Rwandan Genocide Crisis

Transcription

1 Official Background Guide Rwandan Genocide Crisis Model United Nations at Chapel Hill XVIII February 22 25, 2018 University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

2 Table of Contents Letter from the Chair 3 Brief History of Rwanda 4 Hutu Ten Commandments.. 5 Peacekeeping 9 Economic Development 13 Solving the Rwandan Genocide 16 Position List 20 Rwandan Genocide Crisis Page 2

3 Letter from the Chair Dear delegates, Hello everyone, my name is Ryan Saunders and I m your chair for the Rwandan general assembly plus. I m super excited to meet all of you and watch you demonstrate your abilities during MUNCH. The objective of this general assembly is to develop a peaceful international solution to the Rwandan crisis and help build a stable and prosperous Rwanda. In addition, create policies and strategies in order to prevent future genocides and ethnic cleansings around the world. I m a firstyear student at UNC and I m majoring in history and political science. I m from Rocky Mount, NC and graduated from Southern Nash High School. I have a great interest in government and public policy and I applied this interest in high school by being involved in student government and I also volunteered for political organizations in Wake County. Furthermore, I enjoyed playing golf during my junior and senior year, even if I embarrassed myself sometimes on the driving range. Currently at UNC, I m actively involved with Young Democrats, student government, and CIRA. In addition to my interests in government and public policy, I ve also been interested in international relations which prompted me to join CIRA. Unfortunately, I did not have the opportunity in high school to partake in one of these model UN sessions. However, I recently staffed UNCMUNC and it was an awesome experience. I would highly encourage all of you to take advantage of your unique opportunity because model UN can build important skills, such as, communication, collaboration, strategic planning, relationship building, and more. These skills will help mold you into a successful student in high school and for your future endeavors. Throughout the weekend, I hope to provide an awesome experience and hopefully convenience you to continue model UN in college. If you have any questions, concerns, or just want information/advice on college life, please don t hesitate to contact me. I m more than happy to answer any and all questions regarding model UN and the first-year experience. I m eager to see all of you in action to solve the Rwandan crisis and prevent future genocides. Finally, always remember it s always a great day to be a Tar Heel! Ryan W. Saunders Rwandan Genocide Chair waynery@live.unc.edu Rwandan Genocide Crisis Page 3

4 Brief History of Rwanda In 1894, Rwanda was colonized by Germany and became part of a vast series of German colonies in Sub Saharan Africa, collectively known as German East Africa. Following Germany s defeat in the First World War, Rwanda was annexed by the Kingdom of Belgium. Belgian colonial rule pitted Rwanda s two main ethnic groups against one another; the minority Tutsis (14%) were given special privileges and administrative powers over the majority Hutu (85%) population. The Hutus resented being ruled by the Belgians and Tutsis, and in the late 1950s began to rebel against their colonial rulers. In 1959, a Hutuled revolution overthrew the Belgian colonial administration and forced nearly 300,000 Tutsis to flee to neighboring Uganda. Admitting defeat, Belgium granted Rwanda its independence in Elections were held that same year, and Gregoire Kayibanda, a Hutu, was elected the Republic of Rwanda s first president. Under Kayibanda s watch, Rwanda began a policy of state-sponsored persecution Tutsis, characterized by the infringement of their civil rights and extrajudicial killings. This was retribution for all the years of mistreatment that the Hutu majority suffered at the hands of the Belgians and Tutsis. In one event, which took place in December of 1963, 14,000 innocent Tutsis were massacred by the Hutu-led government, in retaliation for terrorist attacks conducted a Tutsi rebel group against the Rwandan state. Rwandan Genocide Crisis Page 4

5 In 1973, President Kayibanda was ousted in a military coup led by Major General Juvénal Habyarimana, another Hutu. Once in power, Habyarimana suspended the constitution and banned all political activity by ordinary citizens. He continued the state-sponsored harassment of the Tutsi minority, generating more and more resentment amongst the minority ethnic group. In 1987, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a political and military organization, was founded by Tutsi exiles living in Uganda, with the goal of overthrowing the Hutu-led Rwandan government. Many of those who joined the RPF were seasoned veterans of a series of Ugandan wars, known as the Bush Wars. On the first of October in 1990, the RPF staged an invasion of Rwanda from Uganda. The government was able to repel the attackers due to the help of French troops, who intervened to assist the Hutu-led government. This failed attack precipitated a new wave of harsh Tutsi persecution. In December of 1990, a Hutu-extremist newspaper, Kangura, published the Hutu Ten Commandments ; I. Every Hutu should know that a Tutsi woman, whoever she is, works for the interest of her Tutsi ethnic group. As a result, we shall consider a traitor any Hutu who a. Marries a Tutsi Woman b. Befriends a Tutsi Woman c. Employees a Tutsi Woman as a Secretary or Concubine II. Every Hutu should know that our Hutu daughters are more suitable and conscientious in their role as woman, wife and mother of the family. Are they not beautiful, good secretaries and more honest? III. IV. Hutu women, be vigilant and try to bring your husbands, brothers and sons back to reason. Every Hutu should know that every Tutsi is dishonest in business. His only aim is the supremacy of his ethnic group. As a result, any Hutu who does the following is a traitor: Rwandan Genocide Crisis Page 5

6 a. Makes a partnership with a Tutsi business b. Invests his money or the government s money in a Tutsi enterprise c. Lends or borrows money from a Tutsi d. Gives favours to Tutsi in business (Obtaining import licenses, bank loans, construction sites, public markets, etc.) V. All strategic positions, political, administrative, economic, military and security should be entrusted only to Hutu. VI. VII. The education sector (school pupils, students, teachers) must be majority Hutu. The Rwandan Armed Forces should be exclusively Hutu. The experience of the October 1990 war has taught us a lesson. No member of the military shall marry a Tutsi. VIII. IX. The Hutu should stop having mercy on the Tutsi. The Hutu, wherever they are, must have unity and solidarity and be concerned with the fate of their Hutu brothers. a. The Hutu inside and outside Rwanda must constantly look for friends and allies for the Hutu cause, starting with their Hutu brothers. b. They must constantly counteract Tutsi propaganda. c. The Hutu must be firm and vigilant against their common Tutsi enemy. X. The Social Revolution of 1959, the Referendum of 1961, and the Hutu Ideology, must be taught to every Hutu at every level. Every Hutu must spread this ideology widely. Any Hutu who persecutes his brother Hutu for having read, spread, and taught this ideology is a traitor. This piece of propaganda was very popular and influential in the rise of anti-tutsi sentiment among Hutus. Rwandan Genocide Crisis Page 6

7 After their initial defeat, the RPF began another recruiting drive, both of Tutsi exiles as well as those still living within Rwanda. This time, the RPF was led by a man named Paul Kagame, who had just returned to Africa after studying at US Army s Command and General Staff College in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. A shrewd commander, Kagame reignited the conflict between the RPF and the Hutu-led government. In 1991, the RPF re-entered Rwanda, this time capturing an entire city in the northern part of the country. They then began a long and bloody guerrilla campaign against the Rwandan state. Under Kagame, the RPF was able to capture some territory around the borders of the Rwanda; however, in June of 1992, they agreed to a ceasefire with the Hutu-led government. Despite a series of setbacks due to violence, a lasting peace deal, known as the Arusha Accords, was struck in August of The Arusha Accords allowed for the establishment of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), to assist in the peace process. Many Tutsis were given positions in the government and large scale persecution of Tutsis ended. Despite the fact that tensions between the two ethnicities were still high, it appeared as though peace was finally taking hold in Rwanda. However, on April 6, 1994, a plane carrying Rwandan president, Juvénal Habyarimana, as well as Burundi s president, Cyprien Ntaryamira, also a Hutu, was shot down. Both presidents were killed in the attack. Hutu and Tutsi tensions were reignited after the killing of the Rwandan president. It was greatly disputed as to who the perpetrators of the attack might have been. Many Hutus believed that Tutsi rebels carried out the assassination, while Tutsis blamed Hutu extremists, claiming that they were looking to insight more ethnic violence. The assassination caused ethnic tensions to roar back to the forefront of social activity in Rwanda. As the Arusha Accords began to deteriorate, the UN sent a peacekeeping force in an attempt to stabilize the situation. However, due to a lack of funding and adequate material support for UNAMIR, the peacekeepers had little effect on what would happen next. Rwandan Genocide Crisis Page 7

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9 Peacekeeping UN peacekeeping efforts focus on helping countries transition from being zones of conflict to becoming peaceful, democratic states. Peacekeeping forces are comprised of military personnel from many countries around the world. Generally, though, peacekeepers come from poorer nations that are unable to provide significant monetary support to UN missions. Under traditional peacekeeping operations, personnel are tasked with the observation, reporting on, and monitoring of ceasefires. They are also used as a buffer between opposing forces, and act as a confidence-building measure for the opposing actors experiencing conflict. They operate under three basic principles: the consent of the parties involved, impartiality, and non-use of force except in self-defense and defense of the mandate. These principles help to maintain the legitimacy of the peacekeeping forces; however, this means that peacekeepers cannot intervene in situations in which they are not wanted and in which there is no peace to support. The United Nations does not have a standing reserve of peacekeeping forces, and troops are only organized and requested once a threat has been identified. This means that getting boots and equipment on the ground can often take more than six months to accomplish after a resolution has been passed authorizing the use of peacekeepers. Peacekeeping mission can only be authorized by the UN Security Council. The United Nations was founded in 1945, upon the conclusion of World War II. Three years later it conducted its first peacekeeping mission, the United Nations Truce Supervision Rwandan Genocide Crisis Page 9

10 Organization (UNTSO), which was meant to monitor the Armistice Agreement between Israel and its Arab neighbors. UNTSO has been running for almost seventy years, and has helped bring stability to the turbulent region. In the UN s early years, peacekeeping operations were rarely approved as the United States and the Soviet Union often disagreed on where and when peacekeepers should be deployed, resulting in gridlock in the Security Council. After the collapse of the USSR in 1991, peacekeeping operations were approved with greater frequency and have taken a much more multidimensional approach. During the Cold War, peacekeeping missions focused mostly on ending the violence and creating the conditions for a lasting peace agreement between the warring parties. However, the more recent multidimensional peacekeeping operations are tasked with more objectives on top of traditional goals. These objectives include monitoring elections, building infrastructure in the country, disarming rebel groups, improving the capacity of the state to provide law and order, providing humanitarian assistance, and promoting good governance. This approach employs not just UN peacekeepers, but many civilian personnel and experts, as it tries to create a stable environment and to support the development of the necessary institutions for proper governance. Not all UN peacekeeping operations have been met with success. In the 1990 s, two missions to Somalia both ended in disaster, with dozens of peacekeepers lives being lost. In the late 1980s, Somalia began its descent into chaos. The government was overthrown and many rebel groups competed for power. The political turmoil led to the intervention of the Rwandan Genocide Crisis Page 10

11 international community, and in February, 1992, a ceasefire between the warring factions was negotiated. United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) was established that same year, and had a force of around one thousand personnel, tasked with overseeing the implementation of the ceasefire and monitoring the country s peace process. However, the ceasefire was quickly broken by the competing factions and warlords. There was also a public backlash against the presence of the peacekeepers, and they had to contend with popular riots and sniper attacks against them. Some difficulties that led to the failure of UNOSOM I were that the UN had promised many more troops than were actually sent, and the humanitarian assistance to the country was lower than expected. As the civil war continued to rage between various factions and militias seeking control of the country in the power vacuum following the fall of the government, the humanitarian crisis worsened. UNISOM II, which began in March, 1993, was supposed to make up for the shortcomings of the previous UN mission. It provided more humanitarian aid as well as a significantly larger amount of personnel. The UN managed to assemble some 28,000 personnel from over thirty countries assigned to the mission, including 22,000 troops and 6,000 civilian logistical support staff. UN troops were deliberately targeted by militias, as they were seen as a threat to their survival and control over the country s resources. One event saw twenty-four Pakistani UN Peacekeepers killed in a surprise attack, after they had been called in to investigate an arms depot. This massacre of UN peacekeepers severely hurt the morale of UNISOM II; however, the fatal blow to the mission came in October after nineteen American soldiers participating in UNISOM were killed in the capital city of Mogadishu, along with two Black Hawk helicopters being shot down. This event inspired the infamous Black Hawk Down book and movie, which recounts the Battle of Mogadishu. The bodies of several American soldiers killed by the militias were dragged through the streets of Mogadishu, causing widespread backlash in the United States towards UNISOM II. US President Bill Clinton proceeded to Rwandan Genocide Crisis Page 11

12 withdraw most of the American troops from the region not long after the events of black hawk down. In April of the following year, when the President of Rwanda was killed and fighting between Hutus and Tutsis amped up with renewed strength, the U.S. was still reeling from what happened in Somalia. This caused their humanitarian involvement in the region to be scaled back. The loss of American support put peacekeeping operations in a tight situation, with less funding and material support. The situation in Somalia has continued to deteriorate, allowing warlords carve up large swaths of the country. This has resulted in widespread famine, with little the international community can do to help. Today, Somalia is a failed state. The civil war continues to rage and the peacekeeping operations there are seen as some of the UN s biggest failures. Rwandan Genocide Crisis Page 12

13 Economic Development Rwanda s economy remains a difficult position due to a low amount of profitable natural resources, a dense and growing population, and limited land available for use due to Rwanda s small borders. As many other developing countries in Africa, such as Nigeria, are embracing industrialization, most of the Rwandan population remains involved in subsistence agriculture. Two major industries that are extremely important to the Rwandan economy are the tea and coffee. Tea and coffee are both a blessing and a curse for Rwanda. After receiving their independence in the 1960 s, Rwanda s economy, based on the two resources, thrived thanks to growing demand for them in the industrialized world. However, after coffee prices fell in the 80 s, Rwanda s economy slipped because their growth and stability largely relied on the coffee market. Rwanda was growing at a rate around 6% during the late seventies and eighties, but growth essentially came to a halt in the late eighties and early nineties. Another factor that caused Rwanda to decline was the International Monetary Fund (IMF) structural adjustment programs in Structural adjustment is when international organizations such as the IMF and World Bank give economically depleted or developing countries loans. However, these countries have to enact certain economic policies that would increase the borrowing power of the Rwandan Genocide Crisis Page 13

14 countries receiving aid. For the case of Rwanda, the elimination of official prices for goods, coupled with currency devaluation were enacted right before the genocide. These policies negatively affected the upper class because state-owned businesses and civil sectors were disproportionately impacted. On the eve of the impending turmoil in Rwanda, the economy s situation continues to deteriorate and GDP is in steep decline. The international community must make tough decisions to improve the economic situation in Rwanda. A few options to sustain the economy that should be addressed are industry, international cooperation, agriculture, and tourism. The industrial sector of the economy remains a small fraction of the country s GDP. However, there's potential in growing the sector to become a major portion of the country s economy. Currently, Rwanda mainly outputs household items and beverages. The country needs funding to develop their industrial sector but and space and resources are limited due to the fact of the country s limited square mileage. Rwanda is in desperate need of increased international funding to develop the country s economy and infrastructure. Maintaining and building relationships with international organizations is essential to building Rwanda s economy. In addition, developing international trade relations with neighboring and abroad countries could help grow and sustain their economy. For example, nearby Zimbabwe has close ties with the Chinese government and most of their international support and trade goes through them. As mentioned before, agriculture is an integral part of the Rwandan economy. Despite the lower coffee prices and cultural tensions brewing, Rwanda still remains highly reliant on its agriculture sector. Besides coffee, tea is also a huge cash crop in Rwanda as climate and other conditions are favorable. Rwanda s animal livestock also plays an essential role in providing food, clothing, and other necessities for Rwandans. Rwandan Genocide Crisis Page 14

15 Finally, tourism is another potential sector to help Rwanda s economy to grow. Rwanda s Nyungwe National Forest is but one of the places where tourists could observe mountain gorillas in their natural habitat. In addition, Rwanda s tourists could also see chimpanzees and other primates in Nyungwe and other parts of the country. Furthermore, Rwanda is home to magnificent volcanoes and beautiful forests that could potentially hosts many visitors. Rwanda s tourism sector has recently declined because of the conflict and recent political instability. Preserving and protecting these national forests and animals is important for the environment and the economy of Rwanda. Rwandan Genocide Crisis Page 15

16 Solving the Rwandan Genocide Economic reforms will help Rwanda in the long-term. However, Rwandans need immediate assistance in dealing with the ongoing genocide currently taking place throughout the country. The council of nations can consider several options for appropriately dealing with the unfolding events in Rwanda. One option includes deploying an international coalition of troops to establish control over the country. Another option is to ramp up peacekeeping efforts on the ground. Should the council of nations do nothing, they may have to contend with being bystanders to a genocide. All options have advantages and disadvantages, but the council of nations will have to decide which option best suits them and which solution will most effectively assist the people of Rwanda. Concerning the deployment of a coalition to Rwanda, this option could be met with positive sentiments be a way for the international community to express their disarray and disgust with the atrocities being committed. This is probably the quickest way to establish peace, if the troops are well well-trained and well-equipped to deal with delicate and difficult situations. However, the governing council has to take into consideration the potential repercussions of their decision, and the precedent it could possibly establish. Africa is a continent that was almost completely colonized just a few decades ago. The idea of international troops - many possibly being of European descent - might serve to alienate and terrify some in Africa, as the memories of European colonialism are still fresh in the minds of many. In addition, the fiscal and physical cost of sending troops from different nations also has to be taken into consideration. Some nations may be reluctant to send their troops to end a genocide in a foreign land because of the possibility of their own troops being killed. Furthermore, the countries have to take into consideration the cost of sending an international coalition to Rwanda. The cost to send troops, feed them, supply them, complete reconnaissance missions, board, etc. will be very expensive. It would be important for the international coalition to appreciate some other issues of sending troops. For instance, they could Rwandan Genocide Crisis Page 16

17 be seen by some as choosing ethnic sides in a bloody and complex ethnic battle. Overall, sending an international coalition could establish temporary peace and show the prowess of the international community. However, getting all the countries to formally agree to a set number, time, amount of money, etc. will be extremely challenging in a situation that needs immediate solutions. The international community could decide to send a peacekeeping force to Rwanda in order to establish some semblance of stability or temporary ceasefire. This solution seems plausible because nations will likely be more open to sending UN peacekeepers than actual combat troops. This could send a more acceptable message to many African countries because it eliminates some worries about a neocolonialism through military intervention. Peacekeeping efforts also sends a better message around the world regarding the international community s willingness to deal with international crises. A number of countries dislike or completely reject the idea of sending combat troops to foreign nations because of the precedent it sets. However, the international community could also be reluctant to send peacekeeping efforts because of the potential loss of human lives. Peacekeepers are usually in very dangerous situations and serious bodily harm or death is a real possibility. Some nations could be unwilling to send these peacekeepers because of the potential political ramifications at home if one of them passes away or group is seriously injured after an assault. Peacekeepers who have spent time in Rwanda before the genocide already faced extreme dangers with civil unrest and wars breaking out over the past few years and decades. In addition, similar to the option of sending an international coalition, the council of nations also has to take into consideration the monetary cost of sending peacekeepers and what they will receive in return for their efforts. This may seem greedy or egregious, but Rwanda is an insignificant country when concerning international trade or economic output. This reason plays a factor in the international community s slow response thus far. Some nations might remain hesitant on agreeing to send peacekeeping efforts or to spending a certain amount of money to help fund these peacekeeping Rwandan Genocide Crisis Page 17

18 efforts because the possibility of receiving trade partnerships or monetary benefits are low. Finally, the international community could have difficulty planning peacekeeping efforts because of the widespread problem and lack of adequate information. If only a minimal amount of information is available, then nations could definitely be reluctant to send peacekeepers or combat troops because they are unaware of the potential dangers they could be sending them into. All of these potential downsides could hinder peacekeeping efforts in a country that desperately needs some type of international assistance to halt the genocide taking place. The third option would consist of the international community maintaining no particular stance and advocating for no specific measures to deal with the crisis. This options sounds devastating, especially for the Rwandan people because they are struggling to survive while other nations refuse to provide any assistance. This response seems inhumane, but some nations might prefer this option because it saves them money, potentially lives of their own soldiers, and prevents from making fatal mistakes within Rwanda s borders. These reasons have been laid about above in the previous two paragraphs about why nations would possibly remain unwilling to interfere. Money and lives could be gone and mistakes created by peacekeepers or combat troops could be used by the nation s enemies as propaganda or the international community could turn against the nation trying to provide assistance. However, even though the option of remaining on the sidelines might seem compelling to some nations, many believe the international community should get involved to protect the lives of thousands of Rwandans. If the international community refuses to intervene, then the ethnic tensions and violence will only increase in Rwanda. However, an international response does not have to take the form of the previously discussed options. The council of nations is encouraged to come up with innovative solutions to solve this issue. The international community needs to get ahead of this situation soon before it deteriorates even further. While sending peacekeepers or combat troops could be undeniably risky, the Rwandan Rwandan Genocide Crisis Page 18

19 people need their assistance to establish regular order. A peaceful Rwanda will also help prevent conflict spreading to other nations surrounding the landlocked African country. Moreover, a cooperative international community sends a strong message to other leaders or groups who attempt to gain control through hate mongering or bigotry. Nonetheless, the international community has a responsibility to act sooner than later to hopefully restore order to Rwanda and help their economy to begin to thrive. The responsibility of solving this crisis now leans on the international community s ability to cooperate and produce tangible plans ready to be utilized immediately. Now, the international community must act before Rwanda dissolves into mass chaos and before the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Rwandans. Rwandan Genocide Crisis Page 19

20 Position List: - United States - Britain - France - Belgium - Germany - Russia - China - Uganda - Zaire - South Africa - Canada - Burundi - Tanzania - Israel - Kenya - Bangladesh - India - Pakistan - Ethiopia - Nigeria - Japan - Italy - Spain - Brazil - Argentina - Egypt - Poland Rwandan Genocide Crisis Page 20

21 - Cameroon - Australia - The Netherlands - Algeria - Angola - Libya - Sudan - Ghana - Mexico - Sweden - Turkey - Austria - Venezuela Rwandan Genocide Crisis Page 21