Trade Unions and the Depression

Transcription

1 Trade Unions and the Depression A Study of Victoria, L. J. Louis e

2 The traumatic experience of the depression of the early 1930s has excited the attention of remarkably few historians in Australia. This close study of the Victorian trade union movement is a pioneering investigation which, it is hoped, may encourage scholars to review conditions in other States during the time of economic crisis. For some readers the work will revive bitter or humiliating memories. Later generations of the-; affluent society may find here a meaningful commentary on the gulf of suffering that separates them from their elders. v $A4.50

3 This book was published by ANU Press between This republication is part of the digitisation project being carried out by Scholarly Information Services/Library and ANU Press. This project aims to make past scholarly works published by The Australian National University available to a global audience under its open-access policy.

4 Trade Unions and th e Depression A study of Victoria, L. J. Louis A u stralian N ational U niversity P ress C anberra 1968

5 First published 1968 This book is copyright in all countries subscribing to the Berne Convention Reproduction, in whole or in part, without written permission of the publishers,, is forbidden Registered in Australia for transmission by post as a book Library of Congress Catalog Card no National Library of Australia reg. no. AUS

6 Foreword It has become trite to say that the depression of the 1930s was one of the watersheds in Australian history. The notion that the middle-aged and the old are still obsessed with the agonising experience of the depression is often used to explain certain tendencies in the contemporary labour movement. More broadly, in the explanation of the gap between the generations, the depression vies with World War I as being the experience which separates the young from their elders. Such assertions are made with confidence, but so far there has been very little serious study of the impact of the depression on Australian society. Les Louis has set out to discover how a section of the Australian trade union movement responded to the depression. In answering this question he has given us the most detailed study that has yet been written about any aspect of the depression in Australia. He has restricted himself to the policies and actions of the unions in one State over the short period of three years. However, he is aware, and this is evident from what he says and what he implies, that the Victorian unions were not an island. They were influenced by what happened in the Labor Party in Victoria and in the labour movement throughout Australia. Further afield, what was thought and what was done in Sydney, Canberra, London, and New York, was relevant to the problems faced by the Victorian unions and their responses to them. In sticking closely to his chosen place and time the writer has been able to deal in certainties; to have ranged more widely, at least until he or others have researched the broader field in the same depth, would have meant moving into the area of insufficiently supported generalisation. The story told here is a record of the failure of the unions to cope with the depression as it affected both the individual worker and the unions as institutions. In this it did not differ in kind from the experience of unions throughout the world: any difference may have been in degree. The unions failed because they were not equipped, either theoretically or practically, to defend their members against the play of economic forces and the decisions taken by employers and governments.

7 Foreword This book is an important contribution in itself. It is to be hoped t that it is only the first of the many similar studies which are needed if we arere to know in depth about the great depression in Australia. Canberra 1967 Robin Gobllan vi

8 Preface The economic depression which overwhelmed most of the world in the early 1930s was of unprecedented magnitude and intensity. Australia, involved in the cataclysm, was to be wracked by the most profound crisis in its history. With the core of life touched, this ordeal was to have lasting consequences for Australian society. It would be difficult to overestimate the significance of the depression for the Australian labour movement, which proved unable to cope with the formidable challenges it encountered. Workers interests were not successfully defended by either the trade unions or the Labor governments which were in office in the Commonwealth and three States. Under the impact of the crisis, the effectiveness of the unions as the basic economic organisations of the working class crumbled, and the political labour movement was shattered. On the other hand, the Communist Party was to become a real force in trade union life. Part of the story of the challenges faced by the unions and how they responded is told in this study of the Victorian trade union movement during the early depression years to mid Originally this study was a thesis submitted in late 1964 to the University of Melbourne for the degree of Master of Arts. In that form it was heavily documented, to the extent that it included a volume of footnotes. Necessarily, the paraphernalia appropriate to a thesis has had to be dismantled, so that this version retains comparatively few references. The sources originally cited were chiefly newspapers and trade union journals, and to a lesser extent trade union minute books; a reader requiring access to more detailed documentation might consult the thesis now in the Baillieu Library, University of Melbourne. While it is hoped that this monograph has a relevance extending beyond the Victorian trade union movement, it is, nevertheless, an inquiry of limited scope. It ignores organisations outside the labour movement which could claim the allegiances of many workers. The trade union movement itself was in no sense an isolated entity, especially in view of its links with the Labor Party; and, in fact, much of this study is necessarily concerned with the political labour movement. A further difficulty is that many unions in Victoria, including the most powerful, were state branches of federal organisations, so that the determination of their policy did not lie exclusively in the hands of vii

9 Preface Victorians. The Victorian movement at this time, furthermore, was not matching the dramatic responses of New South Wales. The Labor split, Langism, support for a general strike, communist influence, and the Mew Guard, had but pale reflections in Victoria. Yet this was itself significant ;and vital to any explanation of the outcome in Australia. This inquiry is concerned with the period from late 1929 to mid-1932, years which constitute a definite phase of the depression in Australia, wiith the latter date marking a turning point. By that time unemployment was att its worst, and the principal measures of readjustment had been implemented. For the labour movement, the nadir of fortune seemed to have been reaictned. The high hopes bred by electoral victory in 1929 had been shattered: wilthin two and a half years the movement had been split and thrown into confiusiion, and the unions were in full retreat. It is with this process, as it manifested itself in Victoria, that the following study is concerned. After 1932 the economy began its slow recovery, and the labour movement hesitatimgly gathered momentum again. But that is another story. viii

10 Contents Foreword, by Robin Gollan Preface Abbreviations 1 Trade Unionism in Victoria at the Onset of the Depression 1 2 The Coming of the Depression: Problems of Theory and Policy 19 3 Unions, Labor Governments, and the Depression, Retreat on the Industrial Front 63 5 Unions, Labor, and the Premiers Plan 90 6 Wage Cuts and Industrial Rout The Unemployed The Last Act: the Fall of Labor in Victoria 193 Postscript 204 Appendixes I Trade Unions: Number and Membership 211 II Notes on Union Officials 212 III Weekly Basic Wage Prescribed by the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration 216 IV Unemployment 217 Selected Bibliography 218 Index 223 ix v vii xi

11 Abbreviations A.C.T.U. A.E.U. A.F.U.L.E. A.L.P. A.M.I.E.U. A.P.S.A. A.R.U. A.W.U. C.I. C.P. C.P.P. cu.c. F.P.L.P. I.C.W.P.A. I.L.O. I.W.W. M.M. P.I.E.U.A. R.I.L.U. S.I.U.C. S.P.L.P. T.H.C. T ram w ay U n io n T.U. m ovem ent U.W.M. V.T.U. W.W.F. A u stralian C ouncil o f T rade U nions A m algam ated E ngineering U n io n A u stralian F ed erated U nion o f L ocom otive E nginem en A u stralian L ab o r P arty A u stralian M eat In d u stry E m ployees U n io n A u stralian P ublic S ervants A ssociation A u stralian R ailw ays U nion A u stralian W o rk ers U nion C o m m u n ist In tern atio n al C om m unist P arty C o u n try P rogressive P arty C en tral U n em ploym ent C om m ittee F ederal P arliam en tary L abor P arty In tern atio n al Class W ar P riso n ers A id In tern atio n al L ab o u r O rganisation In d u strial W orkers o f the W orld M ilitan t M inority M ovem ent P rinting Industry E m ployees U n io n o f A ustralia R ed In tern atio n al o f L abor U nions S tate In strum entalities U n io n s C om m ittee State P arliam entary L ab o r P arty T rades H all C ouncil (M elbourne) A u stralian T ram w ay E m ployees A ssociation T rade union m ovem ent U nem ployed W o rk ers M ovem ent V ictorian T eachers U nion W aterside W o rk ers F ederation

12 1 Trade Unionism in Victoria a t the Onset of the Depression M em bership, O rganisation, and R esources The V ictorian trade unions entered 1930 blind to the likelihood of c ris is and ill-equipped to m a ster the situation which developed. As the organised industrial wing of the labour movement in V ictoria, the unions, despite a sharp drop in 1928, possessed im pressive num erical strength with a total m em bership of 240, 809 at the end of 1929 (see Appendix I ). But these num bers w ere no real guide to the effectiveness of the T rade Union (T- U-) movement, which was beset by serious w eak n esses. W hile the unions covering many of the key' industries w ere fairly strong, the degree to which the different sections of w orkers w ere organised varied considerably: som e unions - for example the A ustralian Federated Union of Locomotive Enginemen (A. F. U. L. E.) - could claim that alm ost a hundred per cent of those eligible w ere w ithin th e ir ranks, while others em braced only a fraction of those engaged in the industry o r occupation concerned. G enerally speaking, ru r a l w orkers w ere not well organised and young w orkers and women w ere less likely to be union conscious. 1 But women w orkers w ere playing an increasingly im portant role in industry, so that between and , while the num ber of m ales employed in V ictorian facto ries decreased by 15, 679 o r 14.6 per cent, the num ber of fem ales increased by 3, 945 or 8.1 p er cent. At the sam e tim e, m any unions complained that juniors w ere displacing adult w orkers. The larg e-scale im m igration of the twenties probably had some effect on the T.U. movement, though it seem s unlikely that it had resu lted in any serious weakening of the unions. N evertheless, m igration was im portant in creating antagonism within the working c la ss and in reinforcing the chauvinistic outlook of many unionists; for it was widely believed in the unions that the N ationalist governm e n t s im m igration policy had been designed partly to enable em ploye rs to use foreign w orkers to break down working conditions. And l See Census of the Commonwealth of Australia, 30 June 1933, Vol. II, pp , for a complete breakdown of the age groups of wage and salary earners in Victoria. The A.L. P. had made no serious attempt to organise young workers, and until the latter part of 19*32 - when the Young Labor Leagues were first organised - there was only the small Youmg Communist League. 1

13 T rad e Unions and the D epression for many this suspicion had grown into certainty when they noted thie nationality of many of the 'scabs' during the 1928 w aterside strik e. The 'fo reig n er' was to be an easy scapegoat in the c ris is ahead. While the m ajority of Victorian unionists w ere m em bers of branches of federal unions, there was a variety of types of unions, ranging from sm all, independent associations to large in terstate O rganisations.^ Industrial unionism, except in such p artially successful instances as the A ustralian Railways Union (A.R.U.) ancd the Printing Industry Em ployees' Union of A ustralia (P.I. E.U. A.), had made little p ro g ress, and rank-and-file organisations, such as shop and job com m ittees, w ere practically non-existent. At the e?nd of 1929 there w ere 151 separate unions in V ictoria and the craft unions played a dominant role. C raft unionism encouraged craft prejudice and parochialism, which in turn tended to inhibit clo ser organisation and the em ergence of a coherent w orking-class ideologgy. In practically every industry a num ber of unions operated, so tlhat men working side by side in the one enterp rise for the sam e employyer might be m em bers of any one of a num ber of different unions, each with its own award prescribing conditions of employm ent for its m e m b e rs. ^ This was not only uneconom ical as it involved wastefiul duplication and the overlapping of functions, but was also inim ical to solidarity as friction developed between unions. 'Body-snatchim g' was a fruitful source of conflict, and 'dem arcation' disputes w ere frequent. F u rth er, this fragm entation m eant the d isp ersal of the potential reso u rces of the w orkers as a c la ss. W here sev eral unions w ere involved, it was difficult to a rriv e at a common policy:: even on m ajor issues there was often m ore disagreem ent than unam im - ity. This seriously ham pered the conduct of disputes and facilitatted piecem eal inroads into conditions and w ages. In an attem pt to o v e r come som e of these organisational disadvantages, unions operating; in the sam e industry w ere often affiliated with a fed eratio n - fo r exam iple 2 There were in Australia 111 federated unions which embraced 83 per cent of the total number of unionists (Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics Labour Reportt 1929, Canberra, p.130). The headquarters of the A.C.T.U. and the great majority osf federal unions were in M^bourne; and many federal officials of a union were also officials of the Victorian branch. The extent to which power was centralised in the federal body of a federal union varried. For example, the State branches of the A.R.U. were practically autonomous, whereas in the A. E. U, branches were much more directly controlled by the federal bodv. 3 E.g, there were about thirty unions with members in the Victorian Railways, and thiere were about twenty-one separate organisations catering for federal public servants, theirr membership varying from about 120 to 10,

14 T rade Unionism in V ictoria the Building T rad es' Federation which em braced twelve unions. But these bodies, loose in stru ctu re and with no real pow er, w ere largely ineffective and proved no substitute for industrial unionism. As the depression deepened, support increased for the long-standing aim of c lo ser organisation. Thinking in term s of one union for each industry, union congresses - for example the A ll-a ustralian T rade Union C ongress in F eb ru ary declared in favour of transform ing the A ustralian T.U. movement so that it would have an industrial ra th e r than a craft b a sis. In fact, however, little was achieved in this direction. O rganisational weakness was accentuated by the stratificatio n that existed within the T.U. m ovem ent. The unskilled w orker, the skilled tradesm an, the 'white c o llar' w orker, and the w ell-paid professional usually did not recognise any im m ediate common in te re s ts. The considerable num ber of wage and salary e arn ers in the public service also contributed to the lack of homogeneity among em ployees as a w hole. Working under totally different conditions and in a different environm ent, public servants w ere not disposed to regard w orkers in industry as p ro letarian b ro th e rs. Indeed, there appears to have been even som e latent hostility between the two sections which was exacerbated by the p re ss and Opposition as they crusaded against governm ent 'extravagance' and depicted the public serv an t riding on the w o rk er's back. Most of the im portant white co llar organisations, such as the A ustralian Public Servants' A ssociation (A.P.S.A.), with nearly three thousand V ictorian m em bers, and the V ictorian T eachers' Union (V.T.U.), with six thousand m em bers from a total of ten thousand State teachers, w ere not affiliated with the T.H.C. or the A. L. P. But the V. T. U. and the A. P. S. A. w ere affiliated with the State Instrum entalities Unions' Com m ittee of which A.A. Calwell, the P resid en t of the A.P.S.A., was the se c re ta ry. And, while th eir organisations eschewed party politics, som e public serv an ts, such as Calwell, J. M ck ellar (Secretary of the A.P.S.A.) and H.M. Crem ean (A.P.S.A. o rg an iser until his election to the A ssem bly in 1929) w ere prom inent m em bers of the A.L.P. Sectionalism was also encouraged by the existence of different categories of em ployers, and the variety of methods and authorities for determ ining conditions of employment tended to m ilitate further against unity of organisation, outlook, and purpose. 3

15 Trade Unions and the D epression The M elbourne T rades Hall Council (T.H.C.), as the central delegate body of V ictorian unionism, was faced with the responsible task of co-ordinating and giving direction to the activities of the num erous unions in the S tate. Effective leadership by the Council was made the m ore im perative by the absence of strong national organisation; for the A.C.T.U. (formed only in 1927) was still in the embryonic stage of developm ent, and the A ustralian W orkers Union (A.W.U.), with about 110, 000 m em bers, continued to see itself as a potential riv al, relations between them being at b est uneasy and fluctuating. Although delegates w ere sent to such bodies as the I. L.O. A ustralian unions generally w ere not favourably inclined towards international affiliatio n s. 4 Passionate com m itm ent to a White A ustralia overwhelm ed what little in te re st th ere was in international w orking-class solidarity. The T.U. movem ent possessed scanty m aterial re so u rces. A rbitration proceedings w ere a costly financial drain, and very few unions had substantial credit balances o r fighting funds, so that finance for extraordinary purposes had to be raised by levies. Some union funds w ere tied up in labour en terp rises, such as the Industrial P rin t ing and Publicity Co. Ltd, the Industrial Insurance Company, and Labor P apers Ltd; but the unions generally w ere not burdened by such com m itm ents, and the co-operative movement in V ictoria exercised little appeal. M em bers contributions w ere usually fairly low, often around 26s a year, though the A.R.U. rate was only 20s while painters paid 44s. The A.C.T.U. C ongress in early 1930 pointed to 'inadequate finance as the m ovem ent's 'chief difficulty', and recom m ended a minimum rate of 36s. But, as in the case of the A.R.U., attem pts to ra ise contributions had to be abandoned with the depression when, indeed, union incom es w ere to decline d isastro u sly and m em bers clam our for economy. Lacking finance, the unions tended to be re stric te d in th eir activities and w ary of becom ing involved in d isp u tes. Staff had to be kept down to a minimum and many unions w ere handicapped by an inadequate num ber of full-tim e officials. The organs available to the T.U. movem ent for propaganda and education w ere inadequate to the task of combating anti-labour ideas or cultivating a w o rk in g-cla ss ideology, and the position was aggravated 4 Although it did not carry out the policies of that body, the N.S. W. Labor Council was affiliated with the R. I. L. U. The A.C.T.U. was affiliated with the Pan- Pacific Trade Unioi Secretariat - a connection vehemently denounced by the Australian Worker (Aust. Worker). The A.C.T.U. Congress in February 1930 resolved to sever the connection, and also to affirm its allegiance to the White Australia policy. 4

16 T rade Unionism in V icto ria by the custom s ban on revolutionary lite ra tu re. A Victorian Labor daily, mooted for so long, was as far away as ever from publication, and the Labor Call and the couple of other weekly papers, also with sm all circulations, did not fill the gap. 5 Only a handful of unions published reg u lar journals and of these only a few, like the A ustralian W orker (weekly) and the Railways Union G azette (with a monthly c irc u l ation of 20, 800) w ere of a size that offered much possibility for the discussion of issues of general im portance beyond the day-to-day affairs of the union itself. Not that they w ere vitally concerned to arouse in te re st in m ilitant action o r ideas; the content and approach of the journals and official Labor papers in no way resem bled that of the inflam m atory W o rkers W eekly. Nor did the journals provide a real forum fo r rank-and-file opinion. It seem ed at tim es that much of th e ir content was designed to enhance the p re stig e of o fficia ls. F o r the re st, the pages w ere often full of long unexciting reports of arb itratio n proceedings. No doubt the V ictorian Labor College p e r form ed a valuable serv ice, but in July 1930 only fo rty -six unions w ere affiliated, and its classes w ere not well attended. L ater, the e sta b lishm ent of the radio station 3KZ by the Industrial Printing and Publicity Company provided a fu rth er medium for propagating Labor views; but throughout the period public m eetings rem ained of f ir s t- rate im portance for the com m unication of ideas. The V ictorian T.U. movement m et the depression with its strength gravely im paired. Unemployment was already taking its toll: during 1929 the figures for unemployment in V ictoria rose from 8,6 p er cent to 13.5 p er cent, and by Novem ber 18, 322 m em bers of unions affiliated with the T.H.C. w ere without work. The industrial upheavals of the late tw enties, and especially the tim ber w o rk e rs dispute in 1929, had taxed its reso u rces and had left the movement in a parlous condition financially. Several strong m ilitant unions which had been the spearhead of the industrial movement w ere reduced to im potence. The Tim ber W o rkers Union had received a paralysing blow, and the Seam en's Union, beset by internal faction fighting, had 5 The Labor Call (L.Call), a weekly, was the A.L.P. - T.H.C. paper. The Workers' Weekly (W. Weekly), published in Sydney, was the organ of the Communist Party! The Industrial Herald (Indust. Herald), a weekly, was a Labor paper in Geelong with little influence. The Union Voice, a monthly, had a literary and intellectual socialist bias, deriving from the near defunct Victorian Socialist Party. The leading articles in the Tramway Record (Tram. Record) by Don Cameron (its editor) usually appeared about a month later in the Union Voice. Cameron was, in fact, with R.S. Ross, a key figure in Victorian union journalism. He was writing for the L.Call, too, in 1931, when he also took over from Bob Rose the Victorian Page in the Aust, Worker. 5

17 Trade Unions and the D epression not com pletely recovered from its defeat sev eral y ears previously. Following its unsuccessful strik e against the Beeby Award in 1928, the once powerful W aterside W orkers' Federation (W.W.F.) had by now alm ost disintegrated, and the rem nants often expended much energy in conflict with the sc a b s who had taken over the jobs of many m em bers of the union. The situation on the w aterfront was a running sore for y ears, and the collapse of union organisation in such an im portant key industry weakened the whole m ovem ent. F u rth e r m ore, the se rie s of defeats sustained by w orkers in the late twenties seem s to have led to w idespread d efeatism within the m ovem ent. Ideology and Policy The V ictorian trad e unions - in common with the A ustralian labour movement generally - w ere not w ell-equipped ideologically to deal with the problem s th ru st on them by the depression. Coherent doctrine of the kind that anim ated som e European m ovem ents had a l ways been lacking in A ustralia. The various stream s of thought - ranging from utopianism to revolutionary socialism - which had in fluenced the early labour movem ent had never been reduced to a system atic guiding theory. T raditionally, intellectuals had played a m inor role in the A ustralian labour movement; dow n-to-earth lead ers, p articu larly in the unions, looked askance at th eorists, except perhaps to snatch fragm ents of doctrine from a medley of sources to justify p ractical p o lic ie s. P racticality was the keynote of labour thinking, and union policies w ere for the m ost p a rt dictated by expediency and opportunism, with the m aintenance of high wages as a principal aim. Also rem aining basic to th eir thinking was that nationalism which had been expressed in the 1905 A.L.P. Objective, in the traditional support for White A ustralia, and in the continuing insistence on the need to encourage and protect A ustralian in d u strie s. The avowed ultim ate objective of the A.L.P. and the T.U. m ovem ent was the socialisation of industry (production, distribution, and exchange). But there was no generally accepted body of so cialist doctrine, o r an agreed interpretation of the m ovem ent s Objective. F o r the union leadership, socialism was a vague distant goal to be achieved through piecem eal reform s and which would be legislated into existence by a Labor governm ent when the electo rate had been educated to a sufficient level of enlightenm ent. The excitem ent of unionists over the R ussian Revolution had subsided, and, long since, official labour leaders had loudly denied that the R ussian experience 6

18 T rade Unionism in V ictoria had any relevance for the local situation. The social o rd er in A ustralia would be transform ed by parliam entary and refo rm ist methods; and in 1927 the A.L.P. had reaffirm ed its adherence to gradualism by revising the 1921 'red objective'. F or such so cialists the p rocess of change involved an extension of the functions of the state; so when Labor at the 1929 State elections prom ised to extend the activities of the State Insurance D epartm ent this was hailed by the Labor Call (14 November 1929) 'as p a rt of the pro cess of steps tow ards S ocialisation'. In 1929 the Objective commanded little enthusiasm. It was regarded as an electo ral em b arrassm en t, appropriate certainly as a slogan on such occasions as May Day, but having little relevance in m a tte rs of p ractical p o litic s. So labour leaders interm ittently attacked capitalism and the evils of exploitation, som etim es spoke vaguely of the class struggle, and pointed occasionally to socialism as the ultim ate mode of winning social justice and the em ancipation of the w orkers. But these outbursts tended to be expressions of m oral indignation ra th e r than statem ents of a firm ly-held, coherent faith. In fact very few unionists w ere class-co n scio u s, m ilitant so cialists, and union perspectives w ere lim ited to the possibility of winning reform s and modifying industrial relations within capitalism. Most unionists regarded industrial peace as highly desirab le, and disinclination for d ire c t action was b u ttressed by defeatism following the strik e s of the la te r tw enties and by the severe penal legislation enacted by the B ruce-p age governm ent in its determ ination to discipline m ilitant unions and d eter w orkers from repudiating A rb itra tion C ourt a w ard s. Official union policies reflected a dependence on industrial arb itratio n and on political action through the A.L.P. A generation of unionists had been re a red under the arb itratio n system and they had been taught to accept arbitratio n as an essen tial p a rt of the labour creed. N evertheless, as the raison d 'e tre of the unions was to p re se rv e and im prove the standard of living of th eir m em bers, th eir strong attachm ent to arb itratio n did not mean that they w ere prepared to relinquish the right to repudiate an adverse award o r to employ the traditional techniques of industrial w arfare when they felt justice was not being done. The T.U. m ovem ent's attitude was dram atically illu strated during 1929 when, without experiencing any sense of inconsistency, the m ovem ent, sim ultaneously and with equal energy, attacked the A rbitration C ourt, supported the tim berw orkers in th eir defiance of an 'unjust' aw ard of the C ourt, reaffirm ed its 7

19 Trade Unions and the D epression support for arb itration, and fought the proposal to abolish the Court. D espite the intense debates of 1929 the m ovem ent was not equipped with a theoretical analysis of the fundam entals of industrial arbitration. Its leaders w ere not concerned to examine closely issu es such as whether (or to what extent) state organs w ere p e r se im partial or the judges w ere possessed of legislative as well as judicial functions. G enerally it was taken for granted that the C ourt, properly adm iniste re d, dispensed even-handed justice - which in p ractice m eant concessions to w orkers. The T.U. movement was extrem ely hostile to the arbitration system as constituted, m aintaining that it had been perverted by the B ruce-p age governm ent and transform ed into a coercive instrum ent to bludgeon w orkers into acceptance of worsened conditions. But only a sm all m inority to the left of the movement attacked the principle of arb itratio n itself. To the m ajority, it seem ed not that arb itratio n itself had been discredited, but that, through the class biased' adm inistration and legislation of B ruce and Latham, its purposes had been d istorted. This was why the C ourt - as in the Lukin Award - was cutting w ages. Only rem ove the cu lp rits, secure a Labor governm ent, and the tru e im partiality of the system would be resto red - together with its usefulness to the w o rk e rs. F ederal trade union organisations, for the m ost p art, had grown up in response to the F ederal A rbitration C ourt, and many unions had been created as p art of the arb itratio n m achinery of the state, having re g is tered in o rd er to secure an award; that is they had not been built up on the basis of conscious, active m em bership and struggle. Many workers joined a union to enjoy the benefits of an award: such m em bers might well be called 'ticket unionists. During the years of prosperity, little m ore was required of the unionist than that he pay his dues and then sit back while officials attem pted to win concessions before some a rb itra tion tribunal. He regarded his union as a slot m achine, for he paid dues at one end and conditions dropped out at the o th er. Thus the 'ticket unionist' was not accustom ed to a s s e rt his initiative or to p a rtic ipate actively in the affairs of his union, which often involved p rotracted legal entanglem ents and specialised arb itratio n proceedings. A fter years of dependence on arb itratio n tribunals and on his officials for rem edying grievances, the 'ticket unionist' adopted a ' le a v e -it-to -th e - officials' attitude. Also, he harboured the illusion that his award, and not the strength of his union, was the secure bulw ark against inroads into his working conditions, and he believed that any gains w ere due to the justice of the tribunal and the su p erio r debating powers of his 8

20 Trade Unionism in V ictoria officials. If such unionists becam e em broiled in an industrial dispute, they w ere handicapped by inexperience and by th eir unfam iliarity with tactical problem s. By being reg istered in the Court, a union was assu red of its income to the extent that it could prosecute m em bers for a rre a r s of contributions; but while the officials could applaud the advantage of such a procedure, especially during a depression, it is highly unlikely that good unionists could be produced by the th reat of legal coercion. It should also be noted that arb itratio n and the m ultiplicity of aw ards stem m ing from individual treatm en t of the various unions helped to p reserv e the fragm entation already noted. Com m itm ent to arb itratio n also m eant a certain loss of union independence and freedom of action, and, in the event of th eir refusing to accept an aw ard, unions cam e into conflict with the State. V ictorian unions by this tim e retained few tra c es of I.W.W. influence, though during the depression there was som e in te re st in the One Big Union idea. They looked m ainly to politics for the attainm ent of th eir objectives, and m ore than seventy unions,including m ost of the im portant ones,w ere affiliated with the A. L. P., which was regarded as the political wing of the labour m ovem ent. T heoretically, the unions could dominate the political m achine, for they could m u ster a m ajority of the delegates to the State conference of the party (169 of 224 in 1929) and had the num bers to determ ine the outcome of s e le c tion ballots; but in practice the relations between the two wings of the movement w ere not so sim p le.6 With c h aracte ristic indifference to theory, the unions made few attem pts to analyse the elem ents of political power o r to define th eir own possible relationship with a Labor governm ent. T heir ideological equipment, here, consisted of a few sim ple a rtic le s of faith: the A.L.P. was the political expression of the industrial labour movement; the A.L.P. laid down the policies to be im plem ented by Labor governm ents; Labor governm ents could legislate for the regulation of industrial relatio n s. Such was th eir faith in the efficacy of legislation that unionists im plicitly accepted a view of governm ental power that alm ost elevated it to the realm of omnipotence, and they assum ed that a Labor government could, and would, ensure a high standard of living. They took it for granted that a Labor governm ent could adm inister the capitalist 6 A scheme to amalgamate the industrial and political wings of the labour movement was being discussed by representatives of the T.H.C. and A.L.P. Negotiations continued in early 1930, but no agreement could be reached. 9

21 Trade Unions and the D epression state in the in terests of the w orkers, and they did not concern them selves with the possibility that the in te re sts of labour m ight not coincide with 'national in te re sts', or that Labor governm ents might regard the la tte r as th eir prim e responsibility. Although they felt that achievem ents of Labor governm ents in the past had fallen short of th eir expectations, the unions did not analyse serio u sly L abor's previous shortcom ings in o rd er to prevent th eir re c u rre n ce. If explanations w ere offered, they tended to be in such sim ple term s as personal failings o r apostasy. W orkers for th eir p a rt had not given undivided support to Labor, as the long reign of the B ruce-p age governm ent made c le a r. N evertheless at the end of 1929 the A.L.P. faced little com petition for the form al allegiance of the trad e unions. On the left the young Communist P arty of A ustralia had only a few hundred m em bers and was handicapped by a divided leadership. Having very few m em bers in the unions, it was a propaganda sect ra th e r than an active 'v an g u ard '. ^ And the political insignificance of the Com m unist P arty was not as m arked as that of the Socialist P arty of A ustralia, which was kept alive by the energy of a few enthusiasts such as W. Clarke (Seamen's Union), and J. Coull. The dem ise of the V ictorian Socialist P arty was close at hand and was being staved off tem porarily by a few stalw arts such as Don Cam eron and R.S. Ross who w ere also prom inent in the A. L. P. Leadership It was a significant feature of the V ictorian T.U. m ovem ent that the num erically strong unions w ere ra re ly an aggressive driving force in the counsels of labour, and that at the sam e tim e the m ajority of the m ost influential officials rep resented unions of le s s e r industrial im portance. The effective leadership of the V ictorian T.U. m ovement was in the hands of a relatively sm all group of what might be designated 'professional trad e union o fficials', and though they cam e under fire as the depression deepened, these m oderate and rig h t- wing leaders managed to retain control. As th eir c ritic s discovered, they w ere well entrenched. There was a core of 'old hands' who had helped build the labour movement and secure conditions and aw ards. Some officials had been instrum ental in founding th eir union and many 7 C ommunists were debarred from membership of the A. L. P. and the A. W. U. The C. P. did not run candidates in a State election in Victoria until November 1929, when it could afford the deposit of only one candidate who secured 1, 869 votes. 10

22 Trade Unionism in V ictoria could claim a lengthy tenure of office (see Appendix II). The officials of the unions and delegates to the T. H. C. and the various labour conferences w ere, with few exceptions, refo rm ists to whom revolutionary ideas w ere repugnant. This union leadership believed that the struggle between capital and labour was to be fought in P arliam ent, in the wages board room, o r before an A rbitration C ourt judge. They looked to political action and Labor governm ents, ra th e r than to m ass w orking-class struggles or industrial action, for the advancem ent of th eir m em bers' in te re sts. As W. J. Duggan (a top union leader and P resident of the V ictorian A. L.P.) declared in his address to the 1929 Conference of the A.L.P., 'The economic power of the w orker on the industrial field is nebulous com pared with his economic power at the ballot b o x '. A num ber of the m ost prom inent union lead ers had received th eir e a rlie r training in the V ictorian Socialist P arty and w ere professed socialists and unswerving advocates of the ballot box. The g reat m ajority of officials w ere active A. L.P. supporters and some had helped to build the political labour m ovem ent. Many w ere on the executive of th eir local A. L.P. branch, and in 1929 m ore than half of the V ictorian C entral Executive w ere union officials, some of whom w ere also federal d eleg ates. Few union officials had not on som e occasion contested a preselection ballot, and som e of these aspiring Labor politicians graduated to P arliam ent o r w ere su c c e ssful in m unicipal elections. There was therefore a significant degree of interlocking between the trade union and A. L.P. leadership (see Appendix II). Many V ictorian officials had commended the proposal in 1929 for O an Industrial Peace Conference on the Mond-T u rn er m odel. In dealing with industrial problem s, union officials favoured the tactics of negotiation and com prom ise, and they w ere supporters of a rb itra tion and conciliation. Indeed, the arb itratio n policy of the unions tended to create a caste of officials who did not function as agitators and o rg an isers but as A rbitration C ourt law yers. If a strik e did occur, the union leadership usually assum ed the role of m ediator and was concerned to work for term s of settlem ent in o rd er to re sto re industrial peace. 8 Scullin, on becoming Prime Minister, revived the proposal; but, though some leading officials approved, the scheme was abandoned, as the Trades Hall Councils in most of the States refused to participate. 11

23 Trade Unions and the D epression The labour m ovem ent trad itio n ally paid little attention to the r e cruitm ent and training of leaders; and, in any case, the easy years of prosperity offered opportunities for the entry of c a re e ris ts into lead ing union positions. N evertheless, it seem s that m ost union officials, though a le rt for opportunities for personal advancem ent, w ere efficient ad m inistrators who ran the office, negotiated with em ployers, acted as A rbitration Court advocates, and had at th eir finger-tips the details of aw ards, industrial legislation, arb itratio n procedures and so on. Being absorbed in technical and adm inistrative questions, these leaders did little to m obilise the potential strength of the w orkers or develop the initiative of the rank and file, and they ra re ly found the tim e or the incentive to inquire into profounder problem s beyond th eir specialised daily task s. T heir policies and th eir conception of le a d e r ship seem ed adequate and appropriate enough during the prosperous y ears, but w ere not to prove so satisfactory during a period of depression. On the Eve During the boom years when A ustralian w orkers enjoyed a relatively high standard of living, there had been a w ithering of the roots of the an ti-cap italist sentim ent that had previously anim ated large sections of the labour m ovem ent, and in 1929 unions generally did not regard capitalism as n ecessarily a b a rrie r to the advancem ent of th eir in te re sts. The stability and expansion of the economy had fostered a w idespread expectation that, to the advantage of both w orker and e m ployer, the system would, with a little tinkering, go on gradually improving; and in som e q u arters of trade unionism it was believed that F ordism ' had rendered the so cialist ideal obsolete. The unions had done little to equip th eir m em bers with a c ritic a l understanding of capitalism o r L abor s O bjective, and the younger generation was to some extent unfam iliar with trade union traditions and id e a ls. Since 1928 there had been a serie s of inroads into the wages and working conditions of sections of the w orkers, and the w aterside w orkers, tim ber w orkers, and coal m iners had offered fierce r e s is tance to such red u ctio n s. Believing that the tim b er w orkers w ere fighting a battle on behalf of all w orkers, the labour movement had rallied to th eir support with finance and encouragem ent. Thus the 9 Until recently the Railways Union Gazette had been unusual for its persistent and militant propaganda for socialism, and had stood out in 1927 in objecting to the revision of the 1921 A.L.P. Objective (R.U. Gazette, 31 August 1927). 12

24 Trade Unionism in V ictoria end of the decade saw la rg e -scale industrial conflicts which w ere accom panied by extraordinary bittern ess and violence, and intensified by the use of the coercive pow ers of the state against unions and th eir le ad e rs. Unions regarded the tim ber and coal disputes as evidence of a general attack by em ployers on the w o rk ers standard of living. But they did not attribute this drive to any basic economic cause; ra th e r, they sought an explanation in term s of avaricious em ployers taking advantage of an anti-w orking class governm ent and a biased A rbitration C ourt. The situation, they believed, urgently demanded the election of a Labor governm ent. Towards the end of 1929, there w ere unm istakable signs that all was fa r from well with the A ustralian economy and, with unemployment becom ing increasingly serio u s, V ictorian trad e unions w ere beginning to feel the pinch. Along with the re s t of the community, however, they w ere unaware of the impending c ris is. In addition, the unions w ere, in a sense, caught on the wrong foot, for the cam paign against the M aritim e Industries B ill as well as the federal and V ictorian p a rlia m entary elections all served powerfully to reinforce both th eir m isconceptions about the A rbitration C ourt and the Labor P arty, and th eir faith in the efficacy of legislation to ensure p ro sp erity. Industrial and political labour together with the white co llar organisations had been practically unanimous in th eir opposition to the B ruce-p age governm ent's proposal that the federal authority should vacate the field of arb itratio n except for the m aritim e in d u stries, and that the States should assum e full responsibility. Only the sm all m inority which opposed the whole policy of arb itratio n did not see the Bill as a calam ity. From the end of May until polling day on 12 O ctober 1929, union leaders re ite ra ted alm ost daily the claim that the governm ent's proposal was designed to sm ash wages and conditions, and the equation retention of the A rbitration C ourt = preserv atio n of the standard of living was tire le ssly repeated and instilled into unionists. The V ictorian T. U. movement participated fully in the rem arkable cam paign mounted by Labor against the B ill, and with sim ila r enthusiasm and energy the movement worked to secu re the election of a Labor governm ent. 10Victorian unions donated a total of 4, 339 9s lid to Labor Party election funds. About I sixteen unions donated 100 or more and amona the larse contributors were the Boot Trades Union ( 450), Postal Workers ( 554), P.TE.U.A. ( 250), A.F.U.L.E. ( 269), I A.R.U. ( 250) (L. Call, 1 May 1930). Cf. the much smaller amount donated in 1928 I (ibid., 3 January 1929). 13

25 Trade Unions and the D epression From mid-1929 the P rim e M inister and other Governm ent m em bers had warned that A ustralia was confronted with grave and urgent economic problem s; but the Labor Opposition had rejected th eir estim ate of the situation- Ironically, the future F ed eral T re a su re r (E.G. Theodore) claim ed that B ru ce's picture of the economy was to a large extent im aginative. Throughout the federal election cam paign Labor spokesm en revealed no real appreciation of the economic danger signals or any aw areness of the difficulties associated with a dependent economy; and they did not d irect the attention of unionists towards such problem s as the failure of the London money m arket. Financial difficulties and unemployment, w orkers w ere told, w ere due to the m ism anagem ent and reckless extravagance of the B ruce-p age governm ent - an indictm ent p ressed, too, by the Age. A Labor governm ent would scotch the 'plot' to slash th eir standard of living and would set the country on the road to pro g ress and p rosperity by 'a retu rn to sane finance'. It would provide employment by expanding public w orks, halt the flood of im ports and encourage local industry by raising the tariff, open the way for peace in industry by amending the A rbitration Act, and it would withdraw the proposed am usem ent tax. H T rade union propaganda ad vocating the retu rn of a Labor governm ent read like the advertisem ents for quack patent m edicines: Before (B ruce-page Government) - slum p; A fter (Labor Government) - p ro sp e rity. Thus at this crucial m om ent, when the country was entering the depression, V ictorian unionists had drum m ed into them the sim ple form ula that a Labor governm ent m eant retention of the A rbitration Court and preservation of the standard of living. Such was the in ten sity of the issu es, that many of the non-political white co llar and public service organisations took the ex traordinary step of appealing to th eir m em bers to 'vote for the retention of a rb itra tio n ', that is for Labor. The Communist P arty, too, advocated the retu rn of a Labor governm ent which it believed would afford w orkers 'a sh o rt breathing space' in th eir resistan ce to em ployers' attack s. L abor's overwhelming victory exceeded the expectations of even the m ost optim istic. In V ictoria, the eight re tirin g m em bers w ere r e turned and five additional seats w ere captured by Labor candidates, ammgst whom w ere the prom inent union lead ers R.V. Keane (General 11 For other Labor promises and proposals, see the speeches of Scullin and Theodore (Age, 20,24, and 28 September 1929; Aust. Worker, 25 September 1929). 14

26 Trade Unionism in V ictoria S ecretary of the A.R.U.) and A. Lewis (Secretary of the C a rte rs' and D riv ers' Union). G reat jubilation swept through the T.U. movement, and it was heightened still fu rth er by the final re su lt in F lin d ers. H ere, the defeat of the P rim e M inister by E.J. Holloway (who as secretary of the T.H.C. had been fined for his p art in the tim ber w orkers' dispute) seem ed to the movement to be the perfect consum mation of L abor's electo ral victory and its trium ph over reaction and the attem pt to lower living stan d a rd s. Scullin (the P rim e M inister elect) reassu red cheering T.H.C. delegates about the future, and there w ere 'rem arkable scenes of enthusiasm ' at Spencer S treet Station as a large crowd gave him a rousing send-off on his way to C anberra w here, according to the Labor Call (24 O ctober 1929), V ictorian Labor m em bers w ere 'to make employment - and h isto ry '. The V ictorian State election campaign followed in November Again, the N ationalists w ere held responsible for straitened circu m stances, and Labor propagandists and candidates sought to make as much political capital as possible out of unemployment and the acute financial em b arrassm ent of the M cpherson governm ent. A Labor governm ent, they prom ised, would 're sto re the State finances to a sound b a sis ', encourage A ustralian in dustries, and initiate developm ental w orks, and by such steps lead V ictoria back tow ards pro g ress and pro sp erity. It would deal with unemployment, and would prom ote the in terests of w orkers, p rim ary producers, and other sections of the community. Labor spokesm en, however, in throwing the onus for the S tate's difficulties on to the 'incom petent and extravagant' M cpherson governm ent, glossed over the fact that loan funds to the States had been severely reduced. M oreover, they did not re-exam ine the situation o r hesitate to repeat the p a rty 's undertakings to w orkers and the unemployed after 11 November, when the Loan Council (with Theodore, the new F ederal T re a su re r, as chairm an) unanimously agreed that, because of the difficult m onetary conditions prevailing, it would be 'quite im practicable' to ra ise loan moneys to p erm it any in crease in the loan program s of the various governm ents. The Hogan m inority Labor governm ent which had lost office a year previously had been a grave disappointm ent to many in the movement, and it had incurred union disp leasu re, mounting in som e cases to hostility. The M inistry's stand during the 1928 w aterside w orkers' strik e and then the police protection afforded the strik e b reakers in the turbulent afterm ath had provoked intense resentm ent which had 15

27 T rade Unions and the D epression blazed into fury when police fired on dem onstrating stevedores; four were wounded, one of whom la te r died. Meanwhile its railw ays policy, especially regarding retrenchm ent, had brought the governm ent into sharp conflict with the A.R.U., which fiercely denounced it as anti-w orking C la ss'. At the selection ballots in A pril 1929 the A.R.U. sought the defeat of those m em bers 'who serv e C apitalism in the name of L abor'. A few days la te r, however, the annual conference of the union decided 'that the incident should be closed' and that m em bers should work for the retu rn of a Labor governm ent. Thus in Novemb er 1929, A.R.U. officials joined with the trade union leadership to present the election of a Labor governm ent as being vital to the in te r ests of w orkers and p articu larly of the unemployed. R.S. Ross (in the A ustralian W orker, 13 November 1929) insisted, 'Those who want the depression banished m ust put State Labor in so that it shall co-operate with F ederal Labor and set pro sp erity flooding the land like rays from the sun.' With Labor governing in both spheres, other propagandists urged, 'The outcome m ust be splendid achievem ents for the w elfare of the w o rk e rs.' They did not mention either the explosive w aterfront situation o r the dissatisfaction which the previous Hogan governm ent had aroused, and indeed Labor candidates extolled at length the reco rd of that governm ent. D issent was confined to the sm all handful of com m unist speakers whose revolutionary polem ics caused little s tir. It would appear, how ever, that the support for Labor within the T.U. m ovem ent was not as vigorous and enthusiastic as it had been at the federal elections,and public service organisations had returned to th eir accustom ed stance. But it might be noted that fourteen sitting Labor m em bers w ere returned unopposed, and the campaign had been shaped by the need to capture country s e a ts. C ertainly there was a swing to Labor, but the p a rty 's strength was only increased from tw enty-eight to thirty in the House of sixty-five. Thus the balance of power was again held by the two L iberals and the four m em bers of the Country P ro g ressiv e P arty (C.P.P.). During the federal and V ictorian election cam paigns, while unionists w ere encouraged to reg ard it as th e ir party, the Labor P arty was presented to electo rs generally as the people's party and not an in terest party. Seeking maxim um electo ral support, Labor put forw ard policies which w ere designed to appeal to the w idest possible variety of groups and in te re sts. L ab o r's program offered no 12 See R. U. Gazette. March, April 1928, March, May 1929, for comments. 16

28 Trade Unionism in V ictoria s tangible th reat to the private en terp rise system and, though there was som e declam ation about the intentions of rapacious cap italists, Labor candidates in public dropped the word 'so cialism ' from th eir vocabu lary. P resse d at a m eeting, E.G. Theodore said that he believed in socialisation, but it was too rem ote to look forw ard to at the expense of the people's im m ediate needs. The Age had thrown its weight behind Labor in the federal elections, and, as the A ustralasian M anufacturer rem arked (26 O ctober 1929), Scullin's speeches w ere intensely patriotic and devoid of bittern ess: 'They contained no r e f e r ences to class w arfare; they w ere national in th eir outlook and atm o s p h e re '. Opponents had not raked up Scullin's resolution of the previous May Day, and the G eneral S ecretary of the A.W.U. was grateful that 'the old Socialistic tig er was allowed to sleep peacefully throughout the cam paign'. U nionists had not been warned that the Senate might prove to be a serious obstacle to a Labor governm ent, and they w ere only inform ed la te r of the constitutional lim itations which w ere to ham per the Scullin governm ent. In V ictoria, despite its notoriously anti-l abor record, the likelihood that the Legislative Council would fru stra te the policy of a Labor governm ent received scant acknowledgment. Candidates did not qualify th eir prom ises to give effect to L abor's proposals, in cluding those such as unemployment insurance which the Council had previously rejected. The general attitude seem s to have been that if Labor secured a m ajority in the A ssem bly, then the Council 'can be brought to h e e l'. A fter the elections, the M cpherson M inistry decided to c a rry on and prepared to m eet P arliam en t. The Age thundered against its 'audacity' and Hogan against its 'unparalleled effro n tery ', both in s is t ing that this 'defeated and d iscredited' m inistry had to go. The Labor Call conceded that th ere w ere weighty argum ents against a m inority Labor governm ent, and it sounded a prophetic note: 'P a rtic u la rly in the case of Labor does governm ent by consent of a non-l abor faction operate detrim entally to m orale and p rin c ip le.' N evertheless, it demanded, 'Labor m ust g o v e rn.' 13 The propriety of a m inority Labor governm ent does not seem to have been seriously debated within the T.U. m ovem ent. The m atter had received attention e a rlie r in the year, however, at the E aster 13 L. Call, 5, 12 December Maintaining that 'the "No Money" cry is all criminal nonsense', it argued, 'there jj_money', but 'only a Labor Government can get it for the unemployed'. 17

29 Trade Unions and the D epression A.L.P. Conference. As a consequence of the g reat dissatisfaction' which the Hogan governm ent had aroused, Conference was urged to declare that Labor should not form a governm ent unless it had a m ajority in the Assembly. The motion, however, had not been accepted. When P arliam ent opened on 11 D ecem ber, Hogan lost no tim e in moving a no-confidence m otion. As the C.P.P. and the two Liberals voted with Labor, the M cpherson M inistry was defeated (36-28) and the P rem ier im m ediately resigned. The next day the second Hogan m inority governm ent took office. The new m inistry was alm ost identical with the one which had been defeated ju st over a y ear p re v iously when the C.P.P. had withdrawn its support. The Labor Call (19 D ecem ber 1929) strongly supported L abor's action in taking office; and, though it now cautioned Labor supporters that they 'have not the right to expect m ore than the Governm ent can do', it, together with the A ustralian W orker, expressed high hopes of the possible achievem ents of this governm ent. It was the A rgus (13 D ecem ber 1929) and not a union journal which insisted that 'th ere is in office a Labour M inistry which cannot give effect to a Labour p ro g ram m e'. Events dem onstrated alm ost im m ediately that the M inistry possessed only lim ited pow er. Increased revenue was n ecessary if the governm ent was to m eet its obligations; so on 18 D ecem ber, Hogan brought down a hurriedly prepared budget which provided for increased taxation. The Legislative Council refused to accept the tax proposals and a deadlock between the Houses ensued. Finally the M inistry gave way and agreed to lower rates of taxation. 18

30 2 The Coming of the Depression: Problems of Theory and Policy Thus is the w inter of our discontent m ade glorious su m m e r', was a typical reactio n by a union official to the fed eral election triu m p h. 1 But while the T.U. m ovem ent was s till jubilantly w elcom ing L ab o r's v icto ry, A u stralia was passing over the threshold of the d ep ressio n. In the following m onths, high expectations and confidence in the Labor governm ents received rude shocks, as the conditions of the tw enties, which had provided a b asis fo r re fo rm ism and the winning of concessio n s, collapsed under the feet of the labour m ovem ent. The price of A ustralian exports fell steeply, while o v ersea longte rm loans had becom e a thing of the p a st. The national incom e contracted alarm ingly and governm ents w ere in creasin g ly e m b a rra s s ed by mounting budgetary d eficits and se rio u s d isequilibrium in the balance of o v ersea p ay m en ts. As 1930 p ro g re ssed, the econom y d eterio rated rapidly while unem ploym ent so ared, and as the w heels of industry slowed down and the th re a t of financial c ris is loom ed m ore m enacingly, pow erful p re s s u re s for econom ic read ju stm en t cam e into play. The V ictorian T.U. m ovem ent, buffeted and perplexed, r e tre a te d, its ranks thinned and in in creasin g d is a rra y. Ideological confusion was w idespread, inroads began to be m ade into w ages and w orking bonditions, and the w o rst fe a rs of m o re and m ore w o rkers w ere re a lised as they joined the dole queues. The Unions and the D epression T rade unions generally, early in 1930, did not re a lise that A u stralia was soon to be engulfed in c a ta stro p h e. At firs t th e re was little concern to analyse the situation and, indeed, som e union jo urnals throughout the whole y ear offered few g en eral com m ents and m ade no endeavour to educate th e ir m em b ers reg ard in g econom ic developm ents. A liquor referendum was the focus of consid erable attention, and m ore energy was expended in prom oting riv al view s on prohibition than in deep consideration of econom ic p ro b lem s. F o r som e tim e th e re was a g eneral inclination to re g a rd the country 's difficulties as m erely tem p o rary, and som e spokesm en condem ned 'panic talk ' of d ep ressio n as d etrim en tal to w o rk e rs. The A u stralian W orker and l Printing Trades Journal, November See also Aust. Worker, 16, 23 October

31 Trade Unions and the D epression the Industrial H erald warned against 'calam ity h ow lers', who would stam pede w orkers into accepting reduced wages, and the Railways Union Gazette (M arch, A pril 1930) advised railw aym en to repudiate 'depression talk ', for any panic would lead to hoarding and consequent decreased circulation of money, with unemployment following as a resu lt. Most union officials held that there was an intim ate connection b e tween tariff policy and the standard of living, and they w ere ardent advocates of high protection. So unions expectantly awaited the m ost beneficial resu lts which w ere to follow the Scullin tariff;^ they confidently predicted that, given a little tim e, the Labor governm ents would clear up the 'm ess' they had inherited and pro sp erity would be resto red. If they had doubts that this was but wishful thinking, they could have been re a ssu re d by the optim istic statem ents of the Scullin governm ent, for, as the P rim e M inister a sse rte d in February, the outlook was 'filled with prom ise, and a retu rn to norm al conditions may be expected at no distant d a te '. As the y ear p ro g ressed and pro sp erity was not resto red, som e of the optim ism vanished, but there was still no realisatio n that the nation was entering a prolonged and unprecedented c ris is, and unions usually did not diagnose the trouble as anything much m ore serious than a tem porary recessio n which unscrupulous em ployers w ere turning to th eir own advantage. That they did not anticipate where the trend of events was leading is undoubtedly of g reat im p o rtance for any explanation of the unions' behaviour. Had they sensed what the future had in sto re, they may have been constrained to form u late, and throw th eir weight behind, effective long-range plans, ra th e r than to have drifted, M icaw ber-like, from week to week. As it was, w orkers w ere made m ore susceptible to the influence of those pro p a gandists who preached that p ro sp erity was ju st around the co rn er and thus w ere probably m ore open to persuasion that som e tem porary sacrifice on th eir p art would contribute to A u stralia's rehabilitation. As the unemployment problem becam e urgent and standards of living w ere increasingly threatened, the unions w ere led to reflect m ore seriously on general economic issu e s. But th eir past indiffer- 2 The sharp decline in imports meant further unemployment in certain industries, and maritime unions expressed anxiety about the tariff (Aust. Worker, 30 April 1930). Qi 22 April, two deputations interviewed Scullin: the Iron Trades Council to urge a prohibitive tariff to create more employment, and maritime unions to complain that the existing tariff was causing unemployment (Argus, 23 April 1930). 20

32 The Coming of the D epression ence to theory and neglect of the ideological education of th eir m em bers, together with the absence of any accepted body of economic doctrine, had serio u s consequences for th eir understanding of the depression. A m edley of th eo ries, solutions, nostrum s and panaceas w ere advocated in increasing profusion. T here w ere some propositions, however, that received fairly general assent and, at the risk of im porting into the unions' thinking a coherence that was lacking, it is im portant to attem pt a general exposition of the stance they tended to adopt tow ards the problem s that assailed them. Union propagandists reacted sharply against the heavy p re ssu re on all sides for deflationary policies. W hatever other differences they had, they all felt that deflation m ust make the d e p re s sion w orse and lead the country to ruin. Recovery could not be achieved and m ust not be attem pted - as they said was being done - by sacrificing the w o rk ers' standards of living. Lower wages and longer hours, in th e ir view, m ust inevitably re su lt in m ore unemployment and w orsening of the depression. F rom this fundamental position they moved forw ard to argum ents based on a belief that in fact in creased wages and a sh o rte r working week w ere keys to recovery. U sually, the startin g point of any analysis was the 'paradox' of want in the m idst of plenty, and descriptions w ere provided of the irratio n al and tragic features of a world in which unemployment and starvation existed side by side with wealth and storehouses overflow ing with com m odities. This anomalous state of affairs, unions held, was due to the disparity between production and consum ption, and, m aintaining that the productive capacity of the country was never g re a ter, they reasoned that the cause of dislocation m ust be in the sphere of consum ption. A ustralia was suffering from depression,not because the people did not produce sufficient wealth, but because th eir purchasing power was too lim ited and they could not buy the com m odities produced. Thus unions arriv ed at th e ir basic argum ent that there was a disproportion between production and purchasing power, and that to revive industry it was n ecessary to re sto re equilibrium by m aking good the deficiency of purchasing pow er. During these y ears, union discussions of rem edial m easu res usually centred around purchasing power, though th ere w ere som e differences as to how the d esired in crease was to be achieved. Some propagandists, especially those influenced by Social C redit theories, contended that in o rd er to c o rre c t the deficiency of purchasing power and thus b rin g consum ption into line with production, a sufficient 21

33 Trade Unions and the D epression supply of currency would have to be made av ailab le. With scant regard for the niceties of term inology, however, m ost union spokesmen re fe rre d vaguely to the shortage of m oney', or occasionally even m ore vaguely to the shortage of 'm eal tic k e ts', and th eir m ajor line of reasoning was developed from the observation that the pay they r e ceived enabled the w orkers to purchase only a portion of the com m odities produced, Thus for m ost propagandists, increased purchasing power m eant higher wages and an income for those at p resen t unem ployed, They argued that an in crease in purchasing power would stim ulate demand and this would lead to a revival of industry and m ore employment. In d irect contradiction to deflationary th eorists, union spokesm en w ere convinced that pro sp erity and high wages went hand in hand; but they ra re ly endeavoured to explore v ery fa r the ra m ifications of the purchasing power argum ent. When they sought to clinch th eir point, ardent proponents of the argum ent, such as the A ustralian W orker (e,g. 16 July 1930), made such assertio n s as, 'Economic conditions do not precede wages; they are the resu lt of w a g e s'. A ssociated with these ideas about purchasing power there w ere usually strong opinions on m onetary and banking re fo rm.^ Observing m asses of unemployed capital and labour on the one hand and idle factories on the other, unions concluded that the sluggish w heels of industry required lubricating with credit; so 're le a se of c re d its' was for the unions a principal m eans to recovery which they urged on every possible occasion. That the wheels lacked this lubricant was no accident: the c ris is had been precipitated by the calculated action of financial institutions in suddenly restric tin g credit. The belief was w idespread that the depression was 'a rtific ia l', the resu lt of a 'conspiracy' of the Money Pow er to sm ash the A ustralian standard of living. The Money Lords, it was claim ed, had a 'stranglehold' on industry, for money 'is issued in accordance with the demands of financial c a p italists', and 'when the supply of money is re stric te d or held up, industry and the w orkers are also held u p '. So unions urged the federal governm ent to break this 'stranglehold' and issue a volume of credit that would be sufficient to enable industry to get on its feet again and also finance public works to absorb the unemployed. In b itte r assaults on Money Pow er, union spokesm en argued that it was a glaring injustice that the control of m onetary policy and cred it should 3 For some acute observations on these aspects of labour thinking, see L. Ross, 'Australian Labour and the Crisis', Economic Record, December 1932, pp

34 The Coming of the D epression be vested in private hands, for this power was exploited for profit re g a rd le ss of the people's w elfare; and, especially after mid-1930, unions w ere increasingly insistent that banking and cred it be nationalised. Soon the slogan was 'socialisation of c re d it'. In reply to th eir horrified c ritic s, union propagandists denied that c red it expansion m eant inflation, but very few of them attem pted to probe deeply into the m echanism of the financial system. They d is m issed out of hand 'the precepts of financial orthodoxy, invented to delude and defraud the people', and they denounced the experts who m ade banking 'a m ore o r less m ysterious and baffling hocus-pocus'. The gold standard should be abandoned, for it was a 'tric k ', which 'enables financial capitalists to regulate the supply of money' for th eir vast enrichm ent. It was claim ed that in his pam phlet Facts and T heories of Finance F rank Anstey had dem olished 'the quantity theory of m oney' and had dem onstrated that increased bank cred its would not n ecessarily resu lt in p rice ris e s. 'The lim it of cred it is the volume of actual wealth available', propagandists asse rte d, and if the 'gold b a sis' w ere to be replaced by a 'wealth b a sis ', then through a Commonwealth-owned banking system sufficient money could be made available for the revival of industry and the advancem ent of the in te r ests of A ustralian w o rk e rs. The unions w ere not perturbed that th eir ideas ran counter to orthodox econom ics in this pre-k eynesian e ra, regarding orthodox econom ists - P ro fe sso r Giblin, for instance - as spokesm en for the em ployers and as pedants who m isled the w o rk e rs. In enunciating its policies, the T.U. movement did not endeavour to justify them in the te rm s of any corpus of economic thought. U nim pressed by the constant demand that A ustralia would have to observe economic laws regarding wage levels, the A ustralian W orker (14 May 1930) replied that 'the g reatest of all economic laws is, that a man should enjoy the full re su lts of his in d u stry '. Invariably, spokesm en fell back on appeals to justice, protesting that it was grossly unfair that w orkers should be forced to b e ar sacrifices when the c ris is was entirely the work of cap italists. Although on occasions, and with suitable care to ignore those propositions which w ere at variance with Labor proposals, some quasi-m arxist ideas were em ployed,4 there was 4 Among the more consistent expositions of Marxist economics was a series of articles by 'Verax' in the L. Call, 11 September-2 October Without much justification, the L. Call, 9 October 1930, referred to Anstey's pamphlet as 'credit interpreted in the Marxist method'. Anstey, however, did go some way towards providing the movement with theoretical arguments. 23

35 Trade Unions and the D epression practically no attem pt to relate official policy to any body of so cialist econom ics. R ather, Henry Ford was a favourite authority for the demand for higher w ages, and n o n -socialist econom ists like C assel and, la te r, the M acmillan Com m ittee R eport, w ere quoted as proof of the soundness of the program for m onetary refo rm. In fact, spokesmen w ere prepared to quote, in defence of th eir ideas, any critic of deflation, w hatever the general principles from which he reasoned, Statem ents of official policy, as form ulated by union and A.L.P. conferences, began with a pream ble which declared that 'unemployment a rises from and is inherent in the C apitalist system, which is based on production for profit and not on human n eed s. Only the socialisation of industry (i.e. m eans of production, distribution and exchange) can rem ove the cause of unem ploym ent.' Then the conferences went on to lay down m easures designed to secure re lief and advocated a se rie s of palliatives which included cred it expansion, nationalisation of banking, reduction of in te re st ra te s, readjustm ent of oversea debts, tariff protection, public w orks, unemployment insurance, and higher wages and a sh o rter working week. At this point we should note som e of the im plications of the attitudes we have been discussing, observing in p articu lar the co n tradictions im plicit in union policies, as these have a bearing on the events that took place after T here is, however, an im portant qualification to b ear in mind during any discussion of these m a tte rs. Inconsistencies may at tim es have been m ore apparent than real: in considering them we m ust rem em ber the dilem m a involved in the need to attem pt to reconcile sh o rt-te rm demands with ultim ate program s; and we m ust also take account of the fact that looseness of language was often inevitable when th eo rists had to presen t difficult concepts for popular consum ption, It was c h aracte ristic of the unions that they should speak in the sam e breath of socialism and of a higher standard of living under capitalism. They a sse rte d that capitalism was in decline and, later, as the c ris is deepened, they pronounced that the system was 'sick unto death'; but they denied that wage reductions w ere unavoidable and, indeed, held out the prospect of increased wages and a sh o rte r w orking week. At the sam e tim e as they accepted the dependence of labour on capital as an axiom of industrial life, unions could not but conclude that no profits m eant no employm ent and that a retu rn to pro sp erity was contingent on the rehabilitation of industry by such stim ulants as cred it releases and higher ta riffs. Thus it was that in p ractice the T.U. movement would prop up capitalism, which it m aintained was 24

36 The Coming of the D epression responsible for w orkers' m ise rie s, and secure a future for the system, though its abolition was the objective of the m ovem ent. Union spokesm en oscillated between a belief that the occurrence of c rise s was inherent in the capitalist system and the view that the p re vailing c ris is was a tran sien t m aladjustm ent due to factors accidental to cap italism. Usually, the strong im plication behind the continually repeated phrase 'a retu rn to pro sp erity ' was that the tw enties had w itnessed the norm al functioning of the system and that the disequilibrium of 1930 was an aberratio n. Industrial life had been running sm oothly until a spanner had been deliberately thrown into the w orks, and the cu lp rits, according to the unions, w ere the Money Lords who had entered into the conspiracy to bring about the artificial depression. A lso, th e ir frequent references to the disturbing consequences of the w ar, and especially the heavy burden of debt bequeathed to A ustralia, indicated the unions' predisposition tow ards an explanation in term s of fortuitous c a u se s. Some of the propagandists who w ere m ost insistent that unem ploym ent was the inevitable accom panim ent of the capitalist system also often declared that the c ris is was the outcome of grave deficiencies on the p art of the capitalists - such as th eir 'g ro ss incom petence', greed' and 'unintelligent selfish n e ss'. M aintaining that th eir proposals m ust inevitably w orsen the depression, union spokesm en frequently denounced the 'stupidity' of the capitalist class and, when they put forw ard th e ir counter m easures to re -e stab lish stability, one gains the im pression that the rep resentatives of lab o u r, in effect, w ere making claim to an ability to run capitalism m ore effectively than the cap italists. Of course, it is quite possible that there was no confusion on this m atter in the minds of such propagandists them selves, and that what was involved was im precise methods of expression. N evertheless, the point rem ains that th ere was a b lu rring of the issue of w hether c rises w ere associated with the essen tial features of a cap italist economy p er s e. Although 'F a t' and capitalists generally w ere often b itterly attacked, and although unions usually recognised the existence of a conflict between labour and capital, with few exceptions they did not preach class w ar; and fu rth er, th eir preoccupation with m onetary reform and high protection to som e extent cut acro ss any conception of a class stru g g le.5 Because A ustralian industry was being 5 Note particularly the attitude of the champions of Douglas Social Credit who insisted that the struggle was not between employer and employee, or between labour and capital, 25

37 Trade Unions and the D epression strangled by the banks and by foreign Shy locks, both em ployers and w orkers w ere suffering, and so it would be to the advantage of both if the unions' financial proposals w ere put into effect. In the eyes of many spokesm en th ere was no clear-cu t alignm ent of w orker versus em ployer. They pointed, for exam ple, to acute antagonism between overseas and home cap italists, and between industrial and financial cap italists, and som e propagandists, like Gordon M assey of the A.R.U., urgently appealed for an alliance between A ustralian w orke rs and em ployers so that the plans of London financiers to destroy A ustralian industries m ight be fru s tra te d. Prom inent in union thinking was the ideal of a self-sufficient A ustralia which would not be dependent on overseas financiers and m anufacturers, and one of the principal instrum ents for achieving this independence was to be the ta riff. Working in harn ess behind a high tariff wall, w orkers and em ployers could build up flourishing industries and a high standard of living. Now, with large num bers of th eir m em bers out of work, unions held that it was im perative that local industries be encouraged so that m ore employment opportunities might be made available. At interview s with Labor M inisters, officials stren u o u sly sought to induce the governm ents to g ran t contra c ts to local m anufacturers and to e re c t high ta riff b a r r ie r s. In som e industries union officials and em ployers made joint endeavours to secure such ends and co-operated closely. In advocating increased purchasing power and protection, union propagandists stre sse d the im portance of the home m arket and they sought to persuade em ployers that p ro sp erity was dependent on high wages, for w orkers w ere the b est custom ers of th eir p ro d u cts. But they had to note with re g re t that, unlike Henry Ford, A ustralian em ployers pursued policies destructive of th eir own vital in terests, and th eir demand for wage reductions was deplored as short-sighted folly. As the Industrial H erald (18 Septem ber 1930) com plained, the 'stran g est p a rt' of events was that m anufacturers and re ta ile rs wanted wage cuts, though such cuts w ere 'suicidal to business in te re s ts '. L ater too, as we shall see, unions expressed angry d isbut between industry and finance. The disciples of Major Douglas often posited their program as an alternative to socialism and in subsequent years tne Douglas Credit Movement of Victoria and the National Credit Association waged energetic propaganda campaigns. 26

38 The Coming of the D epression appointm ent as em ployers who benefited from the tariff imposed wage c u ts. The T.U. movement insisted that it was self-evident nonsense to attem pt to overcom e a glut by reducing purchasing power, and its spokesm en continually rep eated in unsophisticated te rm s the co n ten tion that the sim ple and obvious way to dispose of the accum ulated goods was to in crease the people s purchasing power. But, however plausible its negative point, the movement had not solved the paradox of want and plenty, and, fu rth er, it flouted certain of its own basic assum ptions regarding capitalism. In any ab stract analysis, it was acknowledged that the economic system was based on production for profit and not for use, that production only took place when it was profitable, so that any renew al of investm ent was contingent on the resto ratio n of an adequate rate of profit. Yet the unions advocated policies that, in th eir im m ediate effects at least, would accentuate the decline in the profitability of production, and they thought of a revival of industrial activity p rim arily in term s of an u n restricted flow of com m odities resulting from increased purchasing power. The T.U. movement took the practicability of its proposals for granted, and union spokesm en raised few doubts that it was little m ore than a m atter of persuading the Labor governm ents to take resolute action and impose the n ecessary rem edial m easu res. But considering the conditions of the tim e, the movement was hardly being re a listic. There was even a sense in which the in trin sic c o rrectn ess o r o th e r wise of the specifics they put forw ard was irrelev an t. Em ployers w ere obsessed by the need for reduced costs and th ere was already a near-panic loss of confidence among businessm en, m ost of whom w ere horrified by the m ere mention of m onetary refo rm. Had increased wages and a sh o rte r working week been forced on industry and the unions' financial proposals been put into effect, it was, in the circu m stances, scarcely reasonable to suppose that recovery would have ensued as union propagandists p re d ic ted. So fa r we have been concerned with the official policies of the T.U. movement; but, like the re s t of the community, the movement was b esieged by self-appointed econom ists seeking co n v erts fo r what each 6 See the conditions which the A.C.T.U. Congress in early 1930 had wanted attached to the granting of bounties and tariff protection (L. Call, 6 March 1930). 27

39 Trade Unions and the D epression regarded as the real solution to the c ris is. W orkers w ere inundated by the babble of would-be saviours, and there w ere very few journals to which they could turn for enlightenm ent o r a strong consistent exposition of Labor policy. As the official Labor paper, the Labor Call might have been expected to give a lead in the direction of ideological coherence; but despite its efforts in som e editorials to face the issues of the tim e, its contents tended ra th e r to be an inconsistent hotchpotch. At the sam e tim e one has to b ear in mind that the paper was understaffed. In providing a forum for the expression of all v arieties of opinion, the C all's lib eralism was laudable, but the net resu lt m ust surely have been to sow fu rth er confusion. Even early in the year, on 20 M arch 1930, a perplexed 'Mulga' pointed to the many different proposals put forw ard in its pages and complained that in reading the Call he was 'getting a bit mixed over the darned economic q u estio n '. The Call did render serv ice to the movement, for in m ost issues there w ere le tte rs and a rtic le s advocating Labor policy, especially the banking and cred it p roposals. Also, it c arrie d rep o rts (usually sele c t ively edited) of conferences and of the m eetings of the T. H. C. and A.L.P. branches. P articu larly in the la tte r p a rt of 1930, the e d ito r ials endeavoured to prom ote an understanding of L abor's proposals, though they added little to what the A ustralian W orker and Tramway Record had been saying about the depression all the y ear. At the sam e tim e, the Call was also a boon for those with a pet theory to expound. Thus it contained many of the different ideas about the depression which w ere circulating in the labour movement and which can also be found in the Union Voice and in the couple of journals which p rinted co n tributions. The various schem es for m onetary reform w ere put forw ard in the Labor C all, 7 which enabled the champions of Social C redit to a ir th eir views at length.8 Follow ers of Henry George had th eir letters published, and an arch ist theories w ere advanced by Will C raig who denounced governm ent and civilisation and expounded the principles of the Labor A rm y. In addition, there w ere proponents of various form s of co-operative so cieties, and the elderly but indefatigable H.E. 7 One such contributor was R. Proctor, who in 1930 wrote the booklet The New Evangel Way in which he sought to combine Christian ethics with the economics ot credit control. John McKellar (Secretary A.P.S.A.), for example, was an ardent and prolific champion of the theories of Major Douglas. 28

40 The Coming of the D epression Langridge frequently filled a column in the Call on 'L aborism ' and 'free b r e a d '. ^ Another very prolific correspondent was G.D. Meudell who turned up with a different proposal alm ost every week. Radiating much m ore heat than light, W. W allis in his front-page a rtic le s fulm inated against the 'cockeyed w orld and the state of affairs in A u stralia. His sincerity was unquestionable, though an unkind critic would have claim ed that he was m ore of a windbag than a social analyst. He managed to lend support to many of the different ideas that w ere c u rrent in the labour movement and som etim es his a rticles resem bled the Call in m iniature. Socialisation, b u t... B efore the depression the labour movement lacked any generally accepted body of so cialist doctrine, or any burning zeal to achieve its so cialist objective. In V ictoria, while m ost union leaders professed to be so c ia lists, they, like others in the w ider movement, saw socialism as a vague and distant goal, the realisatio n of which was as yet scarcely a m atter for p ractical planning. The depression, howev er, brought conditions in which it was inevitable that even the m ild e st so cialist should wonder w hether the capitalist system had a future. Com m unist insistence that socialism was now an im m ediate issue helped s tre s s the point, and haltingly in 1930, and m ore distinctly in 1931, union propagandists paid som e attention to the contem porary relevance of the so cialist objective. But quickening in te re st and d iscussion did not yield coherent theory; ra th e r, they underlined the ideological uncertainty that was the legacy of an established p rag m atist trad itio n. Confusion about socialism thus in a sense sym bolised one of the cru cial dilem m as with which the depression confronted the unions, and so it m erits b rief discussion. While the T.U. movem ent m aintained that 'socialisation of industry' was the ultim ate solution for the w o rk ers' problem s, it cannot be said that during 1930 the union leadership mounted anything like a serio u s campaign to s tir enthusiasm for the transform ation of so ciety o r to advance the ran k and file's understanding of the O b jective. 1 T rue, Don Cam eron in the Tram way R ecord and H.E. Boote, 9 His booklet Free Bread also appeared in Bearing in mind the high proportion of Roman Catholics in the A.L.P. leadership, note the Papal Encyclical issued in 1931, which included a denunciation of communism and the statement that no one can be a good Catholic and at the same time a true socialist' (Argus, 18, 25 May 1931). 29

41 Trade Unions and the D epression editor of the A ustralian W orker, passionately condemned capitalism as a social o rd er that m ust eventually be replaced; and P ercy L aidler in the Shop A ssistant argued in sim ple, general term s for workingclass control of industry» But such efforts stood in contrast to the occasional article that was the contribution of m ost jo u rn a ls. Some w riters in the Labor Call also sought to popularise the Objective and urged Labor politicians to take it m ore serio u sly. At the sam e tim e, the Call editorially (as on 28 August 1930) was apt to excuse the Labor governm ents' neglect of the Objective, by pointing to obstacles such as 'second Cham bers and outworn C onstitutions' and declaring that 'only with the advent of unification... will we be so situated as to be able to really te st the apparatus of the P arty as a socialising m edium '. Union expressions on the subject w ere often negative; m ore an ticapitalist than positively p ro -so c ia list. And ra th e r than elucidations of socialism, a rtic le s w ere often diatribes against the injustice, the m oral deficiencies and the irratio n ality of a system in which riches and starvation coexisted. On one of the very few occasions when it accorded the Objective m ore than passing attention, the Labor Call (29 May 1930) claim ed that 'in the departm ent of theory A ustralian L abor's creative contribution to the w orld's working class is its objective'. Self-congratulation was not, however, enlightenm ent, and the spasm odic treatm ent afforded to the subject in the journals did not amount to a system atic analysis of the Objective or of the tim ing and method of its achievem ent. In m ost discussions, the inevitability of the end of capitalism and its replacem ent by socialism w ere a sse rte d ra th e r than argued; and there was fairly general agreem ent that capitalism was breaking down. But when and how was the transition to take place? Given the absence of m ore than superficial analyses of the m echanism of social change it was hard to find any p recise, agreed answ er. Most assum ed with the Labor Call (17 A pril 1930) that in som e way it was 'the Labor P a rty 's historic m ission to bridge the transition... between the old and the New O rd er', and they usually took for granted the idea of 'legislating' socialism into existence, though exactly what this m eant in p ractice few attem pted to say. ^ While the evils of exploitation w ere condemned and there was an occasional reference to the class struggle, the la tte r was not regarded by official spokesm en as a lever for li The Easter 1930 Conference of the Victorian A.L.P. discussed a motion that the party revert to its 1921 Objective; but the voting was 98 for and 84 against, and this did not constitute a statutory majority in favour of the motion, which had been strongly opposed by the politicians who were present (L. Call, 1 May 1930; Argus, 21 April 1930), 30

42 The Coming of the D epression change. In creasin g d isillusionm ent with governm ents and the functioning of parliam ents did not visibly shake th eir avowed faith in parliam en tary politics and legal p ro c e sse s. Revolution was strongly abjured: although capitalism might be in c ris is and m ore rapid change a reasonable expectation, that change m ust still be o rd erly. There was no sh o rt, spectacular road to so cialism. As Bob R oss, a leading so cialist propagandist, m aintained in the Labor Call (4 D ecem ber 1930), 'Socialisation of industry was a p ro c e ss, and not an in su rrectio n '; capitalism would not come to a sudden end; instead, 'evolutionary adaptation and m odification' would occur. This view m erged with that ex p ressed by the Labor Call (28 August 1930) when it spoke of how 'C apitalism has to be m ended' and 'the Labor m ovem ent's mending m ust have in view the sy stem 's ending. Urgent reform s necessary as palliatives for the w orkers in th e ir d istre sse d conditions w ere to be seen in this context as p art of the p ro cess by which, apparently, capitalism would be reform ed out of existence. Hence, aim s ranging from nationalisation of banking and 'socialisation of c redit' to raising of wages gained th eir justification. W hatever th eir im m ediate r e p e r cussions fo r capitalism, they w ere, from a longer-term viewpoint, steps along the road to socialism. In addition to such ideas, a few propagandists (notably Don Cam eron) advanced the argum ent that a 'social p ro c e ss' was 'literally driving the w o rkers' and 'actually bludgeoning them... towards L abor's objective'. 'The average w o rk er', Cam eron held, was 'a creatu re of the driving force of economic conditions and his environm ent generally' and he would not go 'any fa ste r o r fa rth e r forw ard' than he was com pelled to. Thus, 'm ore compelling economic conditions and a m ore stim ulating environm ent generally, a re needed before fu rth er pro g ress will be m a d e...' and before w orkers 'go all the way necessary to control in d u s try... '}^ Cam eron and other propagandists also laid s tre ss on the power of ideas, claim ing that capitalism was able to c arry on and that p ro g ress tow ards the Objective was n ecessarily so slow because w orkers w ere imbued with capitalist ideas. So, for them, one of the crucial avenues for fu rth er advance lay in 'education' of the w o rk e rs, 12 Tram. Record, December 1929, November 1930, January Similar ideas were developed by the L. Call during 1931; and on 8 October 1931, in explaining why 'there is no new state of aitairs to be born, at least not within the immediate future', it argued that capitalism 'has yet to reach its excess development, or unworkable state, before it will disappear. It can neither be saved nor wrecked within a year; it is destined to go through every phase of its possibilities... until it can no longer be carried on...'. 31

43 Trade Unions and the D epression C onferences and P o licies The decisions of the A ll-a ustralian T rade Union C ongress (24 F ebruary to 6 M arch 1930), having been adopted by the M elbourne T.H.C., becam e the official policy of the V ictorian T.U. m ovem ent. The re s o lutions on unemployment declared in a pream ble: Unemployment a rises from and is inherent in the C apitalist system, which is based on production for profit and not on human n eed s. Only the socialisation of industry... can rem ove the cause of unemployment. N evertheless, the nature and degree of unemployment are determ inable to a considerable extent by factors within the presen t economic system that a re controllable. Unless production and the peoples' purchasing power are made to balance there m ust be progressively increasing unemployment In A ustralia, preventable unemployment has been aggravated by the restrictio n of cred it, by im m igration and by a careless d isregard of the position generally.... the p rim ary duty of the A ustralian Governm ents... is the provision of adequate food, clothing and sh elter in default of rem unerative em ploym ent.... The federal governm ent was requested 'to proceed im m ediately with a schem e of national insurance against unem ploym ent' fram ed in detail by the C ongress. The resolutions also urged a se rie s of m easures which included the g reatest possible protection to A ustralian in d ustries, the nationalisation of banking, the expansion of c re d its, extensive public w orks, 'settlem ents of unemployed w o rk e rs', and 'p rim ary production to be system atically fo stered '. ^ At the annual conference of the V ictorian branch of the A. L. P., during E aster 1930, union delegates had a large hand in laying down the p arty 's policy to m eet the deteriorating economic situation. The rep o rt on unemployment was drawn up by a com m ittee composed mainly of union officials. A few weeks e a rlie r they had attended the A.C.T.U. C ongress, and Don Cam eron had been a m em ber of the Congress 13 The Congress urged 'that to carry out the policy of work or maintenance, those in the community who have possessions and income above the basic wage be made to contribute by taxation or tribute in a graduated scale'. Note also the resolutions on arbitration and industrial organisation adopted by the Congress. 32

44 The Coming of the D epression Unemployment Com m ittee. Like the C ongress, the A.L.E Conference held that 'unemployment a rise s from, and is inherent in the C apitalist system,... only Socialisation of industry can rem ove the cause of unem ploym ent'. The State and fed eral governm ents should im m ediately discharge th eir 'p rim ary duty' of providing for the unemployed 'adequate food, clothing and sh elter in default of rem unerative em ploym ent... The Conference declared 'that the diminution of work in governm ent e n terp rises does not excuse the dism issal o r reg ressio n of w o rk e rs...', and it called 'upon the State governm ent in the railw ays and oth er State enterp rises to reduce hours without reducing wages...' in o rd e r to provide m ore em ploym ent. It was also decided 'that a vigorous cam paign for the p ro gressive im provem ent of the standard of living concurrent with the reduction of hours of labor be im m ediately undertaken by the M ovem ent'. F u rth er, the Conference resolved that it 'ex p resse s its approval of the A.C.T.U. (1930) Unemployment Policy and recom m ends it to the State and F ederal G overnm ents'. If during 1930 the labour movement seem ed to d rift without a strong sense of direction, it was certainly not because th ere was a lack of authoritative pronouncem ents. In May 1930 the suprem e policy-m aking body of the A.L.P., the T riennial F ederal Conference, adopted a report on unemployment subm itted by a com m ittee whose chairm an was the leading V ictorian union official, W. J. Duggan. The Conference was of the opinion that 'in A ustralia preventable unemployment has been aggravated by the re stric tio n of cred it due to p resen t banking p ra c tic e '. 'The provision of work depends alm ost entirely on freeing the cre d it reso u rces of the country. As a first contribution in this direction... the F ederal P arliam ent should find 20, 000, '. This C onference, too, affirm ed 'the p rim ary duty of A ustralian G o v ern m en ts... is the provision of adequate food, clothing and sh elter' for those unable to secure employment, and it proposed sev eral m easu res, such as a 're n t m oratorium law ', which the State governm ents should put into effect. The delegates w ere mindful of the purchasing power argum ent and while they applauded the possibilities of the governm ent's fiscal policy, they pointed out that 'until the 14 Duggan had been chairman of the committee which had drawn up the report on unemployment at the Victorian A.L.P. Conference. The other Victorian delegates to the Federal Conference were: Prime Minister Scullin, D. McNamara (M.L.C. and Secretary, A.L.P.), A.S. Drakeford (M. L. A., General President, A.F.U.L.E., and member of the A.L.P. Central Executive), A.A. Calwell (President A,P.S.A. and Vice-President Victorian A.L.P.), R.S. Ross (prominent unionist and Vice-President, Victorian A.L.P.). Ross had been a member of the committee which had submitted the report on unemployment to the A,C. T.U. Congress. 33

45 Trade Unions and the D epression unemployed a re reabsorbed in industry, and thereby becom e consum ers of A ustralian products, the shutting out of im ports will benefit local m anufacturers very little, Tacked to the end of the rep o rt was the statem ent that 'the general problem is inherent in the existing economic system, the rem edy for which is the realisation of the policy set out in the objects and platform of the A ustralian Labor P a rty '. The Communist P arty, Social F ascism, and Revolution At the Ninth Annual Conference of the Communist P arty of A ustralia in January 1930, the 'rig h t opportunist' leaders of the party w ere defeated and the Conference adopted the 'new line' as laid down by the Communist International (C.I.) and the Red International of Labor Unions (R.I. L.U.). ^ In 1930 the Communist P arty set out to popula rise these policies and 'to win the m asses for the p roletarian revolution' under its leadership. There was a m arked tendency to apply m echanically the policies of the C.I. and R.I. L.U. without much serious regard to the actual conditions prevailing in A ustralia, and in changing course the party swung away from 'rig h t opportunism ' only to land on the rocks of 'left se c ta ria n ism. According to the com m unist analysis of the world situation, the period was the 'third phase' in the developm ent of post-w ar capitalism. Features of this phase w ere the 'crum bling of cap italist stab ilisatio n ', the accentuation of international and internal contradictions, and the new 'social fa scist' role of Social D em ocracy whereby refo rm ists becam e the forem ost defenders of threatened capitalism. The economic c risis was not due to financial stringency engineered by the banks, as Labor spokesm en m aintained, and th eir claim that there was a conspiracy of London Shylocks was a 'm yth' designed to divert w o rkers' anger away from A ustralian cap italists. S im ilarly, high tariffs and the expansion of cred it advocated by the A.L.P. w ere expedients to a ssist the cap italist class at the expense of the w o rk ers. The c ris is was the outcome of the fundamental contradictions inherent in the capitalist system which w ere to be explained in term s of M arxist econom ics. The employing class was making a 'frantic attem pt' to place 'the whole burden of the c ris is upon the shoulders of the working 15 For statements of Communist Party policy, of which a very brief summary is given in the text, see: resolutions of the Ninth Annual Conference of the Communist Party of Australia (W. Weekly, 10 January-7 March 1930); theses of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the C.P. of A. (ibid., 15, 22 August 1930); instructions of the Executive Committee of the C.I. (ibid., 6 December 1929, 10 January 1930); theses of the R.I.L.U. (ibid., issues of April 1930). 34

46 The Coining of the D epression c la ss' and to stab ilise the system by sm ashing the w o rkers' standard of living, especially by rationalisation. However, 'every effort of the cap italist class to overcom e the irreconcilable contradictions of the system only intensifies these contradictions still m o re '. The c ris is 'cannot be solved within the confines of capitalism, but w ill end with the destruction of the capitalist system its e lf '. This 'th ird phase' would see ever sh arp er class conflicts and a w idespread 'rad icalisatio n ' of the working c la ss. The w orkers' stru g g les, however, w ere being betrayed by the A.L.P. and the union bureaucracy. They had deserted to 'social fascism ' and now cam e forw ard to a ssis t capitalism to w eather the c ris is at the w o rkers' ex pense. In fact, the principal reason why the Scullin governm ent was 'called to pow er' was because the B ruce-p age governm ent of avowed cap italists was unable to c a rry out the offensive of the cap italist class that had been begun. The offensive was now being ruthlessly directed by the Labor governm ents with the assistan ce of the union leadership. This leadership and the A.L.P. had 'becom e interlocked with the bourgeois State apparatus' and they w ere endeavouring 'to convert the trad e unions into m ere appendages to the C apitalist S tate'. F rom this appraisal of the situation, the Communist P arty believed it was essen tial that it should a s s e rt its independence and becom e 'the leader of the working class and the principal driving force in its economic and political stru g g le s'. Also, it would 'have to fight... two cam ps of enem ies - the openly avowed cap italist p arties... and the Labor P arty... '. But, in fact, com m unists seem to have been m ainly concerned to expose the 'treach ero u s social fascist ro le' of the A.L.P. and the union leadership and to sharpen the struggle against the 'anti-w orking class Labor G overnm ents'. At every opportunity, they vociferously and indiscrim inately denounced these 'agents of the m a ster c la ss'; and w orkers w ere exhorted to repudiate this le ad e rsh ip and unions w ere urged to d isaffiliate from the A.L.P. Every issue of the W orkers' Weekly sought to convince w orkers that, providing they adopted R.I.L.U. tactics and strategy, 'm ass action' would halt the offensive against wages and working conditions. It demanded the rejection of all form s of class collaboration: the class struggle had to be sharpened. Strongly inclined towards 'revolutionary ro m an ticism ', the Communist P arty continually called for strik e action to 'sm ash the capitalist offensive', and it sought to 16 W. Weekly, 10 October For further statements that the government 'was called to power', see ibid., 21 March, 22 August

47 Trade Unions and the D epression incite w orkers to launch a 'counter-offensive' by m eans of a general strik e. Economic struggles had to be lifted to a political level, and strik es broadened into a 'm ass political strik e ' for the abolition of capitalism. A fire with urgency the W orkers' Weekly exhorted the working class to unite and struggle for the revolutionary overthrow of capitalism and the establishm ent of a 'Revolutionary W orkers' G overnm ent' - 'the first constructive step to S o cialism '. The em ancipation of the w orkers could never be achieved through Acts of P arliam ent, as 'le ft' L abor le a d e rs w ere attem pting to deceive them into believing. Though the influence of the Com m unist P arty was to become significant during the depression, it was a very sm all organisation in 1930 in V ictoria, deriving the g re a te r p a rt of its support from the unemployed. The party was very im m ature, and the frequent a rre s t of its leaders was a grave handicap, as was to a le sse r extent the custom s ban on revolutionary lite ra tu re. The content of the W o rkers' Weekly was doctrin aire, and included little news of V ictorian unions, but a g reat deal on 'the w orkers' F ath erlan d '. The p a rty 's zeal^7 and its forceful p rogram s, which m ight have proved attractiv e, w ere offset by its 'left se c ta ria n ism '. Com m unists w ere often m ore concerned to attack union officials and th eir policies than to s tre s s th eir own constructive proposals, so that they tended to adopt a negative policy of anti-officialdom. 'U ltra left' tendencies turned independence into isolation and the party failed to sink its roots into the T.U. m ovem ent. Official Labor policy was also under fire from the feeble guns of the Socialist P arty of A ustralia, which rejected palliatives and claim ed that the only solution to the w o rk ers' problem s was so cialism. This would never even be attem pted by the A. L.P., for it was a cap italist party and the Labor governm ents w ere little m ore than props of the system. However, like the A. L.P., the S ocialist P arty put its faith in the ballot box, and it contended that socialism would be attained by the election to P arliam ent of genuine so cialists who would im m ediately proceed to u sh er in the new o rd e r. M em bers of the party who w ere delegates to the T.H.C. and union conferences tended to adopt a p r e dominantly negative attitude, as they regularly moved am endm ents condemning the Labor governm ents and calling for disaffiliation from 17 See the advice of the W. Weekly (21 November 1930) that, 'If a number of young workers leave a trade union meeting, etc. together, they should march in closed ranks, sing revolutionary songs and cheer for the revolution, and if curious passers-by stop and join them, then one of the comrades should make a speech. 36

48 The Coming of the D epression the A.L.P. At the sam e tim e, relations between them and the Communist P arty w ere m arked by mutual hostility. 37

49 3 Unions, Labor Governments, and th e Depression, 1930 E arly Union D isappointm ents We have seen that V ictorian unions looked to the L abor governm ents to im plem ent rad ic a l and d ra stic m e a su re s to m aintain living stan d ard s and revive in d u stry. They in siste d that the p olitical re p re sen ta tiv e s of the labour m ovem ent w ere placed in P a rlia m e n t to c a rry out the policies laid down by the m ovem ent. But the Scullin governm ent was ham pered by the constitution and a h o stile Senate - th e re w ere only seven Labor m em b ers in the U pper House - and soon, also, by in te r nal d issen sio n. In V ictoria the Hogan governm ent p re c a rio u sly held office without pow er. It did not have a m ajo rity in the A ssem bly^ and th e re w ere only six L abor m em b ers in the u ltra -c o n se rv a tiv e Council. F u rth e rm o re, labour spokesm en who depicted the P arliam en tary Labor P a rtie s as the w o rk e rs' re p re sen ta tiv e s and who re fe rre d to the in te re sts of w o rk ers and national in te re sts as though they w ere identical, soon had reaso n fo r deep refle ctio n. W orking for econom ic stability within the confines of cap italism, and seeking to prom ote what they reg ard ed as the in te re s ts of the people as a whole, the Labor governm ents, in p ra c tic e, when confronted by the n ecessity of choosing the path of duty, saw th e ir resp o n sib ility to national in te re sts as transcending any allegiance to sectional in te re s ts, how ever sym pathetic they felt tow ards the w o rk e rs. But when the unions form ulated th e ir policies in early 1930, they w ere confident of a sym pathetic resp o n se from the L abor governm ents. The m ovem ent had yet to be m ade aw are of the lim ited p o ssib ilities available to these governm ents for the regulation of econom ic a ffa irs, and it was buoyed up by a sanguine b elief that now, with Labor in l The state of the Assembly was: After 1929 elections On eve of Govt's defeat. After May 1932 elections April 1932 A.L.P Nationalist (U.A.P.) 32 Country (U.C.P.) 14 Country Progressive 4 1 Liberals 2 1 Independents Independent Labor 2 38

50 Unions, Labor G overnm ents, and the D epression, 1930 control, the future was full of prom ise for w orkers. When the difficulties confronting the Labor governm ents began to be realised, it was taken for granted that they would be dealt with in accordance with Labor policy. Labor leaders appealed to the movement to appreciate the difficulties they w ere facing and from tim e to tim e pleaded - as Scullin did at the Eight Hour Day Social and the V ictorian A. L.P. Conference - for tim e to deal with the m ess they had in herited. Like many other union officials, F red Sear (Secretary A.R.U.) was la te r to hold contrary views, but in early 1930, in commenting on the Hogan governm ent, he was voicing a w idespread sentim ent when he asserted, 'I have g reat faith in the Labor Government, and believe they will do the right thing, even though they may fall by the wayside. 2 Initial m isgivings w ere raised in the minds of some unionists as the Labor governm ents got off to an inauspicious s ta rt by not dealing decisively with the burning industrial issu es which had caused the T.U. movem ent such grave disquiet. A lock-out on the northern coalfields of New South W ales had dragged on since early 1929, im posing g reat sufferings on the m in e rs. During the federal election campaign, Labor candidates had taken up the m in e rs cause, and Theodore had prom ised that a Labor governm ent would reopen the mines within a fortnight and take firm action against B aron Brown and other em ployers. When Labor assum ed office, th erefo re, V ictorian unionists looked forw ard to an early settlem ent of the dispute. But months la te r Theodore s prom ises w ere still unfulfilled, federal Labor lead ers having unhesitatingly rejected p re ssu re s to take d rastic steps that would have run counter to th eir express determ ination to adhere to constitutional m ethods. The V ictorian T.U. movement afforded the m iners som e financial and m oral support and was eager to see them back at work. However, the attitude of the movement was alm ost casual by com parison with the b itte r indignation of N.S.W. unions. Though disappointed and som etim es c ritic a l, few V ictorian spokesm en took the Scullin governm ent to task, and its abortive efforts w ere defended in som e q u a rte rs, notably by the A ustralian W o rk er. When police fired on and wounded m iners at Rothbury, the Communist P a rty intensified its attack on the Scullin governm ent and won som e 2 R. U. Gazette, January But see the totally different views expressed by the General President of the A.R.U. in an article in the same issue. 39

51 T rade Unions and the D epression sympathy for a general strik e. But in V ictoria, while the affray drew pro tests from a few unions, the movement evinced no o v erwhelming concern. So the m iners staggered on to defeat; and meanwhile the Labor governm ents did not fulfil expectations regarding another urgent industrial problem : the presence on the w harves of 'sc a b s who had displaced unionists during the 1928 strik e. This was a cause of anxiety for the whole T.U. movement and frequent appeals w ere made for governm ent action. The T ransport W orkers Act was not repealed, however, and hesitant moves by the federal m inistry led neither to the reinstatem ent of m em bers of the W.W.F. nor to the ending of preference for 'sc a b s'. The already deplorable working conditions on the wharves d eterio rated fu rth er, and the fierce antagonism b e tween 'scabs' and m em bers of the W.W.F. periodically led to violence. F o r many y ears, the situation on the w aterfront was to be a constant source of weakness and a troublesom e problem for the T.U. m ovem ent. On the few occasions when the Labor governm ents did attem pt to legislate to satisfy the unions' urgent req u ests, the upper Houses proved to be stum bling b lo cks. Disappointm ent was also occasioned by th eir failure to make full use of th eir adm inistrative powers at union prom ptings, even,for exam ple, in the m odest m atter of lifting the custom s ban on an extensive range of lite ra tu re. The federal M inistry did take steps to give p artial effect to the im portant labour principle of 'preferen ce to unionists'; but, to the d issa tisfa c tion of unions, the M inistry bowed before the storm of pro test and quickly rev ersed its stand. 3 C haracteristically, the Labor Call (15, 22 May 1930) held forth on 'P referen ce to Unionists, The Whence and the Why of It' but did not com m ent directly on the M inistry's actio n s. Government em ployees had been gratified, as the federal and V ictorian governm ents had not proceeded with the proposals for retrenchm ent mooted by th eir p re d e cesso rs. However, as the governm ents' finances deterio rated, public servants w ere given m ore and m ore cause to be apprehensive about the future. His governm ent's difficulties led Scullin to summon a conference of re p re se n t- 3 Note that Premier Hogan gave an assurance that he would stand by preference to returned men, and also that several Victorian Labor members (including McNeill and Paul Jones) had publicly opposed the federal Ministry's original decision(argus, 6, 7 May 1930)

52 Unions, Labor Governm ents, and the D epression, 1930 atives of federal public service organisations, and he was able to persuade them to agree that th eir 'O rganisations should refrain from in itia tin g... claim s which would involve the Commonwealth Governm ent in any substantial expenditure'. Meanwhile, V ictorian Labor M inisters w ere already indicating th eir readiness to apply the orthodox rem edy of re tre n c h m en t. D espite the Scullin governm ent's em ergency m easu res, A ustralia slipped deeper into the depression, so that as the months passed it becam e increasingly apparent that the governm ent could not, o r would not, do much in the way of redeem ing its election prom ises; and the hostile Senate, together with the considerable body of m oderate and right-w ing opinion in the F ederal P arliam en tary Labor P arty (F.P.L.P.), reduced the d rastic proposals of the unions to som ething like wishful thinking. The P rim e M inister bluntly dism issed the unem ploym ent insurance schem e drawn up by the A.C.T.U. C ongress as 'financially im p racticab le', and at the V ictorian A.L.P. Annual Conference Scullin did not offer any prospect that w o rkers' in terests would be advanced. Even the Labor Call (19 June 1930), in applauding the work of the A. L.P. F ed eral Conference, was obliged to confess that 'on appearances Twenty M illions and M oratorium have no chance but B u ck ley 's'. N evertheless, though the governm ent's record and pronouncem ents w ere hardly the basis for optim ism, the trade unions throughout 1930 continued to a s s e rt that determ ined action on the p art of the fed eral governm ent would check the depression. In V ictoria, the unemployed, whose num bers mounted rapidly, w ere increasingly re s tle s s and dissatisfied with the Hogan governm ent (see C hapter 7). Unionists* too* becam e m ore and m ore c ritic a l about unem ploym ent relief and about such m atters as the w aterfront position and the governm ent's failure to give effect to Labor P arty policies and decisions. However, the Labor Call and the A ustralian W orker attem pted to p resen t the intentions and efforts of the Labor governm ents in a favourable light, and, while continually asking for m ore radical policies, generally sought to apologise for the governm ents' sh o rtcom ings. A little la te r, the Labor Call (12 June 1930), in defending the V ictorian governm ent's achievem ents, m aintained with some asp erity that 'you cannot put labor governm ent on tria l until you give it a m ajority in the assem bly and mandate it to give battle to the upper house '. D iscontent with the Hogan governm ent mounted and cam e to a head over the w aterfront issu e, for unionists w ere incensed that a Labor governm ent should run sp ec ia l tra in s and provide police p ro tectio n for 41

53 Trade Unions and the D epression scabs - a violation of labour principles that was apparently too much even for some of the officials who argued for a Labor governm ent at any p rice. A proposal to condemn the governm ent was considered at the weekly m eetings of the T.H.C. from 24 A pril to 22 May, and during this tim e Council officials conferred on the m atter with Labor Party and governm ent re p re se n ta tiv e s. In this month also the A rbitration Court rejected the W.W.F. 's application for preference to its m em bers, and on 15 May the Senate disallowed the federal M inistry's regulations which unionists had hoped would a ssis t to break down the preference accorded to the volunteers by shipow ners. In early May union dissatisfaction with the Hogan M inistry rose sharply when it proceeded with legislation for unemployment relief taxation which involved a breach of the Labor platform. The M inistry refused to comply with the Council's wishes concerning the w aterfront, and on 22 May the T.H.C. finally resolved that 'the Hogan Government no longer possesses the confidence of our people and calls upon the P re m ie r to im m ediately tender the resignation of the G overnm ent'. The P rem ier, unperturbed, rejected a request that he come to a T.H.C. m eeting, and instead attended the annual dinner of the M elbourne Cham ber of C om m erce. So the issue dragged on amid recrim inations, as a motion before the Council to endorse the demand for Hogan's resignation was adjourned on sev eral occasions. But while the Trade Union S alaried O fficers'a ssociation thrashed out the m atter, the rank and file w ere not involved. On 19 June the Council accepted an am endm ent (70-49) which sought 'a Conference of the T.H.C. and the A.L.P. Executives and the P arliam en tary Labor P arty to decide on the various questions involved'. Conferences w ere held and on 16 July agreem ent was reached. In future the State governm ent would 'confer and co-o p erate' with the T.H.C. Executive on industrial b ills, the adm inistration of unemployment relief, and future unemployment legislation. A com m ittee was appointed 'to inquire into the facts of the W aterside trouble and to make recom m endations... '. Thus the firs t breach between the T rades Hall and the Hogan M inistry was tem porarily patched up, and the Labor Call (31 July 1930) contended that the agreem ent was 'a m agnificant gain for Labor plans and id e als'. John Sm ith, Shylock, and M ore C onferences As the federal governm ent's m easures did not lead to the expected im provem ent in the A ustralian economy and the deterioration of public finance becam e m o re alarm in g, the advocates of deflation and 42

54 Unions, Labor Governm ents, and the D epression, 1930 wage reductions becam e increasingly vocal after m id The clam our grew louder and took on a m ore authoritative tone when the country's leading econom ists began to take an active in te re st. In June 1930 they issued a statem ent which pointed out that 'the community is faced with a serious loss of re a l incom e and, in putting forw ard proposals regarding this 'lo s s, they expressed the opinion 'that some fall in profits and re a l sala rie s and wages is inevitable'. In the following months the p re ss widely publicised deflationary views, and, seeking to convince people of the necessity for- economic readjustm ent, including wage reductions, P ro fe sso r Giblin wrote his 'L e tte rs to John Sm ith which reached the hands of many re a d e rs. In July Sir Otto N iem eyer arriv ed on the scene, and th ere cam e into prom inence a name that was to be perm anently engraved on the minds of every Laborite of the tim e. With the a ir filled with doleful prophecies of im m inent d isaste r, the P re m ie rs ' Conference m et in August and was stern ly inform ed by N iem eyer that the A ustralian standard of living was 'too h ig h '. Persuaded that the community would have to make 'substantial s a c rific e s', the conference unanimously adopted the M elbourne A greem ent by which the governm ents declared 'th eir fixed determ ination to balance th eir respective budgets for the financial y ear '. Then, im m ediately after the conference, a special m eeting of the Loan Council decided to reduce the loan program s for the cu rre n t y ear for the Commonwealth and the States from 24 m illion to 15 m illion. (In June it had already been reduced from 44 m illion.) F o r V ictoria this m eant a reduction to about 3 m illion, w hereas during the last ten years the V ictorian sh are had averaged about 8 m illion. Union spokesm en and sev eral journals repeated th eir contention that wage reductions and the balancing of budgets by retrenchm ent would w orsen the depression, and they attem pted to refute the arg u m ents advanced by advocates of deflation; but in the battle to mould public opinion the advantage lay with th e ir opponents. Union p ro p a gandists, by com parison, wielded puny weapons in th e ir efforts to combat the determ ined cam paign waged by the daily p re ss and the powerful sallies in the form of weighty pronouncem ents delivered by em ployers, econom ists, churchm en,^ and p o litician s. The labour 4 Archbishop Head was outspoken on the need for the adjustment of wage levels, and Archbishop Mannix held that there must be sacrifices all round (L. Call, 11 September 1930). 43

55 Trade Unions and the D epression movement did not presen t a united, solidly-based ideological front. There was a body of fairly consistent argum ents which made up official policy, but in addition there w ere the voices of those who grasped the opportunity to expound th eir pet th eo ries, such as m onetary reform, Social C redit,and single tax. The union leadership was undoubtedly handicapped; even so, it did not utilise to the full every possible m eans to advance its cause, and there was no strenuous concerted drive to arouse the rank and file. The T.H.C. on 17 July warned all w orkers against the anti-w orking class p ro p a ganda contained in P ro fe sso r G iblin's le tte rs to M r. Sm ith ; and in reply to this m oribund apologist of C apitalism, the Council decided to issue a pam phlet which would set out the u lte rio r m otives behind his mournful dirge of false econom ics', expose his 'lying statem ents and h a lf-tru th s', and explain 'the true causes of unemployment, poverty and destitution which is found only among m em bers of the working c la s s '.^ The Executive, however, did not c a rry out this decision, as it claim ed that the Council could not afford the 100 which the pam phlet would cost. Instead, the Executive accepted an offer by the H erald to publish the Council s views and it appointed P resident Cam eron to p rep are a reply to P ro fe sso r Giblin. The Council's 'case in rebuttal' stated in these seven a rticles in r* the H erald0 constitutes one of the fuller expositions of the official union attitude, and a b rief sum m ary of the m ajor propositions put forw ard will fu rth er elucidate the unions' ideas. Pointing to the existence of 'poverty am idst plenty', the a rtic le s m aintained that 'an increase in wages and a reduction in the hours of working are both possible and n e c e ssa ry '. 'The real cause of our tro u b les', they asserted, 'is that while we are m ost efficient in production, we are m ost inefficient in consum ption'; and if periodic slum ps w ere to be avoided, 'the producing and consuming power of the w orkers m ust approxim ate a balan ce'. 'We cannot m aintain high production without high consumption. If we do not have high consumption, we shall have unemployment, D eclaring that wages 'are the life blood of industry', Cam eron argued that G iblin's proposals would lead to m ore unem ploym ent, fo r 'red u ced wages is reduced spending pow er, a reduced 5 Some delegates opposed the resolution on the ground that it denied the right of free speech (Herald, 18 July 1930) , 21 August

56 Unions, Labor Governm ents, and the D epression demand for com m odities and industrial stagnation'. Instead of making m atters w orse by reducing wages, surpluses of rent, in te r est and profit should c a rry the baby of debit and dep ressio n. In terest was 'a"rak e off" from industry' and if the in te re st charges of overseas bondholders w ere reduced, then budgets could be balanced and industry could go ahead again. Sooner or la te r there would have to be a 'reorganisation of our cred it sy stem ', and one way of m eeting presen t difficulties was 'to issue our own cred it based on our own securities through medium of our Commonwealth B ank'. Finally, Cam eron re fe rre d to 'the obvious break-dow n of cap italist econom ics', and commended to his read ers the views of the T.H.C. which, unlike many econom ists, was not 'soaked in the exploded theories of the M anchester School'. The concept of surplus value was a basic elem ent in his analysis, but Cam eron did not seek to base the 'dynam ic and p ro g ressiv e' econom ics of the T.H.C. on so cialist w ritings, and when he enlisted the support of authoritative opinion he followed the practice of many union propagandists and quoted Ford and other A m erican em ployers to substantiate the soundness of 'the economy of high w ages'. Union spokesm en condemned the M elbourne A greem ent as an attem pt to place m ore burdens on the w orkers in o rd er to enhance the profits and power of fin an ciers. If 'sa c rific e ' was unavoidable, they m aintained, it should be made by the wealthy, through high taxation, or by the bondholders, but not by the w orkers. And they argued for a reduction in in te re st rates and obligations as an answ er to the country's financial difficulties. At the sam e tim e, however, in contrast to th eir counterparts in New South W ales, V ictorian officials hastened to give an assurance that they did not have 'repudiation' in mind, and Duffy (S ecretary, T.H.C.) and sev eral others spoke out strongly against any such course, affirm ing that A ustralia m ust honour its d e b ts. Duffy and Duggan interviewed N iem eyer, to whom they put the union view on in te re st ra te s, and expressed resentm ent regarding the th reat to the w o rk ers' standard of living. Those journals which took an in te re st in the m atter condemned Sir Otto as a Shylock representing English financiers who had come to claim his pound of A ustralian flesh. There w ere vociferous tirad e s against the London Money Lords who w ere attem pting to sm ash the A ustralian standard of living. W arning that the country's independence was endangered, union spokesm en urged that the nation should finance its e lf independently of the Money Pow er, 45

57 Trade Unions and the D epression so that sufficient money m ight be issu ed to rev iv e the econom y. It is interesting to note that some of the union views on the financial c ris is w ere also held by certain sections of em ployers. These views w ere voiced by such journals as the A ustralasian M anufacturer and they w ere embodied in a pamphlet which W.M.Hughes wrote at this tim e. H ughes's Bond o r F ree was welcomed by union propagandists as 'a fitting reply to S ir Otto N iem eyer' and they quoted extracts from it as confirm ation of th eir own ideas. The Clothing T rad es Union was moved to purchase one hundred copies of the pam phlet. According to Hughes, N iem eyer represented 'g re at financial in te re sts' and 'the real purpose' of his v isit was that he 'wants us to scrap our policy of building up A ustralian industries and to confine ourselves to producing raw m a te ria ls'. 'We m ust produce g re a te r quantities of raw m aterials at... lower p ric e s, and to do this we m ust work h ard er and reduce our standard of living ' Such a policy, Hughes asserted, would make things w orse ra th e r than b e tte r. He argued that 'depression in trade and unemployment a re caused by exhaustion of consumption pow er' and so lower wages would be d isastro u s. On the other hand, 'the higher the standard of living, the g re a ter the demand for goods and the demand for labour to produce these goods'. Hughes, in addition, m aintained, 'What A ustralia wants very badly is cheaper money. An im proved, a rationalised system of cred it is e sse n tia l.' The A ustralasian M anufacturer during Septem ber also contended that English in terests w ere out to destroy A ustralian secondary industries and that,instead of following the N iem eyer policy, A ustralia should cut out im ports and build up its in d u stries. Voicing views sim ilar to those held by the unions on the relation between prosperity and purchasing power, it, too, m aintained that wholesale wage cuts would accentuate the depression, though it certainly did not hold that wages should be raised, and its constant demand was for a much g re a ter output from w orkers. It called for a lib eral credit policy, complaining that the Scullin tariff was being nullified by credit restrictio n s; and it insisted that co-operation between labour and capital was essential for achieving pro sp erity. In connection with this question of sim ilarity of views, some consideration of the ideas of Gordon M assey is in structive. M assey was a prom inent m em ber of the A.R.U. and had som e influence in the labour movement in which he was active, though its extent is difficult to gauge. He seized every opportunity to propagate his ideas 46

58 Unions, Labor Governm ents, and the D epression which he expounded in a serie s of a rtic le s published in the Railways Union G azette from Septem ber With few alteratio n s, m ost of these a rtic le s w ere also published as a pam phlet, The Last Shilling, for which P ro fesso r Copland gladly' w rote an in troduction.7 M assey made explicit and developed certain propositions and assum ptions which many other union propagandists often only im plied. Thus he was unambiguous about nationalism and class co-operation, and his objective was the rehabilitation of cap italist industry. As one of his c ritic s declared, after reading M assey's article 'The B irth of a N ation', one would think the Gazette was 'the m anufacturers' journal o r som e such patriotic advocate of cap italism '. M assey was preoccupied with what he regarded as national in te r ests and, for him, the 'one and only issu e' was to 'revive at all hazards our internal trad e, our com m erce and our in d u stry '. The nation would have to work and plan as one harm onious whole and the intrusion of sectional in terests and m istru st would be detrim ental. M assey took into account the fundam ental im portance of the profit m otive, and his plan for recovery was designed to create conditions that would revive the em ployer's incentive to build up his b u siness. But he lam ented that one of the m ajor tragedies of the situation at that tim e was the attitude and shortcom ings of business lead ers, for th ere was too little faith in individual effort and 'not enough punch' o r 'sturdy aggressive co n tro l'. M assey w arned that A ustralia, socially and econom ically, was being shaken to pieces: he noted with alarm that 'cla ss is being rapidly divided from c la ss... in a m anner that is full of foreboding and unhappy possibility' for the future of the existing fo rm of society. M assey m aintained that the gold standard was the im m ediate cause of the economic depression. 'In all ways the unemployment problem is interlocked w ith... an unprecedented slum p in money values' and 'the cause of the whole of this w idespread loss and m isery... is the m aladjustm ent of the w orld's gold supply'. He also advanced the argum ent - which was to becom e increasingly common among Labor propagandists - that the m onetary system had failed. 'Money, which should at all tim es be the servant of industry, no longer serv es - it is the m a ste r... '. The ordinary man was paying 7 However, Copland did not agree with all of Massey's arguments, and he used the occasion to repeat his contention that a 'decline in the standard of living and a reduction in public expenditure is for the moment inevitable'. 47

59 Trade Unions and the D epression the penalty for his ignorance of the basic facts of money - 8 To save A ustralia from the 'e x tre m ists, M assey advanced 'a practical plan' which was 'a m iddle course of safety '. This plan, he assu red read ers, had been endorsed and advocated by em inent econom ists and m onetary experts such as P ro fe sso r Copland, Sir Josiah Stamp, S ir Henry Strakosch, and J.M. Keynes. In essence, 'the rem edy is an im m ediate and official severance of the gold standard from the moneys of A ustralia, with n ecessarily a free exchange rate;^ and, fu rth er, an im m ediate and d rastic revision of our m onetary sy ste m.' While deploring the 'wild personal attacks' on N iem eyer, whom he thought a man of g reat and profound wisdom in banking m a tters, M assey agreed with those who felt that for 'our national ills... Sir O tto's treatm ent has all the appearance of sawing off the p atient's legs and a rm s '. He w arned that every principle and aspiration for which A ustralia stood was in grave danger. He declared that th ere was an inner ring within the international money m arket of London, and that those associated with it dominated A ustralian p asto ral and financial a ffairs. 'This powerful group and its associates reg ard s as anathem a all and every expression of A ustralian national s p irit... If they had th eir way, wages would be reduced, A ustralian industrial life destroyed and the country would become an exporter of cheap raw m a te ria ls. In o rd er to defeat this th reat, the A ustralian em ployer and wage earn er had to be united for m utual defence; and, fu rth e r m ore, a nation-wide sp irit of co-operation between all classes was essential if success was to be attained in 'policies of reconstru ctio n '. But, 'Unhappily', lam ented M assey, 'business and employing in te r ests in A ustralia a re unable to recognise that th eir own im m ediate and intim ate w elfare is com pletely interlocked with that of the A ustralian w ag e-earn er'; and he deplored the fact that 'today trade and com m erce is making common cause with the w ool-grow er against the w age-earn er'» 8 According to Massey, 'Money is not wealth' but merely a means of exchange. The price level is determined 'by one factor only. That factor is the quantity of goods or business to be done in a community taken in relation to the quantity of money in circulation in the same community, 9 It occasioned Massey some satisfaction to point out that the need for 'a true and uncontrolled exchange rate between London and Melbourne' was beginning to be realised by the Bank of New South Wales. 48

60 Unions, Labor G overnm ents, and the D epression Following the August conference, Labor m in isters set about the task of carrying out the M elbourne A greem ent and imposing the 's a c r i fices' it entailed. That Labor politicians should abandon Labor policy in favour of orthodox financial m easures and undertake to low er the standard of living aroused b itte r resentm ent in the T.U. movem ent and provoked hostile criticism of those Labor m em bers who repeated 'cap italistic claptrap' and put the in terests of bondholders before those of the w orkers. M oreover, in V ictoria at this tim e, relations between the T rades Hall and the Hogan M inistry had again become strain ed. As inroads w ere made into the standard of living, econom ies w ere effected in the public serv ice and inadequate relief was provided for the rapidly increasing num ber of unemployed, the d is content of unions mounted, and th eir criticism of the Hogan governm ent ro se to a high pitch. Voicing the intense dissatisfaction which was becoming increasingly w idespread, the C a rte rs' and D riv e rs' Union initiated a campaign to secure a special conference of the V ictorian A.L.P. to deal with unemployment. As other unions lent th eir support to the demand, the C entral Executive of the A. L. P., 'believing that the growing discontent m enaced the solidarity of the M ovem ent', agreed to convene such a conference. Thus it was that the A. C. T. U. and V ictorian A.L.P. both held special conferences in Septem ber 1930 in response to the ominous rum blings within the labour m ovem ent. The T.H.C. had declared on 10 July that 'the efforts of the F ederal and State P arliam ents to deal with Unemployment a re feeble and inadequate', but to no effect. The Hogan governm ent's continued failure to m eet repeated requests for greatly im proved relief m easures led to b itte r c riticism, and the increasing d istre ss of the jobless was a cause for grave disquiet in the m ovem ent. Also at this tim e, there was risin g exasperation as the burning grievances of w aterside w orkers w ere still not relieved. The M elbourne branch of the W.W.F. condemned the 'hesitant cowardice of the so-called Labor M in istries', and the m atter was again considered by the T.H.C. on 21 August. Although the federal governm ent had been appealed to in sim ila r term s so often before, the Council again requested it 'to re -in sta te w aterside w orkers on the job, which rightly belongs to them... '. In early Septem ber, with violence at P o rt Adelaide and com m unist agitation for a general stoppage, the issue was prom inent and was the subject of fu rth er discussions with represen tativ es of 49

61 Trade Unions and the D epression the State P arliam en tary Labor P arty and other b o d ies. But a solution was not found and the m atter was again to be discussed at the forthcom ing Key Unions C onference. P rio r to the Septem ber conferences, the Hogan governm ent had also fallen into disfavour in other q u a rte rs. Railwaymen had been gratified by the decisions of the E aster A.L.P. Conference which had declared against?the d ism issal or reg ressio n of w o rk e rs in State en terp rises and had directed the governm ent 'to reduce hours without reducing w ages'. ^ A.R.U. officials and the Railways Union Gazette had encouraged the expectation that as a re su lt the last had been heard of retrenchm ent in the serv ice, and Labor m in isters, and especially Cain, w ere regarded as champions of railw aym en's in te re sts. But, as railw ay revenues declined, the C om m issioners applied to the A rbitration Court for d rastic wage cuts and took steps to c arry out a program of d ism issals and re g re ssio n s. Railwaymen protested angrily and th eir officials repeatedly interview ed m in isters, and finally laid th eir case before the C entral Executive. The T.H.C., on 4 Septem ber, passed resolutions viewing 'with alarm the action of the Railway C om m issioners', and demanding that the C entral Executive 'im m ediately put into effect the declared policy of the Movement on this q u e stio n... '. But despite a sym pathetic response by the C entral Executive to these appeals, cabinet refused to re stra in the C om m issioners. Cain, M inister for Railways, inform ed the unions concerned that, unless the wages bill was reduced, la rg e-scale d ism issals w ere unavoidable, and at sev eral conferences in early Septem ber he sought to persuade them to accept a schem e of ratio n ing. The A.R.U. and A. F, U L. E. w ere unyielding, though the Railway P rofessional O fficers A ssociation with only th ree hundred m em bers was agreeable. A.R.U. officials pinned th eir hopes on the forthcom ing special A. L. P, Conference where the union's delegates w ere to oppose rationing and re g re ssio n s. In addition to railwaym en and other industrial w orkers, V ictorian public servants also had cause to in terest them selves in the conference, for sev ere government retrenchm ent was clearly im m inent. The Labor Call and A ustralian W orker rem ained champions of the Labor governm ents, and union journals generally did not reflect for a tim e the c ritic a l sp irit that was welling up within the T.U. movement. 10 The words or regression1had been included in the resolution on the insistence of the A.R.U. delegates. 50

62 Unions, Labor Governm ents, and the D epression As one of the first le tte rs published in the Labor Call which expressed this s p irit complained on 26 June, c ritic ism of Labor politicians was being suppressed, and, with Labor in office, 'Labor journals becom e in a m easu re protective buffers functioning between the politicians and th eir c re a to rs and c ritic s, the w orking-class v o te rs'. However, despite the attitude of the journals, the serio u sn ess of L abor's p r e dicam ent had become unquestionable when such prom inent union lead ers as W. J. Duggan began to inveigh against the Labor governm ents. Duggan's views placed him right of centre and he had been a friend of the Labor governm ents, but now he was a hostile c ritic. Duggan's attitude is also worth noting as a pointer to the future, for he rejected the suggestion that 'in d u stria lists' should form a separate party and urged them to become active m em bers of the A.L.P. and gain control of p re-selectio n ballots, so that Labor politicians who had let the unions down might be replaced. The A.C.T.U. and A.L.P. conferences afforded unions an opportunity to exert a powerful influence regarding the future of the labour movement; or, as the Labor Call (4 Septem ber 1930) declared, 'H istory is in the m ak in g '. The question was w hether delegates would deal decisively with the cru cial issu es, and be guided by an appreciation of the long-term in terests of the labour m ovem ent. The Labor Call (14 August 1930) appealed to delegates to heal the breach caused by 'the p artial revolt of the trad es unions' and insisted that there m ust be unity. But something fa r m ore than form al unity was req u ired. The m ovem ent's policies had already been laid down by previous conferences, but they had not been put into effect. M oreover, in recent weeks the essential justification for the very existence of labour in politics had been underm ined. Hogan had taken a tentative step in the direction of securing a political truce to seek party cooperation in V ictoria, and, in the M elbourne A greem ent, Labor m in isters had affirm ed that: 'T h eir decisions have been arriv ed at apart from party or political considerations... '. Would the co n ferences take an unequivocal stand regarding the im plem entation of Labor policy? In term s of popular support, tim e was fast running out for Labor, and the severe setback it suffered in the August m unicipal elections probably weighed heavily on the minds of many delegates to the C o n feren ces.11 ll Retiring Labor councillors who were defeated included the leading union officials WJ. Duggan and G. McPherson. 51

63 Trade Unions and the D epression The Executive of the A.C.T.U., represen tativ es of the State Trades and Labor Councils, and two delegates from fifteen key industry unions m et in conference from 9 to 15 Septem ber, and after deliberation form ulated a serie s of p ro p o sa ls. D eclaring that 'the provision of work depends alm ost entirely on freeing the credit reso u rces of the country', the Conference urged that the federal governm ent should find 20 m illion, and that an Economic Council be set up to determ ine the allocation of the cred it. The federal and State Labor governm ents w ere called upon 'to repudiate the decision of the P re m ie rs' Conference' attended by N iem eyer which called for a reduction of w ages, and to amend the financial agreem ent and dissolve the Loan Council which 'is m erely an instrum ent in the hands of the financial c a p ita lists'. Also, negotiations should be entered into with the B ritish governm ent 'with a view to readjusting the burden of w ar indebtedness now borne by the A ustralian people...'. The Conference asserted, 'an outstanding fact today is that money is too dear. Legislation should be introduced im m ediately to bring about a reduction in all in te re st rates in o rd er to make available to industry cheaper m o n ey.' 'To reduce costs of production, we urge the F ederal and State Governm ents to introduce legislation to provide for - (a) the d e -w atering of the "bonus" sh ares issued by com panies... (b) a lim itation of dividends paid by com panies... (c) the excess of retu rn s to be pooled to be utilised as the b asis of further credits in reducing prices and c o s ts.' The resolutions continued with the recom m endations that federal cabinet should establish control of the whole reso u rces of the country, that State P arliam ents be abolished, and that the Commonwealth governm ent should declare the existence of a state of national em ergency, nationalise banking and the m eans of exchange, establish a m aximum 40-hour working week, and increase the basic wage by 25 p er cent. The delegates m aintained that any reduction of wages o r in crease in the working week would cause g reater unemployment, and the Conference declared its strong resentm ent a t'th e intrusion of the Church in a campaign for the red u c tion of the standard of living...'. The rep o rt on unemployment was subm itted to the union conference on Friday, 12 Septem ber, and over the week-end Septem ber, with one o r two exceptions, the V ictorian delegates, all prom inent officials, attended the Special V ictorian A, L, P. Conference. Although a few union delegates at the C onference endeavoured to apologise fo r 52

64 Unions, Labor G overnm ents, and the D epression the shortcom ings of the Hogan governm ent, the m ajority expressed such b itte r c ritic ism of its efforts on behalf of w orkers that the P re m ie r challenged the Conference to demand the resignation of his governm ent. However, despite the vehemence with which they assailed its record, the governm ent's c ritic s denied that they even w ished to censure it and m aintained that they m erely sought to offer advice. As the Labor Call (25 Septem ber 1930) explained la te r, 'the delegates in sisted that they did not wish the Government to resign. What they want is that the Government do what it is asked to d o.' Many sp eakers made a forceful, though vague, appeal for a stro n g er stand against the Legislative Council, and a few - including M. Considine and F. Sear - urged that if the standard of living had to be reduced, then it should be done by the anti-l abor p a rtie s. But m ost delegates held that it was in the w o rk ers' in terests that Labor should continue in office, and som e unionists argued for a Labor governm ent at any p ric e. As no one called 're sig n ', the Labor Call (25 Septem ber 1930) drew the conclusion that 'the Conference thus endorsed the principle of office being h e ld... '. Union delegates demanded m ore of the Conference than a m ere reaffirm ation of previous decisions on unemployment, so a special com m ittee was set up to draft proposals. This com m ittee was com posed of a m ajority of union officials, including Duggan (P resident, A.C.T.U.), S ear (S ecretary, A.R.U.), and R oberts (A.E.U.), who w ere delegates to the Key Unions C onference. Thus a M ajority R eport was presented which advocated d rastic m easures regarding unem ploym ent. Although the P re m ie r pooh-poohed the idea that th ere was a 'conspiracy' of financial in te re sts, the Conference declared 'that the financial stringency is deliberately created for the purpose of reducing the living standards of the w orkers, thereby creating a so cial condition intensifying unemployment... '. M inisters and th eir supporters condemned the M ajority R eport as 'im p racticab le' and 'an exhibition of h e ro ic s', and while Duggan claim ed that it 'would consolidate the two wings of the p a rty, the P re m ie r m aintained that this would 'w reck' it. When the clause dealing with the governm ent's unemployment policy cam e up for consideration, m in iste rs dug in th eir heels and made the issue a tria l of strength. As seasoned tacticians they insisted that the motion was -12 Cf. the Minority Report introduced by J. Kean (Organising Secretary A.L.P.). 53

65 Trade Unions and the D epression virtually one of no confidence in the governm ent, and the voting on an amendm ent by D rakeford (M.L.A. and G eneral P resid en t, A.F.U.L.E.) was regarded as a te st v o te. The motion was supported by m oderate union officials who strongty denied the interpretation placed on it. N evertheless, the am endm ent was c a rrie d (88-72), 13 and this was seen as a victory for the governm ent over its d e tra cto rs. It was a m anoeuvre, incidentally, that had succeeded in sim ila r circum stances at the 1928 conference. The sting was taken out of the motion' as the Conference declared,'notw ithstanding the resolution of the E aster (1930) Conference, the Labor Governm ents have not com pletely discharged and are not discharging, th eir p rim ary duty, and should go fu rth er in the direction of providing work or the n ecessities of life for the p eople'. I 4 Despite this initial setback, the advocates of the M ajority R eport went on to secure the adoption of the proposals: This Conference instru cts the V ictorian F ederal and State M em bers to take im m ediate steps to see that that resolution [of the E aster 1930 Conference] is com plied with...; That no rationing sh all be introduced in any G overnm ent em ploym ent except with the consent of the unions affected. 13 The R eport also included the proposals which had been subm itted to the Union Conference. TheA.L.P. Conference adopted the clauses which called for the release of 20 m illion of credits, the establish m ent of an Economic Council, and the abolition of the Loan Council. Despite an all-night sitting, however, tim e expired before the Conference could deal with the balance of the M ajority Report, so the rem aining proposals w ere re fe rre d to the C entral Executive. The c ritic s of the Labor governm ents w ere particu larly incensed that previous instructions had not been put into effect, and, as W. T urner (C arters' and D riv ers' Union) a sse rte d at the beginning of the Conference, they believed it was only a w aste of tim e, 'reaffirm ing 13 That is only 160 delegates voted. It was in the early hours of Monday morning and the other delegates had retired. 14 The motion had read 'the Labor Governments have not discharged and are not discharging their primary duty of providing work or the necessities of life for the people. 15 An amendment by A.R.U. delegates to delete all the words after 'employment' was defeated. Note that there were sharp differences of opinion among union officials regarding rationing. 54

66 Unions, Labor Governm ents, and the D epression pious reso lu tio n s'. Now another serie s of instructions had been issued, would they also prove to be no m ore than 'pious reso lu tio n s'? Apparently hoping to prevent a recu rren ce of this rem issn ess on the p art of Labor m em bers, at least in so far as th eir obligation to m aintain p resen t standards was concerned, the Conference demanded 'that the F ed eral and State P arliam entary P a rties give an assurance that they w ill comply with these resolutions, and that they will not support, o r enforce, o r advocate d ism issals o r reductions of wages o r extension of hours, and that the Executive be instructed to obtain such a ssu ra n c e '. However, the attitude of Labor m em bers at the Conference afforded few grounds for optim ism, and the P rem ier had declared that the resolution was 'rid icu lo u s'. A few days la te r the Key Unions Conference concluded after having adopted, with only slight am endm ents, the p ro p o sals indicated above. It is difficult to understand how the unions could genuinely believe that the Labor governm ents could be induced to put these proposals into effect, fo r the reco rd s of these governm ents indicated beyond doubt that they would not in terfere with private property o r step a h a ir's breadth outside the constitution. F u rtherm ore, Scullin and Hogan had made it quite clear that budgets would be balanced and that for them 'national honour' was a prim e consideration. D elegates w ere not unaw are of such obstacles, for they discussed possible steps that might be taken if the C onference's decisions w ere ignored. Finally, a motion for a general strik e was rejected in favour of the amendment: That in the event of the F ederal Governm ent failing to recognise a c ris is and to take the necessary action on the lines suggested by this C onference...the Em ergency Com m ittee shall be empowered to call together all unions to take action to dem onstrate that a c ris is e x is ts. The M elbourne T. H. C. adopted the conference decisions to the cries of 'tre a c h e ry ' from com m unists, who branded proceedings as futile and as a deliberate stratagem to lead w orkers into a blind a lle y. In O ctober 1930 a special m eeting of the A.L.P. F ederal Executive (which included W. J. Duggan) declared itself 'em phatically opposed' to the N iem eyer policy and urged Labor governm ents to re s is t the attacks being made on the w orkers by unscrupulous em ploye rs who w ere taking advantage of 'a tem porary derangem ent of the economic sy stem '. It recom m ended that industry should be stim u l- 55

67 Trade Unions and the D epression ated by making credits available im m ediately, that in terest on bank credits advanced to industry should be reduced, and that negotiations should be commenced for a revision of the w ar debt. 'Sane' Politicians and E x trem ists Any hopes that the Labor governm ents would proceed to deal with the depression in accordance with the policies laid down by the Septem ber 1930 conferences soon proved illusory. Acting P rim e M inister Fenton had already rem arked that the resolutions of the V ictorian A.L.P. Conference w ere not practical p o litics' and P rem ier Hogan had decried the M ajority R eport as 'moonshine and nonsense'. These early reactions had been auguries for the future: political leaders, both State and federal, rem ained firm in th eir resolve to carry out the M elbourne A greem ent, and did not w aver in th eir conviction that to m aintain national solvency and honour was th eir prim e duty. The V ictorian P re m ie r sided with the Lyons group against the 'ex trem ists' in the federal caucus, adding his voice to the outcry against the 'wild m en' who advocated 'repudiation and inflation'. Meantime the depression deepened, unemployment increased further, and hardship becam e m ore intense and w idespread. F a r from im plementing the demand of the unions for action to im prove or at least p reserv e the w o rk ers' standard of living, the V ictorian M inistry allowed railw aym en's wages to be cut (Chapter 4) and itself reduced public service sa la rie s. In these ways, at a tim e when all w orkers' standards of living w ere in jeopardy, a Labor government seem ed to be offering a dangerous example to private em ployers and arbitration trib u n a ls. Tension and m om entary doubt as to w hether the Hogan M inistry would c arry on after the decisions of the V ictorian A. L.P. Conference receded after a cabinet m eeting on 16 Septem ber, and the P rem ier resum ed the task of preparing a balanced budget. A week later, on 24 Septem ber, Hogan brought his budget down. To m eet the deficit, he proposed extensive econom ies in State departm ents, and additional taxation. Public serv an ts' sa la rie s w ere to be subject to a special tax, but this did not satisfy the strong demand for substantial reductions in the public serv ice wages bill, and p re ss, em ployers, and the Opposition denounced the budget. On 30 Septem ber, Argyle (Leader of the Opposition) foreshadowed a motion of no confidence, on the ground that the budget was unacceptable. Hogan prom ptly retreated, announcing the next day an im m inent review of the budget to include 56

68 Unions, Labour G overnm ents, and the D epression a general percentage reduction of public serv ice s a la rie s. The way for this move had been opened by the Public Service A ssociation whose officials - alarm ed by A rgyle's challenge to Hogan - had intim ated th eir willingness to accept sacrifices ra th e r than see the L abor M inistry overthrow n (see pp.75-6). The Opposition th reat was indeed a real one. The extent of the waning of popular support for the Governm ent was driven home by the steep decline in the A.L.P. vote on 27 Septem ber at the Hawthorn byelection. More serio u s, an alteration in the parliam entary balance seem ed inevitable as a resu lt of a tentative am algam ation agreem ent reached on 23 Septem ber by represen tativ es of the Country P arty and Country P ro g ressiv e P a rty. If effective, this agreem ent could have robbed the m inority Hogan governm ent of the conditional support of the sp lin ter C.P.P. on which it had depended. As it happened, the vote on the censure motion took place on 14 O ctober, before the am algam a tion of the Country p arties had been com pleted, and a week a fter Hogan had produced definite plans for public serv ice salary reductions. In these circum stances, the Governm ent survived by the grace of the four C.P.P. m em bers who voted in its favour. But on 28 October, the C.P. union being now com plete, three of these men joined the United Country P arty on the Opposition c o m er b en ches. With his hold on office thus rendered even m ore p recario u s, ^ Hogan was scarcely in a position to execute the directions of the Septem ber A.L.P. C onference. On 6 October the C entral Executive of the A. L.P. had resolved to proceed to enforce the decisions of Conference and to demand the assu ran ces [decided on by the C onference] from each... [Labor] m em ber... This sam e m eeting of the C entral Executive, however, had accepted a ruling by P resident Keane, That the action of the... P arliam entary Labor P arty, in accepting an agreem ent with the State Public Service organisation for percentage deductions above the basic wage in lieu of rationing' was not a contravention of Conference d ecisio n s. It was on the next day that Hogan explained his schem e of public serv ice salary c u ts. 16 But the votes of the two Liberals and McLachlan (Independent) went against the government. 17 The Opposition was further strengthened when at a by-election on 22 November the Nationalist Party captured Caulfield, previously held by a Liberal. candidate. There was no A.L.P. 57

69 T rade Unions and the D epression In practice, Labor could only hold office at the cost of m oderation. In any case Hogan was willing to com prom ise and he gave the Opposition no reason to fear that he would em brace the radical policies being urged by the T.U. m ovem ent. The Opposition re p e a t edly offered to co-operate with the Governm ent in carrying non party' m easures to achieve financial readjustm ent, and it showed no e a g e r ness to take power itself. Labor, in effect, rem ained in office on te rm s larg ely dictated by the O pposition. But in D ecem ber this unstable situation gave place to a serious political c r is is. In the A ssem bly, the Opposition forced d rastic amendm ents to a Governm ent unemployment relief bill, and it appeared that the M inistry, unwilling to accept these changes, would go out of office. Then a com prom ise was reached, and the Bill went through, only to be held up by serious am endm ents in the Council. Meantime two bills to reduce public serv ice sa la rie s in accordance with Hogan's budget proposals w ere also blocked by Council am endm ents. On C hristm as Eve these deadlocks between the two Houses w ere resolved by negotiation, but only after Hogan had made considerable concessions. 18 These c rises m arked the beginning of an overt division in the S.P.L.P. Standing now on traditional Labor p rin c i ples, alm ost a third of the Labor P arty had voted against the m in iste ria l bills to reduce public service sala rie s, which w ere passed, in fact, by virtue of Opposition support. 1^ This incipient split was the V ictorian p arallel to a threatening division in the federal caucus, where b itte r faction fights w ere now in p ro g ress. The determ ination of Acting F ederal T re a su re r Lyons and Acting P rim e M inister Fenton to c a rry out the Melbourne A g reem ent and to pursue orthodox financial policies had been unaffected by the Septem ber conferences. But then in the N.S.W. election cam paign, under the vigorous leadership of Lang, Labor had furiously attacked 'N iem eyerism ' and insisted that the w o rk ers' standard of 18 Six months' supply was granted and Parliament went into recess. The Ministry had introduced several bills which were anxiously sought by the T.U. movement, but they were not dealt with before Parliament adjourned and so they lapsed. 19 Earlier in the year, some Labor members had been hostile to the Ministry's unemployment relief tax measures, though they had not actually voted against them. At the September A.L.P. Conference, Premier Hogan had charged Blackburn (M.L.A.) with having voted 32 times against the government. Blackburn replied that, if that were so, then it showed the government had acted 32 times against Labor policy. 58

70 Unions, Labor Governm ents, and the D epression living m ust be m aintained. Lang's victory spurred on the an tideflation wing of federal caucus, and a serious rift occurred at the end of O ctober when a m ajority of caucus condemned the N iem eyer policy, rejected cabinet proposals for retrenchm ent, and demanded rad ical financial m easu res. Then, in early November, on the motion of Anstey, caucus resolved (22-16) that bondholders in internal loans shortly to m ature be com pelled, save in cases of hardship, to hold th eir bonds for a fu rth er twelve m onths. This precipitated a c ris is in the F.P.L.P. Lyons defied the authority of caucus and threatened to resig n. A com plete split, however, was averted, as a com prom ise was reached and a showdown between the w arring factions was postponed until Scullin returned from o v e rseas. In the federal as in the state sphere, the agonising question was how to reconcile traditional principles and the needs of the movement with political circum stances which pushed Labor governm ents tow ards an im plem entation of Opposition depression p o lic ie s. Divisions had begun which w ere to end in L abor's disintegration. During the la st q u arter of 1930, union propagandists continued to denounce N iem eyer and the 'Money L ords' and th eir 'sin iste r plot' for the 'm ass pauperisation of w o rk e rs'. They becam e m ore in s is tent in th eir demand that it was the duty of the Scullin governm ent to break the 'stranglehold' of the private banks and 'to control the issuing of money in the in terests of the w o rk e rs'. The orthodox policy of retrenchm ent and wage cuts, they urged, would only in ten s ify the depression. The growing d istre ss made it m ore essential than ever that standards of living be m aintained and employment provided for the jobless, and for both purposes bold cred it expansion was vital. Hence union spokesm en endorsed and defended the financial policy adopted by federal caucus, and A nstey's pamphlet. Facts and T heories of Finance, which appeared at this tim e, was received with w arm approval. Anstey addressed A. L.P. branches and public m eetings in support of his views, and typical of the response was the resolution of a Brunswick m eeting, chaired by W. J. Duggan, calling on the federal governm ent to nationalise banking. Lang's electoral victory in New South W ales during O ctober was hailed by V ictorian union officials and journals as a signal Labor trium ph. They saw Lang's 'g reat political program m e' as foreshadowing the a rriv a l of a Labor governm ent which would at last take a firm stand against N iem eyer and the Money Lords to p reserv e the w o rk ers' standards of living. Lang's aggressiveness im pressed as 59

71 Trade Unions and the D epression a welcome contrast to the supineness of other Labor politicians who appeared to have got the w in d-u p'. C riticism was intensified and voiced too by A.L.P. branches as it becam e apparent that the Hogan and Scullin governm ents had little intention of m eeting the demands made on them at the Septem ber conferences. The Liquor Trades Union favoured the rem oval of Hogan as leader of the S.P.L.P., and the E lectrical T rades Union withdrew its affiliation with the A.L.P. for six months, 'as an indication of its dissatisfaction with the adm inistration of the Labor M inistries, and the failure of the Executive to compel the party to deal effectively with unemployment and the attacks on wages and working conditions'. In the Tram way R ecord and Union Voice, Don Cam eron scolded Labor politicians who bowed before the 'High P rie s t of Finance' (Niemeyer), insisting that 'a Labor Government is responsible to the w o rk e rs'. At the sam e tim e he lashed the w o rkers' foolishness in allowing them selves to be persuaded that financial conditions made lower living standards n ecessary. In the Labor C all, le tte rs and a rtic le s expressed keen disappointm ent with the Labor governm ents' effo rts. E ditorials in the sam e journal repeatedly appealed to Labor m em bers for m ore energetic action to help w orkers, and exhorted the federal governm ent to take 'im m ediate action' to put banking and cred it under national control. The A ustralian W orker and some union leaders w ere also suggesting now that the Scullin governm ent should take a firm stand against Senate obstruction of L abor's financial proposals and if n ecessary force a double dissolution. Yet despite these c ritic ism s and appeals, the union leadership and journals seem ed at tim es am bivalent in th eir approach to the Labor governm ents, for, as the Labor Call (30 October and 18 Decem ber 1930) put it, 'L abor in office is infinitely a b etter p ro p osition for the w o rk e rs.' This was the often-used 'le s s e r evil' argument: however true it was - as the Call said - that the position of V ictorian w orkers had not been im proved and 'in many instances... has been w orsened', the fact rem ained that 'had anti-l abor been in office the plight of the w o rk e rs... would have been w orsened to a far g re a ter d egree'. And Cam eron, too (in the Tram way R ecord, Decem ber 1930), after weighing up the advantages and disadvantages of L abor's being in office, concluded that a Labor governm ent was the 'less of two e v ils'. However, at tim es - as if in an effort to b o lster m orale - there w ere b u rsts of positive praise: w itness, for 60

72 L Unions, Labor G overnm ents, and the D epression exam ple, the C all's approval of the Hogan governm ent's 'bold stand' on taxation proposals to balance the budget, and its claim that 'the G overnm ent's reco rd in attem pted legislation... was rem arkably tra d e unionistic and S ocialistic w ell-nigh throughout'. During the y ear, union journals had not inform ed th eir readers of what was going on beneath the surface of federal Labor politics, and the rank and file had not been forew arned of the possible consequences of the wide divergences of opinion w ithin the F.P.L.P. Thus, as an open rift threatened, it becam e all too likely that w orkers would receive th eir political education from the daily p re ss, which, as details of acrim onious debates w ere leaked to it, depicted caucus as a bedlam w here the Lyons group was gallantly battling to save A u stralia from the 'e x tre m ists'. To com plicate the scene, the Com m unist P arty had declared w ar on Lang and his followers whom it identified as 'left social fa scists' and thus 'm o re dangerous to the working class than open right w ingers like Scullin and Hogan'. Now the chief com m entator in the W orkers' Weekly (7, 28 November) rejected the 'fantastic a ssertio n... that there would be a repetition of the "conscription sp lit"' in the Labor P arty. In response to the demands of its 're a l political le ad e r', the Cham ber of M anufactures, he argued, the federal Labor P arty was p re p a r ing for a double dissolution to pave the way for inflation of the currency and wage red u ctio n s. The Labor C all's reaction to daily p re ss reports was to bewail the fact that differences within federal caucus had been made public, and to fulm inate against the 'anti-l abor ink slin g e rs' who grossly m isrep resented L abor's policy and m agnified 'the natural and very n ecessary differences of opinion' within caucus in o rd er to confuse the w orkers and split the m ovem ent. It championed the cause of radical finance and at the sam e tim e fervently sought to im press on w orkers and Labor m em bers that 'so lid arity spells su ccess' and that 'a "split" is the very dev il'. S im ilarly, the A ustralian W orker (12 November 1930) called for the defeat of 'paw nbroker in te re sts' in th eir m achinations to split the party. Thus, while developing c ritic ism s which in p ractice ranged them on the side of the wing of caucus which demanded a radical financial policy, union spokesm en in V ictoria had not been inclined to come to grips with the political im plications of such a position, though Cam eron in the Tram way Record (November 1930) foresaw the possibility of a sp lit. It could not be said that they failed to take sides in the storm y m onetary controversies that the d e p re s- 61

73 Trade Unions and the D epression sion had generated in the movement, nor even that they did not offer some leadership to the rank and file. But, in reality, they failed to m obilise the T.U. movement to intervene decisively to influence the outcome of the controversies within the P arliam en tary Labor P a rties They seem ed neutralised by the h o rro r of a split, and w ere perhaps also aw are, however dimly, that the surge of events was already too much for them. In explaining the attitude of the unions to these crucial questions of policy, it is im portant to rem em ber that at this tim e such m atters did not in fact dominate union attention. They caused great concern, but it was the cu rrent basic wage case that was absorbing m ost of the energies of the union leadership. 62

74 4 R e tre a t on th e In d u strial F ro n t R eform ism and the Communist Alternative As we have seen, the direction of the course of events in 1930 was irre sistib ly against that prescribed by union policies. While unions w ere urging increased wages and a sh o rter working week, and p re s s ing for reform s to raise purchasing power, in fact a series of p iecem eal reductions of wages and working conditions occurred, and these turned out to be a prelude to the 10 per cent cut in the basic wage and the P re m ie rs Plan of In the face of these th reats, the V ictorian unions - preoccupied chiefly with th eir dom estic affairs and im m ediate in terests - made no united stand, but began a disorderly re tre a t. Inroads into the conditions of sections of the w orkers had provoked violent resistan ce in the late tw enties. In coming to th eir support, the T.U. movement generally had felt that tim ber w orkers and coal m iners w ere resisting, on behalf of all w orkers, an alliance of em ployers, biased A rbitration Court, and anti-l abor B ruce-page governm ent. These upheavals, together with rising unemployment, had seriously weakened the movement, and V ictorian unions w ere only too ready to believe at the end of 1929 that the new Labor governm ents would check the offensive against wages and conditions. But the offensive continued despite the changes of governm ent, and on a w idening scale as the depression deepened. Stern challenges now brought to light the w eaknesses in union organisation, policy and leadership, to which reference was made at the beginning of this study. It becam e painfully apparent how ill-equipped the movement was to defend the w o rk ers in te re sts. We saw e a rlie r that there was much agitation by union spokesmen against wage cuts, as being unjust and calculated only to intensify the depression. But the p re ssu re for cuts was too great to be halted by m ere propaganda, w hether couched in term s of the purchasing power argum ent, o r expressed in b itte r denunciations of F a t', the evils of exploitation, or the Money Pow er s plot' to reduce w orkers to a 'coolie level. Voices w ere not lacking to warn unionists that they faced a concerted attack on th eir standard of living, o r even to incite them to what Cam eron (in the Tramway Record) called 'intelligent and sustained re sista n c e. But such calls to resistan ce tended to be 63

75 Trade Unions and the D epression vague exhortations and th ere was little indication that the union leadership had in mind an alternative course to th eir reliance on the Labor governm ents and on a reform ed arb itratio n system. Sometimes spokesmen complained of the w o rk ers ignorance and apathy as the prim e cause of inaction (in practically every issue of the Tram way Record Cam eron decried the stupidity' and 'se rv ile beliefs' of the w orkers) but in fact the leadership itself offered little inspiration to a g g ressiv eness. There was practically no inclination to m obilise the w orkers' industrial strength for action outside the orbit of the arbitration system, and V ictoria was alm ost free of strik es in C ircum stance supported traditional principles here, for defeatism was w idespread and union strength was disintegrating under the im pact of unemployment. The jubilation at the victory of the federal Labor P arty in 1929 has already been stre sse d. Then it had seem ed that the B ruce-page 'perv ersio n ' of the arb itratio n system would soon be rectified, and the A rbitration Court would be able to fulfil its proper function: to conserve and im prove w o rk ers' conditions. This expectation b o ls te r ed the attachm ent of the union leadership to legalism and to the belief that the problem of resistin g attacks on wages was largely the problem of resto rin g the C ourt's re a l function. While unions were extrem ely hostile to the existing system and sought to have it amended d rastically, only a sm all m inority opposed arbitratio n itself. Early in 1930 the A.C.T.U. C ongress had drawn up a com prehensive schem e for reform ing the system. * Its demands included abolition of the penalties upon strik es and lock outs, preference to unionists, and no award to p rescrib e hours exceeding a weekly maximum of forty-four hours or a basic wage which would not m aintain at least the basic standard obtaining at In May, the Scullin M inistry introduced a Bill to amend the A rbitration Act, and though it fell well short of th eir dem ands, the Bill was welcomed by the unions. At the sam e tim e it was denounced by em ployers, p re ss, and the Opposition as 'p artisan legislation designed to extend T rades Hall tyranny. In com m ittee, the M inistry proved am enable to p re ssu re, so that when the Bill passed the House of l The essentials of the scheme were to substitute for court procedures a system of conciliation committees and thus free the system from legalisms and technicality*. A series of deputations urged the federal government to implement the scheme. 64

76 R etreat on the Industrial F ront R epresentatives on 11 July it had been w atered down. Then m ost of its vital clauses w ere rem oved by the Senate, and deadlock between the H ouses seem ed im m inent early in August. But the M inistry com prom ised and in conferences with the Senate accepted many of the la tte r's am endm ents. The m utilated B ill, which was finally passed on 8 August, was far from embodying the full demands of the unions. Union spokesm en assailed the Senate, and the A.C.T.U. P resident c ritic ised the governm ent's 's u rre n d e r'. But the m ore general sentim ent was expressed by Duffy (S ecretary, M elbourne T. H. C.), who accepted the Act as an instalm ent tow ards the goal of the A.C.T.U. C ongress, and far b etter than nothing. F u rth er disappointm ent was in sto re for the unions, as la te r in the y ear the High Court declared invalid the im portant section of the new Act which dealt with conciliation com m ittees. The union lead ersh ip 's continued support for arb itratio n while the Court cut wages was presented as deliberate treach ery by the Communist P a rty. The 'new line' of the C.P. and its analysis of the depression have been outlined in C hapter 2. In accordance with the new line - which presum ed that an international revolutionary situation was developing and the overthrow of capitalism an im m inent p o ssib ility - the C.P. did its utm ost to 'expose' and sharpen the struggle against the 'so cial fa scist' A.L.P. and trad e union bureaucracy, who w ere assistin g the 'anti-w orking c la ss' Labor governm ents to c arry through 'the cap italist offensive' and place the burden of the c ris is on the w o rk ers. V ituperative d iatribes called for struggle against the 'so cial fa sc ists' and urged w orkers to repudiate th eir 'tra ito ro u s' union o fficials. At every opportunity, com m unists denounced arb itratio n - that 'w age-slashing instrum ent of the m a ster c la ss' so strongly supported by the 'social fa s c is ts '. In fierce and p e rsiste n t propaganda they exhorted w orkers to repudiate arb itratio n, defy aw ards, abandon all form s of class collaboration, and instead 'sharpen the class stru g g le'. T heir constant cry was for 'm ass action', which, they insisted, was the only way 'to sm ash the cap italist offensive'. Loudly and continually they called for strik e s and for 'all out' in the industries th re a t ened with wage cuts, arguing that localised stoppages m ust lead to defeat. W orkers w ere often also enjoined to launch 'a counter offensive' for higher w ages, sh o rte r hours and re lief for the unem ployed. At the sam e tim e, as noted previously, the C.P. aim ed at extension of the economic struggles into m ass political m ovem ents, 65

77 Trade Unions and the D epression with a view to organising a m ass political strik e for the overthrow of capitalism. In its campaign to m obilise the working class for m ilitant struggle, the C.P. was equally concerned to convince w orkers that they could take effective action to re s is t cuts only if they set up rank-and-file organisations and fought under rank-and-file leadership. Communists constantly urged the form ation of job com m ittees, councils of action, and rank-and-file strik e com m ittees which would include the unorganised and the unemployed. Such organisations would unite all w orkers irresp ectiv e of craft and lead to the establishm ent of a united front from below '. F u rth er, the w orkers had to elect th eir own rank-and-file leadership to control th eir struggles, which o th e r wise would be betrayed by the 'strik e-b reak in g ' union officials. The C.P. also required its m em bers to take the initiative in building the M ilitant M inority Movement (M.M.). The M.M. was to be 'an auxiliary to the party, and groups w ere to be form ed 'within the unions and upon the jo b s'. Some such groups w ere form ed and published bulletins, for instance the Railway R ebel. C riticising those who abandoned th eir union because it was reactionary, the party insisted that all m ilitants m ust work in the refo rm ist unions to win over the rank and file to a policy of m ilitant struggle and replace the 'so cial fa scist' officials with revolutionary fighters. It also warned e rrin g m ilitants that the rank-and-file com m ittees 'm ust not be considered as a new form of trad e u n io n '. In fact, however, the W orkers' Weekly tended to be vague at this stage about relations between the M.M. and the existing T.U. m ovement; and som e of th eir activities lent point to the charge of the union leadership that com m unists would w reck the unions and disrupt the labour m ovem ent. The com m unist attitude was that resp ect for trade union rules and decisions aided the bureaucracy 'in th eir despicable work of assistin g the em p lo y ers'. L ater, the C.P. 's policy was to build the M.M. as an alternative trade union cen tre. In any c ase in 1930 th ere w ere very few com m unists in the unions, and the party did not achieve its goal of winning m ass support. If the rank and file had doubts about the effectiveness of official union policy, they showed little sign of reacting favourably to the alternative offered by the C.P. M easured in term s of th eir response to the p arty 's wild calls for general strik e s, the 'revolutionary upsurge' of w orkers in V ictoria was not apparent. 66

78 R etreat on the Industrial F ront Early R etreats During 1930, engineering fitters at the S.E.C. works at Yallourn w ere practically the only V ictorian w orkers who took d irect industrial action to re s is t reductions in th eir standard of living. In D ecem ber 1929 Judge Beeby had issued the M etal T rades Award, ^ which respondent unions had denounced as an unw arranted attack on th eir working conditions. T heir m em bers seething with discontent, the A.E.U. and other unions expressed strong opposition to the award and lodged th eir objections with the A rbitration C ourt. It seem s reasonable to suppose that this discontent and hostility influenced Beeby, for in his final aw ard on 25 M arch 1930 he made som e concessions to the unions. The leadership of the A.E.U. regarded the award as a decided im provem ent, though it complained that there w ere still sev eral objectionable p ro v isio n s'. O fficials of the union conferred with em ployers, but they w ere unable to persuade them not to put into effect the 'obnoxious' clau ses. While com m unists cam paigned for a general stoppage, the A.E.U. leadership did not seek to incite m em bers to refuse to work under the award; but the fitters at Yallourn, apparently on th eir own initiative, stru ck on 9 May. 3 Control of the dispute was handed over to the Melbourne T. H. C. Disputes Com m ittee which earned the com plim ents of the Age by pursuing a policy of confinement and peaceful negotiations. The Labor M inistry was anything but sym pathetic, and it decided to leave the m atter entirely in the hands of the C o m m issio n ers. The works w ere able to c a rry on, and on 7 July the fitters resum ed, on the u n derstanding that the Com m ission would consider the possibility of making an agreem ent. The s trik e rs w ere afforded some financial a s s is t ance, receiving 2 10s a week strik e pay, but generally other unionists exhibited no active in te re st in th eir isolated sk irm ish. Sim ilarly, V ictorian unions passively watched the treatm ent m eted out to the A.W.U. by the A rbitration C ourt. At the end of January 1930, the Court reduced the wages of w orkers covered by the A.W.U. 's F ruit Picking Award. The G eneral S ecretary (Grayndler) protested, 2 For the important implications of some of the provisions of the award, see Perlman, Judges in Industry, pp However, Perlman (p. 101) at least overlooks the Yallourn strike when he asserts that, 'the award was accepted without noticeable revolt... 3 The men were to suffer a wage cut of 10s 6d a week and an increase in their working week. A'meeting of fitters' assistants decided to continue working, and the boilermakers resolved to work the increased hours imposed by the award under protest. 67

79 Trade Unions and the D epression and the A ustralian W orker, which had assu red m em bers that th eir officials w ere waging a sterlin g fight in the Court, now branded the judgment a 'scandalous aw ard' which illu strated the urgent need to rem odel the arbitratio n system. It did not offer a lead to the rank and file on how they might reco v er the lost wages, and the Annual Convention of the A.W.U. decided on m ore legal proceedings which proved unsu ccessfu l. On 2 June the A rbitration Court com menced hearing applications for drastic variations of the A.W.U. 's p asto ral aw ard. The union's officials w ere justifiably alarm ed by the attitude of Chief Judge Dethridge who declared, 'I am faced with the disgusting job of ad ju sting conditions, wage conditions, in accordance with economic re a litie s'. So on 4 June, G eneral S ecretary G rayndler withdrew from the Court, challenging the Bench to 'do its w o rst'. The case p ro ceeded, and meanwhile the A.W.U. conducted no cam paign, other than p ro tests to the Scullin governm ent, to p rep are its m em bers to m eet the alm ost inevitable outcom e. On 14 July the judgment granting sev ere wage cuts was issued. Then alm ost a week passed before a special com m ittee of A.W.U. officials m et in M elbourne and entered into discussions, which in the upshot extended for m ore than another week. The A ustralian W orker denounced the C ourt's 'iniquitous decision', which it attributed to D ethridge's bias, especially his adherence to the 'pernicious principle' of adjusting wages to economic conditions. It demanded action by the Scullin governm ent to re sto re the pro p er function of the Court, so that by 'sym pathetic adm inistration' it would fulfil its role of protecting and improving living standards. At the sam e tim e, the A ustralian W orker (23 July 1930) and officials 'strongly advised' all m em bers to await the pronouncem ent of the Com m ittee and warned that any hasty, ill-considered action would assuredly lead to serious trouble. The Melbourne office of the V ictoria-r iverina branch of the union advised sh eare rs to accept work under the new aw ard. But while the le a d e r ship delayed to confer, unofficial strik e s broke out against the award in New South W ales, where the shearing season was beginning, and sev eral strik e rs w ere a rre s te d.^ P a sto ra lists began to enrol volunte ers whom they threatened to use unless the strik e s ended, and the 4 The Sydney Rank and File Pastoral Workers' Committee of Action urged a general stoppage and stepped up its agitation for 'all out'. 68

80 R etreat on the Industrial Front S ecretary of the G ra ziers' A ssociation expressed alarm that the A.W.U. officials w ere taking so long to reach a decision while 'red ra g g e rs' w ere disrupting the industry. At length, the officials issued a m anifesto which stated, in ter a lia, 'any m em ber who accepts employment in the term s of the Award is not offending against any principle of the U n io n th o u g h m em bers w ere allowed the right to bargain for higher r a te s. The A rg u s, that relentless advocate of wage reductions, hailed this decision as a trium ph of good sen se', and a sim ila r opinion prevailed at the M elbourne T rades Hall. But m ilitants regarded the m anifesto as a recom m endation to 'scab ' and this led to the form ation of the breakaway P asto ral W orkers' Industrial Union of A ustralia. Stoppages against the new aw ard continued for a tim e and sum m onses w ere issued against hundreds of s trik e rs. Meanwhile the A ustralian W orker (6 August 1930) urged that m em bers of the union 'tru s t th eir chosen lead ers, who are doing th eir b est for the great organisation...'. These lead ers, after fu rth er consideration, retraced th eir steps to the Court to apply for a variation of the new aw ard. The Argus (16 July 1930) had reported predictions in C anberra that the new p asto ral award would probably prove to be a prelim inary to the g reatest economic readjustm ent that had ever occurred in A u stralia. From the A.W.U. 's decision to accept the aw ard, the Argus (29 July 1930) drew a lesson for all em ployers: the p a sto ralists had proved that the resistan ce of the trade unions was not as form idable 'as the bom bast of many trade union leaders might lead the community to b eliev e'. C ertainly the capitulation of the A.W.U., the m ost powerful union in A ustralia, followed by the failure of the M iners' Union and the A.R.U. to prevent wage reductions, w ere not calculated to inspire a com bative sp irit in w eaker o rg an isatio n s. While som e unions offered resistan ce in the A rbitration Court to any worsening of working conditions, some w orkers agreed to accept wage cuts in the conviction that they would thereby help th e ir em ploye rs to w eather the storm ; many others accepted a reduced income for reduced hours of work, hoping thus to keep d ism issals at a m inim um. In the la tte r p art of 1930, Wonthaggi m iners suffered at the hands of the C ourt, as an aw ard by Judge Beeby provided for a substantial wage cut at the State coal m ine. Several stop-w ork m eetings expressed hostility to the award, but the m iners failed to p reserv e th eir standard of living, as negotiations with the C om m issioners and 69

81 Trade Unions and the D epression appeals to the Labor M inistry to prevent the C om m issioners from im posing the cut proved abortive. On the very day on which the Beeby Award was brought down - 15 August sum m onses w ere issued at the instance of the V ictorian and N.S.W. Railways C om m issioners seeking d rastic variations of the existing railway aw ard s. (In this they w ere joined la te r by the South A ustralian and Tasm anian Com m issioners.) It had cost the A.R.U. 12,000 and much painstaking work to secure a new consolidated aw ard in early 1930, and the A rbitration Court had been occupied for som e tim e with a general log of claim s by the A ustralian F ederated Union of Locomotive Enginemen (A.F.U.L.E.). The V ictorian branches of the A. R.U. and A F.U.L. E- w ere firm ly tied to arb itratio n, and the Railways Union Gazette and the Footplate did not see industrial action as an a lte rn a tiv e.56 D espite the in creasin g difficulties of railw ay finances and the pow erful p r e s s u re on the governm ent for retrenchm ent, officials and journals had in effect encouraged the rank and file to believe that th e ir conditions w ere adequately safeguarded. The C om m issioners applications provoked p ro tests and demands that the governm ent take action to protect railw aym en and re stra in the C om m issioners. The Commonwealth governm ent did intervene la te r, but the Hogan governm ent took no action. 5 though railw aym en had been repeatedly told that a Labor governm ent represented th eir in te re s ts. The unions com m itted th eir future to the Court and becam e involved in protracted legal proceedings. During the next few m onths, the Gazette and Footplate carried long uninspiring re p o rts of proceedings and em phasised the m ag n ificent battle being waged by o fficials. The W orkers' Weekly called in vain for m ass action, and demands for a m ilitant alternative w ere scarcely raised outside the T ransportation Division of the A.R.U. The Railways Union Gazette served notice that the A.R.U. was m obilising in defence, and issuing a call to arm s, but railwaym en w ere expected to participate in the 'fight' only by providing finance for the Court case. The S ecretary of the A.R.U. (Sear) deplored the 'astounding claim ' of the C om m issioners, and G eneral S ecretary 5 Differences over industrial policy had led to a split in the Australian Council of the A.R.U. and friction between the Victorian branch, which supported arbitration, and the militant New South Wales and Queensland branches. 6 However, later the Ministry did force the Commissioners to withdraw from the High Court case. 70

82 R etreat on the Industrial Front Chappie said that it was so d rastic as to bew ilder him. O fficials com plained indignantly, but it cannot be said that railw aym en w ere offered inspiring leadership. Spearheaded by employing in te re sts, a m ost determ ined cam paign was being waged for a reduction of governm ent expenditure, and the Railways D epartm ent was a p rim ary targ et. Yet, a fte r the C om m issioners had declared w ar, the Railways Union Gazette (September 1930) preached the desirability of co-operation and appealed for m utual understanding and sympathy between the various c la s s e s. It lam ented the fact that destructive influences, such as a section of the m etropolitan p re ss, had worked to sep arate class from class where in fact no separation should e x ist. It was at this tim e too that Gordon M assey s a rticles appeared each issue advocating m onetary reform and the urgent need for class co-operation. ^ A fter som e p relim in ary legal skirm ishing, the unions involved secured the appointm ent of Conciliation Com m ittees (provided for in the amended A rbitration Act), with the re su lt that the A rbitration Court was prevented from dealing fu rth er with the applications for variation of the aw ards. The C om m issioners then applied to the Court for an o rd er to set aside the railw ay aw ards on the grounds that the financial situation had created an em ergency. The trade union leadership had viewed events with consternation, fearing that if the attack on the basic wage in this industry succeeded, other unions would im m ediately be faced with a sim ila r th reat. It was th eir concern about the C om m issioners' applications that prom pted the Em ergency Com m ittee of the A.C.T.U. to m eet on 18 August, when the decision was m ade to call the Septem ber Key Unions Conference discussed in C hapter 3. As noted th ere, this conference and the Special V ictorian A. L.P. Conference held at the sam e tim e had em phatically declared th eir opposition to any reduction of the w o rk ers' living standards. The Labor governm ents had been required to p r e vent such reductions being imposed and, fu rth er, to pursue radical policies to in crease the w o rk e rs purchasing power. But the course of events was not in fact affected by the outcome of eith er conference. On 4 O ctober the A rbitration Court set aside the existing railw ay 7 It is somewhat incongruous to note that shortly before this the A.R.U. had decided that its officials should 'take immediate steps to organise the rank and file on the lines of class against class, and not class collaboration, as at present (R.U. Gazette, August 1930). And cf. the previous attitude of the R U, Gazette, which, on 26 October 1927 for example, had denounced advocates ot co-operation. 71

83 T rad e Unions and the D ep ressio n aw ards, with the exception of the basic wage and standard hours. This m eant in V ictoria a reversion to rates and conditions fixed by the Railways C lassification Board for those officers and employees covered by its jurisdiction. Railwaymen voiced ineffectual protests and, with as little success as previously, urged the governm ent to ensure th eir standard of living.^ M eetings w ere addressed by officials who in effect did little m ore than inform the men how badly they had been treated. The G eneral S ecretary of the A.R.U. suggested that the A rbitration Court judges should be replaced, while Gordon M assey utilised the m eetings as an opportunity to expound his m onetary theories and advise railw aym en to study the facts of m oney. The Railways Union Gazette (November 1930) eulogised the work of the union s officials and urged a halt to what it claim ed was an 'attack on a rb itra tio n, which, it insisted, was A.R.U. policy. Making a plea for good will in industry, it a sse rte d that a nation wide sp irit of co-operation between all c lasses is esse n tial', and it denounced those incredibly blind men who w ere using the depression as an opportunity to attack the wage earn er. Trades Hall officials expressed alarm at the judgment, and the Labor governm ents cam e in for some c ritic ism. W. J. Duggan blam ed the federal M inistry which, he m aintained, should have curbed the C ourt. He also declared that if the arb itratio n proposals of the A.C.T.U. had been dealt with in a p roper m anner the p resen t c risis would not have a risen. But he and others who made sim ila r com m ents did not suggest what railw aym en might do to protect th eir w ages. R epresentatives of federal unions at a conference on 5 O ctober discussed the judgment, and delegates contended that it was opposed to all principles of justice. Officials of the ra il unions p ersisted with legal methods and told railwaym en that there was a good possibility that th eir wages might yet be saved. They appealed to the High Court to quash the A rbitration Court decision, and thus becam e entangled in constitution- 8 The unions concerned were the A.R.U., A.F.U.L.E., Federation of Salaried Officers, and Railways Professional Officers Association. The Victorian Commissioners proceeded to make reductions estimated to save the department 130, 000 a year (Argus, 14 October 1930). 9 It appears that the Executive of the A.F.U.L.E. sent telegrams to branches advising members to take no action of a militant nature until the State Annual Conference laid down a policy. 72

84 R etreat on the Industrial Front al questions regarding the validity of the appointment of the conciliation com m ittees and the constitutionality of the railw ay unions being before the A rbitration C ourt. On 1 D ecem ber, the High Court ruled that the aw ards had been legally set aside, and the C om m issioners proceeded with th eir claim s for reduced wages before the C lassification Board; towards the end of the month, th erefo re, the Board granted a 65 p er cent em ergency cut to operate from 4 O ctober. Sear expressed disappointm ent, though, as reported in the Age, 1 January 1931, he was able to discover some 'gratifying' aspects of the d ecisio n. The m isfortunes of the railw ay unions produced a wave of consternation through the T rades Hall, and P resid en t Cam eron protested that the Board 'had done a grievous w rong', as such a reduction in purchasing power m ust lead to fu rth er unemployment. But, within other unions, it seem s that there w ere few expressions of vital concern; and while the A ustralian W orker (8 O ctober 1930) r e garded events as further confirm ation of its belief that the judges w ere biased, and that the arb itratio n system m ust be reform ed, a few other journals m erely noted the d ecisio n s. During 1930 the A rbitration Court provided the unions with a fu rth er cause for anxiety when cost of living adjustm ents led to a decline in the basic wage from 1 May. Wages B oards followed suit, and this led to unsuccessful requests for m in isterial intervention. These reductions, of course, w ere not intended to affect re a l wages, but the unions w ere hostile, charging that the index was not a fair indication of what it cost a w orker to live. On 14 August the T.H.C., with its penchant for com m ittees of inquiry, set up a com m ittee 'to make a thorough investigation into the methods adopted by the Commonwealth S tatistician's D epartm ent in computing the R etail P rice Index N um bers' used by the Court. 'S acrifices' by Public Servants The Labor governm ents, as we have seen, had not checked p iecem eal attacks on the w o rkers' standard of living. The V ictorian governm ent had allowed the wages of railw aym en to be cut and th eir conditions to d eterio rate, and had not attem pted to in terfere when the A rbitration Court handed down adverse aw ards affecting em ployees of State instru m en talities. F u rth er, at a tim e when the basic wage case gravely threatened the in terests of all w orkers, the governm ent itself cut the sa la rie s of public se rv a n ts. The V ictorian public service unions w ere quite inadequate to the task 73

85 T rade Unions and the D epression of preventing salary reductions at such a tim e. They w ere isolated in the main from the industrial and political labour movements and experienced no feeling of solidarity with industrial w o rk e rs. To achieve th eir aim s, they had to rely on the justice of th eir case in fluencing politicians and public opinion, and as a last re s o rt they could only count on th eir electo ral potential. Having very lim ited aim s and a parochial outlook, the public serv ice organisations w ere alm ost exclusively concerned with th eir own im m ediate in te re s ts. However, they w ere acutely aw are of the rising clam our for reduced governm ent expenditure, and w ere especially uneasy after the M inistry began an economy drive and set up a State Service Economies Com m ittee. Then, with the adoption of the M elbourne A greem ent, they had cause to fear that sev ere retrenchm ent was im m inent. Early in 1930, public serv ice unions and the V ictorian State Instrum entalities Unions' Com m ittee had declared against re tre n c h m ent and protested against the Hogan M in istry 's moves in this d ire c tion. In every issue of the Public Service Journal of V ictoria from A pril to August, much space was devoted to publicising argum ents against retrenchm ent. The A.P.S.A. declared that it was prepared to share an equal burden but felt that its m em bers w ere being singled out for special reductions. The A ssociation sent a spate of le tte rs to the daily p ress and protested to m em bers of P arliam en t. The T each ers' Journal seem s to have been slow er to take up the challenge, but the August and Septem ber issu es strenuously repudiated the M inistry's retrenchm ent p ro p o sa ls. In July, thev.t.u. adopted the sam e stand as the A.P.S.A.: it did not oppose readjustm ent but it objected to any special burdens on public servants as 'class taxation'. The Union issued c irc u lars and interview ed M.Ps. in an endeavour to ward off the threatening blow s. Hogan's undertaking to balance the budget in conform ity with the Melbourne A greem ent was form idable enough in itself, but it becam e practically im possible if he intended to abide by the Septem ber A. L. P. Conference d ecisio n s. N evertheless, the M inistry proceeded with its p reparations, with the knowledge that it faced alm ost certain defeat unless it m et the adam ant demand of the Opposition for an economy budget. On 18 Septem ber the executive of the V ictorian A.P.S.A. m et the P re m ie r and the M inister for Public W orks, who outlined the grave financial position confronting the governm ent and invited the A ssociation to accept retrenchm ent m easu res. The A ssociation abruptly term inated its cam paign against the economy drive, as the 74

86 R etreat on the Industrial Front executive was concerned to convince public servants that, unless they accepted sala ry c u ts, the Hogan governm ent would fall and they would suffer m ore serious reductions. A.A. Calwell, who was P resident of the A.P.S.A., S ecretary of the State Instrum entalities Unions C om m ittee, and also V ice-p resid en t of the V ictorian A.L.P., seem ed expecially anxious to save the governm ent. ^ On 22 Septem ber a special general m eeting of the A.P.S.A., with a record attendance of over a thousand m em bers, resolved, on the recom m endation of the executive, that notwithstanding the fact that the V ictorian Public Service had lost over 2 m illion in effective wages since 1908, it is prepared to a s s is t the Government in its p resen t serious financial difficulties and make sacrifices for the public benefit.... The m e eting com m itted the association, on p rescrib ed conditions, to a schem e of rationing, if practicable, o r, alternatively, to percentage red u c tions in s a la rie s. The Public Service Journal of V ictoria (September 1930) adm itted that the decision ran counter to a p rim ary object of the association, but defended the acceptance of reductions as a p a triotic action to a ssis t the State. The P re m ie r, however, was not so successful in his dealings with other public serv ice organisations. He made sim ila r appeals to the V.T.U. and State Hospital Em ploye e s Union, but the executives of both unions refused to comply. Hogan brought down his balanced budget' on 24 Septem ber, with its provision fo r a special tax on public serv ice s a la r ie s. To the dissatisfaction of the Opposition, p re ss and em ployers, it did not provide for a reduction in the public serv ice wages bill, despite the offer of sacrifices by the A.P.S.A. On 30 Septem ber, the L eader of the Opposition gave notice that he would move a motion of no confidence (see C hapter 3). The P re m ie r anxiously looked to the A.P.S.A. to waive the conditions attached to its acceptance of percentage reductions. Im m ediately a fter the House adjourned, he discussed the m a tte r with Calwell who agreed to make such a recom m endation to his executive. On the next day, 1 O ctober, the executive of the A.P.S.A., apparently bent on keeping the governm ent in office at a l m ost any p rice, fell in with the P re m ie r s w ishes, so that la te r the sam e day he prom ised to review the budget and include public service salary cuts. B ranches of the T each ers' Union w ere divided on the 10 The S.I.U.C. had been very active in the latter part of 1929, but now was not heard of until early

87 Trade Unions and the D epression issue, and prolonged heated debates took place at the V.T.U. Council m eetings on 3 and 4 O ctober. Finally, claim ing that it had little choice, the Council resolved: 'we reluctantly feel compelled to acquiesce in such tem porary reductions' on certain conditions. ^ The T eachers' Jo u rn al, however, rem ained a b itte r critic of the governm ent's m easu res. It seem s reasonable to suppose that many public servants who had voted for the motion at the m eeting on 22 Septem ber had been influenced by the expectation that reductions in sa la rie s would be partially offset by benefits in other directions; as a resu lt of the conditions they had laid down, they would give with one hand and receive som e thing in the o th e r.12 N evertheless, on 6 O ctober, the A.P.S.A. Council endorsed the Executive's proposal to withdraw the conditions, and rejected an am endm ent that there be no fu rth er negotiations with the governm ent until the m atter was re fe rre d to a fu rth er m ass m eeting of m e m b e rs. It was on this sam e night that the C entral Executive of the A. L.P. accepted P resid en t K eane's ruling that the proposed salary reductions of m em bers of the A.P.S.A. would not contravene the Septem ber conference resolutions. Hogan's announcement of his schem e for percentage salary reductions was made the next day, and the no-confidence motion defeated a week la te r. The rank and file of the A.P.S.A. w ere allowed to express th eir opinion at a m eeting on 22 O ctober. Only about 180 turned up and a m ajority ratified the Council decision. These events provoked disaffection within the A.P.S.A.,and its long-standing feud with the H ospital Em ployees' Union flared as the la tte r charged that the rights of public servants had been sold out. The M inistry was grateful for the co-operation of the public serv ice organisations, but the Public Service Paym ents Reduction B ill (which was passed at the end of the year) was not shaped p rim arily in the light of th eir objections and suggestions. During The Council refused to hold a referendum and at first resolved to ask members to assist the country in the present crisis by accepting, without protest, temporary reductions. This led President Cremor to threaten to resign, and the Council then agreed to this compromise resolution. The Victorian Women Teachers' Association remained firm in its opposition to retrenchment (Aust. Worker, 8 October 193 0). See also the protests by members of the police force (Argus, 25, 26 November 1930). 12 The conditions included: that increments and superannuation be safeguarded; all reclassifications and promotions recommended by the Commission be given effect to immediately; and the government establish the Classification and Efficiency Board, which was so much sought after by public servants. The meeting also laid it down that the term of the reductions be definitely limited to 30 June 1931 and that the amount of reduction should not exceed 180,

88 R etreat on the Industrial Front V ictorian public servants not only suffered this salary reduction. Travelling allowances also w ere cut and many did not receive the prom otion and increm ents to which they w ere entitled. The T.U. movement had forcefully declared against retrenchm ent, but the unions exhibited no anxiety regarding the fate of the public serv an ts, and the Labor Call (30 October 1930) extolled the governm ent for its 'bold stand' on its taxation proposals to balance the budget. It was not the union leadership, but Blackburn (M.L.A.) who w arned of the probable consequences of the salary red u ctio n s. In opposing the legislation, he argued that the reductions w ere an incentive and an encouragem ent to every private em ployer which would bring down the wage scale of every w orker in the State. The S acro san ct1basic Wage Threatened The question of the basic wage in the railw ays industry had been rem itted to the Full A rbitration Court by the conciliation com m ittees, and on 20 O ctober 1930 the Court began its m omentous basic wage inquiry - the shibboleth of the 'sacro san ct' basic wage was about to be sm ashed. Any Labor leader making a re a listic ap p raisal of the situation might well have been expected to anticipate the outcom e. The p re ssu re s fo r economic readjustm ent w ere growing m ore intense, m ore irre s is tib le, every day. Orthodox economic analyses, which w ere widely publicised, invariably diagnosed the unemployment p ro b lem as sym ptom atic of a standard of living beyond the capacity of the A ustralian economy, and the business world and the daily p re ss m aintained a relen tless clam our for reduced w ages. And in V ictoria, the Hogan governm ent's public serv ice cuts had already set a bad exam ple. M oreover, during the y ear the A rbitration Court judges had repeatedly made ominous statem ents about the 'disgusting job' facing them. Frequently they had re fe rre d to the urgent need for readjustm ent to m eet economic re a litie s, and they had given out unm istakable hints concerning the necessity for review ing the basic wage when 'everything may go into the m elting p o t'. ^ Chief Judge Dethridge had gone so fa r as to say, 'the basic wage question is sim ply this - What is the highest basic wage that the country can pay?' 13 In his fruit industry award in January Dethridge had elim inated the 'Powers 3s' from the basic wage. 77

89 Trade Unions and the D epression And when the railw ay aw ards w ere set aside, Judge Beeby m aintained that 'an em ergency had arisen which called for im m ediate re a d ju stm ents in all d ire c tio n s...'. ^ During the y ear, the Court had been m ore and m ore disposed to take into account evidence regarding the economic condition of the in d u stry concerned, and it was such a co n sideration that led to the unanimous decision to set aside the railw ay aw ard s. The pronouncem ents of the judges w ere indicative of a readiness to depart from the Higgins concept of the basic wage, and such an attitude on th eir p art, taken in conjunction with the recent practice of the Court, strongly suggested that sooner o r la te r the state of the economy would becom e, for the C ourt, a decisive criterio n in the determ ination of wage le v e ls. And observing the lack of any clear-cu t th reat of union revolt against wage cuts, the Court was unlikely to be d eterred by fears of industrial tu rm o il. N evertheless, the unions had not been provoked to make any fundam ental c riticism of arb itratio n as such, and th eir dependence on the existing system had if anything been in creased. As the industrial strength of the unions declined and the frightening prospect of the labour m arket im m easurably strengthened the bargaining power of em ployers, officials no doubt had justification for believing that it would be disastrous for the w orkers to leave the protection of the industrial tribunals. But the T.U. movem ent was acutely d is s a tis fied with the operation of the arb itratio n system, and th ere was considerable m uttering about the bias of the ju d g es. It was held that it was a perversion of the purpose of the system if it worked to the detrim ent of labour, for, as the A ustralian W orker (17 D ecem ber 1930) m aintained, the function of the Court was 'the gradual, continuous and peaceful prom otion of working class b e tterm en t'. Throughout 1930, the A ustralian W orker b itterly decried the 'biased' outlook of the judges and repeatedly appealed to the federal governm ent to rem edy the defects of the arb itratio n system. Especially a fter the High Court judgment re fe rre d to above, the T.U. movement p ressed for fu rth er amendm ent of the A rbitration A ct. The F ederal S ecretary of the A.R.U. said that, as a resu lt of the C ourt's decision on 4 O ctober, 'the faith of railw aym en in a rb i tration had been sh attere d '. However, though m eetings of m em bers of the railw ay unions w ere exceedingly c ritic a l of the a rb itra tio n 14 See the references to the Railway Judgment in the basic wage decision (Shann and Copland, Crisis in Australian Finance, p.145). 78

90 R etreat on the Industrial Front system, few outside the m ilitant T ransportation Division of the A.R.U. and C entral Branch of the A.F.U.L.E. urged that th eir organisation should withdraw from the C ourt. Commenting on the setting aside of the railw ay aw ards in the Tram way R ecord (30 October 1930), Don Cam eron made the unusual analysis: 'The decision is exactly what could be expected. The court is an institution or instrum ent of the C apitalist State, and, as such, always acts stric tly in accordance with instructions received, and the principles that are represented by the C apitalist S ta te.' N evertheless, neither the A ustralian W orker nor Cam eron made a c ritic a l assessm en t of union policy when the fate of the basic wage was entrusted to a 'biased' Court and the eloquence of the union advocates. Com m unists who a sse rte d that the Court was a wage cutting machine, and that the w orkers m ust organise and fight for the preservation of th eir wages outside the Court, w ere paid scant heed. Union officials, enm eshed in legalism and anim ated by a d esire for industrial peace, held top-level conferences, addressed a few public m eetings, and prepared for the wordy battle before the ju d g es. A conference of rep resentatives of federal unions m et in Melbourne on 7 O ctober to consider the th reat of the basic wage application, and re fe rre d the m atter to the Em ergency Com m ittee of the A.C.T.U. with power to act. The Com m ittee - Duggan, C rofts, Cam eron, Duffy - m et next day and decided to convene a conference of union executives on 19 O ctober. The T.H.C. on 16 October entered 'a vigorous p ro test against any reduction of the standard A ustralian Basic Wage' which was already 'insufficient to provide the average fam ily with th eir norm al n eed s'. The Council endorsed the stand taken by the railw ay organisations in th eir opposition to wage reductions, and it called on all w orkers to participate actively in the campaign to prevent a lowering of the standard of living in A ustralia. N early five hundred m em bers of union executives m et at the M elbourne T ra d e s Hall on 19 O ctober. They resolved: That this Conference declares that no effort be spared in defeating the attem p t... to lower the standard of living of A ustralian w orkers by reducing the basic wage, and pledges its financial and m oral support to the A.C.T.U. in w hatever direction is considered n ecessary to p reserv e and im prove our living standards; and that the view of this Conference on the basic wage and wage question generally be conveyed...to the F ederal Governm ent. 79

91 Trade Unions and the D epression The Conference also decided to convene special m eetings of interested organisations to outline the policy of the A.C.T.U. against wage cuts. In the following m onths, while lengthy argum ent proceeded in the Court, V ictorian unions passed resolutions opposing any reduction in the basic wage and voted finance to enable the A.C.T.U. to conduct the case. The Em ergency Com m ittee of the A.C.T.U. had proposed a public campaign to arouse the community to the danger of a cut in the basic wage, and some propaganda m eetings w ere held, but nothing resem bling an effective m ass movement was generated. The w riting on the wall was fairly plain when, on 12 November, the Court issued an interim judgment that intim ated: The Court w ill...on Monday next [ 17 November], proceed to deal with the one and only issue which in its opinion is raised in this proceeding, nam ely, that the decline in the national income and the reduction in the spending power due to cessation of loans make necessary a reduction of the basic wage. It decisively rejected the argum ent of union advocates that extensive investigations into a wide range of subjects by the Commonwealth S tatistician w ere n ecessary, before it attem pted to in terfere with the basis upon which the basic wage was calculated. The following evening the T. H. C. voiced a 'vehem ent pro test against the action of the... Court... in deciding to proceed,.. without giving the Trade Union Movement... adequate opportunity to presen t its case in rebuttal, or to perm it a thorough investigation... into m aterial factors upon which the Court considers its decision will be b ased'. On 18 November a conference of rep resen tativ es of fo rty - five federal organisations deplored the lim itations the Court had imposed on the inquiry, and urged the appointm ent of a royal com m ission to make the investigations the C ourt p ersisted in re je c t ing. The federal governm ent did not act as the unions desired, and though some initial steps w ere taken to set up a royal com m ission to inquire into questions affecting the basic wage, it never in fact came into existence. ^ M eantim e, the refusal of the C ourt to adm it 15 When the Ministry announced its intention, Crofts asked the Court to stay its inquiry, but it refused (Argus, 27 November 1930). In any case, it was understood that the Royal Commission would not have the authority to override decisions made by the Court (ibid., 20, 22 December 1930). The leading Victorian union official, H.C. Gibson^ had been named as a Commissioner. 80

92 R etreat on the Industrial Front evidence he thought essen tial provoked heated exchanges between C rofts - who was in charge of the union case - and the judges. This issue cam e to a head on 18 D ecem ber, when insults' w ere hurled at the Bench and the union advocates withdrew in p ro test against the scope of the evidence allowed. At a conference on 30 November, fed eral union officials had resolved that if the Court continued to refuse to h ear relevant evidence, an application should be made to the High C ourt for a w rit of m andam us. This action was now contem plated; but, legal opinion being unfavourable, C rofts returned to the hearing on 22 D ecem ber. The case dragged on for a record length of tim e, and a vast m ass of data was subm itted to the C ourt. Although during the course of the hearing the unions occasionally shifted th eir grounds, they based th eir defence on sev eral m ajo r argum ents with which we have become fam iliar in the preceding p a g es. 16 As the case proceeded, however, the judges gave no sign that they found the union argum ents convincing, and it was soon apparent that they had few doubts about the loss of national incom e' and the 'reduced spending power of the com m unity' - over 100 m illion, they w ere to conclude. M oreover, th eir conception of relevant evidence and th e ir rem ark s concerning wage fixing c rite ria indicated that the judges did not sh are the unions' belief in the sacrosanctity of the b asic wage. O utside the C ourt there w ere com plaints that the judges w ere not im p artial, and signatures w ere collected on a union petition requesting th e ir rem oval on account of th eir b ias. The T.H.C. rejected a proposal that it call on the federal governm ent to replace the judges with others m ore in sympathy with the w orkers; but the Council did contend that 'the action of the Court [on 12 November]... will arouse grave suspicions among the w orkers and other sections of the com m unity in the capacity of the judges to deal im partially with the m e rits of the B asic Wage c a s e '. However, despite some apprehension regarding the possible outcome of the case, the rank and file w ere not p repared fo r the judgm ent, and the union leadership did not equip itself with a policy to m eet the eventuality of an adverse decision. 1? 16 For a useful summary of the unions' arguments and the judges replies, see the Court's award in Shann and Copland, Crisis in Australian Finance, pp Most journals carried reports of proceedings in the Court, but a few (e.g. the Shop Assistant) did not mention the case. The Aust. Worker (24 December 1930) again urged the federal government to intervene to preserve the standard of living. 81

93 T rad e Unions and the D epression The Ten P e r Cent Cut On 22 January 1931, the F ederal A rbitration Court gave its m om entous decision in the basic wage case. Rejecting union argum ents, the judges m aintained that a general wage reduction 'would leave the spending power of the community in the aggregate unaltered in quantity' and would mean 'a tra n sfe r from them [wage earn ers in em ployment] to th eir em ployers of spending power to the extent of the reductions'. They anticipated that this tra n sfe rre d spending power would be used by em ployers in such a way that industrial activity would be stim ulated and eventually m ore employment made available. The Court agreed that a wage reduction should be a 'la st re s o rt', but it found that g reat and increasing unemployment was strongly sym p tom atic of a wage level too high for capacity at that tim e; 'the conclusion is unavoidable that the p resen t wage level is above that which can be supported by the m arketable productivity of the Commonwealth and that a lowering of that level is one of the essen tial m eans of checking a fu rth er in crease of unemployment, of gradually restoring employment and of resto rin g a pro p er economic balan ce'. Although the judges conceded that wage reduction alone would not m aterially a lte r the situation and a sse rte d that there would have to be re a d ju stment in all directions, they declared that a wage cut was unavoidable and an im m ediate n ecessity. Thus the Court handed down a judgment that m eant a 10 p er cent cut in the basic wage. C harlie Crofts (Secretary, A.C.T.U.), who was handling the union case, cried, 'to hell with these judges', and other unionists in the Court sang the 'Red Flag' and gave three cheers for the Revolution. As suggested previously, there w ere good grounds for predicting that the Court would a rriv e at som e such decision, and, just a few days before, eight leading econom ists had issued a statem ent in which they had asserted that the fir s t condition for recovery was 'a pooling of the lo ss' and that one of the three p rim ary steps which m ust be taken was 'a reduction in the rates of real wages of at least 10 p er cen t'. However, while union officials had been arguing for months before the Court, there had been no preparations in anticipation of an adverse decision; so that 22 January found the unions without any plan to m eet the devastating blow, 18 and, while A.W.U. officials said 18 On 16 January, a meeting of the Emergency Committee of the A.C.T.U. postponed consideration of a request by the Tramway Union that a conference be held of representatives of unions likely to be affected by the Court's judgment (Age, 17 January 1931). The committee decided that a meeting of the full executive of the A.C.T.U. be held at the end of the month (Herald, 16 January 1931). 82

94 R etreat on the Industrial Front that the judgment was fully expected, other leaders w ere reported to have 'ex p ressed su rp rise ' at the magnitude of the cut. Perhaps the P rim e M inister had given many w orkers a false sense of security, for on 13 January he had given an assu ran ce that the la st ditch the Labor P arty would fight would be the ditch of the basic wage.20 Union officials denounced the judgm ent, though som e claim ed it was a p a rtia l victory in that the Court had refused to in terfere with the m ethod of fixing the basic wage, and the P resid en t of the T.H.C. was able to d iscern a 'saving quality in the situation: neither the Court nor em ployers would be m a sters in the absolute sense of the conditions which would operate; neither could escape the effects of reduced spending power.21 But indignation did not issue in decisive le a d e r ship, and, rejecting out of hand suggestions for d irect action, V ictorian union officials discussed the possibility of an appeal to the High Court and looked for the intervention of the federal governm ent. On 1 F ebruary the governm ent did apply to the Court for a postponment of the operation of the 10 p er cent cut, but a few days la te r the application was rejected. While the Court, econom ists, som e church lead ers, and a pow erful p re ss campaign sought to convince w orkers that the cut would benefit them, as industry would be boosted and unemployment curbed, union spokesm en and journals re ite ra ted the purchasing power argum ent and m aintained that the depression would be w orsened. The judgm ent, union propagandists m aintained, had been brought down 'at the behest of the High P rie s ts of Finance' who had decreed that the w o rk ers' standard of living was to be destroyed. The decision was also regarded as a fu rth er stage in 'the sin iste r cam paign' by English in terests to reduce A ustralia to 'a slave state' and to turn A ustralians into producers of cheap raw m a te ria ls. That A ustralian em ployers should also seek wage reductions was to some spokesm en the height of folly, and the hope was expressed that 'If 19 Yet it was more than hindsight that led the General Secretary of the A.W.U. to report after the event that 'from the very beginning the Court made it abundantly clear to all... that the basic wage would be reduced'. (Aust. Worker, 11 February 1931). 20 Argus, 14 January See the heated exchanges in the Court the next day, when Crofts, after attempting to refer to Scullin's speech, was threatened with removal (ibid., 15 January 1931). 21 See also the similar ideas and the references to 'the inexorable law of action and reaction in the L. Call (29 January 1931). 83

95 Trade Unions and the D epression em ployers in A ustralia could be brought to re a lise that the home m arket is th eir only m arket for m anufactures they might cut adrift from the low-wage policy. In V ictoria talk of organising the working class for m ilitant struggle was confined to a very sm all m inority, chiefly com m unists who asserted that the cut confirm ed th eir ch aracterisatio n of the Court as a capitalist weapon and vindicated th eir an ti-arb itratio n policy. The W o rk ers Weekly intem perately denounced union officials as tra ito rs, claim ing that they had participated in the arb itration case in o rd er to deceive the w orkers and pave the way for the cut. The C.P. and the M.M. argued that only the organised power of the w orkers could check the cap italist offensive, and they agitated for a general strik e and urged all w orkers to adopt R.I.L.U. tactics and set up effective organisational m achinery. The W o rk ers Weekly (30 January 1931) predicted that if there was a general strik e the capitalist class would capitulate in a few days, or else they would re s ist with all th eir might, and then the movem ent would go beyond m ere resistan ce to wage cuts to a higher stage of political struggle. Probably the C.P. hoped for the la tte r eventuality, but it was a prospect that found no favour with V ictorian union officials. While the campaign for a general strik e aroused som e response in New South W ales, very few V ictorians w ere inclined to subscribe to such a d rastic policy. On Thursday night, 22 January, the N.S.W. T rades and Labor Council declared in favour of a general strik e; but the M elbourne T.H.C. rejected proposals for d irect action, and, though officials encouraged the expectation that the federal governm ent would save the day, the Council would not discuss a motion that unless the P rim e M inister prevented any reduction in the basic wage, unions be instructed to cancel th eir affiliation with the A. L. P. The T.H.C. expressed its alarm at the cut and urged 'that the A.C.T.U. im m ediately fram e a policy having for its purpose the counter-acting of the C ourt's decision and resto ratio n of the existing standard of living'. The delegates, however, did not suggest in the resolution how the A.C.T.U. m ight achieve such ends. R esentm ent was universal in the ranks of the V ictorian unions, but its expression was generally confined to resolutions of p ro te st. Looking to political action for re d re ss, union m eetings demanded that the federal governm ent take extrem e steps to nullify the C ourt's judgm ent. There w ere also appeals for the reconstruction of the arb itratio n system which had led to such a gross m iscarriag e of ju stic e. No union was prepared 84

96 R etreat on the Industrial Front to take individual industrial action, and the T.H.C. refused to initiate action on a state basis; so all action was suspended until the A. C. T. U. should form ulate a national policy. The A.C.T.U. Executive m et in Sydney from 29 to 31 January It d ecried the intentions of the Loan Council to s e ll the w o rk e rs ' b irth rig h ts to foreign bondholders and called for united r e s is t ance to 'the determ ined attem pts of the big financial dictators to take advantage of the c ris is, and degrade the standards of living of the A ustralian people'. It m aintained that 'the situation is so grave that a state of em ergency should be declared and m easures adopted for the purpose of preserving the living standards of the people and providing sustenance for hundreds of thousands of starving men, women and children... '. The Executive decided to convene a special trade union congress for 16 F ebruary which would consider the general strik e proposal of the N.S.W. Labor Council. Although the deliberations of this C ongress would be of the utm ost significance for all A ustralian w orkers, the Melbourne T.H.C. did not give its delegates specific instructions - they w ere in the event, n everth eless, to vote against a general strik e. On 5 F ebruary, it was moved 'That this Council censures the F ederal G overnm ent... and we... endorse the action of the Sydney T rades and Labor Council in calling a G eneral S trike, and fu rth er, that we im m ediately hold Factory and Mass M eetings... to set up rank and file com m ittees to organise a G eneral S tr ik e... '. However, the Council adopted an am endm ent by C rofts, 'That all affiliated unions be urged to c a rry out the recom m endations contained in the R eport' of the A.C.T.U. Executive m eeting. The Council also reso lv ed, on the reco m m en d a tion of its executive, 'that all affiliated unions be requested to convene special m eetings of th eir m em bers to urge the im portance of representation at C ongress, and to in stru ct th eir delegates how to vote on the business before C o n g ress'. But tim e was short, and it seem s that few unions afforded th eir rank and file an opportunity to elect delegates o r discuss the strik e proposal, and these decisions w ere usually made by the state o r federal executive. With few exceptions, V ictorian union officials w ere solidly opposed to s trik e action, and th e ir statem e n ts condem n ing such a course as ridiculous w ere given ample p re ss publicity. The A.W.U. was an adam ant opponent of a general strik e, and its Annual Convention decided (19-7) to send delegates for the firs t tim e. The V ictorian delegation to the congress was composed overw helm - 85

97 Trade Unions and the D epression ingly of officials, though many unions w ere unable to send delegates to Sydney, and T rades Hall officials w ere initially concerned le st the Sydney unions dominate the congress - a fear rem oved, however, by the decision to allow proxj' re p resen tatio n. The congress was held from 16 to 22 F ebruary and proved little short of a fiasco. A fter sev eral days of fru itless debate, despite vehement opposition by a m inority, the Executive succeeded on the 19th in having the congress adjourned so that a deputation might proceed to C anberra to request the federal governm ent to declare a state of national em ergency. But the whole record of the Scullin governm ent left no doubt that it would not entertain such a step, and the A.C.T.U. leadership, having already broached the subject with the governm ent, m ust have re a lise d the futility of the journey. Im m ediately following the A.C.T.U. Executive m eeting at the end of January, S ecretary C rofts and Jock Garden had travelled to C anberra and interview ed federal m in is te rs. They had w arned that unless the governm ent did som ething about the 10 p er cent cut, there m ight be a general strik e, and it would seem that the proposal for a state of em ergency had been discussed. W. J. Duggan (P resident, A.C.T.U.) was a m em ber of the F ederal Executive of the A. L. P., and the top union officials at least w ere fam iliar with the opinions held by the m ajority of the F ed eral Executive and the F.P. L.P. R epresentatives of the federal governm ent and the State P a rliam e n t ary Labor P a rtie s attended m eetings of the F ederal Executive at M elbourne on 11 and 12 F ebruary when the economic situation was review ed. There had been unofficial com m unications between the Executive and rep resen tativ es of the A.C.T.U., and no doubt the 10 p er cent cut was debated by the Labor P arty lead ers. The m eeting had before it a p ro test by the Clothing T rad es Union against the sm ashing of the standard of living by the A rbitration Court, and before adjourning to Sydney on 13 F ebruary, the F ederal Executive decided to consider the m a tte r when it m et a deputation from the 22 Some delegates to such union conferences can hardly be said to have been well qualified to speak on behalf of the unionists they represented For example,. 'Bunny' Batten (the Herald industrial reporter) represented the Victorian Bill Posters' Union at this congress. Certain of his actions in the past had been regarded as anti-working class, and, though he was supported by practically all the Victorian delegates, he was expelled from the congress (Herald, 18 February 1931). Batten attended Victorian A.L.P. Conferences as a delegate from the Pastrycooks' Union. At the 1929 Easter Conference, an unsuccessful attempt had been made to have his credentials rejected (L. Call, 11 April 1929). 86

98 R etreat on the Industrial Front A.C.T.U. in Sydney. Then on 16 February, in Sydney, the Executive agreed to m eet rep resentatives of the A.C.T.U. with a view to 'joint consideration of the general economic position*. Two days la te r the F ederal Executive protested against the basic wage cut and asked the governm ent 'to do everything possible to prevent this d ra stic reduction... '. The motion and am endm ents before the A.C.T-U. C ongress w ere public knowledge, and the F.P L.P rem oved any shadow of doubt as to its attitude. On 18 F ebruary, at a m eeting of federal caucus, Senator Rae introduced a proposal that the governm ent proclaim a state of em ergency, but it evoked p ra c tic ally no in te re st and was rejected out of hand (41-5) the next day, alm ost without discussion. D espite th e ir aw areness of this whole situation, Duggan, C rofts, G arden, and other represen tativ es of the congress went to C anberra to p resen t th e ir req u est. They interview ed Scullin on 20 February and received a categorical 'no*, as the com m unists had predicted. The congress resum ed on 21 F ebruary, and the deputation reported the failure of its m ission. Stormy sessions followed, in which the executive recom m endation and the num erous am endm ents w ere all rejected. The main general strik e proposal was lost Finally it was resolved to call upon each State Council 'to make p reparation for holding m ass m eetings of all w orkers on the question of taking action to com bat the onslaught of the employing c la s s '. Such m ass m eetings w ere to be held on an industry b asis, and no la te r than 6 M arch. And so the congress ended by m erely throwing back on the unions the onus of finding a method of combating the 10 p er cent cut. N everth eless, the rank and file w ere assured by one leading official and propagandist in the Tram w ay R ecord (March 1931) that the congress had been 'a wonderful su c c e ss'. According to W. J. Duggan it had been valuable ; while the A ustralian W orker (25 February 1931) inform ed them that 'indecision was in ev itab le'. 23 A fter 22 January, em ployers had lost no tim e in applying for 23 Union journals and the L. Call approved of the decision to reject a general strike, and the latter's conception of such a tactic is worth noting. On 26 February 1931 it maintained that a general strike, like a revolution, comes into being 'almost spontaneously' and independently of rules or formulae. It argued that if all workers were affected 'in the same way and in the same degree at the same time, then uniformity of action or reaction...would be possible'. Only then would a general strike have reasonable prospects of success. 87

99 Trade Unions and the D epression variation of aw ards, and union officials w ere occupied in abortive appearances before industrial tribunals. Before long, the rates of wages in practically all aw ards of the Court had become subject to the 10 per cent reduction, and V ictorian wages boards generally followed su it. On 26 F ebruary, the M elbourne T.H.C. adopted the congress recom m endation to hold m eetings; but if affiliated unions expected the Council to offer positive leadership in the search for a policy to r e gain the 10 p er cent cut, they w ere again disappointed. The T.H.C. Executive convened a m eeting of executives of affiliated unions for 1 M arch. This m eeting form ed itself into a campaign council to give effect to the resolutions of the Union C ongress whose purpose it was stated was 'the adoption of a policy to re sto re the living standards of A ustralian w orkers and for p ressin g forw ard the demand for work or for sustenance for unemployed w o rk e rs'. All unions w ere urged to release th eir paid officials for the purpose of addressing midday and night m eetings, and the C entral Unemployment Com m ittee (C.U.C.) was asked to c o -o p e ra te. 2 ^ The T.H.C. was requested to set up a special organising com m ittee to arran g e and control all m eetin g s. It was also decided to seek the appointm ent of a royal com m ission to inquire into the method whereby the C ourt had arriv ed at its basic wage decision. A fter debate on 5 and 12 M arch, the T.H.C. adopted the resolutions of this m eeting of executives and set up an organising com m ittee as re q u e ste d.2^ Some unions w ere still considering an appeal to the High Court, while many complained that it was gro ssly unfair that em ployers who benefited by the tariff should reduce w ages. The P rim e M inister was requested to prevent such a p ractice and to provide protection only to those industries which gave a guarantee that they would not reduce wages below the equivalent of the H arv ester Judgm ent. There was now m achinery to convene m eetings, though some T.H.C. delegates felt m ere m eetings would be pointless unless an agreed policy on the cut could be put before them; and they warned that confusion would re su lt if speakers advocated different p o lic ie s. 24 Note that the A.C.T.U. Congress resolution would have involved the militant Unemployed Workers'Movement as well as the C.U.C. 25 T.H.C. Minutes, 5, 12 March Later this committee suggested that the federal government should appoint a royal commission on the basic wage, but the T.H.C. refused to adopt the recommendation (L. Call, 30 April 1931). 88

100 R etreat on the Industrial F ront The m ajority, however, subscribed to the Executive's reply that the m eetings would give the rank and file an opportunity to express th eir view s, and that, as the congress had rejected the proposals of the A.C.T.U. Executive, each union m ust now form ulate a policy of its own. The journals made little effort to arouse the enthusiasm of the rank and file, ^ and in the circum stances it is hardly su rp risin g that at the m eetings that w ere held unionists rejected strik e proposals and usually did little m ore than repeat the demand that the Labor governm ents should take steps to re sto re the standard of living. The Seam en's Union did entertain the idea of d irect action, but finally decided against such a course - a decision the T. H. C. P resid ent applauded as w ise. A fter a few m onths, the journals re fe rre d specifically to the m atter only on ra re occasions, though in m id-m ay the T.H.C. organising com m ittee was still discussing proposals to begin agitation for the resto ratio n of the cut. But by this tim e the labour movem ent was suffering from the effects of disastro u s political divisions, and the attention of union officials was soon monopolised by the P re m ie rs ' Plan. The V ictorian unions, having ham m ered out no effective policy of re sista n c e, subm itted to the 10 p er cent cut. 26 The R.U. Gazette (March 1931) lamented that railwaymen were literally stunned by the blows of the wage cutters', and A.R.U. officials argued that they had done everything possible but could not go any further because of the attitude of the rank and file (ibid., April 1931). However, the Transportation Division of the A. R.U. protested emphatically against the statement of the Secretary of the A.R.U. that not 3 per cent of the membership would strike to regain wages and conditions. The division m aintained that such statements by a leader tended to stifle the spirit of class consciousness that was so urgently needed (ibid., May 1931). 89

101 5 Unions, Labor, and the Premiers Plan The L abor Split and the 'B attle of the P la n s L ess than six m onths a fte r the B asic Wage Judgm ent, the L abor governm ents adopted the P re m ie rs ' P lan. D uring those m onths the problem s of the country and the difficulties of the T.U. m ovem ent b e cam e m ore and m o re c ritic a l. Events in the fed eral sphere assum ed an in creasin g ly om inous note and ro se steadily to a clim ax, and the Scullin governm ent was subjected to p re s s u re s and s tra in s which it could not w ithstand. The bew ildered T.U. m ovem ent floundered along, anxious about the tren d of events, but m aking sc a rc e ly any effort to intervene decisively to influence the outcom e. Soon a fte r the P rim e M in ister retu rn e d to A u stra lia in early January 1931, the serio u s dissen sio n within the ranks of the F.P.L.P. carrue to a head, and the political labour m ovem ent was d ram atically sh a tte re d. When Theodore was re in sta te d as T re a s u re r, Lyons and Fenton resigned from the cabinet; and then som e w eeks la te r, on 13 M arch, by voting with the O pposition on a no-confidence m otion against the G overnm ent, they and th e ir follow ers placed th e m selves outside the Labor P a rty. A few days la te r they w ere joined by M cg rath (m em ber fo r B a lla ra t). E arly in May, the United A u stralia P arty was founded with Lyons as le a d e r. M eanwhile the conflict betw een the fed eral L abor P a rty and the N.S.W. branch reached a clim ax in the E ast Sydney by-electio n, when E. J. W ard refu sed to follow in stru ctio n s to conform to fed eral policy. Subsequently, when fed eral caucus refused to adm it W ard (12 M arch), those N.S.W. Labor m em b ers in the fed eral P arliam en t who su b scrib ed to the Lang Plan form ed the sep a ra te B easley group. At the end of M arch the N.S.W. A.L.P. Executive was expelled by a Special In te rsta te A. L. P. C o n fe re n c e,1 and soon th e re w ere to be two riv a l L abor P a rtie s in New South W ales. In the House of R epresen tativ es the M inistry was now dependent on the u n certain support of the B easley group, which held the balance of pow er. l The Victorian delegates were: Prime Minister Scullin, Drakeford (M.L.A.), McNamara (M.L.C.), A.A.Calwell, M. P. Considine, andw.j. Duggan (Secretary T. H.C. and President A.C.T.U.). Mick Considine was the only Victorian who voted against the expulsion of New South Wales. 90

102 Unions, Labor, and P re m ie rs' Plan As the depression deepened, though the country was well on the way to a correction of the trade balance, th ere was a fu rth er d e te rio r ation in the public fin an ces. Since the Scullin governm ent did not rectify the w orsening budgetary position, em ployers, bankers, and econom ists, together with the p re ss and influential institutions and public figures, becam e increasingly insistent that th ere m ust be a d rastic curtailm ent of governm ent expenditure and that budgets m ust be b alan ced.2 Such a policy was recom m ended at the P re m ie rs Conference in F ebruary by a com m ittee of experts, who contended that 'the sev e re st sacrific e s' w ere n ecessary to prevent d isaste r. A lternative proposals w ere subm itted by Theodore, and a few days la te r the N.S.W. P re m ie r startle d the country by presenting his plan»3 The Lang Plan was sum m arily rejected by the Conference, which adopted a th re e -y e ar plan to m eet the national em ergency and bring about an adjustm ent of b u rd en s. The F ed eral Executive of the A.L.P., and the F.P.L.P. a few days la te r (19 F ebruary), both approved of the Commonwealth governm ent continuing negotiations with the banks on the lines laid down by the P rim e M inister and Mr T heodore. But the banks refused to give the required undertakings and w ere adam ant that the firs t essen tial was resto ratio n of confidence, som ething which could only com m ence when the governm ents had placed th e ir finances in o rd er by deflationary m easu res. The e ssen ce of the F ed eral T re a s u re r s plan was the creation of additional bank credit concurrently with reductions in governm ent expenditu re, and a reduction of costs in in d u stry. In view of the attitude of the banks, T heodore proposed that th e re should be an issu e of 2 See, fof example, documents in Shann and Copland, Crisis in Australian Finance. For later developments see documents in Battle of the Plans. One of the major obstacles to the implementing ot Labor's financial policy was the Commonwealth Bank Board, and especially its conservative chairman, Sir Robert Gibson. Yet, when Gibson's term had expired in the latter part of 1930, to the consternation of the labour movement, he had been reappointed by Scullin. The blow was softened a little by the appointment of M.B. Duffy (Secretary Melbourne T.H.C.) to the Bank Board. 3 Lang proposed: 1. That the Governments of Australia...pay no further interest to British bondholders until Britain has dealt with the Australian oversea debts in the same manner as she settled her own foreign debt with America. 2. That in Australia interest on all Government borrowings be reduced to 3 per cent. 3. T hat... the Commonwealth Government... abandon the gold standard..., replacing it with'the goods standard'. 91

103 T rad e Unions and the D epression fiduciary currency of 18 m illion. In M arch the governm ent brought down a series of bills designed to give effect to its financial policy, but they w ere rejected by the Senate. So an im passe was reached. The national finances drifted p e rilously. On 1 A pril Lang defaulted on in te re st paym ents to B ritish bondholders; la te r in the month th e re was a run on the N.S.W. Savings Bank and it was forced to close its doors; meanwhile on 2 A pril the Commonwealth Bank Board advised the Loan Council that a point is being reached beyond which it would be im possible for the bank to provide fu rth er assistan ce for the Governm ents in the fu tu re'. T here was passionate controversy regarding the steps that should be taken to rescue the economy, and, especially after Lang's default, L abor's policy aroused opposition that was som etim es alm ost frenzied. L abor's c ritic s w ere in a position to exert a potent influence on public opinion, and they waged a m assive cam paign to convince people that L abor's proposals m eant inflation and repudiation and would resu lt in com plete d isa ste r. A ustralia could be saved only by a retu rn to 'sane finance', and Lyons was hailed as the potential saviour of his country. As m id-1931 approached, the federal governm ent was faced with the prospect of im m inent default. At the end of A pril, the Loan Council expressed the opinion th at A ustralia should aim at securing a balanced budget by the end of June 1934, and it appointed a com m ittee to investigate the budgetary position. J.P. Jones (a senior V ictorian m inister) was chairm an of the three-m an com m ittee, which also in cluded the Labor P re m ie r of South A u stralia. It co-opted the serv ices of econom ists and u n d e r-tre a su re rs, and th eir re p o rt 'upon the p o ssibilities of reaching Budgetary Equilibrium ' was presented to the P re m ie rs ' Conference (25 May to 10 June). E arly in the proceedings the federal Labor leaders revealed that they w ere going to abandon th eir fo rm er attitude and capitulate in the 'battle of the p lan s'. During the firs t half of 1931, the advocates of Social C redit and o th e r solutions and panaceas continued to seek co n v erts among unionists, and with the clam our raised by its opponents it was difficult to hear the voice of official L ab o r.^ W orkers w ere being inform ed by 4 The Special Interstate A.L.P. Conference at the end of March declared that the country was in its present grave position, 'mainly as a result of the breakdown of the monetary system'. Measures it proposed included: placing the control of the currency, credit-creating machinery, and interest and discount rates in the hands of a Commonwealth Central Bank; taxing interest on Commonwealth and State bonds; and putting in hand Commonwealt' and State public works in order to stimulate industry to absorb the unemployed. 92

104 Unions, Labor, and P re m ie rs 1 Plan Scullin and other Labor leaders that the bottom had been reached, and, if m ost of the rank and file w ere not already at sixes and sevens, they would have been pushed in that direction by the b itte r differences of opinion over financial policy that w ere convulsing the m ovem ent. As a correspondent in the Labor Call (30 A pril 1931) com plained, 'D espite the d esperate position of the nation and the sufferings of hundreds of thousands unemployed, half-a-dozen schools of thought within the Labor camp a re broadcasting th eir opinion vehem ently, bew ildering m ost of th eir supporters, and rendering it alm ost im possible for the average electo r to thread the m aze of conflicting p o lic ie s.' However, there was a general line advanced by m ost union p ropagandists. The purchasing power argum ent rem ained basic, and they continued to call for a halt to the 'suicidal policy of d eflatio n '. A generally held prem ise was that there had been a 'breakdown of the m onetary sy stem ', and events made spokesm en still m ore insistent that only a revolutionary change in this system could save A ustralia from w orse troubles. T here w ere fu rth er tirad e s, m ore vehem ent than before, against the Money Pow er, which, through its stra n g le hold on finance, was allegedly responsible for the stagnation of industry and the colossal unemployment. W orkers w ere w arned that the High P rie s ts of Finance had decreed that they w ere to be im poverished still fu rth er. The banks' attitude tow ards Theodore's proposals and th eir insistence on retrenchm ent and balanced budgets, and the Commonwealth Bank's action on 2 A pril, w ere regarded as clear evidence that the Money Pow er was attem pting to defeat dem ocracy and establish a com plete financial dictatorship. The burning issue was, 'Shall the bankers rule the nation?' It was an urgent necessity that the tyranny of the Money Pow er be broken and that a 'sufficiency of currency and credit' should be made available, the 'gold fetish' abolished, and the in terest burden lightened. Union propagandists continually urged that there should be national control of banking and credit. When the question of fundam ental causes was broached, it was generally acknowledged that the cap italist system was ultim ately responsible, and spokesm en who took this position m aintained that the c ris is had been made m ore acute by the 'nefarious operations' and 'selfish incom petence' of fin a n c ie rs.5 As w orkers - with th eir 5 Note especially Cameron's analysis in the Tram. Record (March 1931): 'While the periodic glut issuing in our economic crisis is inescapable while Capitalism lasts, its present severity might have been tempered by wise and disinterested control of credit and currency. ' 93

105 T rade Unions and the D epression 'capitalistically conditioned b eliefs - w ere not ready to change the social system, palliatives to alleviate the position w ere n ecessary and d e sira b le. Union spokesm en responded hotly to the mounting p re ssu re s for deflation early in the new year, and the Expert C om m ittee s R eport to the F ebruary P re m ie rs Conference was vigorously condemned. Although federal L abor s financial policy was fa r less rad ical than the m easures they had been advocating, union propagandists espoused the governm ent's proposals, and thus some degree of coherence was introduced into the m ovem ent's outlook. The journals provided opportunities for Theodore and other federal leaders to expound and publicise th eir views, especially regarding the need for currency and banking refo rm. However, editorials pointed out that the governm ent's proposals would not have m iraculous effects and w ere m erely a tem porary but safe expedient. Being only a means to an end, they would not m ean the abolition of capitalism ; and sev eral journals a sse rte d that there would have to be accompanying m easures to ensure that w orkers benefited. The Labor Call (5 M arch 1931) expressed the view that the m ost form idable obstacle in the way of Labor realisin g its policy was the absurd beliefs held by the w o rk ers' - for exam ple, that wage cuts w ere n ecessary and that the cap italist class and the P a rlia m ents w ere all-pow erful. T heir anti-l abor beliefs and 'the slavish acquiescence of w orkers in the policy of ru le rs ', according to the Labor Call and also Cam eron in the Tram w ay R ecord and A ustralian W orker, w ere largely responsible for the im poverishm ent of w orkers and made th e ir subjection by anti-l abor possible. The perplexed rank and file watched the F.P.L.P. disintegrate am id the b itte r recrim inations of the opposing factions, and union propagandists did little to a s s is t them to thread th eir way through the m aze of speculations, rum ours and partisan rep o rts of the p re s s. L ater, in reviewing the repeated tre a c h e ry of Labor lead ers, a correspondent in the Labor Call (18 June 1931) com plained that it had been the experience of Labor w rite rs that 'legitim ate c ritic ism ' of politicians was not perm itted, and he was of the opinion that if they had been able to point out the incipient signs of apostasy in Labor r a ts ', the movement would have suffered less dam age. Seemingly, many labour spokesm en had high hopes early in the new y ear that the d ifferences, which had appeared tow ards the end of 1930, would be ironed out. W. J. Duggan assu red Scullin at a public reception on 13 January that there was no foundation for rum ours of a split in the party; and 94

106 Unions, Labor, and P re m ie rs' Plan the A ustralian W orker (14 January 1931), in pointing to the efforts being made to detach certain Labor leaders from the movement, expressed the belief that it is not thinkable that such men as Scullin and Lyons will fail in th eir allegiance. The Labor Call (5 February 1931) defended the reappointm ent of Theodore as T re a su re r and m aintained that the resignations of Lyons and Fenton from the cabinet would certainly do no h arm. The A ustralian W orker (28 January 1931) did not com m it itself regarding T heodore s reappointm ent; in its view there w ere grounds for a legitim ate difference of opinion'. Its m ajor concern was that a 'deplorable' th reat of a sp lit had a risen, and throughout F ebruary it appealed for an end to dissension and urged that unity m ust be the overriding consideration. As the divisions within caucus becam e m ore acute a lone correspondent in the Labor Call (26 February 1931) warned that the rank and file w ere in a quandary because of the G ilbertian s ta te of federal Labor p o litics. The union leadership seem s to have done little to a s s is t in resolving this quandary, and, right on the eve of the form ation of the breakaw ay groups, the Labor Call (12 M arch 1931) rejected the contention that the recent re c o n stru c tion of federal cabinet m ight be the cause of the movem ent being split into sev eral w arring factio n s. 'No m atter what happens politically..., it held, the Labor Movement cannot be split so long as the necessity for its existence re m a in s ; and then it went on to argue that the movement was being solidified. And, while the political split was actually taking place, readers of the Tram way R ecord (March 1931) w ere being told that the Labor Movement... is born of the necessity of the w o rk ers. As such it cannot be split by political w eaklings in the F.P.L.P. 'The acid te st is being applied...' and 'L abor is ridding itself of its ex crescen ces. The operation w ill do g o o d.' With the disintegration of the F.P.L.P., Don Cam eron, in the Tram way R ecord (April 1931), contended that w orkers should not be unnecessarily disturbed because Labor lead ers w ere apparently hopelessly and b itterly divided, for such a state of affairs was inevitable. A Labor lead er at all tim e s', he argued, 'goes the way the m ajority of the w orkers a re inclined to go, o r he ceases to lead, 'The w orkers m ust decide the issu es that have divided th eir leaders..o. But the views of the m ajority of w orkers have yet to be expressed m ore em phatically. S im ilar propositions w ere advanced by the Labor C all, which was also inclined to cast much of the responsibility for events on to the rank and file. It explained that 95

107 Trade Unions and the D epression Labor c rises and setbacks w ere inevitable 'because of the w orkers' lack of resistan ce and because of th eir capitalistically conditioned beliefs in things... '. At the sam e tim e, on 26 M arch 1931, it m aintained that, though they may appear to do so, such c rises 'do not delay L abor's p ro g ress one single m inute'. G enerally, however, in discussing the defection of the Lyons group, union spokesm en do not seem to have undertaken any thoroughgoing investigation of the root causes of the repeated apostasy of Labor lead ers, and such discussions usually proceeded sim ply by denouncing the 'r a ts ' who had perpetrated 'one of the m ost cynical betrayals of the working c la s s '. The rank and file w ere now inform ed that the men who had so recently been Acting P rim e M inister and Acting T re a su re r had 'never truly belonged to the Labor M ovem ent'. They had been accepted at th e ir face value by the m ovem ent, which had raised them to the political heights only to be repaid by tre a c h e ry.^ However, th eir desertion was not without its advantages, for without these 'renegades' in its ranks Labor would be strengthened politically. According to union journals, 'Judas Joe' Lyons had been adopted by the Money Pow er and was being idolised by L abor's enem ies because they believed he would be b etter able than the N ationalist leaders to c a rry through th eir 'crim inally insane policy' of wage reductions. W orkers w ere w arned that under the cloak of slogans like 'all for A u stralia' Lyons would lead a ru th less assau lt on th eir standard of living. Lang's stand at the F ebruary P re m ie rs ' Conference won him the approbation of many m em bers of the V ictorian labour m ovem ent, and he was commended by sev eral journals for defying the Money Power in its drive for a lower standard of living. As the b reach developed, alm ost every issue of the A ustralian W orker appealed for solidarity and the acceptance of the authority of F ederal Conference. It decried the split in New South W ales and w arned that unless unity was restored, the Money Pow er would succeed in sm ashing the labour movem ent. O ther V ictorian journals devoted little attention to the controversy, and the Labor Call did not express a definite attitude until after Lang's default and the expulsion of the N.S.W. executive. The views it expressed w ere those of m ost official union propagandists. They 6 The Melbourne T.H.C. cancelled the appointment of McGrath (one of the Lyons group) as the Council's representative on the Ballarat Trades and Labor Council (L. Call, 23 April 1931). 96

108 Unions, Labor, and P re m ie rs ' Plan agreed that something m ust be done to relieve the country of the intolerable burden of debt, and in this Lang was right but, as the Labor C all (2 A pril 1931) insisted, 'L abor m ust accept liability' and default could not be condoned. At the sam e tim e the Labor Call held that anti-l abor was p rim arily responsible for the default, and it warned Labor against being divided on the issue of Lang's action. While deploring the split and calling fo r recognition of the absolute necessity for solidarity, the A ustralian W orker (1 A pril 1931) and the A.W.U. declared th eir support for the decisions of the A.L.P. F ed eral Conference and cam e down em phatically on the side of the federal Labor P arty and against the L an g ites. The union and its journal claim ed that the blam e for the split lay entirely with the A.L.P. Executive in New South W ales, and they denounced the Lang Plan in the stro n g est te rm s. However, within three weeks the A.W.U. and the A ustralian W orker modified th eir attitude, as they becam e alarm ed by the consolidation of anti-l abor fo rces, the ultim atum of the Commonwealth Bank, and the rejection of the F iduciary B ill. Convinced that continuation of the split would inevitably re su lt in w recked Labor governm ents, they w ere appalled by the prospect of riv al Labor parties contesting an election. Unless w orkers presented a united front to th e ir enem ies, they w arned, A u stralia would becom e 'the helpless prey of a m oney-m ongering d esp o tism '. So the A.W.U. and its journal urged that a Unity Conference be held to form ulate a plan for unity. They pointed out that, though the Lang Plan and the Theodore Plan differed radically so fa r as m ethods w ere concerned, both shared a fundam ental identity of purpose, and this could form the nucleus of a common policy. But the A.W.U. was adam ant that no com prom ise was possible regarding the param ountcy of the federal auth o rity. The Em ergency Com m ittee of the A.C.T.U. was assailed by sim ila r fe a rs, and on 24 A pril it signified its w illingness to co-operate with the A.W.U. in convening a unity conference. A few days la te r the in terstate rep resen tativ es of the A.C.T.U. decided to attem pt to secure as soon as possible a conference of rep resen tativ es of the political factio n s, the A.W.U. and the A.C.T.U. Approaches for such a conference, however, w ere rejected by the N.S.W. party Executive. 7 However, the Aust. Worker continued to publicise attacks on the Lang Party and Lang Plan, and to support the establishment of the Federal Party in New South Wales. Also, the A.W.U. decided to launch the World to counteract the Labor Daily. 97

109 Trade Unions and the D epression According to the Com m unist P arty, the conflict" between Scullin and Lang rages only in o rd er to deceive the m a s s e s... In the attem pt to crush the working class and c arry out the common policies of the capitalist class there is no conflict of aim s, but only a division of labor between Scullin and L ang.... The leaders of the Lang faction w ere furiously attacked by com m unists as left social fa s c is ts, whose function was to sid etrack w orkers from taking a revolutionary path after they had becom e disgusted with the right-w ing Labor tr a ito r s. On the other hand, P re m ie r Hogan declared, Mr Lang is only the Punch saying what his Communist m entors tell him to say. The Lang Plan had been condemned by the Special F ederal A. L. P. Conference, and the Plan, and especially any suggestion of repudiation, w ere vehem ently denounced by Scullin, Theodore, Hogan, and other Labor le a d e rs. According to a rep o rt in the Sydney Morning H erald (26 F ebruary 1931), the V ictorian A. L.P. in a 'se c re t le tte r' had inform ed the N.S.W. branch in F ebruary that neither Lang s policy nor his presence was d esired in M elbourne; and in any case im m ediately a fter his election as president in early A pril, Calwell threatened with expulsion any m em ber of the V ictorian branch who supported Lang. N evertheless, the N.S.W. P re m ie r gained a considerable following among the unionists, A. L.P. branches, and unemployed of V ictoria, and on 14 A pril a crowd of about ten thousand gave him an enthusiastic hearing in M elbourne. The m eeting was chaired, in defiance of C alw ell's ruling, by Alf W allis (Secretary of the Clothing Trades' Union). R epresentatives of the Lang P arty paid sev eral v isits when they addressed the T.H.C. and union m eetings. But sympathy for Lang's aim s did not re su lt in the T.U. m ovem ent's officially adopting the Lang P lan,^ nor was the N.S.W. split duplicated in V ictoria. The rupture in New South W ales also dealt a blow to the V ictorian unions by the d b cle of the W orld. The A. W.U., determ ined to destroy the Lang P arty, was instrum ental in securing the launching of the W orld by Labor P apers Ltd to counteract the Langite Labor D aily. But the new paper rendered little o r no serv ice to the T.U. movement and soon proved a costly failure involving financial loss for the V ictorian shareholding unions and shattering the fond hope of a chain of Labor d a ilie s. 8 But see the report of his work in Melbourne by a Lang Party organiser, in which he lists the A.L.P. branches and unions (at least six) which had declared their support for the Lang Plan (Labor D aily, 30 April 1931). 98

110 Unions, Labor, and P re m ie rs' Plan Although unions w ere acutely dissatisfied with the Labor governm ents, th eir feelings w ere ra re ly voiced in the jo urnals. And while a few le tte rs which assailed the governm ents for not acting in the in te re sts of w orkers did appear in the Labor C all, according to one correspondent on 26 F ebruary 1931 c riticism of Labor politicians was regarded as a heinous offence. In early 1931, union propagandists exhorted the Scullin governm ent to grapple m ore determ inedly with issu es affecting the in terests of w o rk ers. A m ore resolute stand was urged against the Money Pow er to prevent it from fu rth er reducing the standard of living. In calling for a bold lead, the A ustralian W orker (18 F ebruary and 4 M arch 1931) insisted that Labor should push ahead with its policy even if it m eant a double dissolution. Union journals welcomed the governm ent s financial proposals and appealed for an assertio n of P arliam en t s suprem acy over Money Pow er. As the c ris is w orsened, the opinion of unionists generally was expressed in a le tte r to m em bers of the F.P.L.P. by the Em ergency Com m ittee of the A.C.T.U. which com plained that the in terests of the Industrial Movement have been subm erged, and that not sufficient was being done for w orkers (A ustralian W orker, 1 A pril 1931). The Labor Call (16 A pril 1931) conceded that Labor had fallen far sh o rt of what was expected, and it explained that this was m ainly because of the retarding influence of Labor renegades. These had been elim inated, so now Labor could push ahead with its financial pro p o sals. It insisted that th ere should be no re tre a t because of the Senate, or other opposition, and together with other journals and propagandists it urged Labor to act quickly and aggressiv ely ', to prevent the High P riests of Finance imposing even m ore intolerable sacrifices on the w orkers. A week la te r, the Labor Call enthusiastically reported, 'L abor politically has becom e m ore inspiringly and constructively a g g ressiv e, and it extolled the federal governm ent for challenging the right of private banking in te re sts to dictate the policy of the governm ent. But during these and the following weeks, union propagandists offered little p recise analysis of the p ressin g problem s being faced by the federal governm ent and the re a l alternatives open to it: ra th e r, they continued to discuss the economic and political situation in broad, propagandist term s which cultivated vague, and som etim es optim istic generalisations. C h aracteristic of this outlook was the Labor C all s declaration on 14 May that the people s necessity... will compel governm ental control of banking' and 'the F ederal Labor G overnm ent's 99

111 T rade Unions and the D epression policy being in harm ony with the trend of events, m ust succeed. Then, in its next issue (21 May 1931), the Labor Call inform ed its read ers that the federal governm ent's policy could not be c a rrie d out. The lim it of L abor s power as a governm ent, it contended, depended on the w orkers, and 'to give effect to its policy both in the abstract and in the concrete, Labor politically m ust always have the undivided support of the w orkers as a m ajority, both industrially and p olitically'. Wage reductions w ere not the fault of the governm ent, as some c ritic s claim ed, for 'a w o rk ers' Governm ent at any tim e cannot go any fa ste r o r fa rth e r than the m ajority of the w orkers them selves a re prepared to go'. Reductions took place because of the attitude of the w orkers, and they had to becom e m ore advanced before Labor governm ents w ere able to do very much b etter than they w ere doing. Two weeks previously (7 May 1931), the Labor Call had reacted in dignantly against a cam paign then being waged outside the labour movement for a sinking of party differences in the face of the economic c ris is, insisting that 'L abor m ust m aintain its independence'. But it now commended Scullin when he proposed a conference of all p arties of both H ouses. It assu red w orkers that, although a deadlock had been reached, the governm ent was still standing to its guns and refusing to accept a policy of wage cuts and reduced pensions, and 'it eith er stands or falls by its policy in that re sp e c t'. Claim ing that the N ationalist senators w ere 'openly in league with the Money Pow er' to defeat the M inistry's legislation the A ustralian W orker (29 A pril and 20 May 1931) directed its w rath against the Senate. It declared against budgets being balanced at the expense of the working class; and, calling on the governm ent to 'keep the battle-flags flying', it m aintained, 'What is wanted, at the e a rlie st possible moment, is a double dissolution of the F ed eral P arliam ent, and an appeal to the people on the issue of financial reco n stru ctio n '. The few union journals which w ere following events objected strongly to the proposals before the P re m ie rs ' Conference which com menced on 25 May, and contended that they would lead to a w o rsening of the depression. Small investors and w orkers w ere to be sacrificed for the fu rth er aggrandisem ent of Money Pow er whose aim was that w orkers be 'reduced down to the lowest level of subsistence they can be induced to accept'. Such journals assailed 'the p re p o sterous demand for equality of sacrific e ' and the 'despicably m ean' proposal to cut pensions. The A ustralian W orker (27 May, 3 June 1931) cried, 'L et us hold fast to our own policy' and 'let the Labor 100

112 Unions, Labor, and P re m ie rs' Plan Movement prepare for the g reatest fight of its c a r e e r '. While d eploring the fact that some Labor rep resentatives advocated sacrifice, the Labor Call (4 June 1931) and Tram way R ecord (June 1931) explained th at the L abor governm ents w ere in a m o st difficult position, and, 'w orst of all, they are also fu rth er handicapped by the obvious lack of knowledge and intelligent support on the p art of the w orkers them selves'. According to Cameron and the Labor C all, 'su p erficial or prejudiced c ritic s ' did not understand that no Labor governm ent could do m ore for the w orkers than they them selves made possible by intelligent and sustained support. It was im possible, th erefo re, for the Labor governm ents to do m ore than they w ere doing. In conclusion both com m entators made the observation that L abor's 'hours of intense travail... will be the d ark est, or those that w ill precede the glorious Dawn'. During May and early June the Industrial H erald c arrie d a rtic le s which extolled the work of the Scullin governm ent. O ther journals strenuously w arned w orkers that g reat hardships would be im posed on them if the governm ent should be replaced by a coalition under Lyons. The deliberations of the P re m ie rs' Conference w ere publicised in the daily p re ss, and soon after its com m encem ent there was little room for doubt as to what the outcome would be, N evertheless, though the proposals under discussion ran com pletely counter to th eir views, V ictorian unions made no concerted attem pt to d irect the Labor represen tativ es. On 29 May the C entral Executive of the A. L.P. adopted a resolution expressing opposition to reductions in wages or pensions, and it hoped the F ederal Executive would convene a special conference to deal with the situation. At the T.H.C. m eeting on 4 June, it was suggested the Council should declare that schem es involving reductions of wages and pensions 'm ust be repudiated by all political and industrial rep resentatives of L abor'; but the motion was not dealt with, and it was to be sev eral weeks before the T.H.C. adopted a resolution regarding the P re m ie rs ' P la n. While the W o rk ers Weekly fulm inated to a sm all audience, union journals did not p rep are w orkers for the 'startlin g change of front' by federal Labor lead ers, and they did not suggest that unions should do anything to influence the decisions of the conference. Yet w orkers w ere already confused, and w ere sorely in need of guidance, especially if the m ajority w ere as stupid as som e propagandists alleged. In early May, the State conference of the A.R.U. had called on the 101

113 Trade Unions and the D epression governm ent to introduce im m ediately legislation to nationalise banking and 'to either stand or fall' in the attem pt. Within the T.U. movement, it would seem that it had been generally assum ed that Labor would p e rsist with its financial policy and that a double dissolution was just around the co rn er, though the A ustralian W orker was practically alone in explicitly advising the governm ent to pursue this course. Scullin and other federal Labor leaders had provided grounds for such expectations on the p a rt of the rank and file. The P rim e M inister had repeatedly declared that he was opposed to wage reductions, and on 20 A pril he had stated em phatically, 'We will not reduce old age, invalid o r so ld ie rs' p ensions'. E a rlie r in the month, he had assured delegates to the V ictorian A.L.P. Conference that his governm ent would push on with L abor's program, irresp ectiv e of the consequences, and, if n ecessary, it would force a double dissolution on the Fiduciary Notes B ill. When the B ill was rejected by the Senate on 17 A pril, Scullin affirm ed that he would fight to the b itte r end, the Bill would be re-subm itted, and,if defeated again, the governm ent would seek a double dissolution. L ater in A pril and again on 9 May, the P rim e M inister made sim ila r statem ents regarding the governm ent's intentio n s. Anticipating federal elections in the n ear future, the V ictorian C entral Executive of the A.L.P. had called for nom inations for Labor candidates and arranged for selection ballots to be held in m id-june. While the governm ent had im plem ented economy m easures in the serv ice, federal public servants had not suffered the salary reductions which the V ictorian servants had accepted in The P re m ie rs ' Conference in F ebruary 1931 decided that sala rie s and wages and allowances in the public serv ices should be reduced, and sev eral weeks la te r the Public Service B oard proposed that federal public servants should agree to a 10 p er cent cut in s a la rie s. A fter negotiations, and with the general consent of rep resen tativ es of the o rg an isations concerned, the aw ards of all federal serv ice unions w ere varied by the A rb itrato r to provide for a reduction com m ensurate with the fall in the cost of living. It seem s that,having accepted these reductions in o rd er to a s s is t the governm ents, public servants believed that they had made a sufficient sacrifice and did not expect to suffer fu rth er cu ts.^ 9 But note that on 22 April the Federal Treasurer introduced a Bill which included provisions for a special tax on public service salaries from 251 and upwards on a graduated scale (Aust. Worker, 29 April 1931). 102

114 Unions, Labor, and P re m ie rs Plan Although uneasy about the clam our for retrenchm ent, the public serv ice organisations and th eir journals did little to educate th eir m em bers concerning economic and political developm ents o r prep are them fo r the P re m ie rs Plan. On 1 June the A.P.S.A. Council rejected a proposal that som ething should be done in anticipation of the possible outcome of the P re m ie rs Conference. However, the V.T.U. Council in May had declared against any fu rth er salary reductions and had resolved to oppose the continuance of existing red u ctio n s. The P ostal A dvocate, organ of the Am algam ated P ostal W o rk ers Union (A. P. W. U.) which was affiliated with the A. L. P. and the T. H. C., made no serio u s attem pt to analyse the depression, and right to the announcem ent of the Plan identified the Scullin governm ent as a champion of public serv ice conditions. Insisting that political action was th e ir only m eans of defence, it repeatedly appealed to postal w orkers to support the governm ent w hatever its shortcom ings, as th e ir wages depended on its rem aining in office. Public serv ice organisations generally had ignored the 10 p er cent cut, and now the P re m ie rs ' C onference, which com m enced on 25 May, had before it the re p o rt of economic experts who recom m ended that all wages and sa la rie s in the governm ent serv ice should have the sam e percentage reduction as the federal basic w age. The Conference adopted the P re m ie rs ' Plan, and at the final sessio n on 10 June the rep resen tativ es of the various governm ents unanim ously pledged them selves 'to give effect prom ptly to the whole of the resolutions agreed to at this C onference'. Soon, old age and invalid pensions w ere reduced from 1 to 17s 6d p er week, and the m a te rn ity allow ance, which becam e payable only to those whose in come did not exceed 260, was reduced from 5 to 4.^ 1 The 10 The Plan embraced the following measures: (a) A reduction of 20 per cent in all adjustable Government expenditure, as compared with the year ending 30th June, 1930, including all emoluments, wages, salaries, and pensions...; (b) Conversion of the internal debts of the Governments on the basis of a 22^ per cent reduction of interest;. (c) The securing of additional revenue by taxation...; (d) A reduction of bank...rates of interest on deposits and advances; (e) Relief in respect of private mortgages. (Shann and Copland, Battle of the Plans, pp ,. 11 Victorian Year-Book , pp.210. There were 69, 924 old age and invalid pensioners in Victoria. Other non-contributory pensions and superannuation and retiring allowances were reduced on a graduated scale that varied from 0.95 per cent to 25 per cent (ibid., p.230). 103

115 Trade Unions and the D epression legislation which was to give effect to the Plan in V icto ria was to in clude provisions for salary reductions ranging from 6 p er cent on incom es not exceeding 100 p.a. up to 27 p er cent on incom es exceeding 3, 000. The F ailu re' of the P olitical Machine in V ictoria The O rganising S ecretary reported to the V ictorian A. L.P. Conference in early A pril 1931 that the sharp divisions in the councils of the labour movement over m easures to m eet the c ris is had had a dem oralising effect and had also produced som e d istru st in the m inds of w orkers on what could be expected of Labor in the future. This state of affairs, which he understated, becam e w orse, and following the adoption of the P re m ie rs' Plan, the V ictorian labour movement was disrupted by internal dissension. But even before the Plan, relations between unions and the Hogan governm ent had been so strain ed that the unity of the movement had been threatened. D issatisfaction with the governm ent was especially acute in those unions with m em bers in its employ, and it will be instructive and convenient to pay p a rtic u la r attention to the A.R.U. It was the la rg e st union in V ictoria, sending the larg est delegation to A. L.P. State conferences, and sev eral of its officials w ere on the C entral Executive of the A. L.P. Its policy could not but be significant; and an exam ination of its attitudes and activities can throw light on both the c h aracte ristic s of the T.U. m ovem ent at this tim e and the cru cial issu es it faced, especially in its relationship with a L abor governm ent. As we saw in C hapter 3, the C entral Executive of the A. L.P., in early O ctober 1930, had demanded from each State and federal m em ber the assu ran ces decided on at the Special A. L.P. Conference in Septem ber. A m eeting of the S.P.L.P. a few weeks la te r agreed to comply, but the C entral Executive insisted that personal assurances be given. These w ere eventually furnished, with the exception of five cases, including the P re m ie r and a senior m in ister, Jones (M.L.C.), who flatly refused despite repeated req u ests. On 8 D ecem ber, the C entral Executive resolved to notify the re calcitran ts that th eir endorsem ents would be held up if they continued to re fu s e. But the assu ran ces w ere not forthcom ing, and the C entral Executive decided to re fe r the m atter to the next annual conference. Unionists who had believed that th eir in terests would be guaranteed as a re su lt of the Septem ber A. L.P. conference had soon been disappointed. As recounted in a previous chapter, the A.R.U. and 104

116 Unions, Labor, and P re m ie rs' Plan other ra il unions had called in vain on the Hogan governm ent to re stra in the C om m issioners from proceeding with the actions that had led to wage red u ctio n s. Union policies during 1930 regarding retrenchm ent and rationing have already been noted, together with the resolution of the Septem ber conference, 'That no rationing shall be introduced in any G overnm ent employment except with the consent of the unions affected'. A fter the conference, the M inister (Cain) again sought to induce unions with m em bers in the railw ay serv ice to accept a schem e of rationing, on the ground that larg e-scale d ism issals would otherw ise be unavoidable. Some unions, including those affiliated with the Iron T rades Council, w ere prepared to agree to the M in ister's schem e on certain stringent conditions (which w ere in any case unacceptable to C ain). But such organisations spoke on behalf of less than one-fifth of the em ployees concerned, and the m ajor unions, thea.r.u., A.F.U.L.E., and S alaried O fficers' A ssociation again declared th eir opposition to rationing. The la tte rs ' attitude was condemned by the P re m ie r, and among the many advocates of rationing in the serv ice w ere officials of the R eturned S oldiers' League. As the C om m issioners em barked on 'd ra stic econom ies', re p re se n tatives of the A.R.U. interview ed m in isters and the C entral Executive of the A. L. P. to request th eir intervention on behalf of railw aym en. On 8 D ecem ber an A.R.U. deputation to the C entral Executive com plained that m in isters w ere not observing the resolutions of the Septem ber Conference and that reg ressio n s and d ism issals w ere still taking place. As a resu lt, the Executive agreed to call on Labor m em bers to prevent fu rth er d ism issals and reg ressio n s in the railway serv ice. Rising resentm ent moved the A.R.U. Council a step fu rth er when on 16 D ecem ber it endorsed a recom m endation from the m ilitant T ransportation Division of the union urging the C entral Executive to withhold the endorsem ent of Labor m em bers who departed from the Septem ber conference reso lu tio n s. In early January 1931, to the 'g re at s u rp rise ' of railw aym en and A.R.U. officials, the C om m issioners com menced a program of rationing. A.R.U officials im m ediately appealed to Cain who com plied with th e ir request to issue an instruction that the program be suspended. But the C om m issioners demanded an O rder in Council and proceeded to serve notices on m ore em ployees. A.R.U. officials w ere successful in th eir efforts to secu re a special cabinet m eeting to deal with the m atter, and a few days before it was held, S ecretary Sear said 'he had reason to be optim istic, and believed that Cabinet would force the C om m issioners to refrain from fu rth er ra tio n in g '. 105

117 Trade Unions and the D epression Cabinet, however, refused to re stra in the C om m issioners. Rationing was greatly extended, and also m ore reg ressio n s and d ism issals took place. Sear claim ed in the Labor Call (16 A pril 1931) that th ere had been about 5, 000 d ism issals in the two preceding y ears, and about 1, 000 reg ressio n s in twelve w eeks. Railwaymen protested vigorously and again called on the C entral Executive of the A. L.P. to in sist that the Hogan governm ent observe the Septem ber conference d ecisio n s. ^ There w ere dem ands that Labor m em bers who supported rationing should be disciplined, and a few m eetings urged the C entral Executive to p re ss for the resignation of Hogan as lead er of the S.P.L.P. F ierce critic ism of the governm ent was also voiced at A.R.U. council m eetings, but the council rejected the proposal forw arded by som e m eetings that the union should consider withdrawing its affiliation with the A. L. P. The council asked the C entral Executive to deal with m em bers of the Labor P arty who had d isregarded the decisions of the Septem ber conference, and, in addressing branch m eetings, som e A.R.U. officials urged that m em bers should all work to cleanse the labour movem ent of those not true to principle. At the sam e tim e P resid en t Phelan voiced the governing principle of the trad e union leadership as he advised railw aym en to b e ar in mind that, though th eir living standards w ere being attacked, the w orst Labor Governm ent is b etter than the best N ationalist G overnm ent. D espite rebuffs the A.R.U. leadership arranged one deputation after another and c a rrie d on negotiations with the C entral Executive, Cain, and other m in iste rs, seeking to have the governm ent take steps to safeguard the in terests of railw aym en and to issue an O rder in Council to prevent rationing. The rank and file w ere assu red that th e ir officials w ere making laudable efforts on th eir behalf, but a few sections of the union questioned the effectiveness of the policy being followed and argued for a m ore m ilitant course of action. The council, however, would not agree to demands that m ass m eetings of m em bers be held - though som e branches did convene m eetin g s.xo V ictorian unions becam e increasingly c ritic a l of the Hogan 12 For reports of meetings and developments see issues of the R.U. Gazette and Footplate. 13 See, for example, the series of protest meetings at the Jolimont workshops, which rejected a proposal to down tools if rationing continued (Argus, 14 March 1931). Rationing, of course, affected nearly all unions. Many, if unwillingly, accepted the practice; some, like the Tramway Union, objected to no effect. 106

118 Unions, Labor, and P re m ie rs' Plan governm ent because of its failure to put Labor policy into effect by m aintaining standards of living and providing adequate relief for the unemployed (see Chapter 7). Com plaints that breaches of the Special Septem ber Conference had been com m itted w ere lodged with the C entral Executive by the A.R.U. and the State H ospital Em ployees Union. The Executive summoned State Labor m em bers to its m e eting on 11 F ebruary to explain th eir actions, and during the following weeks th ere was a serie s of adjourned conferences between the C entral Executive and the S. P. L. P. P re m ie r Hogan m aintained that it was im possible to c arry out the decisions of the Septem ber conference, and, throwing the onus on to his c ritic s, he indicated that if the C entral Executive so desired the M inistry would resig n. Offering a 'strong defence' of the M inistry's refusal to in terfere with the C om m issioners' policy, he asserted that 'the C om m issioners, and not the M inistry, managed the railw ay s'. Finally, on 9 M arch on the m otion of J.F. Chappie (General Secretary of the A.R.U.) the C entral Executive declared 'that the needs of the people req u ire much g re a ter relief than the Governm ent has yet granted o r p ro p o sed '. It called on the governm ent to convene P arliam ent at the e a rlie st date and to subm it a program which would include adequate relief to all the unemployed, im provem ent of the w orkers' standard of living, and constitutional and electo ral refo rm s. The Executive wanted the governm ent to c a rry on, but it also affirm ed that it should give effect to the decisions of the Septem ber conferen ce.14 However, the A rg u s's prediction (11 M arch 1931) that the Executive's instructions would probably not be obeyed proved c o rre ct, and P arliam ent rem ained in r e c e s s. The unusual event of a m ass m eeting of m em bers of the A.R.U. took place on 15 M arch. In his opening ad d ress, P resid en t Phelan com plained of the 'general apathy' of w orkers, a com plaint that was frequently voiced by union o fficials. S ecretary Sear m aintained that the union had achieved much and 'had gone as fa r as the rank and file would allow it. The leaders could go no fu r th e r.' He assailed the Hogan governm ent, and especially the P re m ie r, as being responsible for the heavy blows suffered by railw aym en, and he said he was satisfied that the C entral Executive of the A.L.P. had gone as fa r as 14 According to the Argus (10 March 1931), two amendments, having as their object the cancellation of endorsements of those members of the S.P.L.P. who had not given effect to Labor policy, were defeated by one vote, and the resolution was carried by eight votes to seven. 107

119 T rade Unions and the D epression it possibly could go. The union's tactics to date cam e under fire from the advocates of industrial action but th eir proposals w ere rejected. The m eeting demanded that, if the governm ent did not issue an O rder in Council by 18 M arch to prevent the C om m issioners from rationing railwaym en, the C entral Executive should determ ine which m em bers of the S.P.L.P. w ere prepared to conform to the principles of the m ovem ent. Those not so prepared should be im m ediately expelled from the A. L.P. as well as those who refused to sign the assurance to com ply with the decisions of the Septem ber conference. The m eeting enjoined the State governm ent to legislate to have wages of railw aym en made a first charge on railw ay receipts and paym ent of bondholders' in terest last. These resolutions w ere forw arded to the A. L.P. Executive which replied that it was occupied with preparations fo r the E a ster conference and was thus unable to give p ractical effect to them. This provoked c rie s of 'tim idity' from m em bers of the A.R.U. council which decided to enter a p ro test. A.R.U. delegates to the forthcom ing A. L.P. conference had instructions to take a strong stand against the governm ent's railw ay policy, and to p re ss for the disciplining of M.Ps. who w ere not conforming to Labor policy; and officials of the union now voiced hopes that the conference would have beneficial resu lts for railw aym en. The C entral Executive of the A. L.P. anxiously noted on 9 M arch 1931 'that great dissatisfaction exists among Labor su pporters, because of the inaction of the Governm ent, and that this dissatisfaction is grow ing to such proportions as to m enace the w elfare of the political Labor M ovem ent'. From the beginning of the year, many union leaders evinced a growing determ ination to see steps taken that would ensure that the political labour movem ent fulfilled its purpose and functioned m ore in accordance with the needs of the unions and the unem ployed. A special m eeting of the V ictorian T rade Union Salaried O fficers' A ssociation on 15 Jan u a ry resolved: That it be a recom m endation to all unions and branches of the A ustralian Labor P arty that no sitting m em ber of P arliam ent be eligible for election to, o r continuance as, a m em ber of the C entral Executive of the V ictorian Labor P arty. ^ 15 At the time, members of the Central Executive included Premier Hogan, Senator Barnes, Drakeford (M.L.A.), Blackburn (M.L.A.), and McNeill (M.H.R.). The Secretary, McNamara, was a member of the Legislative Council, and the President was R. Keane (M.H.R.). 108

120 Unions, Labor, and P re m ie rs ' Plan That, while it is reg retted that the n ecessity has arisen, this conference severely condemns the inactivity of the Hogan G overnm ent in failing to p ersev ere with legislation and adm inistration which would be of benefit to the w o rk e rs. That this m eeting of elected officials of the Trade Union Movement is of the opinion that the p resen t political machine has failed to achieve the ideals of its fo unders, and is unfitted to deal with the problem s now confronting the working c la ss. We th erefo re pledge ourselves to work w holeheartedly to the end of reform ing the m achine and placing its control in the hands of the Industrial M ovement. On 19 M arch the T. H. C. took a threatening step in the direction of reform ing the m achine when, by a decision of 72 votes to 38, it amended its own rules so that it could deal with 'all m atters p e rta in ing to political organisation, drafting of platform and the selection or endorsem ent of candidates for P a rliam e n t. However, thea.w.u. repudiated the resolution of the T.U. Salaried O fficers' A ssociation, and the A ustralian W orker always rem ained a staunch apologist for the Labor governm ents. A little la te r the A.L.P. invited nom inations to contest p re-selectio n ballots fo r House of R epresentatives candidates, but only one sitting Labor m em ber, A ttorney-g eneral Brennan, was opposed for selection. ^ At the V ictorian A.L.P. Annual Conference (3-6 A pril 1931), which was attended by 206 delegates representing seventy-three unions and fifty-nine electoral councils, delegates who sought to re s tric t the influence of politicians in the m ovem ent failed to gain acceptance for the proposal that no m em ber of P arliam ent be eligible to sit on the C entral Executive. In electing a new C entral Executive, the C onference made very few changes, and the num ber of m em bers who w ere 16 L. Call, 22 January The last clause was carried as an amendment to a resolution which recommended that sitting State Labor members be opposed in selection ballots (Argus, 16 January 1931). 17 But note that E.J. Holloway, the sitting member for Flinders, contested the Melbourne Ports ballot. Of the thirty-two candidates who contested the House of Representatives ballots (six only), about one-quarter were union officials, and, of the thirty-two, twenty-two were involved in the contests for the two Labor strongholds of Maribyrnong and Melbourne Ports. Many of the more prominent union leaders preferred to contest the Senate ballot and they made up over half of the twenty-one candidates (L. Call, 11 June 1931). 109

121 T rad e Unions and the D ep ressio n politicians was u n a lte re d.1^ Heated conference proceedings saw the reco rd of the Hogan governm ent attacked by m ost union d eleg ates. Insisting that the labour movement placed men in P arliam ent to c arry out its w ishes, the governm ent s c ritic s w ere incensed by its d isregard fo r Labor policy and the instructions it had previously received. Hogan replied that 'the Governm ent had c a rrie d out the decisions of the [Septem ber] Conference as fa r as it was humanly possible,... but to do so in th e ir entirety was im p racticab le'. In reaffirm ing his d e te r m ination not to provide the assu ran ce req u ired by the C entral Executive he declared that the demand 'was opposed to the constitution, was a violation of Labor ideals and B ritish conceptions of freedom, and was a n ti-a u stra lia n '. The C onference, how ever, endorsed the action of the Executive in demanding personal assu ran ces from m em bers of the State and federal Labor p a rtie s, and it instructed the incoming Executive to enforce th is. But the m ajority of delegates refused to support the demand raised by rep resen tativ es of the A.R.U. 'that the nom inations for Labor selection of M essrs Hogan, Jones and Bond be not endorsed, because they had not given a ssu ra n c e s... '. The Conference again declared against rationing, re g re ssio n s, and d ism issals in the railw ay serv ice, and it called on the governm ent to issu e an O rder in Council to the C om m issioners not to oppose the application of unions for the resto ratio n and re-en actm en t of th eir aw ards. Once again, on behalf of the unemployed, delegates fo rm u l ated a serie s of demands which required the governm ent to make available greatly im proved re lief m easu res (see C hapter 7). The Conference then adopted the D rakeford Resolution: That...the State P arliam en t should be called together not la te r than 28th A pril in o rd er to subm it a definite lim ited program m e such program m e to em brace fu rth er p ractical relief for the u n em p lo y ed...; [a] Rent M oratorium R elief Bill; refo rm of franchise and re-d istrib u tio n of seats of Legislative Council...; abolition of State G overnors; creation of a board to investigate and regulate p rices to prevent excessive exploitation of consum ers That, in the event of the legislative proposals not being passed by 17th May, a State-w ide, intensive cam paign be raised against the 18 There were fifty nominations for the eighteen seats. Senator Barnes,, Drakeford, and McNeill were re-elected. Premier Hogan and Blackburn (M.L.A.) did not seek re-election, but Holland (M.L.A.) and Keane (M.H.R.) were elected to the new Central Executive. 110

122 Unions, L abor, and P re m ie rs Plan Legislative Council in all seats for which candidates can be found to oppose retirin g anti-l abor m em bers of the Council, or to contest seats in the election to be held on 6th Ju n e. Labor m em bers, in defending th eir failure to put into effect previous in stru ctio n s, firm ly m aintained that little could be achieved by a m inority government; but if that w ere so, then the Conference was demanding legislative m easures which would alm ost certainly cause the defeat of the governm ent, if the M inistry insisted on attem pting to secure th eir enactm ent. On the other hand, if the M inistry did not make the attem pt, it would be regarded with disfavour by even m ore L aborites. In his ad d ress, P resid en t Keane pointed out that 'the experiences of the past y ear...showed that the existence of a Labor Government in office and not in pow er...was a grave danger to the Labor Movement g e n e ra lly... '. However, in the debates, few unionists seem to have been concerned to grapple with these vital is s u e s. While all demanded that conference decisions m ust be put into effect, with very few exceptions union delegates also wanted the governm ent to rem ain in office. Then, the day after the conference ended, Hogan announced that he would d isreg ard the direction to call P arliam ent together before 28 A pril. It might also be noted that nominations for Labor candidates for the Legislative Council elections had closed in January and only four had been filed. At the elections M cnamara (Secretary of the A.L.P.) was returned unopposed and a m ere th ree Labor candidates (including two retirin g m em bers) contested seats. R eaders of the Labor Call (9 A pril 1931) w ere inform ed that the conference was one of the m ost successful ever held in the S ta te. Proceedings had been lively, but then 're a l and vibrant conflicts of ideals and ideas' w ere essen tial for L abor's p ro g ress. In connection with the demand for assu ran ces, which was 'a vital precaution', Hogan had proved his courage and his capacity to stand practically alone. 19 The Labor Call also m aintained that Scullin and Deputy P rem ier Tunnecliffe had correctly stated the position regarding th eir governm ents' efforts on behalf of the unemployed, for 'L abor Governments are just as strong...and just as capable generally as the 19 Such men, the strong personalities, the L. Call continued, 'notwithstanding the fact that they may have to be fought all along the line because their strongly held beliefs are opposed to those of the majority, are always infinitely greater and more courageous than dependent minded weaklings... I l l

123 Trade Unions and the D epression w orkers make them. The process involved is alm ost m echanical. The demand for the assu ran ces from Labour M.P s. was denounced by the daily p re ss as an expression of the Tust for despotism ' of 'union b o sse s', and it was claim ed that there was a 'vendetta' against Hogan. In opposing the demand for assu rances, Scullin had d ep recated the attacks on Hogan and told the conference that he was 'one of the tru e st and b est Labor men in A u stra lia'. The new C entral Executive, however, was in no hurry to act after the conference, and it indicated that in view of Hogan's illness it would proceed 'tactfully and d is c re e t ly' in the m a tte r. When the P re m ie r left V ictoria on a health trip, consideration of the issue was postponed until his re tu rn. As neither the P rim e M inister nor A ttorney-g eneral Brennan had given the assu ran ces, it seem ed that the C entral Executive would be obliged to take action against them; but la te r the Executive acknowledged that it did not have the authority to in stru ct federal m em bers on the issu e. Sear, the S ecretary of the A.R.U., had clashed with the P rem ier at the A.L.P. Conference, and in the following weeks they c a rrie d on an acrim onious public controversy. Hogan was doing a good job, not fo r the working c lass, whom he was supposed to rep resent, but for the cap italists, Sear declared. 'The Labor Movement m ust be cleansed of excrescences from w ithin', and Hogan 'has eith er got to stick to the principles of the Movement...o r be thrown out of it'. His union did not wish to oust the governm ent, Sear explained, but it wanted a reconstructed cabinet which would not include Hogan and Jo n e s. D eclaring that the w orst enem ies of the labour movement w ere its political serv an ts, the Railways Union G azette (April 1931) discussed 'P o litical Labor and its F a ilu re s '. This a rtic le disclosed som e of the assum ptions and attitudes held by many union le a d e rs. It argued that 'politicians as such a re the reflection of those they re p resen t... [and] generally the w eakness of the P olitical Movement is but a reflection of a g reat amount of apathy, c arele ssn e ss and lack of honest thought by great num bers of the rank and file'. The dependence of unions on political action through the A.L.P. for the achievem ent of th eir aim s is taken for granted, and the Labor P arty itself is not subjected to a n a ly sis. F o r the G azette, the problem w as, 'What can the Industrial Movement do to ren d er the political m achine reasonably efficient?' The answ er lay in the wage e a rn e rs ' vote in preselection b allo ts. If they voted for the right candidates, 'then the policies and principles of Labor would be an accom plished fact within twelve m onths'. 112

124 Unions, Labor, and P re m ie rs Plan T h eir recent experiences had made unions highly c ritic a l of the arb itratio n system ; but the A.R.U., like other unions, continued to rely on arb itratio n as the m eans by which wages and working conditions w ere determ ined, and the advocates of an alternative policy received very little support. In A pril 1931 the ra il unions applied to the 'biased' judges for the resto ratio n of the aw ards set aside the previous O ctober. Cabinet did not issue the O rder in Council to the C om m issioners as directed by the E a ster A.L.P. Conference, and the standard of living of railw aym en was not restored.at the State Conference of the A.R.U. in May, the m ajority of delegates did not favour any radical change of policy, and proposals directed against the u nion's ad h eren ce to a rb itra tio n w ere d efeated. A fter the E aster A.L.P. Conference, A.R.U. officials again made unsuccessful efforts to secure an O rder in Council to end rationing. On 5 May, the A.R.U. Council decided to request that the C entral Executive put the E aster Conference resolutions into operation at once, and to advise Council of the re su lts of th eir action no la te r than 10 a.m. on Saturday, 9 May. Council m em bers pointed out that the A.R.U. 's affiliation with the A.L.P. was to be discussed at the u nion's State C onference, which was to be held on 7, 8 and 9 May. The A.R.U. Conference was addressed by the M inister for R ailways, who certainly did not strik e an optim istic note. P resid en t Phelan described how railw aym en had been hard hit, but claim ed that the union was now 'on the o ffen siv e'. He said the movement was 'considerably disappointed' with the Hogan governm ent, but went on to offer the widely canvassed argum ent that railw aym en would have been considerably w orse off had a N ationalist governm ent been in office. M aintaining that pro g ress could only be made by political m eans, Chappie, the G eneral S ecretary, stre sse d the need to work for a Labor victory at the next elections, so that the P arliam en tary Labor P arty m ight put them on the road to'w idespread p ro sp e rity '. The Conference nevertheless decided that no funds of the union should be utilised 'to a ssis t opportunists seeking political honours in the nam e of L a b o r'. It was also of the opinion 'that M r Hogan should be called upon to relinquish the leadership of the State P arliam en tary Labor P arty, as we believe that he and the m ajority of his P arty have entirely departed from the principles for which Labor stan d s'. 20 The case was referred to the Classification Board, and the unions accepted an offer by the Commissioners. The Board's award restored federal margins, less 10 per cent, and the basic wage also continued to be subject to the 10 per cent cut. 113

125 Trade Unions and the D epression A request by three leading m em bers of State cabinet that they be allowed to address the Conference was g ran ted. The m in isters w ere em phatic that the instructions of A.L.P. conferences to abolish reg ressio n s, d ism issals and rationing w ere totally and absolutely im p racticab le and the governm ent was not prepared to put them into effect. They contended that any attem pt to c a rry out the instructions would be detrim ental to railw aym en, because the governm ent would be defeated and they would lose a sym pathetic adm inistration. Delegates w ere enjoined to b ear in mind that the A.L.P. was a w orking-class party and that railw aym en w ere only a section of the labour m ovem ent. The m in isters appealed for a conference between rep resen tativ es of the A.R.U., S.P.L.P., and the C entral Executive of the A.L.P. which might th rash out 'the b est issue to place before the House and win an election' - and that, they made clear, would not be the p resent dem ands of the union. A lso, if the conference was held, the antagonism of the unions to the cabinet m ight be abated to som e extent. A motion was moved that such a conference be held, but the debate was adjourned to enable m em bers of the C entral Executive of the A.L.P. to deliver a re p o rt. On the previous day (8 May), they announced, the Executive had resolved that, because of the failure of the State governm ent 'to give effect to the decisions of the last th ree Labor conferences and the direction of this executive regarding rationing, reg ressio n s, and d ism issals...m em bers of the Hogan M inistry be summoned to attend...to show cause why th e ir en d o rsem ent... should not be forthwith c an c e lled '. A fter A. R. U. officials had made so many fru itless appeals, it seem ed that the C entral Executive was now about to take som e action. N evertheless, the A.R.U. Conference c arrie d the m otion (54-13) agreeing to the proposed conference. Both the H erald and the Argus reported that the decision was regarded as a 'trium ph' for the m in iste rs. However, the co n ference did not take p lace as the C en tral Executive refu sed to p a rtic ip a te. D espite m ore than twelve months of union criticism and p re ssu re, the governm ent's railw ays policy continued to run counter to that urged by the A. R. U., and it seem ed that the hope that politicians could be controlled by the movement had been proved chim erical. And now further proof was forthcom ing as Labor politicians floundered tow ards acceptance of the P re m ie rs ' Plan. Union R esistance to the Plan A fter the P re m ie rs ' Conference concluded on 10 June 1931, Scullin and Theodore h urried back to C anberra to fulfil th eir pledge 'to give 114

126 Unions, Labor and P re m ie rs Plan effect prom ptly' to the Plan. On 12 June, federal caucus adopted O I the Plan, But despite a great campaign waged by Labor lead ers, em ployers, economic experts, church lead ers, and the p ress to win acceptance for the Plan, the T.U. movement in V ictoria b itterly opposed this 'plot' of Money Power to reduce w orkers to a 'coolie le v e l'. The P re m ie rs ' Plan, and especially the proposed scales of salary reductions, provoked emphatic and w idespread p ro tests from federal and State public serv an ts. They m aintained that, as the Plan m eant reduced purchasing power, it would n ecessarily intensify the depression. Denying that the Plan involved equality of sacrifice, public serv an ts objected that it was unjust and inequitable in its application. T eachers and others declared they w ere willing to accept th e ir fa ir share of the burden of resto rin g economic stability, but they protested against what they regarded as 'a class ta x '. Some also com plained that the Plan constituted 'the total abrogation of the principles which m em bers of the Governm ent w ere elected to su pport'. Public serv ice organisations held a se rie s of top-level conferences, and the rank and file voiced th eir opposition to the Plan and its in cidence at m ass m eetings. Deputations interview ed leaders of the federal and State governm ents, and officials engaged in energetic lobbying. But all to no avail; and this led som e 'ungrateful' m em bers to make hostile c ritic ism s of th eir organisations, which w ere thus fraught with dissension and rendered even less effective. The T.U. m ovem ent and public serv ice organisations w ere both opposed to the Plan, but they did not join fo rces, and in the following months the la tte r stood aloof from the conflict which developed between the T rades Hall and Hogan governm ent over the P la n. Although T.H.C. delegates w ere fully aw are, well before 10 June, that the Labor m in isters at the P re m ie rs ' Conference had agreed to the reduction of sala rie s and pensions, the T.H.C. did not provide the T.U. movement with a declared policy regarding the Plan until 25 June. The In terstate Executive of the A.C.T.U. did not m eet to form ulate a policy until m id-o ctober. As noted previously, the C entral Executive of the A.L.P. had on 29 May voiced opposition to 21 An amendment that the government appeal to the electors on the fiduciary issue proposal was defeated (25-14). E.J. Holloway - former Secretary Melbourne T.H.C. - resigned from the cabinet in protest, and was to lend support to the union campaign against the Plan. 115

127 T rad e Unions and the D epression the proposed reductions, but after the adoption of the Plan alm ost a fortnight elapsed before the C entral Executive dealt with the m a tte r. Meanwhile, on 12 June, the F.P.L.P. had endorsed the Plan, and the federal m inistry, providing a vigorous lead to the States, in tro duced the n ecessary legislation without delay. On 13 June Scullin sent a telegram to the State Executives of the A. L. P., in which he defended the adoption of the Plan and requested them to suspend judgment until the governm ent had m et the F ederal Executive. The Labor Call (18 June 1931) rejected Scullin's a rg u m ent - that it was eith er the Plan o r default - as one which deceived no one. The federal governm ent's decision, it insisted, did not com m it the A. L. P. and could not be endorsed by it. Scullin and his follow ers should be inform ed that they would not be perm itted to act in opposition to the federal platform and the declared policy of the A.L.P. At this stage, the A ustralian W orker (17 June 1931) was firm ly of the opinion that nothing could justify, on the p art of a Labor governm ent, such a deviation from the Labor platform as the P re m ie rs Plan. 'If there is no altern ativ e...then Labor should refuse to apply it... However, when the F ed eral Executive of the A.L.P. m et, the daily p re ss (e.g. the A ge, 19 June 1931) confidently predicted that nothing would be done to em b arrass the governm ent. The F ederal Executive (with Calwell and Cam eron representing V ictoria) m et at C anberra on 18 and 19 June and was confronted with an exceedingly awkward situation. The m aiority of Labor politicians w ere determ ined to put the Plan into effect, but the Executive could not sanction reductions in living stan d a rd s. 22 So it searched for a form ula by which it might express disapproval of the reductions, without seriously em b arrassin g the Labor governm ent. Finally, the Executive arriv ed at a com prom ise resolution, o r, as one opponent of the Plan protested, it 'decided in a Yes-No fashion'. It declared it was 'definitely opposed to that p art of the P re m ie rs ' Conference plan which involves reductions in wages, pensions and social serv ices' but it was convinced that a N ationalist governm ent would be abhorrent to the w orkers and disastro u s for the country. It was of the g reatest im portance, it affirm ed, that the Labor governm ent should rem ain in office.23 M oreover, the P resid en t gave an unchallenged ruling that 22 On the 18th, the A.R.U. decided to send a telegram to the Victorian representatives, demanding that they oppose the Plan (R,U. Gazette, July 1931). 23 L. Call, 25 June, 9 July Initially the press reported that the resolution had been carried unanimously, but see the subsequent statement that five delegates (including 116

128 Unions, Labor, and P re m ie rs ' Plan m em bers of the P arliam entary Labor P arty w ere at liberty to use th eir own discretion when dealing with the P re m ie rs Plan, and also that the Plan was not in conflict with the financial policy adopted at the M arch F ederal A.L.P. Conference. The daily p ress re fe rre d to the outcome of the F ed eral Executive m eeting as 'a victory for the F ederal M inistry', and the Age (20 June 1931) said, As a resu lt of the resolution the P rim e M inister and the T re a s u re r will now be able to put through P arliam ent without opposition the economy plan. However, the Labor Call (25 June 1931) and Cam eron in the Tram way R ecord (July 1931) claim ed that the resolution was virtually a repudiation of the P la n. A ccording to the C all's interpretation of the resolution, 'E very m em ber of the F ed eral P arliam en tary Labor P arty is now in duty bound to oppose the proposed reductions. In addition, it did not m ean that a Labor governm ent should rem ain in office for the purpose of giving effect to an an ti-l abor policy. Its re a l meaning was that the governm ent should rem ain in its advanced position politically as long as is possible fo r the purpose of resistin g the reductions...dem anded by a n ti-l ab o r'. At its m eeting on 4 June, it had been proposed that the Melbourne T.H.C. should declare its opposition to schem es involving wage and pension reductions, and on 11, 18, and 25 June delegates debated the motion and a series of am endm ents. Some opponents of the Plan believed they should 'concentrate on capturing the political m achine, and that 'th ere should be a g reat emptying out of ren eg ad es'. O thers urged the form ation of an Industrial Labor P arty, o r the running of industrial candidates against supporters of the Plan. Amendments moved by the la tte r group of delegates, however, w ere defeated, and there was practically no support for the com m unists who advocated d irect action. The Labor governm ents had th eir cham pions, including M.B. Duffy (form er secre ta ry of the T.H.C. and a m em ber of the Commonwealth Bank B oard). Although the Geelong T.H.C. was opposed to the Plan, as its representative on the Melbourne T.H.C., he strongly defended acceptance of the Plan, being allowed the unusual indulgence of three extensions of tim e to do so. In the upshot, the Council accepted Mick C onsidine's am endm ent (77-44): That this Council repudiates the so -called 'P re m ie rs ' Plan' and Cameron) had voted for an amendment calling for rejection of the Plan, and strict adherence to Federal Conference decisions (Argus, 22 June 1931). 117

129 Trade Unions and the D epression rejects with scorn the attem pt of F ed eral and State P a rlia m e n ta r ians to force this inglorious su rre n d er of Labor principles upon the Working C lass of A ustralia, and calls upon the F ed eral and State Executives of the A. C. T. U. and A. L. P. to im m ediately take action to m eet this onslaught on the standard of living of the w orkers by a counter offensive for the socialisation of Industry, and, fu rth er, calls upon the F ederal and State Executives of the A.L.P. to cancel the endorsem ent of those p arliam en tarian s supporting the A nti- Labor program m e of the P re m ie rs ' P la n.2^ It was moved that, if the C entral Executive of the A.L.P. did not give effect to this resolution, then the Council should advise unions to cancel th eir affiliation with the A.L.P. The m ajority of delegates, however, voted for an am endm ent which called on the C entral Executive to convene im m ediately a special conference to deal with the position that had a risen. The C ouncil's resolution on the Plan was endorsed by the Trade Union (T.U.) S alaried O fficers' A ssociation, and the Plan was also condemned by the Geelong T.H.C., the Bendigo T.H.C., the C entral Unemployment Com m ittee, and by union m eetings and A.L.P. b ranches. A fter months of m anoeuvring, and following fu rth er p re ssu re by the A. R. U., the C entral Executive of the A.L.P. requested m em bers of the Hogan M inistry to attend its m eeting on 19 June 'to show cause why th eir endorsem ent...should not be forthwith cancelled', because of the governm ent's failure 'to give effect to the decisions of the last th ree Labor conferences and the direction of this executive regarding rationing, reg ressio n s and d ism issals in the railw ays serv ice... '. At the m eeting, m in isters w ere adam ant that the financial position made it quite im possible for the governm ent to act as required, and apparently they challenged the C entral Executive to call on the governm ent to resign if it was not satisfied. The C entral Executive m et again on 21 and 22 June, when the governm ent's explanation that it did not have the money to c a rry out the instructions of recent conferences was accepted. The Executive agreed to drop the th reat to discipline m in isters because of th eir failu re to prevent retrenchm ent in the railw ays serv ice. Instead, it directed the S.P.L.P. to proceed with its unemployment tax m easu res, 24 Note that nominations for preselection ballots for seats in the House of Representatives closed on 8 May Practically all sitting members had been unopposed and so re-endorsed. The ballots were held on 13 June. 118

130 Unions, Labor, and P re m ie rs ' Plan by which the governm ent m ust stand o r f a ll.25 In addition, the Executive brought the issue of personal assu ran ces from Labor m em bers to a head, and served an ultim atum on the P re m ie r, Jones (a senior m in ister), and Bond (M. L. A.), demanding that they provide the assu ran ces by 3 July, otherw ise th eir endorsem ents would be cancelled. A lso, after discussion on 21 and 22 June, the C entral E xecutive resolved: That this Executive...d eclares its uncom prom ising opposition to the proposals of the P re m ie rs Conference, which provide for a reduction of w ages, pensions and social serv ices. It urges all F ed eral Labor m em bers and in structs all State Labor m em bers to vote against all such p ro p o sa ls. U ndeterred by the demands of the C entral Executive and the T. H. C., the Hogan M inistry continued drafting the legislation to im plem ent the Plan, and on 26 June it com pleted the task. Hogan, Jones, and Bond rem ained firm in th eir refusal to furnish the a s s u r ances, so that tension in the labour m ovem ent ro se to a high pitch; and when Mick Considine (a prom inent left-w ing Laborite) resigned from the C entral Executive, protesting that in th eir attitude to the Plan the Executive and the F ed eral Executive w ere tacitly accepting a sham eful violation of Labor principles, the opinion was voiced in Labor c irc les that the movement was on the verge of a sp lit. The A.R.U. had been the principal driving force behind the demand for the assu ran ces, but now the leadership of the union w avered and was instrum ental in easing the tension threatening the unity of the m ovem ent. R etrenchm ent in the serv ice had been intensified and Cain had again approached the union with a rationing sch em e. Following the C entral Executive m eetings held on the previous days, S ecretary Sear abandoned his fo rm er stance to advise the outgoing council of the A.R.U. on 23 June that the C entral Executive 'could no longer a s s is t the organisation to re stra in the C om m issioners, so they had to decide which would be the le s s e r of the evils confronting them. The council agreed (19-11) to a conference with the State governm ent to discuss the M in ister s proposals to prevent regressio n s and c o n tro l rationing. The conference was held on 26 June, and gave 25 R.U. Gazette, July J.F. Chappie (General Secretary A.R.U. and Vice- President A. L. P.) told the A.R.U. Council that at the Central Executive meetings it was generally felt it would be better if the government went out of office (ibid.). 119

131 Trade Unions and the D epression rise to p ress predictions that the union would re v e rse its policy r e garding ratio n in g.26 Thus the political situation was made easier; then on 3 July, though it was su rely aw are that it was at least questionable w hether such a conference would be com petent to deal with the m atter, the C entral Executive decided to re fe r the question of the endorsem ents of Hogan, Jones, and Bond to the forthcom ing special conference of the A.L.P. If opponents of the Plan believed the Labor governm ents would bow to union opinion, or that the C entral Executive would take resolute action, they w ere soon disappointed. Indeed, an attem pt was made to have the Executive s stand rev e rse d. But as both sides m ustered equal votes at a special m eeting on 28 June, its previous decision to oppose the Plan stood. The m eeting decided to convene a special conference of the party for 25 July to consider the position. M em bers of the C entral Executive who supported the Plan, for example Senator B arnes (V ice-p resident of the Executive Council) and McNeill (F ederal M inister for Health), together with Kean (Organising S ecretary of the A. L.P.), continued to do so. Little wonder the m ajority of Labor m em bers d isregarded the direction of the C entral Executive, for the se c re ta ry of the party, M cnam ara (M.L.C.), joined the Hogan M inistry and a ssisted to im plem ent the Plan. On 30 June, the S.P.L.P. adopted the M inistry s legislative proposals to give effect to the P la n.2? L ater the sam e day, Hogan sought, and was granted leave, to introduce em ergency bills into the A ssem bly, and the next day (1 July), he moved the second reading of the Financial Em ergency B ill. The situation was not encouraging for opponents of the Plan, and furtherm ore the T.U. m ovem ent's cam paign against the Plan had just been deprived of a m ajor source of strength, for at the end of June the A.W.U. rev ersed its stand. In co n trast to its attitude of the previous week, the A ustralian W orker (24 June 1931) argued that the P re m ie rs ' Conference had been dom inated by the influence of the 26 Later, on 14 July, the A.R.U. Council decided to refer the government's rationing scheme to a ballot of the membership, who in a small poll rejected it by nine votes (R.U. Gazette, August 1931). 27 There was no official voting list, but according to the Argus and the Herald (2 July 1931), the voting was On 9 July, nine Lahor members in the Assembly voted for Blackburn's amendment in opposition to the Plan (Argus, 10 July 1931). The Assembly on 21 July carried the second reading of the Financial Emergency Bill by 48 votes to 11 (Age, 22 July 1931). 120

132 Unions, Labor, and P re m ie rs ' Plan banks. It assu red w orkers that Labor rep resen tativ es had done th eir b est at the conference, but that in face of the obstacles confronting them they had been helpless. The F ed eral Council of the A. W.U. indicated its acceptance of the Plan, and a little la te r the V ictorian branch of the union declared its support for the federal governm ent, which, it in sisted, m ust hold on to office. In the following m onths, however, the A ustralian W orker m aintained that the Plan was not a rem edy for the depression and that L abor s financial policy was the only way out. The Plan, it rep eated ly explained, was not Labor policy, but was being enacted because the Labor M inistry was unable to ex ercise the authority it ought to p o ssess and because the will of the party had been fru strate d. The A ustralian W orker denounced any suggestion to discipline P la n ite s, and it uttered no word of c ritic ism of the fed eral or Hogan governm ents for im posing the reductions; ra th e r, it concentrated on attack ing the Lang P arty and governm ent. N evertheless, it continually urged the necessity for unity, though on 24 June it had declared c rise s in the labour movem ent to be 'h isto rically inevitable', and had advised, 'So don't w orry, b ro th er, when a c ris is fo r Labor com es along. It's all p a rt of a Plan which, in the providence of faith and experience, will gloriously tran sfo rm the w o rld.' In addition to the A.W.U., the A ustralian Tram w ay Em ployees' A ssociation accepted the Plan, and sev e ra l other unions including the B oilerm akers supported the Labor governm ents. The A.W.U. and the Tram w ay Union w ere im portant organisations and Planites made much of th eir attitu d e. But within the T. U. movement it was not an infrequent occurrence when a vital issu e aro se for an organisation's policy to be determ ined by a handful of executive m e m b e rs. In this instance, the decision to support the Plan was made by the F ederal Council of the A.W.U. and the executives of the two branches of the Tram w ay Union. At least in the la tte r case, the m ajority of officials decided on a policy for the union which scarcely reflected the views of the rank and file, for when they w ere able to express an opinion at subsequent m eetings, m em bers of the Tram w ay Union opposed the Plan. And in fact som e of the union's delegates to conferences had ignored instructions and voted against the Plan in the first p la c e. The July issu es of the Labor Call and Cam eron in the Tram way R ecord (July 1931) continued to c all fo r opposition to the P lan The L. C all (2 July 1931) reprinted 'T he Prim e M inister's Illtm inating Address' which 121

133 T rade Unions and the D epression W orkers w ere expressing b itte r disappointm ent and resen tm en t', they pointed out, and w ere demanding a 'm ore aggressive attitude' on the p art of L abor's rep resentativ es. Deploring the fact that Labor was at cro ss purposes regarding the Plan, they also w arned that it would be disastrous if such a situation p e rsiste d. The two journals asked them selves, 'What, then, is to be done?' - a question which was agitating the minds of m ost opponents of the Plan. But the solution suggested by Cam eron and the Labor Call was scarcely im pressive: 'L abor in politics m ust not be perm itted to speak with two voices', they urged. An understanding should be reached 'as quickly as p o ssib le', and Labor M.P s. 'should consider carefully the position'. The issue was sim ply one of L aborites making up th eir m inds w hether they supported o r opposed the red u ctio n s. A few union officials continued to canvass support fo r an Industrial Labor P arty, but the leadership favoured working through the A. L.P. In o rd er to consolidate the union attitude before the special A. L.P. conference, the T.H.C. Executive convened a special conference for 18 and 19 July to which each union was entitled to send only two delegates. This conference, which did not a ttra c t a maxim um attendance, adopted (72-32) the resolution previously c a rrie d by the T.H.C., and rejected a se rie s of am endm ents. In his ad d ress, F.J. Riley (P resident, T.H.C.) suggested, 'su rely it is high tim e that Labor was in Opposition, leaving to the political p arties of C apitalism the unenviable task ' of rehabilitating the economy. But the m ajority of delegates, though fiercely c ritic a l of the Labor governm ents, did not d esire to displace them o r precipitate a sp lit in the m ovem ent. N evertheless, they would not countenance a move by P. J. C larey (an influential official) who sought to delete from the resolution the demand for the cancellation of endorsem ents of su p p o rters of the Plan. On the other hand m otions urging disaffiliation from the A. L.P. w ere defeated, as was a proposal by the Shop A ssistants' Union that, unless the C entral Executive rid the A. L.P. of P lan ites, a breakaw ay party should be established - though the voting (59-42) showed the m inority in favour of this m ore d rastic course of action to be significant. An am endm ent advocating the repudiation of overseas debts was rejected, and another calling for strik e action against the Plan secured only ten explained with 'commendable candour' why 'the bitter pill must be taken'. However, this was one of the few occasions on which the L. Call published a defence of the Plan, and most issues contained articles attacking the Plan, including several by Anstey (M.H.R.) who denounced the Labor governments as being 'Nationalist in everything but name. 122

134 v o te s. Unions, Labor, and P re m ie rs' Plan The conference c arrie d an adjournm ent motion: That, failing the A.L.P. giving effect to C onference's resolution, the unions be urged to subm it proposals to the adjourned m eeting of Conference on Saturday, August 8, to deal with the position created. The daily p ress and som e union spokesm en re fe rre d to the contro v ersy which developed within the labour movement as a conflict between the political wing and the industrial wing. But this g en eralisation was only broadly true, for, as noted above, a substantial m inority of delegates had disagreed with the resolution c arrie d at the T.H.C. m eeting and the Trade Union Conference; and, at the sam e tim e, the S. P. L. P. and the F. P. L. P. had not adopted the Plan unanim ously. A few union officials backed the governm ents' acceptance of the Plan to the hilt; while som e Labor M.Ps. w ere as im placably hostile to the Plan as any unionist. A.L.P. branches, too, w ere divided on the issu e. Both sides organised for the tria l of strength at the Special V ictorian A.L.P. Conference on 25 and 26 July, so that th ere was a l m ost a reco rd attendance. Sixty-two of the sixty-five electorate councils w ere represented by sixty-five delegates and seventy-three of the seventy-six affiliated unions by 161 delegates. Many Labor politicians w ere present, including P rim e M inister Scullin and Senator B arnes who attended as A.W.U. d e le g a te s.2^ Don Cam eron moved the resolution which had been c arrie d by the C entral Executive on 22 June. C rofts (another top union official) proposed an am en d m ent, that the Conference should endorse the action of the C entral Executive in its em phatic opposition to the reductions and its in s tru c tion to V ictorian parliam entarians to vote against the Plan; and also that 'Conference instructs V ictorian represen tativ es in the Commonwealth P arliam ent to take all steps within th e ir power to prevent effect being given to those p arts of the plan affecting wages, old age, invalid and so ld iers' pensions, m aternity allowances and social se rv ic e s '. P resident Calwell ruled the am endm ent out of o rd er, as it would be contrary to the rules of the party for the Conference to issue instructions to federal m em bers. However, a motion to d is- 29 After the conference, the Secretary of the Liquor Trades Union claimed that some politicians had obtained proxies for A.L.P. branches of which they were not members, and some of which were defunct (L. Call, 13 August 1931). 123

135 T rad e Unions and the D ep ressio n agree with the ruling was c arrie d (111-86). Then num erous other am endm ents w ere put forw ard, and, finally, after they had been rejected, C ro fts s resolution was adopted (143-87). Scullin and sev eral other Labor m em bers adroitly defended th eir acceptance of the Plan and unsuccessfully sought to convince the Conference that they w ere acting in the b est in terests of w orkers and pensioners. They w ere upheld by a few union delegates such as W. Dale (Victorian S ecretary of the A.W.U.), L. Batten (a H erald re p o rte r representing the P astry co o k s Union), and M.B. Duffy of the Commonwealth Bank B oard, attending as a delegate from the Rope and Cordage Union. But unionists who took p a rt in the debates o v e r whelmingly denounced the Plan as an intolerable violation of Labor principles, and they assailed the Labor governm ents fo r having accepted the policy of L abor's enem ies. Some argued that, instead of agreeing to the Plan, the federal governm ent should have appealed to the people, and a few m aintained it would be preferab le for Labor to be in opposition ra th e r than do the dirty work for anti-l ab o r. By a sm all m ajority only ( ), the Conference rejected a proposal that it call upon the federal governm ent 'to appeal to the people at the e a rlie st opportunity for power to control the m onetary and banking policy of the n ation.... Again and again during the last eighteen m onths, conferences and the C entral Executive had issued instructions to Labor re p re se n ta tives which had not been c a rrie d out, and at this conference su p p o rte rs of the Plan did not indicate they w ere prepared to re v e rse th eir fo rm er attitude. 30 A delegate from the E lectrical Trades'U nion moved that Labor m em bers be instructed to vote against the Plan and that failure to obey this instruction would re su lt in the autom atic expulsion of the offending m em bers from the A. L.P. This am endm ent was defeated, and the m ajority of delegates fu rth er indicated th eir unwillingness to discipline re c alc itra n t politicians when they 30 It is important to bear in mind the serious dilemma which faced unions at this time and later regarding the political position of Labor. If the Labor governments fell, it was highly likely that elections would be disastrous for Labor, and U.A.P. governments could be expected to enforce the Plan with the greatest severity. There were ominous enough indications of Labor's loss of electoral support; the Tasmanian elections had driven the point home on 9 May, and a month later the Victorian Legislative Council elections had revealed a strong swing against Labor. In these elections Labor had lost the seat held for seventeen years by the Minister for Health (Beckett), and, with only five members in the Council, the Hogan Ministry's precarious hold on office was weakened still further. In August, Labor suffered further severe defeats in the Victorian municipal elections. 124

136 Unions, Labor, and P re m ie rs Plan voted (117-70) to uphold P resid en t C alw ell's ruling that the Conference could not deal with the m atter of assu ran ces from Hogan, Jones, and Bond. Opponents of the Plan who saw the conference resolution as a victory received a iolt the following day, for Hogan issued a statem ent which announced his intention to p e rsist with the legislation before P arliam en t, and which denounced the conference decisions as stupid and u n p atrio tic. N evertheless, the Labor Call (30 July 1931) and Cam eron in the Tram w ay R ecord (August 1931) re fe rre d to the decisions of the union and A.L.P. conferences as an achievem ent for opponents of the Plan. 'It is now the bounden duty of trade union and A.L.P. representatives to oppose the Plan as d irected ', the Labor Call inform ed its re a d ers, and 'th ere is no room for argum ent o r com prom ise'. P lanites, however, com pletely ignored th e ir 'bounden duty'. The legislation had already been enacted by the Commonwealth P arliam ent, and Labor m em bers who had voted for it continued to support the Plan. The second reading of the Financial Em ergency Bill had been c arrie d by the V ictorian Assem bly, and, though th ere was som e delay before its enactm ent, this was not due to the m ajority of Labor m em bers perform ing th eir 'bounden duty'. M oreover, the C entral Executive did not attem pt to ensure that the instructions of the A.L.P. C onference w ere observed. As noted above, the conference would not deal with the refusal of Hogan, Jones, and Bond to give the assu ran ces demanded of them, and after the conference the C entral Executive was disinclined to define th eir position. However, according to the daily p re ss on 5 August 1931, which proved to be well inform ed, the Executive would take no fu rth er action against the th ree men or th eir endorsem ents until the next State electio n s. While deploring the spectacle of Labor governm ents assistin g 'to enforce an ti-l ab o r's policy', the Labor Call and Cam eron in the Tram way R ecord w ere much m ore restrain ed in th e ir c ritic ism of Planites than m ost active opponents of the Plan, although there w ere le tte rs in the Labor Call that b itterly attacked the governm ents. Cam eron in Septem ber 1931 claim ed that the adoption of the Plan was a repudiation of th eir own party by Labor rep resentativ es. But neither journal was seriously concerned to provide a definite lead in the b itte r controversy aroused by those who sought to have Planites d iscip lin ed, though by im plication they opposed such action. 31 In a rare analysis of the problem the L. Call (13 August 1931) raised the question of 125

137 T rad e Unions and the D ep ressio n With the exception of the A ustralian W orker, m ost other journals practically ignored the m a tte r. According to the Labor Call (13 August 1931), politicians departed from th eir line of duty, as in the case of the Plan, because like other men, they always acted in accordance with the way in which they had been trained. Although the Labor Call itself had encouraged ju st such a foolish hab it, it explained that som e people had becom e angry with th eir political rep resentatives for acting contrary to th eir pledges and pro m ises, because of the foolish h ab it of such people of accepting politicians at th eir face valuation. When th e ir rep resen tativ es acted contrary to expectations, such people w ere shocked o r disappointed. While deprecating the im position of fu rth er burdens on w orkers by the Labor governm ents and while lam enting the w idespread poverty and m isery, the Labor Call and Cam eron in the Tram way Record repeatedly blam ed the w orkers them selves for the situation. The Fiduciary Note Issue would have eased the position, the Labor Call (16 July 1931) asse rte d, but it was not to be, because the w orkers them selves have yet to take up a stro n g er stand p o litic a lly '. The Labor Call and Cam eron m aintained L abor's p ro g ress was made slow and difficult by the unfortunate w o rk ers' childlike cred u lity. W orkers accepted a lower standard of living, and the paradox of starvation in the m idst of plenty existed because the w orkers w ere m ostly the m ental slaves of cap italist theories and teachings. The two journals regarded the w o rk ers' plight as desperate, but they w ere able to discover a 'saving quality in the situation, and observed that anti-l abor m egalom aniacs who would im pose g re a te r sacrifices on w orkers w ere not m a ste rs of the situation to the extent that they im agined. A ccording to Cam eron in Septem ber 1931, action and reaction are equal and opposite as a re oppression and revolt, while the Labor Call (16 July 1931) argued, 'an ti-l ab o r going to the extrem e would have the opposite effect to that intended. This might have been consoling sociology but what many of the rank and file w ere looking for was a definite, p ractical lead as to how they m ight regain th eir standard of living. E arly in July, arrangem ents had been made for a special federal conference of the A. L.P. to com m ence on 27 July. L ater the how the situation might be remedied when Labor s representatives deliberately acted contrary to promises made, [ and] pledges given. Its answer was, only by constantly challenging Labor politicians who show tendencies to depart from Labor's p olicy...and by constantly educating the workers themselves as to their rights and powers

138 Unions, Labor, and P re m ie rs' Plan conference was postponed, and on 30 July the T.H.C. decided that the union conference, which had been adjourned until 8 August, should be fu rth er adjourned until after the federal conference was held. Thus during August and early Septem ber the issue was held in abeyance, as the union leadership pursued its w ait-and-see policy. The union conference did not m eet again till 12 Septem ber, and such delays made the task of rallying resistan ce to the Plan all the m ore difficult. When discussing the tasks facing the F ederal A. L.P. Conference, the Labor Call (27 August 1931) and Cam eron in the Tram way Record (Septem ber 1931) urged that it was now the task of the Labor Movem ent to make good where Labor politicians have failed. T heir advice to delegates was that the Plan should be strongly opposed, and the labour movement given a strong and im m ediate lead in that direction. But union officials who w ere directing the union campaign against the Plan w ere aw are of the com position of the conference32 and w ere fam iliar with the opinions of m ost of the delegates, so it is alm ost im possible to believe they in fact expected much from the conference. A fter som e fu rth er delay, the Special F ed eral Conference m et on 27, 28, and 29 August Although many delegates spoke heatedly against the Plan, proposals to discipline its supporters received few votes - Considine being the only V ictorian delegate who voted this way. In another unsuccessful move, Duggan asked that the federal governm ent be directed to re sto re all reductions in w ages, pensions, and social s e rv ic e s. Finally, after lengthy discussion, the conference adopted (22-13) a com prom ise resolution. It declared that the reduction of wages, pensions, and social serv ices ran counter to L abor's platform and could not be accepted as p a rt of L abor s policy, and it instructed the fed eral and State Labor p arties that there should be no fu rth er red u ctio n s. It also reaffirm ed the policy agreed upon at the M arch Special In terstate Conference as providing the only m eans of securing economic and social justice and bringing to an end the p resen t c ris is. But L abor's policy, it resolved, could only be put into effect when Labor secured full control of State and Common- 32 Of the thirty-six delegates, no fewer than twenty were politicians, including the Prime Minister and Federal Treasurer. Over a quarter of the delegates were either members or officials of the A.W.U. which supported the Plan. The Victorian delegates were: Prime Minister Scullin, Drakeford (M.L.A.), McNamara (M.L.C. and Secretary A.L.P.), Calwell (President Victorian A.L.P.), Duggan (Secretary T.H.C. and President A.C.T.U.), and Considine. Don Cameron was one of the delegates representing Western Australia. 127

139 T rad e Unions and the D epression w ealth P arliam en ts, so all Labor organisations w ere required to work with a united front to achieve this end. A fter the conference it was officially explained that the term s of the resolution did not im pose any penalty on the Labor governm ents fo r having introduced the economy m e a su re s. As the m easu res w ere now federal law, th eir provisions had to be accepted, but they w ere not to be regarded as Labor policy. The p re ss hailed the outcome of the conference as a 'trium ph for the Scullin M inistry', and Labor P lanites expressed satisfaction, regarding the resolution as a tactical victory. N evertheless, the Labor Call (3 Septem ber 1931) and Cam eron in the Tram way R ecord (September 1931) acclaim ed the decisions of the conference. D elegates w ere p ractically unanimous in th eir condem nation of the Plan, they w ere happy to rep o rt, and it was significant that Scullin and Theodore had voted against the Plan. They also in form ed readers that the m ovem ent had made good theoretically, where the m ajority of the fed eral and State Labor politicians had failed. The Labor Call was prep ared to concede that reductions had already been im posed, but it hastened to add that 'the damage has been done m ainly as the re su lt of the w eakness of Labor politically, and that it was inevitable in the c irc u m stan c es'. Then, on an optim istic note, it expressed the hope that Labor rep resen tativ es who supported the Plan would have learn t th eir lesson.. But this hope was at once revealed to be quite unjustified, at least in the case of Hogan, who, commenting on the delay in the passage of the Financial Em ergency B ill, stated unequivocally that unless the Bill went through he would not continue as P re m ie r. On 31 August, the T.H.C. Executive decided that the adjourned Industrial Conference would resum e on 12 Septem ber to review the decisions of the fed eral and State A. L.P. C onferences. E arly in the month, the C entral Executive of the A. L.P. invited the T.H.C. and A.C.T.U. to send rep resen tativ es to a conference to be held on 11 Septem ber to discuss preparations for the next federal electio n s. The T.H.C. Executive and the Em ergency Com m ittee of the A.C.T.U., however, replied that they w ere not prepared to send rep resen tativ es to such a conference until the party defined its policy regarding the resto ratio n of w ages, pensions, and social serv ices. At the Industrial Conference on 12 and 13 Septem ber, the m ajority of delegates again rejected the proposal that unions should cancel th e ir affiliation with the A.L.P. if the C entral Executive did not see 128

140 Unions, Labor and P re m ie rs' Plan fit to discipline Labor m em bers who supported the Plan. Advocates of a breakaw ay party w ere again in a m inority; but, as moved by C rofts and A. W allis, the conference resolved: That, failing the existing political p arties and the F ederal and State Labor m em bers of P arliam ent giving a w ritten assurance to the A ustralasian Council of Trade Unions and its branches that they will organise against the P re m ie rs ' Plan, and for the im m ediate resto ratio n of old age and invalid pensions, social serv ices, m aternity allowance and living standards, on the b asis existing before D ecem ber 1930, this Conference take action to initiate the n ecessary financial and m oral support for those m em bers of the F ederal and State P arliam entary Labor P arty and P arliam entary candidates who a re prepared to c a rry out the policy laid down by th is C onference. It also elected a 12-m an com m ittee (most of them top officials) which looked som ething like a potential counterpart to the A. L. P. E xecutive. O ther resolutions adopted by the conference included: That this Conference shall not disband until decided otherw ise by a vote of tw o-thirds of the credentialled delegates, but may adjourn from tim e to tim e. That Conference shall m eet, if necessary once in each month.... That the A.C.T.U. be urged to initiate im m ediately an in terstate movement to consolidate opposition to the P re m ie rs ' Plan and for the resto ratio n of...pensions, social serv ices, m aternity allowance, wages and the w orkers' living standards, and the furthering of the Labor P a rty 's policy on socialisation of industry and the nationalisation of banking, and for giving im m ediate effect to the resolutions adopted by an A ll-a ustralian Trade Union C ongress, Special Conferences of the A.L.P. and the A.L.P. In terstate Conference of M arch la st. Copies of the resolutions w ere sent to the A.L.P. and Labor M.Ps., and the required assu ran ces w ere asked for. Opponents of the Plan stepped up th eir campaign to 'clean up' the Labor P arty and secure control of the political m achine. Most journals w ere reticen t O O about the m a tte r, 00 although notable exceptions w ere the Railw ays 33 For example, it is interesting to note that, though J.V. Stout (organiser, Shop Assist- 129

141 Trade Unions and the D epression Union Gazette (August 1931) and the Industrial H erald (27 August 1931) in which Chappie (General S ecretary A.R.U. and V ice-president A.L.P.), scathingly denounced the Plan and its su p p o rters. He declared Labor leaders to be guilty of base treach ery to w orkingclass p rin cip les. W orkers m ust purge the political movement of the tra ito rs within its ra n k s', he urged, and if n ecessary, break and re-fo rm the party on a m ore solid foundation. The A ustralian W orker (23 Septem ber 1931), on the other hand, urged just as fo rc e fully that it was absolutely essen tial that everything possible should be done to p reserv e the solidarity of the Labor M ovement. It repudiated the decisions of the Industrial Conference, insisting that th ere should be no political vendetta against Labor m e m b e rs. In the following m onths, the A ustralian W orker repeatedly re fe rre d to the next federal elections and called for unity so that Labor m ight put forw ard a bold financial policy. On 22 Septem ber the Industrial Conference Com m ittee resolved that affiliated unions and State E lectorate Councils be asked to demand a special conference of the A. L.P. during Novem ber to deal with the following m atters: 1. To declare all official positions vacant, and the election of new o fficials. 2. To declare all seats on the C entral Executive vacant, and elect a new executive. 3. To declare In terstate Conference delegation vacant, and re-electio n of new re p resentativ es. 4. To declare F ederal Executive delegation vacant, and elect new re p re se n ta tiv e s. 5. Cancellation of all endorsem ents, with a view to reconsideration by new executive. 6. To lay down fighting policy for the next federal election, including the following:- Im m ediate treatm ent of the unem ployment position by the resto ratio n of wages and living standards; of shortening of working hours and adequate m aintenance for unabsorbed w orkers and th eir fam ilies and p rim ary p ro d u c e rs. 7. N ationalisation of banking. ants Union) was an ardent opponent of the Plan and was prominent in the campaign to clean up the party, the Shop Assistant almost completely ignored even the existence of the Plan.. 130

142 Unions, Labor, and P re m ie rs ' Plan 8. Socialisation of industry. 9. A lteration of Commonwealth Constitution to grant unlim ited legislative powers to the Commonwealth P arliam ent. 10. Abolition of State P a rlia m e n ts. ^4 The next day, the P resid en t of the A.L.P. (Calwell) em phatically rejected the com m ittee s demand. 'It was in fact', he a sserted, 'a sm oke screen by those who w ere afraid of the Communist offensive', and its sponsors included those who w ere 'anxious to secure the positions held by o th e rs'. The com m ittee, however, went ahead with its arrangem ents for speakers to address A.L.P. and union m eetings, and on 28 Septem ber a rep o rt of its work was subm itted to a m eeting of union officials. C ircu lars w ere sent to Labor m em bers of P arliam en t requesting them to furnish, before 8 O ctober, the assu ran ces sought by the Industrial C onference. This led P resident Calwell and S ecretary M cnamara to make a joint statem ent on 30 Septem ber which declared that the demand for such assurances was in conflict with the ru les of the A.L.P. On 2 O ctober, at a storm y m eeting of the C entral Executive of the A.L.P., Calwell gave a ruling which threatened with expulsion 'any m em ber of the A.L.P. who supports, advocates o r a ssists to enforce the resolutions of the Union Conference of Septem ber 12th-13th', and any Labor p arliam en tarian who gave the assu ran ce demanded by the conference. He also ruled that the special conference asked for could not be held. The Industrial Com m ittee, however, p ersisted with its efforts to secu re a special conference. C alw ell's directives aroused union resentm ent, and there was justification for the notion fostered by the daily p re ss that, as a re su lt of the b ittern ess developing between the 'political and industrial sections' of the A.L.P., 'a cleavage was in ev itab le'. A larm that was not confined to A.L.P. lead ers resulted in efforts being made to heal the breach. The A.L.P. Executive sought a conference with the T.H.C. Executive, but the la tte r decided to decline any such invitation until such tim e as C alw ell's ruling m ight be withdrawn. On 11 October, after hearing a report from the Industrial Conference Com m ittee, a large m eeting of union executives, on the motion of A. W allis, agreed unanimously to endorse the actions of the com m ittee and the T.H.C. Executive and to pledge its wholehearted support to those m em bers of 34 L. Call, 1 October It is to be noted that at this time - despite the fact that the federal government was implementing the Premiers' Plan - union leaders were stepping up a campaign for radical financial measures. 131

143 Trade Unions and the D epression P arliam ent who w ere in line with 'efforts to uphold w orking-class ideals and p rin c ip le s'. Thus the labour movement seem ed to be rapidly moving along the road to com plete disruption. Like so many other unionists, m em bers of the A.R.U. regarded the Labor governm ents with intense hostility, and at the union's council m eeting on 6 O ctober a motion to disaffiliate from the A. L.P. was barely defeated, the voting being equal. D issatisfaction in the A. F. U. L. E. had reached such proportions that, despite pleas from th eir F ederal P resident, D rakeford (M.L.A. and a m em ber of the C entral Executive) that the trouble lay not with the A. L. P. but only with certain politicians who could be rem oved, a ballot of the m em bership resulted in the cancellation of the union's affiliation with the p a rty. To date, the A.C. T.U. had not come forw ard to offer lead ersh ip. Now, belatedly, a special conference of the In terstate Executive (15-17 O ctober) denounced the Plan and resolved: That all Labor m em bers of P arliam ent who refuse to repudiate and cancel the P re m ie rs ' Plan as far as wages, pensions, and social serv ices a re concerned, be declared outside the Labor Movement, and recom m ends all trad es unions of the Commonwealth to re fra in from rendering assistan ce, eith er m orally or financially, to any such re p re se n ta tiv e s. 35 However, the A ustralian W orker (28 O ctober 1931) fulm inated against the resolutions and a sse rte d that by endangering Labor unity the A.C.T.U. was prejudicing L abor's chances of victory at the next elections. While the unity of the movem ent appeared to be hanging in the balance, the contribution of the Labor Call (22 O ctober 1931) and Cam eron in the Tram way R ecord (29 October 1931) to the controversy was a dissertatio n on 'P oliticians and A g itato rs', which purported to show how they w ere 'only the m edium s of the collective w ill'. However, they did advance the proposition that Labor politicians m ust conform to L abor's policy or be displaced o r ignored. The Industrial Com m ittee p ersisted with its cam paign, though 35 L. Call, 22 October The Executive was also of the opinion that any policy placed before the electors at future elections should include the following item s... - Socialisation of industry, nationalisation of banking, abolition of State Parliaments and State Oovernors,...national insurance... adequate sustenance for all unable to obtain employment, immediate restoration o f...pensions...wages and living standards to at least the 1930 level, and for a 25 per cent improvement of such standards;...the immediate adoption of a 35-hour working week; cancellation of war debts; and immediate action to assist primary producers'. 132

144 Unions, Labor, and P re m ie rs Plan apparently few Labor m em bers had furnished the assurances it req u ired. While union officials had been engaged in top-level conferen ces, the rank and file w ere scarcely involved; but now the issue of the Plan, which had been generally neglected for months at union m eetings, was revived, and resolutions w ere c arrie d demanding the special A. L. P. conference. At the sam e tim e, too, manya.l.p. branches endorsed the demand. The Industrial Conference m et again on 17 O ctober, with few er than sixty-five unions now rep resen ted. The conference, claim ing that m ore than the required percentage of the party m em bership demanded a special conference, called on the P resid en t and Executive of the A.L.P. to give effect to the rules of the party, and summon such a conference not la te r than 7 D ecem ber The conference fu rth e r decided: Failing the central executive calling such special conference on or before D ecem ber 7, this conference invites all branches of the Labor P arty to appoint delegates to attend this conference for the purpose of consolidating the political and Industrial Movement, with a view to giving effect to the Labor platform, and the resto ratio n of pensions, social serv ices, and wage standards, and the im provem ent of such sta n d a rd s. In reply, Calwell, on 29 O ctober, issued an ultim atum to fourteen union le ad e rs, ^ threatening them with expulsion unless they fu rn ish ed undertakings by noon on 2 Novem ber to accept the resolution of the special fed eral conference of August and to agree not to p e rsist in any way with activities in support of the resolution of the industrial con- 36 The majority of those concerned were either secretaries or organisers. They included Duggan (Secretary T. H.C., President A.C. T.U., and a delegate to A.L.P. federal conferences), Crofts (Secretary A.C. T. U., Secretary Cas Employees' Union, member of t.h.c. Executive Committee and A.L.P. Central Executive), A. Wallis (Vice- President ^. H.C., Secretary Clothing Trades Union), E. Stewart (official of Furnishing Trades Union and member of the Central Executive of the A.L.P.), F. Sear (Secretary A.R.U.), J.V. Stout (organiser, Shop Assistants' Union), E. Smith (organiser, Clothing Trades' Union), G. Beardsworth (Federal Secretary and Victorian Secretary Hospital Employees Federation). In some cases their A.L.P. branch took their side against Calwell; e.g. the Sandringham branch supported its secretary, E. Stewart (Argus, 5 November 1931). At first it was regarded as something of a 'mystery' that Monk (Assistant Secretary T.H.C.), Cameron (Vice-President A.L.P. and a member of the Industrial Committee) and the President of the T.H.C., Riley, who had presided over the trade union conferences, had not received the ultimatum (Herald, 31 October 1931). Then it was explained that Riley and Cameron had not been included because they supported the holding of a conference between the executives of the A.L.P. and T.H.C. (Argus, 3 November 1931). 133

145 Trade Unions and the D epression ference regarding a special A.L.P. conference. He blam ed the T.H.C. for the position, charging that it had attem pted to introduce 'the sp irit of "L angism "' into V ictoria, and like the daily p ress and P re m ie r Hogan he warned of a dictatorship of union officials. Support for Calwell cam e from such q u arters as P re m ie r Hogan, Kean (Organising S ecretary, A.L.P.), Senator B arnes (General P resident, A.W.U. and m em ber of the C entral Executive), and the A ustralian W orker (4 November 1931); but the T.H.C., T.U. S alaried O fficers' A ssociation, and unions and A.L.P. branches voiced strong opposition to the ultim atum. When the specified tim e expired, and none of the unionists co n cerned had given the undertaking, the movement seem ed faced with the im m ediate prospect of a sp lit. However, according to p re ss re p o rts, Labor leaders did not reg ard as serious 'the th reat of secession by the industrial w ing', especially as 'the political wing retained the support of four of the stro n g est o rg anisations', the A.W.U., Boot T rades Union, P.I.E.U.A., and the Tram way U nion. 7 The situation was fu rth er com plicated by the fact that, as p art of th eir campaign, union officials had issued an 'in d u strial ticket' for the A.L.P. Senate selection ballot, and the union leaders Cam eron, Sheehan, and W allis (now threatened with expulsion) w ere successful. Influential lead ers, including Cam eron, d esired a tru ce, and behind the scenes they worked to heal the b reach. At a m eeting of the C entral Executive on 6 N ovem ber, P resid en t Calwell withdrew his ultim atum, on the understanding that a conference would be arranged im m ediately between rep resen tativ es of the C entral Executive and the Industrial Com m ittee. The com m ittee, which was m eeting concurrently in another room, agreed to such a conference. In an effort 'to prom ote the unity of the political and industrial sections of the Labor M ovem ent', the rep resen tativ es m et on 9 November and again on the 13th, when it was generally agreed a special A.L.P. conference was n ecessary to c lear the a ir. There w as, however, no unanimity concerning the business to be dealt with at such a co n ference Argus, 3 November 1931; Age, '3 November But see the different policy adopted by the half-yearly general meeting of the N o.2 branch of the Tramway Union (Tram. Record, November 1931). The Printing Trades Journal had not sought to defend the Plan. TUB - Now that'a split had been averted, the L. Call (12 November 1931) and Cameron in the Tram. Record (November 1931) declared their views on disciplining Labor's army'. They argued: 'Labor united in spite of the strongly held and conflicting viewpoints of its representatives or leaders, is always a better and safer proposition...than Labor divided'. 134

146 Unions, Labor, and P re m ie rs Plan A re p o rt of these deliberations was subm itted to a special m e eting of the C entral Executive on 15 Novem ber. Supporters of the Industrial Conference Com m ittee on the Executive moved for a special A.L.P. conference which would deal with the m atters suggested by the com m ittee; but other m em bers of the C entral Executive, while agreeing to a conference to discuss general m atters of State policy, refused to consider including the agenda proposed in the m otion. Finally a com prom ise am endm ent was c arrie d. A special A.L.P. conference would be held on 16 January 1932 'to review the position which had arisen in the Labor Movement in V ictoria, and to discuss any agenda item s relative to the b etter working of the A.L.P. and the winning of P arliam entary electio n s'. It was also decided to invite agenda item s from affiliated unions and party b ra n c h es. The Industrial Com m ittee discussed the m a tte r but postponed making a decision until a la te r m eeting. Then, on 25 November, the Scullin governm ent was defeated and overnight the whole controversy was carefully b u rie d. A Truce and the F ederal Elections On 26 Novem ber, faced by the impending federal elections, the Industrial Conference Com m ittee issued a statem ent declaring that the policy of the anti-l abor forces to set aside all aw ards, reduce wages and in crease hours of labour, rendered it im perative for unionists to stand solidly in the fig h t. Union officials who had been vehem ently castigating the Labor governm ents for th eir betrayal of the labour movement now credited the Scullin M inistry with great achievem ents. Those officials who had been threatened so recently with expulsion from the A.L.P. for th e ir campaign against the P re m ie rs' Plan now studiously avoided any referen ce to the issue and attem pted to persuade unenthusiastic w orkers that th eir only hope for im proved wages and working conditions lay in the retu rn of the governm ent. This seem ing volte-face was also to be observed in the attitude of union officials like E. Stew art, F, Katz, D. Cam eron, J. Sheehan, and A. W allis who w ere Labor candidates. T heir speeches, too, skirted the Plan, neglected th e ir own fo rm er argum ents, and now seem ed to re s t on an acceptance of Scullin's own explanation of his position: that, in the face of unprecedented difficulties and intolerable handicaps, his record w arranted the support of electo rs. Regarding the problem of 'traitors they m aintained, 'Such men autom atically and periodically displace themselves without smashing or dividing the Labor M ovem ent... ', and this automatic process 'should be allowed to operate, without any undue interference from the impetuous'. 135

147 Trade Unions and the D epression During the election campaign Labor speakers followed Scullin's lead in assertin g that they w ere now confident that the c risis had passed, and that A ustralia was on the road to reco v ery. They all based th eir case for a retu rn of the governm ent on the claim that it had saved A ustralia from d isa ste r. Having m aintained the nation's honour, Scullin m ust now be perm itted to proceed to the work of economic r e construction. There was no hint that only a few days e a rlie r many of those who now spoke in this way had believed that Scullin had in effect acted to p reserv e capitalism intact, by carrying out the policy of 'an ti- Labor' and sacrificing the w o rk ers' in te re sts. The union leadership sought the re tu rn of the governm ent, although L abor's election policy did not em brace the radical m easures for d ealing with the depression which the T.U. movem ent had been dem anding.39 A s to the sacrifices im posed on w orkers, Scullin m erely prom ised that 'if the im provem ent [in the financial position] continues there will be an early resto ratio n of pensions and wage stan d a rd s'. Socialisation was severely played down, and Labor candidates - including those who w ere union officials - made protection a dominant issu e. They followed Scullin in advocating rem oval of the fe tte rs which had been placed on the Commonwealth Bank, and also the establishm ent of a C entral R eserve Bank. The la tte r was not seen, however, as a step tow ards socialism, but as a m eans of reviving cap italist industry. There w ere broad referen ces to the need for m onetary refo rm, but m in iste ria lists gave less prom inence to these aspects of th eir policy in the face of a swelling campaign by L abor's opponents to convince electors that the Labor P arty had intentions which would lead A ustralia to financial ruin and chaos.regarding L abor's policy as no th reat to the status quo, the Age supported the re-electio n of the Scullin governm ent, and, unperturbed by his brand of socialism, it included Don Cam eron on its com posite Senate ticket. In the propaganda directed to unionists, the appeals to support Labor w ere predom inantly negative and designed to stim ulate th eir fe a rs. As the Round Table (Vol. XXII, p. 415) reported, 'instead of 39 Cf. the attitude of the Postal Workers' Union which voted 350 to Labor Party election funds, but stipulated that 200 was to go to the Central Executive and the remaining 150 was to be allocated among those Labor members who were prepared to support the immediate restoration of the reductions in wages and pensions made under the Premiers' Plan (Argus, 10 December 1931). 40 But see the manner in which monetary reform was played up by the Aust. Worker. 136

148 Unions, Labor, and P re m ie rs' Plan a cam paign of pro m ises, it developed into a campaign of te r r o r s. Each side claim ed support because of the dangers of putting the other into office'. A typical slogan in the Labor Call warned w orkers to 'get behind the Labor Movement, and save your hom es, wives, children and y o u rse lf'. A constant them e was that anti-l abor politicians w ere the puppets of Money Pow er, men who intended to sm ash protection, abolish arb itratio n, and low er standards of living. T heir retu rn would be 'too harrow ing and h o rrib le '. Safety lay only in solidarity and loyalty to 'o u r' party and rep resen tativ es. The elections of 19 D ecem ber inflicted a staggering defeat on the governm ent. The A.L.P. won only thirteen seats (a m ere four in V ictoria), 41 and Scullin resigned. In subsequent w eeks, A.L.P. and union spokesm en, in seeking to explain the debacle, mentioned factors such as p re ss m isrepresentation, religious sectarian ism, the disunity in L ab o r's ranks, and a tra n sfe r of allegiance of the unemployed. T here w ere also references to 'panicky and preiudiced v o te rs', and 'w orking class im beciles and m ental degenerates' who w ere so stupid as to vote against th eir own in terests and re je ct the Labor governm ent. L ess often the blam e was assigned to the abrogation of Labor principles by the Labor governm ents. 42 But spokesm en like Cam eron denied that Labor lead ers could be held responsible, arguing that w orkers them selves determ ined the direction taken by th eir lead ers, and that 'when the w orkers condemn the shortcom ings of th e ir lead ers, they also a re condemning the shortcom ings which they them selves p o ssess'.43 The Labor C all (24 Decem ber 1931) offered the consolation that according to the law of com pensation 'L abor defeated politically is Labor stre n g thened socially o r in d u strially '. L abor's defeat would, 'in the long run, do it m ore good than h a rm ', for 'if the w orkers cannot be convinced by reason that Labor is th eir only hope, they m ust be convinced by b itte r e x p erien c e '. 41 But there was a swing to Labor in Queensland where a non-labor government was in office. 42 See correspondents'in the R.U. Gazette, January 1932 and Tram. Record, January This was the view, too, of the Indus, Herald (7 January 1932) which maintained that when tne Scullin government adopted the Premiers' Plan 'it committed political suicide'. It regretted the workers' choice, for 'the worst Labor Government is better than the best Capitalist Government'. 43 Tram. Record, January See also the L. Call, 28 January

149 Trade Unions and the D epression The A nti-plan Campaign Resumed Im m ediately a fter the federal elections, the union campaign against the P re m ie rs Plan was resum ed. The crushing defeat renewed a conviction sim ply stated in the declaration of F.J. Riley that the dkbäcle showed the necessity to reorganise Labor fo rces. D isintegration and dem oralisation had to be checked. Labor could not rem ain identified with the Plan, and its representatives could no longe r be allowed to defy the movement and violate Labor p rin c ip le s. Something had therefore to be done about discipline and policy. On 21 D ecem ber, two days after the election, the Industrial Conference Com m ittee fram ed a resolution which affiliated unions w ere requested to forw ard to the A. L.P. for inclusion on the agenda for the special conference scheduled fo r 16 Jan u ary It read: That, for the b etter working of the A. L. P. and the winning of P arliam entary elections, it is n ecessary that the State officers, C entral Executive m em bers, delegates to F ederal Conference and F ederal Executive should at all tim es c a rry out the decisions of Conference and the platform of [the] p arty. As these officers and delegates have failed in this m atter, this C onference...d eclares all State offices, all seats on the F ed eral Conference and F ed eral Executive vacant, and proceeds at once to fill the vacancies. But at the end of D ecem ber the C entral Executive of the A. L.P. decided to cancel the special conference and bring forw ard the annual conference to 30 January The Industrial Com m ittee agreed, and both sides organised for the impending encounter. The atm osphere of tension in V ictoria was heightened by longstanding dissatisfaction on other m atters besides the Plan, and m ost notably on the question of unemployment relief (see C hapter 7). The Hogan governm ent, with its power severely circum scribed by its m inority position in the Legislative A ssem bly44 and the im placable o b stru ctio n of the upper House, had g ravely disappointed the m o v e m ent generally by its legislative and adm inistrative policy, and had aroused the b itte r hostility of the unemployed. It was paying for office a price which, its c ritic s claim ed, was in effect that of c a r r y ing out the policy of its opponents. In D ecem ber - after num erous deadlocks - the M inistry had secured the passage of an unemployment 44 On 3 December 1931, the Ministry survived a no-confidence motion only on the casting vote of the Speaker. 138

150 Unions, Labor, and P re m ie rs' Plan relief bill, but at the cost of concessions which the T.U. movement and unemployed found unacceptable: the unemployed w ere to be forced to work for sustenance and at below aw ard rates of pay. Expectancy was high that there would be a showdown on this m atter too at the January A. L. P. C onference. Yet, significantly, the Labor C all (21 January 1932) pleaded for 'L abor unity at all c o sts'. The conference was attended by 150 delegates representing affiliated unions and 68 delegates from A.L.P. branches. C onsidering this com position, it might seem su rp risin g at first sight that the voting was to be so close. But as noted before, it is at b est only a broad approxim ation to say that the conflict was between the industrial and political wings of the labour m o v em en t. In reading the debates it is possible to discern three groups of union d eleg ates. On the left a heterogeneous m inority, of whom Mick Considine was one of the m ost outspoken, would purge the Labor leadership of Planites and d irect the party tow ards radical policies; and there was a m inority conservative group which backed the supporters of the Plan, though few of this group publicly commended the P lan. But the m ajority attitude, which was expressed by m ost of the leading union officials, was m oderate. These officials believed that the Planites had to be made to adhere to Labor policy, that Labor rep resen tativ es m ust acknowledge the authority of the party, and that unions should have a stro n g er voice in the A.L.P. But as in the past they p re fe rre d to com prom ise ra th e r than precipitate a m ajor sp lit. Accordingly, m ost opponents of the Plan seem to have p re fe rre d to rely on the election of a new set of officials ra th e r than that Conference should take d iscip lin ary action. As proposed by W allis (V ice-p resident T.H.C. and a recent Senate candidate) and Sear, the Conference censured (129-79) the failure of the retirin g executive to enforce the decisions of the conferences It declared 'that those m em bers of the Executive who, by th eir disloyalty or indifference to those decisions, helped to bring about the cut in wages, pensions and working conditions, are unworthy of the confidence of the Movement'; but it rejected (124-80) a move by Considine to im pose penalties. Again, while practically every unionist who spoke criticised the Labor politicians who had supported the Plan, the m ajority of delegates voted against expelling them and followed the conciliatory line of the m oderate union officials who would give the politicians a fu rth er opportunity to rehabilitate th em selv es. 139

151 Trade Unions and the D epression Thus Conference accepted (107-95) a resolution by C larey (an influential union official) that the Labor m em bers who supported the Plan 'violated the substance of the ideals and principles for which the Labor Movement stands, and that all m em bers be warned that any fu rth er support of the P re m ie rs ' Plan will resu lt in expulsion from the P a r ty '. The Conference was b itterly c ritic a l of the paucity of assistance available for the unemployed in V ictoria, and, denouncing the 'work for sustenance' clause in the Unemployment R elief Act, called on the Hogan governm ent to secure its repeal. There was heated discussion when apologists for the governm ent repeated the fam iliar argum ent that, given the p arliam entary balance of forces in V ictoria, there had been no alternative to the acceptance of these 'obnoxious c lau se s'. By a vote of 73 to 69, the conference in effect rejected further appeal to this argum ent by resolving that 'should the Opposition be su c c e ssful in having legislation inim ical to Labor c arrie d, the Labor G overnm ent shall im m ediately re sig n '. (See also Chapter 7.) It is difficult to give p recise meaning to the resu lts of the balloting at the conference for official positions in the party. There was a reco rd num ber of sixty-one candidates for the eighteen seats on the C entral Executive, and this was undoubtedly confusing for delegates. M oreover, to disentangle the influences w orking in favour of p a r tic u lar candidates seem s im possible: som e, for exam ple, would have gained through the p restige acquired by long y ears of service in a position, irresp ectiv e of th eir stance on cu rrent co n tro v ersies. In addition, the attitudes of extrem e left-w ing delegates cut acro ss the conventional 'in d u strial versu s political' riv a lry. N evertheless, the 'in d u strial wing' had considerable success, though a ticket it was alleged to have run46 was only partially accepted. The P resident and the two V ice-p resid en ts46 and both F ederal Executive m em bers (Cameron and Duggan) w ere now leading union officials, and also a m ajority of delegates to F ederal Conference w ere opponents of the P lan. However, the retirin g S ecretary and T re a su re r narrow ly held th eir positions against 'in d u strial' can d id ates,^ 7 and the 45 See L. Call, 4 February The successful candidates, Cameron (President), Chappie (Senior Vice-President) and Riley (Junior Vice-President) had been on the 'industrial ticket'. But in any case Cameron and Chappie were in line for these positions. 47 McNamara (M.L.C.) had been secretary of the party since 1925, and before that had 140

152 Unions, Labor, and P re m ie rs ' Plan political wing' was also credited with having retained control of the position of O rganising S ecretary. Although the conference had censured the retirin g C entral Executive, with only a couple of exceptions, all w ere re-e le cte d. Nine of the eighteen m em bers of the new C entral Executive had been on the 'in d u strial tic k e t'. But while the 'in d u stria lists' secured three new men on the C entral Executive, 48 two an ti-p lan union officials (Chandler and Stew art), though retirin g m em bers and nominated on the ticket, w ere defeated. Another s e t back for the ticket was the rejection of veteran left-w inger Considine who, it will be recalled, had resigned from the C entral Executive in June While the A ustralian W orker (3, 10 F ebruary 1932) reported that after sev eral tria ls of strength between the industrial and political wings, 'finally the political wing em erged v ic to rio u s', the decisions and elections at the Conference did indicate a swing to the left by the m ovem ent, and a hardening of its attitude tow ards the Plan and its su p p o rte rs. With Labor now out of office in the federal sphere and relieved of the unhappy and divisive duty of im plem enting the Plan, a new em phasis on traditional principles was possible. A split had been avoided and Labor M.P s. given the chance to rehabilitate th eir p restig e. In V ictoria, Hogan was still in office, P arliam ent was in re c ess until 6 A pril, and elections w ere not due until la te r in the y ear. F o r the moment, V ictorian State politicians w ere not obliged to act decisively in the light of conference decisions. But th eir dilem m a could not be avoided for long. been organising secretary. Foster (Secretary Plumbers' Union) had been treasurer for nearly thirty years. 48 Clarey, Wallis, and Blackburn (M.L.A. and a staunch opponent of the Plan). Blackburn was an experienced member of the Central Executive but had declined nomination at the 1931 conference. 141

153 6 W age Cuts and the Industrial Rout C rum bling Defences While the union leadership was engaged in prolonged and abortive m anoeuvres to thw art the im plem entation of the P re m ie rs' Plan, the T.U. movement failed to function as a defensive bulwark for the w orkers' standard of living. There was little active, united resistan ce to wage reductions by the A rbitration Court and wages b o a rd s. Rationing and short tim e becam e endemic among the employed, while the unemployed - com pletely overwhelmed by the catastrophe - lost th eir possessions and th eir hom es. Some em ploye rs undoubtedly took advantage of the position to introduce 'speedup' and sweating methods: com plaints w ere, for exam ple, registered against such practices in the textile and clothing trades, w here, in addition, fem ale and juvenile labour seem s to have been used on an increasing scale. Unions issued 'white lis ts ' in th eir efforts to combat sweating and looked to the Anti-Sweating Council for help. Unions found aw ards difficult to enforce even among unionists, and virtually im possible in the case of non-unionists. Behind this situation lay serious deterioration of union org an isation and effectiveness. Although the different unions experienced varying degrees of decline, over all they suffered greatly. A few such as the Tram way Union w ere fortunate enough to experience only a relatively sm all drop in m em bership, but many disintegrated, some of them to the point where they continued to exist practically in name only. 1 Almost all w ere em barrassed by the num ber of m em bers who w ere unfinancial; about half the m em bers of the A.R.U. w ere, for exam ple. M em bers in a rre a rs w ere often p ro se cuted, but this was hardly calculated to make the offenders good unionists, and in the circum stances could not be expected to produce m arked increases in revenue. As th eir incomes declined and th eir m eagre reserv es disappeared, many unions and the T.H.C. found it difficult to make ends m eet. Obliged to make econom ies, they cut expenditure by such expedients as reducing staff and wages, thus further sapping the effectiveness of the movement, and also leaving them open to the charge of adopting the very m easures, l For example, some of the building trades unions (Bricklayers, Builders Labourers, and Carpenters) disintegrated as building practically came to a standstill. 142

154 Wage Cuts and Industrial Rout in the face of the c ris is, for which em ployers and Labor politicians w ere being vociferously berated. Increasing num bers of unionists w ere prom pted to feel that the failure of the movement to cope with the problem s it faced stem m ed from shortcom ings in organisation, and that steps should be taken to place it on stro n g er foundations through am algam ation and the fo rm a tion of industrial unions. The difficulties experienced in the railw ays over rationing provided an example of the unfortunate effects of divided union counsels within one industry where craft unionism was entrenched. ^ The A. R. U. and som e sections within the A. F. U. L. E. in fact showed considerable in terest in the possibility of rem edying the situation. The 1931 State Conference of the A.R.U. resolved: That, as the present system of craft industrial organisation has failed m iserably to effectively safeguard the in terests of the w o rk ers...the A.R.U. take im m ediate action, in conjunction with the A.C.T.U. and T rades Hall Council to form ulate a new form of unionism along the lines of One Big Union, o r, a lte r n atively, an am algam ation of the key industries unions, The A.R.U. Conference also declared in favour of the A.R.U. and A.F.U.L.E. am algam ating, and urged that a strong effort be made to link up all tran sp o rt unions. Officials of the A.R.U., A.F.U.L.E., Road T ran sp o rt W orkers' Union, and the Tram way Em ployees' A ssociation entered into discussions with the aim of form ing a Land T ran sp o rt W orkers' Union, 3 but nothing cam e of the plan. Sim ilarly abortive moves towards clo ser union organisation w ere made in the m aritim e and building in d u strie s. Conferences of rep resentatives of eight m etal trades unions resulted in a draft constitution for an A ustralian Metal W orkers' Union, but the proposed organisation did not come into existen ce. A sim ila r tendency was apparent even among som e public serv an ts. In M arch 1932 the State In strum entalities Unions' Com m ittee, which had not functioned for nearly two y ears, was revived to consider ways of recovering wage standards. The executives of the A.P.S.A. and the V.T.U. had discussions and decided to set up the 'T each ers' and Public Service Defence League' 2 While the A.R.U. and A.F.U.L.E. continued to press for the abolition of rationing, craft unions of the Iron Trades Council stepped up their efforts in support of a rationing scheme rsru. Gazette, September 1931; Argus, 2 July, 15, 23 August, 15 September 1931). 3 After prolonged agitation and negotiations, the two Melbourne branches of the A.T.E.A. (Tramway Union) amalgamated in

155 Trade Unions and the D epression with the objective of 'the resto ratio n of the 1929 sala rie s and conditio n s'. Also in 1932 public service organisations declared th eir support for union efforts then under way to regain the 10 per cent cut in the basic wage. But the effects of such moves w ere lim ited, and despite a new feeling that public serv an ts' in terests w ere not entirely divorced from those of industrial w orkers, there was no positive attem pt to prom ote co-ordinated action. ^ A tim e of disintegration and eroded confidence was not propitious for such attem pts at reorganisation, which even in m ore favourable circum stances w ere defeated by lack of conviction, the vested in terests of officials, and practical objections such as differences in credit balances and ra te s of contributions. Also, they w ere not now accom panied by energetic cam paigns on the p art of union lead ers, who tended to pay lip -serv ice only to the m ovem ent's goal of industrial unionism. R oot-and-branch reorganisation of union stru ctu re and m ethods, on the other hand, was vociferously stre sse d by the Communist P arty. Communist propaganda concentrated largely on the necessity for 'co rrect organisation' in accordance with the policy of the R.I. L.U., discussed in C hapters 2 and 4. The W orkers' Weekly continued to denounce craft unionism and the existing 'social fa scist' leadership, and claim ed that events had proved the total inadequacy of the m ovement to re s is t the 'cap italist offensive' against the w o rk ers. Com m unists w ere, however, suspicious of proposals for am algam ation sponsored by union officials, m aintaining that such moves derived from a d esire by the union bureaucracy to consolidate its grip on the m ovem ent. By co n trast, com m unists postulated the necessity for a 'united front from below ', not so much to strengthen existing unions as to prom ote, by way of rank-and-file organisation and leadership, a m ass movement em bracing all w orkers which would ultim ately take the only w orking-class way out of the c risis by overthrow ing capitalism. Hence for com m unists, a key task was the building of the M.M. - a broad organisation which was to unite all w orkers on the basis of th eir everyday struggles and win them to revolutionary m ethods. ^ 4 Indeed later, as the long-standing conflict between the A.P.S.A. and Hospital Employees' Union flared, the A.L.P. and T.H.C. took action against members of the A.P.S.A. (L. Call, 9 February 1933). 5 M.M. groups were formed at some work places and within some unions, and there was a mushroom growth of united front organisations, e.g. Workers' International Relief, International Class War Prisoners' Aid, Workers' Defence Corps, Friends of the Soviet Union, League against Imperialism, United Front against Fascism. None 144

156 Wage Cuts and Industrial Rout The em battled union officials, who w ere in fact inclined to re p r e s ent all c ritic ism as disruption, replied that com m unists w ere out to w reck the m ovem ent. They w ere hostile to proposals for ran k -an d - file organisation, so that it was to be sev eral years before job com m ittees gained a place in the trade union scene. The policy of the A.R.U. as laid down by its A ustralian Council included job and shop com m ittees, and the 1931 conference of the V ictorian branch reaffirm ed a previous decision to establish industrial com m ittees, 'with a view to rehabilitating the Labor Movement and strengthening the position of industrial unionists'; but the decision was not put into effect. M ilitants in the A.F.U.L. E. made m ore p ro g ress in this direction. A Rank and File Vigilant Com m ittee was established and was taken over as a sub-com m ittee by the m ilitant C entral Branch which endorsed its aim s and obiects. The Com m ittee agitated for rank-and-file organisation and sought to induce the A.F.U.L.E. to adopt a fighting policy and renounce arb itratio n and the Labor P a rty. It appears to have been somewhat narrow and negative in its attitude, and it attacked the union's officials who repudiated its aggressively m ilitant program and obstructed its functioning as far as possible. Finally, annulling the resolutions c arrie d by the C entral B ranch, the executive su p p re ssed the com m ittee as an unauthorised body. While com m unists insisted that, if not stifled and sabotaged by the b o sses' agents who controlled the movement, the w orkers would fight, the union leadership defended itself by stre ssin g the apathy of the w orkers and appealing to tradition. Spokesmen like Cam eron continued to lam ent that responsibility for th eir sufferings lay with the w orkers them selves, since leaders could only go as fa r and as fast as th eir following would perm it. C ertainly it could be construed that, with m inor exceptions, unionists seem ed indifferent to th eir vital in terests: m eetings w ere poorly attended, voting num bers at ballots w ere low (though this was partly to be explained by the large num bers of unfinancial m em bers), and only isolated m ilitant groups showed an obvious will to re s is t w age-cuts and other inroads into th eir conditions. In explaining the general apathy, som e leaders blam ed the easy-going conditions of the tw enties and especially th eir effects on younger men who had not learn ed the value of unionism. But, in fact, the rank of these, however, was able to win mass support. A major achievement for the M.M. was the decision of the Australian Council of the A.R.U. to affiliate with the R.I.L.U. (R.U. Gazette, October 1931). In August 1931, the M.M. brought out in Sydney its own organ, the Red Leader (a weekly). 145

157 Trade Unions and the D epression and file generally had not been drawn into active participation in the T.U. movement, and now officials did not offer policies to s tir the 'ticket unionist' o r those who dropped out because th eir union had failed to protect th eir in te re s ts. Most union officials saw strik e action as being out of the question: they feared d iso rd er and fu rth er defeat, and w ere in any case tied irrevocably to the arb itratio n system and the Labor P arty. They w ere concerned p rim arily to hold th eir unions together and salvage what they could from the w reck, and not at all to m ature adventurous policies to m atch those of the extrem e left. They w ere professionals and sp ecialists, im m ersed in the dayto-day details of union adm inistration, and preoccupied with im m ediate problem s. At the sam e tim e, this competency reinforced th eir entrenched positions, putting rivals at a disadvantage. Apathy and declining m em bership, m oreover, encouraged bureaucratic tendencies and rendered the possibility of a m ilitant policy even m ore rem ote. The bankruptcy of the established leadership was tacitly adm itted by the V ice-p resid en t of the T.H.C. (Wallis) when he said in July 1931, 'In this tim e of c risis we have been unable to produce a policy that can in any way effectively m eet the requirem ents of the working c la s s '. And he was not the only lead er disturbed to note that the disappointm ent of unionists with the Labor P arty was 'reflecting itself in disgust with the Union M ovem ent'. It is virtually im possible to gauge what the inarticulate rank and file w ere thinking, but at least th ere w ere no revolts to replace the leadership which was m anifestly unable to m eet the situation. This leadership showed rem arkable persisten ce during the early th irties, surviving in p articular the furious attacks of the Communist P a rty. ^ F o r the tim e being there was in fact hardly a p ractical alternative to hand, even had the rank and file evinced a d esire for m ilitant leadership. Despite the leap in influence of the Communist P arty, it was to be sev eral years before com m unists began to win union positions: th eir sectarian ism, th eir 'u ltra left' policies, and th eir indiscrim inately abusive attacks and reputation for violence, m eantim e assisted to disqualify th e m.7 T heir 6 But it should be noted that in many unions the position of secretary was a permanent appointment. (See the unsuccessful attempts at A.R.U. annual conferences over many years to have the secretary of the union elected by a vote of the membership.) Of course, during the depression, paid union officials had a powerful economic motive for retaining their positions, as loss of office would have been a financial disaster. While so many workers were facing destitution, union secretaries received upwards of 5 and sometimes 10 per week. 7 The C.P. claimed a total Australian membership of 1, 502 in June 1931, and a few 146

158 Wage Cuts and Industrial Rout uncom prom ising agitation against the existing union stru ctu re and leadership, and against industrial arb itratio n and White A ustralia, together with th eir drive to supplant the traditional leadership of the A.L.P., cut acro ss deeply ingrained principles and loyalties. While they w ere not prepared to come to term s with established tradition and im m ediate re a litie s, they offered no real alternative. Yet, at bottom, in the absence of evidence of a revolutionary tem per among w orkers, it would appear doubtful w hether a m ore re a listic policy or b etter conceived tactics would have made a significant difference to the p a rty 's prospects of m ass support. The sharp rise in party m em b ership still left it as a sm all m inority group, m ostly unemployed, and subject to a high rate of fluctuation. The W orkers' Weekly (29 May 1931) put V ictorian m em bership at 275, but this re fe rre d to 'book stre n g th '. While circulation of the W orkers' Weekly rose and it was extended from four to six pages, its total sales in 1931 w ere probably less than 10, 000 of which about 2, 000 w ere taken by M elbourne. Although dissatisfaction with the arbitratio n system becam e nearly universal, still only a m inority of unionists w ere prepared to follow those who advocated its abandonment. The unions continued to p ress the Labor governm ent until its fall to amend the A rbitration Act, but the Senate rem ained obdurate on this and other issues such as the M inistry's w aterfront regulations; in addition to the unsatisfactory legislation, unions had cause for com plaint in the industrial adm inistrativ e policies of both the Scullin and Hogan governm ents. But the aw ards of the Court and of wages boards did give w orkers some protection against the full weight of the overpowering bargaining position of em ployers in depression conditions, and, however severe the w age-cuts, they w ere at least largely uniform. F u rth erm o re, the operation of the arb itratio n system acted to p reserv e the stability of the T.U. movement. The basic wage dropped each q u arter as it was adjusted in acco rd ance with the decline in the cost of living. The movement objected b itterly and again urged that the methods employed by the Commonwealth Statistician in compiling the cost of living figures should be a lte red.^ But this request as well as other demands for governm ent months later, following a recruiting drive, it was given as 2, 329 (W. Weekly, 21 August 1931). Note also that while communists were vehemently denounced on all sides, dissension developed within the ranks of the party in Victoria which resulted later in the expulsion of leading members. 8 See also the pamphlet Cost of Living Reductions by H.C. Gibson who was a member 147

159 Trade Unions and the D epression action w ere not granted, so that there was a continual fall in wage levels, though according to the official view re a l wages w ere not affected. Securely tied to the arbitration system, the unions w ere hardly in a position to fight a practice which they had accepted when p rices w ere risin g. D isturbed by the p re ss campaign against L abor's financial proposals and its clam our for retrenchm ent and w age-cuts, and unable to fashion adequate propaganda weapons of its own, the T.H.C. advocated a mild form of d irect action and called on w orkers to re s tric t th eir purchase of the Sun and H erald. P rin te rs, however, felt that th eir in terests w ere being injured and brought p re ssu re to b ear on the Council, so that after six months the em bargo was lifted. An elem ent of ludicrousness had also been added to the affair as the Labor C all, claim ing that it had a contract to fulfil, had continued to carry advertisem ents lauding the H erald. While it took no effective action to m aintain standards of living, the union leadership at the sam e tim e continued to advocate higher wages and a reduction of hours as m eans of solving the depression. In early 1932, on the initiative of C.E. Mundy (an A.E.U. official and author of a pam phlet A Shorter Working Week), the T.H.C. appointed a sub-com m ittee 'to investigate and subm it a rep o rt on the question of a sh o rte r working w eek '. In defending this decision against objections from left-w ing delegates, officials m aintained that the com m ittee could perform useful propaganda work. And no doubt that was so; but it was questionable whether this was the im perative task of the m om ent. M oreover, even the m ost wildly optim istic d elegate could not have imagined the Court granting a sh o rter working week at this tim e but the Council did not discuss how such a reform was to be forced on the em ployers, o r on the Labor governm ents who had refused even to listen to the case p ressed by the A.R.U. Strikes The depression w itnessed a steep general decline in strik es in A ustralia, and during 1931 and early 1932 very few V ictorian unions took industrial action to defend standards of living. ^ But there w ere exceptions in the case of m eat w orkers and seam en. of the T.H.C. committee of inquiry into the figures. 9 Whereas in 1929 a total of 1, 296, 676 working days were lost through industrial stoppages in Victoria, only 7,744 were lost in 1930 and 27, 862 in The figures rose to 99, 638 in 1932, and fell again to 26, 693 in 1933 (See Official Year Books of the Commonwealth of Australia). 148

160 Wage Cuts and Industrial Rout When the M etropolitan B utchers' Wages Board applied the 10 per cent cut and im posed a fu rth er cost of living reduction, so that in the last twelve months th eir wages had been reduced by 1 6s 6d, the slaughterm en at the m etropolitan and Geelong abattoirs downed tools on 30 A pril At a stop-w ork m eeting of all m em bers of the Meat Industry Em ployees' Union (A.M.I.E.U.) on 4 May, despite a strong appeal by the slaughterm en for an extension of the strik e to other sections of the industry a large m ajority decided in favour of the resum ption of work. The slaughterm en refused to accept the decision and resolved to 'go it alone'. Sectional m ilitancy within an organisation was not an unusual feature of V ictorian trade unionism, but an isolated sectional strik e had little hope of victory. The action of the slaughterm en seem s to have been largely spontaneous, and no doubt the lack of necessary preparation weakened th eir chances of success from the outset. A l though such aggressiveness refuted the pessim ism of the union le a d e r ship, which continually lam ented that the w orkers would not fight, officials of the A.M.I.E.U. urged the term ination of the dispute; fu rth er, it appears likely that at the m eeting on 4 May the T.H.C. S ecretary was in some m easure responsible for curbing m ilitancy and for the decision to end the strik e. The A ssistant M inister for Labour arranged a conference between the p arties to the dispute, but the strik e rs at first rejected the term s offered. Then, still unable to persuade the other sections of the industry to join them, they finally accepted on 14 May the recom m endation of th eir officials and agreed to retu rn to w ork. Although the T rades Hall and union journals did not draw any such conclusion, the action of the slaughterm en indicated that the strik e weapon could be effective in som e degree despite the unfavourable circum stances, for the em ployers agreed not to apply the 2s a week cost of living reduction. In O ctober 1931 m eat w orkers and seam en w ere involved in strik e s. Negotiations on wages had been in p ro g ress between officials of the A.M.I.E.U. and the Meat E x p o rters' A ssociation for som e tim e when m eetings of the export sections of the union on 13 O ctober expressed dissatisfaction with the resu lts achieved. As the export season was in full swing, the m eat w orkers no doubt felt that it was a m ost propitious tim e to ex ert p re ssu re. On 14 O ctober, taking the dispute out of the hands of th eir officials, slaughterm en engaged in the V ictorian m eat export trad e commenced a go-slow strik e, and within a few 149

161 T rade Unions and the D epression days, as the works w ere closed down, the trade was paralysed. The rank and file of the union adopted this course of action in the face of the opposition of some of th eir officials, and although he m ust have realised that he was prejudicing the m en's prospects of success, Rountree, the P resid en t, was so concerned about this breach of the agreem ent with the em ployers, that he resigned (though the executive of the union refused to accept his resignation and prevailed on him to withdraw it). R ountree, it is interesting to note, together with Secretary A ndersen and the a ssistan t secre ta ry, had been unopposed at the union elections a few months b e fo re. Denying th eir officials authority to undertake negotiations for a settlem ent, the strik e rs established a rank-and-file com m ittee to conduct the strik e; but this led to difficulties, as the em ployers retaliated by refusing to negotiate with the com m ittee. The M. M. issued leaflets urging picketing and an extension of the strik e under rank-and-file control. On the other hand the M inister for Public W orks (Jones) denounced the strik e. P re m ie r Hogan and Calwell, together with a vociferous daily p re ss, vehem ently attacked the com m unists who w ere alleged to be responsible, and advised the m eat w orkers to abandon the rank-and-file com m ittee and re sto re control to officials of the union. Sm aller fa rm e rs w ere aroused to join the big em ployers to threaten the use of non-union labour to man the works; and on 20 O ctober the Meat E x p o rters' A ssociation delivered an ultim atum to the union that volunteers would be employed, unless it gave an assu ran ce by 5 p.m. the next day that work would be resum ed. The rank-and-file com m ittee was obliged to authorise the union executive to negotiate with the em ployers, and on 22 O ctober m eetings of strik e rs in the various centres decided by ballot ( ) to resum e work under the term s of settlem ent offered at co n ferences the previous day. While the men did not secure gains, the existing agreem ent was to be extended to the end of The re st of the T.U. movement does not appear to have regarded the m eat w o rkers' struggle as of vital relevance to th eir own in te re sts, and indeed, the A ustralian W orker (28 O ctober 1931), like em ployers, denounced the strik e as the work of com m unist agitators bent on fomenting industrial strife. While the m eat w orkers w ere thus engaged, seam en, too, w ere on strik e. The trouble originated on the C anberra at Sydney, but, being extended, th reaten ed to lead to a se rio u s dislocation of in te r state shipping. In the firs t instance it was precipitated by a dispute over the employment of a crew m em ber (a com m unist), but after the 150

162 Wage Cuts and Industrial Rout s trik e broke out the seam en m ade additional dem ands on the shipow n e rs, including the resto ratio n of the 10 p er cent wage cut. Once again we can observe, together with its consequences, the phenomenon of an outburst of m ilitancy by only a lim ited section of the T.U. m ovem ent. The eagerness to strik e within the.seam en's Union was largely confined to the m em bers of the Sydney branch who dragged the other ports reluctantly along in th eir w ake. During the strik e V ictorian seam en acted as a brake on the Sydney men, and if the determ ination of affairs had been in the hands of officials of the union o r the V ictorian branch, the strik e would probably not have taken place. At the sam e tim e, the aggressiveness of the Seam en's Union served to isolate it from the re s t of the labour m ovem ent. As in the past, and as would be the case again in the future, the seam en found the other craft unions in the m aritim e industry a serious obstacle to successful industrial action. Although th eir officials opposed the extension of the dispute, the Sydney seam en, determ ined on d irect action, set up a rank-and-file com m ittee to control the strik e and strongly urged the other ports to follow suit. In M elbourne; though sev eral ships w ere held up, the seam en w ere inclined to defer to the authority of th eir officials. A rank-and-file com m ittee was set up but only to a ssis t the officials, and it was disbanded after a few d a y s. Following a com pulsory conference between the p a rtie s, the Conciliation C om m issioner's proposals fo r settlem ent w ere discussed by the seam en. Rejecting the recom m endations of th eir officials that the term s of the co n ference be accepted and that the officials them selves should take over the dispute, the Sydney seam en on 22 O ctober resolved that all in te r state ships should be tied up and urged other States to set up ran k - and-file com m ittees to take over control from officials. M elbourne, however, ignored the instruction of the Sydney m eeting, and a general shipping strik e was averted when on 23 O ctober the V ictorian seam en decided to postpone fu rth er consideration of the dispute until the 27th. At Geelong, the crew of the Colac acted in accordance with the Sydney decision, but w ere constrained to re v e rse th eir attitude on instructions from M elbourne. Except for the few originally tied up, ships left Melbourne according to schedule, and m ost ports other than Sydney also functioned norm ally. On 27 O ctober the Sydney seam en re-en d o rsed the decision for an a ll-p o rts stoppage, but the Melbourne men resolved that they would man all v essels except the C an b e rra. With m in o r exceptions, the o th e r m a ritim e unions stood aloof, and 151

163 T rade Unions and the D epression officials of the W.W.F. and the M arine Stew ards Union were specially determ ined that th eir unions should not be involved in the dispute. Afforded ample p re ss publicity, Turley (Federal S ecretary, W.W.F.) and Moate (Federal P resid en t, M arine Stew ards Union) vehemently denounced the strik e, and, together with the p ress which showed a concern for san e unionism, they attacked the tactics of rank-and-file control and stigm atised the dispute as a dangerous com m unist plot. S im ilar statem ents w ere also made by some A.W.U. officials, and the A ustralian W orker (28 O ctober 1931), in declaring its strong opposition to the strik e, m aintained that it had been forced on the seam en by com m unists in o rd er to em b arrass the Labor governm ent. The s trik e rs w ere supported by the Sydney Labor Council which sought to ra ise financial assistan ce, but the union leadership in V ictoria does not appear to have been sym pathetic. Among those who assailed the strik e rs w ere the P resid en t of the V ictorian A.L.P. (Calwell) and the P re m ie r (Hogan); and the seam en w ere not the first to discover that when in power Labor politicians viewed a strik e with little m ore sympathy than the N atio n alists. Appealing for the resum ption of work, P rim e M inister Scullin trenchantly condemned the strik e as com m unist-inspired, and, affirm ing that his governm ent would not in terfere if volunteer labour w ere in tro duced, he prom ised support for any attem pt by state authorities to settle the m atter and m aintain law and o rd e r. The em ployers threatened to use 'sc a b s' and in Sydney the New Guard offered to help break the strik e. Finally the ship owners issued an ultim atum that unless work was resum ed by the next day, 30 October, volunteer labour would be employed. However, after the intervention of Scullin, the owners agreed to hold th eir hand and await the outcome of a com pulsory conference scheduled to begin on the 31st. In the circum stances the seam en had little choice, so on 3 November they declared the strik e off and instructed the F ederal Executive of the union to discuss the resto ratio n of the 10 per cent cut with em p lo y ers. That these strik e s w ere isolated and weak affairs was perhaps evidence of the quietism of the m ovem ent as a whole: certainly, despite the m ilitan t attitude of a sectio n of those involved, they did 10 See also the partially successful strike by members of the casing section of the A.M.I.E.U. in January 1932 (Argus, 13, 30 January 1932). But note also the disastrous strike at a Melbourne battery factory in May 1932 (ibid., 24 May 1932). 152

164 Wage Cuts and Industrial Rout not validate the com m unist proposition that as the c risis deepened th ere would be a 'rad icalisatio n ' of the working c la ss. At the sam e tim e, officials who com plained of apathy' among unionists made no attem pt to use these isolated b u rsts of aggressiveness as the occasion for agitation to counter defeatism. Alleging that com m unist influence lay behind the disturbances, and undoubtedly convinced that strik es w ere doomed to failure in the prevailing circum stances, the union leadership reacted in a m anner that helped to ensure that the defeat of the s trik e s was inevitable. Back to the Court Towards the end of 1931, the union leadership again directed its attention to the problem of taking distinct action to contest the 10 p er cent cut, and, ignoring the m ilitants who saw such a course as futile, returned to the A rbitration Court to p ress for its resto ratio n. The unions com plained of the hardship occasioned by the cut, and p re sen ted a case to show that, at prevailing w ages, w orkers w ere unable to m eet th e ir com m itm ents and w ere deprived of adequate food and n e c e ssa rie s. Claiming that the reduction had not achieved the resu lts intended, in that th ere had been no decrease in unemployment and that in fact the economy had deterio rated fu rth er, they re ite ra ted the argum ent that an essential condition for the retu rn of pro sp erity was an in crease and not a diminution of the w o rk ers' purchasing power. They argued fu rth er that the Court was not a com petent authority to deal with the question of unem ploym ent. And union rep resen tativ es warned the judges that the continuation of the cut would aggravate the discontent of w orkers and lead to dislocation of industry. But the Court had not offered any hope, even to the m ost optim istic, that the considerations which had determ ined its original judgm ent did not still operate, or that it now doubted the validity of the argum ents which it had previously accepted; nor had it given any indication that it was prepared to change its attitude to the purchasing power argum ent. On 6 O ctober 1931 the annual m eeting of the V ictorian T.U. Salaried O fficers' A ssociation had decided that an agitation for the resto ratio n of the 10 p er cent cut should be com m enced, and re q u e sted unions to c a rry appropriate resolutions which would be sent to the p re s s. The A.C.T.U., which had not acted effectively as the centre of A ustralian trad e unionism since the beginning of the year, now reappeared on the scene, and the Special Conference of the In terstate 153

165 Trade Unions and the D epression Executive in m id-o ctober called upon all sections of the movement 'to demand the resto ratio n of all wages, pensions and social serv ices lost through the P re m ie rs ' Plan and the A rbitration C ourt'. The Executive adopted a program which included a 35-hour working week and a 25 per cent im provem ent on the 1930 level of wages and living stan d a rd s. In o rd er to secu re such demands it resolved that an application be made to the F ederal A rbitration C ourt for the r e s to ra tion of the 10 p er cent cut, and that the federal governm ent be asked to amend the A rbitration Act and to set up a royal com m ission to investigate the question of the basic wage and sh o rte r working week. A m eeting of officials of federal unions on 18 Novem ber, in M elbourne, expressed its support for A.C.T.U. efforts to obtain the royal com m ission, and decided to request all unions concerned to make im m ediate application to the Court for the revocation of the o rd ers which im posed the 10 p er cent cut. With the fall of the Scullin governm ent hopes for the d esired royal com m ission w ere dashed; but early in 1932 the Melbourne T.H.C. urged the appointm ent of a royal com m ission to investigate the methods employed by the S tatistician 's D epartm ent to compute the purchasing power of wages on index figures. However, sev eral federal union conferences which discussed such proposals decided that they should not be proceeded with at that stage. The conferences had m et to discuss the procedure to be followed in the applications to the Court: this they considered to be the im m ediate problem facing the m ovem ent. A few weeks before the case cam e before the A rbitration Court, the T.H.C. convened a m eeting of union executives to consider com bined action for the resto ratio n of the 10 per cent wage cut. This m eeting accepted on 25 F ebruary the proposals of the T.H.C. Executive, that it support the A.C.T.U. in its efforts to secure the resto ratio n of the 10 per cent cut, 'and that each Executive takes up an active agitation in th eir respective organisations, with a view to such fu rth er action as may be determ ined upon by the rank and file of th eir m em bership'. The m eeting rejected the views of left-w ing delegates who a sse rte d that it was a w aste of tim e carrying such a motion and that instead there should be a m ilitant cam paign to convince w orkers that conditions would becom e w orse while capitalism lasted. There w ere stirrin g s of discontent among the rank and file, as m ore m ilitant sections demanded strong action to reco v er the 10 per cent cut. Within both the Tram w ay Union and A.E.U., for exam ple, strong appeals w ere made for m ore aggressive policies and for m ass 154

166 Wage Cuts and Industrial Rout m eetings to m obilise the rank and file. But these appeals failed to move the leadership. M ore positive action had seem ed im m inent when the officials of the A. R. U. and A. F. U. L. E. had been persuaded to arrange a combined m ass m eeting of both unions. This m eeting on 6 D ecem ber threatened a regulation strik e if the Court refused to re sto re wage cuts, H and under p re ssu re from m ilitants the executives of the two unions did produce a booklet setting out departm ental rules and regulations. But the regulation strik e did not take place. Incipient m ilitant feeling thus produced no positive r e s u lts. A conference of rep resentatives of sev eral key industry unions and the Disputes Com m ittee of the T. H. C. agreed in early M arch that strong action was necessary to protect the w o rk ers' in te re sts, but despite statem ents of this kind, no coherent policy was developed to m eet the possibility that the Court would hand down an adverse decision. The hearing had commenced on 7 M arch and lasted for sev eral m onths. While union leaders w ere engaged in p rotracted argum ent before the judges, rank-and-file participation was confined to providing finance and carrying resolutions urging a favourable decision. Then, on 17 June, the C ourt announced its refusal to re sto re the 10 p er cent cut. ll R. U. Gazette, January Cf. the program which a meeting of railwaymen convenectey the M.M. had adopted, but which this combined meeting rejected (92-162). 155

167 7 The Unemployed 1930 While the standard of living of m ost employed w orkers was being cut, the num bers of those out of work w ere rising at an appalling ra te. Taking into account only m em bers of affiliated unions, T.H.C. surveys revealed that the num ber of unemployed unionists in V ictoria increased from 18, 322 in November 1929 to 32, 462 in October 1930^ and that by O the la tte r date rationing of work was w idespread. H ere, we cannot look behind the official statistics to see the courage and despair, the m isery, and the physical and m oral deterioration of those hardest hit by the c ris is. Early 1930 revealed how hollow w ere the traditional claim s that A ustralia led the way in social serv ices. In V ictoria the relief of d istre ss was largely the work of charitable institutions, and the m achinery and the reso u rces available for assistance to the unem ployed w ere pitifully m eag re. In Septem ber 1929 the T.H.C. Unemployment Committee Relief Depot had been obliged to close, and on 23 January 1930 the Council decided not to reappoint an unemployment officer. Very few V ictorian unions paid unemployment benefits, and th eir funds w ere soon run down. By August 1930 only about six organisations, including the P.I.E.U.A., A.E.U., and Operative B ak ers Union, w ere making sustenance paym ents. Those others which imposed levies found that they w ere a means of providing only a little assistance for a short tim e. Unions frequently passed around the hat and th eir m em bers contributed to the appeals by the various relief bodies and charity organisations. In August a m eeting of union officials pledged th eir support for the State Appeal Committee and resolved to organise 'pound day' appeals when food and clothing would be co llected. At 1 According to the Victorian Year-Book, , p.250, unemployment in Victoria rose from 13.5 per cent in the last quarter of 1929 to 21.9 per cent in the last quarter of For details see T.H.C. Minutes, 23 October There is a paucity of source material concerning social conditions. Occasionally a newspaper reporter mingled with some of the unemployed and then wrote up his experiences. See, for example, Herald, 6, 15 August Since this study was completed Miss P.Peter, in her thesis, Social Aspects of the Depression in New South Wales (A.N.U., 1964), has brought to light the social conditions of the adjoining State at this time. 156

168 The Unemployed Geelong, officials arranged processions of the unemployed who so lic i ted donations as they m arched through the s tr e e ts. 3 Many fam ilies w ere in dire d istre ss and undoubtedly appreciated the im m ediate, p ractical assistan ce in the form of food and clothing which they re c e iv ed as a re su lt of the efforts of such unions as the M anufacturing Groc - e r s. Such dependence on charity was, however, hardly calculated to sustain the m orale of the unemployed. O ccasionally, m eetings of individual unions c arrie d resolutions urging the governm ent to provide m ore re lief and to introduce such m easu res as unemployment insurance and a rent m oratorium. Some unions convened m eetings of th eir unemployed to demand work or s u s tenance, and in an endeavour to im prove th eir lot, officials of sev eral unions interview ed cabinet m in is te rs. O fficials of the building trades unions approached the P re m ie r with suggestions for public works that might be undertaken, and rep resen tativ es of w aterfront unions appealed to m in isters to alleviate the plight of many of th eir m e m b e rs. The governm ent was requested to prevent d ism issals in the railw ay and tram w ay serv ices, and rep resen tativ es of the A.E.U. and other m etal trad es unions interview ed m in isters and em ployers to discuss ways of making m ore work available. Such deputations w ere invariably in form ed that the governm ent was sym pathetic, but had no money. R esults w ere hardly encouraging, and meanwhile union initiative in arranging dem onstrations by th eir unemployed was largely confined to building w o rk e rs. G enerally, unions regarded unemployment and relief as the r e s ponsibility of the T. H. C. and the A. L. P., and as problem s incapable of solution by th eir own m em b ers. While som e unions, such as the B uilders L ab o rers' F ederation, frequently voiced demands on behalf of the unemployed, others which w ere also hit hard (e.g. the Plum bers and P ain ters), did not exhibit a sim ila r involvem ent. Even the m ost com placent union journal was s tirre d by the enorm ity of the unem ploym ent problem and joined the deeply com m itted in appealing to the governm ents for m ore effective action. Yet, significantly, the jo u r nals for the m ost p art ignored the unemployed them selves and did not report on the w retched lives of fo rm er m em bers of th eir unions. 3 For reports on the activities of the unemployed at Geelong during these years see the Ind. Herald. 3 This is perhaps not surprising in such cases as the Printing Trades Journal, for relatively few members of the P. I. E.U. A. were involved. On the other hand, though its leading 157

169 T rade Unions and the D epression Not that the Labor C all, A ustralian W orker, and one or two other journals w ere not always sym pathetic; but while they inveighed in general term s against the cap italist system and its m oral deficiencies and argued endlessly about the m easu res needed to cure unemployment, they provided little news about the doings of the unemployed and offered them few p ractical leads for dealing with the im m ediate issues confronting them. Few unions made provision to keep the unemployed m em ber within the T.U. movement once he was unable to pay his contributions, so that the body of unemployed was rapidly isolated from the m ovem ent. Even if unemployed m em bers w ere allowed to rem ain on the books of th eir union, they w ere usually denied the right to vote, thus there was little point in th eir attending union m eetin g s. Only a few unions w ere disposed to go beyond calling an occasional m eeting of th eir unem ployed to take a consistent and d irect in terest in th eir affairs. However, such links did not always prove a great boon to the unemployed, and it is instructive to examine the case of the A. E. U. Many m em bers of this union w ere working 'sh o rt tim e' and in V ictoria the num ber unemployed rose from 306 to 962 during In the first p art of the year, unemployed m em bers of the A. E. U. began to hold m eetings which presented various requests to the Melbourne D istrict Committee (D. C.) of the union. The D. C. refused to accept c o rre s - pondence from the m eetings, so the unemployed commenced an agitation for recognition and sought to persuade the D.C. to make the facilities of the union office available and a ssis t them in such m atters as stationery. With many branches of the union sym pathetic, the D.C. in July resolved that represen tativ es of the com m ittee would attend the unemployed m eetings. C haired by the D.C. chairm an, the m eetings w ere held regularly, but they becam e ra th e r pointless and there w ere com plaints that the D.C. was antagonistic towards the unemployed. The com m ittee was not inclined to defer to the requests made, and it adopted very few of the resolutions forw arded from the m eetings. A.E.U. officials interview ed m in isters and em ployers, and th eir contribution to the unemployed m eetings consisted of reports of such deputations. The unemployed asked the D.C. to request the T.H.C. to organise a huge dem onstration of all unemployed and articles sought to explain unemployment in general economic terms, the Shop Assistant made practically no reference to the 1, 250 shop assistants who were unemployed by October But it should be borne in mind that most of the unions which were hardest hit did not have journals. 158

170 The Unemployed employed, which would m arch around P arliam ent House every evening until the governm ent gave a guarantee that it would provide work or adequate sustenance. This proposal, like sev eral others put forw ard, was not viewed favourably by the D. C., which in reply re fe rre d the unemployed to dem onstrations arranged by the T. H. C. Then in Septem ber 1930 the D.C. decided to discontinue the m e etin g s.5 During 1929, while there had been m arches and deputations to the N ationalist governm ent, there had been no serious attem pt to organise the unemployed; and the T.H.C. refused suggestions that it take the initiative in early The A.C.T.U. C ongress in F ebruary had recom m ended that T rades and Labor Councils devote special attention to the organisation and w elfare of the unemployed, and rep o rt regularly thereon to the executive of the A.C.T.U. Following the C ongress, a m eeting of V ictorian union officials adopted a schem e of organisation subm itted by the T.H.C. Executive. But on 8 May the Executive reported to the Council that the resu lts w ere disappointing, as only nine of the projected fourteen group com m ittees had been form ed. N evertheless, the C entral Unemployment Com m ittee hesitantly got under way. Then la te r in 1930 its organisational stru ctu re was a lte r ed as the industry groups w ere abandoned and suburban groups set up. At the end of the y ear the C. U. C. claim ed the support of eighteen suburban groups, each of which was entitled to two delegates. The A ssistant S ecretary of the T.H.C., Monk, was appointed S ecretary of the C. U. C., and as the official unemployed movem ent it was to rem ain firm ly under the control of the T.H.C. Executive. From early 1930 the Com m unist P arty set itself the task of building the Unemployed W o rk ers' M ovement. The C.P. laid the g reatest em phasis on the im portance of organising the unemployed, as may be seen in alm ost any issu e of the W orkers' Weekly in At the sam e tim e it urged that new m ethods w ere required, since in this period of the decline of capitalism unemployment was not a passing phase but had come to stay. M aintaining that the old method of sep arate o rganisations played directly into the hands of the cap italist c lass, the C.P. insisted that the unemployed should be 'a definite p a rt of the organised w orking-class m ovem ent' and that th ere m ust be 'the clo sest possible unity between the unemployed and em ployed'. Joint rank-and-file com m ittees m ust be set up and a broad united front from below e stab- 5 For reports of events see A.E.U., Melbourne District Committee Minutes, June- September

171 T rad e Unions and the D epression lished. The 'cap italist offensive' could be effectively re siste d and sm ashed only if the unemployed w ere m obilised on the side of the w orkers and th eir struggles linked. The C.P. furtherm ore set out to 'blast the refo rm ist illusion that the problem of unemployment can ever be solved under cap italism ', and while it raised im m ediate demands on th eir behalf, the party aim ed at drawing the unemployed actively into the movement for 'the revolutionary overthrow of cap italism, and the establishm ent of the dictatorship of the p ro le ta ria t'. The 'social fa scist' trade union bureaucracy and Labor governm ents m ust be fought. They w ere carry in g out the capitalist offensive and using police to suppress forcibly any opposition. This 'scum ' at the Melbourne T rades Hall shielded the Hogan governm ent and headed off resistan ce to it, and by treach ery and sabotage fru strated any m ass organisation of the w o rk e rs and kept the unemployed weak and divided. But, in p ractice, for com m unists as well as for the official union leadership, the building of an unemployed organisation was b eset with many difficulties. The T.U. movem ent had not anticipated such a staggering rise in unemployment, and, bew ildered by the rapidity with which it took place, had no breathing space for the form ulation of long-range plans. O fficials, largely preoccupied with the onerous task of attem pting to check the disintegration of th eir organisations, felt that they had a p rim ary duty to financial m em b ers, and neglect of the unemployed, if shortsighted, was understandable. Overwhelmed by th eir own im m ediate problem s and fearful every day for the s e c u r ity of th eir own jobs, m ost w orkers felt helpless to a ssis t the unem ployed beyond the circle of fam ily and friends. F u rth erm o re, as the incidence of unemployment varied, the different unions w ere affected in varying d e g re es.^ As for the unemployed them selves, those who had been good unionists realised the need for organisation. But ex white co llar w orkers and the many inexperienced youths and g irls and school leavers had no tradition of organisation behind them.^ 6 For example, while the P.I.E.U.A. was affected relatively lightly, the building trades unions were very hard hit. Even by March 1930, an official of the Bricklayers' Union could claim that about 75 per cent of his members were unemployed (Argus, 19 March 1930). Also by this time, 3, 000 members of the Builders Laborers Federation and 1, 200 members of the Carpenters' Union were unemployed (ibid., 28 March 1930). Note that a large majority of the unemployed were labourers. 7 For a detailed picture of the unemployed by mid-1933, showing age, marital and occupational status, see Census 30 June The partial breakdown of the apprenticeship system had dire consequences for many junior workers. 16C

172 The Unemployed Many unemployed w ere engaged all day in the search for work, while those'on the tra c k ', o r who w ere scattered in rem ote relief cam ps, presented fru stratin g d ifficu lties. A fu rth er obstacle in the way of establishing effective organisation was the outlook of sections of the unemployed. The optim ists could not be bothered, as they w ere buoyed up by the expectation of a job the next day; others w ere affected by the dem oralising influence of living by the grace of charity, and those who had lost th eir dignity and fighting potential w ere reduced to the point w here life itself becam e unim portant. On the other hand, the proud w ere reluctant to be seen at sustenance depots, so making it difficult for o rg an isers to contact th em. In addition to problem s of organisation, the unemployed always faced the cru cial question of how they m ight secure th eir dem ands. As a la st re s o rt, w orkers could bring an industry to a standstill by withdrawing th eir labour, but the weapons at the disposal of the unemployed w ere pitifully inadequate. T heirs was no m ean task, for initially they had to overcom e the conservative objection that su stenance encouraged paupers and laziness, and then to win recognition for the idea that unemployment was a social responsibility and that it was the duty of the governm ent to provide re lie f. As noted in C hapter 2 the unemployment policy of the V ictorian labour m ovem ent had been laid down in early 1930 by the A.C.T.U. C ongress and the V ictorian A.L.P. Annual C onference. But the unions, as we have seen, w ere soon to discover that, though it was a sim ple m a tte r to form ulate a policy, it was quite a different thing to secure its im plem entation by the Labor governm ents. Despite the protestations of Hogan, that he was doing everything possible for the unemployed but had no money, the union leadership was concerned to induce the Labor governm ents to provide re lief and c a rry out th eir election pro m ises and the policy of the m ovem ent. Eschewing d ra s tic m ethods, they engaged in top-level conferences and deputations. But as the months passed and few gains w ere made such tactics appeared m ore and m ore fu tile. Some of the unemployed found the m eagre resu lts of these efforts intolerable and began to turn to those who w ere advocating a m ore 8 After the great increase in unemployment, a police magistrate in August 1931 (in convicting two men for their part in an anti-eviction demonstration) remarked, It is the fault of many persons themselves that they are not working at present. There is nothing to hinder persons from seeking work and doing something if they really desire it. (Argus, 18 August 1931.) 161

173 T rad e Unions and the D ep ressio n forceful policy. To the displeasure of officials, the m ore m ilitant sections of the unemployed started to voice th eir demands at m ass m eetings and dem onstrations held independently of the T rades H all. S peakers at these gath erin g s furiously attacked the L abor governm ents and T rades Hall officials; and T.H.C. m eetings w ere enlivened, and occasionally disrupted, by interjections from the gallery by unruly elem ents and by unemployed who w ere incensed by what they felt was the Council's neglect of th eir in te re sts. Angered, the T rades Hall leaders hit back at th eir d e tra c to rs. D iscord developed within the ranks of the unemployed, and the antagonism between the union leadership and the m ilitant unemployed becam e m ore fierce. On 2 A pril som e of the unemployed sought to hold a m eeting to p ro test against the governm ent's re lief policy, but T.H.C. officials would not allow them into the hall o r the courtyard. So the men assem bled at the Eight Hour Monument where speakers denounced the officials and the governm ent. Some weeks la te r, a group of unem ployed m et in the courtyard and w ere ejected by police. S ecretary Duffy denied that the police had been authorised to take this action, but this explanation would not have allayed the b ittern ess caused by the event. On 9 and 16 July, when Hogan and other Labor m em bers attended conferences at the T rades Hall with representatives of the T.H.C. and A. L. P., there w ere dem onstrations protesting against the inadequacy of relief. On both occasions a large force of police was presen t and prevented the unemployed from entering the building o r approaching the P re m ie r. So the men gathered at the monument to applaud speakers who attacked the governm ent and Trades Hall officials. One of the men at the m eeting on the 16th was a rre ste d, and subsequently convicted, on a charge of using obscene language. J At the Council m eeting on 17 July the Executive disclaim ed all resp o n sibility for the presence of the police at the T rades Hall; but many delegates w ere unhappy about the m atter, and the Council resolved (38-37) that in future conferences with persons who required police protection should be arranged for som e place other than the w o rk ers' own hall. To com m unists, such police actions w ere evidence of the 'm arch towards open fascism ' by Hogan and the trade union b u reau c racy. R epression would be intensified as the depression deepened, the W orkers' Weekly repeatedly w arned, and w orkers m ust set up W orkers' Defence Corps to defeat police attacks. 9 Note also that several men were arrested on 1 May and 1 August 1930, when communists organised demonstrations (Argus, 2 May, 2 August 1930). 162

174 The Unemployed Yielding to p re ssu re inside the S.P.L.P. and the requests of unions and the C entral Executive, the V ictorian M inistry had agreed that P arliam en t m eet in early A pril for a special session to deal with unem ploym ent. Then began the first of what was to be a long series of battles over unemployment relief, both within the A ssem bly and b e tween the A ssem bly and the Council. The Unemployed W o rk ers Insurance B ill, which the previous Hogan M inistry had seen through the A ssem bly in 1927, was again passed by the low er House and again r e jected by the Council. On 15 A pril the P re m ie r introduced a tax bill to ra ise finance for unemployment relief. The M inistry, however, very soon indicated its w illingness to com prom ise with the Opposition, and it did not attem pt to force through the legislation. Instead, to the consternation of many of its supporters it re c a st its proposals, p ro viding now fo r a stam p tax on incom es of between 1 and 6 a week, and for a reduction of the original ra te s of taxation on high incom es. The Unemployment R elief B ill and the Stamps (Unemployment Relief) B ill w ere passed at the end of May. About this tim e, too, additional soup kitchens w ere established, and m ore m akeshift accommodation for single men was made available. A little la te r the federal governm ent issued dyed m ilitary clothing to provide the arm y of the destitute with a unifo rm. While the Labor Call (12 June 1930) and the A ustralian W orker (28 May 1930) acclaim ed the Hogan governm ent's m easu res, the unemployed and officials of the T.H.C. and C.U.C. expressed d is s a tis faction, and there w ere som e p ro tests against the tax on low incom es which was a breach of the Labor platform (and no doubt this d is sa tis faction was in p art responsible for the motion of no confidence in the governm ent c arrie d by the T.H.C. on 22 May as we saw in C hapter 3). Sustenance was paid only to m a rrie d men, and these payments w ere c ritic ised as both inadequate and uncertain. Single men w ere to apply at sh elters for free m eals and a bed, and single hom eless women w ere to receive re lief through the C harity O rganisation Society in Exhibition S treet. Demands for sustenance for single men and im proved methods of distribution of relief to women w ere put to m in is te rs. T rades Hall officials and the unemployed strongly objected to the control of s u s tenance distribution being in the hands of the lad ies' benevolent so c ieties, and they urged that it should be the responsibility of m unicipal councils. They requested the establishm ent of labour bureaux in the m unicipalities to overcom e the inconvenience of travelling to the 163

175 T rade Unions and the D epression C entral Labour B ureau in King S treet, where the Argus (11 June 1930) reported that men 'fought like wild an im als to reg ister; and the governm ent was repeatedly asked to create a wom en's labour bureau. In preference to the system of sustenance paym ents, T.H.C. officials and the C.U.C. recom m ended that every unemployed man be provided with two days' work a week. The T.H.C. on 26 June deprecated the allocation of the funds raised by m eans of the Unemployment Relief Tax and considered this 'a distinct breach of faith by the Government with the Trade Union Movement... '. Having previously instructed the Executive 'to inquire into the whole question of Sustenance', the Council on 10 July declared that 'the efforts of the F ederal and State P arliam ents to deal with Unemployment a re feeble and inadequate', and requested 'the cooperation of all public bodies in demanding that each P arliam en t... continue in session until a substantial im provem ent...has been brought ab o u t'. On behalf of the unemployed the Council urged: (a) a guaranteed minimum of two days' work p er week or equivalent su stenance, (b) enactm ent of a ren t m oratorium, (c) establishm ent of State distribution depots, and (d) a State Unemployment Insurance Act. All these requests w ere conveyed to P arliam ent House by deputations led by T.H.C. and C.U.C. officials who alm ost invariably cam e away em pty-handed. On a few occasions the deputations w ere p r e ceded by a m arch of unemployed, though officials did not intend that such dem onstrations should be regarded as an instrum ent to coerce the governm ent. In the suburbs there w ere frequent deputations of unemployed to th eir local m unicipal councils. Monk presented r e ports to the T.H.C. stre ssin g the need for g re a ter relief, and the Council appointed a rep resentative to the State Relief Com m ittee. The M inistry did announce it would endeavour to give effect to the T rades Hall request for work instead of sustenance through the benevolent so cieties. It offered to give the quota of sustenance funds for each d istric t to the m unicipality, on condition that the local body provide an equal am ount. The money was to be spent in providing relief work for the unemployed within the m unicipality, m arried men to receive two days and single men one day per week. U nderstandably, m unicipal councils w ere fa r from enthusiastic about the schem e, but, presented with an ultim atum, eventually m ost accepted it. As unemployment increased, the re lief com m ittees, charitable 164

176 The Unemployed organisations, the Salvation Arm y, and other churches stepped up th eir e ffo rts. The benevolent societies and Toe H distributed food and clothing; free m eals w ere provided by the P resb y terian M ission; the Housewives' A ssociation set up soup kitchens; and concerts, carn iv als, and socials w ere held to ra ise funds. The various o rg an isations continually appealed for donations of money, food and clothing, and the G overnor-g eneral set an exam ple with a gift of 50. N everth eless, many relief w orkers reported that in th eir area d istre ss was appalling. Relief authorities denied rep o rts of starvation but did adm it that there was hunger. In June the M inistry had inaugurated a sustenance schem e to a ssis t those who could not be given work, but the re lief they w ere afforded was m eagre. F or the purpose, only 130,000 was allocated, from which grants on a quota b asis w ere to be made to the various local dep o ts. The distribution of this sustenance was largely controlled by the benevolent so cieties, which strongly protested that the amounts w ere m ost inadequate and would allow only the fringe of the problem of destitution to be touched. 10 indeed, the societies w ere so p e rtu rb ed that they w ere relu ctan t to continue, and som e did suspend o p e ra tions - an action described by the P re m ie r as 'breaking the law and equivalent to a s tr ik e '. The m in ister in charge of sustenance (Kiernan, M.L.C.) was adam ant that th ere would be no in crease in sustenance g ran ts. A fter conferences with the m in ister, the so cie t ies agreed to continue distribution within the financial reso u rces at th eir disposal. In early July T.H.C. officials made inquiries concerning the amount of sustenance being granted to fam ilies in the various suburbs, and discovered that the grants varied from 5s to 15s p er week. H On 10 July, about eight hundred men who attended the Brunswick depot to obtain re lie f for th eir fam ilies protested angrily when told that the maximum allowance would be 5 s. There w ere any num ber of com plaints, how ever, that som e fam ilies received less than 5s a week. Among the innum erable reports of d istre ss was the case noted in the Age (9 July 1930) of a man in Brunsw ick with ten children who 10 Age, 20, 21 June In Brunswick the Ladies Benevolent Society was spending nearly 1, 500 a week in distributing sustenance, but the government's grant was only 750 a month (Argus, 23 June 1930). The grant to the Collingwood Society would have allowed lid pei head per week (Age, 21 June 1930). 11 L. Call, 17 July The grant to Brunswick was 750 a month for 727 applicants. The grant to Northcote was 125 a week for 1,125 applicants. Sustenance payments at 165

177 Trade Unions and the D epression received 10s a week su sten an ce. On occasions, fam ilies faced c o m plete destitution when a depot s funds w ere exhausted and it could not distribute any sustenance at all. The schem e, noted above, by which m unicipalities used th eir quota of sustenance funds to provide work for th eir unemployed, apparently did not work sm oothly. There w ere com plaints that in some a re as men w ere given the two day s work and then had to wait for many weeks before given m ore work, being in the m eantim e not eligible for sustenance paym ents. Kiernan instructed that sustenance money was not to be used for the paym ent of rent; so, evictions becam e m ore frequent, and some of the unem ployed who could not m eet th e ir com m itm ents had th eir furniture and other possessions seized. Insisting that its policy was to provide work ra th e r than sustenance, the M inistry would not consider in creasing the allocation for sustenance, and on 17 July Kiernan d e clared that the rate of expenditure for this purpose ( 21, 000 during the five weeks since 11 June) was too g re a t and could not continue. The provision for unemployed women was less than inadequate, and th eir plight was indeed 'd esp erate' as union inquiries revealed.12 According to a re p o rte r in the H erald (15 August 1930) who made f ir s t hand inquiries, many hom eless women, cold and hungry, hid at night from the police like hunted an im als', and hundreds would not apply for charity so long as they had even one shilling left. Single men did not receive sustenance and had to rely on handouts at soup kitchens and w ere fortunate if they secured a bed in m akeshift accom m odation. Although the M inister stated that accommodation at the sh elters was am ple, they w ere in fact badly overcro w d ed.xo The bedding was often verm inous, and young men w ere herded in with m ethylated sp irits addicts and other social d e re lic ts. The men complained of the quality of the food and on occasions claim ed it was infested with m aggots. Bendigo ranged from 2s 6d to 25s per week (Age, 9 July 1930). 12 See, for example, the reports of the inquiries made by Trades Hall representatives (Argus, 17 July 1930; L. Call, 31 July 1930) On the evening following the publication of the Minister's statement, twenty-eight unemployed young men, who had been sleeping in public parks in the bitter cold, appealed for help at the Russell Street Police Station. The police phoned all the shelters but found that no beds were available (Age, 19 June 1930). During the winter, T.H.C. officials reported that at the Gill Memorial Home more than seventy men were sleeping on the concrete floor without mattresses, some with no covering on them (T.H.C. Minutes, 10 July 1930; Age, 9 July 1930). Those turned away from the shelters fended as best they could, and were prosecuted if caught sleeping in a railway carriage (Age, 20 October 1930). 166

178 The Unemployed Men who w ere provided with apportioned work on a relief job did not always find it a boon - despite the citizens who w rote indignant le tte rs to the daily p re ss, denouncing the loafing which they claim ed occurred on such jobs. The work was not easy, and often involved hardship for men weakened by insufficient food, especially if they w ere unaccustom ed to physical labour. F o r those engaged on country work, conditions w ere usually difficult and prim itive; and, fu rth e r m ore, such men had to m aintain th eir fam ilies and also contribute from 16s to 1 a week to the camp in which they lived. The inadequacy of this relief had aroused within the labour m ovem ent intense dissatisfaction (see C hapter 3), which, added to the governm ents' general handling of the c ris is, led to a successful demand for a special V ictorian A.L.P. conference on unemployment. D elegates at this conference, held on 13 and 14 Septem ber 1930, had criticised the Labor governm ents' relief m easures as being 'totally inadequate', and the conference had directed them to discharge 'th eir p rim ary d u ty...of providing work or the n ecessities of life for the people'. But despite this c ritic ism and direction, the m in istries concerned had failed to respond with positive action. During the la tte r p art of 1930, the unemployed becam e m ore m ilitant and active, but this was not as a resu lt of leadership from the T rades H all. O fficials of the C.U.C. and T.H.C. p ersisted with th eir deputations to m in iste rs, requesting m ore adequate relief m e a s u re s. They insisted that the needs of the unemployed w ere growing m ore urgent, and exhorted the M inistry to take bold action to deal with the situation. M inisters w ere again inform ed that the unemployed wanted work ra th e r than sustenance, and Monk subm itted a list of public works which m ight be undertaken. There w ere also appeals to the federal governm ent, and on 3 Novem ber a deputation to Acting P rim e M inister Fenton urged that 20 m illion of cred it be released to finance productive w orks. While work or sustenance to ensure the full basic wage was demanded by the unemployed and th eir representativ es, Monk, on behalf of the C.U.C., p ressed on the V ictorian M inistry a schem e to provide three days' work a week for m arried men and one day a week for single men at 15s p er day. The P rem ier and other m in isters assu red these deputations that the governm ent was doing its utm ost with the lim ited funds available. Hogan did prom ise, however, to subm it a M oratorium B ill, and he also 167

179 Trade Unions and the D epression indicated that the governm ent intended to ra ise additional finance for relief. ^ Monk presented fu rth er reports on the situation to the T.H.C., and on 18 D ecem ber the Council again affirm ed its belief in the need for a State unemployment insurance schem e. The P rem ier convened a public conference for 24 Novem ber to discuss unemployment and he invited a wide range of organisations, including the T.H.C., to send re p re se n ta tiv e s. Despite argum ents that the conference was a blind and that, if Hogan was sin cere, he would have attem pted to put into effect the proposals of the A.L.P. and T.U. movement, the m ajority of Council delegates voted to send re p resentativ es. At the co nference S ecretary Duggan and A ssistan t S ecretary Monk w ere appointed to com m ittees that w ere set up. Also in November, the T.H.C. was represented on a joint Labor com m ittee set up to consider unem ployment relief, which was composed of represen tativ es of the T.H.C., the A. L. P., the S. P. L. P., the State M inistry, and the C. U. C. A fter repeated req u ests, the governm ent did establish a women's labour bureau, and in O ctober it initiated a schem e to provide single hom eless women in the m etropolitan a re a with work for two days weekly at 7s 6d p er day. It also agreed to subsidise ladies benevolent societies so that they m ight offer work for one day p er week to single women living with parents o r re la tiv e s. Conditions in the city sh elters and the food they w ere served led single men to make stro n g e r p ro te sts. Sympathy was not the keynote of the M inistry's response, and in D ecem ber the Labor P re m ie r told the Assem bly 'T here is no sacrifice in sleeping outside in this w eath er'. On the other hand, the M inistry viewed with alarm the congregation of throngs of angry men in the city. In D ecem ber a mixed blessing was conferred on single men when the Broadm eadows Camp of World W ar I was reopened and the sh elters closed. 15 Also, tow ards the end of the year, the M inistry was moved by the g reat dissatisfaction of the unemployed with the existing methods of distribution of sustenance to announce that a new system would be introduced in the m etropolitan a re a. O rders for g ro ceries, m eat, and bread w ere to be issued through tradespeople to approved applican ts. Individuals boarding with strangers w ere to 14 Later the Ministry.introduced the Ueemploveri Occupiers and Farmers Relief Bill, but it had not been dealt with when Parliament adjourned at the end of the year, and so lapsed. 15 Argus, 19 December The camp could not accommodate all those seeking admission, and the men unsuccessfully protested against the closing of the shelters (Age, 23 December 1930). 168

180 The Unemployed receive a weekly o rd er worth 4s 9d, and the value of the grants to fam ilies was to vary according to th eir size up to a maximum of 12s 9d a week. As the y ear drew to a close the State R elief Com m ittee called on housewives to make 10, 000 C hristm as puddings, and private organisations opened appeals to provide the unemployed with 'C hristm as c h e e r'. The sustenance allowance for C hristm as week was doubled, and Mr Sidney M yer gave C hristm as dinner to 12, 000 people, 2, 000 m o re than had been invited. At m eetings and dem onstrations of the unemployed throughout this period, com m unist agitators had relen tlessly attacked the Hogan governm ent and T rades Hall o fficials. When the la tte r organised a dem onstration on 5 August, it was taken over by leaders of 'the ran k - and-file m ovem ent'. The officials thereupon threatened to ban th eir c ritic s from holding m eetings in the T rades Hall courtyard, and the extent of division could be seen on 3 Novem ber when two riv al unem ployed dem onstrations m arched in the city. M eantim e, there had been a num ber of cases of 'd irect actio n '. Some m ilitants had form ed anti-eviction com m ittees, and had tried to prevent evictions by force. From 26 July to 4 August a section of the unemployed im posed a 'black' ban on the Salvation Arm y soup kitchen in B ennett's Lane, where conditions w ere deplorable. When they organised pickets, clashes followed and the police a rre ste d two of the p ick eters. A l though the T.H.C. refused to d eclare its support for the ban, it was not without effect, for the food served at the Lane was im proved and la rg e r p rem ises w ere made availab le. A ban and picketing also took place at the C arlton depot in O ctober, in p ro test against a decision to withdraw re lie f in the form of open o rd ers and substitute parcels of ratio n s. A hostile dem onstration outside the P re m ie r's office on 20 O ctober won a prom ise that open o rd ers would be re sto re d. But the prom ise was not fulfilled, and on 22 O ctober a large body of unemployed m arched to P arliam en t House. Hogan and K iem an refused to appear, so P arliam ent House was picketed while com m unists addressed the crowd. The dem o n strato rs, having defied a police o rd er to move on, w ere d ispersed with batons, and som e w ere a rre ste d. ^ 16 It is extremely difficult to arrive at a confident estimate of the size of the demonstrations held in these years. The daily press was inclined to minimise as far as possible the support for what it regarded as lawlessness; while the sponsors of the demonstrations tended to the other extreme. Probably two to three thousand would have constituted a large demonstration. 169

181 Trade Unions and the D epression In reply to these displays of mounting aggressiveness, the authorities now took d rastic action to crush the Communist P arty and Unem ployed W o rkers Movement (U.W.M.). On 23 October the police began raids and a rre s ts which continued fo r alm ost a week. An attem pt was made to hold a m eeting on the Sunday at the Y arra Bank to pro test, but mounted police charged through the crowd and made m ore a rre s ts. On 30 O ctober, fifty-four persons w ere charged at the City C ourt. The m ilitants initiated a partially successful campaign for the rem ission of fines and the release of those convicted. Despite its b itte r antipathy to the com m unists, the T.H.C. was moved to p ro test against the action of the Police D epartm ent in raiding and searching p rem ises and interfering w ith'the rights of free speech and of assem b lage at the Y arra Bank. And it called upon the governm ent to protect liberty of thought and utterance from tyrannic a s s a u lts '. A few weeks la te r the Council also requested the full rem ission of fines and the cancellation of convictions. The reactio n ary Council, however, would have nothing to do with the M elbourne section of the International C lass W ar P riso n e rs' Aid (I.C.W.P.A.) which m ilitants set up (with Blackburn, M. L. A., as president) as an organisation to handle such m a tte rs. At the m eeting on 13 N ovem ber it was proposed that the Council express its 'disgust' regarding the 'b rutal treatm en t' of the unemployed, in sist that the police should not break up dem onstrations, and also that it demand a full public inquiry into the policy and adm inistratio n of the police force. It was decided, however, to re fe r the m atter to the Executive, who did not report*back until six months la te r, during which tim e m ore 'b ru tal treatm en t' was m eted out to the unem ployed. The T rades Hall p ro tests, even if somewhat perfunctory, e x p re ssed a concern at police action widely felt throughout trade union ranks, and m ost acutely voiced by the m ilitan ts. To com m unists, these 'hired thugs of capitalism ' could be expected to act with severity in the drive to fascism ; others who did not sh are this assum ption w ere nevertheless disturbed when the police seem ed to be h arassing the unemployed, and giving little latitude to m eetings and dem onstrations. Within the m ovem ent, the C om m issioner, B rigadier-g eneral Blarney, was widely held to be responsible for police intransigence. Yet, d e s pite this unpopularity, the Hogan governm ent had declined to replace Blarney by sim ple adm inistrative action when the opportunity to do so had arisen. B larney's fiv e-y ear term of appointment was to expire on 31 August 1930 and in July the M inistry decided to cut the C om m issione r 's s a la ry by 500, and to invite applications fo r the position. The 170

182 The Unemployed im plication was that Blarney would not be reappointed, and the Labor C all (17 July 1930) congratulated the M inistry on its im plicit decision - m ilitary jo s se s, as it put it, 'are not w anted'. But the Opposition, the M elbourne p re s s, businessm en, and the R.S.L. loudly demanded B larney s reappointm ent, and it was soon clear that the Government was w avering. A fter considering tw enty-three applications, the cabinet decided to re sto re Blarney for another three y e a r s. The Hogan M inistry, reflected the Argus (27 August 1930), 'has done only that which public opinion has com pelled it to d o'. The police w ere successful in disrupting the work of the Communis t P arty, but this did not check the determ ination of many unemployed to fight for a b etter deal, and there was a serie s of boycotts of s u s tenance depots. Demanding sustenance tickets, the unemployed on 6 Novem ber placed a 'black' ban on rations issued at the Richmond Town Hall, and it was not lifted until Kiernan on 13 November p ro m ised to inaugurate a new sustenance sch em e. The hall was picketed and la rg e -scale deputations and dem onstrations involving sev eral thousand took p la c e. There was also conflict with the authorities in sev eral other suburbs, and the Brunswick depot was boycotted for sev eral w eek s. The com m unists attem pted to consolidate th eir influence, and on 13 D ecem ber a conference was held to launch a V ictorian branch of the national U.W.M.17 The T.H.C. Executive worked determ inedly to see that affiliated unions did not send delegates, and a few days a fter the conference the C. U. C. instructed its groups not to attend any conference that was not convened by the com m ittee itself. As well as being underm ined by this organisational disunity, the cause of the unemployed suffered as a consequence of the lack of unanim ity in the ranks of the labour movem ent on issu es such as rationing. Although it was official policy to oppose rationing of work, it was advocated by som e unions and sections of the unemployed as a m eans of preventing fu rth er d ism issals. F u rth erm o re, som e unemployed in the country w ere resentful that they rem ained idle while Melbourne men w ere given country relief w o rk. A story sim ila r to the one outlined in this chapter can be told of the Geelong unemployed during The Geelong T.H.C. carried resolutions urging m ore relief, and Council officials arranged m eet- 17 Over one hundred delegates attended the conference which adopted revolutionary proposals. It also drew up a list of demands including a living wage for every worker, a seven-hour day, and a five-day working week (Argus, 15 December 1930). 171

183 T rad e Unions and the D ep ressio n ings of the unemployed. They repeatedly approached the Geelong City Council with requests for re lief work, and occasionally they interview ed State m in isters for the sam e purpose. Unemployment continued to ris e, so that in early October 1930 there w ere 32, 462 unemployed unionists in V ictoria. By that tim e, authorised expenditure had absorbed the estim ated revenue available for relief, and a month la te r th ere w ere sufficient funds for sustenance for only another three or four w eeks. So, on 20 Novem ber, the P rem ier introduced legislation to ra ise additional revenue by increased unemployment ta x e s. The Opposition and the Legislative Council sought to reduce the proposed ra te s of tax, and insisted that the rate of pay on relief works should be below the basic wage. Thus V ictoria was again threatened with a political c ris is. The C.U.C. was of the opinion that the M inistry's proposals w ere inadequate, and it declared its opposition to relief work being done at less than aw ard w ages. The M inistry, however, was prep ared to make concessions to the demands of the Opposition and the upper House, and eventually a com prom ise was negotiated. The proposed ra te s of taxes w ere reduced, basic wage rates (i.e. not aw ard rates) w ere to be paid on relief work, and this work was to be rationed (a maxim um of three days weekly in the m etropolitan a re a and four days in the country). The Unemployment Relief Amendment Bill was passed on 24 D ecem ber, and P arliam ent went into re c e ss From the beginning of January 1931, unemployed men w ere called on to perform re lief work under the te rm s of the Unemployment Relief Act. Most refused to accept the work, however, as they objected to the schem e, which provided for four days' work a week for six weeks at 12s lid a day, and demanded the federal aw ard ra te of 14s a day. Some of the suburban groups of the C.U.C. had already rejected the schem e, when the com m ittee m et on 6 January and resolved to reco m mend to its groups that the Act should be declared black. The M inistry was unmoved, and Hogan replied that the provisions of the Act would have to be c a rrie d out. On 13 January the C.U.C. placed a black ban on country re lief work. Then a week la te r, claim ing that the wages and conditions offered w ere a d irect attack upon the trad e union m ovem ent, the com m ittee resolved to d eclare all work under this schem e black, and to advise all unemployed to refrain from accepting any work unless it was paid for at full aw ard rates and conditions. It also 172

184 The Unemployed urged Hogan to call P arliam en t together to review the unemployment question and institute an unemployment insurance schem e. In early January the unemployed at Geelong condemned the S. P. L. P. for a g re e ing to the relief w ork ra te s, and, endorsing the action of the M elbourne men, pledged them selves to refuse to work under sim ila r te rm s. On 27 January they adhered to this resolve and declared black the relief work they w ere offered. The unions did not throw th eir weight behind the unemployed, and the C.U.C. decision on 6 January in favour of the black ban had been arriv ed at in the face of the opposition of union officials. Indeed, the A.W.U., the union principally involved, underm ined the whole struggle, as it advised its m em bers to take the work offering and rely on the union to obtain the higher ra te s for them by legal proceedings. ^ The T.H.C. displayed no eagerness to en ter the fray, and the Executive on 9 January appointed Monk (A ssistant Secretary, T.H.C. and S ecretary, C.U.C.) as its rep resen tativ e on the board which was to adm inister the Unemployment R elief Act - an action that was hardly consistent with a w holehearted recognition of the black ban. The Council did not deal with the m atter until 22 January when it declared that it supported the action of the C.U.C. in refusing to accept employm ent under the conditions of the Act and expressed the opinion that the rates of pay on re lie f works should not be less than 15s p er day - plus the recognised m argins for skill. It endorsed the appointment of Monk to the Unem ployment Board and urged that State P arliam ent be im m ediately called together to place unem ploym ent re lief m easu res on a m ore satisfactory b a s is. On this occasion, as throughout the depression, the unemployed w ere faced with the problem of how they m ight tran slate th eir d e te r m ination to fight into effective action. The governm ent paid scant heed to resolutions, and passive refu sal to accept the relief work resulted in little m ore than fu rth er hardship, especially for those with fam ilies to support. R epresentatives of the unemployed interview ed m in isters but deputations, too, achieved nothing. On 5 February, cabinet decided that re lief work would continue to be done at the rate set down in the Act; and then, a few weeks la te r, as many of the unemployed w ere still observing the ban, the M inistry took action to bring them to heel. It announced that those who refused relief work 18 Argus, 17 January The A.W.U. became involved in a series of court cases, all of which were dismissed (T.H.C. Minutes, 4 June 1931). 173

185 Trade Unions and the D epression would be denied sustenance, and if they w ere inm ates of the Broad - meadows Camp they would be expelled. The T.H.C. protested and T rades Hall officials and represen tativ es of the unemployed interview ed m em bers of the governm ent, but to no effect. Over one hundred single men at the camp w ere ordered to leave, and when they refused they w ere ejected by the police. T rades Hall officials unsuccessfully sought to persuade the governm ent to readm it the men, who, facing starvation, had no choice but to accept the country relief work. In early A pril 1931, at the V ictorian A.L.P. Annual Conference, union officials again voiced th eir objections to the Unemployment Relief Act. As proposed by Monk, the conference declared that the Act contains provisions which are a violation of the principles of the Labor M ovement'; and it called on the governm ent im m ediately to bring about the repeal of the obnoxious sections. The M inistry, however, did not act as required. But following the reduction in wages of the m em bers of the A.W.U. and the Municipal Em ployees' Union, the rates on relief works w ere no longer below award rates; so a co nference of the C.U.C. and the two unions in June agreed to lift the ban on m etropolitan relief works in so fa r as labouring and sem i-skilled work was concerned. T heir w illingness to support the ban indicated a potential fighting sp irit among many of the unemployed, but that counted for little when they w ere deprived of sustenance. The im poverished T.U. movement, staggering under the blow of the 10 per cent cut, would have been hard put to m aintain them, and officials no doubt regarded it as unfair c r iticism when the Broadmeadows men, in surrendering, complained that they had been let down. N evertheless, it would appear that the Trades Hall had not energetically sought to tap possible sources that might have yielded at least food for the s tr ik e r s. Again and again in the future, the outcome of 'strik e s ' and 'black' bans by the unemployed was largely dependent on the provision of alternative assistan ce when they w ere struck off the sustenance lis t. The T rades Hall rem ained in different, if not hostile, tow ards the efforts of com m unists and th eir supporters to build the W orkers' International R elief and saw no n ecessity for such a body. N evertheless the W.I.R. was able to offer lim ited assistance to destitute rebels, as on the occasion of the m ass walk-out from the Broadm eadows Camp in m id During 1931 the ranks of the unemployed swelled still further and th eir num bers reached a peak in the second q u arter of By then about 27.7 per cent of V ictorian unionists w ere out of work, many thousands of others w ere working for only p art of the week, and 174

186 The Unemployed 47, 098 fam ily units w ere in receipt of sustenance. 19 As destitution and m isery becam e increasingly w id esp read,2^ the leadership of the T.U. m ovem ent continued to in sist that the governm ents should d is charge th e ir obligations and provide adequate relief. The T.H.C. adopted lengthy rep o rts on the unemployment position, which w ere presented by Monk on behalf of the C.U.C. The Council itself ra re ly offered positive leadership to the unemployed regarding the problem s they faced. Responsibility for such m atters was for the m ost p art left in the hands of the T.H.C. Executive, which in p ractice, it would seem, dominated the C.U.C. The m ass of the unemployed continued to have few d irect links with the T.U. movement, and it was not until the end of July 1932 that a union conference was held to form ulate a uniform set of demands on behalf of the unemployed. Although th eir endeavours w ere rew arded with as little success, T.H.C. officials p ersisted with the tactics they had pursued in 1930, and th eir activities on behalf of the unemployed still consisted largely of repeated attem pts to persuade the Hogan governm ent to provide adequate re lie f. On 19 F ebruary 1931, the T.H.C. urged that the State governm ent seek sufficient funds to provide adequate sustenance, and that 'failing P arliam en tary sanction for the required funds, the Governm ent im m ediately tender its resig n atio n '. But it is relevant to note that this had been done in the absence of the top officials who w ere attending the A.C.T.U. C ongress in Sydney. In any case, the T rades Hall did not initiate any moves to displace the governm ent when it did not m eet the needs of the unemployed, and, though all becam e increasingly insistent that it take determ ined action, only a m inority of union lead ers demanded that the governm ent stake its life on L abor's unem ploym ent policy. 19 At the end of July 1932, there was a peak number of 61, 214 male persons registered as unemployed at the Government Labour Exchange and its branches (see Victorian Year- Books). But such figures must be treated with the utmost caution. At the end ot June 1933 there were 36, 877 males so registered; but according to the census returns, in the Wage or Salary Earning Group, there were 98, 718 males and 21, 032 females unemployed (Census 30 June 1933, Vol. I, pp.234, 237). 2Ü Among the few accounts of the life of the unemployed were the articles in the Argus (7 March 1931) and the Herald (19, 20 August 1931). The press painted an attractive picture of the Broadmeadows Camp for single men, but many of the inmates were acutely dissatisfied. Union journals displayed no interest in the camp, and one of the few mentions it received in the L. Call described it as 'a place of desolation, physical suffering and despondency, where dispirited men spend their days in shivering misery' (L. Call, 18 June 1931). At the end of November 1931, there were 448 men in the camp, and the average cost of food per day was 8.8d per man (Victorian Year-Book , p.221). 175

187 T rade Unions and the D epression In early 1931, the T.H.C. and the C.U.C. deplored the inadequacy of the assistan ce afforded the unemployed, and they urged that State P arliam ent should reassem ble and take steps to rem edy the situation. Requests on behalf of the unemployed w ere conveyed to m in isters by further deputations which w ere usually inform ed that the government wanted to do m ore but did not have the finance. P erturbed by the great d issa tisfa c tio n...am ong Labor su p p o rters', the C entral Executive of the A. L.P, in early M arch was moved to call for the convening of P arliam ent at the e a rlie st date, so that the governm ent might subm it a program which would include the raising of money 'to give im m ediate and adequate re lie f' to all the unemployed and for the development of a program of works to absorb the unemployed. However, P arliam ent rem ained in re c e ss, though the M inistry did announce that th ere would be a slight in crease in sustenance ra te s. At the V ictorian A, L.P. Annual Conference in A pril 1931, the Labor governm ents' handling of unemployment was severely criticised, and the Conference declared that th e ir relief m easures w ere inadequate. Notwithstanding the fate of the instructions of previous conferences, union delegates again brought forw ard demands on behalf of the unem ployed. Although Scullin in effect stated that his governm ent would be unable to comply, the Conference, on the motion of Don Cam eron, requested the federal Labor governm ent 'to proceed with a schem e of unemployment insurance without d e la y '. The Conference also accepted a se rie s of proposals by Monk which insisted that g re a ter m easures of re lief should be made available by the Hogan governm ent, that taxation should be increased to enable work to be provided for all unemployed, and that the State governm ent introduce and p ersev ere with a bill to protect unemployed tenants and householders against d istrain t, eviction, and seizure of goods for debts. As noted in C hapter 5, the Conference also expressed the opinion that State P arliam ent should be called together not la te r than 28 A pril in o rd er to deal with a definite lim ited program which should include 'fu rth er practical relief for the unemployed by the provision of work o r increased sustenance' and a Rent M oratorium R elief B ill. At the sam e tim e the m ajority of delegates rejected a proposal by Nat R oberts 21 Argus, 20 March Eligible single persons were to receive 3d a week more (5s), a man and wife were to get an extra Is, and the maximum payable to those with large families was to be raised by 7s 9d per week to 20s 6d (Aust, Worker, 25 March 1931). 176

188 The Unemployed (A.E.U.) that the governm ent should resig n,if it was unable to give effect to the C onference's directives regarding unemployment. The P re m ie r refused to comply with the C onference's decision, so that P arliam en t m et on 6 May. Then as funds ran out and unem ploym ent increased, the M inistry introduced fu rth er legislation. But again the Legislative Council proved a stum bling block, and there was to be one deadlock after another. A Rent M oratorium B ill was brought down, but in the amended form in which it was finally enacted it did not m eet the requirem ents p ressed by the T.H.C. and the C.U.C. during its passage. In June the M inistry introduced legislation to secure additional finance for relief, but the Opposition p arties sought to reduce the amount the Governm ent proposed to ra ise. F u rth e r m ore, they w ere adam ant that the rates of pay on relief work should be less than the basic wage, and that the unemployed should be compelled to perform work for the sustenance they received. It was six months, th erefo re, before a bill was finally passed. Meanwhile, in early August, the B allarat City Council introduced a w ork-for-sustenance sch em e. While the debates in P arliam en t dragged on, represen tativ es of the T.H.C. and the C.U.C. repeatedly interview ed m in isters to request a higher sustenance ra te, a ren t m oratorium, and m ore generous issues of clothing, boots, and firew ood. In an appeal to the federal and State P arliam en ts, the C.U.C. urged that if food, clothing and sh elter for the unemployed could not be provided by orthodox m ethods, they should be confiscated. The T.H.C. and the C.U.C. objected that the amount of finance which the M inistry proposed to ra ise for re lief was insufficient; on th eir estim ate it would provide only 11s 6d p er week to each unemployed w orker. And when the Opposition sought to reduce that amount, both bodies called on the S.P. L.P. to refuse to accept any such am endm ents to the Unemployment R elief B ill. The Council and the com m ittee declared th eir strong opposition to any lowering of the ra te s of pay on re lief work, and on 8 O ctober the fo rm er demanded that the Legislative A ssem bly refuse to com prom ise with the L eg islative Council in the fight to p re serv e the payment of the basic wage to men engaged on relief work. The T.H.C. protested 'em phatically' against any schem e that would oblige the unemployed to perform work for th eir rations, and it condemned the 'work for sustenance' clause in serted in the B ill by the Opposition as a 'blow against trad es u n io n ism '.22 The m ajority of 22 T.H.C. Minutes, 27 August, 17 September The Municipal Employees'Union 177

189 Trade Unions and the D epression delegates would not agree that the Council should call upon all w orkers 'to re s ist to the utm ost this pernicious anti-w orking class proposal', or that it should pledge its support for any move by the unemployed to re sist its im plem entation. However, the Council did prom ise to organise and co-operate with the unemployed to re s is t Clause 9 in the event of its becoming law. The clause was denounced by the C.U.C. which claim ed that it would mean the conscription of labour. The com m ittee called on the unemployed to refuse to work for sustenance, and though it did not consider arrangem ents for the provision of alternative relief for those who would be deprived of sustenance, it drew up plans for a campaign to oppose any attem pt to introduce such a schem e. In addition, the C.U.C. recorded a want of confidence in the V ictorian Labor governm ent and declared 'that the Labor P arty should refuse to function as a Government if legislation is placed upon the Statute Book which com pels the unemployed to work for sustenance at scab rates of pay '. The T.H.C. on 27 August urged the governm ent to cancel the system introduced at B allarat. Monk paid a v isit to the scene, and C.U.C. officials appealed to the M inister for Sustenance to issue an o rd er for the schem e to be discontinued and for sustenance to be given to those who refused to work. When the m in ister flatly refused, the com m ittee said it was 'aggrieved', and then seem s to have done little m ore about the m a tte r. However, the B allarat U.W.M. claim ed in the W orkers' Weekly (11 Septem ber 1931) that under its leadership the local unemployed w ere able to score a p artial victory in th eir resistan ce to the operation of the sch em e. On 15 D ecem ber the V ictorian Labor Caucus abandoned its previous stand and decided to accept the recom m endations made by a Select Committee of both H ouses. The Unemployment Relief Act Amendment Bill No. 4 was introduced into the Assem bly, and a few days la te r,a fte r all the Select C om m ittee's proposals had been inserted, it was passed by both H ouses.the new Act contained a 'work for sustenance' clause, and it p rescrib ed rates of pay on relief work that w ere below award r a te s. The passing of the Act so angered the C.U.C. that in January 1932 it urged its affiliated groups to bring p re ssu re to b ear on m em bers of was especially anxious, as already many of the permanent employees of municipal councils had been displaced by relief workers. 23 In the matter of wages for relief work, the Bill laid it down that married men with dependants could receive a maximum of 2 16s for a week of 48 hours. Other differential rates recommended by the Select Committee were not included in the Bill, but they were inserted during its passage. See also the new reduced rates of payment to unemployed women (Aust. Worker, 20 January 1932). 178

190 The Unemployed P arliam en t to vote against the Hogan M inistry and put it out of office. The com m ittee directed its groups to attem pt to prevent m unicipal councils from putting the provisions of the Act into operation, and it asked the T.H.C. to consider calling a stop-w ork m eeting 'im m ediately the first call is made upon men to work for sustenance. F u rth erm o re, the com m ittee resolved to in stru ct all unemployed to refuse to work for sustenance and to re je ct any work which did not give them at least three days' work at aw ard rates in any one week. The forthcom ing A. L.P. Conference was to be asked to uphold this resolution. The suggestion for a stop-w ork m eeting was not adopted, as the T.H.C. Executive was of the opinion that it would not be su c c e ssful; and Cam eron inform ed a H erald re p o rte r (22 January 1932) that his interp retatio n of the com m ittee's anti-m inistry resolution was that the personnel of the M inistry should be changed. On 28 January 1932, the T.H.C. agreed to the Executive's proposals, that a deputation interview Acting P re m ie r Tunnecliffe, and that a c irc u la r le tte r be sent to all m unicipal councils stating the C ouncil's objection to the introduction of the system of work for su sten an ce. The Council also decided to urge delegates to the A. L.P. Conference to support a motion demanding that the governm ent rep eal the 'w ork for sustenance' clause. The V ictorian A. L.P. Conference com m enced on 30 January 1932, and, as at the previous conference, two rep resen tativ es of the C.U.C. addressed delegates. On 1 F ebruary Monk presented a se rie s of demands on behalf of the unemployed, som e of which had been adopted at the la st annual conference. During the la st two years the Hogan governm ent had not c arrie d out conference instructions or m et the demands of the T.U. movement regarding relief, and certain provisions in the legislation that had been enacted w ere held by union leaders to be violations of Labor p rin cip les. In the circu m stan ces, little could in fact be hoped for from another set of dem ands on the governm ent for m ore adequate relief. Apparently many delegates did re a lise this, for the Conference adopted a m ore d rastic policy than that advocated by Monk. In his ad d ress, the P resid en t warned that 'if Labor is to m aintain its rightful place and prevent large sections of the w orkers tra n sfe rrin g th eir allegiance to the Com m unist P arty, it is n ecessary that m ore consideration be paid to the question of unem ploym ent'. 'In o rd er to prevent fu rth er political tra g e d ies' like the federal elections, the whole question would have to be prom ptly and sym pathetically considered. Many other sp eakers m aintained that faith in the m ovem ent had been seriously im paired and that, unless the governm ent did 179

191 Trade Unions and the D epression much m ore for the unemployed, L abor's political future was well nigh hopeless. Thus the Conference was no doubt influenced by a d e sire to rehabilitate the prestige of the Labor P arty and to revive w orkers' confidence in it. Yet the unemployed had little reason to expect that th eir lot would be much im proved, if at all, as a re su lt of the C onference. Contending that it was the responsibility of the federal governm ent, as well as of the States, to provide adequate food, clothing and sh elter for the w orkless and th eir fam ilies, the Conference called upon the federal governm ent to take steps at once to achieve this end, by making available to industry through the Commonwealth Bank, credits to the extent of 20 m illion. But delegates w ere well aw are of the credit policy of the Lyons governm ent, so it is difficult to believe that they expected a favourable response to this proposal. Indeed, only a day o r so before, rep resen tativ es of the T.H.C. and C.U.C. had presented such a request to Latham, who had flatly rejected it. The Conference then considered the next of M onk's proposals, that the S.P.L.P. be directed to attem pt to give effect to a decision of the la st annual conference that taxation be increased to enable work to be provided. However, it seem s that delegates w ere persuaded that the governm ent would be unable to get the legislation through P arliam en t. They did not p e rsist with the demand, but instead moved out of the real world of politics altogether and accepted an am endm ent, 'that the State P arliam entary Labor P arty shall im m ediately introduce legislation to take over the m eans of production, distribution and exchange, in o rd er to provide p ractical sustenance for the unem ployed'. Denouncing the 'work for sustenance' clause in the Unemployment Relief Act as 'an abrogation of L abor's principles and economic conscrip tio n ', the Conference expressed the opinion that the S.P.L.P. should not have accepted the Bill containing such a provision; and it called upon the governm ent to attem pt to bring about the repeal of 'this objectionable pro v isio n '. Most union delegates c ritic ised the Hogan governm ent for not having c arrie d out previous instructions, and sev eral argued that it should have gone out of office ra th e r than accept the 'objectionable' clauses in the A ct. But only a few union officials sought to back up the p resen t dem ands with th reats of disciplinary action, and the Conference rejected an addendum, moved by D ivers of the Municipal Em ployees' U nion,'that such Labor M em bers...who fail to comply with the directions to repeal...the obnoxious clauses...and reintroduce...a m ore humane sustenance allowance, shall be expelled from the L abor M ovem ent'. H ow ever, the C onference did 180

192 The Unemployed favour a far m ore d rastic proposal than the one sponsored by Monk, who had urged that cabinet should amend the regulations of the G overnor in Council prescrib in g the class of work to be done for s u s tenance. Instead, it instructed the S.P.L.P. to set about at once to rep eal, rescind o r withdraw all regulations governing work for su sten ance at scab ra te s of pay, and, failing this being done, the incoming executive m ust cancel the endorsem ents of all Labor m em bers of both H ouses. F o r two years labour leaders had argued that it was in the in terests of the unions and unemployed that a Labor governm ent should rem ain in office, even if it was unable to put Labor policy into effect; and during that tim e the Hogan governm ent had becom e discredited in the eyes of many w orkers who claim ed that it was carrying out the policy of the N ationalists. Now again the argum ents w ere repeated, and supporters of the governm ent m aintained that it had not had any choice about the obnoxious c la u se s'. On this occasion, however, the Conference resolved (73-69), 'Should the Opposition be successful in having legislation inim ical to Labor c arrie d, the Labor Government shall im m ediately re sig n '. Following the Conference, the C.U.C. p ersisted with its efforts to prevent the unemployed being forced to work for sustenance, and the Labor Call (18 F eb ru ary 1932), too, insisted that 'L abor m ust be adam ant' on the issu e. The U.W.M., which also opposed the schem e, sought to rally re sista n c e, but its attem pts to organise dem onstrations to demand the rep eal of the Act w ere thw arted by the police. The M inistry did not take steps to c a rry out the instructions of the C onference, but it sought to avoid running directly counter to them. Although on 26 January the G overnor in Council had approved the regulations governing the type of work to be done for sustenance, the M inistry, pleading legal obstacles, refrained from having them gazetted - despite the outcry of the p re ss and the Opposition. At the sam e tim e, on the grounds that there w ere insufficient funds, it did not put relief works in hand, and thus side-stepped the labour m ovem ent's objections to the rates to be p a id. But the unemployed w ere afforded only a breathing space, for after the fall of the Hogan governm ent the new U.A.P. governm ent rigidly enforced work fo r sustenance. R esistance to this and other u n satisfactory aspects of unemployment re lief precipitated the g reat 'dole s trik e s' of the m id -th irtie s. Until the Hogan governm ent fe ll, T ra d e s Hall officials continued 181

193 Trade Unions and the D epression th eir cap-in-hand deputations with requests on behalf of the unemployed. On 6 A pril 1932, the day P arliam ent reassem bled, the C.U.C., with the perm ission of the City Council, led sev eral thousand unemployed through the city to p ro test against work for sustenance and to demand a rent m oratorium, a doubling of the scale of sustenance, increased supplies of firewood, clothing, and boots, and free electric light and gas. R epresentatives of the T.H.C. and C.U.C. w ere still seeking interview s with the M inistry right to the eve of the la tte r's defeat; but even in relatively m inor issu es they w ere unable to influence the governm ent's policy. This can be seen in the case of the application form s which the unemployed w ere required from M arch 1932 to fill out afresh each fortnight for sustenance. The edict on these form s had led to angry p ro tests, and som e unemployed offered re sista n c e. On 23 M arch the C.U.C. recom m ended that the form s be declared black, and the T.H.C. on 7 A pril urged that they be w ithdraw n. But the M inister in Charge of Sustenance (W illiams) turned a deaf ear to all entreaties, and tradespeople w ere instructed not to supply sustenance to those who refused to sign the form. Eventually, as the m ajority of its m em bers had already done so, the C.U.C. advised that the form s be signed under p ro test. During the V ictorian election campaign the com m ittee attem pted to make the form s an issu e. It also sought to persuade candidates to com m it them selves to a list of rad ical demands which it had drawn up on behalf of the unem ployed. During 1931 and 1932, com m unists had continued th eir vituperative campaign against the Labor leadership, and, claim ing that the 'social fa scist' T rades Hall officials w ere betraying the unemployed in o rd er to protect the Hogan governm ent, they p ersisted with th eir efforts to build the Unemployed W orkers' M ovement. As the T rades Hall and the Labor governm ents failed to im prove th eir lot, fu rth er sections of the unemployed looked to the U.W.M., and the divisions within the ranks of the w orkless becam e m ore serio u s. Separate dem onstrations w ere organised by the C.U.C. and U.W.M. on 12 January 1931, when som e officials w ere hit by stones allegedly thrown by m em bers of the la tte r organisation. The incident provoked T rades Hall officials to set out to cripple the leadership of the U.W.M. On 15 January, though som e delegates insisted that the U.W.M. had made its a rra n g e m ents for 12 January a few weeks before the T.H.C. had, the Council, on the recom m endation of the Executive, resolved that any delegate who organised o r was identified with counter dem onstrations to those organised by o r with the authority of the Council should be expelled. N evertheless, on 19 January the U.W.M. again attem pted to lead the 182

194 The Unemployed unemployed through the stre e ts to the T reasu ry buildings; but apparently the police w ere determ ined to call a halt to such dem onstratio n s. The m arch ers w ere belaboured by batons and ridden down by mounted police; and during the affray, which resulted in eleven a rre s ts, some of the police drew rev o lv ers. Then followed som e moves tow ards rapprochem ent between the riv al organisations; so that on 16 F ebruary the U.W.M. and the C.U.C. combined for the first tim e in a united dem onstration and deputation to urge a ren t m oratorium. B ranches of the U.W.M. began to send delegates to C.U.C. m eetings, and again on 6 M arch the two o rg an isations co-operated in a m arch and deputations seeking m ore assistan ce for the unemployed, though on this occasion leadership was in the hands of T rades Hall officials. However, the P olitical B ureau of the Com m unist P arty intervened to denounce these moves as 'right opportunist' e rro rs, and in A pril the U.W M. Executive decided to withdraw unconditionally from the 'social F a sc ist outfit known as the C.U.C. and 'to expose and repudiate the anti-w orking class tactics of the T.H.C. and C.U.C. before the m a sse s'. Thus the antagonism s reappeared, and com m unists resum ed th eir fo rm er stance. The few U.W.M. dem onstrations allowed by the police 'counted out' the Trades Hall, and some of th eir banners read 'Down with Labor L e a d ers'. N evertheless, in theory at least, the objective of the M.M. was the establishm ent of 'a united front from below' of all w orkers, and the U.W.M. continued to apply without success for affiliation with the T. H. C., although a few unions, such as the A. R. U., favoured such an affiliation. Becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the attitude of the T. H. C., the m ore aggressive of the unemployed, encouraged by com m unists, attended Council m eetings and by interjections produced lively scenes and som e d iso rd er. The Executive was unable (53 votes to 60) to persuade the Council in May to close the gallery to v isito rs, but la te r adm ission was severely re stric te d. The disturbances, however, continued, and on 3 Septem ber, when the chairm an ruled out of o rd er a motion that represen tativ es of the unemployed be heard regarding the Executive's refusal to consider a U.W.M. application for affiliation, proceedings w ere disrupted. The m eeting was adjourned, and officials made known th eir determ ination to have the gallery closed altogether. Then, just before the next Council m eeting was due to begin, on the night of 10 Septem ber, a hostile U.W.M. dem onstration gathered n ear the C ham ber, apparently with the intention of forcing a way through an iron g rille that had been erected at the e n tra n ce. But 183

195 T rade Unions and the D epression police suddenly appeared who plied th eir batons freely and drove the dem onstrators from the building. It was claim ed that after the m elee weapons such as pieces of iron, batons and stones, w ere found in the H all. V ersions of how the police cam e to intervene differ, and at the storm y Council m eeting, am id b itte r charges and countercharges, the Executive disclaim ed any responsibility and denied the allegations made by som e delegates that the police had been hidden in the building. As proposed by the extrem e left, the Council denounced the brutality of the Hogan Police in batoning w o rk ers' and condemned the Chief S ecretary and other people responsible for the presence of the Police at the T rades H all'. However, as delegates Bodsworth and Le Huray refused to apologise for th e ir conduct at the previous m eeting, on the recom m endation of the Executive, these two com m unists w ere suspended by the Council (78-27); and so T rad e s Hall officials co n veniently got rid of two of th eir m ost uncom prom ising c r itic s. The Executive undertook to inquire into a charge that the S ecretary of the P astrycooks' Union incited and directed plain clothes police to baton w orkers on that eventful evening. A few weeks la te r the Executive found that Perugia did make a statem ent which, in its opinion, was 'in the circum stances unjustified and unw arranted'. The rep o rt was adopted (67-51), and Perugia apologised as requested, after a move to have him suspended was defeated. During the week following 10 Septem ber, the Communist P arty urged w orkers to sm ash the T rades Hall bureaucracy, and sought to organise a dem onstration for 17 Septem ber which would demand U.W.M. representation on the Council and the reinstatem ent of the two delegates. The dem onstration, however, did not take place, and the large contingent of police patrolling the are a went into action only to lock up, on a charge of carrying an offensive weapon (stones), two men who w ere in the vicinity of the T rades H all. The hall was 'like a besieged c astle ' and the Council, m eeting behind closed doors under a heavy police guard, agreed 'that the Executive be empowered to take any n ecessary steps to safeguard the personal safety of delegates, the right of free assem bly, and free speech, and also to protect the w o rkers' p ro p erty ' Similar disturbances had previously taken place at the Sydney Trades Hall. 25 Age, 18 September 1931; T.H.C. Minutes, 17 September This resolution was endorsed by a meeting of executives ot affiliated unions the following Sunday 184

196 The Unemployed The following months w ere also m arked by b itte r dissension, and the T rades Hall com plained that 'sc u rrilo u s lie s' w ere being circulated about the lead ers of the C.U.C. On the grounds that the U.W.M. was seeking to 'white ant' and break up its branches, the C.U.C. attem pted to tighten up its organisation in o rd er to exclude com m unists and th eir su p p o rters. Branded as d isru p to rs, adherents of the M.M. suffered disciplinary action in som e unions, and the T.H.C. Executive assum ed the right to in sist that no c irc u la rs should come before union m eetings until they had received its endorsem ent. Speaking as A. L.P. P resid ent, Don Cam eron (who often a sse rte d that com m unists had nothing to do with com m unism ), in early 1932, pointed the way to V icto ria's future attitude, when he 'com m ended' L ab o r's decision in New South W ales to debar m em bers of 'off-shoots' of the Communist P arty from the Labor P a r ty.^6 The fierce antagonism s within the movem ent exploded into open violence on May Day F o r sev eral y ears the A. L.P. and T.H.C. had celebrated May Day on the first Sunday in May, while the left held a dem onstration on 1 May. But it so happened that 1 May 1932 fell on a Sunday, and two riv al processions m arched to the Y arra Bank, w here a huge crowd gathered. The extrem e elem ent forcibly broke up the official m eeting, and Acting P re m ie r Tunnecliffe and sev eral leading T.H.C. officials w ere m anhandled. The Communist P a rty was held responsible and was denounced by unions. The T.H. C. on 5 May condemned 'the prem editated vicious attack' and declared 'that such methods establish that the Com m unist P arty and its su bsidiary groups a re obstacles to the p ro g ress of the working class and as such m ust be treated as other opponents of the Labor M ovem ent'. If these acts of violence on May Day and 10 Septem ber 1931 w arranted censure, it should perhaps be noted, in connection with the Septem ber episode that the T.H.C. itself assisted to create conditions that enabled those who favoured 'b ash er gang' tactics to gather som e following. While many men, women, and children lacked the n ecessities of life, delegates engaged in wordy debates which w ere cold comfort, and often a provocative affront to the destitute. afternooa (L. Call, 24 September 1931). 26 Argus 31 March On 3 September 1932, the Central Executive of the A.L.P. resolv ed that members of the Communist Party and its united front organisations were ineligible for membership of the A.L.P.; and this step was endorsed by the next A.L.P. annual conference (L. Call, 2 February 1933). 185

197 Trade Unions and the D epression The Council did not pay sufficient heed to the growing desperation of many of the w orkless, and the n ear indifference of well paid officials courted the hostility of the unemployed. 27 As P resid en t Calwell and several other speakers adm itted at the A.L.P. Conference in January 1932, unions and the Labor P arty have not given to the unemployed that sym pathetic consideration that unemployed w orkers and th eir dependants have a rig h t to expect - aye, even dem and.. Com m unists did take a prom inent p a rt in the May Day attack, but there was undoubtedly som e truth in th eir claim that it was spontaneous and not organised in advance by the p arty. W orkers had expected that under a Labor governm ent their in te re sts would be prom oted, but instead they had been degraded. M oreover, under a Labor Chief S ecretary, dem onstrators had been batoned, and the attitude of the police towards the unemployed had been condemned as brutal and unjust by wide sections of the labour m ovem ent. Thus to many ira te w orkers, Tunnecliffe could easily appear as the personal rep resentative of the cause of th eir sufferings. 28 When the official speakers began to propose the usual resolutions about abolishing capitalism and raising living standards, and then went on to slate the Communist P arty, it was natural enough that the resentm ent of the w ilder sp irits in the crow d should r is e to a dangerous pitch. The events of Septem ber and May not only made the task of sincere m ilitants m ore difficult, but also left a legacy of b ittern ess and d istru st for the future. Even after a change in the leadership and policy of the Communist P arty, the A.L.P. in la te r years re fe rre d back to these events as sufficient reason for avoiding any dealings with the party. M oreover, th ere can be little doubt that the policy of the Trades Hall was pushed much fu rth er to the right than it might o th e r wise have been, for the disinclination of officials to m obilise the rank and file was reinforced by the fear that any m ass m eetings o r dem onstrations they organised m ight be captured by ex trem ists and led into acts of violence. In future y e ars, the T.H.C. even refused to organise May Day pro cessio n s. While the th reat of starvation was never fa r rem oved from the 27 Week after week for several months at the end of 1931, part of Council meetings was taken up by consideration of an internal dispute in the Enginedrivers and Firemen's Union. 28 This explanation was put forward a few years later by Percy Laidler (Trade Union Leader, Sydney, December 1935). 186

198 The Unemployed lives of the unemployed, many also suffered the additional hardship of ev iction. The T. H. C. and the C. U. C. repeatedly demanded a rent m oratorium, and, as noted previously, A.L.P. conferences directed the governm ent to bring down appropriate legislation. In May 1931 the C.U.C. recom m ended that the furniture of evicted fam ilies should be deposited at the local town hall, and thus throw the responsibility on to the m unicipal authorities.2 ^ L ater, the com m ittee debated a rent strik e proposal, but its groups w ere evenly divided on the question; so instead it called on its m em bers to adopt 'w hatever m eans lie within th e ir pow er' to prevent evictions. This call was issued again in January 1932, when the com m ittee also decided to appeal to the forthcom ing A.L.P. Conference to in stru ct the governm ent to reintroduce the original Rent M oratorium B ill and to make it clear that, unless the B ill was quickly finalised, the endorsem ents of m em bers of the S.P.L.P. would be cancelled. The resolution moved by Monk at the A.L.P. Conference was much m ild er. He asked delegates to reaffirm the decision of the previous conference and he m ade no m ention of p enalties. However, the Conference was not content m erely to repeat the demand for a bill, and, though the A ttorney-g eneral insisted that it would be im possible to c a rry out such a request, the Conference adopted an addendum proposed by C rofts, 'That the Acting P re m ie r be asked to im m ediately give consideration to issuing regulations to prevent any unemployed person from being evicted from his o r h er h o m e '. Evictions continued to take place, and it was poor consolation to the afflicted to know that, undaunted by previous experience, T rades Hall officials would again urge th eir views on the M inistry. As peaceful methods yielded such poor re su lts, m ore of the unemployed began to turn to the policy advocated by the U.W.M., which m aintained that w orkers should rely m ore on th eir own strength to prevent evictions and less on the possibility of persuading the governm ent to bring down legislation. The U.W.M. p e rsiste d with its efforts to build anti-eviction com m ittees which would give a lead for im m ediate and forceful action. When an unemployed w o rk er's fam ily was about to be turned out, the U.W.M. would organise a dem onstration outside the house, intending by a show of force to d eter the agent o r ow ner. These aggressive tactics could occasionally claim a victory; 29 T.H C Minutes, 28 May The C U.C. received a flat refusal from the Chief Secretary when it reauested that oolice be not useu to evict unemployed workers (ibid., 14 May 1931). 187

199 Trade Unions and the D epression but often they led to police baton charges and a r r e s t s. During some of these clashes police drew rev o lv ers, and on a few occasions they fired a warning shot. Som etim es after an eviction was effected the less law-abiding of the unemployed retaliated by damaging the house, and it was not an uncommon occurrence for ag en ts' windows to be stoned. U ndeterred by police batons, theu.w.m. continued to re s is t evictions, even though those a rre ste d w ere not dealt with leniently, and despite the determ ination of at least one m agistrate that this hooliganism is going to be stopped. Communists regarded the curtailm ent of the right of the unemployed to hold dem onstrations at will and the suppression of U.W.M. m arches as fu rth er evidence of the d rift to fa sc ism. They sought to persuade w orkers to join the W o rk ers Defence Corps and to challenge the re stric tio n s, by force if n ecessary. On occasions the U.W.M. defied police o rd ers and attem pted to lead dem onstrations through the stre e ts. However, though the dem onstrators num bered several thousand, they could not successfully force the issu e against mounted police and determ ined baton charges, and, as on 2 D ecem ber 1931 and 25 February 1932, they w ere dispersed after a b rief exchange of b lo w s.^ Some of the activities of com m unists invited strong police action, but if the tactics employed by the U.W.M. w ere ill-advised and often provocative, there was nevertheless much validity in its assertio n that a vital principle affecting the whole labour movement was involved. A part from the issue of civil rig h ts, dem onstrations w ere one of the few m eans available to the unemployed to im press th eir needs on the public and a tardy governm ent. M oreover, by dem onstrating, a man was given an opportunity to p ro test actively against his lot and to a s s e rt his determ ination to secure a b etter deal, thus countering the dangers of apathy and personal degradation. A few unions - the S eam en's, the A.R.U., the C a rte rs' and D riv ers' - protested against the treatm ent m eted out to the unem ployed by the police and w ere indignant that some w ere a rre ste d on charges of vag ran cy. The T rades Hall defended the right of free speech in general te rm s, and som e officials objected that the unem ployed w ere not receiving a fa ir deal from the police. But the in terest and efforts of the union leadership w ere spasm odic, and it did not consider making an issue of the fate of the U.W.M. dem onstrations. Indeed, the restric tio n s im posed on the activities of the U.W.M. 30 It is, incidentally, interesting to note that a high proportion of those arrested were in their twenties. 188

200 The Unemployed would probably not have been unwelcome to many officials, for they regarded that body as an undesirable disruptive elem ent and, as well, no doubt, som e believed that the com m unists w ere m erely suffering the consequences which could be expected to follow from the tactics they pursued. The attitude of the T rades Hall was conditioned by a d esire to avoid exacerbating social conflicts, and it would appear that it was hardly a coincidence that on 25 F ebruary 1932 the C.U.C. should have taken a very large crowd of unemployed out of the city for a picnic. On that date the U.W.M. celebrated International Unemployed Day and the C.U.C. was aw are that it intended to defy the police and hold a dem onstration to p ro test against work for s u s tenance and evictions. In terest in the I.C.W.P.A. was aroused in som e unions, but the T.H.C. continued to refuse to have anything to do with that body, o r to see the necessity for the existence of any such organisation. However, if officials could feel justified in sum m arily rejecting the m ethods of the extrem e left, th eir own achievem ents w ere no cause for self-congratulation. The m atter does not seem to have been a source of g reat anxiety to the C.U.C., though the com m ittee voiced strong opposition to the unemployed being a rre ste d for vagrancy, and on a couple of occasions requested the Chief S ecretary to prevent the police from taking such action. On 5 M arch 1931 the T.H.C. protested against the conviction a few days before of two unemployed w orkers on such a charge, and it urged an inquiry into police m ethods. The Council had, on 13 Novem ber 1930, viewed with disgust the 'b ru tal' way in which the unemployed w ere being treated, and the Executive had been directed to secure a public inquiry into the policy and adm inistration of the police fo rce. But the Executive does not appear to have been m otivated by any o v e r whelming sense of urgency and it did not re p o rt back to the Council until 28 May On that evening and at the following m eeting, a m otion and sev eral am endm ents w ere discussed, and finally the Council (63-33) called on the State governm ent to institute an inquiry into the operations of the police force and the inaction of Labor m in isters concerning attacks on the working c la ss. Such resolutions, however, did not move Chief S ecretary Tunnecliffe, who did not allow his professions of socialism to in terfere with his determ ination to suppress any th reat to law and order. 31 In reply to criticism at the 1931 A,L.P. Conference, Tunnecliffe said that he knew of no cases of the police persecuting the unemployed (L. Call, 23 April 1931). 189

201 Trade Unions and the D epression In the following months, though the unemployed had possibly even m ore reason to complain of the attitude of the police, the T.H.C. does not seem to have been disposed to extend its effo rts on th e ir behalf, The debates at Council m eetings and the pages of union journals ra re ly reflected the social disturbances troubling M elbourne, and with few exceptions they gave practically no inkling that som e of the unemployed w ere waging a resolute battle on issu es such as evictions. Then in August 1931 the attention of the T,H.C, was briefly directed towards the question again, A large dem onstration, which included m em bers of the U.W.M., attem pted to prevent the eviction of a family at Fitzroy on 12 August, but the dem onstrators w ere dispersed by baton charges and two w ere a rre ste d. In convicting the two men, the m agistrate congratulated the police, but sev eral T.H.C, delegates contended that they had attacked the unem ployed w ithout provocation, and the E x ecu tive undertook to inquire into the incident. Once again, however, there was interm inable delay, and a report was not presented until 21 A pril 1932, when the Council adopted the recom m endation of the Executive that Acting P re m ie r Tunnecliffe be urged to institute an inquiry into the case. Also in A pril 1932, at a previous m eeting, the T.H.C. had been provoked into one of its ra re debates on the treatm ent of the unem ployed by the police. On 6 A pril, as they w ere walking along the stre e t to join a procession organised by the C.U.C., a group of unemployed w ere batoned by plain clothes police and two of them had to be treated for head in ju ries. The following evening the T.H.C. discussed a strongly worded motion, but it finally decided to adiourn the debate and to request the Chief S ecretary to attend its next m eeting. Tunnecliffe refu sed the invitation, but announced th at the incident would be in v e stigated; so on 14 A pril the T.H.C. demanded that the injured men should be rep resented at the inquiry and should be paid com pensation. The inquiry was held and resulted in the police being exonerated. The unemployed w ere made painfully aw are that th eir needs would not be secured through the channels advocated by the union leadership, yet the Communist P arty and its supporters did not succeed in rallying m ass support for th eir alternative policy. At bottom, the party had m isread the c ris is as a developing revolutionary situation. But no doubt the sectarian line pursued by the U.W.M, inhibited its influence and, as well, many potential re c ru its would have hesitated to join up because of the violent antics of the 'lunatic frin g e'. While it is a fact that the Com m unist P arty suffered from the work of agents provo- 190

202 The Unemployed c a te u rs^ the attem pts to do physical harm to Labor leaders revealed that the com m unist camp contained some b ash er' types. In addition, efforts to build the U.W.M. encountered m ajor obstacles in other d ire c tio n s. Its lack of official recognition was a serious handicap, as it was thus often unable to negotiate on behalf of its m em bers or the unemployed generally. Depicted as a m ost evil m enace to society, the U.W.M. was subjected to discrim inatory treatm en t, and it was often denied the use of m eeting room s o r halls and was som etim es singled out.as being ineligible to conduct s tre e t co rn er m eetings. 33 M em bers of the U.W.M. w ere fined for such offences as posting up notices announcing dem onstrations and for tresp assin g on railw ay property when addressing a m eeting. The police stringently enforced the laws relating to the printing and d is tribution of propaganda when it was of com m unist origin; and g e n erally the authorities adopted an increasingly repressiv e attitude towards the activities of the left. A nti-com m unist agitators took a hand, too, to disrupt m eetings and dem onstrate that not only com m unists could be identified with stro n g -arm ta c tic s. At the end of August 1931, three thousand copies of the second issu e of the Red Leader (organ of the M.M.) w ere burned by the P.M.G. D epartm ent at Sydney, and im m ediately after taking office the Lyons governm ent discovered that A ustralia was facing a grave com m unist m enace. The W orkers' Weekly and Red Leader w ere banned from tran sm issio n through the post, 34 and the future existence of the Com m unist P arty was rendered very uncertain by am endm ents to the C rim es Act. The T.H.C. voiced an 'em phatic p ro test' against these m easures of the governm ent, though in condemning the ban many delegates no doubt shared the view of the S ecretary of the Seam en's Union that the sooner the W orker^ Weekly and Red Leader ceased publication the b e tte r. In January 1932 the M elbourne counterpart to the New Guard, the O rder of the Silent Knights, 32 Don Cameron pointed to their part in the U.W.M. demonstration on 19 January 1931 (Aust. Worker, 28 January 1931). See also the incident reported by the W. Weekly, 1 May On the day the Broadmeadows Camp opened, the superintendent stated his firm intention that communist agitation would not be tolerated (Argus, 19 December 1930), and attempts were made to prevent the entry of communists, ^ome who gained admittance were ejected by police (Age, 25 February 1931). 34 Some time later they were also denied transport on the South Australian and Victorian railways. 191

203 Trade Unions and the D epression em erged from secrecy to announce its existence, and after the fall of the Hogan governm ent even m ore severe re stric tio n s w ere placed on the right of assem bly. As the m em orable 'free speech' fights w ere to dem onstrate, a situation was developing that required something m ore than p ro test reso lu tio n s. 192

204 8 The L ast Act: the Fall of Labor in Victoria We have seen how, at the beginning of 1932, the V ictorian A. L. P. C onference had adopted a firm stand, d eclared ag ain st the P re m ie rs ' P lan, and th reaten ed expulsion of m em b ers who gave fu rth e r support to the P lan. On 29 M arch the V ictorian A.L.P. P re sid e n t (Cam eron) rein fo rced the d ecisions of the Jan u ary conference by issuing a w a rn ing, to L abor m in is te rs and m em b ers that, if they supported fu rth e r reductions in w ages at the forthcom ing P re m ie rs ' C onference o r elsew h ere, they would be autom atically expelled from the p a rty. The V ictorian P a rlia m e n t, which had been in re c e s s, reconvened on 6 A pril Two days la te r - and despite the p ro testatio n s of Acting P re m ie r T unnecliffe, who was p re se n t at the m eeting - the C en tral Executive of the A.L.P. decided that 'the re -e n a c tm e n t o r continuance of reductions of w ages, pensions and so cial se rv ic e s is a contravention of the C onference reso lu tio n as to the P re m ie rs ' P la n '. The C en tral Executive w as now apparently reso lv ed to enforce d iscipline in the p a r ty. The resum ption of P a rlia m e n t had found the O pposition confident and determ in ed to dislodge the G overnm ent. The in stru ctio n of the C en tral E xecutive to L abor m em b ers reg ard in g re -e n a c tm e n t of the P re m ie rs ' P lan offered them a golden opportunity, and on 12 A pril the M inistry was challenged on this issu e. A cting P re m ie r T unnecliffe refu sed to give an unequivocal answ er, d eclarin g that it was too early at th is stage for the G overnm ent to rev eal its financial p roposals and that he could not m ake a statem en t until a fte r the P re m ie rs ' C onference. He m e re ly p rom ised th at the G overnm ent would not evade its re sp o n sib ilitie s when the occasion a ro s e. D issatisfied, the O pposition m oved no confidence, and on 13 A pril the G overnm ent was defeated. The th re e independent m em b ers upon whom it had relied w ere su p p o rters of the Plan: in a division of they joined the O pposition. Thus the Hogan govern m ent's p re c a rio u s hold on office w as finally broken, and on 14 A pril P a rlia m e n t was d issolved. The T.H.C., according to its S e c re ta ry, had no re g re ts. On the day the governm ent fell, an E xpert C om m ittee m ade recom m endations to the c u rre n t P re m ie rs ' C onference reg ard in g fu rth er econom ic read ju stm en ts under the P re m ie rs ' P lan. 193

205 T rade Unions and the D epression Additional cuts seem ed to be in sto re, and public service organisations, which had been calling for the resto ratio n of existing salary reductions, protested vigorously. On 11 May M elbourne saw a ra re m ass m eeting of federal and State public servants who declared th eir opposition to the Expert C om m ittee's re p o rt, The T.H.C. denounced the re p o rt as 'a deliberate and sin iste r plan to im pose fu rth er suffering upon the w o rk ers, and claim ed that it had been drafted with the definite object of prejudicing the w o rk ers case then proceeding before the C ourt for the resto ratio n of the 10 p er cent cut. The Council also re ite ra ted its contention that only by resto rin g the lost purchasing power would w orkers be absorbed in industry. At the P re m ie rs Conference itself, Tunnecliffe opposed the new wage reductions, suggesting as an alternative that A ustralia should begin negotiations for a reduction in overseas in te re st paym ents. But, given the defeat of the Hogan governm ent, he could hardly be accepted as a spokesm an for V ictoria, and the proceedings of the conference w ere now held in abeyance pending the outcome of the elections. M eantime, during these elections, the Expert C om m ittee s re p o rt com plicated the issu es involved in the sim p ler question of r e enactm ent of the Plan. The fear that a non-l abor m inistry would ruthlessly im pose even m ore severe cuts than those embodied in the original Plan was reinforced. On the one hand, this fear attenuated the determ ination of the C entral Executive of the A. L.P. to discipline its parliam entary rep resen tativ es; and, on the other hand, those rep resen tativ es them selves - even w here they had form erly supported the Plan - w ere presented by the rep o rt with a new issue which allowed them to equivocate on the general principle of supporting o r not supporting the P re m ie rs ' Plan. Although the candidates held out attractiv e prom ises to the unem ployed and gave an undertaking that a Labor governm ent would attem pt to relieve the parlous condition of governm ent finance by negotiating for a reduction in the in te re st paym ents on overseas com m itm ents, L abor's appeal was alm ost com pletely negative. The speakers on this side mainly concerned them selves with ominous predictions about the intentions of the Opposition, and urged electo rs to retu rn a Labor governm ent in o rd er to prevent fu rth er inroads into the people's living standards. Tunnecliffe appealed for the re-electio n of the Governm ent on two grounds: 'R elief for the Unemployed and P ro te c tion of Living S tandards'. 194

206 The L ast Act Although the A.L.P. Executive had a hand in its drafting, L abor s policy regarding the P re m ie rs Plan was not in s tric t conform ity with the resolution adopted by the January 1932 Conference and the C entral Executive instruction of 8 A pril. In his official policy speech on 22 A pril, Tunnecliffe declared that the governm ent was prepared to r e enact im m ediately the p arts relating to the sala rie s of m in isters of the Crown and m em bers of P arliam en t and of the higher paid public serv an ts. 'It is only in reg ard to the schedule dealing with the sala rie s and wages of the lower paid Public S ervants',he said, 'that any legislative alteration need be sought'. A Labor governm ent would introduce a m easure which would provide for the determ ination of sala rie s and conditions for these low er paid officers by a C lassification and Efficiency Board (a prom ise that was calculated to in terest public servants who had been requesting the establishm ent of a board fo r many y e a rs). But the Tunnecliffe policy avoided stipulating which public servants would be included in the category of 'low er paid', and th ere was certainly no assu ran ce that the public servants would be relieved of cuts im posed by the Plan even if they cam e under the jurisdiction of such a board. L abor's policy was a re s o rt to equivocation which strongly suggested that the party had a rriv ed at a com prom ise and was attem pting to afford a loop-hole for those who w ere pledged to support the P lan. Throughout the cam paign, Tunnecliffe and his follow ers insisted that they w ere not fighting the election on the issue of the Plan. The Acting P re m ie r pointed to the reco rd of the Hogan governm ent in having c a rrie d out the Plan, and flatly denied that the governm ent proposed that public servants should be excluded from 'essen tial s a c rific e s '. Some candidates sk irted the issue of the Plan, while som e, who had previously opposed its adoption, continued to re je ct it. O thers who had originally accepted the Plan, followed Tunnecliffe and A ttorney-g eneral S later and declared th eir support for it, with the qualification that a board should fix the sa la rie s of the lower grades of the public serv ice. F a r from apologising for L abor's support for the Plan, Tunnecliffe paraded the governm ent's econom ical m anagem ent of public finance, and claim ed that V ictoria had made g re a ter p ercen t age reductions in expenditure and had done m ore to m eet its obligations under the rehabilitation schem e than other S tates. The A. L.P. nevertheless issued a c irc u la r announcing that the paragraph in Tunnecliffe's policy speech refe rrin g to reductions and the C lassification Board 'would be in harm ony with the Annual Conference d e c isio n '. 195

207 Trade Unions and the D epression Fearing disruption that m ight cost Labor electoral support, the C entral Executive of the A. L.P. had refrained from taking action against those politicians who had continued publicly to champion the P lan. In the name of unity the C entral Executive p refe rre d to keep dissident Labor m em bers within the fold, even if they held views quite contrary to Labor policy o r held no b rief for the A. L.P. program and objective. But now this expediency was to receive its rew ard, as sev eral P lanites refused to avail them selves of the way of escape provided by the Tunnecliffe policy and insisted adam antly that the Plan m ust be stric tly adhered to. Since the January A. L.P. Conference, Acting T re a su re r Jones, M.L.C., who was regarded as one of the fathers of the Plan, had continued openly to support it. In reply to the C entral Executive resolution of 8 A pril, he had a sse rte d that the th reat of expulsion would not deter him, and after the fall of the governm ent sev eral of his Labor colleagues joined Jones in denouncing the C entral Executive and declaring that the Plan was 'irre v o c ab le '. Em erging from a cabinet m eeting on 19 A pril, Tunnecliffe predicted that L abor's election policy, which m in isters had just drafted, would have the united support of the p arty. However, a week after the Acting P re m ie r had delivered his policy speech, of the cabinet m in isters who had made public declarations, five opposed and five supported Tunnecliffe. On 22 A pril, Jones and K iem an (M.L.C.) resigned from the cabinet in p ro test against Tunnecliffe's policy, and subsequently spoke from U.A.P. platform s to support the Plan and attack the C entral Executive. W illiam s (M.L.C.), who was already M inister for Labour, F o rests and Health, was also given the portfolios previously held by Jones; but, alm ost im m ediately after he had been sworn in, he repudiated the Tunnecliffe policy, and in this was joined by B ailey, the M inister for Lands. However, n either W illiam s nor Bailey resigned from the cabinet Jackson, retirin g m em ber for P rah ran, resigned from the A. L.P. to contest the seat as a Planite; and on the sam e day Bond (retiring m em ber for P o rt Fairy-G lenelg) whose strong advocacy of the Plan had cost him Labor endorsem ent, announced that he was l Age. 29 April Also, according to these same press reports, Lemmon and McNamara (M.L.C. and Secretary A.L.P.) had not yet publicly committed themselves, though immediately afterwards these two ministers came out on the side of Tunnecliffe (ibid., 30 April 1932). 196

208 The Last Act standing for re-electio n as an Independent Labor candidate. W.F. Angus, Mayor of Collingwood and S ecretary of the Clifton Hill branch of the A.L.P., who had presided at the m eeting at which Tunnecliffe had given his policy speech, resigned from the party when refused endorsem ent for Clifton Hill, and stood as a Planite against Blackburn, one of the staunchest opponents of the P lan. So the defections went o n, 2 and to crown the whole trav esty cam e a scandal resulting from the position taken up by Hogan, P re m ie r and lead er of the S.P.L.P., who was abroad at the tim e. On 26 A pril it was disclosed that Hogan had despatched a cable m essage eleven days e a r lie r giving instructions regarding the Plan, and that the Acting P re m ie r had not subm itted these directions in full to cabinet. Thus som e m in iste rs w ere not fully apprised of the contents of the cable until sev e ra l days after Tunnecliffe had delivered his policy speech. Hogan had demanded s tric t adherence to the Plan, and had subsequently repudiated L abor's election policy and attacked the C entral Executive. N evertheless, Tunnecliffe affirm ed his 'absolute loyalty to M r Hogan as my lead er' and m aintained that broadly his views and those of Hogan w ere identical. P rotesting that the P re m ie r had been m isled regarding his intentions about the Plan, Tunnecliffe explained that Hogan approved the Plan in the le tte r while he approved its sp irit. Hogan cabled that the governm ent had offered him the position of A gent-g eneral. A fter first denying this claim, Tunnecliffe adm itted, when p ressed by Hogan's fu rth er insistence, that he had made the offer on his own personal initiative'. It looked very much like an attem pt to buy Hogan off: and certainly it was hardly in keeping with received notions of Labor and so cialist m orality. To the delight of the governm en t's opponents, the dissident Labor m em bers and the A.L.P. P resid ent c arrie d on an acrim onious debate, which p ress and Opposition exploited to the full. F u rth erm o re, som e unwelcome chickens cam e home to roost, as K iernan pointed out that three m em bers of the C entral Executive (Cameron, W allis, and Sheehan) had not cam - 2 Publicity was given to the threats by J.H. Tully and A. Wallace (retiring member for Albert Park) to stand as Planites (Age 28, 29 April 1932). On 12 April cabinet had appointed Wallace to the Geelong Harbour Trust. He would receive 200 p.a. and his parliamentary status and salary would be unaffected. A week later he announced he would not recontest his seat on account of ill-health (Argus, 13, 21 April 1932). Then, a week later, he made known that he was considering reversing his decision and standing as a pro-plan candidate. The Age (6 May 1932) reported that before and during the election campaign efforts were made to form a National government that would include Labor representatives. 197

209 Trade Unions and the D epression paigned against the Plan when they w ere candidates at the recent Senate electio n s. Some A.L.P. branches and unions w ere anxious that preselection ballots be held, but this view was not endorsed by the C entral Executive, which let nine days pass after the fall of the governm ent before it pronounced on the is su e. Then it reso lv ed instead: That, in view of the sh o rt tim e elapsing between now and the date of nominations, it is not in the best in te re sts of the Movement to hold selection ballots, and, fu rther, that the Executive select candidates. How the m eeting arriv ed at this decision was never made public. Nat R oberts la te r reported to his union (the A.E.U.) that he had moved that selection ballots be held, but had been unable to get a seconder.^ If that w ere the case, then other union officials on the Executive had shown little consistency, for m ost of them had been denouncing the Labor m em bers who supported the Plan for alm ost a y ear, and they had conducted a cam paign 'to clean up' the m ovem ent. D espite the consequences to date of such a policy, the Executive again followed a course of expediency and opportunism. The great m ajority of the candidates it proceeded to endorse w ere retirin g m em bers, m ost of whom had previously supported the Plan. They had become d iscredited in the eyes of many w orkers and w ere the object of disgust, if not hatred, to large sections of the unemployed. The Executive refused to endorse Hogan and Bond, but it decided not to run Labor candidates against them. Apparently this decision was hotly disputed by som e of the union officials on the Executive. According to p re ss re p o rts, union lead ers made strong efforts to induce the Executive to p erm it E. Stew art (organiser. Furnishing T rades Union) to oppose Hogan; but they w ere unsuccessful, and the P re m ie r was returned unopposed. Although the C entral Executive was aw are of th e ir attitude tow ards the Plan, on 23 A pril it again endorsed the retirin g m em bers Jackson and B ailey. The next day Jackson resigned from the party, and subsequently stood as a p ro - Plan candidate. Bailey voiced such w arm approval of the Plan that the C entral Executive was constrained to withdraw his endorsem ent on 28 A pril. The Labor P arty did not run a candidate against Bailey in W arrnam bool, but it selected J.V. Stout (organiser, Shop A ssis - 3 A.E.U., Melbourne District Political Committee Minutes, 17 May

210 The L ast Act ta n ts Union) to contest the P rah ran seat in opposition to Jackson. The A. L.P. P resident inform ed Jones that he was no longer a m em ber ofthea.l.p.; but Hogan, Bond, W illiam s, K iernan, and Bailey continued as nominal m em bers of the party, though p ersistin g throughout the election campaign in th eir attacks on L abor's policy and the C en tral Executive. Trapped within a narrow range of options, union officials called on th eir m em bers to vote Labor, on the ground that an an ti-lab o r governm ent would sm ash wages and working conditions. If they wanted to avoid a retu rn to 'slav ery ' and w ere not prepared to be reduced to 'the coolie level of existence', w orkers had to vote for Labor. The 'le s s e r evil' argum ent was again advanced, as spokesm en, while adm itting that the record of the governm ent had been disappointing, insisted that it had protected w orkers to som e extent and that th eir condition would be desperate - especially in view of the U.A.P. 's support for the Expert C om m ittee's recom m endations - if it w ere not re -e le cte d. Even the leaders of the A.R.U., who had had little cause to be grateful to the governm ent, stre sse d this argum ent. E arly in F ebruary th eir disillusionm ent had in fact led the council of the A.R.U. to endorse a proposal from a section of its m em bership urging that the governm ent vacate the T reasu ry ben ch es. But now the Railways Union Gazette (May 1932) declared that w hatever the grievances of railw aym en, 'the w orst Labor politician is a thousandfold preferable to the best N ationalist candidate in existence'; and the A.R.U. donated 100 (alm ost half the total raised by all unions) to A. L.P. campaign funds. This, too, was the stand taken by officials of the A. F. U. L. E., despite the fact that th eir union had disaffiliated from the A. L.P. The Industrial H erald (12 May 1932) presented an unusual version of the 'red bogey'. It claim ed that Labor, w hatever its shortcom ings, 'has saved A ustralia from bloody revolution', and that the N ationalists would create conditions which would lead to riots such as those that had just occurred in New Zealand. However unhappy they may have felt about the situation, union officials found only one course open to them. As Nat R oberts a sse rte d in the A.E.U. R eport (May 1932), though the governm ent had been a d is appointment, they could not turn to th eir class enem ies but m ust vote for Labor as it was 'our P a rty '. A m ajority at the T.H.C. m eeting on 28 A pril resolved that: This Council pledges itself to give full support to all Labor candidates pledged to oppose the P re m ie rs ' Plan in resp ect 199

211 T rade Unions and the D epression to wage cuts, reduced pensions, and social serv ices, and that affiliated Unions be requested to ren d er all possible financial support and to release th eir officials, to take p art in m eetings and generally a ssis t in the successful prosecution of the campaign. The Council rejected the contention of m ilitants that assistan ce should be confined to those who had consistently opposed the Plan; and another am endm ent, that support be given to candidates pledged to c arry out L abor s policy as laid down in its platform as decided by the recent C onference, was also defeated. In defending the motion, Don Cam eron argued that they had to make the best of men as they found them and that it was n ecessary to te st a man and go through the process of elim inating disloyal m em bers as they went along. As in the past, m em bers of the S ocialist P arty of A ustralia received no support for th eir proposal that, ra th e r than vote for Labor politicians who would let them down, w orkers should w rite Socialism ' acro ss th eir ballot p apers. To the A.L.P. leadership, socialism as an electoral issue rem ained as inopportune as ever, and the Labor Call (12 May 1932) lectured the com m itted who felt that the Objective was being shirked. It justified delay with the proposition that the 100 per cent Labor policy, or Socialism, cannot even be attem pted until C apitalism becom es a spent fo rc e '. Entering actively into the election campaign, the A.P.S.A. and the V.T.U. attem pted to operate as an open p re ssu re group to secure relief from the sacrifices im posed by the Plan, and especially to counter any move to im plem ent the recom m endations of the Expert Com m ittee. They acted jointly through the T eachers' and Public Service Defence League, and the V.T.U. brought out a special issue of the T e ach ers Journal and appointed a publicity officer. The C entral Unemployment Com m ittee drew up a list of demands for vastly im proved assistan ce for the unemployed and made it known that it would urge the unemployed to vote only for those candidates who agreed to support the dem ands. In addition, the C.U.C., reflecting the anger of the unemployed, announced that if the hated fortnightly form s w ere not withdrawn at once, the com m ittee would use its influence against governm ent candidates. Active intervention along these lines, however, was not a feature of the cam paign. During the election cam paign, th eir opponents made great play of accusations that Labor in V ictoria was swinging to Langism, and thus threatened to bring repudiation and financial and social chaos. While the campaign was in p ro g ress, the conflict between Lang and 200

212 The Last Act the Commonwealth governm ent rose to its clim ax, and Lang was d ism issed from office on 13 May, the day before the V ictorian poll. As the daily p ress headlined these events, an atm osphere of tense excitem ent was created which was undoubtedly inim ical to the Labor cause. D espite the b itte r hostility of the A ustralian W orker, Lang in fact had a considerable following of a d m ire rs in V ictoria, as had been revealed during A pril, when he visited M elbourne. He arriv ed on the 13th (by a coincidence the day of the Hogan governm ent s fall) and was greeted at the station by a crowd that included a strong phalanx of top union o fficials. On behalf of the T.H. C. Executive, P resid ent R iley welcomed him as a fighter for the w orkers, and on the following night Lang addressed the T.H.C. To many w orkers, Lang, epitom ising the ideal type of Labor politician standing firm ly in opposition to the m achinations of the Money Pow er, stood in sharp contrast to the weak V ictorian governm ent that had just collapsed. T here was indeed little evidence of enthusiasm in the unions for the re -e le ctio n of the V ictorian Labor governm ent, and th eir response to the appeal for finance was p o o r.^ The A.L.P. itself scarcely showed g reat eagerness to fight the election. Sixty-five seats w ere to be filled, and in 1929 Labor had endorsed forty-ning candidates, but now th ere w ere only th irty -fiv e, of whom three w ere returned unopposed.^ The A.L.P. suffered a devasting blow in the election: the thirty seats it had held in the previous parliam ent w ere reduced to sixteen. Defeat had been alm ost a foregone conclusion, and after 14 May not all union journals even bothered to announce the r e s u lts. It was a sse rte d that electors had been stam peded by unscrupulous propaganda, and in his weekly a rtic le in the L abor C all (19 May 1932) W. W allis announced that it was a V ictory for the Unattached V ote'. But the Industrial H erald (19 May 1932) explicitly declared what was undoubtedly in the minds of many: 'The Labor P arty...has paid dearly for tolerating P arliam en tary leadership that supported the P re m ie rs P lan... '. Although thoroughgoing p o st-m o rtem s of L abor's debacle were 4 The expenses of the election amounted to over 750, but the party's appeal resulted in only s. 5 In 1929, fourteen sitting Labor members had been returned unopposed. There was one Communist candidate, E. Thornton. 201

213 Trade Unions and the D epression ra re, there w ere many indications that the collapse had cleared the a ir. The Labor Call (19 May 1932) now declared that the defeat of the Hogan governm ent was a cause for satisfaction ra th e r than regret, as an end was put to its adm inistration of anti-l abor policy. Labor was not weakened, but strengthened by the change, it argued, and Labor had originally made a serious blunder in accepting office as a m inority governm ent. As the Industrial H erald (26 May 1932) put it, Labor 'was kept in office just so long as it did not attem pt to put L abor's platform into effect'. Now the movement was released from the dilem m as of the past two and a half y e a r s. M inisters and politicians who had defied the authority of the party need no longer be propped up o r apologised for, to guard against the g re a te r evil of au.a.p. governm ent. The P resid en t of the A.L.P. (Don Cameron) predicted that the defeat would make Labor a m ore efficient fighting force, having in mind, no doubt, that it cleared the way for removing from the party those who w ere out of sympathy with its p o licies. The Labor Call (19 May 1932) insisted that in future Labor politicians m ust be subjected to ste rn e r discipline, and stre sse d the need to counteract the belief that politicians w ere m ainly concerned about personal gain and could not be tru sted. Before long these opinions received sharp p ractical expression. On 22 May, the C entral Executive of the A.L.P. discussed the position of those parliam entarians who had supported the Plan during the elections. Then it expelled Bailey (17 June) and Hogan, Bond, W illiam s, and Kiernan (1 Ju ly ). ^ These expulsions w ere endorsed at the A.L.P. Conference of January 1933, which also issued a directive that no leader of the S.P.L.P. should in the future be p e r m itted to form a governm ent unless he had a m ajority in the L egislative A ssem bly. A fter the V ictorian elections the T.U. movement had also d is- 6 Like many Labor politicians before him, Jones, who had been expelled during the elections, transferred to the other camp to become a minister in the new Argyle government. Bailey later joined the Country Party and became a leading minister in the Dunstan governments Jones had been associated with the labour movement since about 1892, and had been a prominent pioneer socialist. He had been a Labor M.L.C. since 1910 and a member of four Labor ministries. After an early union career, Hogan became a Labor M.L.A. in He sat on the Victorian A.L.P. Central Executive from 1914 to 1931 and was president in He became leader of the P.L.P. in He had been a minister in the 1924 Labor government and was Premier in and Bailey had been a Labor M.L.A. since 1914 and a minister in three Labor governments. With records like these, it can be seen that it was no simple step to take disciplinary action against such Labor representatives. 202

214 The Last Act played a new leftw ard trend in its attitude to affairs in New South W ales, w here the Lang governm ent had been dism issed and elections w ere to be held on 11 June On 19 May the T.H.C. urged all possible p re ssu re on the federal A.L.P. to prevent the federal Labor P arty opposing any candidates of the New South W ales Labor P arty. Then, at its next m eeting, the Council requested unions to release th eir officials in o rd er to a ssis t the N.S.W. State Labor P arty in its determ ined fight in defence of the economic conditions of the w o rk e rs'. On 9 June the T.H.C. sent greetings to the Lang P arty, wishing it success in its fight on behalf of w orkers. However, Labor in New South W ales was likew ise defeated at the p o lls. In retro sp ect, d isaste r at the V ictorian elections can be seen to have followed logically from the im passe into which the unions and the Labor P arty had been drawn, step by step, during the previous two and a half y e a rs. In many resp ects, the outlook for the unions after the election was very bleak indeed. Politically the movement had been shattered, and its opponents w ere in pow er. N evertheless, the extrem e right-w ing leaders had been rem oved - albeit after the damage had been done - and the authority of the party over the politicians had been re a sse rte d. Scarifying experiences and a deeper aw areness of the problem s political power posed for labour, could, it seem ed, help now to fashion an instrum ent for w o rk ers' em ancipation. It is a m atter of h istory, however, that this prom ise was not to be fulfilled. 203

215 Postscript The b rie f period covered by this study was one in which, with capitalism experiencing an unprecedented c r is is, the V ictorian T.U. m ovem ent was confronted with problem s of a m agnitude fa r g re a te r than any it had faced b efo re. The tra d e unions had developed as the b asic in d u strial organ isatio n s of the w orking class', but w ere also deeply involved in politics fo r the re a lisatio n of th e ir objectives: in A u stralia the A. L. P. had alw ays been reg ard ed as the p arty of the trad e u n io n s. The b asic purpose of the unions was at le a st to p re se rv e standard s of living and to win im proved conditions for th e ir m e m b e rs. But they had also com e to believe that m any of the w rongs they sought to set rig h t w ere the inevitable re s u lt of the c a p ita list sy stem, and that labour s goals would not be fully attained until cap italism was r e placed by so c ia lism. Both im m ediate policy and ultim ate objectives w ere stern ly challenged by the catastro p h ic situation into which the unions w ere plunged in In the outcom e, the stan d ard of living was not p re se rv e d, and although the unions in siste d that cap italism was responsible fo r the debacle and so cialisatio n the only re a l so lu tion, no serio u s m oves w ere m ade tow ards the attainm ent of the m ovem e n t's avowed O bjective. L abor governm ents, in stalled am id optim istic hopes in 1929 and 1930, provided little p rotection fo r the w orking c la ss against the te rrib le econom ic sto rm, and in fact adopted the an ti-l ab o r policy of im posing w age-cuts to sta b ilise cap italism. The sto ry of how the T.U. m ovem ent was overw helm ed by th ese fearso m e difficulties and sw ept along larg ely at the m ercy of events without offering effective re sista n c e, has been told in the foregoing pages. It is a sto ry of h o p elessn ess and h elp lessn ess, whose c e n tra l them e appears in re tro sp e c t to be that of tra g ic d ile m m a. It begins with the sim ultaneous onset of the d ep ressio n and the trium ph of L abor at the polls at the end of This phase ends with the fall of the Scullin governm ent and then the V ictorian L abor governm ent in 1932, which rem oved a m ajo r dilem m a, but only a fte r b itte r suffering and political d isin teg ratio n had been endured, and at the co st of defeats which sh attered the m ovem ent. The labour m ovem ent w as, on any te st, ill-equipped to cope with the ideological challenges th ru st on it by the d ep ressio n. It had no accepted corpus of econom ic o r so c ia list thought, and it is a tru ism 204

216 P o stscrip t among historians that its inclination tow ards working out coherent theory had traditionally been weak. ^ The labour movement em braced a range of in te re sts, which had common agreem ent on certain broad and general principles, like opposition to social and economic injustice and the d esire to secure and m aintain im proved standards of living. The extrem e p re ssu re s generated by the depression w ere calculated to bring differences within this lo osely-structured movement to the fore, and reveal - to its agony - that it em braced men with often radically different ideas about the p ractical application of generalities upon which all had been nominally agreed. As an inbuilt component of the movement, the unions faced p a rtic ularly painful d ilem m as. T heir raison d 'e tre was protection of standards of living, so that under no circum stances could they accept cuts in wages. T heir methods w ere essentially pragm atic; they w ere com m itted by tradition and p ractical experience to the gradual reform of capitalism in the w o rk ers in te re sts. In so fa r as the m ovem ent's goal of socialism affected them, it was as a long-term objective to be won by piecem eal advances. In periods of pro sp erity, the union leadership was able to proceed com fortably with day-to-day struggles for sm all gains, scarcely obliged to face up to the im plications of the assum ptions on which its actions w ere based. But with capitalism in c ris is, fundamental challenges to these assum ptions raised in tra c t able questions which had a p ractical as well as a theoretical im port. The re a litie s of the situation - falling national income, unprecedented unemployment, the need to avoid overseas default - pointed to a need for sacrifice on the p art of w orkers if the cap italist system was to be stabilised. The unions, ipso facto, could never agree to such s a c r i fices. But the m ost obvious alternative - to take d irect action, based on a clear recognition of th eir so cialist goal, to a ssis t in replacing the social o rd er - was even m ore repugnant to them. When forced to adopt an ideological stance, union spokesm en thus took an uneasy middle course. Following the lead of men like Anstey and Theodore, they agitated for inflationary policies, seeking recovery by m eans of l A principal contributor to the L. Call was 'Scrutator', who was a poet, a Labor pioneer, and a sincere socialist propagandist ot left-wing persuasion. In the L. Call of 23 July 1931 he explained: 'My religion I call "The Religion of Humanity! It is a mixture of Christian, Confucian, Buddhistic, Marxian, Leninist and Aurelian philosophy, with a dash of Renan, Rousseau, Spinoza, Omar Khayyam, Thomas Paine, Bradlaugh, Bob Ingersoll, Walt Whitman, Bob Ross, Jack Lang, Will Craig and Harry Langridge in it. 'Tis also streaked with Mark Twain, Aristophanes and Bernard Shaw, and spotted with Shelley, Keats and Shakespeare...Perhaps, if I were less circumspect, or more courageous, I would call myself a Communist.' 205

217 Trade Unions and the D epression increased purchasing power through higher wages and m onetary and banking refo rm s. In the circum stances this was no real solution, and could only lead to an uncertain, contradictory course. Inflationary ideas, in this pre-k eynesian e ra, had no chance of success against the overwhelming opposition of orthodox financial opinion. In addition, the unions them selves, where they advocated such policies coherently, fought from a losing position. Reeling under the im pact of the c ris is, the greatly weakened unions w ere in no position to exert a dominating influence. They could neither contrive effective propaganda weapons nor impose th eir will on the Labor politicians. In the last re so rt, ideas had to be underpinned by the power to enforce them, and this the unions did not hav e. But during this period there was evidence of an increasing in terest in socialism and a new em phasis on the m ovem ent's Objective. Com m unists, though isolated on the extrem e left wing and advancing policies which, given the tem per of m ajority opinion in the unions, w ere unreal as p ractical objectives, undoubtedly played an im portant p art in this connection. The decision of the V ictorian A. L.P. C onference at the beginning of 1932 to set up a Socialisation Com m ittee and organise socialisation units within unions and Labor P arty branches, was partly a reaction to the p re ssu re of com m unist propaganda. But it was also a m anifestation of the general leftward swing in union opinion, as w orsening conditions strengthened the b elief that c a p ita l ism was breaking down and m ust inevitably be replaced. Not that re v olutionary action was given a m om ent's thought: as the A ustralian W orker (17 February 1932) insisted, 'the cap italist system is d estro y ing itself' and 'th ere is no need to kill it'. At the sam e tim e, too, the T.U. m ovem ent's preoccupation with m onetary reform represented, in a sense, a sidestepping of the real issu e s. W hereas classical socialist thought saw the w o rkers' lack of purchasing power as fundam ental to the capitalist system, it was now being said that purchasing power was an elem ent in the system which could be regulated to the w orkers' advantage o r detrim ent. Attack on the power of financial institutions, with the object of taking control of m onetary regulation out of th eir hands, was seen as a fruitful undertaking which would at 2 L. Call, 18 February For some time the A.R.U. had been urging the creation of a Socialisation Committee on the N.S.W. pattern, and following the A.L.P. Conference decision it set up an 'A.R.U. Socialisation of Railways Committee'. Increasing interest in the U.S.S.R., together with the spread of communist influence, were reflected in the decision of the A.R.U. to send a delegate to the Soviet May Day Celebrations in

218 P o stcrip t once prom ote recovery, ra ise living standards, and m ark a consid erable step tow ards socialism. In many ways, this was a com fortable - if not entirely realistic - position to adopt. It fitted the gradualist tradition of the movement; allowed its proponents to have the b est of both worlds - appealing to the electorate as the champions of stability and recovery and to the unions as cham pions of socialism ; and envisaged far-reach in g change within the lim its of legality and without the prospect of open social conflict. But an attitude of this kind could only bring other d ifficu lties. With Labor governm ents in office and with the opposition to m onetary reform so pow erful, the unions' dem ands ex acerb ated ten sio n s within the m ovem ent, and ultim ately raised that fundam ental question: did a Labor governm ent represent the w orkers' in terests or was its p rim ary duty to national in te re sts? Persuaded that th ere was no p ractical alternative, the governm ents cam e to accept the necessity for wage cuts as the only m eans of achieving stab ility. Union spokesm en, though they said c a p italism was breaking down, denied the necessity for sacrifices by w orkers, and tended to regard the cuts as the products of weak governm ents and a 'biased' A rbitration C ourt. Previous assum ptions that P arliam ent was param ount in the nation's life, and that a Labor governm ent could function under capitalism in the w orkers' in te re sts, in creasingly gave place to the belief that Money Pow er was suprem e. M eantime, neutralised both by th eir am bivalent attitudes to capitalism and by th eir fear that loss of the Labor governm ents would lead to something fa r w orse, the unions equivocated on the issue of d isciplining L abor's represen tativ es and drifted from one defeat to another. R etreat was a cum ulative pro cess, and, once begun, led the unions progressively deeper into a bog of ineffectualness. The depression followed so quickly upon the optim ism engendered by the electoral trium phs in 1929 that there was little opportunity to a sse ss the situ a tion and calculate how to take resolute action under determ ined le a d e r ship. Union lead ers, entrenched in th eir positions, used to making decisions on sh o rt-te rm issu es, and ill-equipped theoretically to face so catastrophic a phenomenon as the depression, w ere not of the calibre to elaborate long-range plans with initiative and d ecisiv en ess. It was some tim e before they began to re a lise that recovery was not just round the corner: m eantim e unemployment sapped the strength of th eir organisations and raised im m ediate p ractical problem s which increasingly absorbed th eir tim e and energy. And it should be added that, though difficult to a sse ss precisely, an im portant factor in fu rth er neutralising the union approach to policy was the constant 207

219 Trade Unions and the D epression barrag e of propaganda about the need to accept s a c rific e s. Although the movement sought to rebut the argum ents on which this propaganda was based, its appeal to patriotism, and the m oral p re ssu re it imposed in its demand that sacrifices m ust be made to a ssis t the unemployed, could not but have cut acro ss many w o rk e rs determ ination to re s ist the cuts with which they w ere faced - especially as they saw that the c risis was practically world-w ide. But when this has been said, the cru cial question of discipline rem ains. Conference after conference did c ritic ise the Labor governments for failing to c a rry out previous decisions, made new sets of demands, but refused to attach clear penalties. Some Labor m em bers attem pted to conform, or at least stre sse d - as for example Scullin did - th eir pain at being obliged to act in ways unpalatable to the m ovement, while voicing th eir sincere conviction that there was no a lte rn a tive. O thers - like Hogan - in effect rejected conference dem ands, making clear enough that they had no intention of carrying them o u t. In the face of this situation, the governing policy of the m ovem ent b e came that of preserving the outward unity of the party by hesitating to enforce discipline which would m ean a split in the m ovem ent and bring anti-l abor' into office. Only a m inority - though it was a significant one - favoured a thoroughgoing purge, and was prepared to face the prospect of form ing a breakaw ay party if n ecessary. The alternative to precipitating an overt split of this nature was to 'clean up' the m ovement from the inside, and this, in fact, was the course that the m ajority of the union leadership opted to follow. But its success could not but be lim ited, and in the m eantim e the Labor governm ents im plem ented the policies of 'an ti-l abor', thus losing th eir essen tial purpose and indentity and becoming discredited in the eyes of many w orkers. It has of course to be recognised that, even if it had been firm ly united behind a positive policy, the potential influence of the V ictorian T.U. movement was lim ited. It could certainly ex ert p re ssu re on Labor politicians; and did, on occasion, actually stepping beyond its province to give directives to Labor m em bers, federal and State. But this was the way of wrecking the foundations of the party. M oreover, the special nature of the V ictorian political situation set lim its to such bold expedients. The fragm entation of political groupings had long created an unstable balance in the A ssem bly, and it was m ost unlikely that Labor could ever hope for a c lear m ajority there without electoral redistribution; and there was always the reactionary upper House to reckon with. In the federal sphere, V ictorian union influence was 208

220 P o stscrip t naturally very lim ited: the V ictorians constituted but a sm all segm ent of a large and complex m achine working on federal lin e s. With worsening conditions, the unions becam e m ore dependent on the Labor governm ents as the 'le s s e r evil' in the face of the danger of putting th eir enem ies into pow er. This was th eir central dilem m a, from which they could not escape. Only a m inority w ere prepared to in sist that this unsatisfactory com prom ise m ust be abandoned as being a source of m ore damage than good to the T.U. movement, and that constructive and unified opposition to non-l abor governm ents would in the end be a preferable position to occupy. F a r few er still saw an alternative in action outside the fram ew ork of parliam entary p o litic s. But, by Jan u ary 1932, the unions w ere moving tow ards a show down. The A.L.P. Conference of that month, under strong union p re ssu re, took a firm e r stand against politicians who supported the P re m ie rs ' Plan and other violations of Labor policy. There w ere im m ediate circum stances which accelerated the movement in this direction: m ost notably the w o rk ers' p art in defeating the Scullin governm ent and the prospect of elections in V ictoria, in which Labor candidates could scarcely appear as the champions of w age-cuts. In a sense this hardening attitude was born of defeat. Then the collapse of the Hogan governm ent brought the final liquidation of the dilem m a and facilitated a re tu rn to traditional postures in which radical demands could be made without the lim itations of a responsibility to im plem ent them. A cen tral them e of the sto ry is the disillusionm ent of the unions as they w ere dealt sev ere blows by what had hitherto been regarded as the two traditional instrum ents for achieving th eir ends - Labor governm ents and the A rbitration C ourt. The unions w ere wedded to the arb itratio n system which had been seen as a m eans of peaceful, gradual, and continuous im provem ent of living standards. But they had also assum ed that a Labor governm ent would do what was n e c e ssary to make this concept a reality by undoing the work of the B ru ce- Page governm ent which, they claim ed, had perverted the system. The Court in fact becam e a m ajor instrum ent for readjustm ent, and the Scullin governm ent failed to reform it. Confused thinking and disillusion followed. T here was a tendency for the problem of h a lting wage cuts to be seen largely as a question of reform ing arb itratio n. M eantim e, the alternative of taking d irect action to re s is t cuts becam e less and less feasible, as, lacking m ilitant leadership and unity of purpose, the m ovem ent found its industrial strength shattered by unem ploym ent. Strong o rg an isatio n al links with the unemployed 209

221 T rad e Unions and the D epression w ere essential to the in terests both of the unions and of the unem ployed them selves. But, in fact, the in terests of both were crippled, as the unemployed drifted out of the T.U. movement and hostility and friction developed, and, further, rival unemployed organisations (the C. U. C. and U. W. M.) grew up. In the face of the challenges posed by the whole situation we have been examining, the m oderate, refo rm ist leadership of the unions had been found wanting. While the policies to which they w ere wedded w ere appropriate enough during periods of prosperity, it may well be argued that the unprecedented difficulties presented by the depression demanded a new type of leadership. The entrenched union b u reau c racy rested on the convenient precept that leaders w ere a reflection of the rank and file and could go only as far and as fast as the rank and file w ere inclined to go. It had not been vitally concerned to m obilise o r inspire the fighting potential of the movement, o r to te st the possibility that a rousing forward policy might lead to a successful m ass m ovem ent. A m inority within the official labour movement, however, sensed that weakness begets w eakness, and that there is a reciprocal interaction between leaders and the led. A fter all, to blam e the rank and file - w hatever th eir apparent shortcom ings - suggested a lack of faith in them, and such an attitude could only lead to further defeatism. On one view, the tragedy for w orkers was that a left-wing alliance between m ilitants who thought in these term s and might have offered dynamic leadership m ore suited to the unique challenge of the tim es, was ruled out by the Communist P a rty. 210

222 Appendix I Appendix I Trade Unions : Number and Membership * End V ictoria A ustralia of No. of Total no. No. of No. of year separate of branches m em bers unions m em bers V ictoria C entral labour organisations No. of m etropolitan No. of unions and and d istric t o r local branches affiliated labour councils thereto , , , , , , , , ,089f 739, , , , , * Compiled from Official Year Books of the Commonwealth of A u stra lia. t In V ictoria on 30 June 1933 th ere w ere 348,405 wage or salary earn ers 20 y ears of age and over. This figure is derived from the Census of the Commonwealth of A ustralia, 30 June 1933, and does not include those who w ere employed p art tim e o r w ere unemployed. 211

223 Appendix II A ppendix II N otes on Union O fficials (a) E xam ples of V ictorian union officials, , who had held office fo r lengthy periods C. A ndersen: Sec. A.M.I.E.U J. B radshaw : Sec. P la s te re rs's o c ie ty ; T.H.C. delegate ; a m em b er of T.H.C. Building C om m ittee fo r m any y e a rs. P. B randt: B om Sec. P astry co o k s' Union fo r m any y e a rs. H. C arter: An official of the Clothing T ra d e s' Union since about W.G. Cook: Died One of the founders of the Cold Storage Em p. Union, and s e c re ta ry sin ce its inception (for over tw enty y e a rs ). J. De Gruchy: Sec. Sheet M etal W o rk ers' Union c G. D upree: Sec. T a n n e rs Union; T.H.C. delegate c R. Elliott: B om 1864; died Helped found and build P.I. E.U. A.; an official since 1909, s e c re ta ry from Foundation m em b er of Essendon b ran ch of the A. L. P. A.E. Huckerby: Sec. T h e a tric a l Em p. A ss. since its form ation in 1908; a m em b er of T.H.C. D isputes C om m ittee. H. Keiley: Sec. Wool and B asil W o rk ers' Union, had been an official of the union for m any y e a r s. R. Large: Sec. O perative B a k e rs' Union since W. M assey: Sec. G eelong T.H.C W. M ears: Sec. B ric k la y e rs ' Society since 1907; a m em b er of T.H.C. Building C om m ittee fo r som e y e a rs. H. Moloney: Sec. Ship P a in te rs ' and D ockers' Union ; T.H.C. d eleg ate R. O 'H alloran: Sec. B o ilerm ak ers's o ciety sin ce about T. P ric e : Sec. F ed. Iro n w o rk e rs' A ss. since about P.J. Smith: Sec. B u ild ers L a b o re rs' F ederation fo r m any y e a rs. 212

224 Appendix II J. Walsh: H aw kers and D e ale rs Union; T.H.C. delegate ; by 1935 had been a delegate to every V ictorian A.L.P. conference in the last tw enty-four y e ars. H. W atson: Sec. O perative P a in te r s Union since about (b) Some union officials who w ere m unicipal councillors at som e tim e during M unicipal Name Union council G. R.A. B eardsw orth (J.P.) Sec. Hospital E m p.f ed J.J. Behan H. C arter W. D ivers W.J. Duggan (J.P.) J. Elliott H. F o ster M. Kennedy H. Maynard G. M cp herson F. R ichardson W.H. T urner Sec. Melb. B ranch C a rte rs' and D riv e rs' Union G en.sec. Clothing T rades' Union O rganiser, Municipal Emp. Union Official of P lu m b ers Union' See (c) O rganiser C a rte rs' and D riv ers' Union Sec. P lu m b er s Union Sec. Rubber W o rkers Union (since 1916) Sec. B read C a rte rs' Union since its form ation in 1906 S ec. Fodder and Fuel Trades Union; and for many years a m em ber of the T. H. C. Executive Com m ittee and T.H.C. Disputes Com m ittee O rganiser A. W. U. Sec. C a rte rs' and D riv ers' Union 213 C helsea(m ayor) South M elbourne (ex-m ayor) M elbourne City Essendon C oburg(m ayor) Essendon (mayor) M elbourne City Richmond P reston P reston (mayor) Oakleigh Northcote (ex-m ayor)

225 Appendix II (c) Union officials who held positions in the A. L.P. in V ictoria at som e tim e during J. Barnes: B om 1868; died A.W.U. (V ictoria-r iverina S ec , P re s, since 1913, Gen. P re s, since c. 1922). C.E x. Vic A.L.P. for many y ears. Labor senator , C.J. Bennett: Sec. B lacksm iths' Society since c C.E x. Vic. A. L.P. (had been on C.E x. for over twenty y e ars, and was a past P r e s.). A.A. Calwell: Bom Public servant. P r e s. A.P.S.A. and Sec State Instrum entalities Unions' Com m ittee, C.Ex. Vic. A.L.P ; P re s. Vic. A.L.P. 1931; Fed. Ex. A.L.P.; delegate to every Fed. A. L.P. Conference Subsequently Labor M.H.R. and m in ister. Don Cameron: B om 1878; died V eteran of B oer W ar; prom inent anti-conscriptionist in W. A.; Sec. Vic. Socialist Party; leading Labor jo u rn alist. On Fed. Ex. Tram w ay Union; M arine Stew ards' Union delegate to T.H.C.; P re s. T.H.C ; T.H.C representative on A.C.T.U.; A ss. Sec. T.H.C C.Ex. Vic. A.L.P.; P re s. Vic. A. L.P. 1932; delegate to Fed. A. L.P. Conference; Fed. Ex. A. L.P. Subsequently Labor senator and m in ister. J.W. Chandler: S ec. F. E. D. & F. A., c_ T.H.C. Executive and Disputes C om m ittees. C.Ex. Vic. A. L.P. J.F. Chappie: G en.sec. A.R.U. (had been an official of the A.R.U. for many y e a rs). C.Ex. Vic. A. L.P. (V ice-p res. 1931, 1932). M em ber of board of d irecto rs of Labor C a ll. He had been prom inent e a rlie r in the Vic. Socialist P arty. P.J. Clarey: Born 1890; died Storem en and P a c k ers' Union, and Food P re s e rv e rs' Union (Sec , Fed. P re s ). C.Ex. Vic. A. L.P Subsequently P r e s. A.C.T.U., and Labor politician and m in ister. M.P. Considine: Cold Storage Union delegate to the T.H.C. and A. L.P. C onferences. C.Ex. Vic. A.L.P.; delegate to Fed. A. L.P. Conference C.Ex. = Central Executive; Fed.Ex. = Federal Executive. 214

226 Appendix II C. C rofts: B orn 1871; died Sec. Gas Em p. Union since c T.H.C. E xecutive and D isputes C om m ittees (Pres.T.H.C ). Sec. A.C.T.U C.Ex. V ic. A.L.P. (P re s. A.L.P. 1926). D elegate to I. L.O. C onference A dvocate in b a sic wage c a ses 1931, Jean D aley: F em ale C o n fectio n ers' Union. C.Ex. V ic. A.L.P. fo r m any y e a rs; A.L.P. W om en's O rg a n ise r. A.S. D rakeford: B orn Gen. P r e s. A.F.U.L.E (previously Gen. Sec.). C.Ex. V ic. A.L.P. (P re s. V ic. A.L.P ); delegate to F ed. A.L.P. C onference. M.L.A. (E ssendon). Subsequently L abor M.H.R. and m in is te r. W.J. Duggan: B orn 1884; died Sec. T.H.C. from Nov P r e s. A.C.T.U. C.Ex. V ic. A.L.P. (P re s. A.L.P ); deleg ate to F ed. A.L.P. C onferences; F ed. Ex. A.L.P. H.E. F o ste r: Sec. P lu m b e rs' Union c sin ce about T r e a s. V ic. A.L.P. G. H ayes: O rg a n iser O p erativ e B a k e rs 'U n io n. P r e s. T.H.C ; T.H.C. E xecutive and D isputes C om m ittees fo r m any y e a rs. C.Ex. V ic. A.L.P. F.J. R iley: Sec. M anufacturing G ro c e rs ' Union V ic e - P r e s. V ic. A.L.P P r e s. T.H.C. N. R o b erts: O rg a n iser A. E.U. T.H.C. (V ic e -P re s. June-S ep t. 1930). C.Ex. V ic. A.L.P. R.S. R oss: Died P io n e e r so c ia list; L abor jo u rn a list. Sec. V ic. S o cia list P a rty. C le rk s' Union delegate to the T.H.C. and A.L.P. C o n feren ces. V ic e -P re s. V ic. A.L.P ; delegate to F ed. A.L.P. C onference A ppointed to V ic. State Savings Bank B oard Nov J.M. Sheehan: B o m O rg a n ise r A.R.U. C.Ex. V ic. A.L.P. Subsequently L abor se n a to r , E. Stew art: F e d.s e c. and o rg a n is e r F u rn ish in g T rad e s Union. C.Ex. V ic. A.L.P. A.R. W allis, J.P.: B o m C lothing T ra d e s ' Union (P re s. 1909; o rg a n is e r ; V ic. Sec ; G en.s ec ). P r e s. T.H.C C.Ex. V ic. A.L.P Subsequently C om m onw ealth C onciliation C o m m issio n er. 215

227 Appendix III Appendix III Weekly Basic Wage P rescrib ed by the Commonwealth Court of C onciliation and A rbitration * Date payable 1930 M elbourne Six capitals (weighted average) 1 F eb ru ary 4 10s 4 10s 6d 1 May 4 6s 4 7s 'H arv ester' equivalent (all Houses Index 1 August 4 5s 6d 4 6s N um bers) plus the 1 N ovem ber 4 3s 4 3s 'P ow ers' 3s F eb ru ary 3 10s 2d 3 11s Id 1 May 3 8s 5d 3 9s 4d 1 August 3 5s 8d 3 7s 6d H arv ester' equivalent 1 November s 5d 3 5s 3d (all Houses Index N um bers) plus the 'P ow ers' 3 s; less 1 F ebruary 3 3s 5d 3 4s 4d 10 p er cent 1 May 3 3s lid 3 4s lod 1 August 3 3s 3 3s l id * Compiled from Official Y ear Books of the Commonwealth of A u stralia. But note that an examination of the level of the basic wage does not give an accurate indication of the income being actually received by many w orkers at this tim e. The census of 1933, for exam ple, revealed that of a total of 645, 424 male breadw inners in V ictoria, 334, 317 w ere in fact receiving less than the basic wage. (This figure was compiled from the Census of the Commonwealth of A ustralia 30 June 1933.) 216

228 Appendix IV Appendix IV P ercentage of M em bers of T rade Unions Returned as Unemployed* 1929 A ustralia V ictoria 1st quarter nd " rd " th " st quarter nd rd " th " st quarter nd " rd " th " st quarter nd " rd M th M st q u arter nd M rd " th " * Compiled from Official Year Books of the Commonwealth of A ustralia 217

229 Selected Bibliography A. M anuscript T rade Union Minute Books, 1930-June 1932 (All located at the office of the tra d e union concerned) Amalgamated Clothing and Allied T rad e s Union of A ustralia, Victorian Branch Amalgamated Engineering Union, M elbourne D istrict Committee Amalgamated Engineering Union, M elbourne D istrict P olitical Committee A ustralian B uilders L aborers Federation, V ictorian Branch (General Meetings ; Executive Committee M arch 1931-June 1932) Federated Liquor and Allied T rades Em ployees Union, V ictorian Branch Melbourne T rades Hall Council Operative P ain ters and D ecorators' Union of A ustralia, V ictorian Branch Plum bers and G asfitters Em ployees Union of A ustralia, Melbourne Branch Committee of Management B. Newspapers and Trade Union Journals June June 1932 Age (Melbourne) A m algam ated Engineering Union Monthly R eport (Sydney) A rgus (Melbourne) A ustralian Postal E lectrician s' Union Journal (Melbourne) A ustralian W orker (Sydney), organ of the A ustralian W orkers' Union Footplate (Melbourne), organ of the V ictorian and Tasm anian Divisions of the A ustralian Federated Union of Locomotive Enginemen H erald (Melbourne) Industrial H erald (Geelong) Journalist (Sydney), organ of the A ustralian Jo u rn alists A ssociation and of the New Zealand Jo u rn alists Association Labor Call (Melbourne) 218

230 Selected B ibliography P an -P acific W orker (Sydney), organ of the P an-p acific T rade Union S e c re tariat, P ostal Advocate (Sydney), organ of the Amalgam ated P ostal W o rk ers Union of A ustralia P rinting T rades Journal (Melbourne), organ of the Printing Industry Em ployees' Union of A ustralia Public Service Journal of V ictoria (Melbourne), organ of the V ictorian B ranch of the A ustralian Public Servants' A ssociation Railways Union Gazette (Melbourne), organ of the V ictorian Branch of the A.R.U. Red L eader (Sydney), organ of the M ilitant M inority Movement Most issu es of this period are m issing from the files of the State L ibrary of V ictoria Shop A ssistan t of A ustralia (Melbourne), organ of the Shop A ssistants and W arehouse Em ployees' Federation of A ustralia T each ers' Journal (Melbourne), organ of the V ictorian T each ers' Union T im ber W orker (M elbourne), organ of the A ustralian T im ber W orkers' Union, V ictorian B ranch. Ceased publication O ctober 1930 Tram w ay R ecord (Melbourne), organ of the A ustralian Tramway Em ployees' A ssociation Union Voice (M elbourne) W orkers' Weekly (Sydney), organ of the Com m unist P arty of A ustralia Many issues a re m issing from the files of the State L ibrary of V ictoria C. P erio d icals, A rticles, and O ther P rinted M aterials- A nderson, G., 'Wage Reductions in A u stralia', Economic R ecord, Vol. VII, May 1931, pp , 'T rade U nions', Annals of the A m erican Academy of P o litica l and Social S cien ce, Vol. 158, N ovem ber 1931, pp , 'Wage R ates and the Standard of Living', ib id., p p ( Anstey, F., F acts and Theories of F inance, M elbourne, [1930] Copland, D.B., 'Financial and C urrency P ro p o sa ls', A ustralian Q u arterly, No. 9, M arch 1931, pp C urtin, John, A u stralia's Economic C risis and the 55,000,000 In terest B ill, P erth, n.d. Hughes, W.M., Bond o r F r e e, Sydney, Langridge, H.E., F ree B read, M elbourne,

231 S elected B ibliography M assey, G., The L ast Shilling, M elbourne, P ro cto r, R., The New Evangel Way, M elbourne, Round Table (London): Vol. XX, D ecem ber 1929 to Septem ber 1930; VoL XXI, D ecem ber 1930 to Septem ber 1931; Vol. XXII, Decem ber 1931 to Septem ber 1932 Shann, E.O.G, and Copland, D.B. (eds.), C risis in A ustralian Finance 1929 to 1931: Documents on budgetary and economic policy, Sydney, and (eds.), The Battle of the Plans: Documents relating to the P re m ie rs Conference, May 25th-June 11th, 1931, Sydney, LATER WORKS Anderson, G., 'The Basic Wage in A u stralia', Economic R ecord, Vol. XIV, June 1938, p p Bland, F.A., 'Unemployment Relief in A u stralia', International Labour R eview, Vol. XXX, No. 1, July 1934, p p Cam pbell, E.W., H istory of the A ustralian Labour Movement: A M arxist interpretation, Sydney, Copland, D.B., A ustralia in the World C risis , Cam bridge, Cowper, N., 'Tow ards Industrial Peace in A u stra lia ', Economic R ecord, Vol. XIV, June 1938, pp C risp, L.F., The A ustralian F ederal Labour P arty, , London, Denning, W., Caucus C ris is, P a rram a tta, Evatt, H.V., 'H istory of F ederal A rb itratio n ', A ustralian Q u arterly, Vol. IX, No. 3, Septem ber 1937, pp j 'C ontrol of Labor Relations in the Commonwealth of A u s tra lia', U niv ersity of Chicago Law Review, June 1939, F ish er, A.G.B., 'C risis and R eadjustm ent in A u stralia', Journal of P olitical Econom y, Vol. XLII, No. 6, D ecem ber 1934, pp F itzpatrick, B., A Short H istory of the A ustralian Labor M ovement, M elbourne, Foenander, O. der., Towards Industrial Peace in A u stralia, M elbourne, Giblin, L.F., The Growth of a C entral Bank, M elbourne, Gollan, R., Radical and Working C lass Politics: A study of E astern A u stra lia, , M elbourne, Higgins, E.M., The Queensland Labour Governm ents, M.A. th esis, 1954, U niversity of M elbourne. 220

232 Selected B ibliography Hill, M.R., The Basic Wage, ', A ustralian Q u arterly, Vol. XXV, No. 4, D ecem ber 1953, pp Lang, J.T., Why I Fight, Sydney, j The G reat B u st, Sydney, Louis, L. J., Some A spects of the C ontroversy over Industrial A rbitration in A ustralia during B.A. th esis, 1959, U niversity of M elbourne. M ccallum, J.A., 'The A ustralian Labour P a rty ', A ustralian Q u a rte rly, No. 29, M arch 1936, pp M aclaurin, W.R., Economic Planning in A ustralia , London, O veracker, L., The A ustralian P arty System, London, Oxnam, D.W., 'Strikes in A u stralia', Economic R ecord, Vol. XXIX, May 1953, pp P artrid g e, P.H., 'D epression and W ar, ' in G. Greenwood (ed.), A ustralia: A social and political h isto ry, Sydney, P erlm an, M., Judges in Industry: A study of labour arb itratio n in A u stra lia, M elbourne, P e te r, P., Social A spects of the D epression in New South W ales Ph.D. th esis, 1964, A ustralian National U niversity. Rawson, D. W., The O rganisation of the A ustralian Labor P arty Ph.D. th esis, 1954, U niversity of M elbourne. R echter, M., The Strike of W aterside W orkers in A ustralian P o rts, 1928, and the Lockout of Coal M iners on the N orthern Coalfields of New South W ales M.A. th esis, 1957, U niversity of M elbourne. R oss, L., 'A ustralian Labour and the C ris is ', Economic R ecord, Vol. VIII, D ecem ber 1932, p p j 'The Dilem m a of Trade U nionism ', Economic R ecord, Vol. X, D ecem ber 1934, pp j 'F ro m Lane to Lang', A ustralian Q u arterly, No.24, D ecem ber 1934, pp j 'Socialism and A ustralian Labour', A ustralian Q u arterly, Vol. XXII, N o. 1, M arch 1950, p p Sawer, G., A ustralian F ederal Politics and Law , M elbourne, Theodore, E.G., 'N ationalization of C red it', Economic R ecord, Vol. IX, D ecem ber 1933, pp W alker, E.R., A ustralia in the W orld D ep ressio n, London, 1933 j Unemployment P olicy, Sydney,

233 Selected B ibliography W alker, K.F., 'A u stralia' in W. Galenson (ed.), Com parative Labor M ovem ents, New Y ork, 1955., Industrial Relations in A u stra lia, H arvard, Whitington, Don, The House will D ivide, M elbourne, Wildavsky, A and Carboch, D., Studies in A ustralian P olitics, M elbourne, REFERENCE WORKS Census of the Commonwealth of A ustralia, 30 June 1933, 3 v o ls., Commonwealth B ureau of Census and S tatistics, Governm ent P rin ter, C anberra. Commonwealth B ureau of Census and S tatistics, Labour R e p o rts, , Governm ent P rin te r, C anberra. Official Y ear Books of the Commonwealth of A ustralia, , Government P rin te r, C anberra. Report of the Royal Com m ission appointed to inquire into the Monetary and Banking System s, 1937, Governm ent P rin te r, C anberra. V ictorian Y ear-b ook, , G overnm ent P r in te r, M elbourne. 222

234 Index Amalgamated Engineering Union, 2n., 67, 154, passim Amalgamated Postal Workers Union, 13n., 103, 136n. Anstey, F., 23, 59, 122n., 205 Arbitration, industrial: union attitudes, 7-9, 11, 13, 14, 32n., 64-5, 68, 73, 78-9, 84, 113, 147, 209 Australasian Manufacturer, 17, 46 Australian Council ol Trade Unions, 2n., 4, 27n.; and arbitration, 64; and basic wage, 79, 80, 82n., 85, 86-7, 153-4; depression policies, 32, 52, 55, 71, 85, 132n.; and Labor split, 97; and Premiers Plan, 115, 132, 154; and unemployed, 159 Australian Federated Union of Locomotive Enginemen, 1, 13n., 143, 145; disaffiliated from A.L.P., 132; and retrenchment and wage reductions, 50, 70-3, 105, 143n., 155; and Victorian elections, 199 Australian Labor Party: and basic wage, 86-7; conferences (1930) 32-4, 49, 52-6, (1931) 90, 92n., , 116-,17, 123-5, 127-8, 176, (1932) , , 187; demands assurancesfromlaborm.ps., 55, 57, 104, 110, 112, 119, 120, 125; expulsions, 202; and Hogan government, 53-4, 107, 108, 114, , 124-5, 140, 176, 181; and Lang, 90, 98; and public service retrenchment, 57, 76; and trade unions, 9-10, 11, 108-9, 122, 129, 130-4, 138, 139, 208; and Victorian elections, 198-9; see also Premiers' Plan (Labor Party decisions) Australian Meat Industry Employees Union, , 152n. Australian Public Servants Association, see Public service unions Australian Railways Union, 2, 4, 13n., 101-2, 142, 143, 145, 146n., 183, 206n.; and arbitration, 70, 79, 113; and Labor government, 16, 132, 199; and Premiers' Plan, 116n.; retrenchment and conflict with Hogan government, 50, 54, passim, 118, , 143n.; and Victorian elections, 16, 199; and wage reductions, 70-3, 89n., 113, 155 Australian Tramway Employees' Association, 121, 134, 142, 143, 154 Australian Worker, 4n., 5, 136n.; and arbitration, 68, 73, 78; and depression, 19-20, 22, 23; and Labor governments, 18, 39, 41, 50, 60, 99, 100, 109; and Labor split, 95-7 passim; and Premiers' Plan controve rsy7-it6, 120-1, 130, 132, 134; and strikes, 150, 152 Australian Workers'Union, 4, 10n., 109; and Labor split, 97, 98; opposes general strike, 85; and Premiers' Plan controversy, 120-1, 127n., 134; and unemployed, 173; and wage reductions, 67-9, 82-3 Barnes, J., 108n., 110n., 120, 123, 134, 214 Batten, L., 86n., 124 Blackburn, M.M., 58n., 77, 108n., 110n., 120n., 141n., 170 Bond, E., 110, 119, 196, 198, 199, 202 Boot Trades Union, 13n., 134 Bruce-Page government, 7, 8, 10, 13, 14 Building trades unions, 142n., 157, 160n. Cain, J., 50, 105, 106, 119 Calwell, A.A., 3, 33n., 214; and Labor split, 90n., 98; and Premiers'Plan controversy, 116, 123, 125, 127n., 131, 133, 134; and salary reductions, 75; strikes denounced, 150, 152 Cameron, D., 5n., 10, 32, 176, 179, 185, 214; on depression, 44-5, 93n.; on Labor governments, 60, 202; on Labor split, 61, 95; and Premiers Plan controversy, 101, 116, 117, passim, passim, passim, 140, 193, 200; on socialism, 29, 31; on wage reductions, 63, 64, 73, 79, 94, 126, 145 Carters' and Drivers Union, 15, 49, 54 Central Unemployment Committee, 88, 159, 164, 167, 171, 172, 175, passim, 200 Chappie, J.F., 71, 107, 113, 119n., 130, 140n., 214 Clarey, P.J., 122, 140, 141n., 214 Clothing Trades' Union, 46, 98 Communist Party of Australia, 5n., 10, 14, 34-6, 37, 39, 61, 65-6, 67, 79, 84, 98, passim, , passim, passim, 190, 210 Considine, M.P., 53, 90n., 117, 119, 127, 139, 141,

235 Index Country Progressive Party, 16, 18, 57 Crofts, C.A., 79, 80n., 81-7 passim, 123, 129, 1 33n., 187, 215 Depression: trade union attitudes and policies, 13, 14, passim, 43-8 passim, 52-5 passim, 59, 85, 92-4, 99, luo Douglas Social Credit, 21, 25n., 28, 44, 92 Drakeford, A.S., 33n., 54, 90n., 108n., llo n., 127 n., 215 Duffy, M.B., 45, 65, 79, 91n., 117, 124, 162 Duggan, W.J., 11, 33, 45, 51, 53, 55, 59, 72, 79, 86, 87, 90n., 94, 127, 133n., 140, 168, 213, 215 Economists, 23, 43, 82, 83, 91, 92 Elections: federal (1929) passim, 39, (1931) 135-7; N.S.W. (1930) 58-9, (1932) 203; Victoria (1929) 10n., passim, (1931 Leg. Council) 111, 124n., (1932) E lectrical T rades Union, 60, 124 Fenton, J.E., 56, 58, 90, 95 Ford, Henry, 24, 26, 45; Fordism, 12 Giblin, L.F., 23, 43, 44 Gibson, H.C., 80n., 147n. Gibson, Sir Robert, 9 In. Hogan, E.J., 17, 40n., 42, 51, 55, 56, 58, 98, 112; and 1932 elections, 197-9; expelled by A.L.P. Central Executive, 202; and Labor Party, 53, 104, 107, 1 08n., 110, 111, 119, 125; and Prem iers Plan, 120, 128; and strikes, 150, 152; and unemployed, 161, 167, 168, 172 Hogan Labor government, passim, 38, 56-8, 70, 74-7, 124n.; defeat, 193, 201; and unem ployed, 139, 163, 172, 177, 178; union attitudes to government, passim, 49, 51, 53-5 passim, 60, passim, , 138-9, 175, 180, 199, 200 Holloway, E.J., 15, 109n., 115n. Hospital Employees' Union, 75, 76, 107, 144n. Hughes, W.M., 46 Industrial Herald, 5n., 20, 26, 101, 130, 137n., 199, 201, 202 Jones, J.P., 92, 104, 110, 112, 119, 125, 150, 196, 199, 202n. Kiernan, E.L., 165, 166, 171, 196, 197, 199, 202 Labor Call, 5; and basic wage cut, 83n.; and depression, 28-9; on general strike, 87n.; and Labor gpvernments, 15, 17, 18, 41, 50, 51, 53, 60, 11,' 99, 100, 101, 111, 117, 126, 132, 134n., 137, 139, 202; and Labor split, 95, 96-7; and Prem iers' Plan, 116, 117, 121-2, 125, 128; and socialism, 7, 30, 31, 200 Lang, J.T., 58-9, 61, 92, 96, 201, 203 Lang Plan, 90, 91, 97, 98 Liquor Trades Union, 60, 123n. Loan Council, 15, 43, 52, 85, 92 Lyons, J.A., 56, 58, 59, 90, 92, 95, 96, 101 McGrath, D.C., 90, 96n. M ckellar, J., 3, 28n. McNamara, D.L., 33n., 90n., 108n., I l l, 120, 127n., 131, 140n., 196n. McNeill, J., 4 0 n., 108n., 110n., 120 Massey, G., 26, 46-8, 71, 72 Melbourne Agreement, 43, 45, 49, 51, 52, 56, 58, 74 M ilitant Minority Movement, 66, 144, 150, 155n., 185 M iners Union, 69-70; N.S.W. lock-out, 12, 13, Monk, A.E., 133n., 159, 164, 167, 168, 173, 174, 176, 178, 179, 187 Niem eyer, Sir Otto, 43, 45, 46, 48, 55, 58, 59 New Guard, 152, 191 New South Wales Labor Council, 4 n., 84 Prem iers' Conferences, 43, 91, 92, 94, 102, Prem iers' Plan, 63, 103-4; adopted by Labor governments, 115, 116, 119, 120, see also Elections (Victoria, 1932)1 Labor Party decisions, 101, , 119, 120, 123-5, 127-8, , 193, 195; union attitudes, 100-1, passim, see also Public service unions (and Prem iers Plan) Printing Industry Employees' Union of Australia, 2, 13n., 134, 156, 157n., 160n. Public service unions, 2n., 3, 14, 16, 74, 143, 144n.; and Premiers' Plan, 103, 115, 144, 194, 200; retrenchm ent and salary reductions, 41, 50, 56-7, 58, 73-7, 102 Kean, J., 53n., 120, 134 Keane, R.V., 14, 57, 76, 108n., 110n., Riley, F.J., 122, 133n., 138, 140n., 201, Roberts, N., 53, 176, 198, 199,

236 Index Ross, R.S., 5 n., 10, 16, 31, 33n., 215 Scullin, J.H., 15, 20, 39, 41, 55, 87, 93, 98, 102, 112, 152; and basic wage, 83; delegate to A.L.P. conferences, 33n., 90n., 127n.; election policies, 14n., 17, 135-6; and Premiers' Plan, 114, 116, 124 Scullin Labor government, 17, 38, 64-5, 102, 116; defeat, 135, 137; government split, 58-9, 90, (union attitudes to) 61-2, 94-8, 203; union attitudes to government, 20, 39, 40, 41, 51, 60, 72, passim, 124, 135 Seamen's Union, 5, 10, 89, Sear, F., 39, 53, 70, 73, 105, 107, 112, 119, 133n., 139 Shop Assistants' Union, 122, 129n., 158n. Socialism, 6-7, 12, 17, 24, 29-31, 32, 33, 36, 136, 200, 206 Socialist Party of Australia, 10, 36-7, 200 State Instrumentalities Unions' Committee, 3, 74, 143 Stewart, E., 133n., 135, 141, 198, 215 Strikes, 64, 67, 68, ; see also Timber Workers' Union; Waterside Workers' Federation Tariff protection, 6, 14, 20, 24, 26, 27, 32, 34, 46, 88, 136 Theodore, E.G., 14, 15, 17, 39, 90, 93, 94, 95, 114, 205 Theodore Plan, 91, 97 Timber Workers' Union, 5; 1929 strike, 5, 7, 12, 13, 15 Trades Hall Council (Melbourne), 4, 5n., 109; and basic wage, 50, 73, 79, 80, 81, 84, 85, 88, 154; and depression, 32, 44; and Hogan government, 42; newspaper embargo, 148; and Premiers' Plan, 101, 115, , 122, 194, ; and unemployed, 42, 49, 159, passim, passim, passim, 182, passim, 189, I9Ü Trade union movement: ideology and policies, 6-10, 63-4, 148, 204-7, see also Arbitration, Depression; leadership, 10-12, 64, 146, 207, 210, ; organisation, 1-6, 142-5, 211 Trade Union Salaried Officers' Association, 42, 108-9, 118, 134, 153 Tunnecliffe, T., I l l, 185, 189, 190, passim Unemployed Workers' Movement, 88n., 159, 170, 171,178, passim, passim Unemployment, 5, 15, 41, 53, 139, 140, 142, , 217; demonstrations, 162, 164, 169, 182, 183, 188; evictions, 166, 169, 187-8, 190; militants attack officials, 162, 169, 171, passim; relief, 156-7, 163, 164-9, 172, 176, 178; union policies, see Depression; strikes and boycotts, IÜ9, 171, 172-4; treatment by police, 162, 169, 170, 183, 184, , 191; unemployed organisations, see Central Unemployment Committee, Unemployed Workers Movement United Australia Party, 90 Victorian Socialist Party, 5n., 10, 11 Victorian Teachers' Union, see Public service unions Wages, 12, 63, 216; Court awards and union response, 67-73, 77-89, 113, 147, 153-5; see also Public service unions (retrenchment) Wallis, A.R., 98, 129, 131, 133n., 134, 135, 139, 141n., 146, 215 Waterside Workers' Federation, 6, 152; aftermath of 1928 strike, 2, 6, 12, 15-16, 40, 41-2, 49 White Australia, 4, 6 Williams, R., 182, 196, 199,

237 L. J. Louis left school at the age of fifteen and followed a variety of occupations. He undertook private studies to matriculate, and, while teaching in Queensland, commenced a part-time university course. Later he obtained the degree of Master of Arts with first class honours from the University of Melbourne. At present he is Senior Teaching Fellow in History at Monash University.

238 Also from the A.N.U. Press Harry Holland: Militant Socialist P. J. O Farrell A political biography of the man who led the New Zealand Labour Party until his death in 1933, two years before the Party came to power for the first time. 1964, xi, 234p, plates, cartoons, cloth SA4.95 Industrial Labour and Politics The Labour Movement in Eastern Australia Ian Turner Centred on the labour movement s formative years, this is an examination of some of the crucial questions of Australian labour politics the relation of the industrial and political wings of the labour movement, the conflicts between Labor politicians and the extra-parliamentary organisations, and the part played by left-wing minorities in the movement. 1965, xx, 2l2p, cloth SA5.25 Radical and Working Class Politics A Study o f Eastern Australia Robin Gollan A survey of a period when Australia seemed, in practice if not in theory, the most advanced democracy in the world. Dr Gollan traces the development of a persistent aspiration the search for a prescription which would make life more tolerable for the majority (reprinted 1966, 1967), vi, 226p, paper, SA2.20 (In association with Melbourne University Press) The Coalminers of New South Wales A History o f the Union Robin Gollan The history of the Coal and Shale Employees Federation, the fundamental objectives of which were to ensure that the cost of economic progress should not be borne exclusively by its members, that increased productivity brought improvement, not deterioration, to the lives of the miners. 1963, xii, 250p, cloth, $A5.00 (In association with Melbourne University Press) The Formation of the Australian Country Parties B. D. Graham An analysis of the social and economic factors which led to the rise of the Country Parties in Australia. Demonstrates their affinity with the agrarian parties of the Canadian Prairie Provinces and the American Mid-West. 1966, xiv, 320p, maps, cloth #T6.90 From all good booksellers Australian National University Press Canberra 1968