Regional Security Complex with Ethiopia as the Source of Eritrea s Defense Policy

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1 In: Proceedings of the 16th International Conference of Ethiopian Studies, ed. by Svein Ege, Harald Aspen, Birhanu Teferra and Shiferaw Bekele, Trondheim 2009 Regional Security Complex with Ethiopia as the Source of Eritrea s Defense Policy Scarlett Lopez Freeman 1 Eritrea s choice of defense policy has been shaped by a number of internal and external factors. Internal factors include the political-bureaucratic modeling of Eritrea as an authoritarian, militaristic state and the economic constraints that Eritrea faces as a poor country. Externally, one can examine the regional security complex with Ethiopia; once characterized by an amicable relationship between the two heads of state, it is now one of hostility. The regional security complex with Ethiopia heavily outweighs the internal factors when it comes to Eritrea s defense policy. As I will argue, the regional security complex is at the root of Eritrea s defense policy. An Overview: Eritrea s Defense Policy Eritrea maintains an aggressive foreign policy, 2 characterized by deteriorated and poor relations with neighbors, and is furthermore not favorable to multilateral institutions. 3 Its largest threat emanates from Ethiopia, Eritrea s neighbor to the south, which poses a threat to Eritrea s border and sovereignty. 4 The demarcation of the border remains under dispute with troops occasionally amassing on both sides of the border. 5 Politically, Eritrea has been attempting to develop and/or strengthen its ties to the Arab world. 6 Eritrea is a member of Libyan-initiated Community of Sahel-Sahara States (CEN-SAD) and Libya has reportedly supplied surface-to-air missiles to Eritrea. 7 Eritrea has also twice applied for observer status with the League of Arab States. 8 Other attempts include the supplying of arms to Somalia s Union of Islamic Courts, to counteract Ethiopia s US-backed support of the Somali Transitional Federal Government School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University in the City of New York, New York, NY, USA. Jane s Sentinel Security Assessment - North Africa. 30 October Executive Summary, Eritrea. < Search/documentView.do?docId=/content1/janesdata/sent/nafrsu/erits010.htm@current&pageSelected =alljanes&keyword=eritrea%20executive%20summary&backpath= od_name=nafrs&>. Jane s Sentinel Security Assessment North Africa. 30 October External Affairs, Eritrea. < content1/janesdata/sent/nafrsu/erits080.htm@current&pageselected=alljanes&keyword=eritrea%20ex ternal%20affairs&backpath= Jane s Sentinel Security Assessment North Africa. 30 October External Affairs, Eritrea. 609

2 610 Scarlett Lopez Freeman David s theory of omnibalancing, is described as states accounting for all threats, internal and external, in order to survive in power. 10 In the case of Eritrea, internal threats are minimal due to the stronghold of power by President Isaias Afewerki, 11 so omnibalancing is not applicable to Eritrea. Walt describes balancing as allying with others against the prevailing threat. 12 In order to counteract its largest threat, Ethiopia, which is a US ally against Islamic fundamentalism, 13 Eritrea s strategy is to align with the Arab world in order to balance against Ethiopia. The war with Ethiopia was largely characterized by experienced guerilla tactics as well as fighting positional battles 14 (a static border defense doctrine). 15 Cohen states that most Third World states lack the infrastructure to engage in blitzkrieg warfare but that they do have the ability to engage in long periods of low-level conflict characterized by episodes of intense fighting. 16 With a paucity of advanced military equipment, 17 Eritrea is currently resigned to a limited aims war offensive doctrine with potential for aspects of mainforce attrition, 18 which is congruent with its history of a guerilla army moving towards conventional warfare. 19 Eritrea retains goals of limited aims war territorial aims, no unconditional surrender, political not military victory 20 with some strategies of mainforce attrition no surprise, numerical superiority (estimated 200,000 personnel versus Ethiopia s estimated 150, ), and set piece battles. 22 Eritrea does not possess chemical, biological or nuclear weapons. 23 Although nuclear weapons are considered to be central to international security affairs and are predicted to increase in importance in the coming years, 24 Eritrea s disincentives outweigh its incentives to the development or procurement of nuclear weapons capabilities. Its primary disincentive is the Hawk s dilemma. That is, it is extremely expensive to 10 David, Steven R. January Explaining Third World Alignment, World Politics, Vol. 43, No. 2, p Jane s Sentinel Security Assessment North Africa. 30 October Executive Summary, Eritrea. 12 Walt, Stephen M Alliance: Balancing and Bandwagoning, The Origins of Alliances, Cornell University Press: Ithaca, NY. p Jane s Sentinel Security Assessment North Africa. 29 March External Affairs,Ethiopia. < janesdata/sent/nafrsu/ethis080.htm@current&pageselected=alljanes&keyword=tank&backpath= /search.janes.com/search&prod_name=nafrs&keyword=#toclink-j > Neuman, Stephanie. 8 February Types of Defense Doctrine, Lecture Handout, Columbia 16 Coehn, Eliot A Distant Battles, in The Lessons of Recent Wars in the Third World, Vol. II: Comparative Dimensions, eds. S. Neuman and R. Harkavy. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books. p Jane s World Armies. 1 August World Armies, Eritrea. < tm@current&pageselected=alljanes&keyword=eritrea%20world%20armies&backpath= anes.com/search&prod_name=jwar&> Neuman, Stephanie. 8 February Types of Offensive Doctrine, Lecture Handout, Columbia 21 Jane s World Armies. 26 October World Armies, Ethiopia. < com.arugula.cc.columbia.edu:2048/search/documentview.do?docid=/content1/janesdata/binder/jwar/j wara152.htm@current&pageselected=alljanes&keyword=world%20armies%20ethiopia&backpath=h ttp://search.janes.com/search&prod_name=jwar&> Jane s Sentinel Security Assessment North Africa. 18 March Armed Forces, Eritrea. < janesdata/sent/nafrsu/erits100.htm@current&pageselected=alljanes&keyword=tank&backpath= search.janes.com/search&prod_name=nafrs&keyword=>. 24 Goldstein, Avery. 20 September Why Nukes Still Trump: Deterrence and Security in the 21 st Century, talk delivered at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, Philadephia, PA. pp. 1-2.

3 Regional Security Complex with Ethiopa as the Source of Eritrea s Defense Policy develop nuclear weapons compared to the development of conventional military capabilities; thus, development of nuclear weapons leaves conventional weapons capabilities vulnerable to deterioration which in turn leaves a country vulnerable to outside attack during the time in which the nuclear program is developing. 25 Although chemical weapons may be delivered through chemically-armed ballistic missiles, chemical weapons use during World War I degraded combat effectiveness and reduces tactical mobility, 26 something that Eritrea relies heavily on. 27 In terms of biological weapons for Eritrea, they are indeed cheap at a casualty cost of only $1 per square kilometer versus $2,000 for conventional weapons, although access to delivery systems 28 may prove more of an economic obstacle for Eritrea s budget. Due to the constraints that Eritrea currently faces, nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons are not a viable military option in the near future. Political Bureaucratic Factors and Eritrea s Defense Policy Internally, Eritrea s authoritarian government and military are closely related and exercise strict control over all aspects of civil life. 29 According to Frisch, what determines a third world state s security structure is a result of the state s political and social heterogeneity and the state s relative importance to United States foreign policy and security concerns. 30 He goes on to say that states that value external security [over internal] will establish a conventional army with both conventional and unconventional offensive capabilities. 31 Although Eritrea does not have unconventional offensive capabilities, it does boast a large conventional army. 32 According to Frisch, the heterogeneity of Eritrean society and absence of US protection has prevented fragmentation of security forces, which is disadvantageous both militarily and politically. 33 Despite internal armed opposition to the current regime and the linguistic and ethnic diversity of Eritrean society, the government has quelled potential fragmentation through militarily homogenizing a plural society. 34 Posen says that the disjuncture between civilians and military organizations can be problematic, 35 but as the most militarized society in Africa with one out of seven adults under arms, 36 Eritrea has successfully reduced the chances of unwanted civilian interference into military affairs simply by integrating such a large percentage of the civilian population into the military. 25 Neuman, Stephanie. 28 February Unconventional Military Options, Lecture, Columbia 26 McNaugher, Thomas L. Fall Ballistic Missiles and Chemical Weapons, International Security 15:2. p Jane s World Armies. 1 August World Armies, Eritrea Jane s Sentinel Security Assessment North Africa. 30 October Executive Summary, Eritrea. < m@current&pageselected=alljanes&keyword=tank&backpath= _Name=NAFRS&keyword=#toclink-j >. 30 Frisch, Hillel. September Explaining Third World Security Systems, Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 25, No. 3. p , p Jane s World Armies, 1 August World Armies, Eritrea. 33 Frisch, p Jane s Sentinel Security Assessment North Africa. 30 October Executive Summary, Eritrea. 35 Posen, Barry The Sources of Military Doctrine, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. p Jane s Sentinel Security Assessment North Africa. 30 October Executive Summary, Eritrea. 611

4 Scarlett Lopez Freeman Domestic Economic Factors and Eritrea s Defense Policy In 2003, Eritrea s defense expenditure was an estimated US$180 million, the highest in the world in terms of GDP percentage (see Table 1, below) with, perhaps, the exception of North Korea. 37 Nevertheless, Eritrea is a poor country with low foreign reserves and an overvalued currency that faces socioeconomic crisis and famine. 38 Despite recent attempts to distance itself from foreign aid (expelling USAID), 39 Eritrea remains entirely dependent on foreign assistance simply to feed its population. 40 Table 1: Defense Expenditures US$ (millions) Percentage of GDP Note: Figures for 2003 are estimates. Due to Eritrea s worsening economic condition, 42 its current military equipment is mostly that which was procured prior to and during the war with Ethiopia. 43 There are reported attempts at investing in logistical technology. 44 It has also been suggested that Eritrea has a major record of covert procurement. 45 Eritrea would benefit from modern military equipment, particularly because its largest threat, Ethiopia, has been heavily supported by the US in terms of training and sale of weaponry. 46 There has also been a suggestion of an ongoing arms race with Ethiopia, based on military spending between the two countries. 47 With its prime threat being assisted by the US, it would be beneficial for Eritrea to pursue unconventional military options. 48 However, a stated above, it is constrained prevented by budgetary constraints as defined by the Hawk s dilemma. Thus it has chosen to invest primarily in conventional military options, which also defines its doctrine. 49 During the 1990s, there was increased economic interdependence between Eritrea and Ethiopia, which was one reason that fueled the war with Ethiopia. 50 In an attempt to assert independence, Eritrea dropped the Ethiopian birr and in November 37 Jane s Sentinel Security Assessment North Africa. 18 March Defence Budget, Eritrea, < janesdata/sent/nafrsu/erits090.htm@current&pageselected=alljanes&keyword=tank&backpath= search.janes.com/search&prod_name=nafrs&keyword=>. 38 Jane s Sentinel Security Assessment North Africa. 30 October Executive Summary, Eritrea. 39 Jane s Sentinel Security Assessment North Africa. 29 March External Affairs, Ethiopia. 40 Jane s Sentinel Security Assessment North Africa. 30 October Executive Summary, Eritrea. 41 Jane s Sentinel Security Assessment North Africa. 18 March Defence Budget, Eritrea Jane s World Armies. 1 August World Armies, Eritrea Jane s Sentinel Security Assessment North Africa. 22 February Executive Summary, Ethiopia. < /Search/documentView.do?docId=/content1/janesdata/sent/nafrsu/ethis010.htm@current&pageSelecte d=alljanes&keyword=ethiopia%20executive%20summary&backpath= &Prod_Name=NAFRS&#toclink-j > Neuman, Stephanie. 28 February Unconventional Military Options, Lecture, Columbia 49 Jane s Sentinel Security Assessment North Africa. 30 October Executive Summary, Eritrea. 50 Jane s Sentinel Security Assessment North Africa. 30 October External Affairs, Eritrea. 612

5 Regional Security Complex with Ethiopa as the Source of Eritrea s Defense Policy 1997 adopted the Eritrean nafka. 51 This was a major source of friction between the two countries in addition to the border dispute. 52 Regional Dynamics A regional security complex is a system of security relations among a set of geographically proximate states and can be identified in terms of patterns of amity and enmity. 53 The regional security complex between Eritrea and neighboring Ethiopia is one particularly of enmity but with a strange history of amity between the two state leaders. 54 President Afewerki and Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi are closely related and were apparently good friends during their days in the resistance, sharing the same room when they lived in Mogadishu. 55 Buzan describes two conditions that explain why it could be difficult to see a security complex within a region: (1) There are weak, local states whose power does not project very much beyond state boundaries, and (2) That the presence of outside powers in a region is strong enough to suppress or diminish the perception of importance of security dynamics among the local states. 56 In the regional security complex between Eritrea and Ethiopia, it seems logical to assume that the defense policy of Eritrea is a function of the international system rather than regional dynamics. However, I argue that the regional security complex between Eritrea and Ethiopia dominates the defense policy of Eritrea and, furthermore, strongly informs how Eritrea interacts in the international system. Eritrea and Ethiopia are both seen as weak local states, 57 and their relationship has been suppressed by the substantial long-term stationing of military forces by outside powers in the region; 58 namely the US (and France s) military operations based in Djibouti have made the Horn of Africa relevant in terms of the US-led war on terror, 59 suppressing the local dynamics of the Ethiopia-Eritrea regional security complex. Domestic vs. External Factors External factors heavily outweigh the affects of domestic factors, as Eritrea s authoritarian government has so far subdued and continues to subdue internal threats through the prohibition of ethnic, religious, and regionalist parties and the ruling party s ownership in most sectors of the economy. 60 One can even analyze the domestic factors Buzan, Barry Third World Regional Security in Structural and Historical Perspective, in The Insecurity Dilemma, ed. Brian L. Job. Lynne Rienner Publishers. p Jane s Sentinel Security Assessment North Africa. 29 March External Affairs, Ethiopia Buzan, p Jane s Sentinel Security Assessment North Africa. 30 October Executive Summary, Eritrea, and Jane s Sentinel Security Assessment North Africa. 22 February Executive Summary, Ethiopia. 58 Buzan, p Jane s Sentinel Security Assessment North Africa. 22 March External Affairs, Djibouti, < documentview.do?docid=/content1/janesdata/sent/nafrsu/djibs080.htm@current&pageselected=allja nes&keyword=djibouti%20external%20affairs&backpath= e=nafrs&>. 60 Jane s Sentinel Security Assessment North Africa. 30 October Internal Affairs, Eritrea, < Search/documentView.do?docId=/content1/janesdata/sent/nafrsu/erits070.htm@current&pageSelected =alljanes&keyword=tank&backpath= =>. 613

6 Scarlett Lopez Freeman as directed by the regional security complex with Ethiopia. For example, the militarized society and stronghold on power by the government does not seem like it will change, as continued tensions with Ethiopia have deferred demobilization plans announced in There were reports of large-scale conscription and recruitment of youth into military service into Thus, the regional security complex directs Eritrea s defense policy decisions in terms of Eritrea s political-bureaucratic characteristics. Even economic decisions are dominated by the regional security complex with Ethiopia. There is high military spending even as the Eritrean population faces food shortages. 63 The reasons for expelling USAID in spite of Eritrea s dire need for aid is unclear, but subsequent restrictions on UNMEE operations and expelling of Western UN personnel 64 suggest that the unresolved border dispute with Ethiopia is behind Eritrea s decisions. Although it may seem as though the international system is an important factor in Eritrea s choice of defense policy, it is only important as far as the regional security complex goes. I contend that Eritrea s attempt to strengthen ties to the Arab world 65 is only relevant in terms of its importance regarding the border demarcation issue. Otherwise, Eritrea would engage on a larger scale in multilateral institutions, which it does not. 66 Eritrea s balancing against western countries is an expression of frustration with the perceived international community s lack of pressure on Ethiopia to accept the 2002 ruling that awarded the town of Badme to Eritrea. 67 Eritrea believes that the UN has not given due priority to resolving the border dispute and that Ethiopia is the more favored of the two countries. 68 Thus, Eritrea s interaction with the international system stems from the regional security complex. External factors such as technology do not heavily affect Eritrea s defense policy, primarily because it is economically unfeasible (Hawk s dilemma) to pursue technology beyond conventional equipment. 69 Eritrea s primary threat, Ethiopia, has not pursued any post-war modernization policies 70 and the war fought between the two was a highintensity conventional war. 71 In light of this, it does not seem likely that the Eritrean army will need to engage in countermeasures against the Ethiopian military which is also not significantly modernizing. Conclusion Based on the presented facts, the regional security complex between Eritrea and Ethiopia is at the heart of Eritrea s defense policy. The use of the Horn of Africa as the US s battlefield in the war on terror has suppressed the external perception of this 61 Jane s World Armies. 1 August World Armies, Eritrea Jane s Sentinel Security Assessment North Africa. 30 October Internal Affairs, Eritrea. 64 Jane s Sentinel Security Assessment North Africa. 30 October External Affairs, Eritrea Jane s Sentinel Security Assessment North Africa. 30 October Executive Summary, Eritrea. 67 Jane s Sentinel Security Assessment North Africa. 30 October External Affairs, Eritrea Neuman, Stephanie. 28 February Unconventional Military Options, Lecture, Columbia 70 Jane s World Armies. 26 October World Armies, Ethiopia. < nesdata/binder/jwar/jwara152.htm@current&pageselected=alljanes&keyword=ethiopia%20world%2 0armies&backPath= 71 Jane s World Armies. 1 August World Armies, Eritrea. 614

7 Regional Security Complex with Ethiopa as the Source of Eritrea s Defense Policy security dynamic. Although other factors are accounted for in the development of Eritrea s defense policy, it is evident that the regional security complex with Ethiopia disproportionally directs Eritrea s defense policy from a number of angles. 615

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