No IN THE SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS Term, A.D. 2003

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1 No IN THE SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS Term, A.D PATRICIA ABRAMS, individually, ) Petition for Leave to Appeal from the and as Special Administrator of ) First District Appellate Court of Illinois, the Estate of GEORGIA SABRINA ) First Division WHITE, deceased, and DOROTHY ) BROWN, ) Case No ) Plaintiffs-Respondents, ) There Heard on Appeal from the Circuit ) Court of Cook County, Illinois, County v. ) Department, Law Division ) THE CITY OF CHICAGO, ) Case No. 98 L A Municipal Corporation, ) ) The Honorable Kathy Flanagan Defendant-Petitioner ) Judge Presiding ) and ) HENRIETTA YOUNG and GREGORY ) JONES, ) ) Defendants. ) ) BRIEF AS AMICUS CURIAE, THE ILLINOIS MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, IN SUPPORT OF THE DEFENDANT-PETITIONER, THE CITY OF CHICAGO

2 TABLE OF CONTENTS POINTS AND AUTHORITIES STATEMENT OF AMICUS CURIAE JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT ISSUES UPON REVIEW STATUTES INVOLVED STATEMENT OF FACTS ii iv iv iv iv v ARGUMENTS 1 PLAINTIFFS -RESPONDENTS DID NOT SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGE A GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT IN THEIR ALLEGATIONS OF WILLFUL AND WANTON MISCONDUCT AGAINST THE CITY OF CHICAGO TO PRECLUDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT 1 THE AFFIRMATION OF THE FIRST DISTRICT APPELLATE COURT S RULING WOULD IMPOSE A SUBSTANTIAL BURDEN UPON MUNICIPALITIES IN ILLINOIS BY REQUIRING THEM TO FACE POTENTIAL LIABILITY FOR FOLLOWING THEIR OWN EMERGENCY PROCEDURES WHEN THEIR ACTIONS ARE NOT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF PLAINTIFF S INJURIES 5 CONCLUSION 7 i

3 POINTS AND AUTHORITIES I. PLAINTIFFS -RESPONDENTS DID NOT SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGE A GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT IN THEIR ALLEGATIONS OF WILLFUL AND WANTON MISCONDUCT AGAINST THE CITY OF CHICAGO TO PRECLUDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(b) 1 Gober v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 263 Ill. App. 3d 846, 636 N.E.2d 1016, 201 Ill. Dec. 584, 586 (2d Dist. 1994). 1 Wortel v. Somerset Industries, Inc., 331 Ill. App. 3d 895, 770 N.E.2d 1211, 264 Ill. Dec. 515, (1st Dist. 2002), rehearing denied, appeal denied 201 Ill. 2d 619, 786 N.E.2d 202, 271 Ill. Dec. 944 (2002) ILCS 5/2-1005(c) 1 Community Bank of Greater Peoria v. Carter, 283 Ill. App. 3d 505, , 669 N.E.2d 1317, 1319, 218 Ill. Dec. 791, 793 (1st Dist. 1996). 1 Lewis v. Lead Industries Association, Inc., 342 Ill. App. 3d 95, 793 N.E.2d 869, 874, 276 Ill. Dec. 110, 115 (1st Dist. 2003). 2 W. Page Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on Torts, 41, page 263 (5th ed. 1984). 2 Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 137 Ill. 2d 222, 232, 560 N.E.2d 324, 148 Ill. Dec. 22 (1990). 2 Sisk v. Williamson County, 167 Ill. 2d 343, 346, 657 N.E.2d 903, 905, 212 Ill. Dec (1995). Meck v. Paramedic Services of Illinois, 296 Ill. App. 3d 720, 695 N.E.2d 1321, 231 Ill. Dec. 202 (1st Dist.1998), rehearing denied, appeal denied 179 Ill. 2d 587, 705 N.E.2d 439, 235 Ill. Dec ILCS 50/ Suwanski v. Village of Lombard, 342 Ill. App. 3d 248, 794 N.E.2d 1016, 1021, 276 Ill. Dec. 766, 771 (2d Dist.2003). 4 Quirke v. City of Harvey, 266 Ill. App. 3d 664, 639 N.E.2d 1355, 203 Ill. Dec. 536 (1st Dist. 1994). 4 Thompson v. County of Cook, 154 Ill.2d 374, 609 N.E.2d 290, 181 Ill. Dec. 922 (1993). 4 ii

4 Merlo v. Public Service Co. of Northern Illinois, 381 Ill. 300, 45 N.E.2d 665 (1942). 4 Sokolowski v. All Points Distribution Service, Inc., 243 Ill. App. 3d 539, 612 N.E.2d 79, 183 Ill. Dec. 822 (1993). 4 II. THE AFFIRMATION OF THE FIRST DISTRICT APPELLATE COURT S RULING WOULD IMPOSE A SUBSTANTIAL BURDEN UPON MUNICIPALITIES IN ILLINOIS BY REQUIRING THEM TO FACE POTENTIAL LIABILITY FOR FOLLOWING THEIR OWN EMERGENCY PROCEDURES WHEN THEIR ACTIONS ARE NOT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF PLAINTIFF S INJURIES 210 ILCS 50/ Bowden v. Cary Fire Protection Dist., 304 Ill. App. 3d 274, 710 N.E.2d 548, 237 Ill. Dec. 918 (2d Dist.1999). 6 iii

5 STATEMENT OF AMICUS CURIAE THE ILLINOIS MUNICIPAL LEAGUE IN SUPPORT OF THE DEFENDANT-PETITIONER S MOTION FOR REVERSAL OF THE APPELLATE COURT JUDGMENT AND REINSTATEMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT S GRANTING OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT Comes now the Illinois Municipal League as amicus curiae and states the following in support of the motion for reversal of the appellate court judgment and reinstatement of the circuit court s granting of summary judgment filed by the Defendant-Petitioner, the City of Chicago. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT This Honorable Court has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 315(a) as the Circuit Court of Cook County granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendant-Petitioner in Case No. 98 L 13310, and the First District Appellate Court in Illinois reversed the Circuit Court s grant of summary judgment in Case No ISSUES UPON REVIEW 1. Whether the Plaintiffs-Respondents sufficiently alleged a genuine issue of material fact in their allegations of willful and wanton misconduct against the City of Chicago to preclude summary judgment? 2. Whether the affirmation of the First District Appellate Court s ruling would impose a substantial burden upon municipalities in Illinois by requiring municipalities to face potential liability for following their own emergency procedures when they are not the proximate cause of plaintiff s injuries? STATUTES INVOVLED 210 ILCS 50/ Immunity from civil liability Immunity from civil liability. (a) Any person, agency or governmental body certified, licensed or authorized pursuant to this Act or rules thereunder, who in good faith provides emergency or non-emergency medical services during a Department approved training course, in the normal course of iv

6 conducting their duties, or in an emergency, shall not be civilly liable as a result of their acts or omissions in providing such services unless such acts or omissions, including the bypassing of nearby hospitals or medical facilities in accordance with the protocols developed pursuant to this Act, constitute willful and wanton misconduct. (b) No person, including any private or governmental organization or institution that administers, sponsors, authorizes, supports, finances, educates or supervises the functions of emergency medical services personnel certified, licensed or authorized pursuant to this Act, including persons participating in a Department approved training program, shall be liable for any civil damages for any act or omission in connection with administration, sponsorship, authorization, support, finance, education or supervision of such emergency medical services personnel, where the act or omission occurs in connection with activities within the scope of this Act, unless the act or omission was the result of willful and wanton misconduct. (c) Exemption from civil liability for emergency care is as provided in the Good Samaritan Act. (d) No local agency, entity of State or local government, or other public or private organization, nor any officer, director, trustee, employee, consultant or agent of any such entity, which sponsors, authorizes, supports, finances, or supervises the training of persons in a basic cardiopulmonary resuscitation course which complies with generally recognized standards, shall be liable for damages in any civil action based on the training of such persons unless an act or omission during the course of instruction constitutes willful and wanton misconduct. (e) No person who is certified to teach basic cardiopulmonary resuscitation, and who teaches a course of instruction which complies with generally recognized standards for basic cardiopulmonary resuscitation, shall be liable for damages in any civil action based on the acts or omissions of a person who received such instruction, unless an act or omission during the course of such instruction constitutes willful and wanton misconduct. (f) No member or alternate of the State Emergency Medical Services Disciplinary Review Board or a local System review board who in good faith exercises his responsibilities under this Act shall be liable for damages in any civil action based on such activities unless an act or omission during the course of such activities constitutes willful and wanton misconduct. (g) No EMS Medical Director who in good faith exercises his responsibilities under this Act shall be liable for damages in any civil action based on such activities unless an act or omission during the course of such activities constitutes willful and wanton misconduct. (h) Nothing in this Act shall be construed to create a cause of action or any civil liabilities. STATEMENT OF FACTS The Plaintiff, Patricia Abrams, telephoned the City of Chicago s 911 service at 1:47 a.m. on November 18, 1997, asking for an ambulance because she had gone into labor with her seventh pregnancy. She told the operator that her contractions were 10 minutes apart and that she v

7 did not have a vehicle. Following the service s system of flip cards, which is proper protocol for the city s service, the operator asked the Plaintiff a variety of questions. Again following protocol, the operator explained to the Plaintiff that an ambulance would not be sent to transport her to the hospital because her situation as described by the Plaintiff was not an emergency. The Plaintiff then awakened her sister (Co-Plaintiff Dorothy Brown), who then telephoned the city s 911 service at 1:53 a.m., and she was also told that it was not an emergency. Subsequently, the Plaintiffs contacted Defendant Henrietta Young who agreed to leave work to take Abrams to the hospital. On their way to the hospital, Plaintiff Abrams was sitting in the front passenger seat and the Co-Plaintiff Brown was in the back seat. As Defendant Young was driving northbound on King Drive, she held down the horn on her vehicle, going through a red light while looking at traffic. As Young s vehicle was in the intersection of King Drive and Pershing Road (39 th Street), it collided with a vehicle driven by the Co-Defendant, Gregory Jones. Co-Defendant Jones was traveling between 75 and 80 miles per hour, driving on a suspended license, and driving while intoxicated on alcohol and Crack cocaine at the time of the collision. As a result of the impact, the Plaintiffs sustained injuries, including Plaintiff Abrams going into a coma, having surgery and hardware placed in her right leg, removal of her right ovary, and losing the child, Georgia Sabrina White, with which she was pregnant. The Plaintiffs Abrams and White then filed suit against the Defendant City of Chicago. In their complaint against the City of Chicago, the Plaintiffs claimed that the City owed a duty to the Plaintiffs to use reasonable care and caution when operating the emergency service. The Plaintiffs alleged that the City disregarded that duty when the Plaintiffs called the City s emergency service requesting emergency ambulatory service and the City willfully, wantonly, recklessly, and/or negligently refused to provide or relay the need for such emergency vi

8 ambulatory assistance. The Plaintiffs alleged that they were forced to use amateur emergency assistance which resulted in an automobile collision. According to the Plaintiffs, the injuries were sustained by the various Plaintiffs as a direct and proximate result of the negligent conduct of the City of Chicago. On December 3, 1999, the Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their claim of negligence against the City, leaving allegations of willful and wanton misconduct, which was so ordered by the Circuit Court. The City filed a motion for summary judgment claiming that the Plaintiffs failed to sufficiently allege genuine issues of material facts upon which relief could be granted. In its motion for summary judgment, the City argued that: (1) its refusal to send an ambulance was not the proximate cause of the Plaintiffs injuries, and that the true cause of the accident was Defendant Young running a red light, and being struck by a vehicle whose driver was himself speeding and driving on a suspended license, drinking and smoking Crack cocaine; (2) there was no duty owed under the facts and circumstances of this case to operate an ambulance service for all women in labor, on the outside chance that other people would be trusted to drive them to the hospital; (3) even assuming that the Emergency Medical Services Systems (EMS) Act (210 ILCS 50/1-50/33) required or imposed a duty on the City not to behave in a willful and wanton manner, there was no factual establishment of any willful and wanton misconduct on the part of the City since there was no evidence that failure to send an ambulance under the facts, circumstances, and condition of the Plaintiff constituted a highly unreasonable risk of harm to her; and (4) there was no evidence that the City protocol or any other standard, ordinance, etc. required sending ambulances to women whose contractions were ten minutes apart. The Circuit Court granted the City s motion for summary judgment solely on the basis on the issue of proximate cause. The Circuit Court noted that proximate cause exists when the injury vii

9 is the natural and probable result of the defendant s negligent act, and when the injury is of the sort that an ordinary prudent person ought to have foreseen as likely to occur as a result of that negligence. A defendant s misconduct is not a proximate cause of a plaintiff s injury if some intervening act supersedes defendant s negligence; however, if a defendant could reasonably foresee the intervening act, that act will not relieve the defendant of liability. Therefore, the Circuit Court determined that the relevant inquiry in the present matter was whether the conduct of the drivers of the motor vehicles involved in the collision which caused the Plaintiffs injuries were reasonably foreseeable to the City. The Circuit Court concluded that the City could not have reasonably foreseen that one or both of these drivers would violate their statutory duties to safely operate their motor vehicles on the highways of the state and the city. Specifically, it was not reasonably foreseeable on the part of the City that the driver of the vehicle in which the Plaintiffs were passengers would ride through a red light into an intersection and into the path of on-coming traffic which was proceeding in conjunction with signals which allowed that traffic to proceed in that direction. It was also not reasonably foreseeable by the City that the driver of the other vehicle would be speeding, driving after consuming alcohol and Crack cocaine, and driving on a suspended license. Thus, the Circuit Court found that based on this determination, there was no reason to consider the other issues in this case. On appeal, the First District Appellate Court first determined that the trial court erred in ruling on causation while declining to rule on the issue of whether the City owed Plaintiffs a duty of care because, whether a duty exists is the threshold question in a breach of duty claim. Secondly, the Appellate Court determined that the City s refusal to dispatch an ambulance and transport the plaintiff to the hospital could have been a cause in fact because it was a material element and substantial factor in bringing about the Plaintiff s injuries. Therefore, the Appellate viii

10 Court held that summary judgment for the City was not proper in this matter because issues of duty owed and material facts as to causation of injuries were not decided by the trial court. As a result, the Appellate Court reversed the decision of the trial court and remanded the case for further proceedings. ix

11 STATEMENT OF AMICUS CURIAE THE ILLINOIS MUNICIPAL LEAGUE IN SUPPORT OF THE DEFENDANT-PETITIONER S MOTION FOR REVERSAL OF THE APPELLATE COURT JUDGMENT AND REINSTATEMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT S GRANTING OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT Comes now the Illinois Municipal League as amicus curiae and states the following in support of the motion for reversal of the appellate court judgment and reinstatement of the circuit court s granting of summary judgment filed by the Defendant-Petitioner, the City of Chicago. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT This Honorable Court has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 315(a) as the Circuit Court of Cook County granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendant-Petitioner in Case No. 98 L 13310, and the First District Appellate Court in Illinois reversed the Circuit Court s grant of summary judgment in Case No ISSUES UPON REVIEW 1. Whether the Plaintiffs-Respondents sufficiently alleged a genuine issue of material fact in their allegations of willful and wanton misconduct against the City of Chicago to preclude summary judgment? 2. Whether the affirmation of the First District Appellate Court s ruling would impose a substantial burden upon municipalities in Illinois by requiring municipalities to face potential liability for following their own emergency procedures when they are not the proximate cause of plaintiff s injuries? STATEMENT OF FACTS The Plaintiff, Patricia Abrams, telephoned the City of Chicago s 911 service at 1:47 a.m. on November 18, 1997, asking for an ambulance because she had gone into labor with her seventh pregnancy. She told the operator that her contractions were 10 minutes apart and that she did not have a vehicle. Following the service s system of flip cards, which is proper protocol for 1

12 the city s service, the operator asked the Plaintiff a variety of questions. Again following protocol, the operator explained to the Plaintiff that an ambulance would not be sent to transport her to the hospital because her situation as described by the Plaintiff was not an emergency. The Plaintiff then awakened her sister (Co-Plaintiff Dorothy Brown), who then telephoned the city s 911 service at 1:53 a.m., and she was also told that it was not an emergency. Subsequently, the Plaintiffs contacted Defendant Henrietta Young who agreed to leave work to take Abrams to the hospital. On their way to the hospital, Plaintiff Abrams was sitting in the front passenger seat and the Co-Plaintiff Brown was in the back seat. As Defendant Young was driving northbound on King Drive, she held down the horn on her vehicle, going through a red light while looking at traffic. As Young s vehicle was in the intersection of King Drive and Pershing Road (39 th Street), it was struck on the passenger side by the vehicle driven by the Co- Defendant, Gregory Jones. Co-Defendant Jones was traveling between 75 and 80 miles per hour, driving on a suspended license, and driving while intoxicated on alcohol and Crack cocaine at the time of the collision. As a result of the impact, the Plaintiffs sustained injuries, including Plaintiff Abrams going into a coma, having surgery and hardware placed in her right leg, removal of her right ovary, and losing the child, Georgia Sabrina White, with which she was pregnant. The Plaintiffs then filed suit against the Defendants. In their complaint against the City of Chicago, the Plaintiffs claimed that the City owed a duty to the Plaintiffs to use reasonable care and caution when operating the emergency service. The Plaintiffs alleged that the City disregarded that duty when the Plaintiffs called the City s emergency service requesting emergency ambulatory service and the City willfully, wantonly, recklessly, and/or negligently refused to provide or relay the need for such emergency ambulatory assistance. The Plaintiffs alleged that they were forced to use amateur emergency 2

13 assistance which resulted in an automobile collision. According to the Plaintiffs, the injuries were sustained by the various Plaintiffs as a direct and proximate result of the negligent conduct of the City of Chicago. On December 3, 1999, the Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their claim of negligence against the City, leaving allegations of willful and wanton misconduct, which was so ordered by the Circuit Court. The City filed a motion for summary judgment claiming that the Plaintiffs failed to sufficiently allege genuine issues of material facts upon which relief could be granted. In its motion for summary judgment, the City argued that: (1) its refusal to send an ambulance was not the proximate cause of the Plaintiffs injuries, and that the true cause of the accident was Defendant Young running a red light, and being struck by a vehicle whose driver was himself speeding and driving on a suspended license, drinking and smoking Crack cocaine; (2) there was no duty owed under the facts and circumstances of this case to operate an ambulance service for all women in labor, on the outside chance that other people would be trusted to drive them to the hospital; (3) even assuming that the Emergency Medical Services Systems (EMS) Act (210 ILCS 50/1-50/33) required or imposed a duty on the City not to behave in a willful and wanton manner, there was no factual establishment of any willful and wanton misconduct on the part of the City since there was no evidence that failure to send an ambulance under the facts, circumstances, and condition of the Plaintiff constituted a highly unreasonable risk of harm to her; and (4) there was no evidence that the City protocol or any other standard, ordinance, etc. required sending ambulances to women whose contractions were ten minutes apart. The Circuit Court granted the City s motion for summary judgment solely on the basis on the issue of proximate cause. The Circuit Court noted that proximate cause exists when the injury is the natural and probable result of the defendant s negligent act, and when the injury is of the 3

14 sort that an ordinary prudent person ought to have foreseen as likely to occur as a result of that negligence. A defendant s misconduct is not a proximate cause of a plaintiff s injury if some intervening act supersedes defendant s negligence; however, if a defendant could reasonably foresee the intervening act, that act will not relieve the defendant of liability. Therefore, the Circuit Court determined that the relevant inquiry in the present matter was whether the conduct of the drivers of the motor vehicles involved in the collision which caused the Plaintiffs injuries were reasonably foreseeable to the City. The Circuit Court concluded that the City could not have reasonably foreseen that one or both of these drivers would violate their statutory duties to safely operate their motor vehicles on the highways of the state and the city. Specifically, it was not reasonably foreseeable on the part of the City that the driver of the vehicle in which the Plaintiffs were passengers would ride through a red light into an intersection and into the path of on-coming traffic which was proceeding in conjunction with signals which allowed that traffic to proceed in that direction. It was also not reasonably foreseeable by the City that the driver of the other vehicle would be speeding, driving after consuming alcohol and Crack cocaine, and driving on a suspended license. Thus, the Circuit Court found that based on this determination, there was no reason to consider the other issues in this case. On appeal, the First District Appellate Court first determined that the trial court erred in ruling on causation while declining to rule on the issue of whether the City owed Plaintiffs a duty of care because, whether a duty exists is the threshold question in a breach of duty claim. Secondly, the Appellate Court determined that the City s refusal to dispatch an ambulance and transport the plaintiff to the hospital could have been a cause in fact because it was a material element and substantial factor in bringing about the Plaintiff s injuries. Therefore, the Appellate Court held that summary judgment for the City was not proper in this matter because issues of 4

15 duty owed and material facts as to causation of injuries were not decided by the trial court. As a result, the Appellate Court reversed the decision of the trial court and remanded the case for further proceedings. ARGUMENTS I. PLAINTIFFS -RESPONDENTS DID NOT SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGE A GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT IN THEIR ALLEGATIONS OF WILLFUL AND WANTON MISCONDUCT AGAINST THE CITY OF CHICAGO TO PRECLUDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT Where there are no genuine issues of material fact, summary judgment is a proper method of disposing of an action for a defendant. See 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(b). However, summary judgment is a drastic remedy and should be allowed only when the moving party has a clear and certain right to judgment as a matter of law. Gober v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 263 Ill. App. 3d 846, 848, 636 N.E.2d 1016, 1018, 201 Ill. Dec. 584, 586 (2d Dist. 1994). A defendant who moves for summary judgment may meet its initial burden of production in at least two ways: (1) by affirmatively disproving the plaintiff s case by introducing evidence that, if uncontroverted, would entitle the movant to judgment as a matter of law, or (2) by establishing that the nonmovant lacks sufficient evidence to prove an essential element of the cause of action. Wortel v. Somerset Industries, Inc., 331 Ill. App. 3d 895, 899, 770 N.E.2d 1211, 1214, 264 Ill. Dec. 515, 518 (1st Dist. 2002), rehearing denied, appeal denied 201 Ill. 2d 619, 786 N.E.2d 202, 271 Ill. Dec. 944 (2002). Summary judgment is properly entered when the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits fail to establish a genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c). In ruling upon a summary judgment motion, the evidence is reviewed de novo and construed in the light most 5

16 favorable to the nonmovant. Community Bank of Greater Peoria v. Carter, 283 Ill. App. 3d 505, , 669 N.E.2d 1317, 1319, 218 Ill. Dec. 791, 793 (1st Dist. 1996). An essential element of a plaintiff s cause of action for any tort is that there be a proximate causal relationship between the act or omission of the defendant and the damages which the plaintiff suffered. Lewis v. Lead Industries Association, Inc., 342 Ill. App. 3d 95, 793 N.E.2d 869, 874, 276 Ill. Dec. 110, 115 (1st Dist. 2003), quoting W. Page Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on Torts, 41, page 263 (5th ed. 1984). In addition, a fundamental principle of tort law is that the plaintiff has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant caused the complained-of harm or injury; mere conjecture or speculation is insufficient proof. Smith v. Eli Lilly & Co., 137 Ill. 2d 222, 232, 560 N.E.2d 324, 148 Ill. Dec. 22 (1990). This Honorable Court in Smith rejected the notion that liability may be imposed based merely on a breach of duty, without causation being established. Therefore, whether a plaintiff s tort claim is brought under a negligence or a willful and wanton theory, the plaintiff is required to show that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to the proximate causal relationship between the act or omission of the defendant and the damages which the plaintiff suffered to preclude summary judgment. To state a cause of action in negligence, a plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to establish that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care, a breach of that duty, and an injury proximately caused by that breach. Sisk v. Williamson County, 167 Ill. 2d 343, 346, 657 N.E.2d 903, 905, 212 Ill. Dec. 558 (1995). If there was no duty, there simply cannot be a breach of duty that is a proximate cause of the plaintiff s injuries. To state a cause of action for willful and wanton misconduct, on the other hand, the plaintiff must sufficiently plead facts to establish that the defendant acted intentionally, or that the defendant s actions were in total disregard for the 6

17 safety of others. See e.g. Meck v. Paramedic Services of Illinois, 296 Ill. App. 3d 720, 695 N.E.2d 1321, 231 Ill. Dec. 202 (1st Dist.1998), rehearing denied, appeal denied 179 Ill. 2d 587, 705 N.E.2d 439, 235 Ill. Dec However, as noted above, the plaintiff must sufficiently show that the defendant s actions were the proximate cause of the plaintiff s injuries even when alleging willful and wanton misconduct on the part of the defendant. Therefore, in a claim of willful and wanton misconduct, proximate causation becomes a threshold issue because, if the defendant s actions or inactions were not the proximate cause of the plaintiff s injuries, then the defendant could not have acted willfully or wantonly. Initially, the plaintiffs filed a negligence and willful and wanton misconduct claim against the City of Chicago. However, on December 3, 1999, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their claim of negligence and maintained the allegations of willful and wanton misconduct against the City. In addition, Section 3.15 of the EMS Act provides immunity for emergency medical services from civil liability for negligence claims, and provides liability where the act or omission of the emergency medical service was the result of willful and wanton misconduct. 210 ILCS 50/3.15. The EMS Act protects paramedics and emergency medical technicians (EMTs) from claims of mere negligence, but specifically authorizes suits for willful and wanton misconduct and acts or omissions inconsistent with the person's training. Meck v. Paramedic Services of Illinois, 296 Ill. App. 3d 720, 695 N.E.2d 1321, 231 Ill. Dec. 202 (1st Dist.1998), rehearing denied, appeal denied 179 Ill. 2d 587, 705 N.E.2d 439, 235 Ill. Dec Hence, this was not a breach of duty claim as determined by the First District Appellate Court in this matter. Therefore, the trial court was required to examine the alleged facts presented by the plaintiffs in this matter, and in a light most favorable to the plaintiffs allegations, under the willful and wanton standard upon the City s motion for summary judgment. As noted above, the 7

18 threshold issue to be determined in a tort action under the willful and wanton theory is whether the City s action or inaction was the proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries. The issue of the existence of proximate cause is ordinarily determined by the trier of fact. However, where the facts are undisputed and reasonable people would not differ as to the inferences to be drawn from the facts, proximate cause may be determined as a matter of law. Suwanski v. Village of Lombard, 342 Ill. App. 3d 248, 794 N.E.2d 1016, 1021, 276 Ill. Dec. 766, 771 (2d Dist.2003). Legal cause presents a question of foreseeability. Id. If a defendant's negligence does nothing more than furnish a condition by which injury is made possible, that negligence is not the proximate cause of injury. Quirke v. City of Harvey, 266 Ill. App. 3d 664, 639 N.E.2d 1355, 203 Ill. Dec. 536 (1st Dist. 1994); (Thompson v. County of Cook (1993), 154 Ill.2d 374, 383, 181 Ill. Dec. 922, 926, 609 N.E.2d 290, 294, citing Merlo v. Public Service Co. of Northern Illinois (1942), 381 Ill. 300, 306, 45 N.E.2d 665, 675.) Proximate cause exists when the injury is the natural and probable result of the defendant's negligent act, and the injury is of the sort that an ordinarily prudent person ought to have foreseen as likely to occur as a result of the negligence. Quirke, supra; (Sokolowski v. All Points Distribution Service, Inc. (1993), 243 Ill. App. 3d 539, 543, 183 Ill. Dec. 822, 825, 612 N.E.2d 79, 82.) Therefore, the trial court properly examined whether the drivers of the motor vehicles in the present matter and their unlawful actions were reasonably foreseeable to the City of Chicago, and rightfully determined that they were not reasonably foreseeable. Since the City could not have reasonably foreseen the unlawful actions of the drivers of the motor vehicles, which was the real cause of the plaintiffs injuries, the City s actions or inactions were not the proximate cause of plaintiffs injuries. Consequently, and although the trial court s opinion failed to mention it, the City s actions or inactions could not 8

19 have been considered willful and wanton. And, since the threshold issue of proximate cause was answered in favor of the defendant, there was no reason to address any of the other issues. However, the First District Appellate Court examined the entire matter solely under the negligence and breach of duty standard, even though the negligence claim was dismissed and only the willful and wanton claim remained. The appellate court concluded that summary judgment was not precluded in this matter because the trial court failed to examine the threshold question of duty under the negligence and breach of duty standard. However, negligence was no longer on the table. Only willful and wanton was left. The elements to show negligence are substantially different from the elements to show willful and wanton misconduct. At the trial court level, the City argued that the plaintiffs failed to prove willful and wanton misconduct, but the trial court did not find it necessary to reach that issue since it found for the City on the issue of proximate cause. Notwithstanding, the appellate court did not examine the facts of the matter under the willful and wanton standard. Therefore, the appellate court in this matter erred, its decision should be reversed, and the trial court s grant of summary judgment for the City should be reinstated. II. THE AFFIRMATION OF THE FIRST DISTRICT APPELLATE COURT S RULING WOULD IMPOSE A SUBSTANTIAL BURDEN UPON MUNICIPALITIES IN ILLINOIS BY REQUIRING THEM TO FACE POTENTIAL LIABILITY FOR FOLLOWING THEIR OWN EMERGENCY PROCEDURES WHEN THEIR ACTIONS ARE NOT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF PLAINTIFF S INJURIES The appellate court s ruling in this matter would have a substantial negative financial impact upon municipalities that operate their own emergency medical service if its decision would stand. In effect, the appellate court s ruling lowers the statutory civil liability standard in Section 3.15 of the EMS Act from willful and wanton acts or omissions to negligence. As 9

20 outlined above, the negligence standard is significantly lower than the willful and wanton standard. The negligence standard ends with proximate cause where willful and wanton begins with proximate cause. Obviously, the General Assembly understood this distinction because it specifically provided for liability only where the acts or omissions of an emergency medical service would constitute willful and wanton misconduct. Every municipality that operates an emergency medical service would potentially be held liable, and forced to defend themselves, every time someone called their service for assistance whether they qualified or not under the appellate court s reasoning. In the present matter, Plaintiff Abrams clearly did not qualify for emergency medical assistance under the standard operating procedures of the City s EMS system because her situation (pregnant, in labor with contractions 10 minutes apart, no other medical problems, and no vehicle) was not considered an emergency warranting the dispatch of an ambulance and personnel at the City s expense. The acts or omissions of emergency medical services and/or technicians can not be considered willful and wanton misconduct when the standard operating procedures are followed. See Bowden v. Cary Fire Protection Dist., 304 Ill. App. 3d 274, 710 N.E.2d 548, 237 Ill. Dec. 918 (2d Dist.1999) (Emergency medical technicians' (EMTs) emergency treatment of asthma patient was not, as matter of law, willful and wanton conduct, such that fire department was immune from liability for patient's death under Emergency Medical Services (EMS) Systems Act, even if EMTs acted negligently, where EMTs' conduct was in conformity with the written standing orders and protocols (SOPs) governing treatment of asthma patients, and EMTs did not attempt any life support services beyond their level of training)(emphasis added). However, under the appellate court s reasoning in the present case, a municipality could be held liable in such a situation because it should know or reasonably foresee that someone would drive erratically and 10

21 unlawfully, and cause a fatal accident. In such a situation, it would be reasonably foreseeable that someone would call a cab to get to the hospital, or ask her friend not to drive erratically especially since an emergency medical systems operator explained that it was not an emergency. But, it is not reasonably foreseeable by anyone, let alone a reasonably prudent person, that she would contact a friend who would run a red light and get hit by someone else speeding and intoxicated on alcohol and Crack cocaine. To require municipalities that operate their own EMS system to be potentially liable under such circumstances would be extremely burdensome upon municipalities. III. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, the First District Appellate Courts decision in the present matter should be reversed and the Circuit Court s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Defendant City of Chicago should be reinstated. 11