EUROPEAN PEACE BUILDING:

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1 EUROPEAN PEACE BUILDING: In the Mediterranean area Rouba Al-Fattal Institute for International and European Policy UCL Université catholique de Louvain Brussels, 25 February 2010 Assessing Policy Is the EU MED policy a success of a failure? Framework of analysis: - Levels of analysis - Actors involved - Methods employed - Legal capacities - Instruments available - Critical Junctures - Time periods - Reasons of failures and success - The way forward

2 Levels of Analysis Regional: EMP (dialogue)/ufm (projects) Sub-regional: MEPP (vision) Local: ENP (strategy) - In (o)pt: WB, GS (Jerusalem?) - In (o/d)t: (o)pt + Golan and Shebaa - in Israel (67 borders and beyond) Societal: NGOs, TTs, Religious, women [1] Ibid. [2] European Commission: European Neighbourhood Policy, Documents: Who Participates? [cited 27 Oct. 2009]. Available from [3] European Commission External Relations, The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. [cited 27 Oct. 2009]. Available from Who is Mediterranean? EMP (1995) ENP (2004)**** UfM (2008) EUMS* (15) NE**(13) EUMS (25) NE (16) EUMS (27) NE (16 + Libya) Austria Algeria (AL) Austria Algeria (AL) Austria Albania (EUPC) Belgium Cyprus (EUCC) Belgium Armenia Belgium Algeria (AL) Denmark Egypt (AL) Cyprus Azerbaijan Bulgaria Bosnia & Herzegovina (EUPC) Finland Israel Czech Republic Belarus Cyprus Croatia (EUCC) France*** Jordan (AL) Denmark Egypt (AL) Czech Republic Egypt (AL) Germany Lebanon (AL) Estonia Georgia Denmark Israel Greece Malta (EUCC) Finland Israel Estonia Jordan (AL) Italy Mauritania (AL) France Jordan (AL) Finland Lebanon (AL) Ireland Morocco (AL) Germany Lebanon (AL) France (Libya) (AL) Luxembourg OPT (AL) Greece Libya (AL) Germany Mauritania (AL) Netherland Syria (AL) Hungary Moldova Greece Monaco Portugal Tunisia (AL) Italy Morocco (AL) Hungary Montenegro(EUPC) Spain Turkey Ireland OPT (AL) Italy Morocco (AL) Sweden Latvia Syria (AL) Ireland OPT (AL) UK Lithuania Tunisia (AL) Latvia Syria (AL) Luxembourg Ukraine Lithuania Tunisia (AL) Malta Luxembourg Turkey(EUCC) Netherland Malta Poland Netherland Portugal Poland Slovakia Portugal Slovenia Romania Spain Slovakia Sweden Slovenia UK Spain Sweden UK

3 Methods employed Multilateral: EMP (technical difficulties) Bilateral: ENP, AA (1997), AP (2005) Selective: UfM six projects: - De-pollution of the Mediterranean - Construction of maritime and land highways - Civil protection from climate change and man-made or natural disasters - Identifying alternative energies & Mediterranean Solar Plan (MSP) - Encouraging higher education and research through the EMUNI in Slovenia - Supporting business initiative focusing on small & medium-sized enterprises

4 Legal capacities TEU (1993) CFSP/Council: unanimity, silent diplomacy - EUPOL COPPS, police/civilian mission - EUBAM Rafah, border assistance mission EC/EU Commission: QMV - Election monitoring missions - Budget support for AA, AP, etc. Instruments available Addressing the structures and levels: Political: Quartet (2003), democracy Economic: MEDA, ENPI, TIM/PEGASE,EIB Social: EIDHR, DCI Cultural: gender equality, youth, media Security: Illegal migration and terrorism

5 Critical Junctures The Second Intifada (2000) Hamas PLC electoral victory (2006)

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7 Time periods Four stages over 15 years of relations: : Oslo II Accord to Intifada : intifada to Arafat s demise : rise of Abbas to Hamas : Hamas to stalemate/no NUG Period External Factors EU Focused on political & economic structures Slow start on cultural & legal structures Focused on state/national level Neglected societal and local actors (including religious leaders) Not enough money disbursement Halted economic development Ignored the cultural structure and local actors Increased socio-economic development Worked on the cultural structure Continued to neglect religious leaders Involved local actors Pushed for political reforms Supported PA (Fatah) only Halted development in PT Deepened rift between factions Reversed democratic processes Neglected Gazans and Islamists Worked selectively on the cultural structure (neglecting religious leaders) Lost credibility Israel Lack of trust in the Palestinians Occupation Started the peace process Increased violence Palestinian movement restrictions Occupation Halted the peace process Separation wall Movement restrictions persists Occupation Restarted the peace process Increased movement restrictions Increased violence and violations Occupation Froze the peace process Internal Factors PT Lack of fiscal transparency Corruption Selective reforms (managed democracy) Nepotism and partisanship Lack of trust in Israeli Terrorism and violence General elections were held but no local elections Started the peace process Second Intifada No security No elections No reforms Corruption continues Increase unemployment Nepotism and partisanship Increases violence and terrorism All elections were postponed Halted the peace Process Less corruption Increased transparency Increased reforms Enhanced democracy Enhanced rule of law Better governance Violence and terrorism reduced Presidential and local elections were held Restarted the peace process Hamas win Increase corruption Lack of good governance Improved fiscal transparency in the West Bank only Lack of leadership (no strategy or vision) No government accountability Reversed previous reforms Illegal governments Increased violence (Hamas-Israel & Fatah-Hamas) No National Unity Government All foreseen elections were postponed Froze the peace process

8 [1] John Anderson and Molly Moore, "Palestinians Appear to Give Abbas a Clear Win," Washington Post, 10 January Available from [2] Ibid. Also see Balawi, Palestinian Municipal Elections: A Gradual Change. Period 20 January December /1, 5/5, 29/9, 15/ January Presidential (% of votes) X Hamas boycotted Voter turnout 71.7% Arafat (Fatah) won (88.2%) 2 nd Intifada Not Possible X Hamas boycotted Voter turnout ~50 % Abbas (Fatah) won (62.5%) Postponed for a year Undecided L e v e l PLC X Hamas boycotted District system Religious quota in Fatah won (55of 88 seats) 2 nd Intifada Not Possible X Hamas joined Mixed system* gender quota added Voter turnout 77% Hamas won (44.5% H to 41.4% F PR) (45 H to 17 F district seats) (74 H to 45 total seats) Changed to PR Undecided Local (~80% voter turnout) X Hamas joined District system Gender quota added 1 st round in WB* & G*: Hamas won (31% H* to 30% F*) X Hamas joined District system 2 nd round in WB & G: Fatah won (39% F to 32% H) Changed to PR & Gender Quota in 3 rd round in WB: Fatah won (45% F to 31% H) 4 th round in WB: Hamas won (44% H to 35% F) 5 th round in WB & G Cancelled Undecided Undecided Reasons of failures/success Strategy: clarity, objective FP: structural vs. Traditions (not both) Expectation-capability gap Instruments imbalance Palestinian public opinion: TLC Follow-up (feedback and adjustment)

9 EU committed funds (before 2 nd Intifada) EU committed funds (after 2 nd Intifada) EU committed funds (after PLC elections) MEDA-I billion MEDA-II billion million in 2003 for additional committed funds ENPI 12 billion EIB billion EIB (FEMIP since 2002) 6.4 billion + 1billion for transnational projects EIDHR-I EIB (FEMIP) 8.7 billion EIDHR II

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12 The way forward & obstacles What then? Possible scenarios: - Wait, do nothing (less cost & risk) - Change structures, conditions (C&R) - Balance sources as EU did Negotiate with Hamas and beyond - Regional solution (with US, Israel, API) - Reform/progress in WB only = EU choice Is it going to work? Why bother?