BruinMUN Model UN at UCLA. Security Council Aaron Sun

Transcription

1 BruinMUN 2013 Model UN at UCLA Security Council Aaron Sun

2 Hello delegates, and welcome to BruinMUN 2013! My name is Aaron Sun and I am the chair of the Security Council. I am a junior here at UCLA majoring in political science with an emphasis on international relations, and this is my third year doing Model United Nations. I hope that you come to the conference excited to communicate, learn, and gain new insight into international issues, and that you bring all of your knowledge and diplomatic resolve with you to the negotiating table. The Security Council today faces some of the world s most important and complicated issues, and to successfully resolve them you must be willing to look past your individual differences and come up with logical, well thought-out, and creative solutions. Charged with the maintenance of international peace and security, the Security Council cannot simply ask another committee to solve its problems or shift its responsibilities to a newly created UN body - you as delegates must rise to the occasion. With that in mind, please research as much as you can and come to committee with a solid grasp of international issues so that you will perform at your best. The Security Council at BruinMUN will be run as an open agenda crisis committee. As an open agenda committee the conference will start with no set agenda. At the beginning of the committee delegates will be given time to lobby for whichever topic they want to discuss first and then the body as a whole will set the agenda by a simple majority vote. This background guide will give an overview of three of the most prominent issues in current affairs, and provide several other suggestions that you might want to research as well. However, any other pressing issue that falls under the purview of the Security Council can also be added to the agenda if members of the committee wish to do so - this includes topics not mentioned in this background guide. It is up to you as delegates to come prepared for any and all topics that might come up. As a crisis committee, the Security Council chair and crisis staff will also present you with crises and informational updates from time to time in order to get delegates to think quickly and address new developments that fall under each topic. Expect to receive news briefs, intelligence reports, press releases, and other materials to inform the committee of new (and usually fictional) information that changes the circumstances surrounding the topic that delegates are currently debating. For example, if the committee is addressing Iran, the chair might create a crisis in which an Iranian nuclear facility explodes causing wide scale fall-out and issues for surrounding nations. Thus, it is important for delegates to be willing to be creative and think about new solutions to the interesting problems the committee will throw at you. Once again, welcome - feel free to me anytime with questions concerning the Security Council, BruinMUN, or UCLA. Good luck, and I look forward to seeing you in the fall! Best regards, Aaron Sun Chair, Security Council SecurityCouncil@bruinmun.org

3 Committee Background: Since its inception in 1946, the United Nations Security Council has been the crux of UN efforts to promote peace, and resolve conflict throughout of the world. The UNSC has the power to draft and pass resolutions, create working groups, and form organizations but unlike other UN bodies, the Security Council may also pass binding resolutions, impose sanctions, mandate collective security forces, and dispatch UN peacekeeping operations. In effect, the Security Council is the only committee in the UN that can made that states party to the UN charter take certain actions. The framers of the UN charter gave the Security Council these powers to facilitate its ability to deal with the vast range of tough security challenges and issues of peace that confront our world today. In practice, most of the issues that have been brought before the council were extremely difficult, intricate, and complicated. For example between January and May 2012, the Security Council passed resolutions on topics ranging from the Situation in Sudan (Darfur) to a resolution extending and supporting the mandate of the International Tribunal on crimes against humanity in Yugoslavia in The Security Council is also organized differently from other UN bodies. Chapter V of the UN Charter stipulates that the Security Council be made up of 15 member states with five permanent members and 10 nonpermanent members. 1 The P-5 members of the council are China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America. Each of the P-5 possess veto power over any resolution presented before the council meaning that each P-5 country can singlehandedly strike down any Security Council resolution they do not approve of. The 10 non-permanent members of the council are chosen to represent different regions of the world through elections and they serve two-year terms on the council. Each of the 10 non-permanent members has a vote but none of them possess veto powers like the P-5 states. The work of the Security Council and its member states is essential to the mission of the United Nations. The Security Council is in essence the first responder to international crises and must develop solutions to those crises in a timely and efficient manner taking into account all of the intricacies and complications that are involved in international politics. As delegates in this committee it is your goal to ensure that the Security Council can succeed in its mission to promote peace and security throughout the world. 1 Chapter V: The Security Council, Charter of the United Nations. Web. 2 June 2012 <

4 Possible Topic A: The Crisis in Syria I. Introduction The Arab Spring began with the spontaneous, surprising, and dramatic overthrow of one of the most repressive and brutal regimes in the Middle East in Tunisia. The success of the Tunisian people gave hope to populations all over the Middle East and inspired them to overthrow their own repressive leaders. 2 From Tunisia, the Arab Spring quickly spread to Egypt. In Egypt, protesters were able to force long time dictator Hosni Mubarak out of power within just eighteen days because of help from the international community. During the Egyptian revolution many of the worlds major powers supported the Egyptian people in their fight to overthrow Mubarak. The US, UK and France were some of the few countries who put major pressure on Mubarak to step down. In fact, the US threatened to pull all its substantial support for the Egyptian military if Mubarak did not step down. 3 Eventually, the Egyptian military succumbed to international pressure and fearing the anger of the protesters asked Mubarak to leave or face trial. In Egypt, unlike Tunisia, the international community played a large role in the overthrow of Mubarak. The improbably success of protesters in Tunisia and Egypt and the unprecedented international support for the Arab Spring in these countries gave protesters in other Middle Eastern nations the hope that they too could overthrow their repressive regimes with the help of the international community. Three days after Mubarak feel in Egypt, protesters began to swarm the streets of Benghazi in Libya calling for Muammar Qaddafi to renounce power immediately and leave Libya. Unlike Egypt however, the resistance movement in Libya would turn into a violent revolt almost immediately and within days would become an all-out war. 4 Muammar Qaddafi the dictator of Libya responded to the protests in his country with an unyielding violence and soon the UNSC began considering military action to disable his brutal regime. Soon thereafter, the UNSC passed resolution 1973 that called for the establishment of a no-fly zone over Libya by NATO forces and authorized NATO to use to force to ensure that Qaddafi would not be allowed to kill civilians and to support the rebellion. With NATO help the rebellion was able to cut of Qaddafi s oil supply and incite uprisings within Tripoli itself leading to the dissolution of the Qaddafi regime and eventually the death of Qaddafi himself. 5 The situation in Libya during protests most emulates the current situation in Syria and provides 2 Martin S. Inyk, Kenneth G. Lieberthal and Michael E. O Hanlon, The Arab Awakenings in Bending History: Barak Obama's Foreign Policy (Brookings Institution Press, 2012), Ibid, Ibid, Ibid,

5 substantial evidence that international support may be essential to the continuation of the Arab Spring in other nations. After successful revolutions in Libya, Egypt, and Tunisia and some unsuccessful revolts in Bahrain and Yemen, the next Middle Eastern regime to fall victim to the Arab Spring was the regime of Bashar al-assad in Syria. The Assad family has ruled Syria since the young Hafez al- Assad a Syrian Air Force Commander 6 expelled the Ba ath party of Syria and rose to power in the 1960 s. Hafez ruled over his new nation with an iron fist and throughout his 30 year reign frequently used violence to silence dissidents. Hafez al-assad also used violence and terrorism to exert Syrian influence on the nations of the Middle East. During his reign, Syria fought multiple wars with Israel, invaded and occupied Lebanon perpetuating the Lebanese civil war, supported the efforts of terrorist groups including Hamas in Palestine and Hezbollah in Lebanon, formed close ties with the Islamic government of Iran and assumed an aggressive stance against US, UN and Western intervention in the Middle East. 7 When Bashar finally succeeded Hafez in 2005, the situation did not change and instead arguably worsened. Bashar continued to use violence within Syria to keep his regime in power and even continued to use violence to control Lebanon until the Cedar Revolution of 2005, when Syrian forces were forced to depart from Lebanon. 8 The Assad regime s reliance on violence to maintain power is partly due to the demographic realities of Syria. The Assad family, the upper echelons of the Syrian government, and the majority of Syria s economic elite are Alawite, while most Syria s 22 million people are Sunni Muslim. In fact the Alawite sect of Syria makes up at most 16% of the Syrian population, while Sunni Muslims make up an estimated 74% of the entire population. 9 As a minority controlling a majority the Assad s like many dictators before them choose violence to maintain their control, which has led them to their predicament today. The resistance in Syria began soon after the Egyptian revolution ended and around the time the Libyan revolution was in full swing. On March 15, 2011, activists in Syria called for a day of rage along the lines of the popular uprisings in Egypt and Libya. The Syrian population responded by protesting for three days straight spreading across the country like wildfire. Assad responded by sending in security forces to quell the violence but the regime was not able to quiet the protests, which now began to rock Daraa and even the Syrian capital 6 Syria Profile, British Broadcasting Company News, July 19, 2012, 7 Syria Profile, British Broadcasting Company News, July 19, 2012, 8 Ibid, 3. 9 Syria, The Central Intelligence Agency World Factbook, July 17, 2012,

6 Damacus. This time Assad responded with deadly violence reportedly ordering his troops to open fire on protesters in the major cities and sending thousands of soldiers to Daraa to conduct house-tohouse searches for rebel leaders. 10 For the rest of the summer the protesters continue to gain ground in the city of Hama making it the epicenter of the anti-regime protests. However, suddenly on August 5 th Assad struck back at the resistance with tanks and snipers in a multiday assault on Hama that left hundreds dead and casualties scattered in the streets with hundreds in Hama s hospitals. 11 For the rest of 2011 until June 2012, the cycle of peaceful protest and violent response continued with no real results. Throughout this time period Assad made press statements and speeches stating that he was willing to reform the Syrian regime and address the resistance in dialogue. In February of 2012, Assad held a referendum on a new constitution to placate the resistance but western nations and Syria s opposition groups denounced the referendum as a sham because of voting fraud and the use of violent coercion. 12 The conflict in Syria began to heat up again in June On June 2, 2012, major news agencies reported that another massacre had occurred in Houla in Syria. Horrific images of dead children lined up in a row prompted the strongest outcry heard from the international community since the crisis began over a year before. Not even a week later on June 7 th news agencies again reported another massacre in a town close to Houla with reports that 40 women and children were among the dead. 13 Along with reports that Syrian security forces were firing on unarmed people were reports that Syria had fired up UN observer forces. Again the Assad regime blamed the deaths on and attack on the UN personnel on armed terrorists and again the international community condemned the Assad regime for its excessive brutality. 14 II. History of International Involvement Many states in the international community have taken unilateral action against the Syrian regime. The United States, the UK, France, members of the European Union, members of the Arab League along with multiple disassociated governments have denounced the actions of the Assad regime and imposed unilateral sanctions against Syria until al-assad steps down. 15 Even Russia and China have begun to pull back their previously strong support for the Syrian regime. There is some hope that pressure from the international community in particular pressure from China and Russia will convince Assad to step down peacefully. 10 Martin S. Inyk, Kenneth G. Lieberthal and Michael E. O Hanlon, The Arab Awakenings in Bending History: Barak Obama's Foreign Policy (Brookings Institution Press, 2012), Ibid, Ibid Moni Basu, In Syria a massacre seems eerily familiar, Cable News Network, June 3, 2012, 14 UN monitors in Syria fired on near Haffa, British Broadcasting Company News, June 12, 2012, 15 Martin S. Inyk, Kenneth G. Lieberthal and Michael E. O Hanlon, The Arab Awakenings in Bending History: Barak Obama's Foreign Policy (Brookings Institution Press, 2012),

7 The response of the United Nations has been meaningful but inadequate. In late February 2012, the UN and Arab league appointed Kofi Annan as their co-envoy to Syria. In mid-march, after negotiations with some Syrian officials and diplomats from around the world Annan proposed a 6 point peace plan to the United Nations which was soon accepted by the Syrian government. 16 However, Annan s peace plan was virtually ignored by the Syria government and never came to fruition because of the inability of the Security Council to enforce the plan. The Security Council s failure to enforce Annan s plan and its general inability to take harsh action against the Syrian regime over the last year and a half has been the result of repeated Chinese and Russian vetoes. In fact China and Russia have repeatedly vetoed some of the strongest UNSC resolutions against Assad s regime. In October 2011, Russia and China vetoed a UNSC resolution that threatened Syria with UN sanctions if it did not stop the military crackdown immediately; they vetoed another UNSC resolution in February 2012 that called for Assad to step down; and they vetoed another resolution in July 2012 that called for sanctions against Syria because of the country s non-compliance with the Annan Peace plan. 17 The US and Europe have responded with outrage at the vetoes of Russia and China accusing the two nations of supporting a ruthless dictator and human rights abuser. 18 However, Russia and China s vetoes cannot be just simply boiled down to supporting or not supporting Assad. Russia and China s vetoes are the result of abuses by the US and NATO of the permissive language in UNSC Resolution 1973, which granted the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) power to help the rebels in Libya. NATO forces conducted military missions against Qaddafi outside the parameters set by the resolution, which only called for NATO to enforce the no fly zone and defend the rebellion. China and Russia believe that NATO s actions constitute a major violation of their confidence and as of yet have not been willing to consider giving NATO or another nation that kind of UN-endorsed power again. III. Recent Developments During the summer of 2012, the crisis in Syria escalated into an all-out civil war. The massacres in Homs and Hama added fuel to the Syrian resistance movement, which began to use more violence against the Syrian government. As early as June 16 th reports out of Syria confirmed the worst fears of the UN that the cease-fire brokered by Kofi Annan had completely broken down. For the first time in the conflict, bands of armed Syrian rebels united under the flag as the Free Syrian Army. The Free Syrian Army 16 Kofi Anna s six-point plan for Syria, Aljazeera, March 27, 2012, 17 Martin S. Inyk, Kenneth G. Lieberthal and Michael E. O Hanlon, The Arab Awakenings in Bending History: Barak Obama's Foreign Policy (Brookings Institution Press, 2012), ; and Rick Gladstone, Friction at UN as Russia and China Veto Another Resolution on Syrian Sanctions, The New York Times, July 19, Rick Gladstone, Friction at UN as Russia and China Veto Another Resolution on Syrian Sanctions, The New York Times, July 19,

8 was soon able to form a stable and sophisticated command structure, which allowed the rebel groups to organize their weapons and supplies and move them to the front lines of the conflict. 19 The results of this new united effort were spectacular and in late June rebel forces were able to take control of multiple cities, towns and villages in Syria. The rebels were so successful that by late June they were even fighting major clashes with Assad s forces in Damascus. However, Assad responded in kind using helicopters and missiles against the rebels. 20 In late June, the Syrian crisis worsened after the Syrian military downed an unarmed Turkish plane. The international community condemned the attack and many of Syria s neighbors and allies including Iran condemned Assad for the irresponsible actions of his regime. 21 On the domestic front Assad was finding it harder and harder to maintain his power over his country. The tide was beginning to turn against Assad and in favor of the rebels. The rebels began gaining ground on all fronts and soon Assad was on the defensive. 22 In late July, Major factions of the Syria army defected following the aftermath of the high level defection of Assad s childhood friend Brigadier General Manaf Tlass who left the country and sought amnesty in France. 23 The biggest assault to date on Assad occurred on July 18, 2012 when a rebel bomb exploded in Damascus killing multiple high level members of Assad s regime including defense minister Dawood Rajiha, and Security Chief Asef Shawkat. 24 The Assad regime responded to the attacks by increasing its use of high power weapons against the rebels. The week after the attacks unconfirmed reports surfaced that Syria state officials had claimed that they had a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) and would use it against the rebels to end the war. In 2013, Israel, Turkey, Russia, and the United States all declared that they had evidence that the Syrian government was making use of chemical weapons against rebel fighters. Regional instability has also increased, as 19 Syria s Conflict: With Both Barrels, The Economist, June 16, 2012, 20 Ibid, How will Turkey react to the Syrian downing of their unarmed plane? The Economist, June 25, 2012, 22 The Crisis in Syria: The tide begins to turn, The Economist, July 5, 2012, 23 Syria: Defections in Damascus, The Economist, July 6, 2012, 24 Syria s Crisis: Damascus Attacked, The Economist, July 18, 2012,

9 relations between Israel and Syria have worsened. Israeli fighters carried out an airstrike just outside Damascus, which Syria labeled a declaration of war. Both countries also exchanged fire in the currently Israeli-held Golan Heights, raising fear that conflict in Syria could escalate into full-scale regional war. Syrian rebels have also recently captured a number of UN Peacekeepers in Golan Heights, intensifying tensions throughout the global community. Despite current talks held by Syrian s main opposition group considering peace initiatives to end the war, peaceful solutions remain doubtful. IV. Bloc Positions Most of the world opposes the Syrian regime. Even Assad s longtime allies Russia, China, and Iran have pulled back their support for his corrupt and brutal regime. However, nations still disagree on how to deal with the crisis in Syria. Many European nations support the use of some sort of military option to support the rebels. On the other side of the equation China and Russia ardently oppose any use of a military option. The nations of Africa, Asia, and South America condemn the actions of Assad but also do not wish to see NATO abuse another resolution. At the end of the day the situation in Syria is evolving so quickly that many blocs have not created a solidified view of the situation or an opinion about it. V. Questions to Consider 1. What will happen to Syria after Bashar al-assad is removed from power? 2. How can the Security Council help Syria recover from this civil war after it is over? 3. Are there any peaceful options left on the table to remove Assad from power? 4. Can the UN help promote peace in Syria after Assad falls? 5. What can the UN do to get by the current impasse that prevents strong action in regards to Syria? VI. A Special Note on Syria By the time this committee begins in November, the crisis in Syria may have already come to a conclusion and a new regime may have taken power. If this is the case then this topic synopsis will be outdated. However the topic of Syrian reconstruction will be fair game for committee. The Security Council has a vested interest in ensuring that any regime that takes over Syria is stable and provides for the needs of the Syrian people and this committee will take that topic as a substitute for this one in the case that Assad falls from power before committee starts.

10 Possible Topic B: Nuclear Weapons in Iran I. Background The nuclear program of the Islamic Republic of Iran s began in the 1950 s under Shah Reza Pahlavi. Under the Shah, the Iranian government formulated a plan to develop peace nuclear technologies in cooperation with the United States following regulations on nuclear development imposed by the international community. In fact, Iran even signed a civil nuclear cooperation agreement with the US in 1957 under the auspices of President Eisenhower s Atoms for Peace program. 25 Iran continued its efforts to cooperate with international law by signing the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) of 1963 and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of As a member of the NPT, Iran pledged to not seek nuclear weapons and prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons to other countries. It is important to note that Iran has been and currently still is a member of the NPT and thus is subject to its current legal regulations. 26 In the early 1970 s, the Shah developed an ambitious plan that called for the construction of 20 nuclear power stations across the country by the 1990 s. 27 Iran quickly followed with the creation of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, which was established to develop the infrastructure needed for Iran s nuclear aspirations. The organization s mission was to facilitate the development of nuclear power sites all across the country, research and develop methods for using atomic energy in industry and oversee the development of mining operations on the major deposits of uranium in Iran itself. 28 With a massive infrastructure under development and under NPT guidelines Iran began the construction of its first nuclear power plant in cooperation with Germany at Bushehr in Sam Roe, An Atomic Threat Made in America, Chicago Tribune, January 28, 2007, atoms-day1-story,0, htmlstory. 26 Country Profile: Iran, Nuclear Threat Initiative, July 2012, 27 Ibid, Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), Nuclear Threat Initiative, 29 Greg Bruno, Iran s Nuclear Program, Council on Foreign Relations, March 10, 2010,

11 Though international support was strong for Iran s nuclear aspirations in the mid 1970 s, it was already beginning to erode. In 1974, the US government published a special national intelligence estimate on the prospects for the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. In the report US analysts speculated that if the Shah of Iran was allowed to obtain the technologies needed for nuclear power he would use those technologies to develop nuclear weapons in order to make Iran the hegemon of the Middle East. 30 Though many western governments including France and Germany ignored this concern early on and continued to facilitate Iran s nuclear development, they soon succumbed to pressure from the United States leading to the cancellation of their major projects in Iran including Bushehr in the late 1970 s. 31 However, western support for Iran s nuclear aspirations was completely ended by the Islamic Revolution of On February 11, 1979 Shah Reza Pahlavi abdicated the throne of Iran ending the Pahlavi dynasty and fundamentally changing Iran forever. The Kingdom of Iran succumbed to the Islamic Republic of Iran under the control of the charismatic and fundamentalist Ayatollah Khomeini. Khomeini s regime was not friendly to the west especially the United States and quickly began to break its ties with western countries, which ended any hope of rebuilding western support for Iran s nuclear program. Khomeini dealt further damage to Iran s nuclear program by banning it from 1979 to 1984 arguing that it was un-islamic. 32 Throughout the rest of the 1980 s Iran s nuclear program progressed slowly and not much progress was made mostly because of efforts by the west to prevent nations from helping Iran. In the early 1990 s, Iran s hope for a nuclear program was rekindled under the leadership of the new Ayatollah Ali Khamein i. Khamein i held a more positive view of nuclear technology and the possibilities a nuclear program provided for Iran s energy needs and its military strength. Khamein i began a series of negotiations and programs set to restart Iran s stagnant nuclear program. 33 His efforts paid off in 1992 when Russia signed industry contracts with Iran to finish the construction of the derelict Bushehr plant, which eventually went online in September of Meanwhile, Iran also sought help with its nuclear program from countries including China, Pakistan and even Argentina. For the rest of the decade Iran s nuclear program remained under the radar and though the US continued to be suspicious of Iran most of the international community left Iran s nuclear aspirations alone However, the relative calmness surrounding Iran s nuclear ambitions ended abruptly at a news conference in mid-august 2002 when the National Council of Resistance of 30 Ibid, Ibid, Country Profile: Iran, Nuclear Threat Initiative, July 2012, 33 Greg Bruno, Iran s Nuclear Program, Council on Foreign Relations, March 10, 2010, 34 Bushehr, GlobalSecurity.org,

12 Iran announced that it believed the Iranian regime had secret nuclear facility at Arak. 35 In response to the allegations, the IAEA began and immediate investigation and soon after the Institute for Science and Security published a report in December of 2002 laying out its concerns that Iran was developing nuclear capabilities. 36 In 2003, Mohamed ElBaradei the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, announced that Iran had failed to report certain nuclear materials and activities pursuant to NPT and IAEA regulations. The IAEA, subsequently, ordered Iran to prove that it is not pursuing nuclear weapons within a few weeks or face the consequences. 37 The Khamene i regime responded with hostility denying any pursuit of nuclear weapons and reiterates its position that Iran is only pursuing nuclear energy technology. Despite Khamene i s words, the IAEA formally rebuked Iran in 2005 for its lack of cooperation with the IAEA s legal inquiry. For the next couple years, Iran oscillated between policies of full cooperation with the IAEA and policies completely opposed to the IAEA and international pressure to stop its nuclear program. Finally, in December of 2006 the Security Council because of Iran s lack of cooperation with the IAEA and its failure to suspend its nuclear program voted to impose the first UN approved sanctions on Iran which preclude Iran s trade in nuclear materials. Iran condemned the resolution and sanctions and vowed to speed up its enrichment work. From , Iran continued to defy the IAEA by furthering its nuclear capabilities and testing missile systems leading to more UN and unilateral US and EU sanctions. In 2010, Iran showed a break in its policy agreeing to send enriched uranium abroad for further enrichment under a deal with the west but did not take the steps to implement the policy. II. History of International Involvement The UN has taken many steps to solve the crisis in Iran and the Security Council has been especially active in regards to this topic. Major Security Council resolutions on Nuclear Proliferation in Iran include resolutions 1696, 1737, 1747, 1803, 1835, and Through these resolutions that Security Council has demanded that Iran suspend all uranium enrichment, imposed sanctions on Iran, given Iran incentives to halt the enrichment of uranium, ordered Iran to cooperate with IAEA inspectors and imposed a complete arms embargo on Iran. However though the actions of the Security Council have been numerous on this topic, they have not been successful. Iran continues to enrich uranium in defiance of its obligations under the NPT. 35 Arak, GlobalSecurity.org, 36 Arak, GlobalSecurity.org, 37 Timeline: Iran Nuclear Crisis, British Broadcasting Company News, November 27, 2003, 38 UN Security Council Resolution and Statements, International Atomic Energy Agency,

13 The other major body of the UN that has been involved in the Iranian nuclear situation has been the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The IAEA has published multiple reports on Iran s nuclear aspirations, sent inspectors to the country, and assisted the international community in determining Iran s progress towards nuclear weapons capability. The IAEA has been successful on multiple occasions in determining the current state of Iran s nuclear program but has also been turned away numerous times by Iranian authorities. Though the IAEA has done immense work in regards to monitoring Iran s nuclear program it may need more power and jurisdiction before it will be able to force Iran to release information on its program. Multiple major world powers have also been involved in the fight against and even in support of Iran s nuclear program. Many western nations actually helped develop the program in its early stages but pulled back support when the anti-western regime rose to power. However, the western powers were eventually replaced by Russia and China who in the 1990 s pledged their support to help develop Iranian nuclear capabilities despite protests from the United States. In the early 2000 s even some of Europe budged on their hard stance against Iran and became more lax on Iran arguing that incentives would work better than sanctions in preventing nuclear proliferation. However, this trend has slowly began to wane with Europe and even Russia and China beginning to take a harder stance in an effort to prevent Iran from destabilizing the Middle East. III. Recent Developments Recently, the situation in Iran has become worse. In 2011, the IAEA published a report suggesting that Iran was secretly working on nuclear weaponry and in January 2012 the IAEA confirmed that Iran had begun to enrich uranium to purities of 20%. 39 For Iran to be able to build a nuclear bomb it will need Uranium enriched to 90 per cent. However, it is much easier to reach the 90% threshold now that Iran has nuclear materials enriched to 20%. 40 With new centrifuges in place and plans to build more enrichment facilities Iran s capabilities to build a bomb have grown exponentially. Some experts estimate that if Khamene i ordered his scientists to build a bomb today they would have a crude version within a year and a fully functional version within two. To complicate the problem further, many of Iran s nuclear facilities are underground in hard to reach places. 41 If Iran is able to develop these facilities to full capacity there is a chance that it might leave the NPT altogether ending any obligation it has to abide by IAEA inspections. Furthermore with operational facilities underground, Iran would effectively end the effectiveness of a military strike against those facilities. Thus, Iran would be able to continue its development 39 Uranium Enrichment Begins at Iranian Site, Cable News Network, January 9, 2012, 40 Up in the Air, The Economist, February 25, 2012, 41 Ibid, 2.

14 of nuclear unchecked without IAEA guidelines and be out of reach of countries seeking to stop the program with military options except for one. Essentially the only military option that would be left to stop Iran s nuclear weapons program would be full-scale invasion that could lead to catastrophic casualties and the largest war since WWII. As of 2013, Iran has continued its current strategy of expanding its nuclear research facilities while at the same time, covering up any evidence of previous nuclear research. The government authorized the construction of a research nuclear reactor in the city of Arak which will become operational by the third quarter of 2013, and upgraded its uranium enrichment capabilities by adding more centrifuges to its facility at Natanz. Efforts by the IAEA to gain greater access to Iranian nuclear development sites have continued with little success. One former site at Parchin, which was rumored to have been the location of experimental nuclear weapons testing, was recently paved over with asphalt, denying UN inspectors access to what could have been a crucial piece of Iran s record of nuclear development. Also important was the outcome of Iran s presidential election in June. A slate of 8 candidates were confirmed by the government to be authorized to run for the presidency, but was largely seen as a contest between hardline conservatives in Iran who were already loyal to the Ayatollah. Hassan Rohani emerged as the eventual winner - despite his image as a supporter of the current religious and political establishment in Iran, he was received with much enthusiasm and promised economic recovery and improved foreign relations to an public eager to move beyond the years of the Ahmadinejad administration 42. Rohani s election will undoubtedly affect Iran s relations with the international community - shortly after winning the presidency in June, Mr. Rohani called the issue of relations between the United States and Iran an old wound, which must be healed 43. He reaffirmed Iran s right to nuclear development and refused to 42 Iran in a hopeful mood over president-elect Rohani, Los Angeles Times, July 18, Iranian President-Elect Wants to Ease Strains with U.S., but Sees No Direct Talks, The New York Times, June ,

15 suspend uranium enrichment, but offered to be more open concerning Iran s nuclear program overall. IV. Bloc Positions Most of the world is opposed to Iran s development of nuclear weapons. However, many of voiced their support for Iran s development of peaceful nuclear technologies for energy production. Many countries including nuclear powers like India and Brazil have voiced their support for Iran s nuclear aspirations while condemning any efforts by Iran to develop nuclear weapons. Thus, it is important to note that though most of the world disagrees with Iran s development of nuclear weapons capabilities many countries do support the countries nuclear energy aspirations. There is a major division within the P-5 nations over what to do with Iran. The United States is vehemently against Iran s nuclear program in its current state. However, the US has on occasion been willing to come to terms with Iran having a peaceful nuclear program if the uranium is enriched outside of the country and if Iran subjects itself to strenuous and transparent IAEA inspections. The UK and France believe that though Iran has a right to develop a nuclear energy program it does not have the right to nuclear weapons and thus they have mostly sided with the US on this issue. Finally, Russia and China currently are the strongest supporters of Iran s nuclear program. Though neither Russia nor China would want to see Iran develop nuclear weapons both countries are more amenable to Iran being allowed to develop nuclear technologies without the interference of the west and the US in particular. It remains to be seen how Russian and Chinese policy will change in response to the unsuccessful Iran 2012 talks and to the new reports that Iran now has the capability to enrich uranium to weapons grade. V. Questions to Consider 1. Why have sanctions not been effective at convincing Iran to change its nuclear aspirations? 2. Why have Russia and China been unwilling to join the western effort against Iran s nuclear weapons aspirations? 3. Why have negotiations that involve foreign enrichment of uranium for Iran broken down? 4. Why are the factors that drive Iran s nuclear aspirations? 5. Why would Iran desire nuclear weapons in the first place? 6. What would Iran do with nuclear weapons if it possessed them? 7. How will Iran s most recent political developments affect the way that the UN and other countries engage with it? Possible Topic C: Unrest in Turkey I. Background Turkey s current government is headed by the Justice and Development Party (AKP), an Islamist-oriented political group under the leadership of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Since 2001, the party has won significant support in national elections, leading Turkey out its 2001 financial crisis with the help of a boom in the construction industry. At the same time

16 however, the AKP was seen by many within Turkey as increasingly Islamist and authoritarian 44, with its efforts to limit individual freedoms by arresting political dissidents and imposing restrictions on the sale of alcohol. Discontent with Turkey s government came to a head in Taksim Gezi Park, located next to Taksim Square in the Beyoglu district of Istanbul, Turkey. Notable for being one of the last green spaces in the district as well as the former site of an Armenian graveyard, protests began in April over the government s plans to replace the park with a reconstruction of a military barracks demolished in 1940 that would house a shopping mall within. However, after environmentalists occupying the park were violently attacked by police, the relatively quiet situation turned to rioting and sparked nationwide protests on greater political issues within Turkey, such as the increasingly Islamist policies of the ruling AKP party and the government s tightening hold on individual liberties. In response, government forces continued to employ heavy-handed tactics when dealing with protesters, turning tear gas and water cannons on crowds of citizens 45. II. History of International Involvement Several members of the international community were quick to criticize Turkey s violent response to peaceful protestors. US Secretary of State John Kerry expressed his country s concerns over the reports of excessive use of force by police, and called for an investigation into the political violence while urging restraint on all sides. Similarly, European leaders called for calm while at the same time condemning the Turkish government s approach to political demonstrations 46. These events have also hindered efforts at diplomatic reconciliation between Turkey and Israel, where Prime Minister Erdogan s shaky political footing will make compromise in Turkish-Israeli negotiations nearly impossible 47. Finally, unrest in Taksim Square will carry implications for Turkey s bid to become a member of the European Union - in light of Turkey s suppression of protests, Germany and several other EU states proposed delaying a new round of EU membership talks with Turkey, casting doubt on whether the largely Muslim country will be accepted into the organization 48. Several officials in the Turkish government, for their part, have suggested that the nationwide protests were the creation of a conspiracy by foreign governments to attempt to slow down Turkey s political and economic development 49.Though international response to protests in Turkey has been largely rhetorical, this is likely to change as the situation progresses further. III. Recent Developments For now, Gezi Park has been cordoned off by Turkish police, and any effort to re-enter the park is met with stiff resistance from police officers using water cannons and teargas to 44 Turkey s Glow Dims as Government Limits Free Speech, January 4, 2012, 45 Turkey protests rage for second day, June 1, 2013, 46 German Press React to Anti-Government Protests in Turkey, June 3, 2013, 47 Taksim Square protests put the deep freeze on Israel-Turkey reconciliation, Haaretz, July , 48 Germany proposes delaying EU-Turkey talks over protests, Reuters, June 24, 2013, 49 Turkey probes foreign links to anti-gov t protests, Jerusalem Post, June 23, 2013,

17 disperse protesters 50. However, the park is still the target of regular weekend protests that have gone on for a number of weeks, and clashes between demonstrators and police forces have resulted in five dead and thousands injured from June to mid-july. The park redevelopment plan has also been facing legal hurdles - on June 15th an administrative court annulled the plan, ruling that the construction of a replica Ottoman-era military barracks and shopping mall would not serve the public interest 51. More recently, several human rights groups within Turkey have released reports describing the unlawful detentions of certain individuals, as well as deliberate attacks on medical workers attempting to aid protesters injured in police raids 52. Political unrest in Turkey could potentially affect Turkish policy in other areas - namely its response to the Syrian Civil War and the country s ongoing efforts to deal with the Kurdistan Workers Party, or PKK. IV. Bloc Positions At present, most nations either condemn the Turkish government s use of police force on protesters, or have remained silent, and nearly every country issuing official statements on the matter has called for restraint on both sides and investigations into the violence. Western countries like the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Germany are strongly opposed to Turkey s response to protesters and are concerned with possible violations of human rights. While concerted international action in the form of economic sanctions or military intervention is currently unlikely, the United Nations and other international organizations will be compelled to act if the current situation worsens. V. Questions to Consider: 1. What is the appropriate international response to Turkish protests? 2. Do protesters criticisms of the Justice and Development Party show that Islam and democracy are incompatible? 3. How will Prime Minister Erdogan s shaky domestic political position affect Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East? 4. Considering the vulnerability of popular uprisings like those in Turkey, Syria, and Egypt to terrorist influence, do the protests represent a security issue for the region? Other possible topics: 1. Arab-Israeli conflict 2. Nuclear weapons in North Korea 3. Somalia 4. Nation building in South Sudan Overall Questions to Consider 50 Protesters clash with police at istanbul s Gezi Park, July , 51 Ibid. 52 Rights Groups Accuse Turkish Police of Excessive Force Against Protesters, July 12, 2013,

18 1. What is my country s stance on the situation? How would my country approach such a situation? 2. Can past solutions/programs be re-used effectively to perhaps solve a problem faced in one of these countries? If so, what can be changed to make this solution more effective? 3. How has the United Nations already dealt with the issue and what can be done to make this work more effective? 4. How can the powers of the Security Council be used in an efficient manner to best deal with each situation? 5. What confidence building measures would help to further alleviate tensions between differing sides? Concluding Remarks The background guide above describes three topics that will most likely be discussed in committee, and mentions several others that might also be brought up. Please remember to research international issues widely before committee begins because in the end, it will be you delegates who will be selecting the topics that make it onto the agenda. Good luck!