DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS BOARD ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE BOARD ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

Transcription

1 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS BOARD ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY In the Matter of CELICIA HOOVER-HANKERSON, Respondent. Bar Docket No A Member of the Bar of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals (Bar Registration No ) REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE BOARD ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY I. BACKGROUND On July 8, 2004, Respondent was convicted in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia of one count of conspiracy to defraud the United States and aiding and abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 371 and 2; two counts of fraud in the first degree and aiding and abetting, in violation of D.C. Code (a), (a)(1), and (1981); 1 and two counts of theft concerning programs receiving federal funds and aiding and abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 666(a)(1)(A) and 2. Sentencing was scheduled for September 27, Order, United States v. Hoover- Hankerson, Case No. 03-CR-188 (D. D.C. Jul. 13, 2004). Bar Counsel reported Respondent s convictions to the D.C. Court of Appeals ( the Court ) on July 20, On July 26, 2004, the Court suspended Respondent pursuant to D.C. Bar R. XI, 10(c) and directed the Board to institute a formal proceeding to determine the nature of the final discipline to be imposed and specifically 1 These statutes have been recodified as D.C. Code (a), (a)(1), and (2001), respectively.

2 to review the elements of the offenses of which Respondent was convicted for the purpose of determining whether the crimes involve moral turpitude within the meaning of D.C. Code (a). Order, In re Hoover-Hankerson, No. 04-BG-838 (D.C. July 26, 2004). II. MORAL TURPITUDE ANALYSIS When a member of the bar of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals is convicted of an offense involving moral turpitude, the member must be disbarred. D.C. Code (a). In In re Colson, 412 A.2d 1160, 1168 (D.C. 1979) (en banc), the Court defined moral turpitude as an offense against the generally accepted moral code of mankind. Conviction of felony offenses which manifestly involve moral turpitude by virtue of their underlying elements mandate disbarment without inquiry into the specific conduct that led to the conviction. Id. at 1164; see also In re McBride, 602 A.2d 626, 629 (D.C. 1992) (en banc) (limiting Colson to felony convictions). If the Court has previously determined that a specific crime involves moral turpitude, the Board must adhere to that determination and can only consider whether the attorney was convicted of the crime charged. Colson at 1165; D.C. Bar R. XI, 10(d). A certified copy of the court record is conclusive evidence of the commission of the crime. D.C. Bar R. XI, 10(f). The Court has previously determined that conspiracy to defraud the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. 371 is a crime of moral turpitude per se. See, e.g., In re Lipari, 704 A.2d 851, 852 (D.C. 1997); In re Lobar, 632 A.2d 110, 111 (D.C. 1993) (per curiam); In re Meisnere, 471 A.2d 269, (D.C. 1984) (per curiam) (attached Board Report). According to the certified copies of the court docket entries provided to the 2

3 Board, Respondent was duly convicted of this crime by jury verdict. Where, as here, there are multiple convictions, only one crime involving moral turpitude need be found for disbarment under (a). See, e.g., Lipari, 704 A.2d at 852 (citing In re McGough, 605 A.2d 605 (D.C. 1992)). Therefore, Respondent s conviction of conspiracy to defraud the United States is, standing alone, sufficient to mandate her disbarment. Although we need not decide the issue, we find that Respondent s fraud convictions also involve moral turpitude per se. The Court has held that any crime which includes intent to defraud as an essential element involves moral turpitude per se. See, e.g., In re Rosenbleet, 592 A.2d 1036, 1037 (D.C. 1991) (conviction of second degree fraud under the District of Columbia Code is a crime of moral turpitude); In re Willcher, 447 A.2d 1198, (D.C. 1982) (a crime of which intent to defraud is an essential element is a crime of moral turpitude per se). Fraud in the first degree, in violation of D.C. Code (a) (1981) (recodified as (a) (2001)) expressly requires expressly requires proof of an intent to defraud and is thus a crime of moral turpitude per se. 2 The Board thus concludes that two of the crimes for which Respondent was convicted involve moral turpitude per se fraud and conspiracy to defraud the United States. There is no need to decide whether Respondent s remaining crimes involve moral turpitude per se. See Lipari, 704 A.2d at 852. The Board therefore recommends that the 2 The statute provides that [a] person commits the offense of fraud in the first degree if that person engages in a scheme or systematic course of conduct with intent to defraud or to obtain property of another by means of a false of fraudulent pretense, representation, or promise and thereby obtains property of another or causes another to lose property. D.C. Code (a) (2001) (previously codified as D.C. Code (a) (1981)) (emphasis added). 3

4 Court disbar Respondent pursuant to D.C. Code (a) based on her convictions of crimes of moral turpitude. Respondent has not yet been sentenced. 3 Pendency of sentencing should not delay the Board s recommendation in this matter. See D.C. Bar R. XI, 10(d); In re Zimmer, 637 A.2d 103, 103 n.2 (D.C. 1994) (per curiam) (Board declined to defer its recommendation until after sentencing, because the dispositive issue was the respondent s plea of guilty to a crime involving moral turpitude per se); In re Hirschfeld, 622 A.2d 688, 690 (D.C. 1993) (Board should forward its report and recommendation to the Court, notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal). The Board recommends, however, that the Court defer action on the Board s report and recommendation until Bar Counsel files a certified copy of the order sentencing Respondent with the Court. See In re Lipari, Bar Docket No , at 5 n.1 (BPR Mar. 22, 1996) (Board recommended that Bar Counsel file certification of sentencing before the Court takes final action), aff d, 704 A.2d at 851.I III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Board recommends that Respondent be disbarred pursuant to D.C. Code (a), based on her conviction of crimes of moral turpitude per se, but that the Court defer action on this recommendation until Bar Counsel files a certified copy of Respondent s sentencing order with the Court. Respondent s disbarment 3 Records of the federal district court show that sentencing is still pending. 4

5 should run, for purposes of reinstatement, from the time she files an affidavit in compliance with D.C. Bar R. XI, 14(g). See In re Slosberg, 650 A.2d 1329, 1331 (D.C. 1994). BOARD ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY By Ernestine Coghill-Howard Dated July 26, 2005 All members of the Board concur in this Report and Recommendation except Ms. Helfrich, and Dr. Payne, who did not participate. 5