claims that the offense involved goods worth more than $10 million (Def. Mem. 17), that sum represents the money judgment sought by the Government with respect to four defendants, including three corporations. (12 Cr. 177 (M.D. Fl. 2012, Dkt. No. 38). In any event, as in that case, the defendant here conducted numerous transactions over a period of years involving non-military equipment worth hundreds of thousands of dollars. Nothing about the distinguishing facts in these cases raises a concern about unwarranted sentencing disparities. 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)(6). 17

18 Case 1:12-cr LTS Document 18 Filed 02/11/13 Page 18 of 20 total of 72 months imprisonment for IEEPA violations, money laundering, and false statements in connection with provision of approximately $1 million in telecommunications equipment to Iraq); United States v. Hossein Esfahani, 05 Cr (N.D. Ill.) (defendant, who caused approximately $3.9 million to be transferred from the United States to Iran without a license, received a Guidelines sentence of 46 months imprisonment); United States v. Laura Wang-Woodford, 03 Cr (E.D.N.Y.) (defendant sentenced to top-of-guidelines sentence of 46 months imprisonment for conspiring to violate IEEPA by shipping aircraft component parts to Iran through other countries); McKeeve, 131 F.3d at 1 (51-month sentence imposed in IEEPA case involving shipment of computer products to Libya). 13 The defendant also likens his case to those in which courts have imposed departures under the Guidelines (which the defendant does not seek here). But the defendant s situation is not so extreme. For example, in United States v. Groos, No. 06 Cr. 420, 2008 WL (N.D. Ill. Dec. 16, 2008), the defendant s conduct involved, in its entirety, one sale of $25,000 worth of fire sprinklers to Iran. Id. at *4. Likewise, in United States v. Sevilla, No. 04 Cr. 0171, 2006 WL Significantly, the McKeeve court used the pre-2001 version of U.S.S.G. 2M5.1(a)(1) and 2M5.2(a)(1), which had a base offense level of 22. The sentences would likely be higher today, with the higher base offense level of

19 Case 1:12-cr LTS Document 18 Filed 02/11/13 Page 19 of 20 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 29, 2006), the defendant unsuccessfully attempted to export one United Computer Inclusive Hydraulic Floor Model Testing Machine valued at $47,500 and the corresponding software valued at $3,800. Here, even if the defendant s conduct involved procuring equipment meant for a seemingly legitimate business purpose, the defendant nevertheless was responsible for the export of hundreds of thousands of dollars worth of equipment to Iran s petrochemical industry over a period of years. The defendant conducted these transactions with multiple suppliers, for the purpose of supplying several state-owned petrochemical companies, and did so with full knowledge that his actions were illegal. While it is apparent from the above discussion that it is impossible, even dangerous, to attempt to extrapolate from cases about which the parties and the Court known precious little, it is equally apparent that a sentence within the Guidelines range would not raise the specter of unwarranted sentencing disparities. 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)(6). Accordingly, a sentence within the Guidelines sentencing range here would not necessarily be disparate with those imposed on similarly situated defendants. In any event, the defense s unscientific conclusion with respect to the length of the average IEEPA sentence is entitled to no consideration. 19

20 Case 1:12-cr LTS Document 18 Filed 02/11/13 Page 20 of 20 CONCLUSION For the reasons set forth above, the Government respectfully requests that the Court impose a sentence within the applicable Guidelines range, as such a sentencing would be sufficient but not greater than necessary to serve the legitimate purposes of sentencing. Dated: New York, New York February 11, 2013 Respectfully submitted, PREET BHARARA United States Attorney By: Shane T. Stansbury Assistant United States Attorney Tel.: (212)