DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS BOARD ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

Transcription

1 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS BOARD ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY In the Matter of: : : JOHN O. IWEANOGE, JR., : : D.C. App. No. 06-BG-1079 Respondent. : Bar Docket No : A Member of the Bar of the : District of Columbia Court of Appeals : (Bar Registration No ) : REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE BOARD ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY This matter comes before the Board on Professional Responsibility (the Board ) as a result of an order of reprimand imposed upon John O. Iweanoge, Jr. ( Respondent ) by the Court of Appeals of Maryland (the Maryland Court ) on March 22, The Maryland Court reprimanded Respondent based upon a Joint Petition for Reprimand by Consent (the Joint Petition ). The Board recommends that the District of Columbia Court of Appeals (the Court ) impose the functionally equivalent reciprocal discipline of a public censure. I. BACKGROUND Respondent has been a member of the District of Columbia Bar since December 6, Respondent is also licensed to practice law in the states of Maryland and Virginia. On September 21, 2006, Bar Counsel filed with the Court a certified copy of the order of the Maryland Court reprimanding Respondent. Respondent did not self-report the discipline to Bar Counsel as required by D.C. Bar R. XI, 11(b). On October 6, 5

2 2006, the Court issued an order pursuant to D.C. Bar R. XI, 11(d) directing the Board either to (i) recommend whether identical, greater, or lesser discipline should be imposed as reciprocal discipline, or (ii) determine whether the Board should proceed de novo. Order, In re Iweanoge, No. 06-BG-1079 (D.C. Oct. 6, 2006). On October 12, 2006, Bar Counsel filed a statement with the Board recommending the imposition of functionally equivalent reciprocal discipline of a public censure. On November 9, 2006, Respondent filed a statement in which he takes no exception to the imposition of a public censure. II. THE MARYLAND PROCEEDING The disciplinary action of the Maryland Court is based on findings by the Circuit Court for Montgomery County (the Circuit Court ) following a hearing on January 12 and 13, The Circuit Court found that Respondent violated Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct ( MRPC ) 1.1 (competence); 1.3 (diligence and promptness); and 1.4(a) (failure to keep client reasonably informed and comply with reasonable requests promptly). 1 The discipline stemmed from Respondent s representation in three client matters. In the first case, the Circuit Court found that Respondent violated MRPC 1.1 and MRPC 1.4(a) by failing to appear in court for a trial date and for failing to inform his client that she needed to appear in court. In the second case, the Circuit Court concluded that Respondent violated MRPC 1.1 based on his failure to thoroughly prepare his client s landlord tenant case, and MRPC 1.3, based on his failure obtain service on the 1 MRPC 1.1 states: A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. MRPC 1.3 states: A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client. MRPC 1.4(a) states: A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for information. 6

3 defendant for four years after the case was originally filed and his withdrawal as counsel without informing his client. In the third case, the Circuit Court found that Respondent violated MRPC 1.3 when his failure to appear at a court hearing resulted in entry of a judgment against his client. Following entry of the Circuit Court s findings, Respondent and the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland filed the Joint Petition with the Maryland Court. Statement of Bar Counsel, Attachment 2. In a supporting affidavit, Respondent acknowledged that there was sufficient evidence to support the findings of fact and violations of the Circuit Court. Id. Based on the Joint Petition, the Maryland Court reprimanded Respondent. Order, Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Iweanoge, Misc. Docket AG No. 21 (Md. Mar. 22, 2006). III. ANALYSIS There is a presumption in favor of imposing identical reciprocal discipline that may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence that one or more of the five exceptions set out in D.C. Bar R. XI, 11(c) exists. 2 D.C. Bar R. XI, 11(f); see In re Zilberberg, 612 A.2d 832, 834 (D.C. 1992). When, as here, a respondent does not contest reciprocal discipline, the Board s role is limited to reviewing the foreign proceeding sufficiently to satisfy itself that no obvious miscarriage of justice would result in the imposition of identical discipline... In re Childress, 811 A.2d 805, 807 (D.C. 2002) (quoting In re 2 The five exceptions under D.C. Bar R. XI, 11(c) are as follows: (1) The procedure elsewhere was so lacking in notice or opportunity to be heard as to constitute a deprivation of due process; or (2) There was such infirmity of proof establishing the misconduct as to give rise to the clear conviction that the Court could not, consistently with its duty, accept as final the conclusion on that subject; or (3) The imposition of the same discipline by the Court would result in grave injustice; or (4) The misconduct established warrants substantially different discipline in the District of Columbia; or (5) The misconduct elsewhere does not constitute misconduct in the District of Columbia. 7

4 Spann, 711 A.2d 1262, 1265 (D.C. 1998)). The imposition of identical discipline when the respondent fails to object should be close to automatic, with minimum review by both the Board and this court. In re Cole, 809 A.2d 1226, 1227 n.3 (D.C. 2002) (per curiam). Respondent has taken no objection to the imposition of a public censure as reciprocal discipline. Thus, in accordance with our limited role, we have examined the record and find nothing that rises to the level of an obvious miscarriage of justice. Respondent was afforded notice and an opportunity to be heard in Maryland. His sworn acknowledgement of the findings of the Circuit Court and his consent to the discipline establishes that there is no infirmity of proof. The misconduct in Maryland would also constitute misconduct in the District of Columbia. 3 A public censure is functionally equivalent to the public reprimand issued by the Maryland Court. See, e.g., In re Zentz, 891 A.2d 277, 278 (D.C. 2006) (per curiam) (citations omitted). Accordingly, we recommend issuance of a public censure. 4 3 See D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct Rules 1.1(a) (competence), 1.3(a) (diligence and zeal), and 1.4(a) (communication). 4 On July 20, 2006, the Board filed a report with the Court recommending reciprocal discipline of public censure based on an order of reprimand imposed by a three-judge court in Arlington, Virginia. In re Iweanoge, Bar Docket No (BPR July 20, 2006). The Joint Petition does not refer to the Virginia disciplinary order and it thus appears not to have been taken into consideration by the Maryland Court. It is appropriate to consider a prior disciplinary record in deciding whether substantially different discipline should be imposed under D.C. Bar R. XI, 11(c)(4). See In re Dietz, 653 A.2d 854 (D.C. 1995) (per curiam). This case, however, is governed by the obvious miscarriage of justice standard, since neither Respondent nor Bar Counsel object to the imposition of functionally identical reciprocal discipline. Childress, 811 A.2d at 807. We find that imposition of a public censure does not constitute an obvious miscarriage of justice, even when Respondent's prior Virginia reprimand is considered. 8

5 IV. CONCLUSION Based upon the foregoing, the Board recommends that the Court impose on Respondent the functionally equivalent reciprocal discipline of a public censure. BOARD ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBLITY By: Dated: APR -6 mj All members of the Board concur in this Report and Recommendation.