CONCEPT NOTE. for the Programme Committee meeting on 4 February 2014

Transcription

1 CONCEPT NOTE for the Programme Committee meeting on 4 February 2014 Support to the Danish Institute for Parties and Democracy DIPD (Institut for Flerpartisamarbejde) mid mid 2017 DIPD s mandate is to strengthen and complement the Danish democracy support and to engage in partnership with similar international organisations. Is there scope for increased synergy between the Danida funded governance programmes, CSO s and DIPD s multi-party activities? What are the advantages and disadvantages? DIPD works with a particular emphasis on women in political office, youth in political parties, local level party structures and coalition building - areas where Denmark has a solid democratic experience. To what extent should DIPD specialize further in these intervention areas as particular DIPD niches as opposed to responding to different local demands? Department for Human Rights (JTMR)

2 1 INTRODUCTION The Danish Institute for Parties and Democracy (DIPD) was established by the Danish Parliament in May 2010 (Act 530 adopted May 26, 2010 by the Danish Parliament). Its overall purpose is to offer support to and strengthen political parties and multi-party systems in developing countries. In addition, this support should also complement and strengthen Danish democracy assistance. As an independent public institution, DIPD contributes to Denmark s democratisation efforts by actively involving Danish political parties, other Danish stakeholders and international partners in the support for political parties, multiparty systems and a democratic culture in a number of selected developing countries 1. The institute is governed by a Board of 15 members, appointed by the Minister for Development Cooperation for a 4 year period. This includes 9 members representing the political parties (one from each party represented in Parliament and an additional representative from the then ruling party) and 5 members representing different institutions in civil society and academia, and finally 1 appointed by the Minister in his/her personal capacity. The Board is responsible for all decisions relating to DIPD s strategy, area of work, economy and administration. The independent status of DIPD, the specific focus on political parties and multiparty systems in developing countries and the aim to complement and strengthen the Danish democracy support are core features of DIPD underlined in the act and its traveaux préparatoires. The initial cooperation agreement with MFA covering amounted to DKK 75 million in total. The new 3 year commitment for the period mid 2014 mid 2017 equally amounts to DKK 75 million. 2 CONCLUSIONS FROM ANALYSES JUSTIFYING THE ENVISAGED SUPPORT: EPERIENCES AND RESULTS. DIPD has effectively been in operation since January 2011, and the first project proposals (both party-to-party and multiparty) were approved by the Board in the summer of It was only by early 2012 that all the political parties had started implementation of activities. Consequently, at the time of writing, none of the projects initiated have come to completion. However, as documented both by the recently finalized review and by DIPDs own reporting (in annual reports and on the website), DIPD has already demonstrated results in a number of areas, which will be outlined below. The MFA conducted an independent review of DIPD in the autumn of 2013, and the overall conclusions of the report are positive, confirming the need and relevance for an institution such as DIPD. In particular, the review notes that: DIPD has made impressive progress in establishing effective party-to-party and multi-party projects in a range of countries. It has developed a well-regarded programme of multi-party projects organised through local partners and in collaboration with like-minded organisations, and it has supported the Danish political parties to create party-to party partnerships in a wide range of different countries. 1 DIPD has planned and developed seven multi-party projects and thirteen party-to-party projects in thirteen countries in Africa, Latin America and the Middle East (see Annex 3 for a list of countries). 1

3 It has established a new organization from scratch and built an international reputation, whilst simultaneously navigating logistical and administrative challenges. Regarding Programmatic Results, DIPD has been able to establish itself as a trusted and relevant multi-party operator in a limited number of countries. Particular mentioning should be given to countries like Bhutan, Nepal, Myanmar and Egypt, where it has been possible to promote an agenda with a focus on women in politics, youth in politics, and political parties at local level despite sensitive political challenges and complex political contexts. Much of this has been codified in guides that now form the basis for training. Regarding the work of the active political parties, much has been achieved with limited funding, in particular in areas like: youth engagement in political parties, communication strategies of parties, internal policy development by parties, and political parties operating at the local branch level areas where Danish parties have a long track record. Regarding Institutional Results in Denmark, DIPD has built institutional relationships and cooperation with a range of Danish NGOs, including CISU (Civilsamfund i udvikling), International Media Support and KVINFO. Moreover, DIPD has engaged closely with the Foreign Affairs Committee, the Ombudsman institution, and the International Secretariat of the Danish Parliament. Regarding Institutional Results internationally, DIPD has engaged closely with organisations such as the Danish Egyptian Dialogue Institute (DEDI), the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD), the Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) and the International Foundation for Electoral Assistance (IFES), with whom DIPD implements activities. DIPD has also been active in establishing a Global Knowledge Network on Party Democracy Support - the so-called Political Party Peer Network (PPPN), of which the National Democratic Institute (NDI), the Oslo Center, NIMD, IDEA, Swedish International Liberal Centre (Silc Sweden) and DIPD form the Core Group. DIPD has actively contributed to the knowledge platform with a comparative study on results frameworks in likeminded organisations. Most recently, through the recommendation of MFA, DIPD has been encouraged to provide strategic advice and peer support to two important democracy institutions: Institute for Peace and Democracy (IDP) in Indonesia and the Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency. Regarding organisational achievements, DIPD has within a short time established a wellmanaged organisation. Some of the logistical and administrative challenges referred to by the review team concerns the fact that DIPD started up in an administrative set-up in the Danish Centre for International Studies and Human Rights (DCISM), which after the demise of DCISM by 1 st January 2013 had to be replaced by new offices and independent administrative and financial management systems, a demanding endeavour for the small secretariat. The two recent annual reports from the National Auditors have been without critical remarks to the financial management and annual financial reports of DIPD. Internationally, the importance of enhancing the democratic performance of political parties is increasingly recognised, together with an appreciation of the crucial role of political parties in overall programmes to enhance democratic governance. The 2009 EU Foreign Affairs Council conclusions on Democracy Support and its Agenda for Action establish that EU democracy support should include a special focus on political parties. In the same vein, the UK Department for International Development (DFID) has underlined the importance of supporting political parties in developing countries in the new How to Note on Parliamentary and Political Party Assistance. 2

4 2.1 MAIN CHALLENGES OF CURRENT PROGRAMME The review identifies several challenges, many of which are due to the fact that DIPD is still a young organisation in the process of harnessing its identity, procedures and structures. All DIPD s projects are at a very early stage of implementation, so the review s evidence to assess the results was limited and any evaluation of impact was found to be premature. The challenges and recommendations mainly fall in three areas as mentioned below. Review Recommendations Part I: Strategic focus & program logic Although assistance to political parties remains a small part of international aid, it has grown in recent years. As DIPD notes itself, in its strategy document , The DIPD is beginning its work at a time when there is intense debate about the role of political parties in the development and democracy processes In this context DIPD should retain enough flexibility to ensure that it has a diverse range of programmes, and is able to respond to political developments as they emerge. But flexibility is not a substitute for strategy. Equally, a strategy does not mean doing the same thing in every country. The political parties, in particular will want to retain enough flexibility to decide the most suitable entry points and activities in particular countries. But the strategy does need to provide some organisational coherence, especially between multi-party and party-to-party work. In particular, the Review underlines that the DIPD secretariat, board members and political parties should develop a strategy which should seek to define DIPD s distinctive features and strengths in the field of party assistance. This includes further guidance on how and when DIPD should intervene, strategic objectives and improved measurements of results and exit strategies. Part 2: Organisation, administration, capacity DIPD has achieved a remarkable amount of progress on a modest budget. But it needs to DIPD Board Response & Actions DIPD recognizes the importance of fleshing out a strategy for the next phase which can offer both the clarity of direction requested by both Danish political parties and partners around the world, while at the same time offers the necessary flexibility required to operate in very different and often extremely demanding environments. But at the same time it must be recognized that working on party-to-party capacity building involves very different requirements and different types of negotiations with relevant stakeholders than is the case for multi-party support. Specific action: It has all along been the intention to replace the existing founding document on Political Parties in a Democratic Culture with a more focused and clear strategy when the first experiences had been harvested. The new strategy will clearly articulate DIPD s change path, which will inform project activities. The overall mission remains the same, but it will become clearer how the multiparty and party-to-party are two complementary entry points to achieving the same objectives of democratisation and a democratic culture. It will also be stressed that all projects are carried out within the mandate of DIPD, and the multi-party dialogue capacity is an issue to be addressed in all projects. DIPD is very conscious of the need to pause, take stock of its assets, and then ensure that the different parts of the institution can deliver effectively in the next phase. Part of this will 3

5 reflect on the roles of the constituent parts of the organisation, its internal processes and its staffing requirements if it seeks to continue at this pace. The Review made recommendations in three areas: Firstly, the roles of the Board and the secretariat need further clarifying. Secondly, the DIPD secretariat needs more project and administrative staff as the organisation is straining the limits of its capacity. Thirdly, the DIPD needs to ensure that the communication strategy runs through the organisation, and the publications should be clearer about what DIPD is doing, why it is doing it and what results it expects. Part 3: Project implementation and results While recognising that DIPD has expended significant resources in developing a comprehensive M&E systems, the review recommends DIPD to elaborate a more effective progress management system, combining quantitative and qualitative data. be to ensure that there is an acceptable balance between the ambitions of all involved on one hand, and the resources available to deliver on the other hand. As presented in the detailed section, DIPD is very appreciative of the specific proposals presented by the review, although DIPD does not agree on all of them or would like to implement changes in a different manner than suggested. The MFA will be consulted as part of the follow-up process and a new cooperation agreement between the MFA and DIPD will be elaborated during first half of DIPD is planning to develop a comprehensive Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation System. DIPD will draw on international expertise in this field. However, DIPD is not planning to develop global indicators, which in the political field have proved to fail. In May 2012, DIPDs Board held the first strategic reflection with the theme From Strategy to Result. In January-February 2014 there will be an intensive strategy process with the Board Committee developing the framework for the strategy for the phase of DIPD, culminating in a Strategy Seminar 7th February, The revised strategy is expected to be finalized by the Board end of March. It is expected that it will provide greater clarity and guidance on where DIPD can be most effective, add value and best deploy its resources. On organizational strengthening, a number of measures will be taken, including the recruitment of a finance officer (approved by the Board in December 2013). Moreover, as suggested by the review team, DIPD will look at ways to better allocate staff time used on project development and implementation under the respective projects. On goal and results frameworks, DIPD has taken several initiatives, including the publication on results frameworks already mentioned, and DIPD has started preparing the TOR for the development of a Planning Monitoring and Evaluation system that will also integrate narrative and financial reporting according to DIPDs goals and intervention areas. DIPD s country presence is based the cooperation agreement between DIPD and the MFA and the current DIPD strategy. It is stated that DIPD should focus on a limited number of countries, and preferably countries where Denmark has previously been active with governance and democracy programmes. For the multiparty projects the historical links have been key, whereas the Danish political parties have been free to establish partnerships with relevant like-minded parties in developing countries. This distinction is likely to continue in the new strategy. 4

6 3 PRELIMINARY OVERVIEW OF ENVISAGED SUPPORT At the time of writing, DIPD is still governed by the strategy called Political Parties in a Democratic Culture, which in the vision and mandate chapters states the following: The vision of the DIPD is to contribute to the development of effective political parties and well-functioning multiparty systems as key elements in a democratic culture, thus ensuring citizens in developing countries the freedom and human development to which they have a right. As an independent institution, DIPD is to contribute to Denmark s democratisation efforts by actively involving Danish political parties, other Danish stakeholders and international partners in the support for political parties and multiparty systems in a number of selected developing countries. As clarified by the Board in the initial stage of the strategy process, DIPD is a political project working for democratization, initiated by political parties in the Danish Parliament. This is done by working with political parties as well as other stakeholders in developing countries in order improve the performance of their democratic functions. The annual report of DIPD (2012) stresses that DIPD supports parties to perform more democratically irrespective of the parties being in power or in opposition. Moreover, based on the recommendations of the review, the strategy process so far has also concluded that DIPD will put emphasis on consolidation for the next three years, thus not seeking new partnerships, unless existing partnerships are no longer proving feasible for one reason or the other (including political sensitivities in a particular country) or a partnership is not as results oriented as deemed necessary by the DIPD partner (party or multiparty). 3.1 MAIN PROGRAMME OBJECTIVES AND INDICATORS DIPD s mandate is clearly spelled out in the law, the Parliamentary Commission report and in the cooperation agreement with the MFA. DIPD plans to operationalise the mandate along the following overall lines on the basis of the forthcoming revised strategy: As outlined in the act, the activity budget will continue to be divided equally in two funding envelopes; one for the Danish political parties, and another for multiparty activities implemented by the secretariat. According to the strategy, the activities and partnerships should deliver overall results in the field of democratisation and democratic culture. The next level of results fields are defined as: Enhancing conducive political party regulation and frameworks; Enhancing multi-party dialogue and cooperation; Strengthening the democratic performance of political parties. On the basis of experiences in the first phase, this will be specified and operationalized into: Multi-party platforms or actors supported to engage on issues of joint concern, the party environment and on democratic challenges within political parties in a cross-party setting (see all project in Annex 3); 5

7 Political parties supported to enhance the democratic functions, in particular representation and accountability (see all projects in Annex 3). DIPDs theory of change is informed by a systemic approach to capacity development and change, encompassing several interlinked levels: overall regulatory framework for political parties and democracy, and the multi-party cooperation and dialogue (enabling environment); democratic functions of political parties, notably representation and accountability; organizational development of political parties; individual competence development and incentive structures of political leaders, staff and members. Building on Danish experiences, DIPD works with particular emphasis on: Strengthening the inclusion of women in political office (i.e. Bhutan, Nepal, Myanmar, Egypt, Tanzania, Malawi, Ghana, Palestine, Kenya); Strengthening the inclusion of youth in political parties (i.e. Nepal, Egypt, Zimbabwe, Kenya, Ghana, Palestine); Enhancing the building of local level party structures (branches) and parties active participation in local democracy (i.e. Nepal, Tanzania, Bolivia); Enhancing political dialogue culture and coalition building both formally and informally (i.e. Myanmar, Tanzania, Palestine, Kenya, Nepal) Annex 3 provides an overview of the projects intended results. It should be emphasized that this is presented with the caveat that it is very early to outline the precise objectives of the programmes of the political parties in particular. But the indication is that most party-partnerships will continue in the new phase. Regarding country presence, the revised strategy will clarify the criteria for DIPD s country presence, including complementarities with existing or previous Danish support; relevance of and demand for DIPD assistance in the above mentioned areas; and the Danish resource base. There are no plans to prepare multi-party projects in new countries. Regarding indicators, DIPD is, as a new institution, aware of the need to demonstrate results. DIPD launched the study on Results frameworks in political party support in Stockholm June Following the insights gained from this report as well as the overall work with indicators in the democracy and human rights field, the Board of DIPD has decided that DIPD is not planning to develop global indicators on a one size fits all basis. Rather, DIPD will work on tracing change in results framework and along the chain of change described in the DIPD strategy. Thus, all indicators will be country and project specific and decided with involved partners. In order to be able to draw lessons across DIPD s overall portfolio and document changes in particular areas of DIPD s expertise, DIPD will work with results fields, in which each project will develop specific indicators. The Planning Monitoring and Evaluation system of DIPD to be developed during 2014/15 will include an evaluation policy which will ensure a thematic evaluation each year (i.e. women in 2014; youth in 2015; local party organisation in 2016; and multiparty dialogue in 2017). New three-year projects will put more emphasis on ensuring local and manageable monitoring approaches. Finally, in addition to the programmatic goals and interventions outlined above, DIPD plans to: 6

8 Continue DIDPs participation in the national and international democracy support community; Develop tools, methods, knowledge products and practices of use in the projects undertaken; Facilitate capacity building and sharing of experiences within the political parties on a regular basis; Enhance the volunteer engagement within the Danish political parties. 3.2 HUMAN RIGHTS BASED APPROACH DIPD s engagement in democracy promotion rests on the recognition that human rights are fundamental to the notion of democracy, including the right to participate in elections, the right to associate, the right to assembly and the right to freedom of speech. These rights are essential for the well-functioning of democratic processes and institutions. DIDP s work thus rests on internationally recognised human rights, and partnerships are sought internationally and with local partners where democracy and human rights respect and protection are shared goals. DIPD applies a relational approach, which is essential in a HRBA: The political parties and their members are in many instances the rights-holders vis-à-vis governments, and in some instances even struggling to get recognition of their rights (Swaziland). In other situations, DIPD considers political parties to be duty-bearers and especially so when holding power in government office. The principles of non-discrimination, participation and accountability are not only crosscutting values underpinning the work of DIPD, but also directly targeted in DIPD s cooperation projects through projects to enhance participation and youth in politics, eliminate discriminatory practices and enhance the linkages between parties, citizens and civil society to improve accountability. The focus on the quality of both the process and the outcome is inherent in DIPD s democracy work, where all experience shows that for democracy to thrive both the process (elections, campaigning etc.) must conform to agreed standards, but also the outcome must be accepted and supported by the political parties and the citizens at large. 3.3 RISKS AND ASSUMPTIONS As DIPD engages close to the power centres in political processes, there are risks as well as opportunities at play, which need to be continuously assessed. For this type of political party and democracy support to succeed, DIPD s approach is based on on-going political intelligence and dialogue and not just distribution of funds according to agreed democracy objectives. The overall strategic decisions during the next phase will also be guided by risk analysis and the new Danida risk matrix, including assessment of impact and likelihood of risk factors. In all projects, the contextual risks are significant even to the extent that it should be stressed that DIPD works with the actors and frameworks often considered part of the context. Thus, in Zimbabwe other organisations would consider the new ZANU-PF dominated government as a contextual risk, whereas for DIPD the engagement with the ruling party and the two main opposition parties on multi-party dialogue is the centre-piece of the cooperation project. In Myanmar, the on-going reform process has provided good windows of opportunity for DIPD to engage with all political parties and convene them in a historic gathering, but the risk of derailment or a more restrictive environment is still present and may increase towards the elections. In fact, what DIPD has witnessed in a country like Egypt contrary to what many hoped for just a few years ago 7

9 is that the revolution is being replaced by an increasingly repressive system. In Honduras, the main partner and its members have been victims of killings and disappearances. In Tanzania, the DIPD supported local level multi-party dialogue is both needed due to the increase in violent conflicts in and around the management of natural resources, but also put at risk by powerful national and international interests. Mitigation measures include political economy analysis. The key programmatic risk relates to the risk of not meeting aims and objectives and of causing harm by the intervention. In DIPD, it concerns both the project design and political dynamics and processes, which the projects deal with, but cannot control. The long and intensive efforts of the multi-party platform in Tanzania to ensure a good process and outcome of the Constitutional Review could suddenly be undermined by political interference or inaction. The commitment to develop the youth wings in a number of political parties in Kenya could face counter-measures from non-progressive factions within the party. In Nepal following the elections for the new Constituent Assembly in November 2013 it remains to be seen how the formerly dominating Maoist party will come to terms with being only a distant third after the two main competitors. Flexibility in the programme design and adjustments based on continued dialogue are the main mitigating measures. Institutional risks are present at several levels; both at the partner level, at the level of institutions regulating political parties and within DIPD. The institute has had to establish new procedures and working modalities, both in the secretariat but also among the political parties acting as the project responsible partner in the party-to-party cooperation projects. The risks include corruption and weak administrative and financial capacity of the partners. Risk to the donor agency and to the Danish political parties in the form of political damage or reputational risks are also identified as institutional risks. DIPD operates according to the grant management regime of Danida and thus all safeguards and promotional measures available here are also used. As a supplementary mitigating measure and to address good financial management, DIPD encourages the use of the Mango Health Check among the Danish political parties and their partners, and will in 2014 run anticorruption awareness initiatives at all levels BUDGET PROPOSAL (SEE ANNE 2) The total budget envisaged for the July 2014 to June 2017 three year period is DKK 75 million with DKK 25 million being spent annually. This will cover both the cost of the secretariat of approximately DKK 6.2 million (or 25% of the total budget 3 ), and the activity budget of DKK 18.8 million to be divided equally for party-to-party and multi-party programmes. The relatively high cost of the DIPD secretariat should be seen in the light of two issues: 1) DIPD itself had to develop and manage all administrative and financial instruments after the demise of DCISM; and 2) technical advisory services and other costs related to programme monitoring and supervision are also currently covered by the DIPD secretariat. DIPD does not currently have other core sources of funding, but some of the projects are implemented in cost-sharing or co-funding agreements. Thus, in Myanmar the programme is being implemented with support from NIMD, Netherlands, and with cost-sharing from IMS, IFES and IDEA. In Zimbabwe, DIPD and NIMD share the cost for the partnership on an equal basis. And in Egypt, both DEDI and NIMD contribute with funding and in kind contributions. 2 The Mango's Financial Management Health Check is an international tool that helps CSOs to assess how healthy the financial management is. 3 DIPD is fully funded by the Danish MFA. Therefore, the 7% overhead charge is only relevant if DIPD is awarded with external contracts or supplementary grants from the Danish MFA. 8

10 ANNE 1. Management structure DIPD has slowly built its management structure (and secretariat) since January 2011, using a limited number of full time staff to develop a portfolio in 7 multiparty countries and 9 party-to-party countries (see Annex 3 for a list of countries). As documented in the 2013 Review, there is now a need to strengthen management, and this process has already been initiated with the Board approval of a full time finance officer in early The management structure for will look like this: Direktør Seniorrådgiver Administrator Projektmedarbejder Projektmedarbejder Projektansatte, konsulenter, løntilskud Regnskabsmedarbejder Student Student Studenter Støttefunktioner Management of DIPD is also closely tied to the management agreement between MFA and DIPD, where the issue of organizational development of a new institute is highlighted. But even with additional human resources allocated for the secretariat, the list of necessary administrative and programmatic continues to be demanding for a full time staff of 6: Management of public development cooperation funds according to government guidelines; Daily administration of offices, inventory, filing system, contracts, consultants, salaries; Preparation of party and multiparty project proposals before the meetings of the Board; Advisory support for the political parties through information, seminars, etc.; Monitoring of and reporting on programmes approved by the Board; Communication about DIPD, public seminars, visiting delegations; Participation in both national and international networks working with democracy issues. This also documents that the secretariat is dividing resources between what is considered to be administrative issues, as well as programme issues. Administration (40%) includes among others: servicing the Board, maintenance of administrative systems, filing system / archives, staff and salaries, manuals and guidelines, communication with MFA, contracts and agreements with parties and consultants, transfer of funds, bookkeeping / accounting, budgeting, correspondence etc. Programming (60%) includes among others the development of country profiles, development of project documents, reviewing documents from the parties, monitoring of developments of activities, visits to countries and partners, organizing seminars, delegations and conferences, communication for the DIPD website, etc. 9

11 ANNE 2. Budget for Cooperation Agreement The total budget for the July 2014 to June 2017 three year period will be DKK 75 mio. with DKK 25 million being spent annually. This will cover both the cost of the secretariat of approximately DKK 6.2 million (or 25% of the total budget), and the activity budget of DKK 18.8 million - to be divided equally for party-to-party and multi-party programmes. At the time of writing it is not possible to indicate with any correct detail how much funding each partnership will require. This will only be decided when proposals for the next 3 years have been developed and presented to and approved by the Board. However, on the basis of past experience, the table offers a realistic indication of the amounts. Area 1: Secretariat Area 2: Funding for Party-to-Party activities Area 3: Funding for Multiparty activities Total 6,250,000 Rent for offices 350,000 Administrative services 480,000 Salaries for staff 4,500,000 Honorarium for Board members 365,000 Other costs for running the secretariat 315,000 Budget margin 240,000 Total 9,375,000 A Social Democrats 2,092,700 B Social Liberals 1,064,000 C Conservatives 721,300 F Socialist People s Party 1,026,000 I Liberal Alliance 759,350 V Liberal Party 2,207,350 Ø Red-Green Alliance 874,000 Free Funding 630,300 Total 9,375,000 Nepal 1,500,000 Bhutan 1,700,000 Myanmar 1,900,000 Egypt 1,400,000 Tanzania 1,200,000 Zimbabwe 1,200,000 Others 475,000 10

12 Area 2 covers the funding allocated for the Danish political parties wishing to be active. They have each been allocated an amount of the total funding available for the area, according to the same principles used in other situations (and these principles are specifically mentioned in the agreement between DIPD and MFA): 1/3 of the total fund amount is divided equally among the parties; 2/3 of the fund amount is divided according to the number of seats won in the most recent parliamentary election. Following the September 2011 election, the distribution looked like this: Parti Mandattal /3 af bevilling ligeligt 2/3 af bevilling efter mandater Samlet beløb 2012 A Socialdemokraterne 44 (25.1%) 416,650 1,676,050 2,092,700 B Radikale Venstre 17 (9.7%) 416, ,350 1,064,000 C Konservative 8 (4.6%) 416, , ,300 F Socialistisk Folkeparti 16 (9.1%) 416, ,350 1,026,000 I Liberal Alliance 9 (5.1%) 416, , ,350 O Dansk Folkeparti 22 (12.6%) 416, ,000 1,254,650 V Venstre 47 (26.9%) 416,650 1,790,700 2,207,350 Ø Enhedslister 12 (6.9%) 416, , ,000 In its meeting on 12 October 2011, the Board agreed on the following principles: Changes in the seats in Parliament as the result of members leaving the party they belong to at the time of the election will not impact on the DIPD distribution, which will always be based on the results at the election. The present distribution will be effective for the entire year of 2014 even if an election is called during the year. If this should be the case, the new distribution will only be effective as of 1st January Funding belonging to parties that decide not to engage in party-to-party activities will be moved into a so-called Fripulje. To start with, this funding window will be used to cover for partnerships that might need additional funding due to changes in the number of seats following an election. If this is not needed, other parties can apply. For the three year funding period of July 2014 to June 2017, there will for certain be at least one election, taking place before the end of 2015 and with the new distribution of seats being effective for DIPD as of 1 st January This will obviously be a consideration for all parties in their longterm planning. 11

13 ANNE 3: Project Results Matrix All projects have project specific indicators relating to the intended results me n- tioned below. 1. Party-to-Party Funding Country Ghana Socialdemokratiet & National Democratic Congress Swaziland Socialdemokratiet & Swazi Democratic Party (SWADEPA) Egypt Socialdemokratiet & Egyptian Social Democratic Party (ESDP) Kenya Venstre & Centre for Multiparty Democracy Kenya (CMD) Zambia Venstre & National Restoration Party (NAREP) Egypt Venstre & Free Egyptians Bolivia Intended results By supporting the National Democratic Congress with capacity building at local and national level the intention is to strengthen the party s internal democracy, gender equality and policy development, thereby assisting it in consolidating the democratic process in the party with a spill-over to Ghana as a whole. By supporting SWADEPA with organizational and political capacity building at local and national level, civic education and mobilization efforts, the partnership aims at strengthening SWADEPA and to raise the population s overall political awareness, thus advocating and pressuring for the introduction of multi-party democracy in The overall intended result is a strengthened ESDP, politically and organizationally, thereby enhancing its ability to influence Egyptian politics and work for a continuous democratization in Egypt. This is pursued through a process of capacity building and facilitating experience sharing between the two parties, especially through two training-of-trainers (ToT) components. Enhanced institutional capacity of political parties in Kenya in the areas of communication and youth development, with the purpose of strengthening the democratic development in Kenya. This also involves cooperation with other stakeholders on a Youth Forum linked to Parliament. National Restoration Party (NAREP) is established as a relevant and effective opposition party with a strong presence both at national and local levels. Specific objective is to support the party set up internal operating processes as an emerging modern democratic party. The overall purpose of the project is to engage in a process of organizational capacity building. The focus in the first phase will be on developing an organizational strategy that aims at strengthening the key organizational capacities of the party, including the ability to communicate and engage youth. To develop the territorial and organizational structure and capacity of 12

14 Liberal Alliance og VERDES Bolivia Socialistisk Folkeparti & Movement for Socialism (MAS- IPSP) Tanzania Konservative & Party for Democracy and Development (CHADEMA) Tanzania Radikale Venstre & The Civic United Front (CUF) Honduras Enhedslisten & LIBRE/Frente Nacional de Resistencia Popular Swaziland Enhedslisten & PUDEMO Palestine Enhedslisten & three political parties - DFLP, PPP, FIDA VERDES, moving it from a regional party to a national party. This shall strengthen multiparty democracy in Bolivia, by ensuring that Bolivian voters have real choice in upcoming elections. It also involves new electoral groups, such as women, youths and indigenous persons, in the political processes. Building on an existing interparty partnership SF will enter into a project corporation with MAS-IPSP with two main components: Coping mechanisms of internal disagreements - strengthen accommodating capacity of the MAS-IPSP to prevent escalation of conflicts inside the party organization; and consolidation of the youth branch of MAS-IPSP to build a sustainable organization equipped for broad mobilization and youth participation in decision making processes. Enhanced Youth and Women participation in national politics through CHADEMA. Specifically, the objectives of the project are: [1] To streamline BAWACHA (Women wing) and BAVICHA (Youth wing) organizational structures from the grassroots; [2] To capacitate Women and Youths Leaders on leadership and political skills; [3] To improve party policy advocacy in the grassroots; [4] To increase the number of Women and Youths in the 2014 local government elections and 2015 general elections. Strengthened local party organization of CUF to perform their democratic functions and in particular, including: [A] Improve development of local policy agenda; [B] Enhance local organization and democratic cultures; [C] Improve local electoral cycle management. Clarification of what might be contained in a future constitution and possible procedures for the work of a constituent assembly. This will give the leadership of the FNRP the opportunity to make decisions as to whether the organization should continue this work and give its members better opportunities to act politically. Increased capacity of PUDEMO to be a more visible and credible political force within and outside Swaziland. Relations and cooperation developed between 3 left political parties through increased cooperation between their youth organizations and at the same time to further the position of the young members and women in the parties. This with a view to enhance the social and political role of the left and to strengthen democracy in the political life and in the Palestinian society. 13

15 2. Multi-party Funding Country Bhutan Bhutan Network for Empowering Women (BNEW) and the political parties Nepal JOMPOPS Joint Mechanism for Political Party Support Myanmar Myanmar Multiparty Democracy Programme Egypt Danish Egyptian Dialogue Institute (DEDI), the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (NIMD) Intended results The general objective is to contribute to the strengthening, broadening and deepening of the democratic culture, in a society which has only in 2008 embarked upon the democratic journey, following a 100 years of rule by an enlightened monarchy. Specifically, DIPD supports initiatives that involve results like: [1] More women to be supported to run for both local government office in 2016 and parliamentary seats in 2018 through the Bhutan Network for Empowering Women platform; [2] Political parties supported in building capacity on a multiparty basis, to contribute to Bhutan having a vibrant multiparty culture; [3] Building an understanding of a democratic culture through democracy clubs in schools and media and democracy activities undertaken by civil society. The overall objective of this program is to support the willingness and capability of the political parties to consolidate the newly established multiparty system. Specifically, DIPD supports initiatives that involve results like: [1] Multiparty dialogue strengthened through the six major parties involved in JOMPOPS; [2] Strengthen the political parties at local level, recognizing that parties are democratically weak at local level, and this is where Nepal needs to improve dramatically; [3] Improve the participation of women in the life of the parties including in key positions. The democratic transition in Myanmar is on track and multiparty democracy is developing. Specifically DIPD supports initiatives that involve results like: [1] Multiparty dialogue introduced and strengthened; [2] Political parties knowing their democratic functions in a new democracy; [3] Engagement between the political parties, civil society and the media has taken place. The general purpose of this project, to be implemented by a consortium of parties, is to support new and emerging political parties to become effective and democratic partners in the new democracy. Specifically, DIPD supports initiatives that involve results like: [1] Building of a knowledge base of voter preferences; [2] Establishing effective youth wings of the parties; [3] Training and dialogue on electoral systems, legal reform, constitution building processes and party organization; [4] Establishment of Democracy Schools. Tanzania Tanzania Centre for Multiparty Democracy Entrenching of multiparty democracy in Tanzania, with activities that could have the following results: [1] Multiparty dialogue processes continued and in particular on the constitutional review process; [2] Political parties perform better their democratic functions; [3] Political parties and civil society have started engaging and discuss issues of common interest. 14

16 Zimbabwe Zimbabwe Institute For Zimbabwe s democracy to grow, a vibrant culture of multi-partyism and interparty political dialogue among its three main political parties needs to be encouraged. Specifically, DIPD supports initiatives that involve results like: [1] Understanding the need for cooperation despite ideological differences through a.o. study tours involving the three parties learning from experiences in other countries; [2] Agreeing on codes of conduct through the secretary generals of the three parties interacting closely; [3] Sharing experiences on how to support the involvement of youth and women. Together with other initiatives they can hopefully contribute to a peaceful political process taking place in Zimbabwe. If the three parties agree (and this is not certain at the time of writing), this programme will in the main involve the political leadership of parties represented in Parliament 15

17 ANNE 4. PROCESS ACTION PLAN COOPERATION AGREEMENT DIPD 3 year grant (2014) January February 2014 Internal DIPD-strategy process 6 February 2014 Meeting in the internal Danida Programme Committee January - February Dialogue between the MFA (Department for Human Rights) and DIPD about the follow-up on the review and the preparation of the 2014 grant application 5 March DIPD submits the 2014 grant application to the MFA (Department for Human Rights) 20 March 2014 Department for Human Rights submits the application to the Danida External Grant Committee 8 April 2014 Meeting in the Danida External Grant Committee March April 2014 April May 2014 Preparation of a new cooperation agreement between the MFA and DIPD Preparation of the appropriation document to be presented to the Parliamentary Finance Committee 22 May 2014 Last Board meeting of current DIPD Board May or June 2014 Presentation of the appropriation document to the Parliamentary Finance Committee 27 June 2014 First Board meeting of new DIPD Board 16

18 HRBA/Gender Screening Note Tool for Human Rights Based Approach (HRBA) and Gender Equality Screening Purpose: The HRBA and Gender Screening Note complement the HRBA Guidance Note and the up-coming Gender Equality Strategy and the Gender Equality Toolbox. The purpose of the note is to facilitate and strengthen the application of the Human Rights Based Approach and mainstreaming of gender equality programming related to Danish development cooperation. It can be used as an inspirational checklist by all staff. The information in the note should be based on the analysis undertaken as part of the preparation of the Country policy paper and should draw on major Human Rights and gender equality analysis relevant for the country such as UPR-processes, reports and documents from OHCHR, EU HR Strategy, CEDAW-reporting as well as relevant analysis prepared by other major donors. The Screening Note should be attached to the country programme concept note, and the questions raised below should be reflected in the country programme document. Appraisal of country programmes will include a specific focus on HRBA and Gender Equality. Basic info Title Country/region Budget in DKK mio. Cooperation Agreement, Danish Institute for Parties and Democracy Globally 75 million Starting date - duration 1 st July June 2017 Human Rights Based Approach Assess whether a Human Rights (HR) Based Approach has been applied in the programme: Human Rights Assessment and Standards Issues: yes No Explain: Have major HR analysis relevant for the country (countries) been consulted (UPR, OHCHR, EU HR Strategy, other relevant donor documents) All proposals presented for funding to the Board must follow the standard format of DIPD, and this includes a political economy analysis/assessment of the country. While the specific analysis and documentation referred to will not be required, other types of material referring to what is mentioned would be obvious. 17

19 Have key international HR standards and/or mechanisms influenced choice and formulation of outcome areas? Where relevant, is application at national level, including major gaps between human rights in principle vs. human rights in practice, evaluated and identified? Are key recommendations from UPR for the thematic programmes and from any treaty bodies, special procedures, INGOs, HNRIs etc. that require follow up at national level considered? Yes, but more indirectly than directly. In particular standards relating to gender equality, women s rights, access to information, public participation standards. This would be part of the process mentioned above. In some cases it could be an important part of the dialogue between the parties/partners. Recommendations that can be relevant regarding access to information, freedom of speech and assembly, rights of women, etc. should be relevant for the understanding of the political context. Are rights-holders identified? Yes, as part of understanding the political context. Example: in some countries, an opposition party could be a rights-holder needing to be supported vis-à-vis the ruling partner as duty-bearer. Are duty-bearers identified? Opposite of above. Assess whether Human Rights Principles have been applied in the preparation and in the design of the programme? Non-discrimination: Are any groups among rights-holders excluded from access and influence in the thematic programme areas identified? Not possible to rule this out. Example: the new Constitution and election laws in Egypt will make it impossible for the Freedom and Justice Party to function as a party, and this effectively excludes a large portion of the electorate. Are disaggregated data available on most vulnerable groups? Most likely not. List any key support elements included to promote non-discrimination Participation and inclusion: Are barriers for participation, inclusion and em- DIPD will use and refer to international standards and frameworks as well as national legislation to remind partners of this. Yes, this will be part of the process of defining the political economy, and specifically diagnose what has to be done by 18

20 powerment of rights holders identified? List any key support elements included to promote participation and inclusion political parties to change the situation. These principles are key to the role and functioning of a political party, run an election, etc. It is therefore at the basis of any partnership to discuss how the capacity of a party or a multiparty system to involve and include citizens can be improved. Danish experiences on how to do this will also be used. Transparency: Is the extent to which information is accessible to rights holders including marginalised groups assessed? Where relevant, whether information is available in other than official languages of the country in question should be indicated. Not in general. But to the extent it is considered relevant for the work with political parties, it could be. List any key support elements included to promote transparency Are key accountability mechanisms in the relevant area both horizontal and vertical listed? Are obstacles, e.g. capacity and politicaleconomy incentives that duty-bearers and rights holders face to exercise their obligations and rights listed? List any key support elements included to promote accountability An example could be the Right to Information legislation presently being discussed in Parliament in Bhutan. For the issues covered by DIPD, like for other governance issues, the judiciary, the ombudsman institutions, and the media are key mechanisms. In addition, the Election Commission will play a particular role, and this will be part of the programming. Not necessarily listed, but those obstacles deemed relevant for a particular programme will be analysed and addressed. Internal mechanisms established by each individual party; codes of conduct agreed among parties in a multiparty fashion; efforts by the Election Commission; efforts by the media. Results/Indicators List any indicators designed to monitor a. Inclusion and protection of minority 19