Economic Origins of Authoritarian Values. Evidence from Local Trade Shocks in the United Kingdom

Transcription

1 The : Evidence from Local Trade Shocks in the United Kingdom Cameron Ballard-Rosa Mashail Malik Stephanie Rickard Kenneth Scheve University of Texas, Austin International Political Economy Society 2017

2 Motivation: Values and Political Behavior Brexit, Trump s election, and growing support for populist political parties and leaders, have focused renewed attention on the determinants of public support for populists and the policies they support.

3 Motivation: Values and Political Behavior Brexit, Trump s election, and growing support for populist political parties and leaders, have focused renewed attention on the determinants of public support for populists and the policies they support. Research about these questions often focuses on identifying the relevant economic interests and/or social values that influence these behaviors and opinions.

4 Motivation: Values and Political Behavior Brexit, Trump s election, and growing support for populist political parties and leaders, have focused renewed attention on the determinants of public support for populists and the policies they support. Research about these questions often focuses on identifying the relevant economic interests and/or social values that influence these behaviors and opinions. Careful accounts emphasizing the importance of values recognize that the questions of where these values come from and whether they themselves have an economic origin is left unanswered.

5 Motivation: Values and Political Behavior Brexit, Trump s election, and growing support for populist political parties and leaders, have focused renewed attention on the determinants of public support for populists and the policies they support. Research about these questions often focuses on identifying the relevant economic interests and/or social values that influence these behaviors and opinions. Careful accounts emphasizing the importance of values recognize that the questions of where these values come from and whether they themselves have an economic origin is left unanswered. Goal of this research is to provide an account of authoritarian values that recognizes that authoritarianism is in part shaped by economic stress and present evidence that economic shocks cause authoritarian values.

6 Research Question Does economic threat cause authoritarianism?

7 What is Authoritarianism? Authoritarianism is an individual preference for conventionalism and submission and belief that these value outcomes should be achieved by force (Altemeyer 1981).

8 What is Authoritarianism? Authoritarianism is an individual preference for conventionalism and submission and belief that these value outcomes should be achieved by force (Altemeyer 1981). Three key components: Conventionalism, Submission, Aggression

9 Motivation: Authoritarian Values and Brexit Votes Figure: Authoritarianism and Brexit Vote.

10 Theoretical Framework Early work (e.g. The Authoritarian Personality, Adorno et al. 1950) tended to view authoritarianism as a fixed personality trait that resulted from childhood socialization, specifically repression of hostility toward parental authority.

11 Theoretical Framework Early work (e.g. The Authoritarian Personality, Adorno et al. 1950) tended to view authoritarianism as a fixed personality trait that resulted from childhood socialization, specifically repression of hostility toward parental authority. Most work retained view that authoritarianism is a fixed trait, stable disposition, or persistent attitude formed through early socialization processes and focused on what it explained such as hostility toward outgroups, support for public policies (e.g. immigration, trade, Brexit), voting for populist parties, etc.

12 Theoretical Framework Early work (e.g. The Authoritarian Personality, Adorno et al. 1950) tended to view authoritarianism as a fixed personality trait that resulted from childhood socialization, specifically repression of hostility toward parental authority. Most work retained view that authoritarianism is a fixed trait, stable disposition, or persistent attitude formed through early socialization processes and focused on what it explained such as hostility toward outgroups, support for public policies (e.g. immigration, trade, Brexit), voting for populist parties, etc. Some more recent work has continued to treat authoritarianism as a fixed disposition but argued that it is more likely to be activated and influential in behavior in the presence of economic or social threats (e.g. Feldman 2003, Stenner 2005, Hetherington and Suhay 2011).

13 Theoretical Framework We argue that contemporaneous economic and social threats increase the adoption of authoritarian values authoritarianism is not a fixed disposition (Fromm 1941, Rokeach 1960).

14 Theoretical Framework We argue that contemporaneous economic and social threats increase the adoption of authoritarian values authoritarianism is not a fixed disposition (Fromm 1941, Rokeach 1960). Three potential mechanisms for this effect mirroring the three components of authoritarianism.

15 Theoretical Framework We argue that contemporaneous economic and social threats increase the adoption of authoritarian values authoritarianism is not a fixed disposition (Fromm 1941, Rokeach 1960). Three potential mechanisms for this effect mirroring the three components of authoritarianism. Conventionalism: negative shock return to tradition when times were better

16 Theoretical Framework We argue that contemporaneous economic and social threats increase the adoption of authoritarian values authoritarianism is not a fixed disposition (Fromm 1941, Rokeach 1960). Three potential mechanisms for this effect mirroring the three components of authoritarianism. Conventionalism: negative shock return to tradition when times were better Submission: negative shock look to leader to fix problem

17 Theoretical Framework We argue that contemporaneous economic and social threats increase the adoption of authoritarian values authoritarianism is not a fixed disposition (Fromm 1941, Rokeach 1960). Three potential mechanisms for this effect mirroring the three components of authoritarianism. Conventionalism: negative shock return to tradition when times were better Submission: negative shock look to leader to fix problem Aggression: negative shock expectations blocked generates aggression frustration-aggression mechanism (Dollard et al. 1939)

18 Theoretical Framework We argue that contemporaneous economic and social threats increase the adoption of authoritarian values authoritarianism is not a fixed disposition (Fromm 1941, Rokeach 1960). Three potential mechanisms for this effect mirroring the three components of authoritarianism. Conventionalism: negative shock return to tradition when times were better Submission: negative shock look to leader to fix problem Aggression: negative shock expectations blocked generates aggression frustration-aggression mechanism (Dollard et al. 1939) Some empirical prior work but little in the way of credible causal evidence that real world economic threats cause increased authoritarianism.

19 How Do We Measure Authoritarianism? Altemeyer (1981) developed influential account of right-wing authoritarianism emphasizing three components of Conventionalism, Submission, and Aggression

20 How Do We Measure Authoritarianism? Altemeyer (1981) developed influential account of right-wing authoritarianism emphasizing three components of Conventionalism, Submission, and Aggression However, Altemeyer s RWA scale was still constructed as unidimensional and critiqued for including measures of policy preferences that authoritarianism was thought to explain.

21 How Do We Measure Authoritarianism? Altemeyer (1981) developed influential account of right-wing authoritarianism emphasizing three components of Conventionalism, Submission, and Aggression However, Altemeyer s RWA scale was still constructed as unidimensional and critiqued for including measures of policy preferences that authoritarianism was thought to explain. Recent psychometric work on measures of authoritarianism suggest that approaches that capture each of three subdimensions separately have superior internal consistency and discriminant validity (Duckitt et al. 2010, Duckitt & Bizumic 2013, Dunwoody & Funke 2016)

22 How Do We Measure Authoritarianism? Five-point scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree averaged across six questions per dimension (Dunwoody & Funke 2016).

23 How Do We Measure Authoritarianism? Five-point scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree averaged across six questions per dimension (Dunwoody & Funke 2016). Authoritarian aggression: Strong force is necessary against threatening groups.

24 How Do We Measure Authoritarianism? Five-point scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree averaged across six questions per dimension (Dunwoody & Funke 2016). Authoritarian aggression: Strong force is necessary against threatening groups. Authoritarian submission: Our leaders know what is best for us.

25 How Do We Measure Authoritarianism? Five-point scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree averaged across six questions per dimension (Dunwoody & Funke 2016). Authoritarian aggression: Strong force is necessary against threatening groups. Authoritarian submission: Our leaders know what is best for us. Conventionalism: Traditions are the foundation of a healthy society and should be respected.

26 How Do We Measure Authoritarianism? Five-point scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree averaged across six questions per dimension (Dunwoody & Funke 2016). Authoritarian aggression: Strong force is necessary against threatening groups. Authoritarian submission: Our leaders know what is best for us. Conventionalism: Traditions are the foundation of a healthy society and should be respected. For baseline results, we report average across three dimensions as ASC.

27 Research Design YouGov survey, July 2017, N=1,913

28 Research Design YouGov survey, July 2017, N=1,913 Representative of UK adult population (only study Great Britain)

29 Research Design YouGov survey, July 2017, N=1,913 Representative of UK adult population (only study Great Britain) Asked 18 question battery measuring Authoritarian Aggression, Submission, and Conventionalism (ASC)

30 Research Design YouGov survey, July 2017, N=1,913 Representative of UK adult population (only study Great Britain) Asked 18 question battery measuring Authoritarian Aggression, Submission, and Conventionalism (ASC) Asked individuals to identify their Outward Postcode. There are 2,983 live postcode districts identified by the outward postcode. This geographical location is then used to match each individual to the economic characteristics of their residence.

31 Research Design YouGov survey, July 2017, N=1,913 Representative of UK adult population (only study Great Britain) Asked 18 question battery measuring Authoritarian Aggression, Submission, and Conventionalism (ASC) Asked individuals to identify their Outward Postcode. There are 2,983 live postcode districts identified by the outward postcode. This geographical location is then used to match each individual to the economic characteristics of their residence. Recorded a wide array of demographic and political characteristics of each respondent.

32 Research Design Trade shocks used as an empirical strategy to test for the effect of economic shocks generally on authoritarian values.

33 Research Design Trade shocks used as an empirical strategy to test for the effect of economic shocks generally on authoritarian values. Adopt Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013) empirical strategy for Great Britain.

34 Research Design Trade shocks used as an empirical strategy to test for the effect of economic shocks generally on authoritarian values. Adopt Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013) empirical strategy for Great Britain. Great Britain local labor markets defined by Travel to Work Areas based on actual commuting patterns. We match each respondent to 1991 TTWAs (297).

35 Research Design Trade shocks used as an empirical strategy to test for the effect of economic shocks generally on authoritarian values. Adopt Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013) empirical strategy for Great Britain. Great Britain local labor markets defined by Travel to Work Areas based on actual commuting patterns. We match each respondent to 1991 TTWAs (297). We then construct a measure of local labor market (TTWA) exposure to Chinese import competition.

36 Research Design Trade shock measure defined: IPW uit = j L ijt L ujt M ucjt L it u refers to United Kingdom, c refers to China, i indexes TTWA regions, t indexes year, j indexes 4-digit UK 1992 SIC industries

37 Research Design Trade shock measure defined: IPW uit = j L ijt L ujt M ucjt L it u refers to United Kingdom, c refers to China, i indexes TTWA regions, t indexes year, j indexes 4-digit UK 1992 SIC industries IPW uit is equal to change in Chinese import exposure per worker, weighted by each region s share of national employment by sector

38 Research Design Trade shock measure defined: IPW uit = j L ijt L ujt M ucjt L it u refers to United Kingdom, c refers to China, i indexes TTWA regions, t indexes year, j indexes 4-digit UK 1992 SIC industries IPW uit is equal to change in Chinese import exposure per worker, weighted by each region s share of national employment by sector Take baseline time period to match Autor et al. (2013) to calculate change in import exposure from

39 IPWuit 5th Quintile 4th Quintile 3rd Quintile 2nd Quintile 1st Quintile Sutherland Aberdeen Glasgow Edinburgh Newcastle Leeds Manchester Wrexham Birmingham Cardiff London Canterbury Figure: Change in Chinese Import Penetration

40 Research Design Trade shock instrumental variable defined: IPW ait = j L ijt L ujt M acjt L it a refers to United States (America), c refers to China, i indexes TTWA regions, t indexes year, j indexes 4-digit UK 1992 SIC industries IPW ait is equal to change in Chinese imports to the United States per worker, weighted by each region s share of national employment by sector

41 Econometric Model ASC r = β 0 + β 1 IPW i + X r ψ + Z k φ + ɛ i r indexes individuals, i indexes TTWA regions, k indexes Local Area District regions

42 Econometric Model ASC r = β 0 + β 1 IPW i + X r ψ + Z k φ + ɛ i r indexes individuals, i indexes TTWA regions, k indexes Local Area District regions Standard errors clustered on TTWA regions

43 Econometric Model ASC r = β 0 + β 1 IPW i + X r ψ + Z k φ + ɛ i r indexes individuals, i indexes TTWA regions, k indexes Local Area District regions Standard errors clustered on TTWA regions Estimate by ordinary least squares and instrumental variable estimation ( IPW ait used as IV)

44 OLS Results ( ) (1) (2) (3) VARIABLES ASC ASC ASC ln IPW (91-07) 0.082*** 0.068*** 0.067*** (0.025) (0.021) (0.023) Female (0.029) (0.028) Age 0.005*** 0.005*** (0.001) (0.001) Higher Cert *** *** (0.039) (0.039) University *** *** (0.032) (0.031) Married 0.104*** 0.103*** (0.023) (0.024) % non-uk born (0.001) % non-uk born (0.002) Observations 1,856 1,793 1,793 R-squared TTWAs *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

45 IV Results ( ) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) VARIABLES ASC ASC ASC ASC ASC ASC ln IPW (US, 91-07) 0.993*** 0.988*** 0.981*** (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) ln IPW (91-07) 0.081*** 0.069*** 0.067*** (0.026) (0.023) (0.024) Female (0.010) (0.029) (0.010) (0.028) Age *** *** (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) Higher Cert *** *** (0.015) (0.039) (0.015) (0.039) University *** *** (0.012) (0.032) (0.012) (0.031) Married *** *** (0.010) (0.023) (0.010) (0.024) % non-uk born *** (0.001) (0.001) % non-uk born (0.001) (0.002) Observations 1,856 1,856 1,793 1,793 1,793 1,793 R-squared Weak ID F stat *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

46 Robustness Different time periods ( , )

47 Robustness Different time periods ( , ) Different functional form for IPW (dichotomous, untransformed)

48 Robustness Different time periods ( , ) Different functional form for IPW (dichotomous, untransformed) Including measure of personal income

49 Robustness Different time periods ( , ) Different functional form for IPW (dichotomous, untransformed) Including measure of personal income Including measure of rightwing ideology

50 Robustness Different time periods ( , ) Different functional form for IPW (dichotomous, untransformed) Including measure of personal income Including measure of rightwing ideology Including measure of class identification

51 Robustness Different time periods ( , ) Different functional form for IPW (dichotomous, untransformed) Including measure of personal income Including measure of rightwing ideology Including measure of class identification Including local inequality measure (80-20 earnings ratio at Local Area District level)

52 Results by Subdimension ( ) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) VARIABLES Aggr. OLS Aggr. IV Subm. OLS Subm. IV Conv. OLS Conv. IV ln IPW (91-07) 0.104*** 0.106*** * (0.030) (0.031) (0.027) (0.030) (0.034) (0.035) Female ** 0.070** (0.041) (0.041) (0.035) (0.035) (0.034) (0.034) Age 0.006*** 0.006*** *** 0.011*** (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) Higher Cert *** *** * * (0.055) (0.055) (0.057) (0.057) (0.052) (0.051) University *** *** ** ** *** *** (0.049) (0.048) (0.047) (0.047) (0.033) (0.033) Married 0.113*** 0.113*** 0.106*** 0.106*** 0.089** 0.089** (0.035) (0.035) (0.031) (0.031) (0.039) (0.039) % non-uk born ** ** (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) % non-uk born 0.005** 0.005** (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) Observations 1,793 1,793 1,793 1,793 1,793 1,793 R-squared TTWAs *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

53 Interpretation: Downturn in local labor markets Did import shocks actually affect local labor markets?

54 Interpretation: Downturn in local labor markets Did import shocks actually affect local labor markets? Estimate effect of Chinese import shock on manufacturing employment and median wages

55 Interpretation: Downturn in local labor markets Did import shocks actually affect local labor markets? Estimate effect of Chinese import shock on manufacturing employment and median wages Unit of analysis is Local Area District (LAD)

56 Results on Employment and Wages (1) (2) (3) (4) VARIABLES %Manuf %Manuf Med. wage 07 Med. wage 07 ln IPW (91-07) *** *** *** *** (0.275) (0.289) (5.892) (6.174) Estimation OLS IV OLS IV Observations R-squared *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

57 Threats to Interpretation: Sorting Value change versus sorting?

58 Threats to Interpretation: Sorting Value change versus sorting? Ex ante sorting

59 Threats to Interpretation: Sorting Value change versus sorting? Ex ante sorting Ex post sorting

60 Threats to Interpretation: Sorting Value change versus sorting? Ex ante sorting Ex post sorting Our approaches:

61 Threats to Interpretation: Sorting Value change versus sorting? Ex ante sorting Ex post sorting Our approaches: Ex ante: control for initial regional manufacturing distribution.

62 Threats to Interpretation: Sorting Value change versus sorting? Ex ante sorting Ex post sorting Our approaches: Ex ante: control for initial regional manufacturing distribution. Ex post: estimate whether respondent mobility conditions the effect of import shock (by respondent)

63 Threats to Interpretation: Sorting Value change versus sorting? Ex ante sorting Ex post sorting Our approaches: Ex ante: control for initial regional manufacturing distribution. Ex post: estimate whether respondent mobility conditions the effect of import shock (by respondent) Ex post: estimate effect of Chinese import shock on population and outward migration (by LAD)

64 Threats to Interpretation: Sorting Value change versus sorting? Ex ante sorting Ex post sorting Our approaches: Ex ante: control for initial regional manufacturing distribution. Ex post: estimate whether respondent mobility conditions the effect of import shock (by respondent) Ex post: estimate effect of Chinese import shock on population and outward migration (by LAD) TEASER: identify mini-panel based on BSA data.

65 Ex ante sorting: Initial manufacturing employment (1) (2) (3) VARIABLES ASC ASC ASC ln IPW (91-07) 0.056** 0.059** 0.056** (0.026) (0.025) (0.026) Manuf. employees (log, 1991) (0.020) Low manuf. (%, 1991) (0.034) High manuf. (%, 1991) (0.030) % Manuf. emp. ( ) (0.003) Demographic controls Y Y Y Regional controls Y Y Y Observations 1,793 1,793 1,791 R-squared TTWAs *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

66 Ex post sorting: Individual Mobility (1) (2) VARIABLES ASC ASC ln IPW (91-07) 0.061** 0.055* (0.024) (0.031) Changed postcode (0.470) Changed PC X IPW (0.068) Moved last 20 yrs (0.312) Moved X IPW (0.044) Demographic controls Y Y Regional controls Y Y Observations 1,793 1,793 R-squared TTWAs *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

67 Ex post sorting: Regional Population (1) (2) (3) (4) VARIABLES Log pop. Log pop. Out migrants (#) Out migrants (% pop.) ln IPW (91-07) ** *** (0.055) (0.006) ( ) (0.001) Observations R-squared *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

68 Conclusions Economic threat can lead individuals to adopt more authoritarian values.

69 Conclusions Economic threat can lead individuals to adopt more authoritarian values. Value versus economic origins of populism, economic policy preferences, etc. may not be well-posed question.

70 Conclusions Economic threat can lead individuals to adopt more authoritarian values. Value versus economic origins of populism, economic policy preferences, etc. may not be well-posed question. While values certainly part of the story, the responsiveness of values to contemporaneous economic, social, and security threats needs to be taken into account in explaining political behavior and assessing policy responses.

71 Appendix

72 Distribution of ASC Figure: Authoritarian values.

73 Distribution of ln IPW Figure: (Log) IPW.

74 Brexit Vote Table: Ballard-Rosa, OLSMalik, Results, Rickard & Scheve Authoritarianism Economic Origins and of Authoritarian Brexit vote Values (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) VARIABLES Leave Leave Leave Leave Leave Leave Leave Leave ASC 0.296*** 0.219*** (0.023) (0.024) Aggression 0.215*** 0.167*** (0.013) (0.014) Submission 0.040* (0.020) (0.020) Conventional *** 0.145*** (0.012) (0.014) Female (0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) Age 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.003*** (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) Higher Cert *** *** *** *** (0.045) (0.045) (0.046) (0.046) University *** *** *** *** (0.036) (0.035) (0.035) (0.034) Married (0.028) (0.028) (0.030) (0.027) % non-uk ** * (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) % non-uk 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.007*** 0.006*** (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) Observations 1,579 1,526 1,579 1,526 1,579 1,526 1,579 1,526 R-squared TTWAs Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

75 Brexit Vote & Partisanship (1) (2) (3) (4) VARIABLES Vote Leave Vote Leave Vote Leave Vote Leave ASC 0.080*** (0.022) Aggression 0.088*** (0.014) Submission *** (0.021) Conventionalism 0.069*** (0.013) Female 0.042* 0.046* 0.053** 0.041* (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) (0.023) Age 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002* (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) Higher Cert *** *** *** *** (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.043) University *** *** *** *** (0.034) (0.034) (0.033) (0.033) Married (0.027) (0.028) (0.028) (0.026) % non-uk born * ** * (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) % non-uk born 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.005*** (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) Right Ideology 0.047*** 0.042*** 0.059*** 0.047*** (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) Voted Conservative (0.042) (0.041) (0.042) (0.041) Voted Labour *** *** *** *** (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046) Voted Lib. Dem *** *** *** *** (0.060) (0.061) (0.061) (0.060)

76 Additional covariates (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) VARIABLES ASC IV ASC IV ASC IV ASC IV ASC IV ln IPW (91-07) 0.078*** 0.077*** 0.071*** 0.075*** 0.068*** (0.029) (0.029) (0.024) (0.027) (0.026) Female 0.061* ** *** (0.036) (0.034) (0.026) (0.033) (0.027) Age 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.003*** 0.006*** 0.003*** (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) Higher Cert *** ** ** *** *** (0.048) (0.049) (0.043) (0.049) (0.043) University *** *** *** *** *** (0.037) (0.038) (0.028) (0.037) (0.029) Married 0.111*** 0.128*** 0.082*** 0.117*** 0.077** (0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.029) (0.030) % non-uk born (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) % non-uk born (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) Lower income (0.054) (0.042) Upper income (0.042) (0.036) Inequality 0.047* (0.028) (0.026) Right Ideology 0.130*** 0.127*** (0.008) (0.008) Middle Class 0.157** (0.067) (0.057) Working Class (0.064) (0.054) Observations 1,783 1,734 1,783 1,783 1,734 R-squared Ballard-Rosa, Malik, Rickard 0.137& Scheve Economic 0.321Origins of Authoritarian Values

77 Alternate functional form for IPW (1) (2) (3) (4) VARIABLES ASC OLS ASC IV ASC OLS ASC IV High IPW (91-07) 0.085*** 0.115*** (0.032) (0.044) IPW (91-07) 0.035** 0.032** (0.015) (0.014) Female (0.034) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034) Age 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) Higher Cert *** *** *** *** (0.048) (0.048) (0.049) (0.048) University *** *** *** *** (0.037) (0.037) (0.038) (0.037) Married 0.125*** 0.125*** 0.124*** 0.124*** (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) % non-uk born (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) % non-uk born (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) Observations 1,783 1,783 1,783 1,783 R-squared TTWAs Robust standard errors clustered by TTWA in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Table: Robustness: Alternate codings of IPW

78 Alternate time periods (1) (2) (3) (4) VARIABLES ASC OLS ASC IV ASC OLS ASC IV ln IPW ( ) 0.077*** 0.078*** (0.027) (0.028) ln IPW ( ) 0.060** 0.153*** (0.025) (0.051) Female (0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.035) Age 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) Higher Cert *** *** *** *** (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) University *** *** *** *** (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.039) Married 0.123*** 0.123*** 0.120*** 0.120*** (0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) % non-uk born (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) % non-uk born (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) Observations 1,783 1,783 1,778 1,763 R-squared TTWAs Robust standard errors clustered by TTWA in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Table: Robustness: Alternate time periods for IPW

79 Motivation: Values and Economic Policy Preferences Example Research Question What does the U.K. want for a post-brexit economic future? And why?

80 Motivation: Values and Economic Policy Preferences Research Design Implemented conjoint survey experiment to measure policy preferences across different dimensions of globalization

81 Motivation: Values and Economic Policy Preferences Research Design Implemented conjoint survey experiment to measure policy preferences across different dimensions of globalization Each respondent saw 6 pairs of possible international economic integration plans, with each plan consisting of alternative policies about trade, immigration, foreign investment, and how regulatory policies are set.

82 Motivation: Values and Economic Policy Preferences Research Design Implemented conjoint survey experiment to measure policy preferences across different dimensions of globalization Each respondent saw 6 pairs of possible international economic integration plans, with each plan consisting of alternative policies about trade, immigration, foreign investment, and how regulatory policies are set. Respondents asked Which of these integration plans would you rather see enacted in the United Kingdom?"

83 Motivation: Values and Economic Policy Preferences Research Design Implemented conjoint survey experiment to measure policy preferences across different dimensions of globalization Each respondent saw 6 pairs of possible international economic integration plans, with each plan consisting of alternative policies about trade, immigration, foreign investment, and how regulatory policies are set. Respondents asked Which of these integration plans would you rather see enacted in the United Kingdom?" YouGov survey, December 2016, N=1,000

84 Motivation: Values and Economic Policy Preferences Research Design Implemented conjoint survey experiment to measure policy preferences across different dimensions of globalization Each respondent saw 6 pairs of possible international economic integration plans, with each plan consisting of alternative policies about trade, immigration, foreign investment, and how regulatory policies are set. Respondents asked Which of these integration plans would you rather see enacted in the United Kingdom?" YouGov survey, December 2016, N=1,000 Representative of UK adult population

85 Motivation: Values and Economic Policy Preferences Attribute-Levels ISSUE AREA Trade Immigration Investment Services Regulation POSSIBLE VALUES Unilaterally remove all trade barriers, No trade barriers with European countries (but limit trade with non-eu countries), Limit trade with all countries Free mobility for all immigrants, Free mobility for European immigrants (but limits on non-eu immigrants), Only permit immigrants based on their education/skills, Only permit immigrants based on their region of origin with preferences for immigrants from former British colonies, Block all new immigration Free access to the UK economy for all international investment, Free access to the UK economy for European investment (but limits on non-eu investment), Disallow all foreign investment to the UK economy Free access to the service sector of the UK economy for all international providers, Free access to the service sector of the UK economy for European providers (but limits on non-eu services), Limit access to the service sector of the UK economy for all international providers (except for financial services), Limit access to the service sector of the UK economy for all international providers, Disallow access to the service sector of the UK economy for all international providers Retain EU regulations in the UK, Establish regulations in the UK independent from those required in the EU

86 Motivation: Values and Economic Policy Preferences Baseline Results Figure: Experimental Conjoint Estimates of Integration Preferences.

87 Motivation: Values and Economic Policy Preferences Brexit Vote Figure: Experimental Conjoint Estimates of Integration Preferences by Brexit Vote.

88 Motivation: Values and Economic Policy Preferences Authoritarianism Figure: Authoritarianism and Post-Brexit Economic Policy Opinions.