COMMONWEALTH'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS

Transcription

1 COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS HAMPSHIRE, ss. SUPERIOR COURT DEPT. NO. HSCR COMMONWEALTH V. CARA L. RINTALA COMMONWEALTH'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS Now comes the Commonwealth in the above-captioned matter and respectfully opposes the defendant's motion to dismiss (Paper #148). The defendant cites two grounds for dismissal, neither of which justifies the drastic remedy she seeks. 1. Sufficiency of the Evidence In each of the defendant's two trials, she has moved for a required finding of not guilty both at the close of the Commonwealth's case, and again at the close of her own case. At all four junctures, the Court (Rup, J.) has denied the motion, applying the wellknown standard set forth in Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677 (1979). The defendant devotes the majority of her memorandum to detailing the weaknesses and flaws she perceives in the Commonwealth's evidence against her that is, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to her. But she misses the mark in doing so, for the inquiry is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, "any rational jury could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. at 677. The fact that two juries have thus far been unable to unanimously agree upon the defendant's

2 guilt does not speak to whether the Commonwealth's evidence is sufficient to permit a rational jury to do so, a question this Court has correctly answered in the affirmative four times previously. 2. Due Process / Fundamental Fairness Without citing any Massachusetts authority or precedent, the defendant nevertheless asks this Court to dismiss the first-degree murder indictment against her based upon general concepts of due process and fairness. Even if this Court were to find some persuasive value in the law review article and four out-of-state cases the defendant cites for this proposition, several of the factors discussed in those sources weigh heavily in favor of permitting this case to proceed to a third trial: a) The Differences in the Expected Evidence Although discovery in this area is continuing, the Commonwealth expects there to be several notable differences between the first two trials and the third, including but not limited to: i. Paint Expert: the Commonwealth anticipates calling as an expert witness an employee of PPG Industries regarding the chemical composition, properties, and drying characteristics of the specific type of paint discovered at the crime scene, which is expected to buttress the Commonwealth's argument that the paint had been poured or spilled relatively shortly before first responders arrived; ii. Crime Scene Expert: the Commonwealth anticipates calling as an expert witness a retired United States Army CID (Criminal Investigation Command) agent to testify regarding the common 2

3 characteristics of "staged" crime scenes, several of which are present in this case; iii. Strangulation Expert: the Commonwealth anticipates calling a medical expert witness regarding strangulation, to better highlight the relative ease with which strangulation can produce death; iv. De-bunking the "Sally's Beauty Supply" Evidence: although the defendant placed great emphasis on the investigation's failure to confirm or dispel whether the victim purchased an item at Sally's Beauty Supply on the day she was killed, the Commonwealth has provided the defendant with newly-obtained evidence that conclusively proves she made no such purchase on March 29, 2010; v. Further Dispelling Potential Third-Party Culprits: although the defendant placed great emphasis on the investigation's failure to interview a supposedly disgruntled coworker of the victim's whom the defendant identified in her videotaped interview, the Commonwealth has located and interviewed this person, dispelling any suspicion that he may have committed this offense. With these additions and enhancements to the Commonwealth's evidence (and others that may follow), the defendant's third trial will substantively differ from the prior two. The Commonwealth is hardly rolling out the same, previously-tried evidence and strategies in the blind hope that a differently-constituted jury will do what the other two have not. 3

4 b) The Number of Deadlocked Juries and the Split Although there have been two hung juries thus far, the Commonwealth joins in the defendant's representation and belief that eight members of each previous jury were convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of murdering Annamarie Rintala. But whereas the defendant characterizes this as a "deep division," the Commonwealth considers two-thirds to be a solid majority voting in favor of guilt each time the case has been tried.' c) The Seriousness of the Underlying Charges The seriousness of the underlying charges is a significant factor that is often cited in the authorities the defendant relies upon in making her argument for dismissal, although the defendant conveniently ignores this factor entirely. It goes without saying that murder is the most serious charge that can be prosecuted in our Superior Court. The Commonwealth might be less inclined to try this case three times if it involved a less serious felony, but this case involves the tragic and premature ending of a 37-year-old woman's life, a mother nonetheless, strangled to death in the basement of her own home. If ever there were a case in which a third trial was warranted and justified, it is this one. 1 Defense counsel reports that he heard from an acquaintance, who heard from a friend, who heard from an alternate juror from the defendant's second trial, that all three alternates "would have voted not guilty." Having been contacted by one of those alternates after trial, the Commonwealth can report that defense counsel's quadruple hearsay is mistaken. Regardless, the Commonwealth does not consider it prudent for the Court to delve into the murky waters of how alternate jurors believe they would have voted had they benefitted from participating in the full deliberations. 4

5 d) Fairness to the Defendant and Her Family The Commonwealth does not dispute that this criminal proceeding has strained the defendant and her family, but any such hardships are the direct result of the considerable evidence pointing toward her guilt. The Hampshire Grand Jury found probable cause to believe the defendant had murdered Annamarie Rintala, and two-thirds of the jurors who have deliberated in this matter have been convinced of her guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In light of the second mistrial, the Commonwealth acted in fairness to the defendant by proposing that she be admitted to bail with strict conditions of release. The defendant has since posted that bail, and is (at least for the time being) enjoying considerably more freedom than she had while awaiting her first two trials. This further militates against the drastic remedy of dismissing the indictment on the general notion of "fairness to the defendant." Lastly, it bears noting that whatever discomfort or disruption the defendant and her family have experienced pales in comparison to the endless pain and suffering experienced by Annamarie's parents and family. They remain steadfast in their pursuit of justice, and deserve to have this case brought to a full, fair and final resolution through the third jury's unanimous verdict. e) The Effect of Further Prosecution on the Justice System's Ability to Handle Other Cases. Fortunately, the Hampshire Superior Court caseload has been able to accommodate the limited number of murder trials that have occurred in recent years. And undersigned counsel can attest to the fact that this case has not detrimentally affected this Court's ability to try other cases in a timely fashion. 5

6 f) "Public Perception of Justice" In an effort to buttress her argument for dismissal, the defendant has created a new factor entitled "Public Perception of Justice," in which she claims that the "overwhelming response from the public [following the second mistrial] was 'enough is enough."' In sole support of this claim, the defendant cites a Daily Hampshire Gazette editorial which, in fact, did not advocate for the termination of this prosecution. Rather, the sentiment expressed was that unless the Commonwealth was "able to present more compelling evidence," a conviction at a third trial was unlikely. Without necessarily agreeing wholeheartedly with this sentiment, the Commonwealth nevertheless maintains it has addressed this concern through the additions and enhancements to its case outlined above (see 2(a)(i-v)). The defendant then proceeds to smear the Cochrane family by suggesting their pursuit of justice for Annamarie's murder is financially motivated. This appalling, absurd and desperate claim does not dignify a response, and has absolutely no relevance whatsoever to the issue before this Court. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the defendant's motion to dismiss should be denied. 6

7 Respectfully submitted for the Commonwealth, DAVID E. SULLIVAN NORTHWESTERN DISTRICT ATTORNEY By His Assistant: Steven E. Gagne First Assistant District Attorney Northwestern District One Gleason Plaza Northampton, MA (413) Certificate of Service I hereby certify that I have this day served a copy of the foregoing motion upon counsel for the defendant, David Hoose, Esq., via . Steven E. Gagne First Assistant District Attorney Northwestern District Dated: June 27,