Routledge Handbook of Democratization in East Asia

Transcription

1 This article was downloaded by: On: 29 Sep 2018 Access details: subscription number Publisher:Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: Registered office: 5 Howick Place, London SW1P 1WG, UK Routledge Handbook of Democratization in East Asia Tun-jen Cheng, Yun-han Chu The Asian values debate Publication details Doh Chull Shin Published online on: 11 Sep 2017 How to cite :- Doh Chull Shin. 11 Sep 2017,The Asian values debate from: Routledge Handbook of Democratization in East Asia Routledge. Accessed on: 29 Sep PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR DOCUMENT Full terms and conditions of use: This Document PDF may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproductions, re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The publisher shall not be liable for an loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.

2 19 THE ASIAN VALUES DEBATE A reassessment from the perspective of democratization Doh Chull Shin Today, East Asia represents a region of democratic underdevelopment. Four decades after the third wave of democratization began to spread from Southern Europe, much less than half the countries (seven of sixteen) in the region meet the minimum criteria for electoral democracy (Chase 2011; Freedom House 2015). This ratio is lower than the worldwide average of six democracies for every ten countries (Moller and Skaaning 2013). Why does a region blessed with rapid economic development remain cursed with democratic underdevelopment? What makes it hard for democracy to take root in the region known as culturally Confucian Asia? To explain a lack of democratic development in the region, political leaders and scholars promoted Confucian values as Asian values, and debated the influence, actual or potential, of these values on democratization in East Asia (D. Kim 1994; Fukuyama 1995; Huntington 1991, 1996; K. Lee 1998; T. Lee 2006; Sen 1999; Tew 2012; Zakaria 1994). This chapter seeks to review the theoretical underpinnings of this debate, and assess their claims with empirical evidence available from recent public opinion surveys. 1 To this end, I will first explicate the Asian Values thesis from three alternative theoretical perspectives, each of which offers a different linkage between Confucianism and democratic politics. Then I will test their proposed linkages with the Asian Barometer and World Values surveys conducted recently in Confucian Asia and other regions. Finally, I will reassess the debate in light of recent advances in the study of democratization, and suggest what needs to be done in order to unravel the dynamics of their interactions in greater depth. Theoretical debates The Asian Values debate began in the mid-1990s when former Prime Ministers Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore and Mahathir Mohamad of Malaysia proclaimed that East Asia s rapid and sustained economic development is mainly due to the cultural legacies of Confucianism, and that such Confucian legacies are incompatible with the liberal democracy of the West. 2 Since then, this debate has entailed two alternative theoretical theses, each of which directly challenges the central claims of the original incompatibility thesis the two political leaders advocated (He 2010). One alternative thesis interprets some key principles of Confucianism as compatible with those of democratic values. The other alternative focuses on the characteristics of Confucianism and democracy that can be converged or blended into a hybrid system that can 327

3 Doh Chull Shin be more suitable for contemporary Confucian societies. This section explicates each of these three theses. Of these three contrasting perspectives, the incompatibility thesis is known as orthodoxy (Nuyen 2000: 133). The incompatibility thesis Many scholars and political leaders subscribe to the incompatibility thesis. Samuel P. Huntington is the most outspoken of scholars in this incompatibility camp. He claims that classical Confucian thought is inherently antidemocratic, and Confucian democracy is a contradictory term (1991: 30). Accordingly, Confucian-influenced societies are inhospitable to democratization because Confucian heritage promotes the group over the individual, authority over liberty and responsibilities over rights, and it offers no institutional protection of individual rights against the state (Huntington 1991: 24; 1996: 238). What specific principles of Confucianism and democracy are viewed as incompatible with one another? Supporters of the incompatible thesis point to the qualifications of rulers and the role of the ruled in the political process as one discordant area. In democracy, which is a form of collective self-rule, people rule themselves directly or indirectly through the selection of their representatives. In Confucianism, however, only those capable of discharging the responsibility of governing are allowed to serve as rulers (Analects 4:14). The common people are viewed as incapable of governing themselves, and thus should not be entrusted with governance. It is moral elites, the wise and virtuous, who are charged with ruling the state. Confucianism, therefore, does not contain any fundamental democratic values and principles, such as political equality and popular sovereignty (Chan 2007: 191; see also Elstein 2010). Classical Confucianism, moreover, equates good government with paternalistic meritocracy in which the relationships between rulers and masses are analogous to that between parents and children (Murthy 2000). The role of government is, therefore, considered analogous to that of a good father and mother, who make decisions on behalf of their children. As mother and father to the people, moral elites make all important decisions concerning their welfare. Although the Confucian government of moral meritocracy allows for some degree of popular consultation, dissent and remonstration, it is, at best, a form of guardianship (Chan 2007: 187). This indeed is a stark contradiction to the Western notion of democracy as government by the people, which requires their participation in policymaking. The second set of incompatible principles concerns the proper relationship between rulers and the ruled. Confucius and his followers promoted an organic notion of the state in which the family serves as a model for it. As in the family, its structure and process are hierarchically organized. Such a hierarchically organized state contrasts sharply with the Western democratic state structures with the powers divided into different branches of government (Subramaniam 2000, Robinson 1991). In this type of state, it is impossible for ordinary people to express their interests in the political process and challenge their government policy (Li 1997: ). On the proper role the state ought to play for the people, Confucianism and liberal democracy are also in conflict. In Confucianism, the state, like the family, is a paternalistic institution in charge of the welfare of its members. It is supposed to fulfill parental functions. In principle, therefore, there is no limit to what it should do to ensure the welfare of the people by promoting economic prosperity, political stability and social harmony. It has the authority to intervene in the economic as well as moral affairs of its citizens if such interventions are deemed necessary for the welfare of the people (Bai 2008: 24; O Dwyer 2003: 45). Such an interventionist state runs counter to a liberal-democratic state, which is morally neutral and non-intervening in economic and private affairs (Chan 2007). 328

4 The Asian values debate The final irreconcilability between Confucianism and Western democracy focuses on the role virtue plays in Confucian politics. Confucianism deems virtue to be far more important than formal political institutions in governance, stressing the need for moral leadership over institutional safeguards against official behavior. Confucian political order, therefore, conflicts with a democratic political order in which the rule of law prevails, rights are central, political equality is taken for granted, the political bargaining process overrides moral consensus, and conflict is seen as a necessarily normal condition of political life (He 2010: 20). The compatibility thesis Proponents of this thesis argue that Confucianism contains democratic seeds, and these seeds can serve as the very foundation of sustainable democracy in Confucian East Asia (Hsu 1975: chap. 9; Murthy 2000; Xu 2006). The most prominent of such democratic seeds are two Confucian principles of government, minben (people as the root) and tianming (Mandate of Heaven). The minben principle holds that the people are of supreme importance (Mencius 7B:14), and the ruler ought to take care of their welfare. The tianming principle holds that people s acceptance or consent is the basis of legitimate rule (Mencius 9:5). Although neither of these principles fully meets the definition of democracy as government by the people, both are in agreement on its definition as government for the people. The Confucian practice of selecting government officials by public and open examinations, moreover, is often viewed as an institutional alternative to the free and competitive elections of political leaders (Nuyen 2000: 143). Political constraint of leaders is also present in both Confucianism and democracy. Though the Confucian belief in a mandate of heaven grants leaders considerable authority, such power is fully contingent upon their ethical and effective performance. Confucian leaders are expected to respect public opinion, remain cognizant of societal demands and provide for the national welfare (Hsu 1975). If a leader fails to remain accountable to his subjects, his citizens need to no longer respect his rule. In historically Confucian East Asia, the authority of political leaders is often checked by the two principles of government, which justify citizens to remove malevolent leaders. These principles of dismissing unresponsive leaders are similar to the democratic political practices of conducting competitive elections and impeaching those leaders peacefully. The divine obligation of political leaders to serve and follow the people in Confucian societies can be, therefore, viewed as equivalent to the Western rule of law if either is broken, leaders must be held responsible for their actions (Ackerly 2005). Besides the domain of political accountability, Confucianism and democracy are also deemed similar to each other in their views of equality. All Confucians believe in the equality of man by nature (Analects 7:2; Mencius 6A:7). Confucianism emphasizes universal education for citizens from all walks of life and equal opportunity for political appointment. The Confucian ideal of universal education is compatible with the principle of democratic citizenship that requires the development of an informed citizenry (Collins 2008). Although not all citizens possess the abilities needed to become political leaders, everyone has an opportunity to take merit-based civil-service examinations and to be appointed as a government official. Confucianism, like democracy, is also known to value the diversity of public opinion and its tolerance. The Confucian concept of harmony presupposes diverse views and requires the blending of those views. In this regard, Confucius (Analects 13: 23) admonishes Exemplary persons value harmony but not conformity; petty persons value conformity but not harmony. In the ideal world of Confucianism, harmony refers to the blending of diverse ideas, not the eliminating of opposing views. The Confucian idea of social harmony and the historical practice of 329

5 Doh Chull Shin tolerating multiple religions, therefore, can promote the Western liberal tradition of pluralism that allows for competition among conflicting interests. Emphasizing the importance of order and stability, Confucianism seems inherently contradictory to liberal democracy s championing of political contestation. However, several scholars suggest that dissent, which can be expressed through the practice of remonstration, is a fundamental element of Confucian values (Ackerly 2005; Tan 2003; Collins 2008). In principle, the Confucian notion of dao, or ethical living, allows people to speak out against any injustice or malice transgressing basic human values. Accordingly, Confucianism values the participation of all citizens in solving communal problems, challenging existing ideas when necessary to ensure that the optimal outcome is reached (Hsu 1975; S. Kim 2014). The convergence thesis There is little doubt that democracy and Confucianism clash on their fundamental doctrines of good governance. Yet, an increasing number of Confucian scholars have recently noted that some elements of each doctrine can benefit both doctrines. These scholars have begun to identify the elements that can be reformulated in such a way that new and hybrid regimes can be built throughout the region (Bai 2008; Bell 2006; Tan 2003). The Confucian notion of humanism is widely recognized as one of the most prominent potential linkages between the two doctrines (De Bary 1991; Chan 1999; Freeman 1996; Tu 2002). The Confucian principles of benevolence and reciprocity stress humanism, or consideration of other people in society. Governmental leaders might find it desirable to limit certain liberties in order to maintain political power, but they can reformulate these principles of humanism to promote democratic government for the people, not just by the people, in East Asia. This way, Confucianism can serve to improve the quality of democratic governance in East Asia. Daniel A. Bell (2006) proposes a system combining Confucian ideals of government by intellectual elites with liberal ideals of electoral accountability of government to citizens. More specifically, his model of Confucian democracy consists of two chambers of policymakers one elected by the people, one selected on the basis of competitive examinations. Shielded from the demands of voters concerned with their short-term interests, the upper chamber would be able to serve the interests of the people as a whole. Bell s ideal upper chamber would also be able to protect unpopular individuals and vulnerable minorities from the verdicts of majorities in the lower house (Bell 2006). Sor-Hoon Tan (2003) proposes Confucian democracy as an alternative to liberal democracy. Tan argues that unlike a liberal democracy that operates under the constraints of interest groups, Confucian democracy is capable of promoting both individual freedom and the common good. It is entirely possible that Confucian values might be used to amend the less desirable aspects of Western liberal democracy. Confucian norms can remedy serious problems of the contemporary world, such as rampant individualism and lack of commitment to family and community. Democracy, when forged with Confucian ideals, could produce a uniquely regional system of democracy that combines the principle of government by the people with that of government for the people. Ensuring the mutual existence of liberal democracy and Confucianism in East Asia, however, requires a great deal of effort, but proponents of the convergence thesis believe that such goals are entirely achievable. The genesis of competing theses Why is there so much debate and division over the compatibility or incompatibility between Confucianism and democracy? Why has the debate persisted for so long? To begin with, 330

6 The Asian values debate disagreements originate over which concepts of Confucianism and democracy are used in analyses and how they are conceptualized. The opposing conceptualizations of Confucianism and democracy have contributed to different interpretations of their relationships (Chan 2007; Collins 2008; Elstein 2010; Hu 1997; Xu 2006). Specifically, democracy is often conceptualized procedurally as government by the people or substantively as government for the people. Similarly, Confucianism is conceptualized liberally in terms of benevolence, reciprocity and other humanistic values or illiberally in terms of conformity, duty and other authoritarian values. Those who define democracy substantively and/ or Confucianism liberally tend to promote the pro-democratic argument of compatibility (De Bary 1991; Hsu 1975; Tu 2002). Those who conceptualize democracy procedurally or liberally and/ or Confucianism illiberally tend to advocate the anti-democratic argument of incompatibility (Huntington 1996; Kang 2006). Those who define either democracy procedurally and Confucianism liberally or democracy substantively and Confucianism illiberally are likely to subscribe to the convergence argument (Bell 2006; Hahm 2004; Tan 2003). Such divergent conceptualizations of these two multidimensional phenomena are at the heart of the ongoing Asian Values debate. Empirical tests Can Confucianism hinder democratization, as proponents of the incompatibility thesis claim? Or can it accommodate the practices of democratic politics, as proponents of the compatibility and convergence theses argue? Scholars have only recently begun to use public opinion data to assess the impact of Confucian legacies on the democratization process taking place among individual citizens (Dalton and Ong 2006; Fetzer and Soper 2014; Park and Shin 2006; Chang, Chu and Tsai 2005; Welzel 2011). Of the three versions of the Asian Values thesis discussed in previous sections, these studies test only the incompatibility thesis with the surveys conducted in one or few East Asian countries. They also focused on a few elements of Confucian political or social values and on the direct impact of those values on democratic support. To overcome these limitations of the existing empirical literature, I analyzed the second wave of the Asian Barometer Surveys conducted in all historically Confucian countries except North Korea, including China, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan and Vietnam. In this section, I highlight only those results of this analysis that concern the attachment of their citizens to Confucian political and social values and its linkage with their support for democracy. The prevalence of Confucian values Do people in historically Confucian countries uphold the legacies of Confucian political ethics as broadly and deeply as assumed in the Asian Values debate? How do East Asians compare to their peers in other cultural zones in upholding the values and norms which Confucius and his followers advocated? To address these fundamental questions, I analyzed their attachment to the political legacies of Confucianism, which were most often taken into account in the Asian Values Debate. The political legacies are paternalism and elitism, which characterizes political Confucianism as the government of paternalistic meritocracy. How broadly and deeply do people in Confucian East Asia remain attached to the Confucian model of good government, which represents a mix of meritocracy and paternalism? To address this question, I analyzed the second wave of the Asian Barometer Survey, which asked two pairs of questions, one on paternalism (Q64 and Q134) and the other on meritocracy (Q78 and Q139), in Japan, Taiwan, China, Singapore and Vietnam (see Appendix for the wording of these questions). 3 By counting the number of affirmative responses to the four questions, 331

7 Doh Chull Shin I constructed a 5-point scale estimating the extent of overall support for the Confucian model. On this scale, scores of 0 and 4 indicate, respectively, full detachment from and full attachment to the notion. A score of either 3 or 4 indicates strong or high attachment. For each country, Figure 19.1 reports the percentages of the fully and highly attached in five Confucian countries. When these five countries are considered as a whole, the fully and highly attached constitute small minorities, 16% and 22% respectively. Those who endorsed at least one of the four Confucian political norms surveyed, on the other hand, form an overwhelming majority of 95%. These findings indicate that in Confucian East Asia today, popular attachment to Confucianism is found to be miles wide but only inches deep. Even in the wake of socioeconomic and political transformations, majorities in all the region s countries remain at least partially attached to what Confucius and his followers taught about good government more than two millennia ago. However, neither meritocracy nor paternalism draws unqualified support from a majority of the Confucian Asian population. On the 5-point scale measuring the overall level of attachment to paternalistic meritocracy, the five countries included for analysis in Confucian Asia averaged 2.3, a score higher than the scale midpoint of 2.0. This suggests that on average, the people in Confucian Asia remain attached to more than half the four principles surveyed. Of the five countries, the mean level of attachment is significantly higher in the three non-democracies of China (2.9), Vietnam (2.7) and Singapore (2.7) than in the two democracies of Taiwan (2.2) and Japan (1.5) (see Figure 19.2). Those highly attached to the Confucian model are also far more numerous in non-democratic China (43%), Vietnam (50%) and Singapore (54%) than democratic Taiwan (32%) and Japan (15%). This finding of an inverse relationship between the level of a country s institutional democratization and citizen support for the Confucian political tradition renders support for the claim that the democratization of political systems drives people away from political Confucianism. 4 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% 4% 15% 11% 32% 18% 43% % 54% 21% 50% 16% 39% Japan Taiwan China Singapore Vietnam (Pooled) The Fully Attached The Highly Attached Figure 19.1 The fully and highly attached to Confucian paternalistic meritocracy Source: Asian Barometer Surveys

8 The Asian values debate Japan Taiwan China Singapore Vietnam (Pooled) Figure 19.2 Levels of attachment to Confucian paternalistic meritocracy (on a 5-point scale) Source: Asian Barometer Surveys Historically Confucian East Asia today is no longer a single cultural zone in regard to the mass public s commitment to the legacies of Confucian government. The region is divided into two cultural sub-regions: in one, there is broad, though not deep, support for Confucian legacies; in the other, support is neither broad nor deep. Because these two cultural sub-regions fall roughly along the same lines separating authoritarian and democratic regimes and because both the authoritarian and democratic regimes have similar Confucian legacies this finding of two cultural sub-regions also suggests that non-democratic rule promotes continued orientation toward the Confucian model, while democratic rule promotes a turning away from it. Evidently, the relationship between Confucian legacies and democratization is reciprocal, not unidirectional from the former to the latter. Confucian legacies as an influence on democratic citizenship Do East Asians become less supportive of democracy when they are attached to Confucian social and political legacies, as the incompatibility thesis holds? Or do those legacies encourage them to embrace a hybrid regime, as the convergence thesis suggests? To address these questions from a perspective that treats democratization as an evolutionary or developmental phenomenon, I considered in sequence democratic and non-democratic orientations at the levels of both political regime and process, and ascertained four distinct patterns of political orientations. Because support at the regime level is more fundamental than at the political processes level, I compared the magnitude of democratic and nondemocratic orientations at the regime level and determined citizens relative regime preference. On the basis of whether a democratic regime is preferred to its alternatives, I identified two basic types of political regime orientations: 2.3

9 Doh Chull Shin support for a democratic regime and for non-democratic regimes, which consists of authoritarian and hybrid regimes. For those who prefer democracy to autocracy as a regime, I examined whether they are more supportive of the former than the latter as the method of governance, and differentiated support for democracy into two subcategories: liberal and non-liberal. Those who prefer democracy at both the regime and process levels are considered supporters of liberal democracy. Support for non-liberal democracy, which is often associated with Asian-style democracy, is to prefer nondemocracy at the process level, while preferring democracy at the regime level. In addition to these three types of political orientations non-democrat, liberal democrat and non-liberal democrat there is another for those who, for unknown reasons, refused to judge between democratic and non-democratic structures and processes. This type is called the politically indifferent. To measure these four types of political orientations, I analyzed four pairs of questions from the second round of the Asian Barometer Surveys conducted in six Confucian countries (see Appendix for the wording of these questions). Analyses of these multinational surveys reveal that in Confucian East Asia as a whole, democracy as a regime is the most preferred. While nearly three-quarters (73%) prefers democracy to its authoritarian alternative, a very small minority of about 1% prefers the latter to the former. In two countries, South Korea and Singapore, more than eight out of ten people are democratic regime supporters. Moreover, Figure 19.3 shows that in every Confucian country, including China where nearly one-half did not answer all the four questions asked, democratic regime supporters outnumber authoritarian regime supporters by a large margin of more than 45 percentage points. In Confucian East Asia, as in elsewhere, it appears that democracy as a regime structure has become the only game in town. 100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% 78% 80% 74% 2% 2% 3% 1% 1% 0% 1% % 87% 74% 73% Japan Korea Taiwan China Singapore Vietnam (Pooled) Autocracy Democracy Figure 19.3 Democratic and authoritarian regime preferences in Confucian East Asia Source: Asian Barometer Surveys

10 The Asian values debate Has democracy also become the most preferred method or process of governance in every Confucian country? A careful scrutiny of Figure 19.4 reveals that the democratic method is preferred to the authoritarian method among citizens of all democratic countries, while the latter is preferred to the former among those of all authoritarian countries. These two distinct patterns of process preferences contrast sharply with the single pattern of regime preferences in which people in all six countries prefer democracy to authoritarian and mixed regimes. Evidently the experience of democratic rule encourages East Asians to embrace the democratic process, whereas that of authoritarian rule encourages them to remain attached to nondemocratic process. As the theory of democratic learning contends (Rose 2007; Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer 1998; Shin and McDonough 1999), the method of governance people in Confucian East Asia favor seems to have a lot to do with the particular type of political system in which they live. Another notable finding is that the most preferred system of government in the region is not liberal democracy, a democracy practiced in the West. Instead, it is non-liberal democracy, a hybrid system of government that mixes the constitutional structure of democracy with the authoritarian method or process of governance. Figure 19.5 shows that, in the region as a whole, the most preferred system of government is non-liberal democracy (33%), followed by liberal democracy (29%) and autocracy (7%). Only in Japan, the oldest democracy in the region, liberal democracy is the most preferred system with a plurality of 47%. Even in this country, supporters of liberal democracy fail to constitute even a bare majority. Evidently liberal democracy is yet to become the only political game worth playing in Confucian East Asia. A more notable finding concerns the way in which attachment to political Confucianism orients East Asians to non-liberal democracy and away from liberal democracy. The more strongly East Asians are attached to its legacies of paternalistic meritocracy, the more favorably they are 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% 10% 51% 54% 12% 13% 46% 18% 16% % 19% 28% 12% 20% 33% Japan Korea Taiwan China Singapore Vietnam (Pooled) Authoritarian Process Figure 19.4 Democratic and authoritarian procedural preferences Source: Asian Barometer Surveys Democratic Process

11 Doh Chull Shin 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% 20% 47% 47% 7% 8% 25% 28% 10% 39% 5% % 59% 18% 44% 12% 11% 7% 6% 7% 33% 29% Japan Korea Taiwan China Singapore Vietnam (pooled) Non-democracy Non-liberal democracy Liberal democracy Figure 19.5 The political systems East Asians favor most and least Source: Asian Barometer Surveys disposed toward non-liberal democracy, and the more unfavorably they are disposed toward liberal democracy (see Figure 19.6). In the minds of people in Confucian East Asia, therefore, it is a non-liberal democratic system, not an authoritarian political system, which is most compatible with Confucianism. It is, moreover, liberal democracy, not electoral or delegative democracy, which is incompatible with Confucian legacies. Its compatibility with non-liberal democracy can be interpreted as a piece of evidence supportive of the convergence thesis. Its incompatibility with liberal democracy, on the other hand, can be interpreted to be supportive of the incompatibility hypothesis, which posits that liberal democracy is not suitable for Confucian East Asia. Finally, it should be noted that attachment to Confucian political legacies constitutes one of the two most powerful forces the other being the democratic or nondemocratic type of resident regime shaping the preferred system of government among East Asians. They shape such affective orientations more powerfully than does either of the two core components of socioeconomic modernization: education and income. Specifically, the political legacies of paternalistic meritocracy have more than twice as much influence over liberal and non-liberal democratic orientations as does each of the two socioeconomic resources (for further details, see Shin 2012: Table 8.6 reported on p. 301). To put it differently, Confucianism detracts from liberal democratic support more powerfully than the two forces of modernization that promote it. Because attachment to Confucian legacies is a very powerful force, this finding indicates that Confucian legacies are capable of offsetting the liberalizing effect of socioeconomic modernization on cultural democratization. It also suggests that liberal democracy is not likely to become the only political game in Confucian East Asia in the near future. These and other findings, when considered together, indicate that people in Confucian Asia today are neither broadly nor deeply attached to many Confucian legacies, as assumed in all

12 The Asian values debate 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% Figure % 18% 52% 27% 3% 7% 7% 8% % 35% 48% 21% Levels of Attachment to Confucian Paternalistic Meritocracy 53% 8% 11% Nondemocracy Nonliberal Democracy Liberal Democracy Preferences for democratic and nondemocratic regimes by levels of attachment to Confucian paternalistic meritocracy Source: Asian Barometer Surveys three Asian Value theses. They also indicate that the legacies form a mixed bag, and play multiple roles in the general process of cultural democratization unfolding in East Asia. They motivate East Asians to prefer non-liberal democracy to autocracy, while deterring them from embracing liberal democracy. On balance, they appear to facilitate the hybridization of authoritarian and democratic political orientations to a greater extent than they hinder the embrace of liberal democratic virtues. Suggestions for future research The three decades of the Asian Values debate have generated a large body of the literature on Confucianism and democratization in East Asia. This study reviewed the three alternative theoretical theses advanced in the debate and results of their empirical tests. On the basis of the review, I offer a number of suggestions for future research on democratization in Confucian East Asia. Conceptually, Confucianism should not be viewed as a well-integrated system of ethics. Instead, it should be viewed as one of many multi-vocal systems of political doctrines and social ethics (Stepan 2000). Being loosely structured, it consists of many conflicting elements, including antidemocratic and pro-democratic tenets. For a comprehensive and balanced account, it is necessary to consider all those key tenets of its political and social ethics at the same time. Democratization as a concept should also be viewed as a multi-dimensional phenomenon. Proponents of each theoretical thesis to date have been concerned exclusively with the problems of maintaining the stability of democratic political order by keeping it from reverting back

13 Doh Chull Shin to authoritarian rule. Consequently, they have failed to consider the problems of transforming non-democracies into democracies and of deepening and expanding limited democracies into full democracies. As widely known in the voluminous literature on the third wave of democratization, democratization is a multi-phased developmental phenomenon. And the stability of the democratic polity is not always the most coveted goal that democratic reformers pursue (Haerpfer et al. 2009; Huntington 1991; Rose and Shin 2001; Shin 1994). Theoretically, it should be noted that competing values and their incongruence with democratic structure play an important, balancing role in promoting democratic development (Almond and Verba 1963; Dalton and Welzel 2014; Wildavsky 1987, 1993). While the cultural values most often associated with democracy sustain its institutions, competing cultural values keep those institutions in check. This is why Eckstein (1966) characterized a democratic culture as a culture of balanced disparities and Aaron Wildavsky (1993) characterized democracy as a coalition of cultures. For the same reason, Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba (1963) emphasized the role of a mixed and balanced culture, which consists of parochial, subject and participant orientations in democratic development. For all the important contributions that divergent norms and values can make to democratic politics, however, proponents of all three Asian Values theses have dismissed some of those values and norms as inimical to its development. Finally, it should be noted that Confucian legacies and democratic political practices have a reciprocal and highly dynamic relationship: each influence the other. Attachment to the Confucian principles of ethical meritocracy and paternalistic government, for example, motivates people to prefer non-liberal democracy over liberal democracy. A continued experience of liberal democratic rule, on the other hand, motivates people to dissociate themselves from those Confucian political principles, while a continued experience of authoritarian rule discourages them from doing so. The findings of such highly complex and dynamic reciprocal relationships between the two phenomena require the specification of their relationship as endogenous to each other. Notes 1 This chapter updates the author s earlier study on Confucianism and democratization (Shin 2012). 2 For the evolution of this debate over the past three decades, see Barr (2008), Jenco (2013) and Peerenboom (2003). 3 Korea was not included in this analysis because the survey conducted in the country did not ask Q78 tapping passive citizenry, a component of meritocracy. 4 According to Bell (2006), popular detachment from Confucianism in the wake of democratization may not be necessarily a positive development because it can discourage people from searching for a better alternative to malfunctioning democracy. References Ackerly, Brooke A. (2005) Is Liberalism the Only Way Toward Democracy? Political Theory 33: Allison, Graham, Blackwill, Robert and Wyne, Ali (2012) Lee Kuan Yew: The Grandmaster s Insights on China, the United States and the World. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Almond,Gabriel A. and Verba, Sidney (1963) The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes anddemocracy in Five Nations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Bai, Tongdong (2008) A Mencian Version of Limited Democracy. Res Publica 14: Barr, Michael (2008) Lee Kuan Yew and the Asian Values Debate, Asian Studies Review 24: Bell, Daniel A. (2006) Beyond Liberal Democracy: Political Thinking for an East Asian Context. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Chan, Joseph (1999) A Confucian Perspective on Human Rights for Contemporary China. In Joanne R. Bauer and Daniel A. Bell (eds.), The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights. New York: Cambridge University Press,

14 The Asian values debate Chan, Joseph (2007) Democracy and Meritocracy: Toward a Confucian Perspective. Journal of Chinese Philosophy 34: Chase, William (2011) What Ails Democracy in Asia. Australian Journal of International Affairs 65(3): Chang, Yu-Tzung, Chu, Yun-han, and Tsai, Frank (2005) Confucianism and Democratic Values in Three Chinese Societies. Issues and Studies 41: Collins, Michael (2008) China s Confucius and Western Democracy. Contemporary Review 290: Confucius (1979) The Analects. Translated by D. C. Lau. New York: Penquin Books. Dalton, Russell and Ong, Nhu-Ngoc T. (2006) Authority Orientations and Democratic Attitudes: A Test of the Asian Values Hypothesis. In Russell Dalton and Doh Chull Shin (eds.), Citizens, Democracy and Markets Around the Pacific Rim. New York: Oxford University Press, Dalton, Russell J. and Welzel, Christian (2014) The Civic Culture Transformed: From Allegian to Assertive Citizens. New York: Cambridge University Press. De Bary, Wm. Theodore (1991) The Trouble With Confucianism. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Eckstein, Harry (1966) A Theory of Stable Democracy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Elstein, David (2010) Why Early Confuciansim Cannot Generate Democracy. Dao 9: Fetzer, Joel S. and Christopher Soper, J. (2014) Confucianism, Democratization, and Human Rights in Taiwan. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. Feedom House (2015) Freedom in the World 2015: Discarding Democracy and Returning to the Iron Fist. Retrieved from from VP5X6tLF_Co. Freeman, Michael (1996) Human Rights, Democracy and Asian values. Pacific Review 9: Fukuyama, Francis (1995) Confucianism and Democracy. Journal of Democracy 6: Haerpfer, Christian W., Bernhagen, Patrick, Inglehart, Ronald F. and Welzel, Christian (eds.) (2009) Democratization. New York: Oxford University Press. Hahm, Chaibong (2001) Why Asia Values? Korea Journal 41: Hahm, Chaibong (2004) The Ironies of Confucianism. Journal of Democracy 15: He, Baogang (2010) Four Models of the Relationship Between Confucianism and Democracy. Journal of Chinese Philosophy 37: Hsu, Leonard Shihlien (1975) The Political Philosophy of Confucianism: An Interpretation of the Social and Political Ideas of Confucius, His Forerunners, and His Early Disciples. London, UK: Curzon Press. Hu, Shaohua (1997) Confucianism and Western Democracy. Journal of Contemporary China 6: Huntington, Samuel P. (1991) The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press. Huntington, Samuel P. (1996) The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Touchstone. Jenco, Leigh (2013) Revisiting Asian Values. Journal of the History of Ideas 74(2): Kang, Xiaoguang (2006) Confucianization: A Future in the Tradition. Social Research 73: Kim, Dae Jung (1994) Is Culture Destiny? The Myth of Asia s Anti-Democratic Values. Foreign Affairs 73: Kim, Sungmoon (2014) Confucian Democracy in East Asia. New York: Cambridge University Press. Lee, Kuan Yew (1998) The Singapore Story: Memoirs of Lee Kuan Yew. Singapore: Prentice Hall. Lee, Teng-hui (2006) Confucian Democracy: Modernization, Culture, and the State in East Asia. Harvard International Review 21: Li, Chenyang (1997) Confucian Value and Democratic Value. Journal of Value Inquiry 31: Mencius (1970) Mencius. Translated by D. C. Lau. New York: Penquin Books. Moller, Jorgen and Skaaning, Svend-Erik (2013) The Third Wave: Inside the Numbers. Journal of Democracy 24(4): Murthy, Viren (2000) The Democratic Potential of Confucian Minben Thought. Asian Philosophy: An International Journal of the Philosophical Traditions of the East 10: Nuyen, A. T. (2000) Confucianism, the Idea of Min-pen and Democracy. Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies 14: O Dwyer, Shaun (2003) Democracy and Confucian Values. Philosophy East and West 53: Peerenboom, Randall (2003) Beyond Universalism and Relativism: The Evolving Debates about Values in Asia. Indiana International and Comparative Law Review 14(1): Park, Chong-Min and Shin, Doh Chull (2006) Do Asian Values Deter Popular Support for Democracy in South Korea? Asian Survey 46: Robinson, Richard (1991) The Politics of Asian Values. Pacific Review 9:

15 Doh Chull Shin Rose, Richard (2007) Learning to Support New Regimes in Europe. Journal of Democracy 18(3): Rose, Richard, Mishler, William, and Haerpfer, Christian W. (1998) Democracy and Its Alternatives. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Rose, Richard and Shin, Doh C. (2001) Democratization Backwards: The Problem of Third-Wave Democracies. British Journal of Political Science 31: Sen, Amartya (1999) Human Rights and Asian Values: What Lee Kuan Yew and Le Feng Do Not Understand Asia. New Republic 217: Shin, Doh C hull (1994) On the Third Wave of Democratization: A Synthesis and Evaluation of Recent Theory and Research. World Politics 47: Shin, Doh C hull (2008) The Third Wave in East Asia: Comparative and Dynamic Perspectives. Taiwan Journal of Democracy 4: Shin, Doh C hull (2012) Confucianism and Democratization. New York: Cambridge University Press. Shin, Doh Chull and McDonough, Peter (1999) The Dynamics of Popular Reactions to Democratization in Korea. Journal of Public Policy 9(1): Stepan, Alfred (2000) Religion, Democracy, and the Twin Tolerations. Journal of Democracy 11: Subramaniam, Surain (2000) The Asian Values Debate: Implications for the Spread of Liberal Democracy. Asian Affairs 27: Tan, Sor-hoon (2003) Confucian Democracy: A Deweyan Reconstruction. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. Tew, Yvonne (2012) Beond Asian Values : Rethinking Rights. Cambridge University Center for Governance and Human Rights Working Paper 5. Tu, Weiming (2002) Confucianism and Liberalism. Dao 2: Welzel, Christian (2011) The Asian Values Thesis Revisited: Evidence From the World Values Survey. Japanese Journal of Political Science 13: Wildavsky, Aaron (1987) Choosing Preferences by Constructing Institutions: A Cultural Theory of Preference Formation. American Political Science Review 81: Wildavsky, Aaron (1993) Democracy as a Coalition of Cultures. Society 31: Xu, Keqian (2006) Early Confucian Principles: The Potential Theoretic Foundation of Democracy in Modern China. Asian Philosophy: An International Journal of the Philosophical Traditions of the East 16: Zakaria, Fareed (1994) Culture Is Destiny: A Conversation With Lee Kuan Yew. Foreign Affairs 73:

16 APPENDIX The Asian barometer surveys, The Asian Barometer second-wave surveys were conducted in 13 countries, including six Confucian countries between January 2005 and December 2008, by means of face-to-face interviews with a national sample of each country s voting-age population. Listed below are the sample size and date of the fieldwork for each of these countries. Further details about sampling and interviewing respondents are available from Fieldwork period and sample size Country Fieldwork Period Sample Size Taiwan January February ,587 Singapore July November ,012 South Korea September ,212 Japan February March ,067 Vietnam November December ,200 China November 2007 December ,098 Survey questions Attachment to the Confucian legacies of paternalistic meritocracy Q64 The relationship between the government and the people should be like that between parents and children. Q78 If possible, I do not get involved in political matters. Q134 The government leaders are like the head of a family: We should all follow their decisions. Q139 If we have political leaders who are morally upright, we can let them decide everything. Democratic regime preferences Q97 Here is a scale: 1 means complete dictatorship and 10 means complete democracy. To what extent would you want our country to be democratic now? Q98 Here is a similar scale of 1 to 10 measuring the extent to which people think democracy is suitable for our country. If 1 means that democracy is completely unsuitable for the country today and 10 means it is completely suitable, where would you place our country today? 341

17 Doh Chull Shin Authoritarian regime preferences There are many ways to govern a country. Would you disapprove or approve of the following alternatives? For each statement, would say you strongly approve, approve, disapprove or strongly disapprove? Q124 We should get rid of parliament and elections and have a strong leader decide things. Q126 The army (military) should come in to govern the country. Democratic procedural preferences I have here other statements. For each statement, would you say you strongly agree somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree? Q138 If the government is constantly checked [i.e., monitored and supervised] by the legislature, it cannot possibly accomplish great things. Q141 When the country is facing a difficult situation, it is ok for the government to disregard the law in order to deal with the situation. Authoritarian procedural preferences Q137 When judges decide important cases, they should accept the view of the executive. Q135 The government should decide whether certain ideas should be allowed to be discussed in society. 342