Donnelly. Warren H. Senior Specialist, Energy ^ Kraaer, Donna S. Office of Senior Specialists AUTHOR:

Transcription

1 4 NOCLEAB POWER: THREE BLE SLAND ACCDENT CONGRESSONAL RESPONSE AND NVESTGATONS (ARCHVED 07/25/80) SSUE BREF NUMBER B7*Oi*7 AUTHOR: Donnelly. Warren H. Senior Specialist, Energy ^ Kraaer, Donna S. Oice o Senior Specialists i THE LBRAE Y OP CONGRESS CONGRESSONAL RESEARCH SERVCE MAJOR SSUES SYSTEM DATE ORGNATED 09^05/22 4 DATE UPDATED 03^06/80 FOR ADDTONAL NFORMATON CALL

2 CHS- 1 B79097 OPD ATE-03/0 6/80 On Ma*- ^t, 1Q ') Q i an accident occurred at the Three lile sland nuclear i powerplant, near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, which vas the most serious nuclear accident in the United States to date. While it did not cause any immediate casualties, it constituted a heavy inancial blov to the Metropolitan Edison Co. and its customers, and the utility aces a long, expensive, and probably controversial attempt to restore the damaged Unit-2 to operation. The accident triggered major investigations by Congress, the executive branch, and others. Many hearings have been held and»ore are likely. Legislation to impose conditions upon licenses o nuclear poverplants now in operation is pending. The accident has presented Congress with the issue o nuclear * saety and how to deal with risks that, although low in probability, would be high in consequences. 4 BACKG100ND_iND_POLCY JLNALYSS BACKGROUND c ^ The Powerplant The accident involved one ot two nuclear power reactors at the Three lile sland nuclear powerplant o the Bet r op ol it an Edison Co., located at? Goldsboro, Pa., about 10 miles southeast o Harrisburg. Both units were pressurized water reactors supplied by the Bab cock and Vilcox Company. Commercial operation o the unaected unit began in September 1974 while 9 that o the reactor in which the accident occurred began in May The Metropolitan Edison Co. operates the plants or a consortium o utilities owned by General Public Utilities Corporation. 4 The Accident The accident began at 4:00 on Mar. 28, As it evolved, there were ears o a catastrophic release o the intensely radioactive materials within the reactor, but this did not occur. The accident caused Governor Thorn burgh o Pennsylvania to close nearby schools and to advise pregnant women and pre-school age children within 5 miles o the site to leave, and people within 10 miles to stay inside. Evacuation o rom thousand residents was planned but not ordered. The accident caused public ear and conusion and some voluntary evacuation, and triggered a renewed controversy t over the saety o nuclear power. No detectable injuries or casualties to the public occurred, although some nearby residents were exposed to comparatively small amounts o radiation. Some utility workers received more % radiation exposure than is permitted by regulation, cil though not enough to cause short-term injury. Detectable amounts o radioactive materials were ound in the environment, but below limits that would cause oicial concern 4 and action. The greatest eect to date is the inancial loss to the utility. i For urther details about the accident, see archived issue brie ^ NBC. nvestigations

3 * CRS- 2 B79097 OPDATE-03/06/80 is would be expected, the NEC began several investigations o the accident. To date it has published an abnormal occurrence report on the ** accident, a report rom its "Lessons Learned Task Force," and a report roa its Division o nspection and Enorcement. The NRC has also named Hitchell togovin, a Washington attorney, to conduct an independent investigation. * Details on these investigations ollow: < the " NEC's Abnormal Occurrence report Section 208 o the energy Reorganization Act o 1974, as amended, requires, the NRC to put out. inormation on abnormal occurrences, which are unscteduled» incidents or events that the NRC determines are signiicant roa the standpoint o public health and saety (C. Federal Register, Feb. 24, 1977, 42 FR 10*50). On August 3 the NRC stated in the Federal Register that the * Three Rile sland accident vas determined to be such an occurrence (44 PR 45802). The NRC also included a description o the accident and briely listed the remedial actions taken. Updates on the accident and its impact on * operating reactors and reactor licensing are to be provided in the NRC c quarterly abnormal occurrence reports to Congress. The BBC's Lessons Learned Task Force The NRC established a "Lessons Learned Task Force" to identiy and * evaluate those saety concerns originating with the accident that require licensing actions. n addition, the Task Force was charged to identiy, analyze, and recommend changes to licensing requirements and the licensing v process or nuclear poterplants. The Task Force looked into seven technical areas covering: (1) reactor operations, including operator training and licensing; licensee technical qualiications; reactor transient and accident analysis; licensing requirements or saety and process equipment, instrumentation, and controls; on-site emergency preparations and procedures; the NEC's accident response role, capability, and management; and eedback, * evaluation, and utilization o reactor operating experience. The Task Force completed its report in July 1979, which the NRC. subsequently published (Report NDREG-0578). Briely, the Task Force said its revie* o the accident had disclosed a number o actions relating to design and analysis and plant operations that it recommended be required in the short term to provide substantial additional protection or the public health and saety: "All nuclear power plants in operation or in various stages o construction or licensing action are aected to varying degrees by the speciic recommendations." The Task Force said it was continuing work relating to general saety criteria, systems design requirements, and nuclear powerplant licensing and operations. The Task Force*s recommendations covered nine aspects o design and analysis and three aspects o operation. On August 13 the NBC (s Advisory Committee on Reactor Saeguards reported its review o the short-term recommendations o the Task Force. The ACRS 1 said that an orderly and eective implementation and appropriate level o review and approval by the NRC sta o the recommendations would require a somewhat more lexible, ana in some cases mere extended, schedule than is t implied in the Task Force report. As or the recosaendations, the Committee agreed with their intent and substance with our exceptions, where it made recommendations o its own.

4 CRS- 3 B79097 UPDATE -03/06/80 he_hbcjs^t., investigation Another NRC response was to direct its Ot ice o nspection and * Enorcement (B) to investigate the acts o the accident and to evaluate the perormance o the licensee as a basis or corrective action or enorcement action. t Mas headed by Victor Stello, Jr., director o the Oice o * nspection and Enorcement. The E report was completed in July 1979 and was published by the NRC in August (NURBG-0600). * The E investigation supported earlier estimates that the collective radiation dose to the population rom the accident or the period o Bar. 28 to Apr. 7, 1979, represented minimal risks o additional health eects. E identiied several inadequacies o radiation protection within the plant and criticized the measurements o o -site radiation made by the licensees. The investigation also substantiated earlier conclusions about the causes o the t accident and actors aecting its severity. nadeguacies were conirmed in the ollowing six areas: equipment perormance, transient and accident analyses, operator training and perormance, equipment and system design, * inormation low, and emergency planning. According to the E investigation, the most disturbing result was conirmation o earlier conclusions that the accident could have been prevented in spite o inadeguacies ound: NThe design o the plant, the equipment that was installed, the various accident and transient analyses, and the emergency procedures were adequate to have prevented the serious consequences o the accident, i they had been * permitted to unction or be carried out as planned. N Noting considerable evidence o a "Kind set," the E report said that without this "mind set" the operators might well have acted to preclude or better mitigate the accident. According to the B investigation, substantial eort is needed, by both the SEC and the industry, to ensure that the lessons o the accident are * implemented at other acilities. t concluded that urther study is clearly needed about the contributions o other organizations that can inluence the operation o nuclear power plants, including designers, reviewers, builders, $ vendors, and regulators. A ull assessment o all the underlying causes o the accident must await completion o these studies. The ^Rpgpy in report Within weeks o the accident, the NRC instituted a special inquiry to review and report on the accident. ts principal objectives were to determine what happened and why, to assess the actions o utility and NRC personnel beore and during the accident, and to identiy deiciencies in the system and areas where urther investigation might be warranted. To conduct this inquiry, the NRC in June 1979 contracted with the Washington law irm o Rogovin, Stern & Huge, speciying that it would have ull independence. The Rogovin report was presented to the Commission on Jan. 24, 1980, in two volumes. Tae irst describes the events ollowing the accidents and the indings and recommendations o the Special nquiry Group. The second contains detailed technical and analytical backup. The central theme o its conclusions was that the principal deicie acres in commercial reactor saety are not hardware problems, they are management problems. The regulatory system is well equipped to review saety o nuclear reactor designs, but has ailed to take timely account o actual operation o existing plants. The NKC is not ocused, organized, or managed to meet today's regulatory needs; it is incapable in its present orm o managing a comprehensive national saety program or existing nuclear powerplants and those scheduled or operation. However, the Special nquiry Group concluded that while major changes must be made, these changes will make commercial nuclear power much

5 CSS- a B79097 UPDATE-0 3/06/80 * saer than it is today. Some o the iogovin report recommendations included: establishment o stringent remote siting criteria; a major strengthening o NRC inspection and enorcement; i a zone step licensing process or standard designs; a moratorium on construction permits until recommended changes are Bade; creation o a national reactor operating company; and possible piohibition o one company rom both generating and selling electricity rom nuclear power. CEQ.Studies $ The Council on Environmental Quality has contracted with the Environmental Law nstitute to study the legal and technical implications o requiring consideration o environmental impacts rom accidents like the Three Hile sland accident in environmental impact statements or nuclear plants. t has also contracted with Princeton University's Center or Environmental Studies to determine what the extent o long-term health and environmental impacts would have been i the accident had been worse (Nucleonics Week, Aug. 23, 1979: 2). Presidents Commission on the i Accident at Three, Mile sland On Apr. 11, 1979, President Carter signed executive order and established the President *s Commission on the Accident at Three Hile sland. 9 The 11 -member commission was headed by John Kemeny, President o Dartmouth College. ts purpose was to conduct a comprehensive study and investigation o the accident. The Commission's study and investigation was to include: (a) a technical assessment o the events and their causes; this assessment shall include, but shall not be limited to, an evaluation o the * actual and potential impact o the events on the public health and saety and on the health and saety o the worker; (b) an analysis ol the role o the managing utility; (c) an assessment o the emergency preparedness and response o the * Nuclear Regulatory Commission and other Federal, State, and local authorities; t (d) an evaluation o the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's licensing, inspection, operation, and enorcement procedures as applied to this acility; ^P" (e) an assessment o how the public's right to inormation concerning the events at Three Hile sland was served and other steps that should be taken - durjjig similar emergencies to provide the public with accurate, comprehensible, and timely inormation; and () appropriate recommendations based upon the Commission indings. The Commission is to prepare and send a report to the President o its indings and recomsendations by Oct. 25, 1979.

6 CHS- 5 B79097 UPDATE-0 3/06/30 At a meeting with the Commission on Apr. 25, 1979, President Carter said than when it made its recommendations to nil, he intended to carry the* out "within the bounds o his authority and responsibility as President" (Weekly» Compilation o Presidential Documents, Apr. 30, 1979: 692). On June 10, however, in a aeeting with newspaper editors, the President said he would carry out the Commission's recommendations «i they are at all practical11 & (Nucleonics Week, Aug. 20, 1979, special issue, p. 1). On Oct. 22, 1979, the President's Commission on the Accident at Three Bile * sland released its report and indings. Among its recommendations were: (1) to abolish the existing MRC and replace it with a new agency to be headed by a single administrator (appointed rom outside the present agency) ; (2) to establish an oversight committee on nuclear reactor saety to examine the perormance o this new agency and the nuclear industry; to retain the Advisory Committee on ceactor Saeguards; (3) to place the responsibility or * sae operation o plants with the licensee; (4) to site new plants in areas remote rom population centers, and (5) to require the agency, on a case-by-case basis, to assess new saety improvements, review the training * program and competency o the licensee, and condition licenses upon review and approval o state and local emergency plans. Ater the report was released. President Carter commissioned a panel to review the paper submitted by the Kemeny Commission. The panel was to drat an option paper and submit it to the President within 30 days. The group was co-ciiaireti by Frank Press, the President's science adviser, and John Deutch, undersecretary o the Department o Energy. On Dec. 7, 1979, President Carter announced steps to help ensure that nuclear powerplants operate saely. He said, "Saety has always been, and will remain, in my top priority," and that nuclear power is an energy source 9 o last resort, but that we cannot shut the door on it. The President said he would: (1) Send an NEC reorganization plan to Congress, which would preserve and strengthen HBC*s commission orm (thus rejecting a principal recommendation o the Kemeny commission). (2) Appoint a new RFC chairman. n the interim, NRC Commissioner Ahearne would serve as chairman, replacing Dr. Hendrie. (3) Direct the Federal Emergency Management Agency to head up all o -site emergency activities and to review emergency plans in all States with operating reactors by June Direct NBC and other agencies to accelerate placement o resident Federal inspectors at every reactor site. (5) Ask ali relevant agencies to implement virtually all o the other t Kemeny Commission recommendations. The President also called on the nuclear industry to make three changes: (1) ro develop enhanced saety standards or design, operation, and construction o powerplants; (2) to develop and maintain a comprehensive training, examination, and evaluation program or operators and supervisors; and

7 CBS- 6 B79097 UPDATE-0 3/06/80 (3) to modernize, standardize, and simpliy control rooms to permit better inormed decision-baking in an emergency. ^ 4s or licensing o nuclear powerplants, the President endorsed the NRC*s temporary "pause" in issuing new licenses and construction permits, but urged NEC to complete its corrective work as quickly as possible, and no later than * June 7, ^ Response, o the Nuclear ndustry V The overall response o the nuclear industry has been to establish a * central coordinating committee, an analytical center, and an institute or nuclear powerplant operations. * The AP*s Policy Committee on rqllpwrpp r to the Tll Accident Shortly alter the accident, the Atomic ndustrial Forum (P) ormed a 1 Policy Committee to consolidate the industry*s response to lessons learned at TH. n August 1979 the committee commented to the NRC on the irst phase o NEC's "lessens learned" task orce report, inding most NBC sta recommendations generally acceptable. Subcommittees prepared a Nuclear Power Emergency Response Plan, helped to create the nstitute o Nuclear Power Operations; and made recommendations or design criteria and other technical «matters. *?he Nuclear. Saety Analysis Center (NSAC) n Hay 1979 nuclear utilities ormed the NSAC at the Electric Power Research nstitute in Palo Alto, Caliornia. Headed by B. Zebroski, its * initial objectives were to get the best possible understanding and documentation o what happened at TH, the contributing actors, and what the accident implies or saety management. NSAC also provides technical * coordination and a clearinghouse unction. NSAC made an initial report on the accident in July t identiied roughly 24 contributing actors. almost any one o those actors had been slightly dierent, there would * have been no TH damage. NSAC cautions against trying to correct all o the actors because some remedies might conlict with others. nstead, it called or attention to a ew very important remedies which can apply to most plants. The nstitute^o^nuclea^power^operations (NPQ) Early in 1980 the nuclear utilities brought into being an nstitute o Nuclear Power Operation (NPO), which is dedicated to ensuring high quality $ operation o nuclear powerpiants. ts purposes are to establish industry-wide benchmarks or excellence in nuclear operation and to conduct independent evaluations to assist utilities in meeting those benchmarks. t t will determine educational and training requirements or operating personnel and will accredit training organizations. The nstitute has established oices in Atlanta, Georgia. Congressional Response By the time o the irst anniversary o TH, ten subcommittees o the Congress had held hearings on one or another aspect o the accident. Among these, the Subcommittee on Energy and Environment o the House Committee on

8 CSS- 7 B79097 UP DATE-0 3/0 6/80 1 nterior and nsular Aairs had completed extensive hearings into almost every phase o nuclear power, and the Subcommittee on Nuclear Regulation, Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, had in progress an * investigation and a set o studies. The principal legislative response appeared in the NRC s authorization bill or FY80, still in conerence as o Mar. 3, 1980, which, among other things, vould tie urther licensing o * nuclear powerplants to the existence o State nuclear emergency plans. On Jan , Mr. Udall, as chairman o the vlnterior Committee, introduced a comprehensive bill (H.B. 6390) designed to reduce the risk o nuclear * accidents, establish a nuclear waste disposal plan, and give local communities more voice in siting o nuclear powerplants. One provision would orbid the NRC to issue operating licenses or new plants until it certiies? that the lessons learned rom Three Mile sland have been incorporated into the plant s design, operating procedures, and emergency plans. For urther inormation, see Part o the chronology, below. POLCY ANALYSS The Three Mile sland accident has revived opposition to nuclear power among various groups and has kindled resh controversy over the uture o nuclear power, i hat Congress does as the various investigations reach their conclusions and the Administration and the NBC decide upon their positions can greatly aect the uture o nuclear power in the United States. Likely i policy issues or Congress or the short and long term include the ollowing: Short-term oversight issues j (1) Finding out what happened in the accident and why and how it happened. How close to disaster did it come? (2) Determining what were the risks to the public health and saety and to the health o the plant operators. (3) Determining how well various Federal and State agencies and the nuclear utilities and industry responded to control the accident. (4) Establishing the costs o the accident who is to pay what part o them and what the eects will be upon the electricity rates charged by the utility. (5) Monitoring what Federal and State agencies do to reduce the risks o such accidents in other nuclear powerplants now operating or in construction. (6) Assessing the eectiveness o nuclear accident and disaster planning. (7) Determining how well the nuclear insurance system worked to reimburse losses o the public. Long-term oversight issues a (1) What long-term eects can be expected rom radiation exposure o the public and workers? (2) Hhat eect will the accident have upon nuclear energy in the Dnited States and upon Government energy policies and plans?

9 CaS- 9 B79097 OPDATE-0 3/06/80 1 (3) that will be the uture o Onit-1 o the Three-Mile sland plant? (4) What will be done with the radioactive wastes and damaged uel rom ^ the accident? (5) Can the damaged Unit-2 be returned to service? (6) How will NRC decide whether the damaged plant can be returned to service or i it should be decommissioned? NRC decides the plant can be * returned to service, how will it veriy the integrity o those parts that were»ost exposed to the eects o the accident? * Long^tery policy and.legislative issues (1) How are the risks o nuclear power and its beneits to be balanced? (2) ihat is the uture ol nuclear energy in the Oaited States? Should it be promoted, be kept as an energy source o last resort, or be shut down? (3) How can the NRC be reorganized to increase the eectiveness o its nuclear saety responsibilities? (4) s a moratorium on urther licensing o nuclear power pi ants desirable? For what purposes? Onder what conditions? (5) Should State emergency plans be made a prerequisite or licensing operation o new nuclear powerplants? (6) Onder what conditions should nuclear powerplants now Hearing completion be licensed or operation? (7) To what extent can the nuclear power industry police itsel or saety and or training o its operators? ^ LEGSLATON Completed legislation P.L (S.J.Res. 60) Coners subpoena power upon the Presidential Commission appointed to W investigate the Three Axle sland nuclear powerplant accident to require the attendance and testimony o witnesses and the production o evidence relating to the accident. Permits the issuance o an order or the inspection o the powerplant at Three Hile sland. ntroduced Hay 17, Passed by Senate Hay 17. Passed by House Hay 22. Signed into law Hay 23.?ropgsed_leigslation Hany bills were proposed soon ater the accident. Host proposed suspensions o licensing either temporarily or permanently. These bills are listed in archived issue brie 7903S. On Jan. 31, 1980, Representative Odall, chairman o the House Committee on nterior and nsular Aairs, introduced H.R as a result o his coitmittee's extensive hearings into the accident and nuclear power. H.R (Odall)

10 t CRS- 9 B79097 OP DATE-0 3/0 6/80 Reduces the rrisk o nuclear accidents, establishes a nuclear vaste disposal plan, and gives local come unities a greater voice in the siting o * nuclear powerplants. ntroduced Jan. 31, 1980; reerred jointly to Covaittees on nterior and nsular Aairs and on nterstate and Foreign Commerce. At the tiae o vriting the only legislation that had received any action vhich responded to the accident was the NRC*s authorization or FT80 (S. 562 and H.R. 2606) : Z^ >MEC^s^u^ori2ation_gr_.PY 2_lS^_562_and_H,.E^^2608l.. The Senate bill vas reported ro* the Environment and Public Works Committee on Hay 15 * (S.&ept ) ater amendment by Senator Hart to prohibit the NEC rom issuing operating licenses or nuclear poverplants until it has approved State emergency plans and also to require shutdown o existing nuclear * poverplants i their State emergency plans are not approved by the HRC within 6 Months. The COMB it tee included in its report a statement o principles proposed by its Nuclear Regulations Subcommittee which deal with reaote monitoring, the NRC's emergency response, resident HRC inspectors, training o reactor operators, and other Matters. he Senate amended and passed the bill on July 17,, The House bill vas reported rom the Committee on «nterior and nsular Aairs on Hay 15 (H.Rept , part ) ater adoption o 10 avendaents o the Energy and BnvironMent SubcoMmittee and 4 other amendments; including one or a 6 -month moratorium on issuance o new construction permits and one to prohibit issuance o an operating license until a State emergency evacuation plan has been approved by the NRC. t was subseguently reported rom the Committee on nterstate and Foreign Commerce 9 with amendments on June 29, 1*79 (H.Rept , part 2). Conerence meetings have begun but have not yet produced agreement. HEADNGS U.S. Congress. Joint Economic COB m it tee. Subconmittee on Energy. Nuclear power plant shutdowns who pays? Hearing, 96th Congress, 1st session. Apr. 5, Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. O., p. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Environment and Public Works. Subcommittee on Nuclear Regulation. Three lile sland nuclear power pi ant accident. Hearings, 96th Congress, 1st session. Apr. 10, 23, and 30, Part. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. O., p. Serial no "?. S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Labor and Human Resources. Subcommittee on Health and Scientiic Research. Three Nile sland nuclear accident, Hearing, 96th Congress, 1st session. Apr. 4, Washington, O.S. Print. O., p.

11 CBS-10 B79097 UPDA TE-0 3/06/80 REPOiTS_AHD_CONGR SSigMAL_>OCOKENTS Hart, Gary, Remarks in the Senate. Discussed "setbacks" at the Three-Jiile sland nuclear powerplant; urged HBC investigation and said he will introduce legislation requiring NEC to Maintain continuous remote monitoring o nuclear powerplants; included articles. Congressional record [daily ed.]. Apr. 2, 1979: S3824-S3827. Hart, Gary. Remarks in the Senate. mportant lessons o Three Mile sland. Congressional record [daily ed.] June 13, 1979: S7597-S Hart, Gary. Remarks in the Senate. The meaning o Three Mile sland (Address given to the National Press Club). Congressional record [daily ed.] Hay 21, 1979: S6283-S6286. Sandman, Peter H. and Wary Paden. At Three Mile sland. Columbia journalism review, v. 18. July-Aug. 1979: 43-50, 52, Udall, Morris K. Remarks in the House. Nuclear power and Arizona. (Summary statement o his views on nuclear power.) Congressional record [daily ed.] Sept. 18, 1979: E4582-E4583. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. Subcommittee on Military nstallations and Facilities. Civil deense and the Three Mile sland nuclear accident. Dec. 18, Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. O., p. (96th Congress, 1st session) Civil deense aspects o the Three Mile sland nuclee.r accident. Hearings, May 16, 17, 23 and June 14, Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. O., p. (96th Congress, 1st session. Report H.A.S.C. no ) U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government. Operations. Emergency planning around U.S. nuclear powerplants: Nuclear Regulatory Commission oversight. Fourth report by the Committee on Government Operations together with additional and dissenting views. 105 p. (96th Congress, 1st session. House. Report no (3). r.s. Congress. House. Committee on Governmental Operations. Subcommittee on Energy, Environment and Natural Resources. Response to Committee report on emergency planning and related saety issues: Nuclear Regulatory Commission oversight. Hearing, Nov. 1, Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. OO., p. (y6th Congress, 1st session) U.S. Congress. Bouse. Committee on nterior and nsular Aairs. Accident at Three Mile sland nuclear powerplants: oversight hearings. May 9, 10, 11, and 15, Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. O., p.

12 CRS-11 B79097 OPDATE-0 3/06/80 (96th Congress, 1st session. House. Report no. 96-8, part 1). Authorizing appropriations to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission; H.K Hay 15, Washington, O.S. Govt. Print. O., p. (96th Congress, 1st session. House. Report no. part 1). Oversight hearings. May 21 and 2*1, Washington, O.S. Govt. Print. O., p. (96th Congress, 1st session. House. Report no. «*6-8, part ) D.S. Congress. House. Committee on nterior and nsular Aairs. Subcommittee on cnergy and the Environment. Accident. Nuclear saety, v. 20, Sept. -Oct. 1979: O.S. Congress. House. Committee on Science and Technology. Subcommittee on Energy Research and Production. Nuclear poverplant saety systems. Hearings, 96th Congress, 1st session. Hay 22-24, Washington, O.S. Govt. Print. O., p. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Science and Technology. Subcommittee on Natural Resources and Environment. Three ttile sland nuclear plant accident. Hearing, June 2, iashington, U.S. Govt. Print. O., p. (96th Congress, 1st session) O.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Environment and Public Works. Nuclear Regulatory Commission authorizations; S Hay 15, Washington, O.S. Govt. Print. O., p. (96th Congress, 1st session. Senate. Report no ) 9.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on nvironment and Public ' Works. Subcotvittee on Nuclear Regulation. Three Mile sland nuclear power plant accident. Hearings, Oct. 2 and 3, 1*79. Washington, O.S. Govt. Print. O., p. (96th Congress, 1st session) O.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Environment and Public Works, Subcommittee on Nuclear Regulation / House. Committee on nterior and nsular Aairs, Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment. Report o the President "s Commission on the Three Bile sland Accident. Joint hearing, Oct. 31, Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. O., p. (96th Congress, 1st session) CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS 1 PART 06/07/80 President Carter *s target date or the NEC to complete its internal reorganization and work beore resuming * licensing construction and operation o nuclear

13 CRS-12 B79097 OPD A TE-0 3/06/80 powerplants (C., his statement o Dec. 7, 1979, on the Kemeny Commission). 06/00/80 Target date or FEHA to complete its review o State emergency plans or States with nuclear reactors (C., the President's Dec. 7, 1979, statement on the Kemeny report). 03/14/80 New deadline or NRC determination whether the TH accident constituted an "extraordinary nuclear occurrence «(Federal Register, Feb. 19, 1980: 10990). 02/19/80 MBC appointed a special task orce to study cleanup operations at Three Mile sland (NRC release 80-36). MRC announced extension o deadline or determining i the TH accident constituted an "extraordinary nuclear occurrence." New deadline Bar. 14, 1980 (Federal Register, Feb. 19, 1980: 10990). 02/13/80 NRC stai placed new conditions on Three lile sland Unit 2 (NEC release 80-31, Feb. 13, 1980). 01/31/80 Representative Odall, chairman o the Committee on nterior and nsular Aairs, introduced a bill (H.R. 6390) designed to reduce the risk o nuclear accidents, establish a nuclear waste disposal plan, and give local communities a greater voice in the siting o nuclear powerplants. The bill results rom the Committee s hearings on the Three Hile sland accident. 01/24/80 - The NBC received and was brieed on the report o its Special nquiry (The Rogovin report). 01/04/80 A panel o senior NRC sta ound that the required criteria were not met regarding the waiver o Price-Anderson Act deense provisions to be applied to law suits arising rom the TH accident. The panel recommended that the Commission determine that the accident was not an "extraordinary nuclear occurrence" under the law. The Commission invited comments rom the public to aid it in making its decision (Federal Register, v. 45, Jan. 4, 1980: 1180). * 01/02/80 12/07/79 The NRC sta issued letters and orders to utilities on lessons learned rom the TH accident. These went to utility operators o 68 commercial nuclear power reactors and set deadlines or completing design, procedural, and staing improvements, lith some exceptions, i licensees do not provide adequate justiication the plants must implement the changes by Jan. 31 or be shut down. President Carter announced steps he is taking as a result c the Kemeny Commission report to help ensure that nuclear powerplants are operated saely.

14 cas-13 B79097 UPDATE-0 3/06/80 11/21/79 The Nuclear Regulatory COB Mission held a one-day inormal hearing on whether the accident at Three lile sland should be considered an extraordinary nuclear occurrence. 4 r t 11/15/79 Senator James HcClure addressed the annual conerence o the Atoxic ndustrial Foru«stating that the pro-nuclear audience should ight or the v moral platorm on which the anti-nuclear opposition had set itsel. The NEC inormed the White House that it agrees with the majority o the recommendations in the President*s Commission on the Three Bile sland Accident report, with a ew exceptions, and has active programs under way which address most o the Kemeny commission s concerns. 11/09/79 n a letter to Prank Press, presidential science adviser, and in a 30-page document detailing agency actions and plans, NRC chairman Joseph Hendrie said that based "on the results so ar o our own internal reviews o the accident, we have generally ound that the actions recommended by the President's commission in the areas o human actor, operational saety, emergency planning, nuclear power plant design and siting, health eects, and public inormation are necessary and easible." 11/05/79 The NHC adopted an interim statement o policy on the licensing o nuclear power plants to be ollowed while the Commission considers a range o options dealing with the extent to which its regulatory structure should be modiied as a result o TH. Representative Horns Odall announced that his Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment would begin work on legislation to amend the Atomic Energy Act. He stated that he is seeking to modiy Federal law in light o what was learned rom the Three Nile sland accident. 10/25/79 Due date or the report o President Carter's commission to investigate the nuclear powerplant accident at Tnree Bile sland. i 4 10/02/79 NRC chairman Hendrie, during a hearing beore the Senate Subcommittee on Nuclear Regulation, said that the NEC Bight take over control o a stricken nuclear powerplant in the event o another accident like TM The Washington Post, Oct. U, 1*79: A2). 09/16/7S The NdC sta recommended that the Government consider the accidental release o dangerous radiation when deciding on location o new reactors (The New York Times, Sept. 17, 1979: A1, A19). 09/10/79 NRC licensing work to proceed, but in time with Kemeny Commission work (Nucleonics Week, special issue. Sept. 10, 1979).

15 cas-14 B? OPDATE-03/06/80 08/23/79 Members ol the Ke»eny Commission criticized a decision o a top MiC oicial to resume licensing o new reactors. Later, the oicial, Harold R. Denton, reversed his decision (The New York Times, Aug. 24, 1979: A1). 4 Huclear plant management and operators Bust understand hat they are doing and not blindly ollow rules, as they apparently did at Three Nile sland, said Canada's Atomic Energy Control Board president, Jon Jennekens (Nucleonics Week, Aug. 23, 1979: 7). 08/16/79 Nuclear electricity production in the 0.S. could drop signiicantly in 1979 and 1980 as a result o regulatory and policy actions attributable to the Three Nile sland accident, according to a DOB analysis requested by Senator Bark Hat ield (Nucleonics Week, Aug. 16, 1979: 10). 08/10/79 President Carter told newspaper editors that he will carry out the recommendations o the Kemeny commission "i they are at all practical" (Weekly Compilation o Presidential Documents, Aug. 17, 1979: 1428). i 4 08/03/79 The teieny Commission, in an executive session, decided to sever all ties with its citizens advisory group in reaction to a dispute over the group's role in the investigation. The Commission decided not to orm a replacement group and, instead, decided to write to some 200 public interest, industry, and other groups to solicit suggestions and advice on any aspect o the investigation (Nucleonics Week, Aug. 9, 1979: 5). The MBC published its determination that the Three lile sland Accident was an abnormal occurrence PB 45002). * 07/12/79 TMl-induced nuclear cutbacks could hurt the Southeast more than other parts o the U.S. by causing higher energy costs, greater oil and gas consumption, and more sulur dioxide emissions (Report o a study by the National Economic Research Associates, nucleonics leek, July 12, 1979: 8) 07/08/7S Ralph Nader's group. Critical Mass, accused the Nuclear Regulatory Commission o a conlict o interest in the way it measured radiation doses at Three Mile sland. 07/02/79 The NHC ordered Metropolitan Edison to keep the undamaged unit 1 at Three Mile sland shut down until the agency can drat speciic restart procedures and hold a public hearing. The utility had kept the unit shut down voluntarily ollowing the March 28 accident at unit-2 (Nucleonics Week, July 5, 1979: 3).

16 CRS-15 B79097 OPDATE-03/06/ /18/79 The House passed the NEC appropriations bill (H.R. 4388) ater deeating Mr. Reaver's amendment to prohibit use o unds or licensing a nuclear power plant in a state that lacks an emergency evacuation plan that has been tested and submitted to the HRC. 06/14/79 The NEC named Washington attorney Hitch ell Rogovin to head an independent investigation o events surrounding the nuclear plant breakdown at Three Nile sland Phe Washington Post, June 15, 1979: A10). 06/11/79 An industry task orce o the Edison Electric nstitute reported searching or vays to spread the risks o consequential damages arising rom major nuclear accidents. The group is headed by vice chairman Gordon Corey o the Commonwealth Edison Co. (Electrical Reek, June 11, 1979; 1) t i OS/24/79 The Senate Committee on Environment and Public iorks reported S.ies. 171, to provide $401,692 or an investigation o the Three Hile sland accident (S.Rept ). 05/23/79 President Carter signed into law P.L , conerring certain powers on his Commission to investigate the Three Hile sland nuclear accident. 05/21/79 The House passed S.J.Res. 80, to coner certain powers on the Presidential Commission to investigate Three bile sland (Congressional Record, Hay 21, 1979: H3480-H3481). NRC sta announced a 3-month reeze on issuing o operating licenses and construction permits or new nuclear powerplants while experts assess the implications o Three Hile sland (The New York Times, Hay 22, 1979: A1-A18). 05/17/79 The President's Commission halted its irst hearings on Three Hile sland because it had not yet received authority rom Congress to subpoena witnesses and evidence. The Senate passed S.J.Res. 30 to coner subpoena power on the President's Commission to investigate Three Aile sland. 05/07/79 Senator Hart, Chariman o the Nuclear Regulatory Subcommittee said, in a speech at the National Press Club, that there should be a moratorium on the issuing o operating licenses or any new nuclear power pi ants until the state involved has prepared a comprehensive emergency plan and had it approved by the NRC. Senator Kennedy, during discussion with nuclear opponents, avored a nuclear construction moratorium.

17 cas-16 B79097 UPDATE-03/06/30 President Carter said it would be out o the question to shut down all operating nuclear powerplants, but he would like to minimize the need or their use. The BBC issued a ormal order directing the shutdown o three Babcock and Hilcox nuclear power reactors still Operating. The utilities had previously volunteered to shut then down or saety modiications and additional operator training. 05/03/79 Secretary o HEW Caliano said that radiation exposure rom the Three Bile sland accident was higher than originally estimated. As a result, the stettistical probability indicated that at least one to ten cancer deaths caused by radiation could be expected among the tvo million people living within 50 miles o the plant [The New York Times, May 4, 1979: A1). 04/26/79 President Carter swore in the eleven members o his panel to investigate Three Rile sland. The group is headed by John G. Kemeny, president o Dartmouth College. 04/25/79 The MRC announced that the Three Mile sland Plant 2 should be in a stable shutdown in one veek (May 2, 1979). t t 4 t 04/23/79 Harold Denton o the NRC said he believed the accident was caused more by human than mechanical error. He enumerated our major mistakes. At least one violated NEC rules and all our involved poor judgement by the operators who were on duty. The Atomic ndustrial Forum created a special committee to coordinate the nuclear industry's activities in the atermath o the Three Mile sland accident. 04/19/79 The Nuclear Regulatory Commission issued new operating instructions to reactor operators calling or reassessment o certain operating procedures and ordered careul review o all plants to avoid uture Three Mile sland incidents. 04/16/79 -- The senior nuclear saety expert o the Tennessee Valley authority said that almost 11 months beore the March 28 accident he warned the manuacture oh the reactor (Babcock and Wilcox) that there was a possibility that a similar accident could occur. 04/12/79 The NEC instructed licensees o 34 nuclear powerplants to beware o the kinds o mistakes and breakdowns that caused the accident at Three Mile sland. t 04/11/79 * President Carter appointed a commission to investigate the accident at Three Mile sland and to make recommendations to prevent any uture accident [The New York Times, Apr. 12, 1979: A1, A20].

18 cas-17 Ta79C97 OP DATE-03/06/80 4 The Eoisor Electric nstitute appointed an ad hoc committee to oversee the coordinate eorts o the industry to address the impacts o the accident, and invited representatives o public power systems to participate. The committee is chaired by Ployd W. Lewis o rtiddle South Utilities, nc. (Nuclear News, May 1979: 50). 04/10/79 President Carter said in a news conerence that it is not possible tc abandon nuclear power in the oreseeable uture and that a bureaucratic nightmare or maze o red tape would not contribute to more saety o nuclear reactors. t i 4 NHC Chairman Hendrie, at a hearing o the Subcommittee on Nuclear Regulations o the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, said Mwe cannot have an acceptable nuclear power program in this country i there is any appreciable risk 11 o other accidents like the one at Three Mile sland. The Chairman and his ellow commissioners testiied that there must be a searching review and evaluation o MBC policies and procedures. 04/09/79 NEC spokesman Dr. Three Mile sland o the core. Denton declared that the crisis at was over with regard to the status Governor Thornburgh rescinded his evacuation recommendation and said it was considered sae tor pregnant women and preschool children to return to their homes within a 5-mile radius o the site. The Governor also declared that all schools not already reopened would do so, that state oices would return to normal business, and that local civil deense orces would step down rom ull alert status [The Hew York Times, Apr. 10, 197i»: A1}. 04/05/79 President Carter, in his address on national energy policy, mentioned the Three Nile sland accident twice. He said the accident had demonstrated dramatically that the nation has other energy problems and that the accident obviously "...causes all o us concern." He said he had directed the establishment o an independent Presidential commission o experts to investigate the cause o the accident and to make recommendations on how "...we can improve the saety o nuclear poverplants." There will be a ull accounting. - The General Accounting Oice transmitted its report to Congress on emergency response planning and capabilities at nuclear acilities. 04/04/79 Hr. Ddall, chairman o the Committee on nterior and nsular Aairs and o its Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment, announced plans or a sweeping inguiry into the role o nuclear power in the United States.

19 CBS-1S E79097 OPDA TE-03/06/80 04/03/79 Dr. Harold Dent on, spokesman or the NEC, said the risk o a dangerous gas explosion within the damaged reactor had been eliminated. 4 t t i c t t * i i t The Onion o Concerned Scientists called or the resignation o Chairman Joseph H. Hendrie o the NEC, accusing him o being not it to be the nation's chie nuclear regulator. At the OCS press conerence. Senator McGovern said he would introduce legislation to halt all nuclear plant construction and licensing until a comprehensive, independent review o possible saety deects in nuclear plants was conducted [ The New York Times, Apr. 4, 1979: A16]. 04/02/79 Robert Pollard, a ormer NEC reactor expert, now with the Onion o Concerned Scientists, brieed several Congressman and their stas on the accident and recommended the immediate shutdown o all Babcock and Hilcox plants unless the operators can provide convincing evidence that the general problems have been corrected. Senator Kennedy, speaking at the Council on Foreign Relations, called or a review o nuclear power "s role in reducing On i ted States dependence on oil imports iom the Middle East and urged a resh examination o the nuclear weapons risks arising out o the wide international use o atomic energy. Be also urged tightened procedures or licensing nuclear power plants. According to Press Secretary Jody Powell, President Carter ordered a ederal inquiry into all aspects o the Pennsylvania accident. He stated that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission as well as the Department o Energy were among agencies involved in the Carter order or the Federal Study Group. 04/01/79 Senator Gary Hart spoke on CBS»s "Face The Nation." He said that he would introduce legislation requiring the ederal government to maintain a continuous monitoring o reactors and to assume ull control immediately in the event o a crisis. The Senate Democratic leader Robert Byrd (Vest Virginia) said that "the Pennsylvania accident raised serious questions about the saety o nuclear power." He urged a shit toward greater reliance on coal and transerring research unds rom nuclear energy to coal. President Carter toured the Three Nile sland nuclear plant. Both the President and his nuclear saety advisers stressed that conditions were stable. 03/30/79 At approximately 11:30 AM the Chairman o the NRC,

20 CES-19 E79097 OP DATE-03/0 6/80 John Hendrie, suggested to the governor o Pennsylvania, Bichaid Thornburgh, that pregnant women and pre-school children in the area within live Riles o the plant site be evacuated. An on-sxte state o emergency was called by * Governor Thornburg ater an uncontrolled release o radiation that initial readings* shoved to be as high as 1,200 millirets per hour were detected. t The governor went on Civil Deense Radio and regular radio to warn persons rom within a ive to ten ulle radius to stay indoors and to advise * pregnant wo»en and preschool children to evacuate the previses. $ President Carter was in touch with Governor Thornburgh and oered ederal assistance i needed. He also oered the same assistance to the Nuclear Regulatory & Commission. The President established an interagency task orce in the National Security Council to deal with the problem (Federal Emergency Management Agency). Senator Gary Hart held a news conerence in Washington on the Three Bile sland incident. 03/29/79 NBC oicials reported that the ailure at the * Three Mile sland Plant was regarded as the tost serious accident in the United states to date. * A congressional delegation headed by Senator Hart visited the site to ascertain the potential harm to the public 9 s health and saety. Senator Edward Kennedy, Chairman o the Energy Subcommittee o the Joint Economic Committee, asked Secretary o Energy James Schlesinger to reconsider his decision to submit a bill to speed up the licensing o nuclear power plants. n a letter to the Secretary, Kennedy asked or ive saety measures to be considered beore a license would be issued. These were (1) require a inal design beore a construction permit is issued, (2) establish a deadline or the resolution o unresolved saety problems, (3) upgrade saety o existing power plants, (*») establish deinitive siting criteria or population density, and (5) allow assumption by the NEC o direct responsibility or quality assurance activities. White Eouse Press Secretary Jody Powell said that President Carter was concerned about the radiation leak at Harrisburg and was getting inormation on t rom the National Security Council. 03/28/7S At approximately 4:00 AM at 98% power, the secondary eed pumps o the Three Mile sland Unit 2 in Middletown, Pennsylvania tripped due to a eedwater

21 C&S-20 B79097 OPDATE-0 3/06/80 polishing system problem, thus beginning the accident. PABT CHRONOLOGY OF COMMTTEE HBSPONSiS *?he_ Senate^ Cpmmittee^on^Environment and_ Public^ torks x Subcommittee Nuclear.Regulation, Senator Gary Hart ^ chair man; V * 11/09/79 The Subcommittee concluded hearings en the cost o recovery and cleanup operation at TM. 11/08/79 The Subcommittee began hearings on the cost o recovery and cleanup operations at TM. 10/31/79 Joint hearing held on the report o the President's Commission on the accident (The Kemeny Commission) with the House Committee on nterior and nsular Aairs. 10/02/79-10/03/79 Hearings on the NEC's immediate response to the accident. 05/10/79 The subcommittee ordered reported the NEC's authorization or FY80, S. 562, with an amendment to shut dovn all operating nuclear power plants in any State that cannot produce an BBC-approved emergency evacuation plan within six months, and to halt issuance o new operating licenses in such States, and an amendment to provide $401 thousand or the subcommittee's investigation o the accident. 05/09/79-05/10/79 Hearings held on the Federal Government's responsibility or radiation protection and on emergency planning or nuclear power accidents. t 05/09/79 Appearing beore the National Press Club, subcommittee chairman Hart called or a moratorium on the issuing o operating licenses or any new nuclear plant until the State involved has prepared a comprehensive emergency evacuation plan and had it approved by the NEC. He outlined other steps to be taken or considered by the Federal Government that included: a system o BBC monitored radiation detection devices near every nuclear reactor in the U.S.; continuous on-site inspection by the NEC; more training and revised licensing requirements or reactor operators; remote monitoring o key instruments in each reactor; establishment o a specially trained and licensed "elite nuclear SWAT team w by the NRC to assume control o a reactor in an emergency; and a 1985 deadline or the Administration and the industry to come up with an acceptable plan or waste disposal. 01/30/79 Hearings on the accident and the NEC decision to temporarily close other Babcock and Wilcox nuclear power reactors. 04/27/79 Hearings on the accident.