Côte d'ivoire. Country Profile 2007

Transcription

1 Country Profile 2007 Côte d'ivoire This Country Profile is a reference work, analysing the country's history, politics, infrastructure and economy. It is revised and updated annually. The Economist Intelligence Unit's Country Reports analyse current trends and provide a two-year forecast. The full publishing schedule for Country Profiles is now available on our website at The Economist Intelligence Unit 26 Red Lion Square London WC1R 4HQ United Kingdom

2 The Economist Intelligence Unit The Economist Intelligence Unit is a specialist publisher serving companies establishing and managing operations across national borders. For 60 years it has been a source of information on business developments, economic and political trends, government regulations and corporate practice worldwide. The Economist Intelligence Unit delivers its information in four ways: through its digital portfolio, where the latest analysis is updated daily; through printed subscription products ranging from newsletters to annual reference works; through research reports; and by organising seminars and presentations. The firm is a member of The Economist Group. London The Economist Intelligence Unit 26 Red Lion Square London WC1R 4HQ United Kingdom Tel: (44.20) Fax: (44.20) london@eiu.com Website: New York The Economist Intelligence Unit The Economist Building 111 West 57th Street New York NY 10019, US Tel: (1.212) Fax: (1.212) newyork@eiu.com Hong Kong The Economist Intelligence Unit 60/F, Central Plaza 18 Harbour Road Wanchai Hong Kong Tel: (852) Fax: (852) hongkong@eiu.com Electronic delivery This publication can be viewed by subscribing online at Reports are also available in various other electronic formats, such as CD-ROM, Lotus Notes, online databases and as direct feeds to corporate intranets. For further information, please contact your nearest Economist Intelligence Unit office Copyright 2007 The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited. All rights reserved. Neither this publication nor any part of it may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited. All information in this report is verified to the best of the author's and the publisher's ability. However, the Economist Intelligence Unit does not accept responsibility for any loss arising from reliance on it. ISSN Symbols for tables "n/a" means not available; " " means not applicable Printed and distributed by Patersons Dartford, Questor Trade Park, 151 Avery Way, Dartford, Kent DA1 1JS, UK.

3 Main railway Main road International boundary Main airport Capital Major town Other town February 2007 MALI BURKINA FASO Samatigila Kouto Wangolodougouou Boundiali Korhogo GUINEA Morondo Blanc Bandama R. Bouna Koutouba Touba Kani Mankono Katiola Dabakala Bondoukou ou Biankouma L. de Kossou Baoumi Nzi R. Tanda Man Vavoua Sakassou Mbahiakro Bangolo Guiglo Daloa Issia L. du Buyo Gagnoa Sinfra YAMOUSSOUKRO Dimbokro Toumodi L. de Taabo R. Nz i Daoukro Bongouanou Abengourou GHANA LIBERIA Sa ssandra R. Lakota Sassandra Divo I v o r y Sikensi Dabou Grand-Lahou Banda m ar. C o a s t Agboville Abidjan Grand- Bassam Aboisso Tabou 0 km Gulf of Guinea 0 miles The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2007

4 Comparative economic indicators, 2006 Gross domestic product (US$ bn) Gross domestic product per head (US$) Nigeria Mauritania Ghana Senegal Burkina Faso Mali Benin Niger Mauritania Guinea Togo Gambia Guinea-Bissau Senegal Nigeria Benin Ghana Burkina Faso Mali Togo Gambia Guinea Niger Guinea-Bissau Sources: Economist Intelligence Unit estimates; national sources ,000 1,200 Sources: Economist Intelligence Unit estimates; national sources. Gross domestic product (% change, year on year) Consumer prices (% change, year on year) Mauritania Ghana Nigeria Burkina Faso Gambia Mali Niger 14.1 Guinea 25.0 Ghana Nigeria Mauritania Benin Guinea-Bissau Burkina Faso Benin Guinea Guinea-Bissau Togo Senegal Senegal Togo Gambia Mali Niger Sources: Economist Intelligence Unit estimates; national sources Sources: Economist Intelligence Unit estimates; national sources. Country Profile The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2007

5 Côte d'ivoire 1 Contents Côte d'ivoire 3 Basic data 4 Politics 4 Political background 7 Recent political developments 13 Constitution, institutions and administration 15 Political forces 18 International relations and defence 23 Resources and infrastructure 23 Population 24 Education 25 Health 25 Natural resources and the environment 26 Transport, communications and the Internet 29 Energy provision 30 The economy 30 Economic structure 32 Economic policy 34 Economic performance 36 Regional trends 36 Economic sectors 36 Agriculture 40 Mining and semi-processing 42 Manufacturing 43 Construction 44 Financial services 45 Other services 45 The external sector 45 Trade in goods 47 Invisibles and the current account 47 Capital flows and foreign debt 48 Foreign reserves and the exchange rate 50 Regional overview 50 Membership of organisations 55 Appendices 55 Sources of information 56 Reference tables 56 Population 56 Transport statistics 56 Electricity production and consumption 57 Petroleum production and consumption The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited Country Profile 2007

6 2 Côte d'ivoire 57 Government finances 57 Money supply 58 Interest rates 58 Gross domestic product 58 Gross domestic product by expenditure 58 Prices 59 Production of main cash crops 59 Gold, oil and gas production 59 Manufacturing production 59 Construction statistics 60 Stockmarket indicators 60 Main composition of trade 60 Main trading partners 61 Balance of payments, IMF series 62 Net official development assistance 62 External debt, World Bank series 63 Foreign reserves 63 Exchange rates Country Profile The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2007

7 Côte d'ivoire 3 Côte d'ivoire Basic data Land area Population Main towns 322,463 sq km 18.2m (mid-2005; IMF estimate) Population in!000 (at the 1998 census) Abidjan 2,878 Bouaké 462 Yamoussoukro 299 Daloa 173 Climate Weather in Abidjan (altitude 20 metres) Languages Measures Currency Financial year Time Public holidays in 2006 Tropical Hottest months, February-April, C (average daily minimum and maximum); coldest month, August, C; driest month, January, 41 mm average rainfall; wettest month, June, 495 mm average rainfall French, Dioula, Baoulé, Bété and other local languages Metric system CFA franc; fixed to the euro at a rate of CFAfr656: 1. Average exchange rate in 2006: CFAfr522.9:US$1; exchange rate on February 18th 2007: CFAfr499.5:US$1 January-December GMT Fixed: January 1st, Labour Day (May 1st), Independence Day (August 7th), Assumption (August 15th), All Saints! Day (November 1st), Peace Day (November 15th), Christmas (December 25th) Variable (according to Christian and Muslim calendars"may vary): Prophet!s birthday (March 31st), Easter Monday (April 9th), Ascension Day (May 17th), Whit Monday (May 28th), Eid Al Fitr (October 13th), Tabaski (December 20th) The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited Country Profile 2007

8 4 Côte d'ivoire Politics Once considered to be one of the most stable countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, Côte d!ivoire has experienced a collapse of political order since 1999, degenerating into civil war in September The main parties in the conflict signed the Marcoussis peace accord in January 2003, and a national reconciliation government was installed in March However, the country remained divided in two, with the north controlled by the former rebels, known as the New Forces, and the south under government control. At the end of October 2005 the scheduled presidential election had to be postponed because little of the accord had been implemented, reflecting disagreements over the interpretation of the reform agenda. To forestall a constitutional vacuum, the UN Security Council extended the mandate of the president, Laurent Gbagbo, and Charles Konan Banny, the former governor of the regional central bank, was appointed prime minister with extensive executive authority. However, the new national unity government was able to take only small steps towards its mission of holding elections by October 2006, forcing the international community to extend the transition period by another year, with Mr Banny remaining as prime minister. This pattern of failure to meet election deadlines looms large over the current timetable, which theoretically requires elections by October Political background Félix Houphouët-Boigny rules for 35 years A turbulent fin de régime Côte d!ivoire became independent in August 1960, with the francophile Félix Houphouët-Boigny as president. Mr Houphouët-Boigny came to dominate the country!s political life, and in the 1960s and 1970s presided over Côte d!ivoire!s emergence as one of Africa!s few stable and economically successful countries. His party, Parti démocratique de Côte d!ivoire-rassemblement démocratique africain (PDCI-RDA, known as the PDCI), became similarly dominant. There was remarkably little internal strife, and no significant external threat. The president avoided expenditure on a costly"and possibly untrustworthy"army, with national defence largely entrusted to France. Côte d!ivoire!s success as an exporter of cocoa, coffee, timber and tropical fruits was another important factor in its stability. These exports quickly enabled the country to achieve an enviable level of prosperity. The number of French people working in the country came to exceed that in colonial times, and high-rise buildings transformed the Abidjan skyline. Called in by the PDCI regime to contribute to the country!s development, immigrants arrived from Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali and other neighbouring countries, mostly to work as seasonal workers on cocoa and coffee plantations. Many settled in Abidjan and in the fertile farming regions in the centre of the country. During the 1980s commodity prices fell and Côte d!ivoire began to face serious economic and social problems. As Mr Houphouët-Boigny declined into senility, popular dissent increased and by the beginning of the 1990s demonstrations and strikes had become commonplace. The first multiparty elections were held in 1990 and were won by the PDCI and Mr Houphouët-Boigny, who defeated Country Profile The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2007

9 Côte d'ivoire 5 the Front populaire ivoirien (FPI) and Mr Gbagbo amid accusations of vote-rigging. For the first time, Mr Houphouët-Boigny established the post of prime minister, appointing Alassane Ouattara, an economist and former governor of the regional central bank, Banque centrale des Etats de l!afrique de l!ouest (BCEAO). Mr Ouattara conducted an economic reform programme in the face of significant resistance within the ruling party, particularly from the president of the National Assembly, Henri Konan Bédié. Upon Mr Houphouët-Boigny!s death in December 1993, Mr Ouattara and Mr Bédié both vied for the succession, which Mr Bédié eventually won by invoking constitutional provisions transferring power to the speaker of the National Assembly in the event of the death of the president, while Mr Ouattara left the country to take up a post at the IMF in Washington. Henri Konan Bédié takes over A coup installs General Robert Gueï Mr Bédié began consolidating his own power, moving his loyalists into key positions in the administration and sidelining those sympathetic to Mr Ouattara. A pro-ouattara party, Rassemblement des républicains (RDR), broke away from the PDCI in June Mr Bédié was re-elected with 95% of the vote in the October 1995 presidential election, which both the FPI and the RDR boycotted. However, all the major political parties did take part in the legislative election in November 1995, in which the PDCI retained an overwhelming majority in parliament. Support for the Bédié government started to flag in 1998 as the economy showed signs of faltering. In mid-1998, as both domestic and international support for Mr Bédié waned rapidly, the National Assembly passed broad constitutional changes. The electoral code was amended, requiring that a presidential candidate should have an Ivorian father and be able to demonstrate ten years of continuous residence. This was intended to bar Mr Ouattara from standing in the 2000 presidential election, on the grounds of "dubious nationality". In early 1999 the IMF and the EU announced that they had both terminated financial support for the government, owing to growing concerns about fraud and corruption. On December 24th 1999 Mr Bédié was overthrown in a bloodless coup. The coup was led by a group of young army mutineers headed by General Robert Gueï, who denied having political ambitions and promised new elections by the end of An all-party government was formed in January 2000, but intense competition and political manoeuvring soon led to an informal FPI- PDCI alliance against the RDR. RDR ministers were sacked from the cabinet in May 2000 and efforts were made to change the constitution to include an even more restrictive definition of the concept of "ivoirité", again aimed at preventing Mr Ouattara from standing as a presidential candidate. The constitution and electoral code were approved by 87% of voters in a referendum in late July. With presidential and legislative elections forthcoming, General Gueï announced his candidacy on behalf of the newly formed Union pour la démocratie et la paix en Côte d!ivoire (UDPCI)"although he later stood as an independent candidate. He also proceeded to purge the army, in response to which many of his erstwhile military backers took refuge in neighbouring countries. A month later the Supreme Court disqualified all of the main presidential candidates except for General Gueï and Mr Gbagbo. The RDR and the PDCI boycotted the election in protest. The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited Country Profile 2007

10 6 Côte d'ivoire Mr Gbagbo has a difficult mandate General Gueï!s attempt to claim victory over Mr Gbagbo in what was obviously a rigged election was thwarted by a popular uprising on October 25th General Gueï was forced into hiding, after losing the support of the army. Mr Gbagbo was declared the winner, but this was immediately contested by Mr Ouattara!s supporters, who denounced the election as fundamentally flawed and took to the streets. Clashes between RDR militants on one side and the army and FPI supporters on the other turned particularly violent on October 26th. A mass grave of 57 people was later found in Yopougon, north of Abidjan, most of the victims being Muslims from the north, like Mr Ouattara. Presidential election, October 2000 Votes % of total Laurent Gbagbo (Front populaire ivoirien) 1,062, Robert Gueï (independent) 587, Francis Wodié (Parti ivoirien des travailleurs) 102, Theodore Eg Mel (Union démocratique et citoyenne) 26, Nicolas Dioulo (independent) 13, Invalid ballot papers 254, Total 2,046, Registered voters - 5,475,143 Voter turnout (%) Source: Comité national électoral. Despite substantial misgivings, France and other influential partners eventually endorsed Mr Gbagbo!s election in the absence of a better alternative. In the legislative poll that followed in December, Mr Ouattara!s candidacy was rejected once again, prompting the RDR to boycott the contest. Unrest prevented voting from taking place in the north; by-elections were later held in January 2001, without the RDR. The PDCI won 98 seats in the legislative elections, narrowly followed by the FPI with 96 seats. In a new FPI-led government, Pascal Affi N!Guessan was appointed prime minister, but the PDCI, Parti ivoirien du travail (PIT) and some independents also took up some posts. Legislative election results (seats) Oct 1995 Dec 2000-Jan 2001 Front populaire ivoirien (FPI) Parti démocratique de Côte d'ivoire (PDCI) Parti ivoirien des travailleurs (PIT) 0 4 Mouvement des forces d'avenir (MFA) 1 Union démocratique et citoyenne (UDCY) 1 Rassemblement démocratique des républicains (RDR) 13 5 Independents 0 18 Unallocated 0 2 Total Voter turnout (%) n/a Source: Economist Intelligence Unit. Reconciliation seemed to be progressing well Developments in 2001 seemed to presage a reconciliation, starting with local elections on March 25th in which all of the political parties took part. Mr Bédié, Mr Ouattara and General Gueï agreed to participate in a forum of national reconciliation held in Abidjan between October and December The Country Profile The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2007

11 Côte d'ivoire 7 forum!s non-binding recommendations offered a consensual framework. It called on the judiciary to recognise Mr Ouattara!s nationality, and on all political parties to accept the results of the elections and the new constitution and to form a national unity government. It also recognised the need to overhaul the judiciary and the security forces and to reform land ownership, immigration and nationality policies. In January 2002, a meeting between Mr Gbagbo, Mr Bédié, General Gueï and Mr Ouattara appeared to cement the reconciliation. Mr Ouattara was awarded his nationality certificate and hopes increased that he would be recognised as an eligible candidate in the 2005 elections. A government of national unity, including the RDR, came into being in August However, the FPI still dominated the new government, retaining 21 seats in a cabinet expanded from 28 to 39 portfolios. Recent political developments A mutiny spirals into civil war France breaks the stalemate after ECOWAS fails to do so The September 2002 coup attempt and the ensuing descent into civil war took the country entirely by surprise. On September 19th a military mutiny erupted in Abidjan, Bouaké (the second city) and the northern town of Korhogo, apparently led by junior officers. Several days of violence in Abidjan led to the assassination of General Gueï and of the interior minister, Emile Boga Doudou, as well as attempts on the life of Mr Ouattara and other leading political figures. The mutiny was put down in Abidjan amid repression and reprisals by pro-fpi gendarmes and vigilantes against immigrants, northerners and presumed RDR sympathisers. However, in Bouaké and Korhogo it took hold and was soon joined by rebellious officers who had been living in exile in Burkina Faso. As the mutineers swiftly took control of the entire northern half of the country, often welcomed by the local population, the military front hardened along an east-west line, splitting the country almost exactly in two. Fearing a prolonged civil war that could drag in other countries in the region, the French government stepped up its military presence in Côte d!ivoire, agreeing to police the ceasefire line following the agreement of a truce on October 19th. After two new rebel groups, Mouvement pour la justice et la paix (MJP) and Mouvement populaire ivoirien du Grand-Ouest (MPIGO), opened a new front in the west of the country, the French contingent held the western rebels at a strategic crossroads and the government hurried to bolster the underequipped army with emergency arms purchases, as well as hiring mercenaries. Inconclusive peace negotiations at the end of 2002, under the auspices of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), hardened attitudes on all sides. The political climate worsened, with assassinations of presumed opposition sympathisers in Abidjan, atrocities carried out on civilians by both the government and rebels, and a refugee crisis in the west. In January 2003 the government, rebels and main political parties agreed to hold peace talks under French supervision at Marcoussis, a Paris suburb. The results were approved by a summit of African heads of state, the French president, Jacques Chirac, and the then UN secretary-general, Kofi Annan. Seydou Diarra, an elder statesman who was General Gueï!s prime minister, was selected to lead a reconciliation government that included the established political parties as well as the rebels. However, prospects for the implementation of the accord were quickly The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited Country Profile 2007

12 8 Côte d'ivoire The Marcoussis Accord undermined by resistance from Mr Gbagbo and controversy over the distribution of portfolios in the new government, requiring further negotiations to be held in Accra (Ghana), but the presidency sought to control opposition ministers by directly appointing their powerful permanent secretaries. Standoffs also took place over crucial positions, including the defence and security portfolios and the appointment of new management for the state-owned television station. The meeting of the Ivorian political parties and rebel movements at Marcoussis took place under strict French supervision. To the surprise of many observers, the talks yielded a comprehensive accord substantially echoing the findings of the 2001 national reconciliation forum. The points of agreement included the following: a national unity government should be formed, which would include all major parties and rebel groups at senior ministerial level; Laurent Gbagbo should remain president, but cede many executive powers to a new prime minister; the rebels should lay down their weapons and the new government should organise the regrouping of all military forces and their disarmament under international supervision; the new government should reinforce the independence of the judiciary and restore public administration over the entire national territory; a Human Rights Commission should be established to investigate reported abuses; the new government should propose a naturalisation law with clear criteria and a straightforward application process; the constitution should be amended to limit presidential mandates to one term and to specify that candidates should be Ivorian and born of one Ivorian parent; and the government should prepare a law to reform existing landholding laws. The ceasefire is broken and an arms embargo is imposed Lack of progress on key aspects of the Marcoussis Accord resulted in the government stumbling from crisis to crisis, with various parties suspending their participation in protest for months at a time while the disarmament and reform process stalled again. Meanwhile, the opposition hardened its unity against Mr Gbagbo as seven parties, namely the PDCI, the RDR, the UDPCI, Mouvement des forces d!avenir (MFA), Mouvement patriotique de Côte d!ivoire (MPCI), the MPIGO and the MJP, formed a new coalition, known as the G7, with the objective of ensuring the full implementation of the Marcoussis and Accra Accords. In May 2004 Mr Gbagbo issued a decree firing three opposition ministers, resulting in the G7 ceasing dialogue and precipitating another round of mediation in Accra in late July, where the parties recommitted to the Marcoussis process. However, this too resulted in no material progress. A major blow to the stumbling peace process took place in November 2004, when the national military, known as the Forces armées nationales de Côte d!ivoire (FANCI), bombarded Bouaké, the headquarters of the New Forces. After a FANCI aircraft shot at a French post in Bouaké, killing eight French soldiers and a US civilian, France retaliated by bombing and disabling FANCI!s air capability. This set off four days of anti-french violence in Abidjan by "Young Patriot" militias, ransacking French businesses and residences, with no police intervention to contain them. French troops dispatched to the city fired shots into a crowd, killing several under disputed circumstances. These events resulted in a UN Security Council resolution imposing, on November 15th, an arms embargo on Côte d!ivoire and providing for the imposition of individual sanctions on persons deemed to be hindering the peace process. Meanwhile, Country Profile The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2007

13 Côte d'ivoire 9 Mr Gbagbo promised to ensure the passage of the constitutional amendment governing eligibility conditions. However, once parliament had passed the amendment, Mr Gbagbo reiterated his prior demand that it be approved by a national referendum before he could sign it into law. This manoeuvre renewed the stalemate, as the New Forces still required enactment of the amendment before beginning to disarm, while Mr Gbagbo argued that a referendum was constitutionally required and could not be held until the national territory was reunited, which presupposed the rebels having disarmed. Thabo Mbeki brokers a new peace summit Start of disarmament fails and elections are postponed Mr Banny holds meeting with four main crisis protagonists With international concern growing, mediation efforts were consolidated to the South African president, Thabo Mbeki, acting on behalf of the African Union (AU). Mr Mbeki convened a summit in Pretoria in April 2005, at which he personally brokered a new agreement. The main outcome was a decision that each party be able to present the candidate of their choice in the presidential election, by implication allowing Mr Ouattara to run. Mr Gbagbo was to take this measure under Article 48 of the Ivorian constitution, which allows extraordinary measures when the integrity of the territory is imperilled. After a delay Mr Gbagbo confirmed this measure, but also announced that he would use Article 48 for any other measure that he deemed necessary, sparking opposition protests that this deviated from the summit agreement. In May the opposition solidified its unity, as the PDCI and the RDR signed an alliance, the Rassemblement des Houphouëtistes pour la démocratie et la paix (RHDP). Prospects for any further progress under the Pretoria agreement dimmed as an army campaign to begin disarming pro-government militias in the west fizzled out and a massacre of villagers in the west led to accusations of blame on all sides. After refusing to endorse Mr Gbagbo!s interpretation of events, the army spokesman, Colonel Jules Yao Yao, was demoted and went into hiding. With turmoil in the army and increased wariness by the rebels, the deadlock renewed, spurring another summit in Pretoria in late June This produced renewed statements of good intentions by all parties. By September, however, it became obvious that elections could not be held as scheduled. With Mr Mbeki having lost the trust of the opposition, the Nigerian president, Olusegun Obasanjo, joined the discussions in his capacity as head of ECOWAS. On recommendations from ECOWAS, the AU passed a resolution on October 6th, which the UN Security Council quickly endorsed on October 13th by issuing Resolution This provided for the extension of Mr Gbagbo!s mandate for up to one year until the holding of elections, and required the appointment of a new prime minister with extensive executive authority. An International Working Group (IWG) was also formed, to provide reinforced oversight of the peace process. In late November the governor of the BCEAO, Charles Konan Banny, was announced as prime minister. After lengthy negotiations Mr Banny formed a government in which he retained the strategic posts of finance and communications, entrusting them to junior ministers in his office, and distributed other posts among all parties. After some initial teething problems in late February 2006, Mr Banny started to assert his political powers when he convened a meeting with Mr Gbagbo, Mr Ouattara, Mr Bédié and Guillaume Soro, the head of the New Forces, in the The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited Country Profile 2007

14 10 Côte d'ivoire administrative capital, Yamoussoukro, marking the first time since the start of the crisis that such a summit had taken place without external mediation. In the ensuing period of goodwill Mr Banny began measures to address the problem of national identification and voter rolls, a necessary step towards the holding of elections. To resolve the impasse in which one side demanded voter identification before disarmament and the other the opposite, Mr Banny proposed a principle of "concomitance", by which both processes would begin at the same time on a trial basis. Despite resistance from Mr Gbagbo!s side, the idea was rapidly embraced by the IWG. Mr Gbagbo appeared to give in, accepting concomitance while reiterating his personal reservations, but he opened a new struggle in April by announcing that the Institut national de la statistique (INS), and not the election commission, should be in charge of establishing the new voter rolls, to immediate objections from the opposition. Some progress appears to be under way Government resigns over toxic waste scandal In late May some real progress appeared to be under way, as public sessions known as audiences foraines were held in seven locations, scattered among government and New Forces territory and in the demilitarised zone, in which magistrates heard and adjudicated requests for identification documents. At the same time, preliminary "pre-regroupment" exercises were held in several locations as an initial step in the disarmament process, and military dialogue between FANCI and the New Forces started up again. However, this amounted to very little concrete progress toward disarmament, and the problem of disarming the militias remained intractable, particularly in the west, as evidenced by highly publicised ceremonies in various western towns yielding virtually no weapons turn-ins. In mid-july, with the identification process about to re-start on a broader basis, beginning in Abidjan and fanning out nationwide, the FPI sharpened its stand against the process, calling it a vehicle for election fraud. As the identification hearings began, "young patriot" militias once again demonstrated in Abidjan, shutting down the city for a day and leading to another round of political recrimination while effectively forcing the identification process to operate at snail!s pace. In August, with the election deadline looming, Mr Gbagbo put forward a revised interpretation of the purpose of the identification hearings that would effectively result in leaving the 2000 voter rolls unaltered, a proposal immediately rejected by the opposition. In the face of this ambiguity the justice minister, a RDR member, recalled all operating identification teams, and Mr Banny sought a compromise. All of this was set aside, however, by an unexpected disaster, as it became clear, in early September, that a major cargo of toxic waste had been illegally dumped at various locations around Abidjan, causing widespread illness and several deaths. As it emerged that the waste had been unloaded from a tanker chartered by a Dutch firm, Trafigura, and brought ashore by an Ivorian contractor, Tommy SA, in a tangled arrangement involving possible corruption or dereliction of duty by numerous agencies and authorities, Mr Banny presented his government!s resignation. By the time the government had reformed, with its composition mainly unchanged, it was clear to all parties that holding elections by October was impossible. Country Profile The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2007

15 Côte d'ivoire 11 UN extends the transition period again Mr Gbagbo proposes a direct dialogue with the New Forces Control of the country MALI Korhogo GUINEA LIBERIA Man New Forces territory "Confidence zone" YAMOUSSOUKRO Abidjan GHANA 0 km Facing this reality, the international community responded in a similar pattern as in 2005, with ECOWAS presenting recommendations to the AU and the UN Security Council then passing Resolution 1721 on November 1st 2006, which called for a further one-year extension of Mr Gbagbo!s mandate, along with an expansion of Mr Banny!s executive authority. It also made the UN commissioner for elections solely responsible for arbitrating disputes in the process of preparing the poll, now to be held by end-october The resolution failed to fully satisfy any party, however, as it mainly held existing arrangements in place, while Mr Gbagbo made no secret of his desire for an entirely new framework. Hardliners proposed that Mr Gbagbo appoint a new prime minister accountable to him and expel the French peacekeeping force. Meanwhile, Mr Gbagbo held consultations with representatives of all constituent forces in society, with the aim of launching a new initiative. Following these consultations, Mr Gbagbo proposed, in December 2006, to hold bilateral talks with the New Forces, in a reversal of his previous refusal to accept the New Forces as a legitimate counterpart and in an apparent move to retake the initiative in the peace process and drive a wedge between the New Forces and their allies in the political opposition. A series of consultations ensued, resulting, in January 2007, in the G7 giving its approval to the idea, which was also gaining tentative approval from the international community on condition that it assist in the implementation of Resolution In early February the first round of "direct dialogue" was held in Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso) between a New Forces delegation and a group of emissaries of Mr Gbagbo. However, it was not clear what these discussions could achieve or what was their potential to re-start a political process that the IWG in January 2007 had declared to be in a state of total deadlock. The Ivorian crisis: important recent events September 2002-January 2003 A military mutiny is put down in Abidjan but spreads in the north. In October a ceasefire, enforced by France, divides the country into northern and southern halves. A peace accord is reached on January 25th in France. Seydou Diarra is appointed as the prime minister in charge of forming a government of national reconciliation. January-July 2004 In March confrontation with police at an opposition march results in the death of at least 120 people. Parti démocratique de Côte d!ivoire (PDCI) and six other opposition and rebel parties form a coalition, the G7. The president, Laurent Gbagbo, issues a decree firing three opposition ministers, including Guillaume Soro, the head of the rebels, known as the New Forces. All parties meet at an international summit in Accra, Ghana, and recommit themselves to the peace process. November 2004 Government forces bombard Bouaké. The chief of staff, Mathias Doué, is sacked and replace by Colonel Philippe Mangou. The UN Security Council imposes an arms embargo and South African!s president, Thabo Mbeki, is chosen to mediate the crisis. The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited Country Profile 2007

16 12 Côte d'ivoire April-June 2005 Mr Gbagbo agrees to use emergency powers to allow all parties to field presidential candidates, thus permitting Alassane Ouattara, the leader of Rassemblement démocratique des républicains (RDR), to run. The PDCI and the RDR form an alliance, Rassemblement des Houphouëtistes pour la démocratie et la paix (RHDP). Disarmament deadlines lapse. July-August 2005 From hiding, Colonel Jules Yao Yao (demoted in June 2005) and General Doué call on soldiers to resist Mr Gbagbo!s orders. Parliament again fails to pass agreed reform laws within the most recent timetable. The opposition disavows Mr Mbeki. September-December 2005 Mr Gbagbo officially postpones elections. The UN Security Council endorses African Union emergency measures for Côte d!ivoire through the issuance of Resolution 1633, which includes the extension of Mr Gbagbo!s mandate for up to one year. The governor of the regional central bank, Charles Konan Banny, is eventually designated as prime minister. Mr Banny announces a power-sharing government in which he keeps the finance and communications portfolios in the prime minister!s office. January-February 2006 The International Working Group (IWG) recommends the dissolution of parliament, sparking a crisis in which the president!s Front populaire ivoirien (FPI) announces that it is pulling out of the peace process. Following mediation by the Nigerian president, Olusegun Obasanjo, the FPI returns to the government. Mr Gbagbo issues a decree prolonging the National Assembly!s mandate. UN financial and travel sanctions are imposed on three protagonists in the conflict, including the leader of the "young patriots", Charles Blé Goudé. Mr Banny holds a summit of political leaders in the administrative capital, Yamoussoukro. April-May 2006 The principle of "concomitance" is agreed, whereby identification exercises necessary to rebuild voter rolls will begin on a trial basis alongside first steps towards disarmament. The trial is held in seven localities and is considered a success. July-August 2006 The FPI rejects the identification process, and "young patriots" demonstrate in Abidjan. Mr Gbagbo proposes to limit the mission of the identification hearings, resulting in opposition protest and the suspension of the hearings. September 2006 The government resigns, following an illegal toxic waste scandal, and is reinstated. October-November 2006 Elections are postponed again, and the international community brokers a new oneyear transition for Côte d!ivoire. UN Security Council Resolution 1721 largely renews the prevailing arrangement, with elections to be held by October December 2006-February 2007 Mr Gbagbo proposes direct negotiations between the presidential camp and the New Forces. After consultation with the political opposition, the New Forces agree to Country Profile The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2007

17 Côte d'ivoire 13 join the negotiations. A New Forces delegation and emissaries of Mr Gbagbo meet in Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso) but no concrete progress is reported. Constitution, institutions and administration The constitution is changed Côte d!ivoire!s first constitutional regime, which was adopted at independence in 1960, was still in place when the December 1999 coup took place. However, many amendments had been made to the 1960 constitution. The country adopted a multiparty system in 1990 in response to growing domestic and international pressure. Mr Bédié also changed the constitution twice, in a bid to reinforce his power base. It was his amendment of the electoral code in 1995 that started the debate over the concept of ivoirité. The new constitution was approved by referendum, with 87% of the vote in July 2000, but it remained deeply controversial because of the last-minute revision of the eligibility rules (Article 35). The 2001 forum of national reconciliation recommended that the constitution be reviewed and clarified. This process has been overtaken by events, first by the Marcoussis/Accra agenda, which requires significant changes to the constitution, and second by the continuation of the political and military conflict, which has cast that agenda into uncertainty. Since October 2005 the country has been in an ambiguous constitutional situation whereby neither the two successive one-year extensions of Mr Gbagbo!s term nor the delegation of executive powers to the prime minister are provided for in the constitution, yet the constitution has not been suspended. Article 35, the concept of ivoirité and the civil war The 1995 electoral code barred Alassane Ouattara from standing in the presidential election on the grounds that he could not prove that both his parents were of Ivorian descent. The code was amended in 1998, requiring that a presidential candidate should have one Ivorian parent and be able to demonstrate ten years of continuous residence. The eligibility criteria as set out in Article 35 of the new constitution were tightened shortly before the referendum took place in 2000, requiring presidential candidates to prove that they had never held any other nationality and that both of their parents were Ivorian citizens. Mr Ouattara was a student, and later held posts in international organisations, allegedly as a Burkinabé citizen. During the forum of national reconciliation in 2001, the president, Laurent Gbagbo, went so far as to admit that the two clauses had been specifically designed to exclude Mr Ouattara. Mr Ouattara!s case polarised the country, some people claiming that his exclusion was based on fair constitutional rules and others insisting that he had been denied fundamental civic and political rights. This was symptomatic of the country!s deepening identity crisis. The nationalistic concept of ivoirité, developed during the rule of Henri Konan Bédié and used later as a political platform by both General Robert Gueï and Mr Gbagbo, claimed that Ivorian citizenship should be restricted and protected from the influx of foreign immigrants. It is estimated that up to one-third of the total population consists of first- and second-generation immigrants, chiefly of Burkinabè, Malian, Guinean and Ghanaian origin. Labour was imported from surrounding countries as far back as the colonial period, and the numbers swelled during the boom years of the 1970s. Migrants came principally as seasonal workers on plantations, but large numbers subsequently settled in towns. Fuelled by politicians, the concept of ivoirité encouraged southerners, who are, in the The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited Country Profile 2007

18 14 Côte d'ivoire main, Christian or animist, to regard themselves as "true Ivorians", and whipped up xenophobic sentiments against Muslim northerners (whether they were of Ivorian nationality or not). Although a settlement of the controversy over Mr Ouattara seemed to be in progress before the civil war erupted, the swift division of the country into rebel north and loyalist south confirmed that the concept of ivoirité had the potency to overwhelm and reframe other issues. The Marcoussis/Accra accords envision addressing ivoirité on several fronts, namely eligibility, immigration and citizenship policy, and underlying land-ownership issues. The lack of progress in implementing the accords testifies to the deep-seatedness of this dispute. Paradoxically, the question of ivoirité has faded from public debate, as the civil war itself and the commitment or otherwise of the different parties to the peace process have become the primary issues. In addition, in April 2005 Mr Gbagbo agreed to use exceptional powers to allow all parties to present the candidate of their choice"thereby including Mr Ouattara"in the October 2005 election. Although that election did not take place, it seems likely that this precedent will hold. However, the underlying problem of ivoirité has yet to be resolved and has the potential to resurface in the context of the resolution of issues of nationality, identification and voter rolls necessary to hold a credible election, underscoring the complexity of the crisis. A powerful presidency Public administration is plagued by problems The present constitution is still based on a strong presidential regime. The president is elected by universal suffrage for a five-year term of office, which is renewable once. The president appoints a prime minister to co-ordinate the government. Members of the unicameral parliament, the National Assembly, are also elected by universal suffrage every five years. The number of parliamentary seats has been increased from 175 to 225. A Constitutional Council handles matters of constitutional interpretation. The constitution also provides for an economic and social council and guarantees the independence of the judiciary. In practice, the courts have remained strongly influenced by the executive. Prior to the civil war, a series of major judicial reforms were announced but had yet to be implemented. These included installing a Council of State, a Supreme Court of Appeal and an Audit Office to replace the now redundant Supreme Court and its judiciary and audit chambers. Heavy red tape pervades public administration, making it sometimes slow and inefficient. Financial malpractice plagued previous administrations, encouraged by the absence of auditing. Numerous cases of embezzlement by members of the Bédié government were divulged after the 1999 coup. Mr Gbagbo!s administration has been implicated in a number of new scandals, including the award of public funds to support ventures by obscure or unknown local and foreign companies, along with opaque privatisation deals. There are widespread concerns that cocoa-sector revenue that should be being used for price stabilisation and sector development is being diverted into off-budget expenditure, notably military spending. The severe economic downturn since the conflict erupted in 2002 seems to have led to higher levels of generalised corruption and venality at all levels of public administration. Up to this point the government has managed to pay the civil-service wage bill, but with frequent delays, and civil-service unions in various fields, including the public health system, have launched periodic, though usually brief, protests and strikes. Country Profile The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2007

19 Côte d'ivoire 15 During the height of the military conflict in 2002 and early 2003 public administration was affected by the curfew that curtailed the workday in Abidjan. Government offices in the north and west of the country shut down, and with few exceptions have yet to reopen, pending the oft-delayed implementation of the disarmament agreement. The New Forces have established a makeshift administration that levies fees on transport and trade and maintains public safety. Many public services, such as schools and clinics, have not shut down altogether but are run with minimal staff and on an improvised basis. Delegations from the central ministries in Abidjan have visited many locations, but so far only a few civil servants have been deployed. Political forces The FPI is sharing power but controls back channels The PDCI seeks a revival Founded in 1982 by the current president, Mr Gbagbo, the nominally socialist FPI historically claimed to have offered the only genuine alternative to four decades of PDCI rule, since the party was already in opposition when the first multiparty elections took place in After Mr Gbagbo!s victory in 2000, the FPI increased its parliamentary representation from 13 seats to 96. It led the government and held the significant ministries from 2000 until the formation of the national reconciliation government in March The prime minister during that period, Affi N!Guessan, represented the FPI in the Marcoussis peace talks, and he remains the party president. The FPI!s traditional support base is in the Bété-dominated centre-west around the cities of Daloa and Gagnoa. Support in Abidjan is also significant, particularly in the vast, populous suburb of Yopougon. In the new government of Mr Banny, the FPI holds seven ministries, compared with nine in the government of Mr Diarra. However, the influential hardline faction of the FPI operates less out of the ministries than through Mr Gbagbo!s presidential advisers. Leaders of the hardline group include Mr Gbagbo!s wife, Simone Ehivet Gbagbo, who is also the party!s leader in parliament; Mamadou Koulibaly, the president of the National Assembly; and the "prophet", Moïse Koré, pastor to Mr and Mrs Gbagbo, who are both "born again" evangelical Christians. This group appears to have consolidated its sway over the FPI and has demonstrated its overtly good relations with the "young patriot" militias. Founded in 1946 by the late president, Mr Houphouët-Boigny, the PDCI-RDA, known as the PDCI, held office from 1960 to It remained the only legal party until 1990, when the first multiparty elections took place. The number of PDCI seats has now fallen from a comfortable majority of 146 in 1995 to a still substantial 98. Ousted by the December 1999 coup, the party has nonetheless managed to maintain a solid base of support in the Akan-dominated central and eastern regions, particularly around Yamoussoukro and Bouaké. The PDCI!s historic strength, notably in the north and the far west, has been supplanted in recent years by the RDR and the UDPCI respectively. The PDCI underwent an internal power struggle after losing incumbency. After Mr Bédié returned from France to participate in the 2001 forum of national reconciliation he won an internal election and resumed the presidency of the The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited Country Profile 2007

20 16 Côte d'ivoire party in Despite rivalries within the party, Mr Bédié appears to have successfully restored his pre-eminence within the party. The PDCI accepted posts in Mr Gbagbo!s government but has taken pains to differentiate itself from FPI policies as the civil war has continued. Its alliance with the RDR under the RHDP label has consolidated the single most important alliance within the G7 coalition of opposition parties and New Forces, lending the PDCI a strategic role at the political centre of the coalition. The RDR has become a key political actor The RDR was formed in June 1994 by dissidents from the ruling PDCI who remained loyal to Mr Ouattara. A liberal opposition party, the RDR draws its main support from the north, Mr Ouattara!s home region. A former deputy managing director of the IMF, Mr Ouattara has also enjoyed significant international support. The RDR!s boycott of the 2000 legislative election placed it largely outside the formal constitutional arena; subsequent by-elections garnered the party a mere five seats. However, it came first in the March 2001 local elections, leading in the north and also in urban districts in several other regions. The RDR entered Mr Gbagbo!s government of national unity a month before the civil war, and the outbreak of the war and the spread of rebellion in the north"the party!s base"appeared to take it by surprise. The state media accused the RDR of fomenting the rebellion, however, and the party leadership went into hiding or exile to avoid detention. After the Marcoussis agreement the party joined the national reconciliation government with seven ministers, although their effective power was highly curtailed in practice. The formation of the G7, and later of the RHDP, has consolidated the RDR!s position as a crucial political presence, however. In the new government of Mr Banny the RDR holds five portfolios. Mr Ouattara, who has now been recognised as an eligible presidential candidate, returned in January 2006 from prolonged selfimposed exile in France, reasserting his position in the Ivorian political scene despite fears for his security. The former rebels are not an official political party One result of the civil war is the emergence and conversion to politics of armed movements, now known collectively as the New Forces. The main rebel group, the MPCI, assumed its political identity several weeks into the war, with the former student leader, Guillaume Soro, as secretary-general. As a result of its military gains, the MPCI obtained seven seats in the first reconciliation government and has six in the new government. The New Forces have six posts, and Mr Soro is minister in charge of the reconstruction of the north. Although they have not made the formal transition to political party, the New Forces have assumed a hybrid role as members of an alliance of political parties yet at the same time the de facto government of the country!s northern half. The MPCI!s backers and sources of funding, which have allowed it to run an organised and relatively disciplined military campaign, are still largely mysterious and the source of much speculation, with supporters of Mr Gbagbo alleging that the MPCI is nothing more than the "military wing" of the RDR and is funded by Mr Ouattara. In fact, little is known other than that the New Forces currently fund themselves, at least in part, by levying duties on the entry and transport of goods within their zone, as well as from both licit and illicit trade Country Profile The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited 2007