The Impact of Water Scarcity on the Syrian Conflict and. the Movement of Internally Displaced People in Syria. Mario Di Giovanni & Gevorg Shahbazyan

Transcription

1 The Impact of Water Scarcity on the Syrian Conflict and the Movement of Internally Displaced People in Syria by Mario Di Giovanni & Gevorg Shahbazyan FIU Faculty Supervisor: Dr. Eric Lob Master of Arts in Global Affairs Florida International University Miami, Florida 2017

2 WATER AVAILABILITY AND REFUGEE FLOWS IN SYRIA 1 Abstract Water plays a critical role in shaping the current conflict in Syria. Water scarcity is one of the primary causes of the war as it created the basis for the uprising as droughts devastated Syria s agricultural sector, provoking the migration of millions of people into cities, creating further pressures on water and food supplies in urban centers. Water is also influencing the outcome of the conflict as it is used as a weapon of war and is one of the factors affecting the destination of internally displaced people in Syria. Water scarcity was one of the primary drivers of migration before the conflict and became a secondary driver of population displacement in Syria during the war compared to security.

3 WATER AVAILABILITY AND REFUGEE FLOWS IN SYRIA 2 Table of Contents Abstract... 1 Introduction... 3 Water Shortages and the Start of the Syrian Conflict... 5 Syria s Water Sources... 5 Recent Water Scarcity Issues in Syria The Link Between Water Scarcity and the Start of the Syrian Refugee Crisis The Use of Water as a Weapon During the Syrian Conflict Refugee Flows in Syria and Water Sources Current Water Conditions in Syria Migration Routes of The Internally Displaced Population Relationship Between Refugee Routes and Water Sources The Impact of Refugee Flows on Syria s Water Sources How Water Scarcity Will Influence The Outcomes Of The Syrian Conflict If Resources are Allocated to Water Supply Systems If Water Scarcity Continues in Syria Conclusion References... 42

4 WATER AVAILABILITY AND REFUGEE FLOWS IN SYRIA 3 Introduction The current Syrian crisis is the result of complex interconnected factors affecting the country, including religious conflicts, socio-political tensions, economic decline, and popular uprisings in neighboring countries (Gleick, 2014). As a result of the conflict, there are a rapidly increasing number of displaced people both within and outside of Syria. According to the United Nations, there are more than 13.5 million Syrians in need of humanitarian assistance. It is estimated that there are more than 6 million internally displaced people (IDPs) in Syria. Additionally, the first quarter of 2017 saw an increase of more than 250,000 Syrian refugees (displaced Syrians forced to cross national boundaries), bringing the approximate number of Syrian refugees to 5.1 million since the start of the war (Miels & Depetris, 2017). Both the IDPs in Syria and refugees in camps near the Syrian border face immense challenges to find the resources necessary to meet their basic needs, particularly water. The Middle East is currently facing extreme droughts that create many socio-economic problems (Massoud, Al-Abady, Jurdi, & Nuwayhid, 2010). Experts consider that the region is one of the driest places on Earth because it only contains about one percent of the world s renewable water sources (Espinoza & Heinrich, 2016). The area s low rainfall and high levels of evaporation are some of the reasons for the water shortage in the region. Additionally, the high levels of population growth and the inefficient use of water aggravate the situation (Espinoza & Heinrich, 2016). Governments in the region face challenges in determining how to obtain water and how to allocate it in a way that satisfies both population demand and the agricultural sector, which is a major source of income for many countries in the Middle East. However, the agricultural sector is a high consumer of water which creates an additional challenge on how to strike a balance between water demanded by the population and water required for crops.

5 WATER AVAILABILITY AND REFUGEE FLOWS IN SYRIA 4 The extreme droughts that Syria suffered in the years before the current conflict are considered to be important triggers of the uprisings. The droughts hampered the country s agricultural sector, which is fundamental for Syria s economy, accounting for almost 20 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) (CIA, 2017). Additionally, the Syrian government reduced subsidies, inputs, credit, and other assistance to farmers during the drought, worsening the situation before the conflict (De Châtel, 2014). As a result, farm workers left their agricultural lands after the failure of their crops and the decline of livelihood in the countryside, seeking refuge in the cities. The resulting inflow of persons into Syrian urban centers increased population pressures over food and water in the towns, sparking uprisings. To better understand the possible outcome of the Syrian refugee crisis, it is essential to understand how access to water impacts refugee movements in Syria. Currently, the lack of accessible water is one of the factors pushing Syrians to leave their lands and is also important when deciding where to go. However, there are other factors that also come into play that have a higher influence over the decision of IDPs to leave their homes and where they go, including the presence of violence. This research will explain the relationship between water availability and the flows of IDPs in Syria, demonstrating how water scarcity was one of the primary drivers of migration before the conflict and became a secondary factor during the war compared to avoiding violent conflict. The information utilized for the analysis includes quantitative and qualitative reports, analysis, books, journals, interviews, and documents developed by academics, politicians, and experts in the fields of water management, refugee movements, and conflicts in the Middle East. The research will provide projections of the long-term impact of water scarcity in the Syrian conflict and the Syrian refugee crisis.

6 WATER AVAILABILITY AND REFUGEE FLOWS IN SYRIA 5 Water Shortages and the Start of the Syrian Conflict The influence of droughts and its effects on rural communities in Syria has been underconsidered when studying the factors leading to the outset of the war. The impact of the decline of freshwater resources on individuals, communities and local economies has not received substantial attention from analysts (De Châtel, Holst-Warhaft, & Steenhuis, 2014). The assessments of Syria s stability were mainly concerned with the struggles in Syrian urban centers and the religious conflicts that have historically affected the country (Weinthal, Zawahri, & Sowers, 2015). However, these assessments often ignored the influence of climate factors to the start of the conflict, including droughts. A wider analysis of drought as an igniting factor of the war could have provided a better understanding of why the fighting started, what aspects are influencing the war today, and what must be considered to develop possible outcomes. To better understand how water contributed to the outset of the conflict it is essential to be familiar with Syria s main water sources, including the location of water inside the country and the evolution of access to water in Syria. The development of water scarcity in Syria shows how it was a primary factor to the start of the war and still plays a role in the conflict. Additionally, different players of the war use water as both a political and military weapon, seeking to inflict harm on the opposing forces by targeting their limited water sources or gain leverage over populations by controlling the supply of drinkable water. Syria s Water Sources Syria has seven agro-ecological zones which are illustrated in Figure 1: The Barada and Awaj basin fed by the Barada and Awaj Rivers, which flow through Damascus.

7 WATER AVAILABILITY AND REFUGEE FLOWS IN SYRIA 6 The Yarmouk River flowing through the border between Syria and Jordan. The Orontes River Basin in the western side of the country between Aleppo and Homs. The Euphrates and Aleppo water basin that runs from Aleppo and Lake Assad, in Figure 1. Water basins in Syria. (Mourad & Berndtsson, 2012) the North Central part of Syria to Raqqa and on to the Northwest corner of the country along the Euphrates River crossing Deir ez-zor and Al Bukamal. The Dajleh and Khabur basin around Al-Hasakah and Nusayabin with the Tigris River in the northeastern corner of the country and the Nahr al Khabur River running from the Euphrates River through Al-Hasakah. The Coastal Basin on the Western coast of Syria between Turkey and Lebanon.

8 WATER AVAILABILITY AND REFUGEE FLOWS IN SYRIA 7 The Desert area in Central to South Syria that surrounds Palmyra. In total, Syria has 21 rivers inside its territory, some of them being seasonal (Hollander, 2005). All of the major rivers in Syria, including the Tigris, Euphrates, Orontes and Yarmouk, are shared with bordering countries. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations (UN), it is estimated that the total water availability in Syria, including both renewable and groundwater (water located underground in soil pore spaces and the fractures of rock formations) is approximately 16.8 cubic kilometers per year. Almost 60 percent of Syria s water sources come from neighboring countries (FAO, 2016). The high percentage of water which comes from outside its borders makes Syria dependable to its neighbors for reliance on water availability and security. Syria has agreements with Turkey, Iraq, Lebanon, and Jordan over the water resources shared between the countries. 1 The Tigris and Euphrates Rivers are shared upstream with Turkey and downstream with Iraq. Although a formal agreement between the three countries does not exist, there are bilateral agreements between these countries for sharing water sources. The water agreements over these rivers serve as an example of cooperation strategies that Syria has implemented with the neighboring countries to manage water resources. Before 1998, the relations between Turkey and Syria were limited due to ongoing diplomatic disputes. It was only after signing the Adana agreement in 1999 that marked a turning point in bilateral ties between the two countries. The agreement established cooperation between the two countries against the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). Ten years later, Syria and Turkey signed the Joint Political Declaration on High Level Strategic Cooperation, which helped to 1 These are non-binding transboundary agreements

9 WATER AVAILABILITY AND REFUGEE FLOWS IN SYRIA 8 create an array of agreement in different areas, including political, security, commerce, education and water. As water becomes scarcer in the Middle East region, cooperation between countries sharing the same water basin will become increasingly critical (Rosengrant, 1995). Turkey is an upstream state that both, directly and indirectly, controls the flow of the rivers down to Syria through dams and other water related management projects. Cooperation agreements indicated that Turkey would provide the necessary amount of water in exchange for Syria regulating its northern border more carefully for the anti-terror operations against Kurdish militias. However, Turkey has not complied with the agreements in different occasions. In March 2017, Turkey cut off water flow from the Euphrates River to Lake Assad, which provides water to Aleppo and nearby farmlands. The blockage of the Euphrates by the Turkish government was felt the most in the Kurdish-held city of Manbij, northeast of Aleppo, suggesting that the move was aimed at Kurdish militias in Syria. As such, water has an underlying geopolitical importance for Syria and other regional players. Access and control over water resources provide strategic significance to an upstream country such as Turkey. It enhances military projection, diplomatic strength, trade, domestic stability and leverage over Syria and Iraq. For this reason, water will also be a critical source of conflict and cooperation based on further fragmentation of Syrian territory into smaller zones controlled by religious, political, and ethnic groups. Figure 2 shows the land distribution in Syria according to open-source data available as of January 2017, illustrating which groups control each water basin. The government forces are mainly situated on the western side of Syria, including portions of the Al Yarmouk, Barada, Awaj, Orontes and Coastal regions, which include Aleppo, Homs, and Damascus. Rebel forces

10 WATER AVAILABILITY AND REFUGEE FLOWS IN SYRIA 9 are mainly situated on the southern and northwestern sides of Syria, including portions of the desert basin bordering Jordan and western extremes of Euphrates basin. The north and northeastern side of the country is mainly controlled by the Kurds, including large portions of the Dajleh and Khabur basin around Al-Hasakah and Nusayabin. The Islamic State (IS) is primarily situated in the central and eastern side of Syria, including Raqqa and the Euphrates River.

11 WATER AVAILABILITY AND REFUGEE FLOWS IN SYRIA 10 Recent Water Scarcity Issues in Syria A long-term trend to warmer and drier air in the region causes the more severe droughts in Syria (Kelley, Mohtadi, Cane, Seager, & Kushnir, 2015). Weaker winds bring less moisture Figure 2. Military situation in the Syrian Civil War as of January 2017 (Mourad & Berndtsson, 2017) Controlled by Ba'athist Syrian forces Controlled by Syrian Democratic Forces (Rojava) Controlled by ISIL Controlled by Tahrir al-sham (al-nusra) Controlled by Syrian opposition forces from the Mediterranean into the country reducing rainfall water collection, while warmer temperatures cause higher rates of evaporation, which reduces the available groundwater.

12 WATER AVAILABILITY AND REFUGEE FLOWS IN SYRIA 11 The growth of Syria s population is another factor affecting Syria s water availability per capita. The total Syrian population grew from approximately three million in 1950 to over 22 million people in 2012, increasing the demand for water (Gleick, 2014). The impressive population growth decreased the country s water availability per capita from approximately 5,500 cubic meters in the 1950s to about 760 cubic meters per capita by The lower levels of per person water availability are considered to be under chronic water shortage, according to FAO s levels of water stress (FAO, 2012, p. 7). The growing demand for water in Syria created a significant water deficit in the country even before the current conflict. It was estimated that in 2007, the country had a total water deficit of 3.59 billion cubic meters (De Châtel, 2014). Agriculture is another sector which consumes considerable quantities of water and has been hindered by water scarcity. According the FAO, 87.9 percent of Syria s water was destined to agriculture and livestock in the years leading to the start of the war (FAO, 2016). Due to extreme droughts and poor economic conditions, the Syrian agricultural sector was tremendously affected, reducing its share in the Syrian economy. The UN estimated that the Syrian economy shrunk by 45 percent compared to the pre-conflict statistics. Additionally, the war has pushed the government to prioritize its survival over agriculture development and water infrastructure. The threat of water scarcity also increases when there is a lack of knowledge regarding monitoring and managing groundwater resources. In Syria, a deficit in water availability from other sources is frequently resolved by overuse of groundwater (Robins & Fergusson, 2014). In 1997, about 60.1 percent of irrigation water in the country came from groundwater sources (Hollander, 2005), making groundwater critical for Syria s agricultural sector. However, for the same year, five of the seven water basins in Syria were facing negative water balances with more water being consumed than replenished by the rain or other natural sources.

13 WATER AVAILABILITY AND REFUGEE FLOWS IN SYRIA 12 About half of the water used for Syria s agriculture comes from the Tigris, Euphrates, and Orontes basins (Zurayk, 2014). The remaining irrigation water uses aquifers fed from the Turkish mountains, particularly in the farming regions of Al-Hasakah and Raqqa in the northeast of the country. Syria has a centralized management of water distribution in the country (Hollander, 2005). The government of Bashar Al-Assad worked to expand water access in Syria by improving and building water distribution systems, particularly aimed at helping rural communities and the agricultural sector (Saleeby, 2012). However, the constant population growth, unanticipated operational costs, and the use of water-demanding crops (i.e. cotton, wheat) placed additional pressures on water sources, leading to shortages, and, on occasion, the salinization of agricultural lands which makes them unsuited for agriculture (Gleick, 2014). The Barada River is an example of unsuccessful water management by Syria s government. The river is the largest source of water for Damascus and the Ghouta plain. The exponential growth of the Syrian capital caused significant water shortages in the city. The government compensated the deficit of water through new water distribution systems and pipelines (Hollander, 2005). However, the redistribution of water to satisfy the needs of Damascus resulted in water shortages in the agricultural sector in nearby agricultural lands, leading to an economic downfall in these areas. Water scarcity in Syria dramatically deteriorated after 2010, in part due to the Syrian conflict, but also due to the ineffective policies of the Syrian government including lack of investment in irrigation infrastructures and improper management of groundwater sources. The Syrian crisis has further pushed food and water services to the brink of collapse (Lovelle, 2016, p. 1). The combination of severe droughts, ongoing conflict and inefficient water policies

14 WATER AVAILABILITY AND REFUGEE FLOWS IN SYRIA 13 by the government, have generated substantial risks for Syrians to secure food and water creating an environment prone to uprisings. Currently, the Syrian government does not have full control over its territories. Therefore, it cannot implement statewide water strategy to provide water equally to all regions, given the lack of proper infrastructure and water mismanagement. The lack of control over the territory affects the government s operability and limits its capacity to provide water. However, this does not exclude the possible intent behind providing water to regions that support the government or withholding water from territories that are against the government. Forces opposing the Assad administration, particularly IS, have been able to overcome water cutoffs by the government since they can obtain water from other sources under their control, such as the Euphrates river. However, the Assad government has also reached agreements with rebels to restore water supply to government-controlled cities that depend on water sources held by rebels (France 24, 2017). The Link Between Water Scarcity and the Start of the Syrian Refugee Crisis Social unrest, like the one experienced by many countries during the Arab Spring, is impossible to link to only one cause. However, water scarcity is cited with increasing frequency as a significant multiplying factor (Jägerskog, 2016, p. 4). A 2014 report by Nicholas S. Robins and James Fergusson noted that the correlation between water scarcity and anarchy is inarguable (Robins & Fergusson, 2014, p. 8). Water shortages played a significant role in creating the conditions which led to political unrest and ultimately violent insurrection in Syria (DuBois, 2016, p. 154). The impacts of climate change on Syria s environment caused detrimental second- and third-order effects on ecological and human systems including stronger droughts affecting the availability of food and

15 WATER AVAILABILITY AND REFUGEE FLOWS IN SYRIA 14 water (DuBois, 2016, p. 154). Additionally, rising unemployment and lack of political freedom chipped in to form the basis for the uprisings (De Châtel, 2014). Analysts of the Syrian conflict have highlighted the important role of water at the start of the war. Severe droughts between 2006 and 2010 had devastating effects on the agricultural sector and rural lands of Syria. Additionally, the cancellation of state subsidies on diesel fuel and fertilizer in 2008 and 2009 at the height of a severe drought further deteriorated the situation (De Châtel, 2014). The dire conditions pushed many into unemployment, particularly those in agricultural communities (Mourad & Berndtsson, 2011). The result was an early influx of people into Syrian cities in search of opportunities and a better livelihood. Kelley et al estimated that between 2006 and 2011, more than 1.5 million Syrians moved from the rural areas to cities (Kelley, Mohtadi, Cane, Seager, & Kushnir, 2015). The movement of people into Syrian urban centers placed further pressure on the struggling cities in Syria, resulting in political instability and violent conflicts as uprisings started to appear. The total urban population of Syria in 2002 was 8.9 million but, by the end of 2010, had grown to 13.8 million, a more than 50 percent increase in only eight years, a far greater rate than for the Syrian population as a whole. The population shock to Syria s urban areas further increased the strain on its resources. (Kelley, Mohtadi, Cane, Seager, & Kushnir, 2015) Often, the demand of those leading the uprisings was water. When protests in Kufayr al- Zayt occurred in April 2011, permanent access to clean drinking water was among the first demands placed on the government rather than the fall of the regime (Hollander, 2005). When

16 WATER AVAILABILITY AND REFUGEE FLOWS IN SYRIA 15 Assad s government failed to answer the plea of the population, local militias were set up to challenge the government. As a result, the Syrian army moved in to face the growing resistance, initiating the repression (Hollander, 2005). Figure 3 explains the systematic effects of climate change in Syria and how it increases the probability of mass migrations. The higher temperatures in the arid areas of Syria increased the rate of evaporation and reduced rainfall. As a result, the ecological system was affected by massive droughts crippling crops and farms. The changes in ecological systems are followed by effects on human systems, including severe stress on agriculture. The tensions from shortages of employment, food, and water produce mass migrations, as people will seek refuge in cities and other areas, looking to cover their basic needs. These population movements result in conflict since the influx of people to cities places further pressure on already limited urban resources, increasing the probability of uprisings. Rural-urban migration is significant because it creates a critical mass of aggrieved citizens in cities, which become fruitful recruiting grounds for mass demonstrations. As such, water scarcity can also determine the outcome of the conflict as it is linked to the rise of extremist groups in regions facing extreme water shortages. IS has been able to fully control water supply in the territories it controls since they have access to water sources, including the Euphrates river, leaving the government without being able to influence the area s water flow. Paucity of water has created fertile ground for IS recruitment In areas where the drought weakened civil institutions and the protections they provide, new fronts opened that not only provided a safe haven to IS combatants but also served as an incubator

17 WATER AVAILABILITY AND REFUGEE FLOWS IN SYRIA 16 where these groups could increase their numbers and gain momentum (DuBois, 2016, p. 155). Figure 3. Systematic Effects of Climate Change in Syria. (DuBois, 2016) 1st Level Changes in Physical Environment Example: Higher Temperatures 2nd Level Effect on ecological systems Example: Droughts, Desertification Effect on human systems 3rd Level Example: Severe stress on agriculture, food security 4th Level Effects from human responses Example: Mass migration, conflict Figure 4 shows a map of Syria with zones that experienced extreme drought from 2000 to 2010 and the presence of the Islamic State (IS) in these territories in June The unit of analysis employed for the orange areas depicting drought zones was the Vegetation Health Index, which groups territories into four classifications depending on the severity of the drought (UNISDR, 2011). The levels of drought are determined by crossing rainfall data with the temperature index. The map shows in orange areas that showed severe impacts of drought, which is the most severe category of the index, every year from 2000 to The critical levels

18 WATER AVAILABILITY AND REFUGEE FLOWS IN SYRIA 17 of drought negatively affected the agricultural sector in these regions. Therefore, the map shows how the rise of the Islamic State is linked to economic mishaps caused by droughts in Syria. The north and northeastern governorates of Syria, which are regions that typically produce two-thirds of Syria s crop yields, were among the most affected by the drought and are also the regions that IS has maintained consistent control of since the beginning of the conflict (DuBois, 2016, p. 155). The Use of Water as a Weapon During the Syrian Conflict In the existing literature, water is often regarded as either a natural resource or an industrial commodity. However, its political and military function and potential are of particular importance as well. The IS and government forces have repeatedly used water to increase their territorial control or influence the opposing party. The earliest recorded conflict over water in the region happened over 4500 years ago when the territory that is known today as Syria belonged to the Kingdom of Mesopotamia. A dispute over control of irrigation water prompted King Urlama of Lagash to stop the water supply to the city of Umma, a neighboring city-state deprived of natural resource (DuBois, 2016). The parties involved in the conflict showed keen interest over the dams in the Tigris and Euphrates river since they are seen not only as strategic targets but also as powerful weapons of war (Espinoza & Heinrich, 2016, p. 6). The dams supply several areas of Syria with electricity and are considered of major strategic importance to the Syrian regime (Gleick, 2014, p. 336). As a result, it was not long before there were fights over the control of dams and other water

19 WATER AVAILABILITY AND REFUGEE FLOWS IN SYRIA 18 resources. In November 2012, rebels clashed with government forces to capture the Tishrin hydroelectric dam on the Euphrates River (Vidal, 2014). Fighting among the different players in the war brought damages to Syria s water infrastructure and supply. During aggressions around Aleppo in 2012, the major pipeline which delivered water to the city was damaged by government air strikes, leaving over three million people with shortages of drinking water (BBC, 2012). In February 2013, anti-government forces captured the Tabqa dam in Lake Assad that provides much of the electricity to Aleppo (Saad & Gladstone, 2013). However, the capture of the dam and consequent water mismanagement resulted in a drastic fall in water levels (Chudacoff, 2014). The targeting of water systems in Syria by both IS and government forces highlight the strategic value of water supply, hydroelectricity, and flood control in water-scarce regions (Gleick, 2014, p. 336). Military maps of Syria also show how IS organizes around the most important rivers in the area. Figure 4 shows how the Islamic State has concentrated its control and presence around the Euphrates River.

20 WATER AVAILABILITY AND REFUGEE FLOWS IN SYRIA 19 Figure 4. Drought in Syria and the presence of the Islamic State, June (Friedman & Fedirka, 2017) In Damascus, about four million people suffered from water scarcity in December 2016 after water springs outside the city were targeted by the ongoing conflict (United Nations, 2016). The Wadi Barada and Ain al-fija springs serve 70 percent of the population in and around Damascus (Barrington, 2016). The Syrian government was accused of deliberately attacking the Damascus water supply by bombing the spring (Miles, 2017). The Wadi Barada valley northwest of Damascus had been under rebel control since In Syria, rebel and government forces have reached understandings that ensure the flow of water to support civilians. The agreements between the cities of Damascus and Aleppo, providing the constant stream of water are examples of deals between the government and rebels (Reuters, 2017). However, IS has not come to terms with other forces to assure the flow of water.

21 WATER AVAILABILITY AND REFUGEE FLOWS IN SYRIA 20 The terrorist group has targeted dams and overflowed water systems. However, under IScontrolled territory, they have worked to provide water, acting as a de facto government. Figure 5. Presence of Islamic State near Rivers, December (BBC, 2017) By acting as providers of basic needs, the IS also sought to win the affection of locals (DuBois, 2016). Therefore, water also serves as a formidable political weapon for the Islamic State. As shown in Figure 5, the territory control of IS mainly follows water sources, particularly the Euphrates River. IS uses its control of water infrastructure and water sources as a political instrument to confer bargaining power, earn political legitimacy, and marshal local support (Khan, 2016, p. 1). Jennifer Dyer, a former Intelligence Officer of the United States, stated that if ISIS has any hope of establishing itself on territory, it has to control some water (Vidal, 2014).

22 WATER AVAILABILITY AND REFUGEE FLOWS IN SYRIA 21 Refugee Flows in Syria and Water Sources The many years of conflict have also taken a toll on the Syrian water infrastructure. The Syrian system of water pipes has been damaged extensively due to deliberate attacks and lack of maintenance. The population has been forced to look for alternatives, relying on wells or water trucks. Many have also decided to migrate in search of a better livelihood, which includes access to water. Approximately, one of every two Syrians has been displaced from their homes due to the conflict. Drought is a slow, gradually developing form of natural disaster that may extend over years. Over the duration of the drought, there may be several seasons of decreasing harvests and building stresses. As the drought progresses, households will begin to take on coping strategies, which include migration. (Dow, Carr, Douma, Han, & Hallding, 2005, p. 17) Current Water Conditions in Syria In Syria, a combination of damaged infrastructure, lack of maintenance, and ongoing conflict has resulted in a reduction of 50 percent of access to water compared to levels before the war (Jägerskog, 2016). The loss of livelihood due to increasing water scarcity forced many Syrians to migrate to cities before the conflict. Farmers moved to cities only to be relegated to city slums with low living standards (DuBois, 2016). The Public Network constituted the largest source of water for more than 90 percent of the Syrian population before the onset of the crisis. This network was often fed by rivers and water bodies and in some cases through the groundwater. After the Syrian crisis started, the use

23 WATER AVAILABILITY AND REFUGEE FLOWS IN SYRIA 22 of water tankers spread as an alternative to the public network due to the damage to the system and as some water plants went out of service. The Quneitra governorate, in the southwest of Syria, has seen the highest rate of water tanker use. The rural regions of Damascus also use tankers, as the public network does not provide water to all sub-districts. However, tankers are a costly alternative as they are mainly provided by private tanker companies (Baker, 2013). Occasionally, tankers are also provided by UN-coordinated humanitarian responses (Saltori, Daraz, & Pajak, 2016). The piped water system suffers dysfunctions but continues to operate in different degrees of efficiency. People living in areas where the piped infrastructure is dysfunctional, suffer from reduced quality, inferior quantity, and uncertain availability (Boutin & Touma, 2016, p. 3). Those affected accounts for about 69 percent of the entire Syrian population 2. The areas that showed continued use of public networks are mainly those that have been under the continued control of the Syrian regime, which is the Western side of the country. Territories which have suffered violent clashes mainly rely on tankers for water supply. The populations which face the biggest risks from water scarcity are poor rural communities with the lack of proper institutions and inadequate resource management. These are territories mainly controlled by rebels or IS. The northeastern region of Syria, currently under control by the Kurds, also suffered from the intense drought, destroying crops and livestock (De Châtel, 2014). Figure 6 shows the results of a 2013 study by the United Nations indicating the severity of access to water in Syria during the earlier years of the war. Some of the governorates with severely limited access to water included Deir ez-zor, Raqqa, and Aleppo, all of which enjoy the 2 Approximately 21,770 million in 2010, estimated 4 million have become refugees since

24 WATER AVAILABILITY AND REFUGEE FLOWS IN SYRIA 23 flow of the Euphrates river within their borders. Additionally, rural Damascus communities also suffered from severely limited access to water. On the other hand, the coastal regions, the Southwest border and northeast borders of Syria were the governorates that had poor to moderate water access in the country. Although it still shows water shortage, the situation was not as severe as the previously mentioned governorates. Figure 6. Access to water and sanitation by governorate, February (UNICEF, 2013) A report published by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) in December 2016 displayed new information regarding the severity of access to water across Syria.

25 WATER AVAILABILITY AND REFUGEE FLOWS IN SYRIA 24 Figure 7. Access to water and sanitation by governorate, December 2016 (UNOCHA, 2016) As the conflict rages on, the affected regions shift and the number of people in need increases.

26 WATER AVAILABILITY AND REFUGEE FLOWS IN SYRIA 25 As shown in Figure 7, the governorates that were under severely limited access in 2013 continue to be the most critical territories in the country (UNOCHA, 2016). However, limited water access is now more severe in the northeast and southwest corners of the country. Also, limited water access is more severe in territories that border the Euphrates river, which are also areas currently held by IS. Although Syria continues to have water sources in the form of rivers, the problematic mismanagement of water by controlling parties, particularly in territories held by IS, result in limited water access. Water scarcity was one of the causes of the rise of IS in the territories. Now, although their goal is to become a fully-functional state, water shortages have become more severe in areas held by IS due to the mismanagement of water sources, but also because of the constant fighting that has damaged the water infrastructure. While individuals in all of Syria s governorates have been affected by the conflict, those closest to the battles are among the most profoundly affected. Areas of conflict and instability are plagued by weak institutions and poor management as the top priority is survival. In these areas, the severity of needs requires an urgent response. Figure 7, with more recent information, shows several focus points where the number of people in need regarding access to water is greater. These hotspots are where fighting has been more intense, including Raqqa, Aleppo, Homs, and Deir ez-zor. These are also the areas with most severe problems of access to water. Therefore, current limitations of water access in Syria are mostly related to ongoing fighting, since the besieged areas are the ones that suffer the most from limited water access. When comparing current water access to who is controlling each territory (Figure 2), there is not an absolute difference between the lands held by government forces, rebel forces or Kurds. Each of these parties suffers from similar access to water severity levels. However,

27 WATER AVAILABILITY AND REFUGEE FLOWS IN SYRIA 26 areas held by IS show more severe levels of water access. The governorates of Deir ez-zor and Raqqa, and portions of the Homs governorate around Palmyra, currently held by IS, show severe water access conditions, possibly linked with mismanagement of water sources in the area. The more serious levels of water access in territories held by IS and rebels are the result of water mismanagement by rebels, rather than a deliberate strategy conducted by the Syrian government. Migration Routes of The Internally Displaced Population Throughout history, people often migrate to cities with nearby water supplies, rivers, and lakes to develop and sustain themselves. Migration to places with availability of clean water is often the case when the primary factor when deciding where to go in the search for opportunities and better livelihood. However, the conflict in Syria has reached levels that force people to migrate even to areas with low access to water so they can avoid zones of conflict.

28 WATER AVAILABILITY AND REFUGEE FLOWS IN SYRIA 27 Figure 8. Displacements in Syria after March (IDMC, 2012) The early years of the war showed three main tendencies in refugee movements inside of Syria (as illustrated in Figure 8): Displacement of people from the Deir ez-zor and Raqqa governorates to Al-Hasakah and Aleppo, leaving regions with significant water sources (Euphrates River and Lake Assad) to other areas with the probable intention of avoiding the Islamic State. Large movements of people from Aleppo south to Homs and Damascus and the border with Jordan, which are linked to the start of the Battle of Aleppo. Displacement of people from Homs to Damascus and south to the frontier with Jordan, in the years of the Siege of Homs. 3 3 Beginning in 2011

29 WATER AVAILABILITY AND REFUGEE FLOWS IN SYRIA 28 The available data did not provide details about the characteristics of Syrians that moved in the three waves of displacement described above. The constant violent clashes have limited the participation of researchers to obtain further information about the IDPs. However, the data shows estimates of how many people fled in the early years of the war. The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) estimated that more than 1.5 million people were internally displaced. This equates to one in every fifteen Syrians becoming an IDP after the war started. By March 2012, approximately 50,000 to 60,000 fled Homs after the government increased its use of heavy artillery against the city. By July 2012, it was estimated that more than 200,000 fled Aleppo (Arnaud, 2012). The movement of individuals does show a modest level of correlation with the available water access in the country between 2012 and When comparing the destination of IDPs in Syria with the areas with severe, modest, or poor water access, IDPs tended to move to areas with less severe levels of water access, including the Al-Hasakah governorate and southwestern region of Syria. However, IDPs also moved away from areas with significant water sources, including the Euphrates River. The movement of internally displaced persons to regions with less severe water access does not mean that there is a causal relationship between water access and the destination of the internally displaced. Areas with higher levels of water access in Syria are also regions which had suffered the least amount of conflict in 2012 and Therefore, another important consideration in the decision-making process of IDPs when deciding where to go is the existence of violence.

30 WATER AVAILABILITY AND REFUGEE FLOWS IN SYRIA 29 Figure 9 shows a June 2016 map of displacements inside of Syria. The more recent evidence of IDP movement shows a similar picture as in 2013: people leaving conflict prone areas. Data from 2016 also indicates that the displacement is not always over long distances. A considerable number of Syrians are displaced within their districts, meaning that they move to nearby areas to avoid violence in their communities. In the first half of 2016, fighting among the many actors of the Syrian caused the displacement of many in the country. The regions prone to conflict showed the displacement of a great number of people. In the first months of the year, conflict in Deir ez-zor displaced as many as 3,000 families. Also, fighting in Aleppo and rural Hama caused great waves of displacement of people, moving away from the violence. Clashes in the governorate of Al-Hasakah also forced many to move away from a region with less severe levels of water access to territories suffering from severely limited water access in Deir ez-zor governorate. Another important factor seen in 2016 is that people living in government-controlled grounds moved within the territory held by the government. However, those living in territories controlled by anti-government forces prefer to avoid government-controlled areas. The tendency of not moving between territories seized by different parties demonstrates that political factors also influence the destination of IDPs. Those living in government-controlled areas could fear being captured by the IS. Inversely, those living under IS-held areas could fear being imprisoned by government forces if they move to government-controlled areas. Therefore, the movement of IDPs is also affected by the party controlling the territory where they are located, as they feel a threat of crossing into the territory of another party. A 2013 study by the United Nations indicated that IDPs usually relocated inside the governorate where they used to reside (UN, 2013). Displaced people stated that their destinations

31 WATER AVAILABILITY AND REFUGEE FLOWS IN SYRIA 30 tended to be places where they know others or with similar social characteristics. Therefore, remaining near the areas of origin and staying in territories with related cultures is another factor considered by IDPs when forced to move. Relationship Between Refugee Routes and Water Sources The comparison between the destination of IDPs and the places with severe water situation shows that there are other factors influencing where and why Syrians migrate in addition to water availability. Proper refuge and shelter from violence is an immediate concern for those displaced within Syria. IDPs living in temporary collective centers endure overcrowded conditions and lack access to clean water, electricity and waste management. Figure 9. Displacements in Syria, January-May (OCHA, 2016) When comparing levels of water access and the destination of IDPs, safety from violence appears as the most decisive factor when deciding to leave. IDPs seek to avoid conflict areas, but

32 WATER AVAILABILITY AND REFUGEE FLOWS IN SYRIA 31 not necessarily move in search of water and food in distant regions. IDPs mainly move within the same governorate, meaning that they first want to avoid conflict areas, even though they might end up in water-scarce territories. As illustrated in Figure 10, the highest concentrations of displaced populations are located in districts close to the major conflict areas. The high concentration is especially evident in Raqqa, Aleppo, and Damascus, showing elevated levels of IDPs in nearby regions. Also, every governorate in the country contains districts with a high percentage of internally displaced persons. This shows how displacements mainly occur within the governorates and Syrians tend to not move far away from their homes. There is also a correlation between the high percentage of IDPs over the local population and more severe levels of limited water access. This shows how the displacement of people has placed additional pressures on the already limited water sources. Also, the lower rates of IDPs in areas that are considered to be suffering less severe levels of water access could also show that water access is not one of the main factors in deciding where to go when displaced. Now that Raqqa is a new epicenter of the war, it is crucial to understand future movement of people in the city and its surroundings. Based on general water scarcity and refugee flow patterns, a significant number of IDPs will stay within the governorate of Raqqa. Referring to Figure 10, the northwestern territories of the governorate bordering the city of Raqqa, already showed high percentages of IDPs over the local population. Regions within the same governorate but farther away from Raqqa show lower percentages of internally displaced persons, which confirms that most people leaving the city remain in nearby towns as they avoid the fighting.

33 WATER AVAILABILITY AND REFUGEE FLOWS IN SYRIA 32 Figure 10. Percentage of IDPs over Population, December (UNOCHA, 2016) Additionally, reports from the ground have confirmed that internally displaced persons in Raqqa were moved to nearby territories so they could return to their places of origin shortly after (UNHCR, 2017). Water availability has a higher correlation with the site of refugee camps on the edge of Syria. As Figure 11 shows, there are numerous refugee sites around the Syrian border, and they are located near water sources. Camps in the southwest corner of Syria follow the Jordan River. Camps to the east of the country are on the Euphrates and Tigris river. To the north, there are also camps near upstream Euphrates river. The high demand for water in refugee camps forces the setup of these camps near water sources in other to have enough supply of water.

34 WATER AVAILABILITY AND REFUGEE FLOWS IN SYRIA 33 Figure 11. Sites of refugee camps around Syria, February (HIU, 2017) The available data does not provide conclusive information as to why Syrians may prefer to cross into another country instead of staying inside Syria. One assumption is the low level of conflict in bordering territories compared to inside of Syria. As people inside the country seek shelter from the violence, refugee camps near the border are a viable option as they do not move too far from their homes, but they are protected from the extreme violence of the war by being in a different jurisdiction. The Impact of Refugee Flows on Syria s Water Sources The many years of continuous conflict have brought essential food and water services to the brink of collapse (Lovelle, 2016, p. 1). The armed conflict resulted in significant changes

35 WATER AVAILABILITY AND REFUGEE FLOWS IN SYRIA 34 to land use and water management in Syria, and, ultimately, in unanticipated increases in transboundary flow to downstream Jordan (Gorelick, Muller, & Yoon, 2017). Stanford researchers showed how the conflict in Syria changed water reservoir storage in the country. Using satellite imagery, the study compared Syria and bordering countries to analyze territories with similar climates but different political stability. The study revealed that about 50 percent of water reservoir storage decreased in comparison to before the conflict (DeWeerdt, 2016). Additionally, agricultural lands in Syria have also seen greater decline than in neighboring countries (Gorelick, Muller, & Yoon, 2017). The differences in available irrigation water between the countries suggest that conflict and massive movement of people affected water availability in the country. The damages to irrigation systems will further complicate the resolution of the conflict since the agricultural sector will have considerable challenges to recuperate after the war. How Water Scarcity Will Influence The Outcomes Of The Syrian Conflict The securitization of water is likely to remain a critical issue for Syria given the increasing water shortages caused by a growing population, a rising refugee population, a high level of dependence on trans-boundary water, and a volatile political situation in the region. The prolonged influence of water scarcity over the Syrian conflict is that as the fighting continues, the water deficit continues to grow. Therefore, water scarcity is not only a consequence of the conflict, but it is also one of the root causes of the war. The resolution of the conflict must not only depend on solving political and religious conflicts but must include infrastructure development, economic opportunity, stability, and

36 WATER AVAILABILITY AND REFUGEE FLOWS IN SYRIA 35 allowing families to reunite. The outcomes of the war will also be defined depending on how water shortage issues are handled. The long-term stability of the country will depend in part on the rehabilitation of the water infrastructure and the guarantee of irrigation systems for the agricultural sector. The war has also affected the factors that influence the decision-making process of IDPs when deciding if they should leave their homes and where they should go. As explained in Table 12, the factors influencing the movement of people inside of Syria have seen dramatic changes from before the start of the war to their current situation. One of the most relevant differences is that before the war, the movement of Syrians was mainly into cities and urban centers, particularly from those who left agricultural fields after seeing their crops ravaged by the drought. There main reason to move was the search of better livelihood. Today, as a result of the widespread of violence in the country, many refugees are leaving the cities trying to avoid the ongoing fighting.