E-FILED 2017 MAY 01 10:33 AM BUCHANAN - CLERK OF DISTRICT COURT IN THE IOWA DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR BUCHANAN COUNTY

Transcription

1 IN THE IOWA DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR BUCHANAN COUNTY STATE OF IOWA, Plaintiff, vs. CHRISTOPHER DOUGLAS SOULES, CASE NO. FECR MR. SOULES BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO DISMISS Defendant. I. Introduction Via Complaint and Affidavit signed by Officer Ben Ward and filed April 25, 2017, the State accused Mr. Soules of violating Iowa Code (4) by leaving the scene of an accident resulting in death. The complaint alleged Mr. Soules [did] not immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the accident or as close as possible, and fail[ed] to return to and remain at scene of accident. (4/25/17 Complaint). As detailed below, this information is factually incorrect. A recording of a 911 phone call placed by Mr. Soules provides real-time evidence that Mr. Soules unhesitatingly identified himself and his role in the accident to dispatch and tried his utmost to resuscitate Mr. Mosher. Mr. Soules described the location of the accident and communicated with dispatch for approximately 5 minutes and 45 seconds while help was en route. The evidence will further show that emergency responders arrived on the scene shortly after Mr. Soules concluded his 911 call. Mr. Soules remained on the scene with those emergency responders for several more minutes before returning to his home. For whatever reason, the charging officer failed to include in the Complaint and Affidavit that Mr. Soules provided his name and accident location to the telecommunication arm of law enforcement prior to his departure. Nor did the charging 1

2 officer mention that Mr. Soules had rendered emergency aid to Mr. Mosher. Ultimately, Mr. Soules 911 call establishes probable cause does not exist for the charge against Mr. Soules. II. Governing law The purpose of a criminal complaint is to identify a person who has allegedly committed a public criminal offense and to allow a magistrate to review the complaint and sworn affidavit to determine whether there is probable cause that the offense was committed. See Iowa Code Probable cause is established when the totality of the circumstances as viewed by a reasonable and prudent person would lead that person to believe that a crime has been committed and that the arrestee committed or is committing it. State v. Pedka, 555 N.W.2d 202 (Iowa 1996). Iowa Code (1) directs: The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to or death of any person shall immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the accident or as close as possible and if able, shall then return to and remain at the scene of the accident in accordance with section As the Iowa Supreme Court has held: [T]he manifest intent of section is to prevent a motorist involved in personal injury or property damage accidents from evading liability, civil or criminal, as a result of such accident, by escaping before his identify can be established. Further, it is clear that the legislature intended to protect persons from distress or danger from additional mutilation and exposure, for want of proper treatment. State v. Sebben, 185 N.W.2d 771, 774 (Iowa 1971). Accordingly, a person violates Iowa Code by concealing or attempting to conceal the identity of one involved in an automobile accident wherein personal injuries are sustained. Id. Iowa Code then provides: 2

3 1. The driver of a vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to or death of a person or damage to a vehicle which is driven or attended by a person shall give the driver s name, address, and the registration number of the vehicle the driver is driving and shall upon request and if available exhibit the driver s driver s license to the person struck, the driver or occupant of, or the person attending the vehicle involved in the accident and shall render to a person injured in the accident reasonable assistance, including the transporting or arranging for the transporting of the person for medical treatment if it is apparent that medical treatment is necessary or if transportation for medical treatment is requested by the injured person. 2. If the accident causes the death of a person, all surviving drivers shall remain at the scene of the accident except to seek necessary aid or to report the accident to law enforcement authorities. Before leaving the scene of the fatal accident, each surviving driver shall leave the surviving driver s driver s license, automobile registration receipt, or other identification data at the scene of the accident. After leaving the scene of the accident, a surviving driver shall promptly report the accident to law enforcement authorities, and shall immediately return to the scene of the accident or inform the law enforcement authorities where the surviving driver can be located. A person who fails to comply with the requirements of Iowa Code (1) and may be charged with a class D felony if the accident resulted in death. Iowa Code (4). III. Argument A. Mr. Soules satisfied Iowa Code (1) It is indisputable that Mr. Soules has not violated the first paragraph of Iowa Code That paragraph states two requirements: First, a driver in an accident must provide identifying information to certain individuals. Second, a driver in an accident must render reasonable assistance to anyone injured in the accident. The first requirement does not apply to the facts of this case and Mr. Soules satisfied the second requirement. 3

4 1. Providing identifying information to other individuals involved in accident As to the first requirement, the Iowa Supreme Court has clarified that Iowa Code (1), when it requires a driver to report his or her identifying information to the person struck, the driver or occupant of, or the person attending the vehicle involved in the accident does not mean law enforcement or eyewitnesses. State v. Tarbox, 739 N.W.2d 850, 854 (Iowa 2007). Rather, Iowa Code (1) simply requires a driver to report identifying information to the driver or a passenger of the other vehicle involved. Tarbox, 739 N.W.2d at 854 ( [A]ttending refers to someone who is present with the vehicle rather than one who comes upon the vehicle after the fact. ). Tragically, because Mr. Mosher was unresponsive at the time of the accident and no other person was with Mr. Mosher on his tractor, Mr. Soules had no one to whom he could report his identifying information as contemplated by Iowa Code (1). 2. Rendering reasonable assistance Turning then to the second requirement of Iowa Code (1), it must first be emphasized that the Complaint and Affidavit fails to mention Mr. Soules rendered reasonable assistance. Indeed, the 911 phone call placed by Mr. Soules establishes he rendered reasonable assistance to Mr. Mosher and arranged for medical treatment. Mr. Soules called 911 and told dispatch he had rear-ended Mr. Mosher s tractor. He relayed that Mr. Mosher and his tractor were situated in a ditch a mile north of Aurora. Mr. Soules checked on Mr. Mosher to determine if he was conscious and breathing. Mr. Soules then administered CPR to Mr. Mosher, reporting to dispatch that Mr. Mosher had blood coming out of his mouth. Other individuals were on the scene with Mr. Soules, but Mr. Soules nevertheless took it upon himself to try to revive Mr. Mosher. Before hanging 4

5 up, he confirmed that emergency responders were en route. Mr. Soules did not depart the scene until he was assured emergency personnel had the situation in hand. As a matter of law, the State cannot prove Mr. Soules did not render reasonable assistance. Mr. Soules actions at the scene, as captured by the 911 recording, unquestionably were reasonable as required by Iowa Code (1). B. Mr. Soules satisfied Iowa Code (2) No Iowa court has interpreted Iowa Code (2), but an examination of the plain language of that provision reveals Mr. Soules was in full compliance with its requirements. The first sentence states that, in an accident causing death, the surviving driver must remain at the scene except to seek aid or report the accident. But the first sentence of Iowa Code (2) must be read in tandem with the second: the second sentence states that, before leaving the scene, the driver must provide a driver s license, automobile registration receipt, or other identification data at the scene of the accident. The first sentence s directive to remain on the scene cannot be indefinite; the second sentence qualifies what is necessary to release a surviving driver to leave the scene. To discharge the legal obligation imposed, these first two sentences clearly establish that a surviving driver must remain on the scene until the driver has provided identifying information. Notably, the Tarbox decision supports this proposition by its explicit rejection of the argument that Iowa Code (1) requires a driver to remain at an accident scene until the police arrive. Tarbox, 739 N.W.2d at

6 As the 911 recording proves, Mr. Soules complied with Iowa Code (2) by providing his identification data to dispatch while on the scene of the accident. 1 Identification data is not defined in the Iowa Code; it serves as a catchall. The dictionary definition of identification is the state of being identified or evidence of identity. Identification, Merriam-Webster, see also Tarbox, 739 N.W.2d at 853 ( Absent a statutory definition or an established meaning in the law, we give words used by the legislature their ordinary and common meaning ); State v. White, 563 N.W.2d 615, 617 (Iowa 1997) ( The dictionary provides a ready source for ascertaining the common and ordinary meaning of a word. ). Relatedly, Iowa Code 719.1A criminalizes the provision of false identification information to law enforcement. If a person can be prosecuted for merely providing false identification it is then axiomatic a person should be absolved from criminal liability for providing truthful identification information. By stating his name, Mr. Soules provided the information necessary for dispatch, law enforcement, and Mr. Mosher s family to identify him. Mr. Soules is well-known in his small community. His identity was known to the emergency responders who arrived on scene. A second call to from law enforcement to dispatch further confirms that law enforcement was aware Mr. Soules was the driver of the vehicle that struck Mr. Mosher s tractor. There was never any attempt by Mr. Soules to obfuscate his identity. Cf. Sebben, 185 N.W.2d at 774 (defendant never revealed identify and in fact 1 The second sentence of Iowa Code (2) is silent as to whom identification data must be provided. Accordingly, Mr. Soules disclosure of his identity to dispatch must satisfy this requirement. See Tarbox, 739 N.W.2d at 853 ( [T]his court strictly construes criminal statutes with doubts resolved in the accused's favor. ). 6

7 deliberately concealed identity). Mr. Soules thus satisfied the prerequisite that freed him to leave the scene: he provided identification data at the scene of the accident. Mr. Soules likewise satisfied the requirements of the third sentence of Iowa Code (2). Again, that sentence states: After leaving the scene of the accident, a surviving driver shall promptly report the accident to law enforcement authorities, and shall immediately return to the scene of the accident or inform the law enforcement authorities where the surviving driver can be located. (Emphasis added). The disjunctive or is important. A surviving driver is relieved of the responsibility of returning to the scene so long as the driver informs law enforcement of the location of the surviving driver. Soules promptly reported the accident to dispatch, which is an arm of law enforcement. See Iowa Code 34.2(4) ( A 911 system shall be capable of transmitting requests for law enforcement, fire fighting, and emergency medical and ambulance services to a public safety agency or agencies that provide the requested service at the place where the call originates. ); id. 80B.11C (stating law enforcement academy provides training to dispatchers; training curriculum developed in consultation with law enforcement agencies); (stating Buchanan County Sheriff s Office Communications Division provides dispatch services for the Sheriff s Office and police departments in Fairbank, Independence, and Jesup); see also Tarbox, 739 N.W.2d at 854 (recognizing a person in an accident would contact the authorities and [a]t that point the dispatcher would send the necessary authorities and medical personnel to the scene to render aid ). Because Mr. Soules reported the accident to dispatch and informed dispatch where the accident had occurred, he was in 7

8 full compliance with the last sentence of Iowa Code (2). He had no legal obligation to return to the scene or to wait there for law enforcement to arrive. C. Mr. Soules satisfied Iowa Code Having shown Mr. Soules fulfilled the various requirements of Iowa Code , it becomes clear that Mr. Soules cannot be charged with a violation of Iowa Code The first clause of Iowa Code (1) requires a driver to stop immediately at the scene and the second clause requires a driver to remain at the scene in accordance with section There can be no dispute that Mr. Soules stopped his vehicle immediately at the scene of the accident, satisfying the first clause of Iowa Code (1). And, as explained above, Mr. Soules complied with Iowa Code , satisfying the second clause of Iowa Code (1). IV. Conclusion The information provided by Mr. Soules during his 911 call fulfilled the requirements of the reporting statutes. Not only did Mr. Soules satisfy the letter of the law, he satisfied the spirit. He gave law enforcement on-the-spot identification and location information and reasonably provided treatment to Mr. Mosher. See Sebben, 185 N.W.2d at 774 (stating these purposes); Tarbox, 739 N.W.2d at 855 (finding, as a matter of law, defendant could not be prosecuted for violating Iowa Code ; affirming district court s grant of motion to dismiss). Because probable cause does not exist to establish Mr. Soules committed the charged offense, the prosecution against him must be dismissed. 8

9 Copies to: PARRISH KRUIDENIER DUNN BOLES GRIBBLE GENTRY BROWN & BERGMANN, L.L.P. By: /s/ Gina Messamer Alfredo Parrish AT Brandon Brown AT Gina Messamer AT Grand Avenue Des Moines, Iowa Telephone: (515) Facsimile: (515) ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT PROOF OF SERVICE The undersigned certifies that the foregoing instrument was served upon all parties to the above cause by: ( ) personal service ( ) first class mail ( ) certified mail, return receipt requested ( ) facsimile ( ) Airborne Express (overnight) (X) electronic filing ( ) on May 1, I declare that the statements above are true to the best of my information, knowledge and belief. Shawn M. Harden Buchanan County Attorney th Avenue NE P.O. Box 68 Independence, Iowa Phone: (319) Fax: (319) ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF Christopher D. Soules DEFENDANT /s/ Gina Messamer 9