FINAL REPORT. How does defence matter in the 21st century? The views and insights from Poland.

Transcription

1 How does defence matter in the 21st century? The views and insights from Poland. FINAL REPORT Research project on security and defence carried out by demoseuropa - Centre for European Strategy Foundation with the support of Public Diplomacy Division of NATO Warsaw, 31 August 2013

2 Table of Contents 1. Project s Background & Objectives 2. Methodology & Target Groups 3. Conclusions and Recommendations 3.1. The post- Afghan agenda of NATO and the new security challenges 3.2. Security and defence discourse in Poland: political arguments that matter 3.3. Institutional reforms of NATO and NATO s cooperation frameworks with 4. Annexes the European Union and its Member States 4.1. Annex 1: Executive Summary: Qualitative Study on Attitudes and opinions of Poles on state security (English language version) 5. Attachments 5.1. Attachment 1: Final Report from the Qualitative Study Attitudes and opinions of Poles on state security (Polish language text version) 5.2. Attachment 2: Research of attitudes and opinions of Poles on state security. Presentation of results - Power Point presentation (English language version) 5.3. Attachment 3: Research of attitudes and opinions of Poles on state security. Presentation of results - Power Point presentation (Polish language version) 2

3 1. Background & Objectives of the Project Poland s geopolitical location between the West and the East has always been a major strategic factor that shaped Polish national identity and defined, both, the country s national interest and strategic objectives. It has also underpinned perceptions of threats and challenges to national security and the country s preferences for defence strategies and tactics. The perceptions of threats and attitudes towards security and defence in Poland have been additionally moderated in recent years by radical changes to global, regional and national security environment brought about by the negative aspects of globalization, scarcity of resources, increasing number of global hotspots, erosion of the non- proliferation regime, terrorist threats and a growing impact of non- state actors on the global security landscape as well as a diminishing role of international institutions and organizations. Undeniably, Polish military engagements in two expeditionary operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have had a lasting impact on public perceptions. With NATO being one of the main pillars and guarantors of Poland s security, the main objective of this project was to explore, asses and evaluate interpretations, understandings and attitudes of key clusters of the Polish civil society towards three major tenets and propositions of modern defence as conceptualized by NATO: its costs, economic benefits and international importance in the XXI century. We specifically sought to understand and establish the following: What were the attitudes of the Poles towards defence and its economic costs and benefits? What were the attitudes of the Poles towards national and international security threats and challenges as well as defence within the context of international obligations? What political importance did the Poles assign to defence capabilities as an instrument underpinning modern diplomacy and complementing the security umbrella of the Atlantic Alliance as well as the nation s soft power? What kind of knowledge and understanding did the Poles have with respect to the impact of security and defence policies on other areas of life including economic growth, jobs creation and innovation? 2. Methodology & Target Groups The project was composed of four inter- related stages. 1) In the first stage, a qualitative research was carried out in the months of May and June 2013 with a use of qualitative research technique - Focus Group Interview. 3

4 2) In the second stage, preliminary conclusions based on research findings from the focus group interviews have been presented and thoroughly tested during a public debate with the key segments of the Polish civil society. The debate was held on July 11, The purpose of the debate was to engage representatives of civil society with security and defence experts as well as policy- makers to explore key research findings related to defence: its costs, economic benefits and international importance. The debate, interactive in its format, was open to the general public. 100 representatives of the Polish civic society took part in the event. 3) In the third, elaborative stage of the project, this final report, presenting research findings as well as incorporating conclusions from the exchanges with civil society and policy recommendations of the experts, has been drafted to be submitted to the Public Diplomacy Division of NATO on 2 September ) The final phase of the project will comprise publishing and promotion of the research report and accompanying policy recommendations through a set of on- line and off- line communication instruments including: web- site of demoseuropa - Centre for European Strategy ( e- mailing to demoseuropa s newsletter subscribers in the European Union (approx unique subscribers) and media features. The target groups for the project comprised of: 1. Primary target group: Opinion formers and policy- makers 2. Secondary target group: Media, professionals and general public 4

5 3. Conclusions and Recommendations 3.1. The post- Afghan agenda of NATO and the new security challenges The withdrawal of NATO from Afghanistan in 2014 requires the redefining of NATO s mission in the post- Afghan era. Despite the fact that NATO will have to continue to support the Afghan military in different dimensions and spheres, in the post- Afghan era, the Alliance should consolidate around its core and traditional role, which is to directly guarantee the security of its members. Such consolidation will help increase the sense of security of all Alliance members and as such, will increase their will and readiness to participate in out of area operations. This return to the roots is justified in the context of the processes in the field of global security NATO must pay more attention to changes in the military potential of emerging countries and carry out a continuous projection of their possible consequences to the global balance of power. In 2003, the defence spending of NATO members constituted almost 70% of global defence spending. In the next few years, this share is expected to fall below 50%. The defence spending of China (2nd place worldwide) and Russia (3rd place worldwide), two authoritarian powers that conduct an assertive policy that is sometimes confrontational with the West, is growing especially fast. The probability of a conventional military conflict between NATO and China or Russia is currently very low. However, by strengthening their military potential, Russia and China may use it to force their strategic priorities that are contrary to NATO interests (which can be seen in the tensions between Beijing and Moscow and their neighbours, as well as the conflict in Syria). The economic crisis in the euro zone and the lack of the political will to strengthen their own military forces in many European NATO members are deepening the existing disproportion between their military potential and the military capabilities of the armed forces of the USA. At the same time, Washington is decreasing its military presence in Europe treating it as the most stable part of the world, shifting its involvement toward the Far East. In this situation, an increase in the responsibility of Europe for its own security is a natural and necessary foundation for its security strategy The European Union needs to fundamentally strengthen its Common Security and Defence Policy, its strategic dimension as well as its defensive capabilities. The EU should focus its efforts on ensuring a reliable contribution toward the performance of NATO activities in the area of collective security in Europe. The process of bringing together defence resources (that is becoming necessary in the face of the reduction of 5

6 security and defence spending) should be subordinated to this goal. The appropriate starting point for this process should be the identification of the defence tasks that could be carried out collectively by groups of member states on a regional level European countries that take greater responsibility for the security of the Old World will continue to need the support of the US. The area of NATO s specific involvement outside of its own borders (Africa and western Eurasia) overlaps with what are considered to be key regions in the Common Security and Defence Policy- CSDP The consolidation of NATO around its defensive functions, as a regional organisation whose centre of mass is located in Europe, should not be treated as closing off from the outside world. The wars in Libya, Syria, Mali, and Georgia as well as the armed incidents in Karbakh clearly showed how unstable and potentially threatening the situation in the neighbourhood of European NATO members can be to their security. As a result, one of the most important elements of the new NATO mission should be the stabilisation of North Africa, the Middle East, the Sahel, and the Horn of Africa, as well as the Black Sea basin. This must envisage the ability to become militarily involved, which includes military interventions NATO must also show an ability to become involved in the construction of a stable security environment in the long term through the development of military forces and institutions in neighbouring countries in accordance with NATO standards. Many neighbouring countries including, among others, those in North Africa and the Middle East, need outside support for the construction of institutional security structures and the strengthening of the military capabilities of their armed forces, so as to be able to effectively fight terrorist organisations and armed militias, or ordinary bands of outlaws. These reforms are important not only in regard to their hard security, but also for external political stability. NATO has unique know- how in this context. And it knows how to apply it, an example of which can be the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme directed toward European countries that are not members of the Alliance and former members of the USSR, as well as the mission in Afghanistan. A programme similar to PfP should be directed toward, among others, the Arab partners of the Alliance On an institutional basis, NATO should continue to play an important role in regard to the Western Balkans as well as the Black Sea basin. For these countries, the process of joining or becoming closer to NATO is a very important instrument in introducing Western standards that, in the long term, allow for their democratisation and modernisation. Recent examples of such evolution include Georgia, Croatia, and Albania. 6

7 3.2. Security and defence discourse in Poland: political arguments that matter Poland is one of the few NATO countries that did not decrease defence spending in recent years, and instead increased it (in absolute values) and initiated an ambitious programme for the modernisation of its armed forces. In the situation of decreasing defence spending in Spain or the Netherlands, Poland has the potential to become one of the most important European members of the Alliance in terms of military potential The consolidation of Poland s defence potential is fully understandable after its significant involvement in foreign expeditionary missions in recent years. Nonetheless, it should not signify a re- evaluation in terms of the challenges to the security of Poland and the Euro Atlantic region as well as a depreciation of the importance of the sources of instability located outside of NATO s boundaries. In the long term, Poland should maintain a balance between territorial defence and the ability to become involved in expeditionary operations Additional funding for defence should be seen as both investing in national security and continuation of the economic modernisation process. Poland needs an effective strategy for using increased defence spending to stimulate economic growth Aside from jobs and the production of military equipment for the internal market as well as for export, the defence industry can become one of the most innovative economic sectors in Poland. For this purpose, the development of Poland s defence industry will require increased cooperation with its NATO partners. It would be good for this cooperation to be a part of the wider increasing of the military capabilities of NATO members on the basis of the principle of pulling and sharing Poland strengthened its position as the undisputed regional leader in the field to security as a result of the radical increase of its budgetary advantage in regard to other Central European countries. Currently, Poland spends twice as much as the aforementioned countries on defence, and this difference is five times greater in the case of defence investment (the purchase and modernisation of equipment). Poland should promote military cooperation in the region which must be based on solid financial foundations. This way, Poland will be able to play an important role in preventing the deepening of the differences between individual NATO members in terms of their military capabilities. 7

8 It is in Poland s interest to, as part of regional cooperation, build a common understanding of the needs in regard to security and to ensure operational synergy that leads to the joint performance of defence tasks (ex. the control of airspace, coastal patrols, training). For this reason, as part of the smart defence programme as well as other initiatives, Poland should be involved in cooperation with Central European countries and require them to increase their military capabilities. Poland s performance of the role of regional leader requires significantly greater support from Warsaw for NATO expansion in the Western Balkans, which will join Central Europe after acceding to the Alliance. This role of regional leader will make it easier for Poland to increase the cooperation of the region as part of NATO structures (the Partnership for Peace programme) with countries from Eastern Europe and the Southern Caucasus Poland should make corrections in the programme for the modernisation of its armed forces by taking into greater account global trends (the development of navies, air forces, new shipping routes - the Arctic), NATO s needs (out of area operations), and regional security requirements that directly relate to Poland (the protection of the airspace of the Baltic States, the balance of naval power in the Baltic Sea) The development of the navy should be viewed as an instrument for strengthening Poland s cooperation with key NATO partners in the Baltic Sea basin - Norway and Denmark The development of Poland s cooperation with the Alliance members from outside of Central Europe would also be of value. This type of cooperation can be included in the process of globalisation of Poland s foreign policy. In this context, Turkey can constitute an interesting partner for Poland, for which the post- Soviet area is of similar importance in terms of security as it is for Poland. Poland and Turkey give priority to relations with the USA and NATO as the main point of reference and as a guarantee for their own security. In 2012, both countries established consultations with Romania in regard to NATO expansion, security in the Black Sea region, as well as coordination in regard to the implementation of the missile defence project. For many years, Turkey has been implementing various programmes for the development of its own defence industry. Cooperation with Turkey would also be beneficial in regard to increasing Poland s involvement in the region of the Mediterranean Sea in regard to security by organising joint manoeuvres with Turkey on the Mediterranean Sea or air force exercises in Anatolia. 8

9 3.3. Institutional reforms of NATO and NATO s cooperation frameworks with the European Union and its Member States A well grounded and deep institutional reform of NATO is not very likely given the current political and economic circumstances. Forcing this reform to take place could be counterproductive A strategy of small steps, evolutionary changes, and a bottom- up approach seems to be justified. Its main goal should be to take NATO s cohesion further (closer cooperation on the regional level as well as on the bilateral and multilateral level between members) as well as to increase the military potential of member states In regard to the decision- making process constructively abstaining from voting and refraining from participation in operations or participating in them under special rules (derogations) should be promoted as an organisational rule of NATO, instead of resorting to vetoing or blocking. The latter should only be used as a last resort The custom of regular and frequent political consultations provided for in Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty should be popularised. These consultations highlight the function of the Alliance as a political community, and are important in regard to both crisis prevention and management NATO s cooperation with outside partners, including regional organisations, should be intensified. This cooperation will be beneficial in regard to carrying out specific NATO operations, will allow partners to be influenced (a network of co- dependencies), and will strengthen the cohesion of the Alliance (NATO institutions as the main interlocutor in relations with the outside world) The intensification of the cooperation of the Alliance with the European Union, which should be NATO s main partner in Europe, will be difficult without the resolution of the problem of Cyprus. For this reason, the EU and NATO should take over the Cyprus peace process from the UN As part of the bilateral relations of NATO with European Union member states, the Alliance s institutions should support the specialisation of individual members. These specialisations may help in the sense of ownership that individual members have with the Alliance In order to strengthen the links within NATO, regional cooperation between members will also be necessary. Cooperation at the regional level with partners from outside of the Alliance may also be beneficial for the deepening of the relations between NATO and the EU (Sweden and 9

10 Finland as the most important EU members that are not members of NATO) In relations between NATO members, it is very important to strengthen the view of the former of the identical security status of all states as well as the resulting sense of identity and trust in NATO. The Alliance should, in accordance with its earlier declarations, modernise or build the military infrastructure that is necessary for the acceptance and stationing of support forces in new member states (among others, airbases, ports, bridges, fuel depots) Most of the new members spend significantly less on defence than the NATO obligations regarding defence spending (2% of GDP). Despite the fact that the full implementation of NATO s promises that were made to the new members is not very likely in the short term, their partial fulfilment is possible, under the condition of the increase in the defence spending of the new members The identification of cooperation amongts NATO members with the organisation should also strengthen the possible preparation and updating of NATO contingency plans The factor strenghtening ties with NATO and the military capabilities of its members should be an increase in the frequency of large scale multilateral military exercises, based on scenarios providing for the implementation of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty Public discourse on NATO, security and defence in Poland: challenges and barriers In the case of Poland, a significant challenge for the presence of the NATO issue and the necessary reforms of the Alliance is the lower presence of foreign topics in the media. This especially pertains to the subject of hard security A significant challenge to building public support for the security and defence policy is in recent years the noticeable decline of the identification of the Polish society with NATO, the USA, and its support for foreign interventions. 1 1 In the Transatlantic Trends 2012 survey published by GMF, less than 30% of Poles viewed the intervention in Libya as justified, more than 45% viewed it as unjustified, and almost ¼ did not have an opinion on this matter. For comparison, almost 60% of the French, and 50% of the British viewed the intervention as justified, while, respectively, nearly 40% and 40% viewed it as unjustified. Even in pacifist Germany, more than half of all respondents viewed the intervention in Libya as justified. More than 70% of Poles declared that they would be opposed to an intervention in Syria, even if it would have the support of the UN Security Council. For comparison, less than half of all British, and slightly 10

11 Another challenge to the presence of NATO in the public discussions in Poland is the limited sense of an external threat in the conventional sense (aggression by neighbours) and unconventional (e.g. terrorism) A positive aspect, confirmed by studies carried out as part of this project, is the belief of Poles that Poland should remain in NATO and carry out its obligations within the Alliance Public communication regarding the mission, role, and tasks of NATO as well as the security policy should be based on the popularisation in traditional and online media of a substantive expert debate showing NATO as the most important pillar of Poland s security, thanks to which the probability of military threats is viewed as minimal Focusing communication solely on direct military threats may limit its scope and reach. What should especially be shown are the links between different types of security, e.g. cyber terrorism as an economic threat, or the importance of traffic routes, and the supply of raw materials for economic development Of key importance in social communication will be the local rooting of the narration regarding NATO and Poland s place in the Alliance. In this context, it is extremely important to disseminate knowledge regarding the strategy for the modernisation of the Polish armed forces. It should be presented as an element of the economic development of Poland and included in a wider NATO context (cooperation with partners, the common priorities of the organisation) Social communication, the goal of which is to build support for the involvement of Polish armed forces outside of the area of NATO s mandate, should not be solely based on arguments pertaining to obligations regarding the Alliance. Such communication should underline specific and measurable benefits for the Polish armed forces that arise out of such involvement. more than half of the French held this view. In , Poles were the only nation in which the majority (almost 60%) supported complete withdrawal of its military forces from Afghanistan. 11

12 Annex 1: Executive Summary: Qualitative Study on Attitudes and opinions of Poles on state security 1. RESEARCH CONTEXT AND BACKGROUND The following summary is based on the qualitative research, the objective of which was to identify and explore opinions, attitudes and expectations of Poles with regards to national security and defence policies, The project was carried out in May and June The research was carried out and based on the FGI technique (Focus Group Interviews) which enables the respondents to freely demonstrate their opinions in groups controlled by a moderator. The use of this technique enabled juxtaposition of different evaluations, perspectives and expectations towards Polish national security and the influence of other actors on the Poles sense of security in terms of public expenditures for defence in 12imes of economic crisis. The research had the following objectives: 1. To get to know the Poles level of awareness concerning national security. 2. To explore perceptions of security threats and problems faced by the country in times of peace. 3. To determine the Poles attitudes towards the national security system. 4. To understand how the Poles define the concept of national security in the 21 st century. 5. To determine the Poles attitudes towards public expenditures for national security in times of economic crisis. 6. To determine the level of awareness on how public security influences other functional areas of the country. Focus group interviews were carried out according to pre- designed discussion guidelines, which included the following issues: 1. associations connected with national security and its public awareness, 2. perception of threats affecting the sense of national security, 3. evaluation of public defence situation, 4. recognition of the influence of actors on Polish national security, including neighbouring countries as well as super powers, 5. finding out opinions on the involvement of Poland in the North Atlantic Treaty, including military operations outside the NATO area, 6. perception of the European Union in terms of Polish national security, 7. determining the perceptive value of expenditures on defence and their significance compared to the entire public expenditures, 8. the influence of financing defence and national security on other economic areas of the country. 12

13 2. Target Groups Four distinct and diversified groups of respondents were convened to allow for an appropriate triangulation of knowledge. These consisted of : 1) opinion leaders and security/defence experts group (recruited in Warsaw); 2) news buffs group - people actively searching information on international relations, political environment and eager/ willing to discuss politics (recruited in Warsaw); 3) current news followers group followers of current political news, having general knowledge of international and domestic affairs (recruited in Warsaw); 4) control group of current news followers recruited in the north- eastern city of Bialystok. Each group of respondents consisted of 6 respondents aged 26 55, with at least secondary education, with different professions and political sympathies. Opinion leaders group consisted of respondents who participate in the discussion on national security, because of professional reason i.e. current and ex- executive employees of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, National Security Bureau, and The Polish Institute of International Affairs; current and ex- ambassadors of Poland to international institutions, who have extensive knowledge on the subject. This expert discussion helped to establish precise framework for analysis of discussions of the two remaining groups of ordinary citizens. Five focus group interviews took place in the course of the project in Warsaw and in Białystok. One focus group carried out in Warsaw with opinion leaders, two focus groups carried out in Warsaw and Białystok with citizens characterized as news buffs, two focus groups carried out in Warsaw and Białystok with respondents following current news. Warsaw was chosen for the fact that it s a capital city where the highest authorities are based and therefore the discussion about the national security is more present and more advanced. At the same time its central location may cause its inhabitants to perceive national security as a somewhat abstract concept. The choice of Białystok was made in order to find out opinions of inhabitants living close to the border, where a number of ethnic minorities and the proximity of neighbouring countries is debated systematically and has more practical dimension. 13

14 3. MAPPING OUT OPPORTUNITIES AND THREATS: PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICIES OPPORTUNITIES Negative opinion on the condition of armed forces and social expectations relating to their modernization GENERAL ATTITUDES THREATS Lack of coherent and clear message regarding current and planned actions Fulfilment of ally commitments Advantages of compliance with NATO member standards Training units and gaining actual combat experience NATO MEMBERSHIP Casualties in the military Increased threat of terrorist attacks High costs of involvement in operations with no connection to the Polish reason of State Inability to use potential advantages resulting from participation in operations DEVELOPMENT AND MODERNIZATION Positive impact of defence expenditures on the economy: development of the defence sector, new jobs, technology transfer, stimulation of entrepreneurship Politicization of security Lack of trust in competences of high command Irrational expenditures on defence Lack of coherent plan of defence expenditures 14

15 4. FOCUS GROUPS CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Conclusions Both citizens and experts understand security in a very wide context. The situation is similar in the case of threats. Understanding security in social and economic categories comes to the front, which can be attributed to individual experiences of the citizens and dominant media narrative. Direct military threats are considered unlikely. This opinion should be attributed to the stable situation in the region and Poland s membership in regional security systems. Anxieties are generated by forms of soft offensive, such as energetic dependence, economic and financial exploitation, as well as cyber- crime. These means are seen as even more efficient pressure tools on national politics because of their correlations. Recommendations for public communication Introduction of the subject of national security to public discourse should include all the mentioned issues (social, economical etc). Only then will it be possible to convince the society of a certain level of expenditures for defence. Focusing solely on military threats could curb social reception. NATO should be communicated as one of the main and efficient pillars of security and stability of the region, thanks to which the probability of military threats is perceived as minimal. This area of security requires a clear definition of roles and specifying the relations of EU (associated with guarantying stability in the soft respect) and NATO. Poland s security guarantees are established mainly on membership in NATO and the EU. The roles of both organizations are clearly attributed the UE is an element of national security in terms of economic and social dimension, while NATO shapes military and defensive area. An important element is the role of NATO as an organization motivating the development of the Polish army and supervising the introduced changes Involvement of Poland in NATO s international operations is perceived as a fulfilment of ally obligations, and not Poland s current interest. Ambivalent assessments should be noted: on one hand involvement of Clear definition of both these organisations and their relations is crucial. Considering the relations between the EU and NATO in terms of national security, clear definition of their roles and competences should be made: NATO as a military element, and the EU as a part of internal national security system and soft means, such as peace missions. This media narrative should be maintained and strengthened with definite examples of trainings and exchange of know- how and technology. Communication concerning support for further involvement of Polish army outside NATO area should not be based solely on arguments for ally obligations. The communication should stress exact benefits for Polish armed forces. 15

16 Poland in NATO s international operations is seen by the experts and other respondents as investment in future ally relations. In addition they are aware of other benefits, such as training of troops, exchange of know- how and acquiring battle experience. On the other hand, general belief is that participation in such missions makes the country more vulnerable to terrorist attacks and incurs costs. Furthermore, there are no tangible profits for other countries. The image of the national defence system is negative due to presumed underfinancing and underequipemnt of army units. There is a lack of knowledge on actual expenses and financing of the defence system. Moreover, the guidelines of the Polish Armed Forces Modernization Plan for the coming years are not revealed. This lack of knowledge is a direct result of the lack of information. There s no clear communication in a wider media perspective. There is a strong belief that military investments have a positive impact on the economic development of a country. Despite the economic crisis there is a support for maintaining defence expenditures on a stable level only this guarantees execution of a strategic Polish Armed Forces Modernization Plan. Security environment continues to be defined in the context of activity of two main government entities Russia and the US. Security as a subject of political fighting - fear of defence politicization is a common problem. Clear communication of the current situation and future plans aiming at changing the image of armed forces is crucial. It is important to launch a coherent informational campaign directed at a wider public and based on information concerning expenditures and modernisation plans. In order to strengthen support for future national security policies, it is necessary to launch communication based on economic benefits, innovations and labour market. Arguments and communication directed at a wider public should include the importance of a stable level of expenditures necessary for strategic and long- term development of Polish Armed Forces. Unpredictability of Russian foreign affairs and a clear interest of the US in the Pacific region prove that there s a need for the development of local pillar of security, i.e. Polish Armed Forces. Communication concerning security should be based on substantive expert discussions. 16

17 DISCLAIMER: While reading the above summary, one needs to bear in mind that the objective of qualitative research is to explore individual issues and to describe the perspective of the given sample; however, it is not representative and therefore cannot be generalize as the view of the whole population. Warsaw, 31 August