THE CAMBODIAN BOAT PEOPLE

Transcription

1 THE CAMBODIAN BOAT PEOPLE Seeking Asylum from War and Oppression July, Prepared by: Dr Dennis Shoesmith Senior Lecturer in Politics Northern Territory University Copies available from: Jesuit Refugee Service (Australia ) PO Box 522 KINGS CROSS NSW DIii iiiiiiu mill mill iniiii iinii iiiii i n mi T

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3 A SUMMARY OF THE CASE FOR ASYLUM 1. The Argument for Collective Asylum The seventy-nine Cambodian boat people rescued from their sinking vessel and brought to Darwin by H.M.A.S. Townsville on 2 June, 1990, have a compelling case to be granted asylum in Australia. They risked a 3,500 km. sea journey in an unsafe fishing boat when other Cambodians have perished in that attempt. Some have said that they put to sea because they were more afraid of the war which has engulfed their country and of the return of the Khmer Rouge than of drowning. Almost, all of "them have lost family or friends to the Khmer Rouge and the war. All of them fear the Khmer Rouge and are terrified of coming under its control. What would be the consequences for these Cambodians if the Australian Government were to deny them asylum and to forcibly repatriate them to Cambodia? This Submission draws on the available evidence to detail conditions inside Cambodia today so as to offer the Determination of Refugee Status Committee an answer to that question. An understanding of the military and political crisis in Cambodia and the threat to the personal security and even the lives of the boat people if they are forced to return will help the Committee make an informed and just assessment of their claims for asylum. The present situation within Cambodia is detailed within the body of this submission but in summary : If they were returned they would be at immediate risk of widespread internal war and persecution by the Kmer Rouge.

4 Within Cambodia, hundreds of thousands of people have fled their villages to escape the Khmer Rouge in the past two months or are being relocated by the Hun Sen government. Individually, the young men who make up the majority of the group are at personal risk because they are liable for immediate conscription and with little or no training immediate deployment in the battle zone. This is not orderly conscription but arbitrary press ganging of boys as young as fourteen or fifteen taken off the street or from their classrooms. As this submission will show, the military situation within Cambodia is grave and the position of government forces chaotic in most of the countryside. If they survive the fighting they face capture by a victorious Khmer Rouge with its fearful reputation for the torture and execution of its opponents. Young men and women also face conscription into forced labour squads which are sent to repair roads, bridges and railway lines destroyed by the guerillas or to gather timber and forest products. They are at risk from the fighting and from the minefields which both sides have scattered throughout much of rural Cambodia. About a third of the group face persecution and discrimination because of their Chinese ethnic background. The Hun Sen government introduced harsh discriminatory regulations against ethnic Chinese through Ordinance No. 351 issued in The popular perception in Phnom Penh that Chinese are associated with corruption and usury in the newly opened economy of the capital has aroused increasing hostilit y against this community in the past year.

5 In addition to these real threats to individuals, all the Cambodians who fled illegally' to Australia are especially and specifically at risk; as a group. All 224 Cambodians who have arrived in Australia since November have exposed themselves to retaliation by a government which is increasingly resorting to. repressive measures to discipline the population under its control in the face of the Khmer Rouge threat. They can expect to be singled out for harsh treatment if they are involuntarily returned. We urge the Committee to recognise the particular danger which these Cambodian arrivals face because of their special character as a group who have 'illegally ' fled Cambodia and who are therefore marked for punishment and persecution if they return. The Australian Government has no diplomatic relations with the Government of the State of Cambodia and cannot ensure appropriate measures by that government for their protection were they forcibly repatriated. Despite assurances by the Hun Sen government that voluntary returnees will not be persecuted, in the present military and political crisis, the government cannot guarantee their safety from war or the Khmer Rouge. Indeed, the boat people themselves are very afraid. In their view and the view of other Cambodians in Australia, they are at real risk from the Hun Sen government itself, especially if forced to return. Mr Chheng Chhor, Secretary of the Khmer Community in New South Wales has warned that "if they are sent back they will be treated as traitors by the Government... and will be jailed and shot". (1) The asylum-seekers themselves believe that at least they will be listed and singled out for harsh treatment such as being sent to the areas of heaviest fighting, or assignment to the forced labour squads working in the most dangerous areas. As their testimony quoted in the body of this submission reveals, they are terrified that they will be at immediate risk of imprisonment, boatings and even death.

6 It will be established in this submission that the one assurance the Hun Sen government can no longer give the Cambodians in Australia is security from the Khmer Rouge. They know that the Khmer Rouge are everywhere, and "wherever they are staying they will punish and kill people... where Pol Pot is there will always be killing ". 2. The issue of asylum and the search for a peaceful resolution of the Cambodian crisis are separate but linked issues The Determination of Refugee Status Committee has the responsibility to consider the case for asylum submitted by each applicant. But to do justice to the individual claims by the 224 Cambodians who have arrived in Australia since November, the Committee should take into account both the critical situation in Cambodia and the corroborative evidence of the urgency of their appeal for asylum offered by the actions of the Australian and United States Governments as recognition of the gravity of the Cambodian crisis and to stop the real possibility of a return to power of the Khmer Rouge. The claims for asylum submitted by the 224 Cambodians must be considered on their merits. Their case cannot be judged fairly unless the Committee assesses the situation in Cambodia. An assessment of that situation, we believe, will persuade the Committee to make a general recommendation to the Minister in support of the call for asylum of all 224 Cambodians given the real threat to their security and lives as individuals and as a group. At the same time, the decision on their appeal for asylum must not be influenced by any idea of using them as a warning to other potential asylum -seekers.

7 The correct response to the possibility of more Cambodians fleeing their homeland is for the Australian Government to address the root causes of the crisis itself by joining with the United States and others in'the international community in pushing for a comprehensive settlement which offers Cambodia a chance of peace. We need simultaneously to be true to the humanitarian principles which we espouse in our region and to seek a genuine and peaceful resolution to the Cambodian crisis which is the root cause of the refugee exodus. This will involve separate but complementary policies of granting asylum to those Cambodians in Australia while working in the international community to isolate the Khmer Rouge and help provide the necessary conditions for a return to political and economic stability in Cambodia.

8 I CAMBODIAN BOAT PEOPLE: THE RIGHT TO ASYLUM The Cambodians who have fled to Australia since November last year have a compelling case for asylum. The critical situation in their homeland forced them to risk the hazards of a 3,500 km. sea journey in frail craft. At least one other boat load of Cambodians have perished in that attempt. The Flight by Sea The third group of seventy -nine Cambodians to reach Australia, rescued from their sinking vessel on 2 June, left Cambodia 's port city of Kompong Som on 6 May. The group was made up of core family, other relatives and friends and crew. The fishing boat, the Kraingsor was not built for long sea voyages but they decided to try to reach Singapore, fleeing a war which has now engulfed every province but the four in the north -east of their country. Moving down the through the Gulf of Siam and the South China Sea to the north coast of peninsula Malaysia, they were twice supplied with fuel and water by Singaporean navy vessels. On 13 May they arrived off the west coast of Kalimantan in Indonesia. The Indonesian authorities refused them permission to disembark although they begged for asylum because of the condition of their boat. One family told the lawyers interviewing them in Australia that they were beaten by Indonesian officials because they repeatedly pleaded to be accepted into an Indonesian refugee camp. The Indonesians did supply them with provisions and maps to navigate to Australia.

9 Forced back to sea, escorted by an Indonesian vessel, "they made the crossing to Madura Island off Surabaya in Java where they were allowed to drop anchor for one day. On 29 May they reached the Timor coast and the following day set out on the final leg to Australia. They used the flight paths of commercial aircraft as a guide, reasoning that these would be headed for the Australian coast. However, they became lost for several days. When they reached Australian waters they did not know where they were. After 27 days at sea, the Kraingsor began to founder. Its 79 passengers were lucky. HMAS Townsville transferred them from their sinking boat and took them to the safety of Darwin. Some of the Cambodians have told the lawyers advising them on their appeal for asylum that they would consider suicide rather than a forced return to Cambodia. The Right to Asylum This submission argues that the deepening military and political crisis in Cambodia represents a direct and immediate threat to the safety of every one of the 224 Cambodians who have arrived in Australia if they were forced to return. Given the reality of that threat, those Cambodians who are not granted full refugee status should be offered humanitarian protection. This would represent a four-year period of residence with the possibility of longer -term residence in Australia. A supplementary option is for their status to be regulated by establishing a specific category for them granting them Temporary Entry Permits of a fixed four-year duration subject to review of country conditions at the expiration of that time-period. At the very minimum, temporary asylum ought to be given until repatriation can occur with safety and dignity.

10 international Recognition of the Present Crisis It was only well after the arrival of this third group of Cambodian boat people that even informed Australians began to understand just how desperate the military and political situation has become in Cambodia since the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops last September. The initial unfriendly reaction by some Australian leaders to their plight may have been explicable in terms of an ignorance of the situation they had fled. There is no excuse for that ignorance now. An increasing number of reports from Cambodia in June and July reveal the rapid progress of the Khmer Rouge forces until today they hold the military balance in even those provinces surrounding the capital. The crisis in Cambodia is, in fact, so acute that the United States has dramatically reversed its policy towards that country and the contending factions. For the first time in eleven years, Washington is prepared to cooperate with Vietnam in an attempt to stave off the imminent return to power of the Khmer Rouge. (2) The resurgent Khmer Rouge now moves through rural Cambodia at will and is poised to overthrow a besieged and economically destitute Hun Sen government in Phnom Penh. As this analysis of the situation in Cambodia is being written, the Australian Foreign Minister is urgently reviewing Australia 's Cambodia policy in response to the US change of position. The US decision confirms the Cambodian boat people 's claim that they have fled a desperate situation. International recognition that the Khmer Rouge are close to retaking power substantiates their fear that they face a real threat of Khmer Rouge oppression if they are returned.

11 Their individual fates are caught up in the widening internal war, the breakdown of order under a besieged and destitute Hun Sen government, and the expanding power of the Khmer Rouge. Their flight has marked them for probable political persecution both by a desperate Hun Sen government and by the Khmer Rouge if they were to come under its control. Many of them are youths who face arbitrary conscription into the civil war. If they survive that war they face the real possibility of retribution from a reinstated Khmer Rouge which is even now able to impose its rule over much of rural Cambodia. Australia 's Responsibility In signing the 1951 UN Convention and 1967 Protocol relating to the status of refugees, Australia accepted the responsibility of protecting refugees and asylum seekers - not only through its role as a country of resettlement, but also as a country of first and temporary asylum. It is inappropriate to use the asylum-seekers now in Australia as examples ' or a warning to deter others. They should be protected according to the humanitarian principles affirmed by Australia while the Australian Government works in the international community for a way to address the root causes for their flight from Cambodia. (3) In a larger sense, the Cambodian tragedy is one in which Australians carry some responsibility. We were involved in the Indochina war at the time it was extended to Cambodia. (4) We have been involved since 1979 in efforts to seek a peaceful resolution of the continuing conflict there. Since November, we have become a country of first asylum. It is a humanitarian responsibility and in our national interest to do everything we can to support a just and peaceful resolution of the Cambodian crisis. Only in this way can the root causes of the refugee exodus be addressed. As a separate but linked policy, we should treat with understanding and compassion those Cambodian ^ who have landed in Australia.

12 II CAMBODIA 1990 WAR AND OPPRESSION The flight of the 224 Cambodians who reached Australia between November 1989 and June 1990 can only be understood and their claim to asylum can only be assessed in terms of the desperate situation confronting their country. The individual fate of each of the Cambodian boat people is caught up in the internal war being won by the Khmer Rouge, the breakdown of order, the reimposition of Khmer Rouge rule and terror throughout the countryside, the economic collapse of the Phnom Penh government and the signs of panic and new repressive measures within that government. None of them can be guaranteed his or her safety and dignity if forced to return. The Context : 30 Years of War The Cambodian people have suffered three decades of almost continuous internal war and external invasion. The revolt begun by the Khmer Rouge in the 1960s, occupation of the eastern provinces by the North Vietnamese, the saturation B-52 bombing and invasion by American and South Vietnamese armies in the early 1970s, the mass executions and starvation of the Pol Pot years, the Vietnamese invasion in December, 1978, and the present conflict have led to the deaths of millions of Cambodians and sent more millions fleeing for their lives. (5) The 224 Cambodian boat people have fled a country again in the convulsions of war. There is a real possibility that the Khmer Rouge will regain power and disturbing evidence is now coming out of rural Cambodia of the harshness and cruelty of Khmer Rouge treatment of civilians.

13 In the past month, an estimated further ISO- ISO, 000 Cambodians have either fled their villages, many towards the Thai border to escape the fighting, or as part of Phnom Penh 's forced relocation program to shift population away from the Khmer Rouge. Some 26,000 Cambodians, halfstarved and ill, have recently fled Khmer Rouge control to Site 2 on the Thai-Cambodian border. (6) The Political Situation: Irreconcilable Opponents For the past three deacdes the Cambodian conflict has been in an essential sense a proxy war, fought out not only between rival Cambodian factions but between regional and superpower rivals. The achievement of a better relationship between the Soviet Union, the People 's Republic of China and the United States in the late 1980s has provided at least the opportunity for Cambodia to be disentangled from superpower rivalries. The withdrawal of Vietnamese troops by 26 September, 1989, removed an obstacle to a political settlement. The US in mid-july, 1990, suddenly announced a reversal in its Cambodian policy, declaring its intention to drop support for the tripartite coalition, provide humanitarian assistance to the State of Cambodia based in Phnom Penh, and, most significantl y, resume relations on this issue with the old enemy, Vietnam. China has not given any indication that it will withdraw support from the Khmer Rouge-led tripartite coalition. The Thai government still provides it with sanctuary and acts as a conduit for Chinese military aid. But even as the possibility of outside disentanglement from the conflict becomes a possibility, the confrontation between the Cambodian actors themselves has reached its crisis.

14 The People 's Republic of Kampuchea (renamed -the State of Cambodia on 30 April, 1989 ) was created in January, 1979, a few weeks after Vietnam launched a large-scale invasion of Cambodia, driving the Pol Pot Government of Democratic Kampuchea to the Thai border. The new regime was led by former elements of the Khmer Rouge who escaped the Pol Pot purges of 1978 in eastern Cambodia by fleeing to Cambodia. In 1978, this rival faction formed, with Vietnamese encouragement, the Khmer National United Front for National Salvation (KNUFNS ) and took over government under Vietnamese tutelage. Whatever else, the Vietnamese invasion ended the Pol Pot terror during which at least a million Cambodians died and the entire country was turned into a forced labour camp. (7) Led by President Heng Samrin and Foreign Minister and now Prime Minister, Hun Sen, the State of Cambodia has relied until now on Vietnamese and Eastern bloc support. Apart from the Soviet Union and its former Eastern European satellites, the Phnom Penh government has been recognised only by a few countries including Cuba, Nicaragua, Mozambique, Angola, Libya and India. A majority of the UN member countries have continued to reject its claim to be the legal government of Cambodia and have instead recognised the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea, renamed in February, 1990, the National Government of Cambodia. The US decision to press for the Cambodian seat at the UN to be declared vacant could change this situation for the first time since The Coalition Government of Cambodia is a contrived and tactical alliance of the Khmer Rouge and the two non-communist factions. The United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC ) is led by Prince Norodom Sihanouk, former President of Cambodia until a 1970 coup, nominal head of Khmer Rouge government in 1975, and now nominal President of the Khmer Rouge-dominated coalition. Son Sann, a former Prime Minister under Sihanouk - an experience that has left them anything but friends - is the civilian leader of the Khmer People 's National Liberation Front (KPNLF ) but exercises little authority over his own senior militar y officers.

15 The third faction is the Khmer Rouge, Pol Pot 's revolutionary movement which ruled Cambodia as the Government of Democratic Kampuchea from April, 1975 until December, The coalition was forced on the two noncommunist factions in 1982 by China, the United States and Thailand as the price of militar y and diplomatic support. It has been more important politically than militarily, providing a figleaf of legitimacy for US and ASEAN support for the Khmer Rouge. China played the central role in persuading its defeated Cambodian ally and the two reluctant non-communist groups to form the Coalition Government. (8) With the US announcement ending support for the tripartite coalition, this arrangement to sanitise international military support for the Khmer Rouge is finished but the PRC has given no indication of dropping Pol Pot. Considerable US 'lethal and non-lethal ' aid has been directed to the non-communist members of the coalition since the early 1980s, some of it approved by Congress, some of it covert CIA support. The US decision should mean this will stop. Thailand continues to provide all three factions with sanctuary and camps for their captive populations. By 1988, the Khmer Rouge controls five main camp areas along the border : Trao, Site 8, Borai and Site K in Thailand, and the areas around Pailin and Phnom Malai inside Cambodia. (9) Singapore has supplied small arms and other support to the noncommunist groups. The UN through its United Nations Border Relief Organisation (UNBRO ) has provided humanitarian assistance to people in camps controlled by the Khmer Rouge as well as the Siahnoukists and the KPNLF and thus has unwillingly contributed to the Khmer Rouge 's survival. Today, the Khmer Rouge retains crucial Chinese support and are probably able to continue the war to its conclusion against an isolated Phnom Penh even without its coalition partners or, if Thailand closed the border, without sanctuary in Thailand.

16 The Khmer Rouge has always been the dominant faction, militarily and politically, since In the past, Khmer Rouge units have turned on their coalition partners in the field and destroyed KPNLF units to assert their control of Cambodian territory. It has suited the Khmer Rouge leadership to cooperate with the Sihanoukists and the KPNLF since last September to lessen international alarm at the prospect that Pol Pot may soon again rule Cambodia. But it is not on the Khmer Rouge political agenda to share power with anyone. Leaders of the KPNLF at Site 2 told me in 1987 that they expected that if the coalition were to oust the Hun Sen regime, they expected the Khmer Rouge to turn on them and devour them. (10) The Khmer Rouge operate in the so-called 'liberated zones ' of the other two factions and in effect retain control of all occupied areas. The Intractable Problem of the Khmer Rouge The Khmer Rouge under the same leadership responsible for the extremist and murderous policies of the 1970s presents an intractable problem for a peaceful resolution of the Cambodian crisis. Pol Pot, 65, is still the effective party leader, although he formally stepped aside as general secretary. His coalition partner, Prince Sihanouk, has recently acknowledged that Pol Pot "still controls everything ". (11) He remains commander-inchief of the Khmer Rouge guerilla force, commanding his troops from a jungle base at Bong Nam Ron in Thailand 's eastern Chanthaburi province. His 30-40,000 regulars are strictly disciplined, seasoned fighters skilled in military tactics and in propaganda work perfected over three decades of warfare. His brother -in-law, long Sary (through his first wife now in a mental hospital ) remains Khmer Rouge foreign minister. Nuon Chea, former party second-in-command is heavily involved in political and economic planning. Khieu Samphan, who briefly served as a Khmer Rouge cabinet member in a Sihanouk government, is the party

17 ideologue but although presented as party leader is believed to be only number five in the party hierarchy. General Ta Mok, the notorious "Butcher of Cambodia" who killed tens of thousands of civilians in the south -west during the 'Year Zero ' period, commands the Battambang area around Pailin, close to his old killing grounds. (12) Despite cosmetic changes in its public image, the Khmer Rouge is demonstrating inside Cambodia today that its political and military agenda is to reimpose absolute control over the country and with it the 'ultimate revolution " ideology of the years. The Khmer Rouge uses a combination of terror and political indoctrination through a 'hearts and minds ' program to extend its mass base inside Cambodia. The Thais and international support have provided the Khmer Rouge with a sanctuary and a controlled population in the border camps such as Site K and Site 8. There the party recruits fighters and porters and rests its troops. Camp administrators make little distinction between civilians and combatants : all able-bodied single men and some married men are fighters? single women and some men carry ammunition or war materiel into Cambodia. All the camps are run on military lines with strict discipline and instant obedience. Camp residents are mobilised for the war effort through a combination of extortation and appeals to patriotism and compulsion. Beyond actual combat, the most difficult and dangerous task is carrying heavy loads deep into Cambodia on trips that can last up to a month. Children as young as 10 years old are required to porter across the border. The land mines are a constant danger. Ta Mok, one of the highest -ranking Khmer Rouge commanders, lost a leg when he stepped on a Chinese mine planted by his own soldiers. (13) Over the past four or five years Khmer Rouge units have silently extended control over village communities throughout west and north Cambodia extending an even more severe regime over their populations.

18 Since the Vietnamese withdrawal completed in September, the Khmer Rouge have moved rapidly to establish larger 'liberated zones ' with a growing population under their direct military and political control. The main base has been in Battambang province but other base areas are being built up in the western and northern provinces. Outside these liberated zones ', Khmer Rouge maintain de facto control through periodic visits to villages as far as Kompong Thor n and Kompong Speu provinces, immediately north and south of the capital. Since 1989, the Khmer Rouge has made a conscious effort to restrain its cadres and 'soften ' its treatment of civilians under its control. Ranking Khmer Rouge leaders following Pol Pot 's recent example, have instructed their subordinates that the Khmer Rouge image must be improved both domestically and abroad. (14) Their fighters pay for food and help villagers with civil projects. They bring with them gifts of clothing, blankets and supplies provided by their Chinese allies. They conduct propaganda programs and educational campaigns using the techniques of the 'mass line ' developed as a strategy of 'people 's war ' by Mao Zedong in China in the 1930s. (15) They are reported to even pay the salaries of local police and collect taxes in villages with permanent Khmer Rouge cadres. But even in the camps within Thailand, obedience to the Khmer Rouge is based on compulsion. The operative rule is 'no work, no food '. Camp residents have no choice but to accept Khmer Rouge rule and to carry out their tasks. Despite the shift in tactics since last year, the evidence of Cambodians who have escaped Khmer Rouge control within Cambodia stresses the continued use of terror to obtain obedience. The Cambodian who offers less than full support for the Khmer Rouge, even for the ordinary villager, is 'punishment '. (16 )

19 Two high -level defectors have recently revealed the Pol Pot strategy through the 'hearts and minds ' campaign and the use of terror to position the Khmer Rouge to muster mass support for an election campaign should the international efforts to hold elections in Cambodia succeed. At the same time, this tightens their grip on the rural population and the rural economy, cutting of Phnom Penh from the 88 percent of Cambodians who live and work in the rural areas. In recent lectures, Pol Pot has argued that time is on the side of the Khmer Rouge. He has instructed Khieu Samphan to spin out the peace negotiations to allow the Hun Sen government to be further weakened. The Khmer Rouge has a deliberate policy of not permanently occupying urban areas outside their western bases and of limiting heavy civilian casualties. Their object is to demonstrate that Phnom Penh is incapable of protecting its people, that Cambodia is actually already controlled by the Khmer Rouge. (17) They are also able to call on deep-rooted Khmer patriotism and historical antagonism towards the Vietnamese whom the Khmer Rouge have fought since 1978 and earlier while the Vietnamese installed the present government in Phnom Penh. '» For international political reasons, the Khmer Rouge has made an effort to project a fresh image, admitting past 'mistakes ', and denying that they are any longer communists or even socialists. (18) But they are evidentl y as ready as ever to use al'-out terror against uncooperative Cambodians or against whole sectors of people marked out as ideological enemies. Government soldiers are marked for automatic execution even when not with their units. (19)

20 The Same Khmer Rouge The leadership remains the same, but there is convincing evidence that the Khmer Rouge 's ideological agenda remains the same. In early 1988, a Khmer Rouge defector formerly under Ta Mok 's command handed over an army manual distributed to Khmer Rouge soldiers in In the document, the Khmer Rouge admitted to somewhat excessive ' efforts to mobilise the Cambodian population into a Ibour force and in getting rid of enemies 'inside and outside '. But, the general policy was correct : Democratic Kampuchea is truly nationalistic. It fervently and always loves the people. It dares to sacrifice everythin g'. [emphasis added] The document attacks not only the Hun Sen regime but also the Sihanoukists and the KPNLF accusing them of plotting to exclude the Khmer Rouge from a settlement. (20) The evidence from the 'liberated zones ' confirms the bascially unchanged character of the Khmer Rouge program. The Khmer Rouge methods of indoctrination linked with terror are those of the 1970s. The 26,000 half-starved Cambodians who recently fled a Khmer Rouge zone to the KPNLF -controlled Site 2 are evidence that their concessions to world opinion are insincere. An alarming number of refugees who recently returned from within Cambodia to the Khmer Rouge-controlled Site 8 inside Thailand were suffering from malaria and cholera. (21) Their appalling condition is disturbing evidence of 41ife under Khmer Rouge rule in the 'liberated zones ' of western Cambodia. The execution of passengers o after t er Rouge ambushed a train travelling between Phnom Penh and Kompong Som on 1 July was also characteristic of the 'killing fields ' of the 1970s. A survivor of the massacre told how, after summarily shooting dead two militiamen on the train, the Khmer Rouge systematically divided the passengers into two groups : 'civilians ' and 'government employees '.

21 For more than half an hour the survivor heard continuous firing as they executed those in the government employees ' group. Other Khmer Rouge herded the 'civilians ' into a work party to porter the cigarettes, food and motorcycles taken from the train to a base camp eleven km. away. A Phnom Penh official later put the number of those killed at 26 with 52 wounded and 10 m issing, but the actual casualty rate was probably much higher. (22) This incident is particularly revealing because of the systematic and ideologically conditioned manner in which people were classified for execution reflecting the characteristic mentality of the Khmer Rouge revolutionary program in the 1970s. Two weeks later, between 200 and 300 Khmer Rouge attacked another train, this time 60 km. north of the capital in Kompong Chhnang province. Armed with rockets and automatic rifles, the guerillas strafed the passenger carriages killing at least 30 civilians. Hospitals in the rpovince could not take all the victims and more than 120 dead and wounded were brought to Phnom Penh. (23) Interviewed in May, Prince Sihanouk, while defending the Khmer Rouge as anti-vietnamese patriots, acknowledged "they are vicious, they are cruel, they are murderers..." (24) The pattern of ideologically determined executions is the same pattern imposed on Cambodia by Pol Pot in Their leader continues to see the world as a vast conspiracy against his heroic fighters who will triumph whatever the coalition of forces against him. (25) Threatened with the loss of power, as in 1978, or seeking to attract international support, as now, the leadership has announced sudden shifts in strategy. In 1978 it was suddently to create a "prosperous nation with happy people ". (26) Today, the Khmer Rouge official objective is a "peaceful " and "noncommunist " Cambodia. Each of the 79 Cambodians who reached Darwin on June 2, told interviewers of their own and their families experiences with the Khmer Rouge and of their desperate fear of a Khmer Rouge return to power. They do not want to return to a future which matches the horrors endured by their parents ' generation in the 1970s.

22 Intensifying Civil War The Khmer Rouge commands the largest and the most effective armed force within the Coalition. It can deploy units at batta lion strength in almost every province west, north and south of Phnom Penh. It has recently extended its military operations into Kompong Cham, Prey Veng and Svay Rieng provinces east of the capital on the Vietnamese border. Its 30-40,000 fighters has made tremendous gains in territory in the past months and is "now tightening the noose around Phnom Penh". (27) The Sihanoukist forces in the ANS are estimated at possibly 20,000 but they have had a poor fighting reputation in the past and are possibly only gaining some successes now on Khmer Rouge sufferance. The KPNLF forces at around 10,000 have also been active this year but again they are far inferior to the Khmer Rouge. There is little doubt that the Khmer Rouge forces are capable of pursuing the war against Phnom Penh alone. If they defeat the Hun Sen army, they could turn on their present allies and eliminate them as well. (28) Following the Vietnamese withdrawal, the 30-40,000 Khmer Rouge and the 30,000 ANS and KPNLF troops confront the 45-50,000 regulars in the army of the State of Cambodia. The conventional wisdom is that government forces need to outnumber guerillas by about five to one to achieve a military stalemate. In Cambodia, the opposing forces are nearer one-to-one with the Khmer Rouge enjoying a demonstrated superiority in military capacity. The Khmer Rouge are well equipped by China with modern weapons. The Phnom Penh forces once have an advantage in artillery and air power when they can use it during the dry season. But the Khmer Rouge gains this wet season may have wiped out this advantage. With fuel supplies and military aid exhausted, the Phnom Penh army may be unable to recover in time to press any advantage in the coming dry season. Their forces are

23 increasingly demoralised and ramshackle, badly paid and fed, poorly trained, and unable "to match the Khmer Rouge in the field. (29) The Khmer Rouge have the.classic guerilla advantage of mobility and initiative, choosing when and where to concentrate their forces. The government 's troops are rigidly organised in provincial commands under semi-autonomous provincial chiefs, giving the Khmer Rouge an extra tactical advantage. (30) From their secure base areas in the remote Cardamom Mountains of southwest Cambodia and around Pail in in Battambang province, and with the new 'liberated zones ' opened north and south of Phnom Penh, the Khmer Rouge are now waging the "strategic offensive " phase of the guerilla war, the phase which encircles the enemy capital until it falls into the revolutionary 's hands. (31) It is a chilling rerun of Morale within the Hun Sen forces is low. The Vietnamese made an effort to build up and train Cambodian army capable of taking over from Vietnamese forces after their withdrawal by September, 1989, but that effort has clearly failed. The Hun Sen government has resorted to desperate measures, conscripting teenagers and throwing them into battle with little or no training. These soldiers know that their army has lost the initiative to the Khmer Rouge. They are further demoralised by inadequate supplies and little or no pay. The village militia is more vulnerable : poorly armed, fragmented bands of civilians defenceless against professional Khmer Rouge units even of platoon size. In provincial towns, staff of schools and hospitals must join other civilians to form night patrols against guerilla attacks. They face a seasoned and ruthless enemy, well armed and well trained in commando and sabotage techniques. The countryside is infested with land mines which account for scores of mutilations and deaths each month. (32)

24 The KImer Rouge are Winning the War Since the Vietnamese withdrawal in September, the 'coercive balance ' has dramatically shifted towards the Khmer Rouge. By mid-1990, the American ClA 's assessment was that Khmer Rouge strength was growing daily and the balance of power had finally tipped in its favour. (33) It is precisely in this situation where the coercive balance is moving from a government to its enemies that the level of political violence against civilians typically intensifies. As both Phnom Penh and its Khmer Rouge opponents contend for control of territory and population, both sides are liable to use coercion against those villagers caught between them. (34) Between September and December, 1989, Khmer Rouge units intensified a campaign against the provincial centres in western Cambodia and mounted attacks around Phnom Penh itself in an effort to secure the northern and western gateways to the capital. On the eve of the Vietnamese withdrawal, the Khmer Rouge began a wide-ranging offensive which has now almost engulfed Cambodia. In August, 1989, they attacked four government garrisons in Battambang province forcing them to abandon their positions. In September -October, 450 Khmer Rouge encircled Pail in, southwest of Battambang, pounding the town with mortar and heavy artillery fire and taking it from government forces on 24 October. (35) General Ta Mok has since made Pail in his command centre. In October, the Khmer Rouge announced they would take control of the province. (36) The Vietnamese sent in 3,000 special forces to help government troops defend the provincial capital. In November -December, the Khmer Rouge mounted major offensives in Battambang, Cambodia 's second largest city, but also in Kompong Thor n deep inside Cambodia, and in Kornpong Speu, only 48 km. south of Phnom Penh on Highway Four, the crucial link with Cambodia 's port city of Kornpong Som. By the end of 1989, Highway Five

25 linking the capital with its western provinces, Highway Six linking the north, and Highway Four south to Kompong Som were all subject to Khmer Rouge interdiction,'denying the capital access at least temporarily to three quarters of its people and territory. The KPNLF leader. Son Sann, claimed in December that the Khmer Rouge 's "real intention is not to keep the cities. They could do what they want but they want to keep a low profile ". (37) The provincial capital, Battambang, was attacked on January, as well as several command posts of the key 5th military region northwest of the city. Khmer Rouge radio claimed the resistance had taken over parts of the city, assaulting the regional military headquarters and the airfield at Bek Chan. (38) Having proved their point, they withdrew but Battambang has been subjected to further serious attacks in May and June. (39) By February, the Khmer Rouge and their resistance allies were in occupation of an estimated 1,000 sq.km. of territory in western and northwestern Cambodia. The Khmer Rouge embarked on a program of shifting their Thai border populations back into the 'liberated zones ', many of whom were relocated against their will. (40) The Military Situation in nid-1990 The current second wave of large-scale offensives was launched in June partly to demonstrate the Khmer Rouge 's capacity to wage the war regardless of its allies and international attempts to patch together a peace proposal. Reports from foreign journalists within Cambodia in June and July reveal that fighting has reached its worse level since Two reports which reached the Jesuit Refugee Service in July suggest that the Phnom Penh government is in real peril :

26 One wild American journalist just came back from a long trip inside with the Sihanoukists and he said he 's never seen the fighting so bad. Just everywhere... Another journa list who has been watching the situation for years - been in Bangkok since last week told me that he feels it is just a matter of time until the Khmer Rouge come back. He said that they could probably take Phnom Penh tomorrow, without much opposition, if they wanted to. But still they aren 't concentrating on the major cities, or big military victories, but are winning the so-called psychological war, buying rice with American dollars, being nice to widoes, etc. They are winning hearts and minds everywhere, he says. So much so that he feels people are resigned to their return to power... We also heard that even in the KPNLF /ANS 'liberated zones ' they found that the Khmer Rouge had alread y been through, set up networks, and were paying the police... Some Khmer intelligence people (working with the USA) who 've been around for years (but sent their families to the States earlier ) now have come out from Cambodia and want to stop, feeling it's too dangerous for them to stay in. They are now in the camps. (41) Nate Thayer, an Associated Press journalist, has also reported extensive fighting across north and northwestern Cambodia. During a five-week, 700 km. trek in June-July, he saw Khmer Rouge units seize hundreds of villages and military positions, forcing government troops to retreat to the provincial capitals - which the guerillas are confident they can take. The resistance now controls much of the north and are shelling and launching commando raids against the provincial capitals of Kompong Thorn and Siem Reap which is completely surrounded. The Khmer Rouge threatens the nearby temples of Angkor, the ancient symbol of Khmer identity. They control thousands of km. of roads and supply routes which carry convoys of Chinese trucks, oxcarts and civilian porters ferrying supplies to frontline troops. Khmer Rouge field commanders boast that they can take Phnom Penh in an encircling strategy the way the Khmer Rouge captured the city in April, (42)

27 Over the past three years the Khmer Rouge have stockpiled Chinese weapons and ammunition and can sustain its war. effort without immediate resupply. So far the Chinese leadership has shown no sign of abandoning them but further direct aid would be difficult if the Thai government decided to close the frontier. (43) If the Khmer Rouge do take the port of Kompong Thor n, the Chinese could ship military supplies to them there rather than across the Thai landbridge. It is significant that the resistance now has a source of income available to it from the timber resources and gemstones of the territory in western and northern Cambodia it now rules. Rural resources in the western provinces is being diverted away from Phnom Penh and to the resistance and this could provide them with the income purchase arms. Until June, the Khmer Rouge displayed some caution in their military strateg y, partly to reassure international opinion mainly in Washington that they were not going to embarrass their supporters by taking power prematurely and partly because they believed that time was on their side. There has been a more aggressive position taken by some of the military leaders represented by Ta Mok who has urged a fight-to-the-death campaign against Phnom Penh. long Sary has represented the diplomatic strategy which has been endorsed by Pol Pot, keeping the military pressure on the Hun Sen government but leaving open the opportunity of a more respectable return to power through international negotiations. This more subtle strategy seems to have been dropped since June. Early in that month. Prince Sihanouk as formal leader of the Coalition Government of Cambodia and Hun Sen as Prime Minister of the State of Cambodia signed the Tokyo Communique calling for a ceasefire and the creation of a transitional supreme national council. At the Tokyo meeting the Khmer Rouge delegation walked out of the conference room 25 minutes after it opened.

28 Within two weeks the Khmer Rouge showed their contempt for the communique (which was also rejected by China) when 1,450 Khmer Rouge and ANS fighters occupied the provincial capital of Kompong Thor n north of Phnom Penh. They withdrew and government troops later reclaimed Kompong Thorn. But they are surrounded by the Khrner Rouge who are active throughout the province. The guerillas claim to control Highway Six cutting off Phnom Penh from northern Cambodia. (44) By early July, in north and west Cambodia Hun Sen forces were isolated in the provincial centres, Pursat, Battambang, Siem Reap and Sisophon and the Khmer Rouge controlled the surrounding countryside. On 10 July, the guerillas claimed they briefly occupied Sisophon and the town of Banteay Meanchey. Khmer Rouge radio claimed they laucnhed a five-pronged attack on 14 July against Battambang destroying an aircraft and other facilities at the airfield which they held overnight and firing 107 mm rockets into the city itself. (45) In mid-july, Khmer Rouge leader, Khieu Samphan, identified Kompong Thorn, central Pursat, Battambang and Kompong Speu as the "hottest battlefields ". Khmer Rouge activity in the central province of Kompong Speu immediately to the west of the capital intensified in October -November 1989 when Ta Mok, the Khmer Rouge commander, moved 1,500 of his best troops into the western province of Pursat and into Kompong Speu. In November, the resistance took control of twenty km. of Highway Five and in February, they again closed the highway. Raiders have concentrated on kidnapping and terrorising government employees although all civilians are at risk. Reported deaths and maimings from mines increased by percent after November. In June, the Khmer Rouge took over direct control of several districts, and 1,000 massed guerillas stepped up attacks against civilian centres sending 20,000 refugees fleeing to Phnom Penh. (46)

29 Fighting has intensified in Kampot, the southern coastal province with the crucial port of Kompong Som. In mid-1989, the Khmer Rouge were active inside the port city, planting mines near government offices and exploding grenades in the central district. Their units attacked villages on the very boundary of the port. In February, Khmer Rouge bombed bridges on Highway Four, cutting the vital supply link between Kompong Som and Phnom Penh. Attacks on villages in May and June, 1990, resulted in high civilian casualties including eleven orphans in avillage on the outskirts of Kompong Som. (47) In the adjoining province of Kompong Chhang, Khmer Rouge attacks sent more thousands fleeing to the capital. In late June their troops mounted sustained attacks against military posts and population centres in the provinces of Kompong Cham, Svay Rieng and Takeo east and south of Phnom Penh and so completely encircling the capital. (48) They have also taken the fighting to the Vietnamese border, the scene of Cambodian-Vietnamese battles in 1977 and In July, 1990, the Khroer Rouge are militarily active in every province in northwestern, northern and southwestern and southeastern Cambodia. The only provinces where heavy fighting has not been reported are the four northeastern provinces bordered by Laos and Vietnam. In the rest of Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge move freely in force, take villages, towns and provincial capitals and control the major communications and supply links to the besieged capital. They are highly trained, highly disciplined and ruthless. They are winning the war.

30 Diplomatic and Military Pressure Prince Sihanouk and others have warned in recent weeks that the Khmer Rouge cannot be left out of negotiations for a political settlement. If they are isolated from these negotiations they will become more dangerous because the military option will appear the easy way out. (49) This is either naive or disingenuous. The Khmer Rouge appear to be pursuing a double-track policy of military domination of the countryside and consequent pressure on Phnom Penh to capitulate diplomatically (and therefore politically ) on the key issue of Khmer Rouge involvement in the proposed Supreme National Council. The sharp rise in Khmer Rouge activit y may signal a new strategy. The Khmer Rouge is now demanding of the Phnom Penh government a bilateral truce. Rather than simply marching into the capital, it would be a political coup for Pol Pot if he could force the Hun Sen leadership to treat with him and to agree to a 'peace ' formula irrespective of the international negotiations involving the UN Security Council. President Heng Samrin of the State of Cambodia government on 17 July described the widespread attacks as intended to sabotage the country 's interior and this was designed partly to gain the upper hand in negotiations. The timing of the June-July Khmer Rouge assault is linked to the UN negotiations. When the 'Big Five ' in the Security Council - the US, Soviet Union, China, France and Britain - met in Paris on 16 July, the Khmer Rouge demonstrated its military strength in the provinces closest to Phnom Penh, threatening the capital itself. Nominal leader Khieu Samphan referred to the Paris talks as "very important " and revealed that "we may liberate one or two provincial towns to force the hand of the other side in negotiations ". (50)

31 The Khmer Rouge view of diplomatic negotiations is nevertheless peculiar. In early July, they presented Phnom Penh with a demand for equal power-sharing but that the Hun Sen leadership were guilty of "acts of treason " and should be put to death. (51) Economic Collapse The Cambodian boat people have been dismissed as economic refugees '. (52) The Cambodian economy is certainly in a state of collapse but this crisis is fundamentally linked to the escalating war and the political crisis caused by the resurgent Khmer Rouge. It is because the government in Phnom Penh has to direct up to 40 percent of its dwindling income to the war effort that it can no longer maintain essential services. (53) The Khmer Rouge are now able to deny the government access to a rural economy which is also disrupted by constant fighting. The boat people ' s stories of the situation which they fled fix on violence, the fighting, the threat of Khmer Rouge terrorism, the danger of arbitrary conscription into the government army or forced labour squads, not on economic hardship. But the economic crisis is part of the larger context of the collapse of order within Cambodia. The economy was destroyed in the 1970s by internal war and invasion and US bombing and by the millennarian collectivisation experiment conducted during the Pol Pot years. The government installed by the Vietnamese inherited a country in ruins. A recent paper produced by the Ministry of Agriculture on the present crisis describes the consequences of war and the Pol Pot years :

32 The genocidal regime of Pol Pot ( ) further destro yed the infrastructures. Most of the skilled personnel died or fled abroad and production ground to a halt. By 1979 the economy of Cambodia was in ruins. In 1979 a decimated, malnourished population was left without the means of production ; many of the surviving [draft ] animals and much of the stock of rice seed was consumed as food in the first months of Industrial facilities were rendered inoperable by indiscriminate scavenging of machinery as well as through lack of spare parts, raw materials, and skilled manpower. There had been no currency or markets for four years and no collection of tax for nearly a decade. The effects of the war and famine took a greater toll on the men than on the women, with the result that the ratio of the population of women to men is of the order of 57:43, and may be much wider in some places. A further consequence of these events is the large number of families which are headed by widows or otherwise single women, which emphasises the need to establish social programmes that will provide a safety net for these people. (54) The Ministry places Cambodia 's population at 8,600,000. An estimated 88 percent live in the countryside dependent upon rice cultivation. Nearly half are under 16 years of age. Social services remain rudimentar y and health problems are reflected in the extremely high rates of infant and child mortality (210 per 1,000 live births ). (55) Given the absolute devastation of Cambodia in 1979 the achievement since then are remarkable but they have been wiped out by the last eleven months of fighting. Meagre revenues from rubber, fish, timber and gem exports are swallowed up by the war budget or are denied by the resistance. Most destructive has been the conjunction of widespread war and the collapse of external aid from the Soviets and their former partners from the eastern bloc in COMECON. Cambodia has depended upon COMCECON aid for up to 80 percent of the country 's annual income. This aid will formally cut off from January, 1991 but, in fact, almost all outside aid has stopped. Only

33 the Soviets maintain an aid presence in Cambodia but they now demand hard currency for armaments and other goods ; hard currency which Cambodia does not have. (56). The Council of Ministers announced in June the sacking of 56,000 government employees, 25 percent of its workforce. Some government factories have simply closed down. Government salaries have fallen to where they only meet a fraction of a family 's minimum living costs and civil servants are forced to find other sources of income, working in other jobs or in the blackmarket. (57) Essential supplies such as petrol and diesel fuel previously provided from socialist countries are now severely rationed. The economy has also suffered from the decision in April, 1989, to dismantle the the collectivised and planned economy without providing the necessary administrative and managerial arrangements to support the system to more liberalised system. Spiralling inflation, a currency devalued by per cent, the reappearance of petty corruption and usury are all symptoms of a political and economic system disintegrating from internal loss of direction and external threat. The state does not have the material or human resources to manage such a transition even in a period of peace. (58) The privatisation of the economy while allowing some Cambodians in the capital to accumulate personal wealth has opened a new gap between rich and poor which in the tense situation in Phnom Penh has aroused popular resentment. There are now no restrictions on usury and Chinese money lenders have reappeared. This has provoked anti-chinese feeling among some Khmers and has sharpened the feeling expressed in the restrictive Ordinance 351 issued in 1984, forbidding the use of Chinese language or customs even within the family. (59)

34 The Costs of War: A Country in Disarray In the past eleven months, Cambodia has regressed into a situation of acute political, militar y and economic crisis. The efforts of the Hun Sen government to rebuild the country after the Pol Pot years were substantial but they have now collapsed. This is the larger context within which we can begin to understand the distress and fear which provoked the 224 Cambodians to flee their country and risk their lives at sea. The war is imposing an intolerable human and financial burden on the state and its people. The military effort saps scarce resources from essential areas such as agriculture and health care. There is no safety net for the growing numbers of injured and maimed soldiers and civilians, the families which have lost their most productive members. The civilian population is demoralised as young people as young as fourteen or fifteen are press ganged into the armed forces. Badly paid soldiers are turning to looting or are deserting their units. (60) Stories of corruption, the reappearance of social inequalities and failure to provide minimum living standards have disillusioned many ordinary Cambodians including many soldiers. (61) External threat and internal collapse provide the context for a series of political crises within the Hun Sen administration. The alleged reactionar y coup ' of June, 1990, was used to justify a purge of senior civilian and military officials including the Minister for Communications, Transport and Posts. Two colonels and a number of civil servants were arrested and accused of forming an opposition Liberal Social Democratic Party or Democratic Freedom Party. (62)

35 Divisions have appeared in the Phnom Penh leadership. Prime Minister Hun Sen 's failure to reverse the military tide and the reform experiments of last.year has isolated him from an influential group of party hardliners led by Chea Sim who has been able to tighten his grip on the party and key government positions since the crackdown on the alleged coup makers. (63) Violence against the citizen: Conscription Not surprisingly in the critical situation which has developed over recent months, the Phnom Penh government is showing signs of abandoning the human rights and political reforms of last year. The worsening military and political situation is persuading the Hun Sen government to adopt more coercive measures against its own population. Civil war and the real danger of infiltration by the Khmer Rouge within the administration have meant that the powers of the Stasi or the Securitate, the repressive agencies of the Interior Ministry, have expanded. (64) The government is increasingly nervous and suspicious of its citizens. The most blatant infringement of individual rights, directly linked to the Khmer Rouge threat, is the widespread forced and arbitrary conscription into the armed forces. This is one of the most acute fears of many of the young Cambodians who fled to Australia. Youths as young as fourteen or fifteen have been seized in classrooms, in movie houses, or on the streets and thrust into combat zones only after perfunctory training. There they face a seasoned enemy notorious for treating captured opponents with savagery. One of the older men in the group of 79 boat people now in the detention centre south of Darwin, an ethnic Chinese who survived the labour camps of the Pol Pot years, was concerned to save his children from conscription. Earlier this year (1990) the Cambodian government announced that any sixteen year-old boy or girl

36 (or any child who looked big and strong ) would have to join the army. Once conscripted they must remain in the army indefinitely. Soon after, some government people came to his house and took the names of his son and daughter. They warned the children not to leave or he and his wife would be punished. His main reason for leaving Cambodia was because of the war : am scared of death. I am scared of Pol Pot. If we return to Cambodia the whole of our family will be punished by death because we left illegally and because we escaped the army. This has happened to others already. It is not only the family with me in Australia that will be punished so will the rest of the family in Cambodia. Punishment is by death ; that has been the rule in Cambodia since (65) The experience of one of the young men now in the detention centre is not unusual. He was born in Kompong Thor n, the province subjected to heavy Khmer Rouge attacks this year. He completed first year high school in 1985 but the war interrupted his studies and he had been unemployed since then. His father, a teacher, died in 1978, the last year of Pol Pot rule. Between his uncles and aunt on his father 's side were among those taken to perform forced labour for the Khmer Rouge. They were shot when they refused to work. He fled Kompong Thorn in late April as Khrner Rouge units ranged through local villages kidnapping some and killing others. Some of his own school friends had been taken. He was convinced that the Khmer Rouge, whom he had seen casually strolling through the provincial capital and eating in its restaurants, would return to power. He had no confidence in the Hun Sen government and he fled conscription as well as the Khmer Rouge. (66) Conscription, war and Pol Pot : these are three immediate threats to their lives that they have fled.

37 A 33 year-old man who was among those evacuated from Phnom Penh by the Khmer Rouge in 1975 and spent the next three years in daily fear for his life. He cannot face this fear again : The reason I left Cambodia was because of Pol Pot. The story will never end. Wherever they are staying they will punish and kill people. Now Pol Pot has returned to Cambodia, all of the people in Cambodia will be killed. Where Pol Pot is there will always be killing. I am very frightened that if Pol Pot comes back I will be killed. The main reason I am frightened is because I have been a teacher and before Pol Pot always killed teachers. The other reason I am frightened is because come from the city and Pol Pot does not like people who live in the city, they like the old Khmer people who live in the country... I also left because I am sick and tired of war and I am frightened of the new war. Just before I left, my name was listed to be a soldier for Heng Samrin. There are no Vietnamese now and Pol Pot can take over very easily... If I go back to Cambodia I will be imprisoned because I left Cambodia. I do not know if I will have a trial or not. I think that I would be imprisoned immediately and would not know how long I would have to stay in prison. (67) Ateenage boy 's experience earlier this year : _ have seen the soldiers shoot young men running away from being put into the army. was in the cinema, watching a picture when everyone heard the soldiers were coming for the young men. I saw the young men being beaten and shot. I was in Phnom Penh when this happened - during a school holiday _. I went with my sister _ that day. I was very frightened and I cried when this happened. My sister went and hid in someone else 's house and I was left in the cinema. When the men ran outside, the shooting started. I couldn 't see the shooting at first. I looked through a small hole in the wall and could see some men shot and injured. Some were killed and some were injured. (68)

38 These stories are entirely consistent with the reports coming out of Cambodia. It is evident that these people haye fled immediate danger and would face immediate danger if they were returned. Racial Conflict Over a third of the Cambodians who have fled to Australia have an additional reason to fear return. They are ethnic Chinese and the Chinese in Cambodia are becoming a vulnerable minorit y. The largest ethnic minority is the Muslim Cham community, and the Phnom Penh government moved to protect this groups rights in the 1980s. Cambodian Christians have also enjoyed some recognition. But, perhaps under pressure from the Vietnamese advisers, the government enacted tough anti-chinese regulations through Ordinance 351 issued in The Chinese Cambodians among the boat people are acutely conscious of these discriminatory regulations. Citizens identified by government officials as ethnic Chinese (estimated at up to 500,000) are forbidden to use Chinese names, Chinese language even within the family, or to maintain Chinese cultural and religious traditions. (69) The penalties are severe and include lengthy imprisonment. In the freer economic conditions introduced in 1989, some ethnic Chinese have reemerged as money lenders and black market traders. They are popularly believed to be involved in petty corruption with officials and are becoming a resented and vulnerable target for angry and frightened Khmers aware of widening income disparities in Phnom Penh. It is no coincidence that percent of the boat people are of Chinese background. The other ethnic group at risk is the Vietnamese. One estimate puts their number in Cambodia at 200,000. (70) Many of them were settlers in Cambodia before the Pol Pot years and returned after Under the pressure of war, relations between Khmers and local Vietnamese have sharply deteriorated. Formed in acenturies -long history of conflict, Cambodians

39 have a traditional hostility to their Vietnamese neighbours. Anti -Vietnamese feeling today has reached dangerous levels. The Khmer Rouge demands that Vietnamese settlers be expelled. The People 's Republic of China has claimed that there are 'over one million illegal Vietnamese ' in Cambodia, among whom are hidden Hanoi 's 'special agents '. (71) If the Khmer Rouge begins to expel Vietnamese from Cambodia or subject them, as is likely, to persecution, this is the issue which conceivably could provoke Hanoi into military retaliation and, despite the problems in Vietnam, a reinvolvement in the Cambodian war. *** *** *** The conditions prevailing in Cambodia detailed in this submission are life-threatening and support the application for asylum in Australia presented by the 224 Cambodians who have reached here since November, As a group they are at particular risk of persecution and even death if they are forcibly returned. As individuals, most of them have additional compelling reasons to fear return. All of them are terrified of the war which has engulfed their country and of the power of the Khmer Rouge. They must be allowed to stay in Australia at least until they are able to return to their homeland with security and dignity.