No Supreme Principle: Confucianism's Harmonization of Multiple Values

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1 Wesleyan University From the SelectedWorks of Stephen C. Angle 2008 No Supreme Principle: Confucianism's Harmonization of Multiple Values Stephen C. Angle, Wesleyan University Available at: 33/

2 No Supreme Principle: Confucianism s Harmonization of Multiple Values 1 Stephen C. Angle September 8, 2007 The present symposium is a reaction to one of the most stimulating debates that the Chinese philosophical community has seen in years. The vigorous challenges mounted by LIU Qingping prompted a wide-ranging and constructive conversation that has focused in four areas: first, the historical, contextual interpretation of classical Confucian teachings, and their strengths and weaknesses in that context; second, arguments about the continuing cultural influence of these Confucian orientations; third, methodological questions about the proper way to study and develop Chinese philosophy; fourth, more substantive argument about what sort of philosophy one ought to adopt today. As both an important and insightful participant in the debates and the chief force behind organizing and presenting these discussions to a wider public, GUO Qiyong also deserves tremendous credit. Finally, I would like to offer my thanks to HUANG Yong for enabling philosophers outside of China to continue the conversations initiated by Professors LIU and GUO. In this short essay I will take issue with what I believe is Professor LIU s most central contention, namely that consanguineous affection is the supreme principle [Liu 2007, 5] of Confucianism. Another way he puts this is to say that Confucianism places filial piety absolutely above everything else [Ibid]. I agree, that is, with Professor GUO s contention that for neither classical nor neo-confucians were statements about the importance of filial piety 1 This essay is substantially based on material from my forthcoming book, Sagehood: The Contemporary Significance of Neo-Confucian Ethical and Political Philosophy. In the spring of 2007, I had opportunities to discuss these ideas with both Professors GUO Qiyong and LIU Qingping, and I thank them both for their warm hospitality and incisive comments. Thanks also to HUANG Yong for helpful comments on an earlier version of the essay.

3 credited as general principles, [and thus] we can see that they do not endorse blood affection as something supreme [Guo 2007, 24]. My approach will be to consider three ways in which one might reach a decision on what to do in the face of an apparent conflict between values. One possibility is to strive to maximize some underlying ur-value, to which all other values may ultimately be reduced. A second option allows for irreducibly distinct values, but calls for choosing the greater value over the lesser, according to a fixed, ordinal ranking. The third method I consider grants that some values may generally be more significant than others, but advocates the situation-specific harmonization of all values in a manner that honors the importance of each distinct value. LIU s position requires either the first or (more likely) the second of these options, but I argue that Confucians both do and should endorse the third. There is an emphasis in both classic Confucian passages and later neo-confucian discussions on viewing a situation imaginatively so as to avoid an either/or choice. In a recent book, Mark Csikszentmihalyi provides important background to this idea. He cites some early examples of individuals faced with dilemmas who do not find good solutions; early commentaries on these stories invoke the phrase both advancing and retreating are problematic [Csikszentmihalyi 2004, 4]. However, a theme of Csikszentmihalyi s book is the emergence of the idea of perfect sages who can synthesize or harmonize the various relevant virtues. His focus is on the physical-cum-psychological material virtue underlying this and other developments. For present purposes, let us consider the following passage, cited by Professor LIU as Case 2 [Liu 2007, 2], in which Mencius discusses how the sage-king Shun treated his villainous stepbrother, Xiang: Wan Zhang said, Xiang devoted himself every day to plotting against Shun's life. Why did Shun only banish him when he became Emperor? He enfeoffed him said Mencius. Some called this banishment. 2

4 Shun banished [various villains]. Xiang was the most wicked of them all, yet he was enfeoffed in Youbi. What wrong had the people of Youbi done? Is that the way a humane man behaves? Others he punishes, but when it comes to his own brother he enfeoffs him instead. A humane man never harbors anger or nurses a grudge against a brother. All he does is to love him. Because he loves him, he wishes him to enjoy rank; because he loves him, he wishes him to enjoy wealth. To enfeoff him in Youbi was to let him enjoy wealth and rank. If as Emperor he were to allow his brother to be a nobody, could that be described as loving him? May I ask what you meant by saying that some called this banishment? Xiang was not allowed to take any action in his fief. The Emperor appointed officials to administer the fief and to collect tributes and taxes. For this reason it was described as banishment. Xiang was certainly not permitted to ill-use the people. [Mencius 5A:3; Mencius 1970, 140-1, slightly modified] Here we have a situation that looks rife with conflict. The passage suggests that at least three values are involved: love for one s brother, a more general compassion for the people of Youbi, and just or equitable treatment for criminals. Shun s solution is certainly not to add up the importance of each of these on a single scale and act accordingly: there is no hint of an underlying value (like Mohist benefit, for instance) that can tell us how much attention to pay to the well-being of the people, on the one hand, and to what degree Shun should feel (or at least express) love for Xiang. It also does not appear that Shun simply chooses one supreme value over the others. His solution is complex, leading some to call it banishment rather than enfeoffment. I would therefore argue that Shun has seen a harmonious solution one that will honor all the relevant aspects of this particular situation. In saying this, we should recognize the way in which Shun has dealt with Wan Zhang s complaint about the injustice of the solution. Shun clearly does not recognize the applicability here of a treat like cases alike principle, because the cases are not alike: we have 3

5 different relationships to our close kin than we have to others. 2 In other words, a prima facie conflict has been imaginatively resolved without any cause for regret and without the perceived forgoing of any genuine value. Zhu Xi says that this solution was the extreme of humaneness (ren zhi zhi 仁之至 ) and the utmost appropriateness (yi zhi jin 义之尽 ) [Zhu 1997, 1213]. In other words, thanks to Shun s imaginative solution to what would otherwise have produced a conflict between humaneness and appropriateness, both values received maximal expression. In a recent, important study of Wang Yangming, Warren Frisina makes a similar point when he says that according to Wang, sages maximize the harmonic possibilities within any given situation [Frisina 2002, 85]. 3 We must be careful, though, to guard against two ways in which this talk of maximizing could be misleading. First, maximal humaneness does not mean to abandon all restraint in indulging another s desires. We are familiar with stories in which love for another causes one to lose one s bearings. Zhu in fact cites the case of Jing Di s 景帝 behavior toward the King of Liang, saying that because Jing Di was far too indulgent, his feelings cannot be called humane [Zhu 1997, 1213]. While humaneness is rooted in feelings of love and compassion, if these feelings are out of balance, they do not count as humaneness. Second, we should not conclude from the juxtaposition of humaneness and appropriateness that harmony is defined by maximizing humaneness without diminishing appropriateness. That is, harmony is not a trade-off between two competing values. Zhu makes this clear when he comments on the common saying Humaneness and appropriateness bend and 2 It is beyond the scope of the present essay to treat in detail the role of principles in Confucian ethical reasoning. In brief, principles or explicit standards (jing 经 ) have critical heuristic roles but are not the ultimate ground for an ethically proper reaction; this is quite similar to both classical and contemporary Western virtue ethics. 3 Frisina grounds this interpretation of Wang in passages like the following: The man of humanity regards heaven and earth and all things as one body. If a single thing is deprived of its place, it means that my humanity is not yet demonstrated to the fullest extent [Wang 1963, 56]. 4

6 break each other. Zhu agrees with his student s reaction to this saying, namely that the extreme of humaneness and the utmost of appropriateness are only possible when there is no favoring of one over the other. But Zhu adds that the extreme of humaneness and the utmost of appropriateness are independent of one another, implying that each is defined by the whole situation, rather than by a specific trade-off against the other value [Ibid]. In two insightful essays, Yu Kam Por has found evidence in both classical and Han dynasty texts for a view very much like the one I am developing here. For instance, he notes that according to the Analects 6:18, the deficiency of one value cannot be compensated for by additional qualities of another value [Yu forthcoming, 63]. I can add to this that when he comments on this Analects passage, Zhu says both that Only when students reduce what is excessive and supplement what is deficient can they attain complete virtue [Zhu 1987, 40], and that if either value wins out over the other, coherence (li 理 ) cannot be adequately [attained] [Zhu 1997, 727]. Even more strikingly, Yu has found a passage in the Yi Zhou Shu 逸周书 that explicitly names the synthetic, harmonious point at which we should aim: If there is an inbetween (zhong 中 ), it is called three. If there is no in-between, it is called two. Two struggles with each other, and results in weakness. Three constitutes harmony, and results in strength. Yu adds that three is not another claim that competes with the two, but a synthesis of the two [Yu unpublished, 17; emphasis in original]. This idea can be clarified if we recall the culinary and musical metaphors with which the concept of harmony was first developed(see [Guo 2000], [Li 2006], and Chapter Four of [Angle, forthcoming]). It is certainly true that a cook needs to take into account the amounts of pepper, broth, and so on in his soup as he decides how much salt to add. His goal, though, is an appropriate saltiness the perfect contribution to the overall harmony rather than maximizing 5

7 the amount of salt he can put into the soup without compromising the other ingredients. Once he finds the harmony, we are not tempted to say that some saltiness was sacrificed in order to preserve the right amount of pepper. Western philosophers like Martha Nussbaum are concerned that in conflictual situations we will be forced to forgo genuine values, and it is clear that Professor LIU is similarly worried by the results of Confucian attention to filial love. I think it should be clear, to begin with, that genuine values are not forgone in the case of soup, and this is not because there is one, underlying value (perhaps taste ) to which all other values are reduced. It is perfectly cogent to think about salt and pepper as distinct, incommensurable values, and to aim at a balance or harmony between them, rather than choosing one (supreme) value over the other. Similarly, Zhu s analysis of Shun s treatment of Xiang is that no values are forgone. Humaneness is not traded off against appropriateness; instead, each is perfectly (or maximally) expressed, relative to the possibilities afforded by the situation. Zhu Xi and his fellow neo-confucians would of course characterize the possibilities afforded by the situation in terms of coherence (li). 4 So, when discussing the statement in Analects 13:18 that fathers cover up for their sons, and sons cover up for their fathers when one has done something wrong, Zhu says that this is the extreme (zhi 至 ) of universal coherence and human feelings [Zhu 1987, 98]. Varying specifications of context always provide the framework within which one can talk about perfect or extreme (or, suitably qualified, maximal ) expression of values. Indeed, Yu Kam Por has argued that even when only one value is mentioned, determination of whether one goes too far, falls short, or is perfectly apt in one s expression of the value is always implicitly relative to (at least) one other value [Yu forthcoming, 61]. 4 For extensive discussion of the meaning of li and an argument for translating it as coherence, see Chapter Two of [Angle, forthcoming]. 6

8 Instead of mounting a text-based argument against seeing filial piety as a supreme value on which see Professor GUO s essay my aim has been to articulate a philosophical position that better accounts for the complexity of ethical decision-making, as it is described in the passages from Mencius on which Professor LIU has based his argument. In response to a view somewhat like mine, Professor LIU objects that what Shun did already harmed the interests of the people of Youbi [Liu 2007, 10], and thus cannot be seen as seamlessly uniting the demands of filial piety with humaneness. This complaint is unconvincing because it relies on the idea that unless every effort is single-mindedly devoted to maximizing their interests, the people will be harmed. But this can only make sense on one of the first two models of ethical decisionmaking we have been considering; the third model explicitly asserts that what counts as maximally realizing a given value is always relative to the particular context, and cannot be determined by looking solely at one dimension of the situation. According to the Confucian model of ethical judgment that I have been developing, thinking about our responsibilities in terms of maximizing a single value (like interests ), stripped bare from context and from all other related values, is a deeply impoverished approach to our ethical lives. 5 Even as I say this, though, I must acknowledge that some related passages do not, in my opinion, express as fully as possible the dimensions of a harmonious reaction to their distinctive circumstances. For example, Professor LIU discusses the famous case of Shun fleeing with his father on his back, should his father have murdered someone (this is Liu s Case 1 [Ibid, 2]). I have discussed this passage extensively elsewhere, and I conclude that Mencius leaves out of his 5 It is a separate question whether Shun s solution is really the best harmonization of all relevant values. Might there have been some other way for Shun to put into effect his love for his brother? Could Shun s benevolence toward the people of Youbi have been expressed (and their interests preserved) in some alternative, more robust, fashion? Perhaps. The historical details (if this ever actually happened) have been lost to us. My point is that reasoning in this way trying to see and harmonize all the relevant values is precisely what the Confucians are after. 7

9 picture the critically important emotion of grief that Shun should be feeling. 6 In many cases everyone, even a sage, should feel negative emotions like grief; this is part of a holistic, harmonious, appropriate response to certain kinds of situations. In conversation, Professor GUO has told me that he believes Mencius would agree, and did not mention grief because of the particular conversational context in which the recorded discussion occurred. This is certainly possible. More generally, though, contemporary Confucian philosophers should accept that grief can be part of a harmonious reaction, whether or not we are confident the historical Mencius would have agreed. This is in keeping with treating Confucianism as a live philosophical tradition, open to revision and development, rather than as a static museum-piece. Instead of Professor LIU s post-confucianism, therefore, I suggest we take seriously the possibility of a contemporary Confucianism that learns and grows through dialogues like that between Professors LIU and GUO. References Angle, Stephen C. (forthcoming). Sagehood: The Contemporary Significance of Neo-Confucian Ethical and Political Philosophy. Csikszentmihalyi, Mark. (2004). Material Virtue: Ethics and the Body in Early China. Leiden: Brill. Frisina, Warren G. (2002). The Unity of Knowledge and Action: Toward a Nonrepresentational Theory of Knowledge. Albany, NY: SUNY Press. Guo, Qi 郭齊. (2000). 中國歷史上哲學範疇 和 的形成 [The Formation of the Philosophical Category of "Harmony" in Chinese History]. Zhongguo Wenzhe Janjiu Jikan, 16, Guo, Qiyong. (2007). Is Confucian Ethics a 'Consanguinism'? Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy, 6(1), Li, Chenyang. (2006). The Confucian Ideal of Harmony. Philosophy East & West, 56(4), See Chapter Six of [Angle, forthcoming]. 8

10 Liu, Qingping. (2007). Confucianism and Corruption: An Analysis of Shun's Two Actions Described by Mencius. Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy, 6(1), Mencius. (1970). (Lau, D. C., Tr.) Mencius. London: Penguin. Wang, Yangming. (1963). Instructions for Practical Living. New York: Columbia University Press. Yu, Kam-por. (Forthcoming). The Handling of Multiple Ethical Values in Confucianism. In Yu, Kam-por, Ivanhoe, P. J., & Tao, Julia (Eds.), Taking Confucian Ethics Seriously: Contemporary Theories and Applications (unpublished). The Confucian Conception of Harmony. In xxxx [[I am checking the citation with Kam Por and will let you know when I hear]] Zhu, Xi 朱熹. (1987). 四书章句集注 [Collected Commentaries on the Four Books]. Shanghai: Shanghai Shudian (1997). 朱子语 [Classified Conversations of Master Zhu]. Changsha: Yuelu Shushe. 9