Regional Tensions and Internal Community Relations in the GCC

Transcription

1 Meeting Summary Middle East and North Africa Programme September 2014 Regional Tensions and Internal Community Relations in the GCC Chatham House, the Royal Institute of International Affairs, is an independent policy institute based in London. Our mission is to help build a sustainably secure, prosperous and just world. The views expressed in this document are the sole responsibility of the speaker(s) and participants do not necessarily reflect the view of Chatham House, its staff, associates or Council. Chatham House is independent and owes no allegiance to any government or to any political body. It does not take institutional positions on policy issues. This document is issued on the understanding that if any extract is used, the author(s)/ speaker(s) and Chatham House should be credited, preferably with the date of the publication or details of the event. Where this document refers to or reports statements made by speakers at an event every effort has been made to provide a fair representation of their views and opinions. The published text of speeches and presentations may differ from delivery. The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2015

2 Introduction This is a summary of discussions that took place at a workshop held on September 2014 in Kuwait City, co-hosted by Chatham House and the Al Salam Centre for Strategic and Development Studies. Participants including academics, civil society representatives, former policy-makers, business leaders and journalists were asked to discuss regional tensions and internal relations in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Key points that emerged from the discussion are summarized as follows: The importance of public opinion is contested in the Gulf both for governments as well as citizens. Social media have opened new channels through which citizens can express their opinions, and policy-makers are seeking ways to engage with (and at times limit) that conversation. At the same time, regional governments policy-making remains opaque and the impact of citizen opinion on decision-making may be limited. Despite the opportunities for growth in public polling, methodological and political obstacles abound. Sectarian identity is increasingly important for citizens understanding of their roles within society and the region. This is true even in cases where citizens themselves may not explicitly pinpoint sectarian identity as important; sectarian identity is still a strong predictor of political views and goals. Gulf states have often tried to capitalize on sectarian and other identities to advance their political agendas. They have portrayed themselves as the only forces able to maintain peace between otherwise mutually hostile communities. This argument has convinced some constituents to back strong regimes perceived as being able to prevent the sort of instability and conflict seen in Iraq, Syria and Yemen. There is broad scepticism of the US s role in the region, despite calls for greater American intervention to halt the Syrian crisis. Many members of Gulf governments and publics do not believe Washington is committed to the region. The GCC is unlikely to be able to produce a compromise towards a common foreign policy in the foreseeable future. Qatar and the UAE, in particular, have pursued independent policy objectives that directly conflict with one another. Economic and political integration is also unlikely in the near term, though political leaders will give rhetorical support to the idea of a GCC union. Islamic State (IS) poses a very significant threat to the Gulf region, both militarily and in terms of radicalization and recruitment. But participants in the workshop considered the US s focus on IS to be problematic. In particular, there was a feeling that such a narrow focus is likely to be ineffective in tackling IS s threat, and that it could even be counterproductive if other underlying crises for example, the continued atrocities of the Bashar al-assad regime and the displacement of up to 10 million Syrians are not also addressed. Nor is there a coherent, shared GCC strategy to address this risk at the moment. Gulf states face a difficult future balancing their desire for political stability with the need to reform and diversify their oil-dependent economies. For example, reducing costly subsidies of food and utilities has proven very unpopular with the public. Hence, states are likely to put off economic reforms until they feel the political situation is more secure. 2 Chatham House

3 SESSION 1 GCC public opinion on foreign policy Limitations on public opinion research The workshop began by assessing the limited availability of reliable information on public opinion in the Gulf, and the various efforts under way to try to better measure and understand public opinion. Participants discussed the various experiences of collecting poll data in different GCC countries. It was noted that authorities views towards polling data in the six GCC states varied widely. One participant described the challenges of convincing authorities in the UAE to conduct a poll among students about their views on political participation. In the end, a poll was possible only after the pollster invested significant time in creating relationships with the relevant stakeholders. By contrast, Qatar has worked with the University of Michigan to establish the Social and Economic Survey Research Institute (SESRI) at Qatar University. SESRI has been able to undertake random-sample phone polling on a range of topics, including regional political dynamics. Kuwait generally has greater freedom of speech than the other Gulf countries, but a participant involved in public opinion research said that both pollsters and respondents were often nervous about articulating views on potentially controversial subjects a key challenge to producing credible results. Qatari polls indicate growing perceptions of threat In a May 2014 omnibus survey by SESRI, Qatari nationals were asked about their perceptions of the GCC. Some 51 per cent of respondents felt Qatar played an equal role in GCC decision-making compared with other regional countries, while only 6 per cent felt it did not. Meanwhile 19 per cent described the GCC s accomplishments as satisfactory while 35 per cent described them as unsatisfactory. Respondents were asked which of several options would best promote the aims of the GCC: the creation of a single currency, dispute resolution, the formation of a GCC union, the creation of a GCC parliament; only 31 per cent answered that a union would be most efficacious. A second poll asked Qataris to name the country they believed posed the greatest threat to: Qatar, to the GCC, and to the Arab World. In 2010, just 17 per cent named Iran as the greatest threat to Qatar and 50 per cent argued that no country posed a threat. By 2012, however, 50 per cent chose Iran as the biggest threat and only 16 per cent felt no country was a threat. Credibility of results Participants raised several concerns about the ability of polls to produce credible results in the GCC. The first obstacle is that a pollster s questions may be limited either by government restrictions or by the pollster s own fears about tackling controversial topics. A second limitation relates to the respondent s ability to freely answer questions, particularly when the subject is politically or socially sensitive. One participant argued that years of living under restrictive governments have conditioned GCC citizens to answer questions the way they think they should answer them, rather than expressing their personal beliefs. Another commented that the identity of the pollster can also have an impact on the results the implication being that respondents may self-censor their answers according to the pollster s nationality, gender or age, for example. However, one researcher pointed out that all of these limitations are highly context-dependent, and that there are effective ways to deal with them in a poll. The presenter also pointed out that surveys conducted by SESRI in Qatar have been able to broach very sensitive subjects, including domestic 3 Chatham House

4 abuse, regional political tensions, and the country s role within the GCC. He noted the frankness of some replies. For example, when asked for comments at the end of a survey, one respondent answered, Sheikh Hamad needs to forgive my loan, referring directly and personally to the then Qatari emir. Comparison between countries Following this debate, discussion turned to the complicated question of how polling results can be utilized. One suggestion to make the information more powerful was to put responses in regional context. It was noted, for example, that knowing Qatari respondents answers to a given question is less interesting than knowing how those answers compare to an Emirati sample. Participants agreed, however, that the challenges faced by pollsters in the GCC are so far prohibiting any meaningful comparisons from taking place. Because different countries have varying rules governing the process, it is difficult to use the same questions in various contexts. Finding partner institutions was also seen as a challenge for example, a Qatari institution would struggle to find an Emirati counterpart given the current political tensions between the two countries. For the moment, this remains a significant limitation on the ability to poll across the GCC. Use of results A discussion followed regarding whether governments in the Gulf care about public opinion. Because of the concentrated nature of decision-making, some participants argued that public opinion was not of concern. However, others argued that it was a growing concern particularly as domestic stability becomes a priority amid regional turmoil. A presenter noted, for example, a 2011 survey that was conducted in the UAE following the elections of the Federal National Council, the results of which were kept private. Social media A consensus emerged around the fact that public opinion is increasingly important and transparent in the Gulf. The creation of a space where citizens can express their opinions openly has raised awareness within the population but also within governments about the power of public opinion. In Kuwait, for example, 80 per cent of the adult population uses the internet daily roughly 2.7 to 2.8 million people. Of those, another 80 per cent use social media or about 2 million users. That is a huge increase from just a few years ago, when penetration was far lower. The prevalence of social media could have a positive impact on polling, some participants argued, by normalizing the idea of having and expressing a personal opinion about political topics. However, governments have also noticed the rise in social media use and have boosted their surveillance and online activism accordingly. This could deter some social media users, who feel their safe space for expression of opinion is compromised. 4 Chatham House

5 SESSION 2 Identity politics and the Arab Spring Case study: Gulf survey on identity The session opened with the findings of a recent survey conducted by the Gulf Centre for Development Policies, based in Kuwait, which gathered 1,600 online responses from four GCC countries: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Oman. The sample was separated by sectarian affiliation, and the number of respondents was roughly proportional to the size of each of the four countries. Most respondents named being an Arab or Muslim as their most important identity markers, with their sectarian identity as a lower priority. Still, the answers to other questions revealed deep sectarian divisions. Respondents agreed that sectarian relations had worsened since 2000, except in Oman where relations were seen to have improved. Meanwhile, Shias in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia agreed with the statement, I feel that sectarian discrimination has affected my ability to achieve my main goals in life. Saudi and Bahraini Shias were similarly more likely to disagree that the cultural identity of their states reflected their own. Asked who was to blame for sectarian tensions, many respondents signalled that the United States had a strong negative impact. The respondents also agreed that Saudi Arabia and Iran had both contributed to poisoning regional relations, though in this case Sunnis were more likely to agree with Saudi policies and Shias with those of Iran. This finding is somewhat unexpected, indicating the role that regional geopolitical rivalries have played in solidifying negative identities in the region. Ideologies such as Islamism and secularism appeared to have little impact on whether a person of one sect or another supported a given uprising. The author concluded that sectarian affiliation is the strongest predictor of a person s position on domestic and regional political issues, suggesting that the identity has a stronger pull than most people admit. Types of identities The discussion continued by noting some of the different identities at work within the Gulf, as well as where and how they are applied. There was a consensus that identity is very important for both citizens and for leaders in state formation and stability. Such identities can also shape foreign policy, as in the case of Qatar, a country led by a Salafist ruling family but supporting Ikhwan factions regionally. Among the primary identity sources noted were religious sect, political ideology and national identity. Sunni, Shia and Ibadi, as well as sub-sects of each, are among the religious strands represented among Gulf nationals. Politically, a contrast was painted between Islamist and secular identities, particularly in the context of foreign policy construction, with Qatar as example of the former and the UAE as the latter. The Saudi state is meanwhile premised on its compromise with Wahhabi religious scholars, providing another foundation for political identity. Fully secular and liberal schools of thoughts are also present. Finally, national identity is increasingly strong in the GCC. The use of political identity There was a consensus that conflicting identities contribute to crises whether internal or regional. Governments and other political actors also often manipulate these identities in order to promote their agendas. The case of Bahrain provides a clear example of sectarianism being utilized as a 5 Chatham House

6 political tool. One participant described how an initially multi-sectarian uprising was transformed into a Shia-dominated opposition movement through a combination of targeted rhetoric and scaremongering tactics on the part of both the government and some members of the opposition. This episode, beginning in 2011, was just the latest in a long string of incidents that have seen the Shiite majority rise up in protest. Meanwhile, the government has sought very actively to redress the identity imbalance by naturalizing large numbers of Sunni expatriates into the population. While Shiites once represented some 70 per cent of the population, their share has likely now declined to roughly 60 per cent. A second example of identity conflict is visible in the recent dispute between Qatar on one side and Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain on the other. A presenter noted that only recently have small states such as Qatar and the UAE been able to play an active political role within the region. Their assertiveness has made their respective political ideologies all the more irritating for those who disagree. In this particular case, Qatar s support for political Islamists including the Muslim Brotherhood has come into direct conflict with competing ideologies, notably the more liberal foreign policy espoused by the UAE. It was up for debate whether Qatar s position towards the Brotherhood was truly ideologically based or was in fact a pragmatic tactic used to gain regional influence. Once formed, identities can take on a life of their own in the social space. A presenter noted how several authors have courageously tackled the issue of identity post-arab Spring in an attempt to contextualize various groups experiences and also to put forward alternative conceptions of identity. Novels, poems and other forms of cultural production can affect the ways in which people conceive of their national identity, as well as the ways in which they imagine political possibilities; it was noted that before the Arab uprisings Egyptian novels had identified many of the social and political issues that later came to the forefront of the political scene. However, it remains unclear what impact art and other discourse can have on the stickiness of identities themselves, which may be more vulnerable to change from political manipulation and daily life experiences. Impact of identity politics One notable impact of identity politics is its ability to discourage political change, participants argued. Politicians may try to exploit identity divisions as a means of delaying or blocking politically sensitive reforms. It was argued that in Bahrain the recent crisis has actually resulted in the rolling back of reforms previously implemented during the 1990s and 2000s. Examples include the introduction of harsh new anti-terrorism laws, as well as the stripping of nationality from some members of the opposition. A debate then ensued about whether strong governments are needed to manage the differing identities in Gulf society. In general, most participants agreed that abrupt change and political instability tend to favour sectarianism, as citizens look for other social institutions in the absence of a coherent state. Proponents cited the example of Iraq, noting that it was only after the regime of Saddam Hussein fell that sectarian differences erupted. Others argued for a more relaxed, melting pot approach to incorporating citizens into the national conception of identity. Oman could be considered one example of this, home to a majority Ibadi population but also hosting Sunni, Shia and Hindu though one Omani national indicated that there was still some tension below the surface that could bubble up in the event of political instability. Finally, others called for a government that has a strong but gentle hand that can both contain social tensions and allow for freedom of expression by people of varying identities. 6 Chatham House

7 Towards more control Discussions about the strength of government in controlling identities evolved into a conversation about political reform. Participants were broadly pessimistic about the prospect of Gulf governments opening up whether in terms of political representation, freedom of expression or social inclusiveness. There was a general sense that security challenges in the region would push governments towards more, rather than less, repressive tactics. In addition to local governments preferences for stability in other words, the status quo the international community was seen to have little appetite for change. This reflects unease at the way Arab Spring-inspired uprisings turned into civil wars in Libya, Syria and Yemen. Radicalization and extremist religious identities were deemed to present a further challenge in the near future, particularly with the rise of IS in Syria and Iraq. Marginalized groups are among those most vulnerable to radicalization and recruitment, making youth unemployment a particular concern for countries such as Saudi Arabia. Gulf states are likewise extremely worried about the blowback from these conflicts for example, Qatar has increased security at hotels and other high-profile landmarks. The fallout may include not just direct security threats but also damage to domestic politics and society. Returning foreign fighters may carry with them sectarian ideologies and mental scars; citizens frustrated by the inaction of governments to stop the atrocities in Syria could make their critiques more public; or fragments of IS ideology could infect local political groups. Despite generally pessimistic views about political reform in the coming years, there was optimism about the young generation of Gulf citizens, who are generally better educated and more widely travelled than their elders. The region s young people may be less willing to tolerate repression or the inefficiencies of economic models based on rent-seeking. SESSION 3 Regional politics and the role of the US Two contradictions framed the discussion of US policy in the Middle East. First, participants noted that many in the region are distrustful of American influence and meddling in the region but at the same time many also crave intervention to solve crises, for example in Syria. Second, participants noted the apparent hypocrisy of American critiques of human-rights abuses in the region, given Washington s own long-standing support of autocratic regimes, both before the Arab Spring and in the present, as well as human rights abuses both in the US and by US forces abroad. These two observations led into two questions regarding US engagement with the region: Does the US want to withdraw from the Middle East, as reflected in the administration s suggestion of a foreign policy pivot to Asia? And when the US does engage, what are the mechanisms through which it will do so? For example, on the latter, should the primary mechanisms be bilateral or should Washington lean more towards engagement on a regional level such as through the GCC? Specific issues of interest Whether US engagement with the region is reluctant or not, it was cited as having a particularly strong impact on several specific topics: Iran, the Muslim Brotherhood, and IS in the context of the broader Syrian crisis. On Iran, participants reiterated Gulf states continued mistrust of US-led nuclear talks. Some argued that the negotiations essentially give Iran cover to promote and consolidate its regional agenda under 7 Chatham House

8 the guise of international cooperation. There was also broad distrust of what Iran s interests are for the region, and whether they reflect the best interests of the people of the Middle East. One presenter argued that Iran is like all countries a rational actor and would act out of self-interest. One clear example is the protection of Shia interests in the Arab world, perceived by Tehran to be under assault. Some suggested this behaviour is essentially analogous to the role that Saudi Arabia seeks to play as the global protector of Sunni Muslims from the besieged Syrian opposition to the Rohingya minority in Myanmar. The US perspective on the Muslim Brotherhood was noted as of particular importance. A speaker explained that the group s political and social role is extremely context-dependent. For example, the Muslim Brotherhood operates very differently in Kuwait than it does in Egypt, and its methods are different again in the UAE. In Kuwait, for example, the Muslim Brotherhood is highly integrated into the political system. And in several Gulf countries, the organization had a role in shaping educational systems in the years after independence. Hence, a desire to either support or to repress the Muslim Brotherhood would carry broad implications not just for the members of the organization but for the fabric of the nation in question. Participants suggested that US policies towards the group should reflect these local realities. Anti-Islamic State coalition The formation of a US-led international coalition against Islamic State (IS) has recently reshaped the relationship between Washington and the region. All members of the GCC joined the coalition, though in various capacities. The UAE has played the most active role in airstrikes, with Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Qatar also taking part. Kuwait has offered the US use of its military bases; Oman has pledged support but it is unclear what form this will take. Aside from the military operations, however, participants noted the importance of seeking out the roots of IS s radical ideology as well as the factors that make it attractive to recruits. With large numbers of foreign fighters now operating with the group, these questions were said to be of equal importance to both the region and the West. A dozen European countries now have fighters who have joined IS, and Americans have travelled to the battlefield as well. Participants pointed out that one of the root causes of IS s rise is the ongoing Syrian conflict, which shows no sign of being resolved. Without dealing with the extensive war crimes of the Bashar al-assad regime, participants argued, it would prove near impossible to stop IS. In other words, the movement s growth is a reaction to the brutality of the Syrian government; hence recruitment and radicalization cannot end until the regime s abuses do as well. In the regional fight against IS, participants also noted the risk of defining extremist in an overly broad way that would provide governments with an excuse to target dissidents and moderate Islamists. Participants observed very different views of what groups are and are not radical. For example, while Saudi Arabia and the UAE have listed Jebhat al-nusra as a terrorist organization; Qatar has not. Israel Palestine Finally, the discussion turned to the issue of the Israeli Palestinian conflict, arguing that the region will generally remain unstable and prone to radicalization until this long-standing conflict 8 Chatham House

9 is resolved. One participant asked whether Arab states could increase the visibility of this issue in their relationship with the US essentially forcing Washington to make a peace settlement a more important priority. In this vein, there was a consensus that in the coming months the US will seek above all else stability in the Middle East. Fundamental American interests are still to preserve the safe passage of oil through the region, uphold Israel s security and limit blowback from regional conflicts. This may favour a more conservative foreign policy approach towards other conflicts in the region, for example in Bahrain or even Yemen, in which the US is likely to defer to the relatively stable GCC monarchs. SESSION 4 Inter-GCC relations The fundamental dilemma of inter-gulf relations reflects the GCC countries varied foreign policy priorities and goals. Despite commitments to boost cooperation within the GCC, each country has largely maintained its own independent positions on major issues. In the aftermath of the Arab uprisings, the differences between these priorities have become particularly apparent: for example, in the ongoing diplomatic standoff that saw Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain withdraw their ambassadors from Doha last March. Qatar s role The session opened with a discussion of Qatar s foreign policy. In the early years of his reign, former emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani sought to differentiate his country s foreign policy from that of Saudi Arabia. During the first phase of this undertaking, roughly between 1995 and 2010, Qatar built its position on the principles of impartiality, mediation and soft power. The country saw its niche in acting as a neutral party within the region and the broader international sphere. It adopted a talk to everyone approach, and built good relations with everyone from Israel to Hezbollah. Another important factor during this period was the decision to host the US Al Odeid air base, the largest in the region. And finally, the opening of the Al Jazeera satellite network provided Qatar with a means to brand itself in the region. The speaker argued that Qatar s policy in 2011 took a significant shift, from soft power to hard power. In the years that followed, Qatar was actively involved in military operations including the joint NATO mission in Libya in Doha also provided support to the Syrian opposition to President Bashar al- Assad. This more active role was sharply criticized by Qatar s neighbours, which eventually withdrew their ambassadors from Doha in protest. However, the speaker argued that the current crisis was close to coming to a close and that diplomats would be restored to their posts soon, particularly after a recent move by Qatar to expel a handful of high-profile Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood leaders. Saudi Arabia s role Qatar s fiercest critic has been Saudi Arabia, which a second speaker indicated has a different philosophy toward political change in the region. Saudi Arabia is not so much opposed to a specific kind of change as it is to the speed with which change takes place; the kingdom would prefer slow and gradual reform that maintains regional stability. Riyadh was particularly alarmed in the Arab Spring by the United States quick abandoning of long-standing ally Hosni Mubarak. The speaker argued that this preference for gradualism applies even where Saudi Arabia has taken an active anti-regime role. 9 Chatham House

10 In Libya, Saudi Arabia did support a NATO-led coalition whose airstrikes helped to unseat Muammar Qaddafi, but did not participate directly. In Syria, it was suggested that Riyadh might have preferred that Assad stay in power but miscalculated, believing that putting strong pressure on the regime would force reforms that would be acceptable to the opposition. Regarding relations with Qatar, Saudi Arabia was deemed to be most frustrated by Doha s active foreign policy in and immediately around the GCC, for example in Bahrain, the UAE and Yemen. A GCC foreign policy? There is no clear consensus on what a GCC-wide foreign policy would look like, especially when it comes to dealing with Iran, political Islam and popular protest around the region. A speaker argued that the focus on political Islam was misplaced. The speaker suggested that states such as the UAE and Saudi Arabia have a strong aversion to any popular movement, particularly those aiming to topple a government. In 2011, these countries feared that protests would move to the Gulf. Hence, Abu Dhabi and Riyadh may have had the same counter-revolutionary reaction towards the uprisings even if Islamist parties had not won power in the first elections in Tunisia and Egypt. It was argued however, that prioritizing stability and the maintenance of the status quo may ultimately prove out of step with popular sentiment and therefore could prove unsustainable in the long term. Participants noted that while the outcomes of the Arab Spring uprisings varied widely, one common element was that they opened up discussions about freedoms and human rights that will now prove very hard to silence, particularly among the younger generation. The GCC therefore may need to open some windows and opportunities for reform in the coming years. Otherwise, some noted, it could face more violent attempts at change, as witnessed in Syria and Libya. GCC integration Amid regional turmoil, participants argued that the creation of a GCC union has become more pressing for Gulf governments. However, at the moment governments are not focused on undertaking the technocratic changes that would be necessary for such a union for example, greater economic and defence cooperation. Rather, they are focused on the rhetorical and symbolic priority of demonstrating a unified stance toward regional stability. Even at a national level, the discussion pointed out that governments are putting politics before economic well-being in an attempt to maintain stability. One example comes from Bahrain, which has been working to arrange the purchase of natural gas from Russia. This will be more costly but less politically complicated than purchasing fuel from nearby Qatar. It was noted that if and when inter-gcc technical cooperation does improve, the Gulf will face one very large existential question: four of its members have oil and hence are not in need of a Gulf economic union in the immediate term; but Oman and Bahrain do need economic assistance and stronger trade. These conflicting goals will require a measure of compromise from all sides. But any compromise will also be complicated by the GCC s lack of mediation capability and the seeming inability of governments to work out their differences. 10 Chatham House

11 SESSION 5 Scenarios for the future The stakes for the GCC countries are high in the coming years. A growing youth population and the possibility of lower long-term oil prices could force hard economic changes. Meanwhile, political unrest elsewhere in the region and a retreating US presence could destabilize the Gulf in unpredictable ways. However, participants also pointed out that many had forecast wrongly the collapse of the Gulf monarchies before, and there was no immediate sign that instability would take hold in a serious or violent way. Reasons for optimism The single largest reason that participants cited for optimism is the region s large youth population. The upcoming generation is generally better educated, more connected through technology, and more exposed and open to ideas of political change. If this generation is able to seize the opportunity and to take on leadership positions within the political or economic sphere, we could see broader reforms on a range of issues. Innovations and movements toward greater adoption of technology were also mentioned as possible positive developments. Several Gulf countries, and particularly the UAE, are working on developing solar and other renewable energy sources while slowly moving their fuel prices toward market levels. The adaptation of more technological solutions could streamline services and also reduce the region s dependency on migrant workers. Meanwhile, the technology sector has the potential to provide ample job opportunities for youth outside the government sector, where Gulf citizens are overwhelmingly employed if education systems can produce skilled IT graduates. Reasons for pessimism Despite some positive signs, the general mood of conversation was pessimistic about the future of the Gulf and particularly about the possibility of political and economic reform. Ongoing political turmoil was deemed likely to push back even the most limited reforms and openings. Meanwhile, economies are unlikely to take significant steps toward reducing oil dependency, while the priority remains keeping citizens happy by upholding social welfare systems. It was predicted that the economic outlook could be particularly bleak if Gulf states do not take advantage of the breathing room oil revenue has afforded them to reform. Countries have repeatedly pushed back unpopular reforms that would reduce dependency on crude oil revenues for example by lowering subsidies in Kuwait, or lowering salaries and benefits in the public sector so as to encourage people to work for private firms. Participants also expected sectarianism and other community tensions to continue to rise, exacerbated by exclusionary government policies. Governments are likely to play communities off one another in order to avoid introspection. Regional tensions between the Gulf and Iran are an additional component of these sectarian tensions. Gulf countries remain broadly sceptical of the ongoing international negotiations over Tehran s nuclear program and instead see Iran as seeking to expand its role in the Arab world most recently, for example, through the rapid advance of the Houthi movement in Yemen. The rise of IS militants in Iraq and Syria was also expected to be a long-term challenge, both in terms of the military threat they pose but also in terms of radicalization within the Gulf. This and other fallout from the Arab Spring could hit the GCC in unexpected ways. 11 Chatham House

12 Finally, the discussion turned to the often-ignored environmental challenges that the Gulf will face in the coming decades. Water is being drained from aquifers; Bahrain and other coastal states could lose territory from climate change and erosion; coral reefs could disappear with the building of further inter-gulf causeways; and overfishing could leave the seas depleted. There are few efforts so far to address these challenges. Other changes to watch A large question mark over the debate remained the status of the Israeli Palestinian conflict. Several discussants asked how Gulf states could be encouraged to take a more active role in the mediation of the crisis a role that could put the Arab Peace Plan back into the spotlight. Despite the plethora of other ongoing crises, the stand-off with Israel remains one of the most important grievances driving regional tensions as well as extremism. Gulf states may also need to examine what role they want migrant workers to play in the medium term. Technology may provide for some low-skilled jobs to be replaced with automation; however, the ease and low cost with which labour is imported could deter technological innovation. As the Indian subcontinent develops, and wages rise in the traditional South Asian source countries for migrant workers, Gulf companies seeking the lowest possible labour costs may shift to new source countries, for instance in East and West Africa. A final uncertainty is the role of the United States in the region. After showing signs of reluctance to be involved in the Middle East for the first six years of his presidency, Barack Obama is now spearheading a coalition to combat IS, with the participation of all the Gulf states. However, there is still widespread frustration with Washington s policy toward the region. Gulf states may expect to take on more responsibility for their own security in the coming decades. The upcoming generation of Gulf citizens will likely expect to have a stronger voice in all of these matters, whether through social media or direct engagement with policy-makers. Gulf governments will need to find a way to include those voices and broader public opinion in a constructive way, or they may face a backlash or rising disenfranchisement. These lessons apply not only to the GCC countries but also to their Western allies, particularly the US, whose regional policy faces ever-greater scrutiny by a well-informed and -connected Arab public. Listening to a plurality of voices from regional officials to civil society to youth may improve US standing in the region and increase stability in the longer term. 12 Chatham House

13 About the MENA Programme at Chatham House The Middle East and North Africa Programme undertakes high-profile research and projects on political, economic and security issues affecting the Middle East and North Africa. Future Trends in the GCC Project This paper forms part of the MENA Programme s ongoing project on Future Trends in the GCC. The project aims to research, analyse and anticipate some future scenarios for the political and economic development of the GCC states. The research has four main strands: Citizenship and political development: Looks at citizens shifting attitudes and political aspirations particularly those of the under-30s who make up the majority of the GCC s population, exploring the dynamics of reform. Citizenship and the economy: Explores changing economic realities within the GCC, analyzing the potential of GCC countries to reform and diversify their economies and the links between citizens political and economic expectations. Islamism and post-islamism in the Gulf: Considers the diverse aspirations of Islamically inspired movements and their respective trajectories amid regional changes. External threats and internal community relations: Focuses on the intersections between shifting regional dynamics, transactional movements and community relations within GCC countries. The project seeks to deepen understanding of these various themes while analyzing the prospects for GCC countries to adapt to ongoing changes in the region and develop their systems accordingly. These themes are explored in the context of relevant changes in the wider Middle East region. Engaging with youngergeneration scholars, researchers and analysts from the GCC countries is a core element of the project Chatham House

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