The European Neighbourhood Policy: a Strategy for Security in Europe?

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1 02300_19943_08_cha06.qxd 10/23/06 3:01 PM Page The European Neighbourhood Policy: a Strategy for Security in Europe? Stefan Gänzle Introduction The 2004 enlargement of the European Union (EU) was heralded as historic in terms of both its magnitude and geopolitical outreach, yielding the Central and East European countries ultimate return to Europe. Enlargement, however, resulted in more than the mere addition of ten new member states. It also pushed the EU much closer towards what is broadly conceived as a new neighbourhood and into an area that the EU considers to be of paramount importance for security in Europe. The future of EU engagement in its neighbourhood will depend on two decisive factors. First, the EU is in an uncertain and difficult period of internal adjustment and consolidation after enlargement and the failed referenda in France and the Netherlands on the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe. Second, the EU is about to absorb the impact that new members such as Poland and the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) will have on the EU s foreign policy towards Eastern Europe (EU Eastern Policy 1 ). It is in this context that the EU is compelled to devise a strategy for the new neighborhood countries, in particular Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova. In 2001 and 2002, in the wake of increasingly strained relations with Russia, the European Union began to devise a proximity policy. This ultimately led to the creation of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). 2 As the European Commission President Romano Prodi put it at the time, the primary objective of the ENP was to create a ring of friends surrounding the Union and its closest European neighbours, from Morocco to Russia and the Black Sea. 3 Similar to the policy of enlargement, the ENP s main purpose since its inception has been the enhancement of the EU s overall relationship with each of its neighbouring countries through the promotion of stability, security and sustainable development both within and 110

2 02300_19943_08_cha06.qxd 10/23/06 3:01 PM Page 111 The European Neighbourhood Policy 111 without the EU. 4 The EU, therefore, subscribes to a twofold objective allowing for the enhancement of the EU s internal security by fostering security in a comprehensive manner well beyond its external borders. Since the end of the Cold War, the EU has been confronted with the task of redefining its relationships with the states of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). So far, the EU has pursued a policy of gradual and differentiated rapprochement prior to ultimately including CEE states into its internal structures of governance. 5 While Article 237 of the Treaty of Rome asserted that [a]ny European State may apply to become a member of the Community, 6 the treaty remained silent on the criteria that define the term European. Instead, it has become conventional wisdom to loosely conceptualize the borders of Europe within a set of factors encompassing geographical, geopolitical, cultural, religious, historical, economic and political considerations. 7 Yet, it seems that a geographical approach to the concept of Europe prevails as long as it is clear and simple to devise. It may be relatively easy to exclude the Southern Mediterranean from a geographical perspective, but it is increasingly difficult to operate the same definition vis-à-vis the EU s new Eastern Europe, where borders tend to acquire the character of a moving frontier. European post-cold War relations must be analysed within the scope of the increasing institutional supremacy, presence and actorness 8 of the European Union. On a regional level, following the collapse of communism in Europe, the CSCE/OSCE gradually lost its primacy as the institutional core of pan-european relations and concurrently its ability to offer itself as a model for the New Europe. 9 By and large, it was accession to the EU and NATO the centrepieces of the Euro Atlantic structure of prosperity, stability and peace, with the European Union as the core institution of European political order that became the mantra and telos of the Central and Eastern European countries foreign policy preferences. Karen Smith has suggested the history between the EU and its neighbours in Central and Eastern Europe can be interpreted as the EU coping with the exclusion/inclusion dilemma by eventually choosing inclusion. 10 However, while this is true for the EU s neighbours in Central and Eastern Europe, one should not overlook the fact that the EU opted for a dual track policy 11 that separated the Central and East European countries (including the Baltic states) from the Newly Independent States (NIS). Ultimately, the EU has developed different models of differentiated integration, oscillating between inclusion and exclusion. Without downplaying the importance of economic considerations, EC/EU enlargement in the 1990s acquired a distinctly political feature following the southern enlargement of the 1980s (Greece in 1981, Spain

3 02300_19943_08_cha06.qxd 10/23/06 3:01 PM Page The Changing Politics of European Security and Portugal in 1986). Those countries had just emerged from rule by military dictatorships. Similarly, the so-called northern enlargement of 1995 marked a distinct political tide of change with the formerly neutral, or more accurately, non-aligned states of Austria, Finland and Sweden opting into the European Union. In the case of the Southern European countries, EC/EU membership primarily boosted internal security through the EC s provision of external incentives for domestic democratization. In contrast, the EU was perceived foremost as an (additional) provider of external security in the case of Austria, Sweden and Finland. When the big bang enlargement of 2004 brought ten new member states into the EU, clearly the inclusionary approach won out over exclusion. Even with the completion of the most recent expansion, there are still several states waiting in line for EU accession: Bulgaria and Romania may join in 2007 or 2008, 12 and both Croatia and Turkey entered into negotiation talks with the EU in October Additionally, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was officially recognized as a candidate for EU membership in December The other countries of the Western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro) have membership prospects provided that they meet various forms of conditionality set out by the EU. Clearly, the Union will continue to embrace new member states over the next years. Thus it is feasible to conceive of a wider EU of up to 35 member states which will stretch well beyond Europe s geographical borders in sensu strictu. At the same time, it is likely that in the future the EU will continue to exclude some countries that are considered to be part of Europe at least as far as Europe is defined in terms of geography. Until recently, the EU s approach to the countries of the former Soviet Union was shaped by the fact that the EU as well as various member states tacitly acknowledged the pivotal role played by Russia. In the wake of the Orange Revolution in November 2004 and the energy dispute between Russia and Ukraine in 2005/2006, the relationship seems to be conceptualized as triangular. In this vein, the German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier declared on 21 March 2006 to the German-Russian Forum: In the EU-Russia-Ukraine triangle the three sides must be as equal as possible. Disturbed relations between two of these partners destabilize the region. However, the precondition for regional stability is that all sides stop thinking in terms of traditional spheres of influence and in categories of geopolitical rivalry. 13 Whereas the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) aspiring for EU membership subscribed to extensive Europe Agreements as the legal base of their relations with the EU in the mid-1990s, most of the Newly Independent States launched Partnership and Cooperation

4 02300_19943_08_cha06.qxd 10/23/06 3:01 PM Page 113 The European Neighbourhood Policy 113 Agreements (PCAs) with the EU. The PCAs were less comprehensive than the European Agreements and reflected Russia s role in shaping EU relations with the former Soviet Union s closest neighbours. 14 While the Europe Agreements were much more asymmetrical (the EU opened its market to the CEECs before most of the CEECs markets were opened to the EU) and conditional (the CEECs completely accepted EU conditionality provisions), the PCAs tended to be much less ambitious. Furthermore, in a second stage of bilateral relations, the EU established Common Strategies towards Russia (1999), Ukraine (1999) and the Mediterranean region (2000) in an attempt to unify its approach at both the individual member state and the EU levels with regards to its unfolding Common Foreign and Security Policy in general. 15 Most recently, in the course of the introduction of the ENP, Russia opted out of any further agreements established under the same heading as other European neighbours and instead insisted on pursuing a strictly bilateral EU Russia strategic partnership. As a consequence, both the EU and Russia have agreed upon the creation of the so-called Common Spaces which basically mirror the pillar structure of the EU itself, encompassing economic cooperation as well as cooperation in the fields of external and internal security, plus education and research. As Dimitry Danilov argues in his chapter, the EU Russia relationship will progress on some issues, but significant constraints will limit the relationship to tactical rather than strategic arrangements. While the EU was aiming at establishing a comprehensive approach in dealing with its immediate vicinity, the mere fact that the EU s policy towards the new Eastern Europe recreated the dual track policy in the East the Eastern Policy in the framework of ENP and EU Russia relations may spur the aspirations of Ukraine, Moldova and other countries to become members of the European Union. There is a vast body of literature available on ENP. Many studies have focused on the EU s ability to provide for an external incentive model albeit below the membership line and thus without relying on the membership carrot to induce transformative change in a partner country. 16 While some have been sceptical with regards to the transformative power the EU can deploy in its neighbourhood policy, 17 others who understand the EU s oscillating policies between inclusion and exclusion as an effort to regulate Europe s changing political order have welcomed the ENP as a significant advance. 18 The central argument of this chapter is that ENP not only needs to be addressed as an offspring of enlargement policy and politics, but it must also be understood in terms of the EU s efforts at conflict prevention and crisis management. Thus, after setting out the contents and the development of the European Neighbourhood Policy, this chapter

5 02300_19943_08_cha06.qxd 10/23/06 3:01 PM Page The Changing Politics of European Security will explore whether the ENP provides a new model for the European security relationship. The European Union and models of integration in Europe From the 1950s until the late 1980s, the European Community (EC) was confronted with alternative models and modes of political and economic integration in Europe. For example, the European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA) was conceived of by European states such as the UK, which explicitly did not wish to subscribe to the EC s far-reaching regional integration scheme politically and economically in terms of policies and decisionmaking style. While the alternative model in this particular case was set up outside the EC, the perspective changed considerably in the wake of the Cold War s end, marking the general recognition of the EC/EU as Europe s central institution for bringing West and East together. In this light, the European Economic Area (EEA) created in 1989 aimed at providing an alternative and differentiated model of smooth integration into the EC/EU, which came primarily from inside the Community itself. Without offering any sort of participation in the law-making process, the European Economic Area (EEA) extended the single market to those countries that were members of the EFTA. Yet, by this time it was already clear that a number of EFTA countries, such as Austria, Sweden and Finland, were about to apply for or had already applied for full-fledged membership in the EU, while at the same time a number of the remaining EFTA countries were considering doing the same and were closely associated with various policies of the European Union. 19 The EC/EU devised three basic, sometimes interlinking models for dealing with its immediate neighbourhood throughout the 1990s: 1. Comprehensive, all-inclusive models of pan-european cooperation (such as the European confederation and to a lesser extent the Europe Conference). 2. Differentiated approaches of gradual and conditional integration of individual countries 20 into the EC/EU (based on so-called Europe Agreements) or cooperation/integration with the EC/EU (based on the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements). 3. Geographically focused approaches of EU foreign policy, external relations and regional policy involving the EU and specific non-eu countries (particularly in the context of the Euro Mediterranean partnership ( Barcelona process ), the Northern Dimension initiative and the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe).

6 02300_19943_08_cha06.qxd 10/23/06 3:01 PM Page 115 The European Neighbourhood Policy 115 As early as January 1990, French President François Mitterrand tabled the idea of creating a European Confederation providing links between all European states, including the Soviet Union. 21 Ultimately, this idea would have brought the EC very close to the institutional logic of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which at that time was preparing negotiations for the Charter of Paris (November 1990). Although Mitterrand s proposal did not produce immediately tangible results, it resonated quite clearly in a later proposal put forward by Frans Andriessen, then European Commissioner for External Relations. In April 1991, he suggested creating the status of affiliate membership 22 in a sense the status that the Community had awarded to Germany s Eastern länder following the reunification of Germany (until 1994, East German MEPs were granted observer status in the European Parliament). Affiliate members were supposed to have a seat, yet no vote at the table of EC/EU decision-makers in a number of specified areas (for example, foreign policy, transport, environment, monetary affairs, research and so on). In both cases, the CEECs rejected these suggestions, fearing first the presence of the Soviet Union, and second the creation of a long-term waiting room and antechamber for EC/EU membership. This last concern came to play an increasingly key role in their foreign policies throughout the 1990s. In June 1992, the European Commission sketched out the idea of a European Political Area that would provide a forum for regular meetings of EU member states and associated countries from Central and Eastern Europe. One year later, in June 1993, this suggestion developed into the Copenhagen European Council s initiative to create the structured dialogue, a framework for discussions on all areas of EU business. 23 However, at the very same time that the CEECs were finally awarded the prospect of joining the EU in the future, they were required to accept unconditionally the EU rules of the game regarding integration into the Community. At the Essen European Council in June 1994, the EU heads of state and governments launched the so-called pre-accession strategy, providing additional financial resources for the CEECs on their path towards market economies and democratization. In mid-1995, the Commission s White Paper for integration into the EU internal market provided guidance and directives to the CEECs for the adoption of EC regulations and directives in this area. Last but not least, between 1998 and 2002, all the candidate countries entered into negotiations on the terms of their accession to the European Union. Concomitantly, the EU fleshed out a similar, but less ambitious policy towards Eastern European countries that were likely for various reasons to be left out of the enlargement process for the foreseeable future. Most

7 02300_19943_08_cha06.qxd 10/23/06 3:01 PM Page The Changing Politics of European Security importantly in this regard was the signing of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements in 1994, and the launch of Common Strategies at the end of that decade. While both agreements set out a plethora of inter-institutional relations and called upon Russia and Ukraine to pursue political and economic reforms, none of them created a perspective for a relationship that might develop into the creation of a common market with the European Union. Although the PCA outlined the establishment of an eventual free trade area between Russia and the EU, this option was not pursued further. At the Luxembourg European Council meeting in December 1997, the European Union decided to launch a European Conference which will bring together the Member States of the European Union and the European States aspiring to accede to it and sharing its values and internal and external objective. 24 Initially the EU offer was addressed to Cyprus, the applicant countries of Central and Eastern Europe and Turkey. Later, it was expanded to include closely associated countries such as Norway, Iceland and Switzerland. The European conferences involved regular meeting of heads of state and government to discuss a wide range of policy issues of mutual interest. 25 The conferences were primarily offered in order to mollify Turkey in light of the decision not to consider it as a candidate country for EU enlargement at the Luxembourg EU summit; yet, for a number of years, Turkey refused to participate. At the Göteborg European Council of June 2001, the EU member states decided to invite Ukraine and Moldova to join the European Conference. 26 However, as it lacked any political decision-making capacities, the European Conference largely remained an exercise in symbolic politics that did not yield any substantial successes. Last but not least, is the Northern Dimension initiative, launched by the Finnish government in 1997 in order to raise EU-wide awareness of the particular needs (especially with regards to the environment) of Northern Europe and its immediate vicinity (Russia, the Baltic states and Poland). Similar to the European Conference, albeit limited in its geographical scope, Finland and Denmark organized the Northern Dimension conferences which involved Russia in the context of a partnership approach ; 27 yet as holds true for all comprehensive approaches, neither the European Conference nor the Northern Dimension conferences allowed non-eu members a seat at the decision-making table. The making of the European Neighbourhood Policy The first steps towards the making of the ENP were taken following a letter from the UK Foreign Minister to the then Spanish Presidency of the European Union in January In this document British Foreign Minister

8 02300_19943_08_cha06.qxd 10/23/06 3:01 PM Page 117 The European Neighbourhood Policy 117 Jack Straw suggested offering Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova clear and practical incentives for proceeding with political and economic reform. Furthermore, his proposal included granting these countries the status of special neighbour based on a firm commitment to democratic governance and free market principles. 28 At this stage, the countries of the Southern Mediterranean area were not addressed as potential candidates for such an inclusive approach. More interestingly, it was Swedish Foreign Minister Anna Lindh and Trade Minister Leif Pagrotsky who suggested extending the geographical scope of the new policy to include Russia as well as the Southern Mediterranean countries, according to the notorious formula from Russia to Morocco. Clearly, this step anticipated the southern EU member states dislike of distinctive sets of policies geared towards non-eu countries East and South of Europe. In December 2002, the Copenhagen European Council approved the idea in principle: The enlargement will strengthen relations with Russia. The European Union also wishes to enhance its relations with Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus and the southern Mediterranean countries, based on a longterm approach promoting democratic and economic reforms, sustainable developments and trade and is developing new initiatives for this purpose. The European Council welcomes the intention of the Commission and the Secretary-General/High Representative to bring forward proposals to that end. 29 It is against this backdrop that the European Security Strategy, presented by Javier Solana in December 2003, declared that building security in our neighbourhood 30 is one of the three strategic objectives 31 of the EU. With regard to Eastern Europe, the strategy upholds that [i]t is not in our interest that enlargement should create new dividing lines in Europe. We need to extend the benefits of economic and political cooperation to our neighbours in the East while tackling political problems there. We should now take a stronger and more active interest in the problems of the Southern Caucasus, which will in due course also be a neighbouring region. 32 Four months later, in March 2003, the European Commission released its Wider Europe-Neighbourhood: a New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours document. The Commission made it clear from the beginning that its objective was to tie the neighbouring countries into the Union s security policies, including conflict prevention and crisis management. 33 The Commission stated that: [s]hared values, strong democratic institutions and a common understanding of the need to institutionalise respect for human rights will

9 02300_19943_08_cha06.qxd 10/23/06 3:01 PM Page The Changing Politics of European Security open the way for closer and more open dialogue on the Union s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the development of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). A shared neighbourhood implies burden-sharing and joint responsibility for addressing the threats to stability created by conflict and insecurity. 34 At that time following pressure from the Southern Mediterranean member states it became clear that the envisaged proximity policy had to encompass both the non-eu countries of the Mediterranean rim and the Western NIS, thus establishing a ring of friends as Romano Prodi put it. Furthermore, the Commission was still confident of also including Russia in this new policy. The Commission encouraged the EU to take a more active role to facilitate settlement of the disputes over Palestine, the Western Sahara and Transnistria (in support of the efforts of the OSCE and other mediators). 35 Interestingly, the subsequent ENP Action Plan with Morocco does not contain any reference to the Western Sahara. Whereas Spain, followed by most of the EU member states, would have liked to put this issue on the EU s agenda, France, in opposition, adopts a pro- Moroccan stance and opposes giving ENP any particular role in solving this conflict. 36 This not only highlights divisions between member states and the Commission in the development of ESDP-related facets of the European Neighbourhood Policy, but also divisions between individual member states. The relatively small ESDP mission to Georgia and the EU border mission in Ukraine and Moldova in the context of the Transnistria conflict illustrate concerns among some of the member states, in particular Germany, that the EU-Russia relationship is imperilled. In July 2003, the Commission suggested launching a number of immediate measures based on existing financial instruments and initiating a new and comprehensive neighbourhood instrument, substantially increased in terms of its budget. It should be noted that at the very beginning of ENP, the operational focus of EU funding focused on the neighbouring side of the external border: Such an Instrument, capable of operating on an identical footing on both sides of the EU s external border, would provide a more complete approach, allowing for a mix of cross-border and regional co-operation activity to be developed around the external border. 37 It was only with the European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper that the Commission subscribed to a more far-reaching policy approach and moved the initiative into higher gear, as a Commission press release termed it. 38 One month after the Commission decided to make this initiative a top priority, the General Affairs Council decided to extend ENP to the Caucasian countries of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia. 39 This decision clearly

10 02300_19943_08_cha06.qxd 10/23/06 3:01 PM Page 119 The European Neighbourhood Policy 119 adds to the political weight of the initiative. In the meantime, Russia declared it did not wish to be included in this policy; instead, it opted for a strategic partnership approach in its own right. As Dimitry Danilov points out in his chapter, the Russian decision needs to be interpreted in light of a rather general foreign policy change undertaken by Moscow in the wake of EU enlargement. Russia is increasingly uneasy with the status of its relationship with the European Union. The self-exclusion of Russia 40 in terms of the ENP membership may, indeed, have helped the Caucasian republics accept entering the orbit of the ENP; yet, in turn, it has given the neighbourhood approach an additional enlargement twist, as practically all countries of the new East are likely to consider pursuing future EU membership. It is likely that the ENP will not fully develop its potential as a policy for stabilizing the Western NIS and Russia, unless EU membership or some form of comparable relationship is offered. 41 Principles, objectives and instruments of the European Neighbourhood Policy In May 2004, the European Commission published its Strategy Paper on the European Neighbourhood Policy. In this document, the Commission laid out the principles and objectives that would govern all future ENP partnerships. The ENP aims at sharing the benefits of the EU s enlargement in 2004 with neighbouring countries in strengthening stability, security and well-being for all concerned in order to prevent the emergence of new dividing lines in Europe. 42 Clearly, at the time of enlargement some East European leaders had qualified the establishment of Schengen-borders as future paper curtains. Throughout the process of drafting the European Neighbourhood Policy, a normative tone was added: The EU has a duty, not only towards its citizens and those of the new Member States, but also towards its present and future neighbours to ensure continuing social cohesion and economic dynamism. The EU must act to promote the regional and sub-regional cooperation and integration that are preconditions for political stability, economic development and the reduction of poverty and social divisions in our shared environment. 43 ENP aims at addressing these concerns and hopes, and ultimately at contributing towards greater regional security. In December 2002, Commission President Romano Prodi declared: We have to be prepared to offer more

11 02300_19943_08_cha06.qxd 10/23/06 3:01 PM Page The Changing Politics of European Security than partnership and less than membership, without precluding the latter. 44 ENP offers its partner countries the chance to participate in various EU activities through greater political, security, economic and cultural cooperation albeit below the membership level. Prodi emphasized that the aim is to extend to this neighbouring region a set of principles, values and standards which define the very essence of the European Union. 45 In March 2003, the European Commission asserted that the EU s neighbours should be offered the prospect of a stake in the EU s Internal Market. 46 The European Neighbourhood Policy rests upon several key principles: first, the ENP subscribes to a conservative institutional approach as it is built into the existing framework of the EU s bilateral relations with a respective ENP partner country. Thereby the European Union avoids duplicating existing institutional structures. In terms of the EU s associational outreach beyond its boundaries, this means that the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (which were developed in the first half of the 1990s to serve the NIS), as well as the more classical Association Agreements with the Mediterranean countries, provide the platform on which ENP may develop. Ultimately, this is also a commitment to a strict and differentiated bilateralism in terms of inter-institutional relations despite the fact that ENP also encourages its neighbouring countries to engage in sub-regional cooperation. 47 Second, the Commission has declared that ENP constitutes a case for joint ownership of the institutions and of the process in general albeit this ownership is based on the awareness of shared values and common interests. 48 Although the European Union does not explicitly state that the normative model is to be taken from the EU itself, it is clear that ENP countries are expected to converge towards the normative model of the Union. This is clearly due to the internal constraints of EU governance, which make it extremely difficult to unpack agreements that have been painstakingly developed for the 15 member states that made up the EU prior to the 2004 enlargement. Furthermore, the EU reiterates what is already part of the PCAs. For example, in the case of Ukraine, the PCA affirms that Ukraine needs to approximate its existing and future legislation to that of the Community. 49 The PCAs that entered into force in 1998 were only agreed to for an initial period of ten years. Therefore the strong focus on these legal documents make more likely that the PCAs will be renewed in order to avoid another lengthy discussion and ratification process for new treaties. 50 Third, the ENP sets up a procedure for monitoring the success as well as shortcomings of agreements made under ENP. Following this comprehensive step towards achieving the overarching policy goals of ENP, the European Commission refined its existing country strategies. The ENP is being reshaped in order to be compatible with the

12 02300_19943_08_cha06.qxd 10/23/06 3:01 PM Page 121 The European Neighbourhood Policy 121 existing framework of relationships between the EU and its neighbours. Each country strategy paper subsequently supplies a strategic framework for the period Furthermore, these strategy papers set out EU cooperation goals and policy responses as well as identifying areas for cooperation which are defined as key priorities. In addition, the country strategy papers provide an assessment of the partner countries policy agendas and political and socio-economic situations. Attached to the strategy is information about the EU response in more detail, highlighting programme objectives, expected results and conditionality in the priority fields of co-operation for the period The primary objective of the strategy papers was to define the scope and modes of cooperation, underpinned by financial aspects. Concomitantly, the European Commission drew up its first set of country reports. In May 2004, country reports were published on the first seven of the ENP countries which have Association or Partnership Agreements with the EU in force. A further five country reports were published in March 2005 on the next set of countries to be included in the policy (Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia), as well as with those countries whose agreements had already come into force (Egypt and Lebanon). These reports provide an outline of the political, economic and social situation in the ENP countries. They also provide the space for future assessments on the achievements of each of the EU s partner countries. The Commission announced that the first assessment would be released in 2006, to be followed by another round of country reports in The next stage in the development of ENP saw the conclusion of ENP Action Plans with each of the countries. In June 2004, the Council of the EU endorsed the Commission s proposal: Action Plans should be comprehensive but at the same time identify clearly a limited number of key priorities and offer real incentives for reform. Action plans should also contribute, where possible, to regional cooperation. 52 Subsequently, a wide range of other areas have been emphasized. They jointly define an agenda of political and economic reform by means of short and mediumterm priorities (between 3 and 5 years). They cover political dialogue and reform, economic and social cooperation and development, trade-related issues and market and regulatory reform, cooperation in justice and home affairs, cooperation in sectors (such as transport, energy, information society, environment, research and development) as well as a human dimension (people-to-people contacts, civil society, education, public health). The incentives the EU offers in return for progress on relevant reforms are greater integration into European programmes and networks, increased assistance and enhanced market access.

13 02300_19943_08_cha06.qxd 10/23/06 3:01 PM Page The Changing Politics of European Security Finally, the implementation of mutual commitments and objectives agreed upon in the Action Plans are subject to regular monitoring by the European Commission and the partner country. In addition, the European Commission is expected to issue periodic reports commenting on progress as well as shortcomings. This procedure clearly reinforces elements of conditionality by offering reviews of the relationship in exchange for compliance with jointly agreed commitments. According to the Deputy Head of Ukraine s Mission to the EU, his country aims at under-promising, but over-delivering 53 on the terms of its objectives set in the Action Plan. Currently, EU assistance to the countries covered by the European Neighbourhood Policy is channelled through various geographical programmes. 54 In October 2004, the European Commission proposed an increase in funding for the ENP to almost 15 billion. This is conceived as a part of the reform of EU assistance instruments that will be replaced by a simplified structure and a single instrument the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI). This will be a much more flexible and policy-driven instrument 55 designed to target sustainable development and approximation of EU policies and standards, as well as supporting the agreed-to priorities in the ENP Action Plans. One of its most innovative features is that it entails a radical simplification to the current situation where cross-border cooperation at the external EU border is hampered by interfaces between internal and external funding instruments operating through different rules. 56 This means that cross-border cooperation with non-eu countries will be considerably eased along the EU s external land and sea borders in the east and in the south, putting partners under the same funding regime and instruments. The EU hopes to substantiate its goal of avoiding the emergence of new dividing lines in Europe as a result of these changes. ENPI also envisages extending forms of technical assistance to partner countries that had previously been used in the process of the CEECs rapprochement towards the EU, such as Technical Assistance and Information Exchange (TAIEX), long-term twinning arrangements with EU member states administrations (national, regional or local), as well as participation in Community programmes and agencies. Moreover, the Commission expects that the priorities identified in the action plans, which are agreed to with the authorities of the country, will have a lighthouse effect in terms of guiding the programming of other assistance programmes from other donor countries and institutions. After painstakingly difficult negotiations on the financial perspectives for the years , a compromise was reached at the European Council in December The Council determined that the EU s external action including pre-accession, stability,

14 02300_19943_08_cha06.qxd 10/23/06 3:01 PM Page 123 The European Neighbourhood Policy 123 development cooperation and economic cooperation, ENP, humanitarian aid and macro-financial assistance would receive approximately 50 billion from Out of this budget, only 10.5 billion were assigned to ENP. The security dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy The EU s Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood Policy, Ferrero-Waldner, has argued that through its capability to draw transformative power from a system of mutually defined incentives, ENP presents a modern, smart policy embracing security, stability and prosperity. 58 This statement gives evidence of the Commission s broad conception of security, which takes stock of measures aiming at the enhancement of non-military, soft security issues in the targeted countries. Throughout the development of the ENP, the EU became increasingly aware of the fact that this policy may potentially yield results in reinforcing state capabilities in the neighbourhood as well as contributing to conflict prevention. Thus, it is possible to discern three major factors which ultimately have an impact on the security dimension of the ENP. First, ENP offers inclusive forms of cooperation and integration focusing, amongst others, on areas of soft security. Second, albeit not designed as fully-fledged conflict-prevention tool, ENP has been viewed and used as a tool for conflict prevention. Third, ENP offers ENP countries an additional foreign policy orientation. The policy fosters a framework that may assist those countries in devising their individual foreign policy strategies. In the case of the Ukraine and Moldova, it made clear that there is a European option at hand as opposed to a Russian option that may require further reintegration into the CIS. Yet the Russian Federation, along with other actors in the region (such as NATO and the US), is playing an important role. Although Russia has expressed concerns vis-à-vis the scope of EU enlargement, it has not been as outspokenly opposed to this process as it was in the case of NATO enlargement. It is very important for the EU to devise strategies that ultimately will not alienate Russia from both the processes of EU enlargement and the European Neighbourhood Policy. Fostering soft security and state-building via policy transfer, policy learning and flexible inclusion Clearly, the main focus of the ENP is the promotion of internal stability in the countries of the European borderland. The EU would ideally like to see its neighbours adopt values such as the rule of law, democracy and

15 02300_19943_08_cha06.qxd 10/23/06 3:01 PM Page The Changing Politics of European Security respect for human rights and minority rights in accordance with the norms and standards for example, political pluralism, freedom of speech and media, respect for the rights of persons belonging to national minorities, non-discrimination on grounds of gender, political, religious and ethnic grounds set forth by institutions such as the OSCE and the Council of Europe. In a nutshell, the EU aspires to make these countries similar to the Union itself in order to ease mutual interaction based on its in-depth knowledge and experience in dealing with transition countries. Furthermore, the ENP Action Plans encourage a wide range of initiatives in interregional and cross-border cooperation arrangements involving the sub-national level(s), targeting public health, fostering local democracy and civil society, as well as building strong national education programmes. Through this approach, the EU attempts to foster confidence-building measures between the EU and the ENP countries as well as between the ENP countries themselves. Combating organized crime and corruption are high on the agenda of the EU s relationships with most of the ENP countries. Yet, it remains to be seen just how successful the EU will be when it comes to enhancing third countries state functions as well as statebuilding. Furthermore, the Action Plans are eager to set up closer cooperation based on people-to-people contacts. With regards to education, training and youth, the EU Ukraine Action Plan for instance strives to enhance a policy dialogue between EU and Ukrainian authorities in the field of education and training. 59 Furthermore, it sets out to incorporate Ukraine in a number of higher education and university programmes such as Tempus III, the Erasmus Mundus and the youth programmes. It also encourages Ukraine to subscribe fully to the objectives of the Bologna process in Higher Education, thus ensuring the compatibility of the Ukrainian university system with that of EU member states. Together with the other Eastern ENP countries, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Moldova, Ukraine joined the Bologna process in May Furthermore, the Ukraine EU partnership has been extended to cover Europe s satellite radio navigation system (Galileo), which sets the framework for cooperation in satellite navigation in a wider range of sectors, particularly in science and technology, industrial manufacturing, service and market development, as well as standardization, frequency and certification. According to Ferrero-Waldner, Ukraine has become an avant-garde country, 61 yielding further progress on the market economy status necessary for Ukraine s bid for WTO membership, as well as on visa facilitation and energy issues. Ultimately, the key mechanism for driving EU-inspired external reform resides with the perspective of moving beyond cooperation to a significant degree of integration, including through a stake in the EU s Internal Market

16 02300_19943_08_cha06.qxd 10/23/06 3:01 PM Page 125 The European Neighbourhood Policy 125 and the possibility for Ukraine to participate progressively in key aspects of EU policies and programs. 62 Yet it is not only the ENP country which will benefit from closer forms of inclusion into EU programmes and policies in the case of Ukraine, the EU aims at getting access to the country s Antonov fleet in order to cope with its weak capabilities vis-à-vis its airlift capabilities and to boost its credibility in terms of ESDP. Thus, the success of the ENP ultimately will depend on the stakes both partners hold in this process. Addressing the issue of conflict prevention Although conflict prevention has played a major part in the politics of the EU s Eastern enlargement, it was not highly prioritized at the launch of the ENP. This was mainly because the European Commission was reluctant to engage with Pillar II issues, such as conflict management and resolution issues, due to constraints set by the treaty obligations. In short ENP is a Commission-driven policy, and crisis management is the prerogative of the Council. 63 Yet, with the explicit reference to neighbourhood policies in the European Security Strategy, it was made clear that the ENP would also be framed in terms of conflict prevention policy. In addition, the potential as a conflict prevention tool is highly demand-driven or, in other words, dependent on the policy-takers perception and expectations vis-à-vis ENP itself. Both Georgia and Moldova have expressed hopes that the European Union and ENP would play a pivotal role in resolving some of the conflicts in their territories. 64 The ENP Action Plans agreed to in 2005 make clear reference to conflict prevention. Likewise, the ENP Country Strategy Papers feature references to territorial disputes and call for a shared responsibility for conflict settlement. Similarly, the Action Plans with Israel, Jordon, Morocco, Moldova and Ukraine, the Palestinian Authority and Tunisia all mention a shared responsibility for conflict prevention and resolution ; conflict resolution also figures high in Action Plans that were in the process of negotiation at the beginning of Clearly, there is a long history of this approach in the efforts of the EU to play a (significant) role in the Israeli Palestinian conflict. So far, the ENP approach to conflict resolution has not yielded tangible results. When the Council of the EU decided to include the Caucasian republics in the ENP, it was obvious from the start that conflict prevention needed to be at the top of the agenda. Armenia, Azerbaijan and the issue of Nagorno- Karabakh represent symbols of Europe s frozen conflicts. As the EU is currently preparing the Action Plans for these countries, it remains to be seen what kind of results the ENP will be capable of generating in this particular region.

17 02300_19943_08_cha06.qxd 10/23/06 3:01 PM Page The Changing Politics of European Security After a controversial debate among the member states, the EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine was set up in November 2005 under the lead of the European Commission. Although it is an advisory, small-scale, technical body with no executive powers, it provides training and advice to Moldovan and Ukrainian officials, reinforcing their capacity to carry out effective customs controls and border surveillance. 65 Ultimately, it is designed to contribute to building confidence and strengthening crossborder cooperation, particularly with a view to resolving the frozen conflict in Transnistria. ENP targets a number of security areas: the Action Plans explicitly mention proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, reform of the police and judicial system in order to fight corruption, measures against organized crime and the countering of international terrorism. Offering a foreign policy orientation In the immediate aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, both Russia and Ukraine searched for a European option or some form of integration into the European Union the Common House of Europe as it was framed at the end of the Gorbachev era. While Boris Yeltsin was supportive of the idea of having a close relationship with the EU, he later changed his tone. Shortly after Putin s rise to power in 2000, it became clear that Russia no longer intended to pursue this option further. Moreover, for the very first time, the Russian government explicitly declared that EU membership was not on its political agenda. There were several reasons for this development, the most obvious being: first, the Russian political elite took a nationalistic turn during the presidency of Putin and became increasingly dismissive of the commitments at stake in European integration in terms of sovereignty; second, Russia feels that Europe and the EU in particular are highly dependent on Russian energy supplies and it therefore serves Russia s interests to remain outside the EU in order to be able to benefit economically from this situation; third, EU inclusion of the Baltic states and Poland increased scepticism and to some extent Russo-phobia in the realm of the EU. For the in-betweens, such as Ukraine and Moldova, this political development meant that they were increasingly forced into taking a stand on their position vis-à-vis EU membership. This created an entirely new regional context for Ukraine and Moldova, who were left in limbo throughout the 1990s. At best, both countries aimed at walking a fine line between the European and Slavic options. Ultimately, however, both Ukraine and Moldova remained fairly close to Russia and its interests when it came to the development of their foreign policy orientations. With the Orange Revolution and the involvement of Poland and Lithuania in resolving the dispute surrounding the 2004 Ukrainian

18 02300_19943_08_cha06.qxd 10/23/06 3:01 PM Page 127 The European Neighbourhood Policy 127 election, two EU member states proved to have a pivotal role in the Ukraine s embrace of the European option. Thus the framework of the ENP offers an opportunity for further exploration of a closer relationship with the European Union. In his speech at the European Parliament, Viktor Yushchenko, President of Ukraine, was very explicit: Ukraine still has much to do to become a full member of the European family, but we are all now united by values, history and aspirations... Like making bread, you need the right ingredients and a lot of work. European integration is the only path open for Ukraine. It is time to move beyond words and take action to develop democracy, the rule of law, freedom of the media and to tackle corruption. We must not lose this unique opportunity to bring the EU and Ukraine closer. 66 The ENP opens a discursive as well as a policy space for mutual interaction that ultimately will generate an additional foreign policy orientation. It is evident that a foreign policy orientation does not create a more secure environment per se, yet it may provide the means ultimately to achieve the goal of establishing a more secure international environment instead of being lost in a regional limbo. Conclusion The ENP does not provide an entirely new approach in the field of EU foreign and security policy. Given its reliance on the European Commission as a primary driving force, and the fact that it is strongly path-dependent and modelled after the enlargement policies, it may even be accurate to argue that it somehow presents new wine in old wineskins. 67 Yet, one should not ignore the fact that the ENP does not render obsolete those EU Treaty provisions which allow European states to apply for membership. Against this backdrop, two factors have added a considerable integrationist twist to the European Neighbourhood Policy: first, Ukraine and Moldova are indisputably European countries in terms of Art. 49 TEU unlike to Russia and the Southern Mediterranean. Furthermore, the Russian decision to reject ENP partner status indirectly contributes to anchoring the Eastern European bloc of ENP countries in a pro-eumembership camp. Second, the accession of Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and in 2007/8 Romania to the European Union has and will further increase the number of member states willing to support Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova on their path towards European integration and potential EU membership. In early 2005, the then Foreign