YIANNOS PAPANTONIOU MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE OF THE HELLENIC REPUBLIC «SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE IN THE NEW SECURITY ENVIRONMENT»

Transcription

1 YIANNOS PAPANTONIOU MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE OF THE HELLENIC REPUBLIC «SOUTHEASTERN EUROPE IN THE NEW SECURITY ENVIRONMENT» HELLENIC OBSERVATORY LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND POLTICAL SCIENCE LONDON, 9 TH MAY

2 Ladies and Gentlemen, I am pleased and honoured to be amongst you in this prestigious institution this afternoon. This is the second time I am invited to address the students and faculty of the London School of Economics. I want to thank those who have invited me back and, in particular, Professor Kevin Featherstone and the Hellenic Observatory. Founded in 1996, under the stewardship of its first Eleftherios Venizelos Chair in Modern Greek Studies, Professor Loukas Tsoukalis, the Hellenic Observatory has established its credibility as a center for research on modern Greece. We have every confidence that under the leadership of Professor Featherstone, the Greek Program will continue to flourish. We recognize and appreciate the Observatory s 2

3 contribution in the better understanding of the evolution of modern Greek society and institutions and we shall stand by it in the years to come. A year ago I have argued in favour of increased coordination of economic policies in the Eurozone and the implementation of structural reforms in line with the Lisbon summit in an effort to strengthen growth and create employment. What I want to argue today is that within the new increasingly globalised environment we need to move towards new institutional arrangements in order to enhance security and preserve democracy. We are currently live in an age of great opportunities but also substantial challenges. If globalisation is to be a success story it must work for all nations and address all major issues. Unless we manage the global economic and political space effectively and fairly globalisation 3

4 will result in the marginalization of countries and the proliferation of conflicts. In this case, globalisation will be dominated by its darker side. Some negative aspects have not been adequately addressed. Poverty and the associated evils still affect more than a billion people. Terrorism has become a major threat for our societies. Regional conflicts based on old ethnic or religious strife are still taking place and human rights of minorities are being violated. Southeast Europe and the Middle East have been especially affected by the recurrence of violent conflicts. Southeastern Europe could be considered, as the stability barometer of our continent. The fact that, the 20th century began and ended with the military engagement of all the great European powers in the Southeastern part of Europe, proves the region's strong bond and interaction with the continental mainstream. 4

5 Besides, regional conflicts in this area have often had a spill over effect, escalating to enmities or even wars in the whole of Europe. The current impasse in the Middle East conflict has highlighted the fragility of the peace process in the area and the lack of a coherent and coordinated response by the international community. The situation has been aggravated by the Israeli government s view of a military solution to the problem. Pacification through continuous occupation has failed in the past leading to more not less violence. Almost ten years ago Israel and the Palestinians laid the foundations for a permanent solution of the Arab- Israeli conflict by recognising each other s right to exist and by signing the Oslo accords which paved the way to the establishment of a Palestinian governmental structure. However, the prospect of lasting peace has been 5

6 undermined both on the Israeli and the Palestinian side. The failure of the Israeli government to prevent the expansion of settlements and the non-implementation of agreed withdrawals from West Bank areas has undermined the credibility of the peace process. Palestinian violence on the other hand perpetrated by extremist forces sabotaged any peace deal based on compromise. The failure to reach a negotiated settlement has led to an appalling destruction and misery. The whole world is united behind the UN resolutions for an Israeli withdrawal from Palestinian territory and a return to the negotiating table. The Saudi initiative, which is a significant framework towards a comprehensive peace, indicates that there is an increased determination from the Arab world. The need for a monitoring mechanism and possibly an 6

7 international peace keeping force has been stressed by a number of European governments. Without a breakthrough in the Middle East peace process, a major obstacle to normalising Western relations with the Arab world will remain while the credibility of international institutions will be dented. While in the case of the Middle East the international community has been actively involved albeit with limited success, the Cyprus problem has remained in the sidelines. The 1999 decision by the Helsinki Council disassociating accession of Cyprus to EU from the solution of the problem has created a new reality. Both sides are currently participating in the UN sponsored negotiations. This is a unique opportunity that should be grasped by both communities. These negotiations must produce results before the enlargement deadline becomes pressing. 7

8 Accession of a unified Cyprus will be beneficial to the Turkish Cypriots since will open the way for structural funds financing faster development and deeper integration to the European economy. It will also be beneficial for Turkey if a solution to the Cyprus problem is found since it will remove one more obstacle in Turkey s European path. Furthermore, such a development will decisively contribute to the improvement of Greek Turkish relationship while strengthening the European Union s influence in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. Since the beginning of the post-cold War era, the Balkans has been abounding with serious economic, political and social problems. The Balkans has been a puzzle created by age-old historical processes, with the most recent ones leading to phenomena of great 8

9 financial crises, ethnic enslavement, minority oppression, crime and poverty. The EU response to the crisis in the Balkans is based on the idea of a Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe. This initiative aimed at opening the door to a long-term political and economic stabilization process. Furthermore, It has as its goals the prevention of ethnic conflict; the creation of stable conditions for democracy and anchoring the countries of SE Europe firmly in the values of -and institutional structures- of the Euro- Atlantic Community. The novelty about this initiative was that it was offering the countries of the region the perspective of membership in Euro-Atlantic structures: these countries were clearly seen as belonging -or having a right to belong- to this wider (political and security) community. 9

10 The prospect of membership in the EU and NATO was clearly chosen as the appropriate foreign policy tool towards the stabilization of the region. As this form of initiative was thought to have been effective in anchoring democracy and the market reform process in Central and Eastern Europe, the same exercise could be repeated for SE Europe. Southeastern enlargement of NATO will lead to the strategic unification of the region, with Central and Western Europe. I strongly believe that the accomplishment of such unification will have substantive effects, because it will contribute significantly to the development of the region, facilitating its assimilation to the European bulk. What should be borne in mind is that the iron curtain must not be replaced by a velvet wall raised against 10

11 nations, which are an integral part of the common European cultural heritage. These countries, have invested a great deal of financial resources and enthusiasm in order to enter the Euro- Atlantic community. It is not incidental that the acceptance of Euro-Atlantic organizations, in these particular countries, is quite widespread among their citizens and leaders. I should also underline, at this point, the fact that the candidate states of Southeastern Europe are active NATO partners, already. Therefore, their accession to the Alliance, in the subsequent enlargement wave, will come as a natural consequence of their present contribution to allied activities. 11

12 These countries, apart from their participation in NATO's programmes, such as PfP (Partnership for Peace) and EAPC (the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council), have also been actively present in joint peacekeeping activities in Bosnia and Kosovo. They have also contributed to significant peripheral initiatives, extending their role from net consumers of security to producers as well. A significant example of peripheral initiatives in the region is the establishment of the official cooperation between the Ministers of Defense of Southeastern Europe (SEDM, namely South-East Defense Ministerial). Greece, Italy, Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, Fyrom, and Albania are full members, while the USA, Croatia and Slovenia participate as observers. 12

13 Under SEDM, these 10 countries have commonly engaged in the following activities: the Satellite Interconnection among Military Hospitals (SIMIHO), the Crisis Information Network (CIN), the Engineering Task Force (ETF), the South Eastern European Simulation (SEESIM), the elimination of terrorism, border control and security, environmental protection and control of Mass Destruction Weapons. Another significant argument, which further advocates the accession of Southeastern European countries into NATO, is that this enlargement does not appear to be opposed by Moscow, as it has occurred in the case of the Baltic states. Russia is a very important factor of stability in Europe and, thus, cannot be ignored. 13

14 Therefore, I should stress the necessity of developing and providing for a regulated network of cooperation between NATO and Russia. It is important to gradually introduce Russia as a partner of the new Euro-Atlantic architecture of security, in order to avert its being isolated or even feeling offended, due to the creation of a zone of westernized states, extending from the Baltic to the Black Sea. The former picture will probably result from the full entry of East European nations into western political and military organizations, therefore Russia should be seriously considered. As I have argued so far, it is evident that for Greece, the enlargement of NATO is not just a subject of mere theoretical discussion. 14

15 On the contrary, the need for such a development is a relentless reality that resulted from the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and led to a setting of instability, violent dispute and unprecedented poverty, as well as social unrest. Such characteristics are quite common among the regions around my country. Thus, an initiative that would establish peace and security in the Balkans is extremely appealing to Greece. It is known that my country has been cut off from its EU partners, due to the war in Yugoslavia, despite the development, in short time, of alternative ways of communication through the Adriatic Sea. These efforts did not completely solve the problems, particularly as far as the north of the country was concerned. 15

16 Greece, as the only member of both NATO and the European Union, in the greater region of Southeastern Europe and Eastern Mediterranean, has played an active role in the stabilization of the region, since the beginning of the recent crisis, by providing relief to its suffering nations, in every possible way. Apart from the humanitarian aspect of such contribution, we are of the conviction that security and stability in the region are a prerequisite for our own safety and prosperity, as well as for Europe as a whole. The main objective of the Greek government is to carry on the process of opening multiple channels of communication and closer cooperation with its northern neighbors. In this context, it is staunchly in favor of a gradual connection among the Balkans, NATO, the European Union and other European institutions. 16

17 In order to contribute to the stability, security and cooperation in the European and transatlantic area, the forthcoming NATO Summit in Prague, must focus on the following: - ensuring that NATO develops all military capabilities necessary to meet new challenges and threats, - intensifying NATO s relationship with Russia and the Ukraine, and, - extending membership to Europe s new democracies. In the aftermath of September 11, some have asked whether enlargement is still a priority. It is, indeed. Those events have actually reinforced the importance of even closer cooperation and integration between the US, the European NATO members and all democracies 17

18 in Europe. If all new security threats are to be met effectively, a broad and strong coalition should be build consisting of countries that share western values and ideas and that are able to act with NATO members. All aspirants must know that NATO membership involves serious commitments and solemn responsibilities. In this context, some have demonstrated their determination to contribute to Euro-Atlantic security and stability, by fully supporting the war, against terrorism, by offering military facilities, personnel and combat means. We believe that NATO enlargement can become a means of achieving Alliance core purposes, while contributing to its continuing dynamism as the pre-eminent security institution in the Euro-Atlantic area currently. Enlargement is also expected to widen the circle of democracies and expand the zone of stability and 18

19 security through the Baltic and SE Europe. Such a move would simply confirm the very principles that have been NATO s source of strength and vitality. Should the small enlargement option is chosen i.e., Slovenia and Slovakia-, this would do little to enhance stability in the Balkans, since expectations in the region have become extremely high. As countries in the region have offered support to NATO, they normally expect their actions to bring political and military benefits, including membership. If these expectations are not met, the pro-western, pro-reform governments in many of these countries could be seriously weakened. Focusing on NATO enlargement does not imply that the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the European Union and its growing European Security Defence Policy (ESDP) are underestimated. The ESDP 19

20 has assumed a greater share of the defence burden, especially after the September 11 events in the U.S, and it should play a decisive role as regards managing security crises in Southeast Europe. The CFSP relies not only on different decision-making procedures, but also on the policy instruments it uses. Instead of directives and regulations, the CFSP uses political tools such as common strategy and common position. Commentators and officials often stress the fact that the EU is well-suited to using soft power tools, such as trade, aid, assistance or the membership perspective. The EU seems to be better prepared at influencing by attraction, and persuasion, than by [military] coercion. Seen from outside, the EU methodology can have an enormous magnetic force. In essence, the EU has chosen to be an instrumentality for 20

21 conflict-management and resolution through (the process and/or perspective of) integration. The EU view considers military means to be at the one end of the spectrum, with trade and economic sanctions on the other. This continuum also implies that sanctions should not only be seen as an alternative to military action but as a first step towards the extreme case of using force, eventually. This reflects the limitations of the civilian-power Europe discussed in earnest back in the 80 s. Today, instead of ignoring the concept, the EU must build on it, by stressing the relationship between military capabilities and the support of democratic principles. Moreover, the possession of military means is necessary because it allows for the possibility of using them. It adds to the credibility of the EU as an important 21

22 and influential international actor. By not having the military option, the range of possibilities becomes more restricted and less credible. By having both options, the EU would enjoy more freedom of manoeuvre when dealing with international crises. The approach of the EU through structural diplomacyderived by the legal bases and the provisions for regular consultations- is a slow-moving process. It can rarely produce spectacular results in a case of a crisis. The structural diplomacy approach reinforces the view that the CFSP puts an overwhelming emphasis on the legal value of those documents it signs, while not on the content of specific strategic plans. Structural diplomacy can be an accepted tool for preventing political instability, economic dislocation and ethnic conflict. 22

23 The most serious future security challenges facing European and US strategic interests lie on Europe s periphery and outside Europe. Future transatlantic debates must center on how Europe and the US will share responsibilities for meeting these challenges. The most significant question is what kind of security architecture will serve European interests and how will the US relate to it. Institutions, ideas and instruments have been created, but their success remains to be seen. The future European security agenda will have to concentrate on: - an assessment of the principal changes under way in the European security environment, - the identification of all new risks and challenges, as well as the means to meet them, 23

24 - the definition of the goals of the emerging security system and the elaboration of its guiding principles, and, - the suggestion of a reform plan of the existing institutions to enable them to cope with, and manage the fundamental changes under way in Europe. Through the CFSP, the EU will be challenged to undertake a crucial role concerning security tasks, crisis management and peace support operations in SE Europe. The perspective of accession to EU has strongly motivated the current candidates to overcome institutional deficit, undertake painful reforms, and implement economic transparency and stability. If they are kept waiting, despite of their strong efforts, their population will be disappointed. 24

25 However, a clarification of the divisive issues between ESDP and NATO is absolutely necessary if further enlargement of both organizations is to be successful. This would also facilitate the ability of aspirant members to adapt within these structures. On behalf of the EU, there have been significant efforts to increase and develop its defence capabilities. The Headline Goal, set in Helsinki, is to be met in 2003; in the meantime the EU and NATO should intensify their dialogue to clarify their missions, resources and strategies. Within this framework, Greece is not prepared to accept the so called Ankara text, which resulted from the unilateral US British initiative without the European Union s authorisation. 25

26 To that extent two improvements are still required in order this platform to be acceptable by us: Firstly, the decoupling of the Headline Goal from frictions which aroused within NATO and weaken ÍÁÔÏ s role in certain regions. Unless that, is secured the ESDP will certainly lack cohesion and credibility. Secondly, to secure the autonomy of the Headline Goal operations, in case that this operations do not use NATO capabilities. This is in line with the letter and spirit of the Nice Treaty. We all now know that there is no end to history. On the contrary the world evolves faster than in the cold war years and institutions that do not adapt and develop disintegrate. In this new environment both the USA and the EU have an enhanced strategic role. The two 26

27 entities should adopt a common perspective on the important issues facing today s international scene. The big issues today are better security, the improvement of the business environment in order to increase wealth and reduce poverty, the better quality of the environment and the promotion of free trade. The new geopolitical situation in Europe which could potentially bring wider security across the continent, invites us to develop an autonomous defence policy, and to give it autonomous means by coordinating armaments programmes, supporting technological innovation, creating competitive defence industries and establishing credible communications and intelligence networks. The priorities are not the same for all member states in the area of defence. Divisions do exist and some 27

28 member states do not share the vision for developing a European defence policy, at least in this stage. During our forthcoming presidency Greece will promote those initiatives that will attract the broader possible consensus in order to strengthen the capabilities of the European Security and Defence Policy. 28