India-Japan Maritime Security Cooperation ( ) : A Report

Transcription

1 India-Japan Maritime Security Cooperation ( ) : A Report PANNEERSELVAM, Prakash Guest Researcher A Strong India is in the best interest of Japan, and a strong Japan is in the best interest of India. Former Prime Minister of Japan, Shinzo Abe Speech at the Indian parliament, 22 August 2007 Introduction India-Japan interactions have been marked by goodwill and singularly free from any structural impediments. However, the bilateral relationship between the two started to take centre stage only after the end of Cold War. However, both countries refrained from discussing defence and security matters, until Prime Minister Mori visit to India in The brief talk between two Prime Ministers in New Delhi removed many deadlocks in the bilateral relationship. Since then, India-Japan relationship maintained steady course and attained the stature of Strategic Partnership in The remarkable change in Indo-Japan relationship in the post-cold War dramatically changed the security perspective of Asia-pacific region. Notably, maritime security cooperation between the two countries captured global attention. At the same time, the growing interaction between two naval forces in the recent years raised some serious questions about the intention and objectives of India-Japan maritime security cooperation. A preliminary literature survey on this topic reveals that, not too many research works has been done on this subject. Most of literature on India-Japan relationship largely focuses on complicated relationship that existed between two countries during post-world war era or bilateral relationship in Post-Cold War. This policy analysis is important because it focuses exclusively on India-Japan maritime security cooperation to identify the key factor to strengthen the strategic cooperation. In the pragmatic international system, it is crucially important to 67

2 analysis and identifies weakness and strength in the strategic cooperation. This paper will critically analyse India-Japan maritime security cooperation. Since, after Alondra Rainbow incident in 1999, both India-Japan seriously pushed cooperation in maritime field. Therefore, this research will focus on the time period of Brief History India-Japan relationship is deeply rooted in historical and cultural interaction. Osamu Kondo says, Japanese thought that the world consisted of three countries, namely Japan, China and India. 1 As a neighboring country, Japanese were well aware of Chinese tradition and culture, as Buddhism become popular among Japanese, India came to be known as the country of Buddha. Many Japanese Buddhist monks tried to visit India, after many attempts few succeeded to reach India. Konga Zammai is one of the monks entered mainland of India in 818. From India sub-continent, a Buddhist priest called Bodhisen third son of Tamil Pallavan King travelled to Japan from China in 735. But, sea-route is not explored until 1548 when three Japanese Christians visited Goa, first Japanese to travel across Indian Ocean to reach India. 2 Apart from those rare incidents, India remained almost inaccessible to Japanese. Further, a national seclusion order in 1635 and 1639 severely restricted all foreign ships to enter Japan and prohibits Japanese to visit abroad. The self-imposed isolation policy severely restrained Japanese interaction with the international community. Despite the restriction, British East India Company sent their ships Return to Japan in 1674 to reopen direct trade, but the ship was not allowed to enter Japan and sent back to India. 3 Otherwise, British East Indian Company had great desire for Japan could have established deep economic relationship. Japan isolation policy came to an end in 1854 after Commodore Perry order to open the Japanese port to the US merchant ships. Japanese never 1 Osamu Kondo, Japan and the Indian Ocean at the Times of the Mughal Empire, with Special reference to Gujarat, Satish Chandran (ed.). The Indian Ocean: Exploration in History, Commerce and Politics (New Delhi 1987) 2 Ibid 3 Edward Maunde Thompson(eds), Diary of Richard Cooks: cape merchant in the English factory in Japan, , with correspondence, (New York: 1964) 68

3 seen steam boat realized the importance of industrialization to match itself with foreign power. The spur in thinking rapidly changed Japan into modern industrial nation in the late 19 th century. Indians under the British colonial rule saw Japan as a role model for development. Many Indian eminent scholars visited Japan during this period to study the transformation in the society. Then, Japan military victory over Russia, thrilled Indian freedom struggle movement in the Sub-continent. In many ways, historical and cultural events influenced each other principles and ideas in different ways. But, in political terms the relationship failed to gain momentum because of Japan policy in Cold War is largely governed by two factors, the legacies of the Second World War and the compulsion of the Cold War. 4 During World War II, Japanese Imperial Army s aggression over East Asia and Southeast Asian strained Japanese image abroad. As the result, Japan s Post-World War external policies are largely governed to make over Japan s image in Asia. Interestingly, India did not claim war reparations from Japan. At the same time, Indian Justice Radha Bindo Pal s dissentient judgment in the International Military Tribunal for the Far East caught Japanese attention on Judge Pal and on India. In 1952, Japan regained sovereignty and India signed peace treaty with Japan in the same year. Before the bilateral relationship reaches its potential, Cold War politics strained the relationship. Japan skeptical about India s non-alignment policy limits Tokyo ties with New Delhi to trade and development assistance. The relationships seemingly become active only after the end of Cold War. The importances of non-military threats and issues like terrorism, piracy, proliferation of Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) have assumed new importance. 5 The change in the security environment in the post-cold war and the emergence of non-traditional security threat subsequently changed the dynamics of security relations between the two nations. India-Japan has also realized the importance to rejuvenate the diplomatic ties to sustain peace and security of Asia. The bilateral relationship stagnated during Cold War assumed new position in the post-cold War. As a maritime nation, two countries understood the importance of 4 K.V Kesavan, India and Japan Changing Dimension of Partnership in the Post-Cold War Period, ORF Occasional Paper#14 (New Delhi: 2010) 5 Ibid 69

4 security of Sea-lane have also shown great willingness to work hand-in-hand to combat non-traditional security threats to safeguard safety and security of maritime space. Building Maritime Security Cooperation: Glimpse on Joint Statements Any study on India-Japan maritime security cooperation could thus be incomplete without analyzing the Joint Statements. The Joint Statements, the visit of high dignitaries from both the sides signifies the importance of the bilateral relationship in the new millennium. Therefore, the study made an attempt to explain in detail about the various Joint Statements issued between , to understand the nature of bilateral relationship and the importance of maritime security cooperation. Prime Minister Mori landmark visit to India in August 2000, signifies both Japan and India resolve to take their bilateral relations to a qualitatively new level. During the discussion Prime Minister Mori and Indian counter part Atal Bihari Vajpayee agreed to establish the Global Partnership in the 21 st century. 6 Prime Minister Mori visit to India reflects a major strategic change in Japanese regional diplomacy. Nevertheless, Mori was the first Prime Minister from Japan to institutionalize high level dialogue, comprehensive security dialogue, cooperation in anti-piracy operation and security dialogue between Japan and India. During this period, Indian Defence minister travelled to Japan and hold discussion on exchange of ship visit and bilateral security dialogue with Foreign Minister Yohei Kono and Japanese Defence Agency Director General, T. Kawara. 7 By July, both Japan and India started first session on Comprehensive Security Dialogue and military-to-military talk to discuss ways and means to further enhance bilateral defence cooperation. As the bilateral relation compounds into new form, Japan government on 26 October 2001 announces to discontinue the measure on India, which the Japanese government had taken in response to the nuclear tests conducted by Indian in 6 C. Raja Mohan, India, Japan unveil new global partnership, The Hindu, 24 August 2000, 7 Minister of External Affair India, Annual Report

5 May Followed by Yoshiro Mori former prime minister three day visit to India as a special envoy of Japanese premier Junichiro Koizumi to discuss about Japan-India global partnership and regional issues like Afghanistan, terrorism, which helped to uplift bilateral relationship, strained by 1998 pokharan nuclear test. Commenting on the new development in the bilateral relationship, Japanese ambassador to India Hiroshi Hirabayashi says the "discontinuation of economic measures by the government of Japan will pave the way for resumption of loan and grant assistance to new projects in India, thereby propelling India-Japan relations into a new phase of friendship and cooperation." 9 The mutual understanding finally led two head of the state to sign the historical accord called Japan-India Joint Declaration. Japan-India Joint Declaration-2001 On December 2001, Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee paid visit to Japan. This was the first visit since Prime Minister Narasimha Rao s visit in The visiting Indian Prime Minister and Japanese counter part Junichiro Koizumi agreed to strengthen the Global Partnership for the 21 st Century based on strategic convergence and economic complementaries. After discussion on wide range of bilateral and regional issue a substantive Japan-India Joint declaration was issued on 10 December This was for the first time both Japan and India have set forth for active bilateral security cooperation for: Comprehensive Security Dialogue covering the entire range of issues of mutual concern including disarmament and non-proliferation, as well as Military-to-Military consultations, and also confirmed that the two sides would hold a dialogue on counter-terrorism in the framework of the Japan-India Comprehensive Security Dialogue See, Japan-India Joint Declaration, MOFA, December 2001, 9 Former Japanese Premier Mori Visit to India, The Times of India, a-japan-relations-japanese-leader. 10 See, Joint Statement on Japan-India Joint Declaration, MOFA. 71

6 As Japan increasingly worried about the regional and global issue the joint statement will enhance moderate cooperation in security field to combat non-traditional security threats in Indian Ocean. More interestingly, the issue of Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is classified under the global challenges not under bilateral relation was a great relief for India, which remain source of contention in bilateral talk. Japan positive gesture towards the bilateral relationship is well received in Indian strategic circle. At the same time, Japan acknowledges rescue of hijacked Alondra rainbow in 1999 by Indian Navy-Coast Guard. In overall, the joint statement made, both the countries to realize strategic importance for getting together to contribute to regional and global security. Prime Minister Mori s visit in 2000 and reciprocal visit made by Indian counterpart in 2001 to Tokyo paved a new way ahead in establishing strong bilateral defence mechanism, which led Koizumi to visit India in 2005 to widen the cooperation in maritime field. Towards India-Japan Partnership in a New Asian Era: Strategic Orientation of India-Japan Global Partnership Both the nations continued their effort to concertise the India-Japan Global partnership in the 21 st century. Defence authorities take this opportunity to broaden and deepen the security cooperation. As a significant step forward, Cabinet Minister and Director General of Defence Agency of Japan Mr. Shigeru Ishiba visited India in 2003 on an invitation from Indian Defence Ministry to discuss nuclear nexus between Pakistan and North Korea. Japanese Ambassador Mr. Yasukuni Enoki describe this is an indicator of the growing strategic importance of India in Japan s eyes. 11 On the other hand, nuclear remains the flashpoint in the bilateral relationship. On the sideline of Asian Cooperation Dialogue (ACD) in China, on foreign ministerial meeting Japan Ministry of Foreign Affair Kawaguchi Yoriko insisted that India should sign and ratify CTBT and NPT. 12 While, India maintained its commitment to self moratorium on 11 Japanese Ambassador, Mr. Yasukuni Enoki s Message ( ), 12 Satu P. Limaye, India-East Asia Relations: 2004: A Year of Living Actively, 72

7 no-further nuclear test and determined to maintain strict control over export of nuclear and missile technology. In the meantime, Japan foreign office issuing statements asking India to refrain from testing ballistic missile, catered negative feeling in rapidly advancing strategic relationship between two nations. 13 Despite, Japan lifting of economic sanction on India after demonstration of its nuclear capability in 1998, Japan fundamental stand on India s nuclear and missile development remain unchanged. However, Japan is cautious in not allowing nuclear issue to overshadow ongoing bilateral cooperation with India. Particularly, Japanese ambassador to India Mr. Yasukuni Enoki in various media interaction and public speech, he emphasized: Japan will position India as a major power in Asian and international society and that Japan has strong desire to strengthen its global partnership with India which is essential for stability, prosperity and peace of the world. This is the number one message our foreign minister delivered to the Indian side (2004). We have no doubt that India is also seeing Japan in the same paradigm. 14 India has also understood Japanese sentiment towards nuclear issue, seeks common ground in establishing meaningful bilateral strategic relationship. As piracy and armed robbery started to hurt Japanese SLOC s in Southeast Asian water, India stepped up its cooperation in maritime field. An Indian delegation headed by Deputy Director General Prabhakaran Paleri of Coast Guard attend meeting of the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against ships in Asia in In the same year, an Indian Coast Guard 13 See, Statement by the Press Secretary/Director-General for Press and Public Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on a Missile Launch Test by India, 14 Subhash Kapil, Japan-India Strategic Dialogue Requires More Political Synergy, 73

8 vessel visited Japan to take part in fourth India-Japan Coast Guard exercise, to mark the event Director General of Coast Guard and Vice Admiral Suresh Mehta visited Japan to witness the exercise. 15 As becoming Chief of Naval Staff in 2006, Admiral Suresh Mehta supervised many joint Coast Guard exercise and played key role in institutionalizing bilateral maritime cooperation with Japan. Nevertheless, Indian Coast Guard Director General Prabhakaran Paleri equally played important role in structuring Japan-India maritime cooperation, even after his retirement from Indian Coast guard Mr. P. Paleri through his writing, he continued his effort to strengthen bilateral cooperation in maritime field and he was a visiting fellow to Tokyo based Ocean Policy Research Foundation (OPRF) a reputed maritime think-thank in Japan. In ministerial level, on sideline of ASEAN+3 in Vientiane on November , Japan Foreign Minister and Indian External Affair meet and discussed wide range of issue covering economic relation, United Nation reform, environmental issue, maritime security and disarmament and non-proliferation issue. 16 Once again, Japan insisted India to sign NPT, India clarified that it had no intention of signing the NPT. Ahead of Prime Minister meeting, the Foreign Minister talk remains crucial to refine the context of the bilateral relation. On 29 th November, Prime Minister Koizumi met Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and discussed the course of bilateral relation, including various regional and global issues. In that meeting Prime Minister Koizumi appreciates, Indian Prime Minister s Vision on arc of advantage, across which there would be large-scale movement of people, capital, ideas, and creativity. 17 The idea of Arc of Advantage is well received by the Japanese. In fact, speaking ahead of official visit to India, Prime Minister Koizumi said Japan and India are sharing strategic interests in realizing what Prime Minister Manmohan Singh calls an arc of prosperity in Asia as well as in dealing with such international issues as terrorism, the environment, energy and U.N. reform," India s Minister of External Affair Annual Report Japan-India Foreign Ministers Meeting (Summary), MOFA, 27 November 2004, 17 PM s Address at Third India-ASEAN Business Summit, 19 October 2004, 18 Japan, India share strategic agenda, claims Koizumi, Japan Times, 30 April 2005, 74

9 The shared vision carried by the two Prime Ministers helped to realize the full potential of their global partnership for peace and prosperity. The highlight of the talk was indubitably to reinforce the Japan-India Global Partnership, which was agreed between former prime mister Mori and Vajpayee in Further, to enhance the partnership in bilateral, regional and global level. Two Prime Ministers issued Joint statement and an Eight-fold Initiative, which comprised measure for cooperation in eight key areas of interaction: 19 1) enhanced dialogue and exchange 2) comprehensive economic engagement 3) enhanced security dialogue and cooperation 4) science and technology initiative 5) cultural and academic initiatives and strengthening of people-to-people contacts 6) Cooperation in ushering a new Asian era. 7) Cooperation in U.N and other international organization. 8) Responding to International Challenges. Many of the issues incorporated in the Eight-fold Imitative were already mentioned in the Joint Declaration. However, this was the first time, cooperation in maritime field between two countries received acknowledgement from highest level. The two leaders recognized the importance of safety and security of international maritime traffic, directed: both countries to work together on a sustained basis, including the annual Japan Coast Guard-Indian Coast Guard talks, joint exercises against piracy as well as cooperation through means of information sharing and technical assistance. The Japan Coast Guard and the Indian Coast Guard will commence efforts to establish a framework of effective cooperation. The two leaders, in view 19 See, Joint Statement on Japan-India Partnership in a New Asian Era: Strategic Orientation of Japan-India Global Partnership, MOFA. 75

10 of the importance of maritime security, also instructed the Maritime Self Defence Force of Japan and the Indian Navy to enhance their cooperation, including through exchange of views, friendship visits and other similar activities. 20 From this Joint statement, both the countries ensured that the exchanges and dialogue in the security and defence field will further help to cement cooperation in maritime field. Most importantly, holding annual Prime Minister level meeting and launch of high level strategic dialogue between National Security Advisor and Advisor to Japanese Prime Minister reflects the need for long term political, economic and strategic interests. The Joint Statement further reflects, the urgency from both the sides to expand the level of cooperation to catch the missed opportunities. Analysts view the political synergy of Indo-Japanese cooperation is essential not just to further bilateral relations, but for the greater cause of a more secure Asia-Pacific region. 21 The threat perception of two countries regarding to piracy and maritime terrorism are identical. The crucial choke points such as Hormuz Straits, Gulf of Aden and Straits of Malacca would be equally a concern to both India and Japan. Moreover, Japan s strategic opening with India will withhold its political grip over Indian Ocean and South Asia, which Japan tried to achieve through ODA and financial assistance for decades. Further, the transformational visit of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to Japan in December 2006 has led the relation to ink Strategic Partnership. Global and Strategic Partnership-2006 As the two countries, inching towards signing a Global and Strategic partnership, the maritime security attained significant attention in India-Japan relation. Both sides have acquired a new dynamism and momentum, especially 20 See, Joint Statement on Japan-India Partnership in a New Asian Era: Strategic Orientation of Japan-India Global Partnership, MOFA. 21 Arpita Mathur, Koizumi s visit to India: Forgotten Friendship to Achieve Partnership, IDSA Commentary, 2 July 2005, hur_

11 since the landmark visit of Prime Minister Koizumi to India in Defence Minister Pranab Mukerjee on an official visit to Tokyo in May 2006, met his counterpart Mr. Fukushiro Nukaga, Minister of State for Defence of Japan and Mr. Kazuo Kitagawa Minister of land, Infrastructure and Transport in two separate occasion to discuss the range of defence cooperation between two countries. During the talk, both sides reaffirmed the desire to enhance cooperation to tackle transnational organized crime at sea such as piracy, armed robbery, illegal arms and drug trafficking, illegal migration, cooperation in search and rescue operation, and protection of marine environment. The Coast Guard received highest priority, as two Coast Guards have conducted several rounds of Joint exercise both in Japan and India. During this period, heads of two Coast Guards signed Memorandum of Cooperation in maritime security and safety. The Joint statement signed during Indian Defence minister visit to Japan in May 2006 has put placed a structured framework for a dialogue and cooperation in the security field. 22 Moreover, Prime Minister Visit to Tokyo in December 2006 heightened the bilateral relationship into new height. Particularly, after Prime Minister Manmohan Singh expressed his keen interest in Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's proposal to open a four-way strategic dialogue that involves Japan, India, Australia and the United States in an interview with Yomiuri Shimbun ahead of his visit to Japan on 13 th December. 23 The spectacular speech in the Japanese diet on 14 December 2006, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh s reassuring words propelled bilateral relation into a new and dynamic phase: 24 common values and the enormous economic complementarities that exist between us to build a strong partnership of the highest mutual importance Strong ties between India and Japan will be a major factor in building an open and inclusive Asia and in enhancing peace and stability in the Asian region and beyond. 22 Joint Statement, Visit of Mr. Pranab Mukherjee, Ministry of Defence to Japan, 25 May 2006, Embassy of India, Japan 23 Singh Keen on Strategic Talk, Yomiuri Shimbun, December 2, PM s address to Joint Session of the Diet, 14 December 2006, 77

12 Like Japan, India sees nuclear power as a viable and clean energy source to meet its growing energy requirements. We seek Japan s support in helping put in place innovative and forward-looking approaches of the international community to make this possible. I would like to affirm that India s commitment to universal nuclear disarmament remains unshaken. - Speech of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh Japanese Diet (Parliament) Further, Indian Prime Minister elaborated on security issues and importance of promoting defence cooperation, including for protection of sea-lanes to secure our trade and energy flow. After, India and the US agreed upon civil nuclear cooperation in Focus of Indo-Japan debate gradually shifted to civil nuclear cooperation. But, Japan realized the need of nuclear energy to India, agreed to discuss civil nuclear cooperation and also supported India s stand globally. Even in the Joint Statement called as Strategic and Global Partnership Japan agreed to discuss the international civil nuclear cooperation framework with respect to India. At the same time, Japanese Prime Minister told journalist that India should respond to the concerns of the international community and workout appropriate safeguard with the IAEA. Indian Prime Minister responded positively, that There is adequate appreciation of the fact that India needs nuclear power for its energy security and I am convinced that when the time comes, Japan will be on our side. 25 Tokyo flipping stands on nuclear issue is understandable, because Japan is the first nation to suffer the brunt of nuclear weapon. Gingerly, India moved nuclear issue with Japan not with urgent at the same it insisted Tokyo to take note of India s growing energy demand. On the other hand, Japan-India endorsed Strategic and Global partnership making a new opening in Indo-Japan relationship. 25 PM: Japan will be on our side in NSG, The Times of India, 17 December

13 Source: The Prime Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh and the Japanese Prime Minister Mr. Shinzo Abe, greeting each other after signing an agreement on Indo-Japan Strategic partnership, in Tokyo on December 15, 2006, Especially, in defence and security aspects the joint statement imparted stronger political and strategic dimensions to bilateral relations. As the two sides agree to work closely: to enhance cooperation in capacity building, technical assistance and information sharing between their respective agencies and undertake anti-piracy measures. They share the view that India and Japan must cooperate closely to ensure the safety and security of international maritime traffic that are vital for their economic well-being as well as that of the region. 26 As Japan-India relationship is growing stronger and deeper, at the same time Japan is undergoing constant change in defence policy. During this time, Prime Minister Shnizo Abe elevated the stature of the defence Agency to Ministry level. Unlike other Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe is vocal about amending the Article 9 of Japanese constitution. The qualitative shift in Japan s defence policy is not directly related to its growing relationship with India. However, the beginning of 26 See, Joint Statement Towards India-Japan Strategic and Global partnership, MOFA. 79

14 new innovation in Japanese defence establishment will subsequently expanded the scope of Self-Defence Force cooperation with India. As a strong advocator of defence and security matters, Prime Minister Abe view India is full of potential and key player in the indo-pacific region. On the other hand, India preoccupied with nuclear deal with the US, failed to reciprocate Japanese view on the strategic partnership. Naturally, India worried about its entry into Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) and Japan attitude over nuclear cooperation with India, acted as a strong pressure on New Delhi to send special envoy to negotiate with Tokyo. Most importantly, India doesn t want to continue the mistake of neglecting Japan in international agenda. 27 Through the public speech made by Prime Minister s Special envoy Shyam Saran and External Affair Minister Pranab Mukherjee at the Japan Institute of International Affair (JIIA) it is clear India made desperate attempt to get Tokyo s support and forum nod for access to the resources and technology in this field. 28 However, both the countries kept the nuclear issue not to overturn the strategic and global partnership. Road Map for New Dimensions to the Strategic and Global partnership-2007 Like his predecessor Koizumi, Prime Minister Abe who uphold assertive diplomacy and a greater role for Japan in global politics, sensed importance of India in regional politics. His visit to India in 2007, as part of a bilateral agreement to have high level annual summits was carefully watched by the observers for a major announcement on nuclear deal and quadrilateral strategic forum. As he did, by accompanying large contingent of ministers, 243 business representatives of top Japanese companies and 12 vice-chancellors from Japan universities for an active participation in bilateral relation. In diplomatic level, two sides continued the talk on Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) and to upgrade exchanges in security and defence field. While addressing 27 Following Nuclear Test in 1998, India sent special envoy to major western capitals, but failed to send one special envoy to Japan. Being a major donor and economic power house of Asia, Japan 28 Transcript of Address by Shri Shyam Saran, Special Envoy of the Prime Minister at the Japan Institute of International Affairs on 15 January 2007, 80

15 joint session of Indian parliament titled Confluence of the two seas on August 22, 2007 Prime Minister Shinzo Abe got wide appreciation from the Indian parliamentarian. In that speech, Prime Minister Shnizo Abe made three crucial remarks pinpointing the state of the bilateral cooperation: 29 rediscovered India as a partner that shares the same values and interests and also as a friend that will work alongside us to enrich the seas of freedom and prosperity, which will be open and transparent to all. this "broader Asia" will evolve into an immense network spanning the entirety of the Pacific Ocean, incorporating the United States of America and Australia. India and Japan have vital interests in the security of sea lanes. From now on let us together bear this weighty responsibility that has been entrusted to us, by joining forces with like-minded countries. -Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe Speech at Indian Parliament From his speech in Indian parliament, it is clear The Prime Minister of Japan optimistic about the future of the bilateral relation and favors stronger and deeper strategic ties with India. Mr. Abe interest in creating working relation between India, the US and Australia, which is also called as quadrilateral forum received great attention. Finally, Mr. Abe s mentioned about sharing responsibility on the security related issue, especially on maritime domain reflects Japan willingness to accept crucial role in Asian security. Over the last few years, Japan-India relationship broadened and deepened enough to call it as a strategic and global partnership. To upgrade the present level of cooperation, the two Prime Ministers issued Joint statement for New Dimensions to the strategic and global partnership between India and Japan. In which, the detailed working plan has been announced to sustain the strategic cooperation in long term. Importantly: 29 Confluence of Two Seas, Speech by Mr. Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan at the Parliament of the Republic of India, MOFA, 22 August 2007, 81

16 The two leaders reorganized common interests in such fields as maintaining the safety and security of sea lanes in the Asia Pacific and the Indian Ocean regions, and fighting against transnational crimes, terrorism, piracy and proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. 30 The cooperation in security field gained significance space in the Joint Statement. Further, two prime ministers assured to deepen strategic level dialogue at various levels, including strengthening defence exchange and cooperation between the Coast Guards. On ground, for the first time Indian navy, JMSDF and US navy conducted their first multilateral exercise called TRILATEX-07 in Pacific. 31 Followed by, JMSDF participated along with Australia, Singapore Navies in Malabar-07 exercises in Bay of Bengal. The participation of JMSDF vessels first time in the exercise along with Australian and Singapore navies in Indian Ocean was widely seen as a result of series of discussion and talk between armed force of Japan and India. The Prime Minister Shinzo Abe ambitious Quadrilateral Forum failed to gain momentum after Australia backed-off from the idea. Moreover, the resignation of Shinzo Abe from Prime Minister and the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) winning upper house election had put a pull stop to the idea of Quadrilateral forum. The newly elected law maker Yasuo Fukuda is largely seen with a dovish personality and soft handler of diplomatic issues. Unlike his predecessor Koizumi and Abe, Fukuda is not conservative on foreign policy; since he stayed in office for short period it is tough to determine his view on Japan interest with India. However, both Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda and his Indian counterpart never miss the opportunity to meet and discuss bilateral issue on the sidelines of the East Asian Summit in Singapore. In 2008, former foreign minister Taro Aso basically belongs to 30 See, Joint Statement on Road Map for New Dimensions to the Strategic and Global partnership, MOFA. 31 TRILATEX-07 concludes, Frontier India, 17 April 2007, 82

17 conservative stand on foreign policy and known for his tough stand against North Korea took over as the Prime Minister of Japan. Aftermath of 2008 Mumbai attack, in a public speech Japanese Prime Minister Taro Aso stated "This kind of terrorism is unforgivable, extremely despicable and vicious. I feel strong resentment and deeply condemn it. Japan is with the Indian people who are fighting against terrorism and we will cooperate with the Indian government." 32 The statement from highest position of the government was seen as a major move forward in building strong bilateral cooperation with India. Though Japan, always stated that the issue of Kashmir should be resolved within the ambit of the Shimla Agreement. In several occasions in the past, Japan official stand on Kashmir remain dubious. During Obuchi Keizo as a Foreign Minister he advocated an international conference for finding solution to Kashmir issue. 33 Japan keenness to play a lead role in resolving the Kashmir issue displeased India diplomatic circle. Even during 1998, Kargil War, Japan government took very lenient stance; Japanese news paper Yomiuri Shimbun reported that It is only natural for Indians to enjoy their "victory" this time. But resentment of the Indian military runs deep among local residents. In addition, the operation did not bring a fundamental solution to the Kashmir problem." 34 Japan neutral lines for demanding peaceful settlement and fail to condemn Pakistan for starting the fight seriously irked India. Finally, Indian diplomat concluded that Japan have no independent opinion on the issue rather it take the cue from the US. The miss-communication and lack of understanding led to soreness in relationship temporarily, but it was gradually rectified by the visit of Prime Minister Mori in In 2008, Taro Aso built consciousness within his government to build its relationship with India. 32Mumbai attacks: Reaction from International leaders to terrorism, The Telegraph, 27 November 2008, m-international-leaders-to-terrorism-bombay-india.html 33 Takako Hirose, Japan s Role in South Asia in the Post-Cold War Period, (eds) K.V Kesavan and Lalima Varma, Japan-South Asia: Security and Economic Perspectives, (New Delhi:2000) 34 India after Kargil: Diplomacy and Politics, Implications and Trends, India Focus, August 1999, Vol4, No3. 83

18 Advancement of Strategic and Global Partnership-2008 Japan-India relationship sailed peacefully and achieved another milestone in 2008 by signing a joint statement on the advancement of strategic and global partnership between the two countries. Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh on his second bilateral visit to Japan in less than two years signifies the great importance that India attaches to its relationship with Japan. Following the pursuit of Global and Strategic Partnership two sides agreed upon to beef up the cooperation and to device action plan during the annual summits. In a major breakthrough, two Prime Ministers issued Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation between Japan and India. Affirming, their commitment to cooperate in following field: Information exchange and policy coordination on regional affairs in the Asia Pacific region and on long-term strategic and global issues. 2. Bilateral cooperation within multilateral frameworks in Asia, in particular the East Asia Summit, ASEAN Regional Forum and ReCAAP processes. 3. Defence dialogue and cooperation within the framework of the Joint Statement signed in May 2006 between the two Defence Ministries. 4. Cooperation between Coast Guards 5. Safety of transport 6. Fight against terrorism and transnational crimes 7. Sharing of experiences in peacekeeping and peacebuilding 8. Disaster management 9. Disarmament and non-proliferation The Joint Declaration also devised a planned mechanism to achieve the global and strategic partnership which was agreed by both the side in The consultation on the defence and security matters was designed in two way process, 1) cooperation in foreign office level and 2) cooperation between two armed forces. In foreign office level, a) two sides agreed to conduct strategic dialogue at Foreign 35 See, Joint Statement on Joint Declaration on Security cooperation between India and Japan, MOFA. 84

19 Minister-level, b) Meeting between the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affair of Japan and the Foreign Secretary of India, c) Dialogue on Disarmament and Non-proliferation at Director General/ Joint Secretary Level, d) Track 1.5 strategic dialogue. Consultation are agreed to concretize the above mention cooperation between the two countries. Similarly, the cooperation in defence forces includes, a) meeting between defence ministers, b) Meetings between the Vice-Minister of Defense of Japan and the Defence Secretary of India including Defence Policy Dialogue, c) Military-to-Military Talks at Director General/Joint Secretary level, d) Exchange of service chiefs, e) Navy-to-Navy Staff Talks, f) Service-to-service exchanges including bilateral and multilateral exercises. The nine elements listed in cooperation field are already agreed upon by two sides during defence ministers meeting in In fact, all these nine elements in security cooperation were in operation since The devised mechanism for cooperation, Japan-India has started consultation on major field even before the 2008-Joint Declaration. However, the Joint Declaration is symbolically important to prove two countries stake in regional and global issues. By reaffirming 2006 Joint Statement, two Prime Ministers have also proved to global strategic community that Japan-India is actively collaborating in defence and security field. Meantime, the piracy and hijacking of the ships in Gulf of Aden by Somalia pirates gradually engulfed the maritime discussion. In October 2008, the United Nation Security Council passed resolution 1838 calling on nation to employ military force to repress the act of piracy. 36 Indian government approved navy s proposal to send warships to east African coast to protect Indian merchant ship. 37 Japan a largest user of Hormuz straits and Gulf of Aden stumbled by the piracy activity in the west of Indian Ocean. The revolutionary change in domestic politics, the defeat of Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in August 2009 election and rise of Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) into power for the first time in the fifty years raised serious question about the security issues and bilateral diplomatic relationship with India. 36 UN Security Council backs force against pirates, Maritime Journal, 9 October 2008, 37 India Rushes warship to the Gulf of Aden, The Economic Times, 18 October 2008, lth-frigate 85

20 New Stage of Japan-India Strategic and Global Partnership-2009 New administration under Yukio Hatoyama leadership is equally interested in expanding bilateral defence and security talk with India. The new governing party DPJ placed equal importance in the bilateral relationship with India as LDP did. The high-level visit and talk between foreign and defence minister is actively pursued under the Hatoyama leadership. In April 2009, Four Indian naval warships visited Japan for a bilateral and trilateral Malabar exercise with Japan and the US. JMSDF participation in the series of Malabar exercise emphasis growing need of cooperation among regional navies. Besides to that, Indian Defence Minister visited Japan in November 2009 to meet his counterpart Mr. Toshimi Kitazawa to discuss on defence exchanges and cooperation between Japan and India and on the regional and international security situation played an important role in devising the action plan for the defence cooperation and exchange. 38 The bilateral minister level discussion help to conclude possible cooperation between two armed force s, which was signed during Prime Minister Hatoyama s visit to India in December On his maiden visit to India, Prime Minister Hatoyama and Indian counterpart Mr. Manmohan Singh signed two Joint Statements. Firstly, Action Plan to Advance Security Cooperation based on the Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation between Japan and India. The action plan indicates: Annual Subcabinet / Senior Officials 2+2 dialogue (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defense of Japan / Ministry of External Affairs and Ministry of Defense of India Annual bilateral naval exercises, alternately off India and Japan, to enhance cooperation and core ability for maritime operation and disaster relief Multilateral Naval Exercises, when possible Passing Exercise (PASSEX) during ship visits 38 See, Joint Press Statement, % pdf 86

21 Participation as observers in major army and air force exercise After the US and Australia, Japan agreed to expand the strategic dialogue to 2+2 consultation at senior officer level with India. This was the first time, India will engage in such a high level 2+2 dialogue with Japan. Further, the positive change in maritime cooperation will allow the two countries naval force to participate in multilateral and bilateral naval exercise. The PASSEX will further enhance the scope of cooperation and communication maritime security operation or humanitarian relief. Secondly, New Stage of Japan-India Strategic and Global Partnership Joint Statement reiterated the importance of annual summit and expressed satisfactory for deepening: 39 Annual strategic dialogue between foreign ministers, To hold annual defence ministerial meeting. Framework at the Subcabinet / Senior Official - level 2 plus 2 dialogue. Japan enthusiastic about expanding relationship with India was clearly visible during Hatoyama visit to India. In the past ten years ( ), Japan-India bilateral relationship was undergone notable changes. Especially, after India s nuclear test, followed by Kargil war temporarily put South Asian in nuclear flashpoint. However, India effort to delink the Kargil issue with the nuclear war elevated New Delhi position to responsible player in Asia-pacific region. Moreover, India s growing economic clout and need for nuclear weapon to protect itself from Chinese and Pakistan s nuclear blackmail convinced international community to accept India s sentiment over the issue. Nevertheless, India is not accepted as a Nuclear Weapon State formally; but India attained international attention in gaining reputed nation with growing GDP. After economic liberalization in 1990 s, India adopted Look East Policy to progress in economic field. In the meantime, Japan politico-economic and security policy shifting from Cold War setup exactly matches the trajectory path of India s vision of Asia. The Prime Minister Mori realized the growing convergence in the field of economics, politics, security, energy and nuclear disarmament field urged 39 See, Joint Statement New Stage of Japan-India Strategic and Global Partnership, MOFA 87

22 him to travel to India in 2000 to sign a historical Joint Statement, which remains a root for Japan-India to achieve the high standard in the bilateral relationship. Joint Statement: Outcome Japan-India relationship is relatively new in political and security arena. Therefore, to build consciousness and trust in both sides, Prime Ministers lead the initiative to issue Joint Statement to find possible area of cooperation and to enhance communication from both sides to avoid distrust in the growing bilateral relationship. In the Joint Statement, defence and security aspects received much larger space from the beginning making it as core pillar of the bilateral relation. Meanwhile, Japan sensitivity towards piracy and maritime security threats in Indo-pacific region grabbed India s attention to the issue. India already making strong initiative in maritime domain realized the need for cooperation with Japan in the area of maritime security to form a combined effort to fight non-traditional security threats in the Indian Ocean. Three underlining points from the Joint Statement: 1) Both countries shares mutual understanding on the regional and global issues. 2) The security of Sea-lane in Indian Ocean is inexorably links with national security of two nations. 3) Maritime Security Cooperation plays pivotal role in bilateral relationship. Among the armed forces, the naval forces have lots in common to cooperate in dealing with non-traditional security threats. Apart from defence and security aspects, Japan-India relationship in economic, politics and diplomacy gained significant attention during this period. After Prime Minister Mori visit to India in 2000, Japan-India relationship has undergone significant qualitative changes. By 2009, Japan ranked sixth largest in cumulative Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flow into India. During this period, Japanese companies have made huge investments worth of US $ 2, 530 billion into Indian market. 40 The list of Japanese company operating in India 40 Ministry of External Affair India, Annual Report

23 also increased from 300 in 2005 to 627 companies in Moreover, India has become largest recipient of Japanese ODA since 2004 drawing huge sum of money to build countries infrastructure. During Prime Minister Shinzo Abe visit in 2007, two countries set trade target of US $ 20 billion by Due to surge in the global economy two countries reached US $ 17.7 billion mark falling short of actually set target in The Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) which came into force in August 2011 is expected to boost two side trades. Between, bilateral trade increased significantly, FDI flow from Japan has shown upward trend, India topped ODA and other economic assistance from Japan and finalization of CEPA will bring abundance opportunity in economic and trade field. In diplomacy, leaders visiting each other countries have become regular practice since In fact, both countries religiously following the rule to have annual India-Japan summit to discuss the bilateral and global issue to coordinate and formulate the policy. Under the aegis of Prime Ministers, two countries foreign, defence and economic ministers have conducted several bilateral discussions on their respective field to deepen the cooperation. The annual summit continued in the consecutive years, with broader vision for Japan-India Strategic and Global partnership in the next decade-2010 and Vision for the Enhancement of Japan-India Strategic and Global Partnership upon entering the year of the 60th Anniversary of the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations Detail VIP Visit between India and Japan Years India to Japan Japan to India Total Source: MOFA, The quantum jump in the VIP visits to two countries during ( ) is a valid evidence to prove the intensity of discussion and willingness to find a way 41 Ibid 42 Ministry of External Affair India, Annual Report

24 forward to achieve peace and stability in Asia. The signing of CEPA and Civil Nuclear Cooperation deal finally brings to the conclusion. Japan-India relation has gone further to resolve the bilateral and global issue amicably with giving positive node on the relationship status. In the line of discussion on maritime cooperation, it is crucially important to analysis the cooperation between two maritime agencies. Cooperation between Navies and Coast Guard As Japan and India relation new to defence and security, the cooperation between two countries armed forces was negligible during Cold War. During 1990 s, there was no big development in defence and security relationship between two countries, except navy s goodwill visits to both countries ports. However, Indian navy as part of Look East Policy conducting Joint naval exercise with the US (Malabar) since 1992 and with Singapore (SIMBEX) since 1993 to establish defence cooperation with Asia-pacific countries. In that way, Indian navy created an opportunity to call upon Japanese port in 1995 on a good will mission. In the following year, JMSDF training ship visited Mumbai on its tour to Indian Ocean Region. However, two sides refrained from taking any initiative to discuss defence and security matters. In the all time low relationship, interestingly India Chief of Naval Staff, Mr Vishnu Bagwat visit to Japan in 1997 came in surprise to strategic experts and raised several question about the possible defence cooperation between two countries. The doubt was clarified, by visiting Japan s Vice Minister for Defence Kastuhito Asano who agreed to conduct bilateral defence consultation on issue related to Asia and maritime security. This was the first time, high ranking parliamentarian from Japan s Defence Agency visited India to discuss about the security consultation, generated sense of confidence in pursuing the bilateral relationship further. Followed by, another high ranking officer from Japan s defence agency visited India to start the Secretary-level talk. The talk in civilian level slowly graduated to defence personnel level, when Admiral Yasumasa Yamamoto Chief of Maritime Staff of the JMSDF visited New Delhi from 4-8 February 1998, was the first visit by JMSDF Chief of Maritime Staff to India. On his maiden visit to India, Admiral Yamamoto held discussion 90

25 with Indian counter part Admiral Vishnu Bhagwat about strategic and security issues. In the high profile talk, Admiral Vishnu Bhagwat suggested exchange of officers; Admiral Yamamoto readily agreed to offer a seat for an Indian officer in the Japan s National Institute of Defence Studies (NIDS). 43 Already, JSDF officers have provision to undergo training in India s Defence Service Staff College. The agreement will allow Indian officer to visit Japan and interact deeply with defence personnel s in Japan. Further, Admiral Vishnu Bhagwat proposed Joint Rescue Mission for a disaster relief operation and emphasized on bilateral cooperation between two sides. When the relationship was in the nascent stage three incidents positively affected cooperation between two sides naval forces: 1) 1998 Nuclear Test conducted by India 2) Hijack of Japanese owned Alondra Rainbow incident. 3) September 11 attack on the US Due to nuclear weapon test in 1998, countries like UK, USA and Australia had imposed ban on exchange training with Indian Navy. 44 However, Japan didn t impose such ban rather Indian navy officer have been deputed to Japan during this period. Despite, Japanese government imposed strong economic measure on India. This positive response from Japanese side facilitates to deepen the trust level in the bilateral relationship. Arrested Pirates of M.V Alondra Rainbow Source: Indian Coast Guard 43 Bidya Bikash Basu, Indo-Japan Naval Cooperation, Strategic Analysis, May 1998, pp Ministry of Defence India, Annual Report

26 In another incident, the rescue of hijacked M.V Alondra rainbow by the Indian Coast Guard and Navy in November 1999 received great appreciation from Japan. 45 While Japan severely battling piracy off Malacca straits, the successful capture of pirates by Indian maritime force become sensational news in Japan. Realizing the importance of information sharing and anti-piracy operation skills to battle piracy and armed robbery, starting from 2000 Japanese Coast Guard commenced annual maritime exercise with Indian Coast Guard. Besides, Al Qaeda attack on the US on 11 th September 2001 shattered global security environment. Japan under Koizumi administration immediately enacted anti-terrorism special measure law and other law to amend the self-defence Force law. In November, JMSDF warship dispatched to Indian Ocean for information gathering. By December 2001, three months after September 11 attack, JMSDF replenishment ships commenced refueling operation in the Indian Ocean. Since 2001, JMSDF vessels were present in Indian Ocean in a mission to support the US initiative war on terror campaigner. Therefore, these three crucial incidents helped two sides to understand the regional and global issue. Moreover, Indian Coast Guard holds great reasonability in Indian Ocean. The Search and Rescue mission of Indian Coast Guard covers almost entire major sea-routes in the Indian Ocean. Every year thousands of Japanese owned/controlled merchant vessels/tankers have to pass through India Ocean to reach Japan. Realizing the sense of responsibility the Indian Coast Guard hold, Japan Coast Guard realized the opportunity to strengthen its cooperation with Indian counterpart to enhance its capability and to assure the safety of Japanese ship to reach home safely. Since 2000, Japanese Coast Guard under the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism held regular bilateral maritime exercise with Indian Coast guard. 45 See, Capture of Pirates Ship MV Alondra Rainbow in a Joint Operation by the Coast Guard and Navy, 92

27 Source: Indian Coast Guard As series of consultation continuing on Ministerial level between two sides, a Memorandum of Cooperation (MoC) was signed on 24 November 2006 by DGICG and Commandant of JCG for the establishment of collaborative relationship to combat crime at sea and develop regional cooperation between Indian Coast Guard and Japan Coast Guard. The MoC envisage strong cooperation in following field 46 : 1) Sharing information on preventing and responding to acts of crime at sea such as piracy, armed robbery, maritime violence and crimes, acts against maritime security, drug trafficking, smuggling and illegal migration at sea and protection of marine environment. 2) Carrying out search and rescue operation at sea. 3) Exchange of information and facilitation of technical assistance on combating marine pollution. 4) Exchange of technical assistance, wherever feasible, for taking preventive and protective measure for addressing natural disaster like tsunamis and super cyclones. 46 See, Indo-Japan Coast Guard Combine Exercise SAHYOG-KAIJIN 2006, November 2006, Indian Coast Guard. 93

28 Moreover, heads of two Coast Guards regularly met and exchange notes on the sideline of Heads of Asian Coast Guard Agency Meeting (HACGAM). The process of cooperation between Coast Guard agencies was initiated by Japan consequent the capture of the pirated vessels M.V Alondra Rainbow by the Indian navy and Coast Guard in The first meeting of HACGAM held at Tokyo in 2004, since then every year heads of Asian Coast Guard meets regularly to discuss range of maritime security issues. Japan serious about combating piracy and armed robbery in Asian water proposed to establish inter-government working group, which later on developed into a Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP). The agreement is aimed at to promote regional cooperation, information sharing, Capacity building, and cooperation for mutual legal Assistance and extradition of the offender among the members state to suppress piracy and armed robbery in Asian water. Based on the agreement, an Information Sharing Centre (ISC) was established in Singapore, which will act as contact centre. India become the tenth country to ratify the agreement and designates Indian Coast Guard as a focal point for ReCAAP in India. This further broadens Indo-Japan maritime cooperation in international forum. In 2012, 11 th bilateral high-level meeting between Commandant of the Japan Coast Guard and Director General of the Indian Coast Guard held at New Delhi, followed by JCG-ICG participated in combined exercise off the Chennai coast. The High-Level Meeting agreed on the following points: 48 1) Each agency should conduct adequate patrol in water off its own coast in order to prevent Piracy and ensure safety of navigation to the extent possible. 2) Each agency should inform its point of contact of each agency to each other in order to receive/handle distress alert from the other agency s related ship attacked by pirates or in case of other emergency that navigates around off its own coast, and conduct necessary rescue operation for the above mentioned ship to the extent possible, in case any assistance is required th Head of Asian Coast Guard Agencies meeting scheduled to be held in New Delhi, 19 July 2012, 48 The 11 th Bilateral High-Level Meeting Between the Commandant of the Japan Coast Guard and the Directed General of the Indian Coast Guard and the JCG-ICG Combined Exercise. 94

29 3) Each party should share information and its expertise on anti-piracy and conduct combined exercise including radio communication exercise between its MRCCs (maritime rescue coordination centre) in order to enhance counter-piracy capability of both parties. The frequent visit of serving naval chief from both the sides, exchange of ships and maritime exercise in the past twelve years ( ) entrusted great reasonability on both the sides to safeguarding the good order at sea. Navies from both sides have also shown great interest in the ongoing combined exercise between JCG-ICG. The strategic implication attached to naval drill or joint naval exercise had cautioned both side leaders to move cautiously on this issue. However, Navy of both sides has been conducting regular PASSEX (Passage Exercise) during the ships visit to each other ports. JMSDF-Indian Navy Since 1957, JMSDF Overseas Training Cruise visits Indian Ocean and Indian port as part of regular training activity for junior officers who have graduated from the general officer candidate to course at the Maritime Officer Candidate School. But, the full-fledged navy-to-navy cooperation surfaced only after the visit of Prime Minister Mori in Then the exchange of defence ministers and visit of service chief in the following years gradually elevated Japan-India relationship into strategic levels. When we talk about strategic level, Navy-to-Navy cooperation plays a crucial role in determining the future course of the bilateral relationship. Both Japan and India are maritime country immensely depend upon overseas resources and trade for sustainable economics. In terms of security challenges, both countries national security is also closely netted with the maritime environment. Therefore, in the post-cold War two countries arranged bilateral agreement to enhance regional and maritime security in the Indian Ocean. The Joint Statement on Defence and Security Cooperation-2006 and 2009 laid specific scope of cooperation between the two armed forces. To mark the new beginning in the bilateral defence and security cooperation, two countries navies first time participated in joint naval drill along with the US navy called as TRILATEX-07 in the Pacific Ocean off the Boso peninsula, central Japan in April 95

30 In the six-hour naval exercise, three navies performed basic drill of communicating among each other through radio transmission and flag signaling. This followed by Malabar series of exercise in Bay of Bengal on September Annually conducted bilateral Malabar exercise gained more strategic significance, when India invited Japan, Singapore and Australia navies to participate in the multilateral naval exercise. 50 On Indian Navy request, JMSDF Destroyer JS Yuudachi (DD-103) and JS Oonami (DD-111) participated in the naval drill. During Malabar-2007, JMSDF Destroyer JS Yuudachi (DD 103) leads the formation of ships in the Bay of Bengal Source: wn.com In the six-day exercise, more than 20,000 personnel, twenty eight warship and 150 aircraft were involved in the exercise. 51 In an effort to increase interoperability among the participant, the five nations worked together to improve their anti-submarine warfare, anti-piracy, humanitarian and combat skills. Cdr Gurpreet S Khurana claimed, this was the first time Malabar-2007, 49Trilateral naval exercise in Pacific Ocean, The Hindu, 17 April 2007, 50 Gurpeet S Khurana, Joint Naval Exercises: A Post-Malabar 2007 Appraisal for India, IPCS Issue Brief, September Kitty Hawk, Allies Complete Malabar Exercise, Department of Navy, United States of America, 9 October 2007, 96

31 has generated a lot of international interest. 52 Considering the change in the venue from western sea board of Indian Ocean to Bay of Bengal close to international sea route and the idea to include Japan, Singapore and Australia into the Indo-US Malabar series raised serious question about the nature of the cooperation. Already, China registered strong protest against four nations (India, Japan, the US and Australia) exploratory talk on quadrilateral Forum on the sideline of the ARF Security policy meeting in May Despite Chinese apprehension over the multilateral naval exercise, India, Japan and the US navies continued their Malabar-2009 off the coast of Okinawa from April 26 th to May 3 rd close to Chinese water. During the exercise, three navy conducted series of drill related to anti-submarine warfare, surface warfare, air defence, live fire gunnery training and Visit Board, Search and Seizure (VBSS) technique. The Malabar-2009 is significant because it was second time JMSDF operating along with the US and India navy in the Pacific Ocean. In 2010, the tsunami, Earthquake and Fukushima crisis prevented Japan from taking part in the Malabar series of exercise. Since, Japan not yet recovered completely from the triple disaster in 2010, India-US bilateral Malabar Exercise continued without Japan in But, Malabar-2007 and 2009 envisages naval cooperation is not mere diplomatic venture or symbolic gesture for goodwill relationship. Rather, a good opportunity for India and Japan naval forces to derive tangible operational experience from such exercises. Meantime, Navy-to-Navy talk made significant progress in building a consensus for Joint Action Plan. In 2011, Indian Defence Minister A.K Antony and his Japan counterpart discussed about bilateral naval exercise apart from multilateral ones. 53 As two sides agreed for bilateral naval exercise, in 2012 Japan-India conducted first naval exercise in pacific water. The first bilateral naval exercise named as JIMEX-12, four naval warships from Indian side and two JMSDF destroyer, one maritime patrol aircraft and a helicopter belong to JMSDF participated in the basic maneuvering exercise covering Humanitarian Aid & Disaster Relief (HA/DR) operations and Visit, 52 Gurpeet S Khurana, Joint Naval Exercises: A Post-Malabar 2007 Appraisal for India, IPCS Issue Brief, September Antony s visit to give a push to defence ties, The Hindu, 31 October 2011, 97

32 Board, Search and Seizure (VBSS) drills, which form a part of Anti-Piracy operations. 54 During the inauguration ceremony, Rear Admiral P Ajith Kumar said, this exercise is basically designed to increase interoperability between two navies in the sphere of maritime security and HA/DR operations. The first bilateral naval exercise coinciding with the celebration of Indo-Japan sixty years of diplomatic relationship mark a new beginning in the bilateral relationship. In the sixty-years of diplomatic relationship, both Japan and India had never come this much close in economic, political and security area. Particularly, during ( ) Japan-India made tremendous progress in defence and security cooperation. Noted Japan Times columnist Brhama Chellney called Asia's booming economies are bound by sea, and maritime democracies like Japan and India must work together to help build a stable, liberal, rules-based order in Asia. 55 Japanese strategic experts have high regards for India, particularly Indian navy is seen by Japanese as a strong seagoing naval force in the region with decade of experience in operating aircraft career and fixed wing aircraft in Indian Ocean Region. 56 Given Indian Navy geostrategic impetus in the Indian Ocean Region, JMSDF seeks to expand cooperation with Indian navy to perform a proactive role in maintaining good order at sea. Nevertheless, JMSDF one of the largest non-nuclear and most sophisticated navy in the world will certainly benefit Indian Navy. Therefore, the cooperation will mutually benefit two navies and also enhances the maritime security operational capability, whenever the necessary arise. The US and China factor in Indo-Japan maritime cooperation The US and China factors plays a crucial role in shaping the bilateral interaction between India and Japan. Naturally, India, Japan and the US face no ideological, cultural, historical or territorial disputes; rather there is considerable opportunity for the three nations to work side-by-side on economics, energy, 54 First Bilateral Maritime Exercise between India and Japan Jimex 12 to commence on 09 June 12, 8 June 2012, 55 Brhama Chellaney, Build Japan-India naval ties, The Japan Times, 28 December 2011, 56 Opinion is based on the interview with eminent scholars, serving and retired JMSDF officials 98

33 foreign and security policy. Therefore, US act as a positive impact factor in Indo-Japan cooperation, while on the contrary China attributes negative role. Both, Japan and India have ideological, historical and territorial disputes with China. Attack on India and occupation of Indian Territory by Chinese PLA during 1962 war, illegally aiding Pakistan missile programme and China s String of Pearls strategy to encircle India have casted negative shadow on Indo-Sino relationship. In terms of economic relationship Japan enjoys close relationship with China, but issues pertained to historical factors looming large as an obstacle in Japan-China relationship. In addition, dispute over Senkaku Island and issue of navigation in South China Sea seriously threatens Japanese sense of security in the region. China building strong naval force, views the emerging cooperation between India and Japan are part of the US strategy to counter Chine PLA-Navy expansion plan in Indian Ocean. Dr Gregory Kulacki, senior analyst and China project manager at the Massachusetts-based Union of Concerned Scientists, talking about Indo-Japan Space prgramme he stated that "They (China) are more concerned about what this implies about US intentions rather than what it implies about the intentions of the Japanese or the Indians, particularly as it concerns space." 57 But, this argument is well applicable to every aspect of Indo-Japan strategic cooperation. China objects to naval exercise in the region accusing the participant for conspiring in a sinister plot to contain China is apparent. Security analyst s fear that Chinese reactions to closer Indo-Japanese naval ties will constrain the scope of bilateral interaction. 58 Therefore, it is necessary to understand the impact factor of the US and China in Indo-Japan maritime cooperation. The US Factor During Cold War, India-US bilateral relationship was cold and strained by suspicion. The ideological war between two super powers (US-USSR) prevented 57 Peter J Brown, China fears India-Japan Space alliance, Asian Times, 12 November 2008, 58 James R Holmes, Andrew C Winner and Toshi Yoshihara, Indian Naval Strategy in the Twenty First Century, (New York: 2009). 99

34 India from joining either of the club and remained non-aligned country, which irked the US. Following, the collapse of Soviet Union the relationship between India and US started to buildup. Then, the relationship saw temporary watershed after India went for nuclear test in Despite the nuclear hiccup, in 2000 US President Bill Clinton travelled to India and restored the momentum in the bilateral relationship with New Delhi. After September 11 attack, the dynamics of Indo-US relation changed even drastically, as Secretary of State Colin Powell mentioned it, since the terrorist attack on the United States we reshaped the whole region-reinvigorated US-India Relationship. 59 For the US, Indian Ocean emerges as a crucial pathway in fight against Islamic insurgency in Afghanistan. Therefore, President George W. Bush favoured India s position in quickly changing global politics. This was reflected when US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage in an interview said We love the idea of being able to call on occasion on Indian ports, naval ships we hope it will be good for US-India relations. 60 By 2004, India-US signed Next Step in Strategic Partnership (NSSP), followed by US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and Indian counterpart Pranab Mukerji signed the New Framework for the India-United States Defence Relationship on June Despite domestic pressure and legal complications over civil nuclear cooperation, both the countries successfully signed Indo-US Civil Nuclear Agreement. Equivalently, Indo-US defence and security cooperation gained attention and made significant headway during this period. India s Ministry of Defence is reportedly planning to double its arms procurement and likely to spend over 20 million US dollar more than twice the amount it spent in the past ten years on an annual basis. 61 To improve the interoperability between 59War on terror reinvigorated Indo-US relation, The Times of India, 6 February 2002, eshow/ cms? 60Ravi Tomar, India-US Relations in a Changing Strategic Environment, Research Paper No. 20, Parliament of Australia, 25 June 2002, ry/pubs/rp/rp0102/02rp20 61 India s 10 s latest defence procurement programmes, The Economic Times, ent-programmes/indias-10-latest-defence-procurement-programmes/quickiearticleshow/ cms 100

35 two navies, Indian Navy shifting its priority towards the US based manufacture to arm rapidly expanding Indian naval fleet. The recent induction of INS Jalashwa, P8I Maritime reconnaissance and anti-submarine aircraft from the US will solidifies the ongoing navy-to-navy cooperation. Generally, Indian armed forces policy to diversify the arm procurement greatly benefited the US manufactures, which substantially helps to increase military-to-military coordination. On the other hand, naval diplomacy paved a new opening in Indo-US relationship. For the first time the US, Australia, Japan and India jointly coordinated Tsunami relief operations in The coordination between the like minded countries in HR/DR operation increased the awareness among the leading navies about the necessary of regular joint exercise. Subsequently, the bilateral relationship began to attain multilateral level, when three nations (the US, Japan, Australia) Trilateral Strategic Dialogue on 18 March 2006, agreed on to foster their support and recognized the importance of reinforcing our global partnership with India. 63 Consequently, in 2007, India-US-Japan conducted first multilateral naval exercise called TRILATEX-07 off central Japan. Followed by, India, the US, Japan, Australia and Singapore navies took part Malabar series of exercise off bay Bengal in Indian Ocean. Naval analysts believe this is a part of Indo-US bilateral cooperation, to advance the relationship by joining hands with like minded country in Asia-pacific region. During this period ( ), Japan and the US held series of high profile meeting, discussion with Indian counterpart separately to consolidate India position in the global politics. The US foresaw India s growing ties with Japan as an opportunity to bring India onboard to form a trilateral strategic arrangement. In 2007, US-Japan Security Consultative Committee, communiqué clearly states that build upon partnerships with India to advance areas of common interests and increase cooperation, recognizing that India's continued growth is inextricably tied to the prosperity, freedom, and security of the region as a common objective in 62 Indian Ocean Earthquake and Tsunami: Humanitarian Assistance and relief Operations, CRS Report for Congress, 10 February 2005, 63 Trilateral Strategic Dialogue, Joint Statement Australia-Japan-United States, MOFA, 18 March 2006, 101

36 Japan-the US relationship 64 After the failure of Quad initiative, the US cautious in moving forward to form a small dialogue group, preferred less confrontational approach vis-à-vis China. 65 In December 2011, three countries foreign minister held their first trilateral dialogue in Washington. After the four hours of discussion, all the three quickly declined that the meeting is not aimed at China. 66 One step forward, Japan foreign minister KoichiroGemba expressed Japan and US willingness to conduct similar dialogue process with China. In fact, the trilateral talk concluded without finding agenda for the trilateral cooperation. In sum, the US played key role in linking India with Japan to form a trilateral dialogue. As the three nation initiative gaining momentum, China remains a major concern for all the three nations. The trio had also realized the success of Indo-Japan-US trilateral dialogue is depends upon, how effectively they delink issues pertained to China. However, China s recent spat with Japan over Senkaku Island and freedom of navigation in South China Sea likely to make the trilateral dialogue more vulnerable to Chinese diplomatic offensive. China Factor China vehemently opposes any form of cooperation between India, Japan, and the US. In fact China relentlessly try to contain growth by placing obstacle in Indian development pattern by encouraging Pakistan and supplying illicit nuclear reactor design, weapon grade plutonium, transfer of 5000 ring magnets and the Khusba reactor which has helped to train hundred of Pakistani engineers. 67 Moreover, China has been hostile to Indo-US nuclear deal; the leading Chinese newspaper People s Daily the mouth piece of ruling communist party of China repeatedly published editorials criticizing Bush government for 64 Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee Alliance Transformation: Advancing United States-Japan Security and Defense Cooperation, MOFA, 1 May 2007, 65 K.V Kesavan, India and Japan Changing Dimension of Partnership in the Post-Cold War Period, ORF Occasional Paper#14 (New Delhi: 2010) 66 Inside the first ever US-Japan-India trilateral meeting, Foreign Policy, 23 December 2011, eral_meeting. 67 Mihir Kumar Roy, Security environment in the Indian Ocean, 102

37 signing bilateral civil nuclear agreement with India. 68 Besides to that, China had opposed both India and Japan candidature for permanent membership in UN Security Council. 69 But, the Challenge from now on could be how to deal with growing Chinese PLA-Navy in Indo-pacific region. Peter Navarro and Greg Autry s documentary called Death by China: Confronting the Dragon-A Global Call to Action in which they claim The People Republic of China is moving forward at Manhattan Project speed to develop a blue water navy capability. 70 Many Indian and Japanese scholar have also agreed to the fact, that China s PLA-Navy acquired latest technology like purloined sonar s, radars and submarine launched missile such as US W-88 Ultra Compact, missile guidance and submarine tracking technologies with her access to the US technology. JGSDF General (Rtd) Taki says Chinese ambitious about building a large ocean going fleets is likely to have an adverse effect on the regional security. Between 1995 and 2008, the PLA-Navy commissioned approximately thirty-eight new submarine into service, an average of 2.9 submarines per year. 71 In addition, newly inducted aircraft career ex-varyag, under construction Chinese built aircraft career scheduled to hit dock in 2015 and highly modernized surface fleet poses serious challenge to countries who share maritime realm with China. In Indian Ocean, China devised strategy to contain India by building chain of naval facility in Sri Lanka, Mayanmar and Pakistan, which is famously known as String of Pearl-Strategy. But, Japan faces even more serious trouble in its territorial water from intruding Chinese ships. Since, Japan immensely depends upon those areas for energy and trade fears Chinese naval activity could possibly interrupt flow of maritime traffic in that area. The Picture (below) clearly indicates Chinese military/non-military vessels trespassing Japanese territorial water. Defence of 68 China attacks Indo-US Nuclear deal, Rediff India, 4 November 2005, 69 China opposes Japan s bid for security council, The Michigan Daily, 13 April 2005, 70 See the Documentary on Death by China: Confronting the Dragon-A Global Call to Action, 71 Peter Dutton, Scouting, Signaling and Gatekeeping, Chinese Naval Operation in Japanese water and the international law implications, China Maritime Studies, US NAVAL WAR College, 103

38 Japan 2011, stated that Chinese navy and other organization as following objective to conduct maritime activity in Japanese water. 72 The first objective is to intercept naval operation by enemies in water as far as possible from the country in order to defend Chinese territories and territorial water. The second one is to develop military capability to deter and prevent Taiwan s independence. The third is to acquire, maintain and protect maritime rights and interest. The fourth is to defend SLOC of China. Japanese is also paying close attention to Chinese activity near Japanese territory water and Chinese activity in South China Sea. Chinese Activities in the water of Japan Source: Defence of Japan 2011, Ministry of Defence Given Chinese maritime activity near Japan and Indian Ocean, it is clear China will expand PLA-Navy maritime activity, surveillance, naval training and exercises in East China and South China Sea. Moreover, China is deeply suspicious about growing bilateral maritime cooperation between India and Japan. Particularly, a day before first ever official security consultation between India, Japan, the US and Australia in 2007, China issued demarches to each of the 72 Defence of Japan 2011, Ministry of Defence. 104

39 participant to know the purpose of the meeting. 73 In the same year, India-Japan-US conducted first ever multilateral naval drill close to Chinese water in Pacific Ocean. In response to the naval drill, People s Daily Chinese news paper editorial criticized saying It is absolutely not new for Japan and the U.S. to sit down and plot conspiracies together but it is rather intriguing to get India involved. 74 But, both India and Japan tried hard to relive China from any misconception about ongoing maritime exercise in Pacific and Bay Bengal. Even, at the time of signing Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation in 2008, Manmohan Singh and Shinzo Abe made it clear that the agreement on defence and Security cooperation is not aimed at any third country. In response to media person question, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe said, We regard security cooperation with India as very important... There was a mention of China and we do not have any assumption of a third country as a target such as China. 75 Despite the assurance from India and Japan, Prof Kesavan says, China views the evolving bilateral closeness with considerable suspicion and it has voiced its misgiving in no uncertain terms. 76 Given the geopolitical significance of the region, China will continue to negate every aspect of India-Japan partnership. To allying anxieties of China, Prof Kesavan suggest both India and Japan should make use of Track II, Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-pacific (CSCAP) and ARF to address growing Chinese naval strength. 77 At the same time, Admiral (Rtd) Mihir Roy warns latent ambition of China s Blue Water Navy cannot be brushed under the carpet to avoid rocking the boat of bilateral trade between US, China, and Japan. 78 Therefore, strategic analyst advices, both India-Japan should act in caution to avoid any head-on collision with China, which will not only derail Indo-Japan 73 Siddhartha vardarajan, Four Power meeting drew Chinese demarches, Global Research, 10 June 2007, 74 A goodwill joint naval drill, People s Daily, 75 Siddarth Vardarajan, India, Japan say new security ties not directed against China, The Hindu, 23 October 2008, 76 K.V Kesavan, India and Japan Changing Dimension of Partnership in the Post-Cold War Period, ORF Occasional Paper#14 (New Delhi: 2010) 77 Ibid 78 Mihir Kumar Roy, Security Environment in the Indian Ocean, OPRF, 105

40 defence and security cooperation, rather it will have similar implication on regional security order in Indo-Pacific region. The US and China Status on Indo-Japan Maritime Cooperation The US China Indo-Japan (Overall) Bilateral Relation Supportive Cautious Indo-Japan Deepening Defence Ties Supportive Cautious Indo-Japan Bilateral Maritime Welcoming Cautious naval/coast Guard Exercise Indo-Japan Multilateral Naval Exercise like Malabar-07,09 and TRILATEX-07 Welcoming Hostile Source: Compiled by Author based on the preliminary assessment. The Table (above) clearly states the status of the US and China over India-Japan maritime cooperation. The speeding cooperation between the two countries is seen as positive growths by the US, in contrast China see its part of containment policy. It is important for India and Japan to respect the two perspectives and act accordingly to sustain the development in the bilateral cooperation. Task before India and Japan Finally, the study likes to elaborate three crucial tasks to strengthen full-fledging strategic cooperation between India and Japan. 1) India-Japan Maritime Cooperation should declare war Global Piracy and Armed Robbery, 2) Bilaterally, India-Japan economic cooperation will demand robust interoperability between two navies, 3) To jointly develop defence system. These task required, strong political direction from two sides and strong diplomatic initiative to turn the maritime cooperation into robust security partnership. India-Japan Maritime Cooperation should declare War on Global Piracy IMB Piracy reporting centre (IMB-PRC) reports shows there is significant rise in piracy and armed robbery around the globe. In the first half of 2012, total 210 ships reported piracy attack and 23 ships are reportedly hijacked by pirates. Out of 23 ships, 13 ships have been hijacked by Somalia pirates in Indian 106

41 Ocean. 79 According to report, as many as 188 seafarers, along with 11 ships were currently held by Somalia pirates in captivity. Moreover, Somali pirates moving out from traditional ground into to deep sea to hijack ships, which have become major concern for the coalition force operating in anti-piracy activity in western Indian Ocean. Apart from Somalia incident, in the last few years piracy in west Africa/Gulf of Guinea have increased considerably, says Sam Bateman. 80 The recent spur of piracy incident in the Gulf of Guinea seems to be more worrying. The attackers are more violent, crew members are sometimes kidnapped for ransoms and hijacking of vessels to steal cargo etc escalated safety and security of seafarers and transportation in that region. 81 Actual Piracy Attack Worldwide 2012 Source: IMB-PRC Apart from petty theft like stealing crew s valuables and ships machinery part there was no serious piracy incident reported in Southeast Asian water and Indian subcontinent. Thanks to coordination and cooperation between littoral navies that helped to reduce serious piracy crime like hijacking the ships in the 79 Piracy and Armed Robbery News and Figure, ICC Commercial Crime Service, 80 Sam Batman, Calming troubled waters- Global and regional strategies for countering piracy, Special Report, Australia Strategic Policy Institute, Issue 47 August Freedom C. Onuoha, Piracy and Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea, 12 June 2012, 107

42 region. However, the piracy and armed robbery, maritime terrorism remains major challenge to maritime nation ferrying goods via these crucial points. Both, India and Japan are major user of sea route of this region. Invariably, the security of the sea-lane connects both nations together in addressing the issue of good order at sea. In a step forward to achieve the common goal, India-Japan should expand maritime security cooperation beyond regional dimension and pursue Piracy as a Global Threat. India-Japan economic cooperation will demand robust interoperability between two navies As this report mentioned it already, India-Japan trade and economic relationship advancing in a fast pace. According to survey conducted by Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) says that 90% Japanese companies cited India as the future growth potential of the local market, a clear indication of expectation for the Indian market. 82 Besides, the Japanese companies have identifies two costal states with large port facilities, Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu as an ideal place to setup manufacturing plant in India. The presence of port facility and the their location next to international SLOC provides an advantage to Japanese manufactures to export finished goods to African, West Asia and European continent using sea-route. Promising Regions within India Source: Survey Report on Overseas Business Operation by Japanese manufacturing Companies, Japan Bank for International Cooperation. 82 Survey Report on Overseas Business Operation by Japanese manufacturing companies, Japan Bank of International Cooperation, December