CONGRESSMAN MICHAEL TURNER ON U.S. STRATEGIC FORCES POLICY

Transcription

1 CONGRESSMAN MICHAEL TURNER ON U.S. STRATEGIC FORCES POLICY TUESDAY, JULY 26, :15 A.M. ET WASHINGTON, D.C. WELCOME/MODERATOR: George Perkovich, Director, Nuclear Policy Program, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace SPEAKER: Representative Michael Turner (R-OH), Chairman, Strategic Forces Subcommittee, House Armed Services Committee Transcript by Federal News Service Washington, D.C.

2 [00:00:07] GEORGE PERKOVITCH: Good afternoon. Think it s a good turnout and I don t know if it s associated with the weather got decent. It s actually lovely out, unlike the last week, so thank you for bringing that, Congressman. I want to welcome all of you here for what s obviously a very timely discussion. And we re very glad to have with us Congressman Michael Turner to talk about U.S. strategic forces policy. Congressman Turner represents Ohio s 3 rd District, and he s currently the chairman of the House Armed Services Strategic Forces Subcommittee, hence the topic of today s discussion and its importance. It s also, I think, very germane to our discussion and the work that many people here are doing related to NATO s deterrent posture review. Congressman Turner is the chairman of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization s Parliamentary Assembly. He was appointed to that post in January of this year and is very actively involved in engaging with counterparts from other NATO states. So we are delighted to have all of you here and have Congressman Turner will make a statement, a presentation on U.S. strategic forces policy, and then we ll open it up for discussion, which I ll be happy to moderate. So Congressman Turner, thanks. REPRESENTATIVE MICHAEL TURNER (R-OH): Well, thank you, George. Thank you for the introduction and for hosting this event today. It s a privilege to be here. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace is known on both sides of the aisle with great deal of respect for your active international engagement and for your dedication and attention to nuclear policy issues, and I appreciate the opportunity to be able to speak about some of those today. It is good to see that there is a crowd. Thank you all for coming. It s good to see embassy friends, administration representatives, some congressional staff and a number of you from that I understand are from academia and think tanks who are going to participate in this discussion and who participate in the discussion on a regular basis. I really do appreciate you being here and your attention to what I think is one of more important policy issues that we re currently facing. [00:02:34] Today, I would like to give you a congressional perspective on our nation s strategic posture, focusing on four major area topics: first, a world the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons and the need to sustain a robust deterrent; second, the longstanding bipartisanship in the U.S. Congress on nuclear matters; third, the nuclear-related provisions contained in this year s House-passed National Defense Authorization Act the NDAA; and lastly, my thoughts on how we achieve a sustainable nuclear deterrent for the foreseeable future. Although we may not all agree on all the policy issues with respect to nuclear policy and posture, I appreciate the opportunity to share with you my perspectives and concerns. Our differences have fostered a healthy, thoughtful debate and greater focus on nuclear matters that, in all candidness, has languished for several years. It has also helps

3 us to realize that there was a significant amount of common ground for us to work from. The importance here is the issue of the ongoing and future dialogue. One could argue that this renaissance in nuclear policy of sorts was launched by two events. The first was the January 2007 op-ed by four esteemed statesmen: George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger and Sam Nunn. While I would be hard-pressed to identify anyone who would disagree with a vision of a world free of nuclear weapons, I know many who are deeply concerned with the interpretation that achieving this vision starts with the U.S. drastically cutting its nuclear forces in the hopes that others would do the same. This isn t a world free of nuclear weapons but rather a world with far fewer U.S. nuclear weapons, which does not make the U.S. or our allies any safer. [00:04:29] The second was here at Carnegie. In his October 2008 speech here, then-secretary of Defense Robert Gates concluded that, quote, all have come up against the reality that as long as others have nuclear weapons, we must maintain that some level of these weapons ourselves. He added that try as we might and hope as we will, the power of nuclear weapons and their strategic impact is a genie that cannot be put back in a bottle, at least for a very long time. The former secretary of Defense is right. As I look at the world we live in where nuclear dangers from proliferation threats such as Iran and North Korea, the instability between India and Pakistan and the sophistication of Russian and Chinese nuclear capabilities are all increasing, it seems a misguided priority to focus on disarmament, and U.S. disarmament in particular, when the conditions that might permit it don t exist. President Obama acknowledged as much in his 2009 Prague address, reaffirming the vision, but also cautioning that, quote, this goal will not be reached quickly, perhaps not in my lifetime. And he pledged that so long as nuclear weapons existed, the United States would retain a strong deterrent to, quote, deter any adversary and guarantee the defense of our allies, close quote. So, too, did the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States. It concluded in its May 2009 report that, quote, The conditions that might make possible the global elimination of nuclear weapons are not present today and their creation would require a fundamental transformation of the world political order. The Commission also added that we need to retain our deterrent for, quote, the indefinite future. [00:06:18] I think we re seeing a pragmatic bipartisan conversion on two basic points. One, the nuclear abolition is a long way off. And two, we will ensure that our nuclear deterrent remains credible for the foreseeable future. As previously, as ranking member, and now chairman of the House Armed Services Strategic Forces Subcommittee, I ve had the pleasure to work closely with my friends across the aisle, Ellen Tauscher, Jim Langevin and now Loretta Sanchez. In a bipartisan manner, we convened numerous hearings, briefings and trips on topics ranging from the nuclear posture review, New START, to sessions with STRATCOM on force structure to visits to the nuclear weapons laboratories to understand the technical aspects of our warheads. Our annual defense authorization acts are largely bipartisan, and in the areas where we disagree, we engage in serious constructive debates.

4 Under Ellen Tauscher s chairmanship, our committee established the Strategic Posture Commission, which provided a strong foundation for the administration s 2010 Nuclear Posture Review and has contributed to a bipartisan consensus about what needs to done to address the host of problems identified by the commission in our nuclear enterprise. Likewise, in the Fiscal Year 2010 NDAA, the committee established the stockpile management program to provide policy objectives for managing the stockpile. [00:07:43] Ensuring the highest standards, security, reliability of our nuclear deterrent, modernizing our nuclear weapons complex and providing meaningful work to our talented scientists and engineers continues to be a bipartisan priority of the committee. We listened to then-secretary Gates blunt assessment of the stockpile in his Carnegie speech, stating, quote, there is absolutely no way that we can maintain a credible deterrent and reduce the number of weapons in our stockpile without either resorting to testing our stockpile or pursuing a modernization program. The commission was equally blunt, stating, quote, Existing facilities are genuinely decrepit; the intellectual infrastructure there is in serious trouble; the National Security The National Nuclear Security Administration, NNSA, has a reasonable plan, but it lacks funding of the commission, close quote. Regardless of whether or not you believe that the U.S. should or should not have agreed to the New START treaty, it was a key catalyst for moving us along the path toward modernization. My colleagues in the Senate pressed hard to secure presidential assurances that the long-needed modernization efforts would ramp up and be fully funded. And the Senate s resolution of ratification reaffirmed the importance of modernization. Candidly, had the treaty debate not been contentious, I have little doubt that the administration s pledges might never have been made, and many of the priorities identified by the Strategic Posture Commission and, again, by the Nuclear Posture Review would be hampered by still worse delays and underfunding. [00:09:23] General Chilton, then commander of U.S. STRATCOM, testified before our committee in 2010 that nuclear modernization investments, quote, are required in order to confidently reduce the overall U.S. stockpile while sustaining the credibility of our nuclear weapons. Vice President Biden told an audience at the National Defense University in February 2010 that, quote, guaranteeing our stockpile allows us to pursue deep nuclear reductions without compromising our security. Consistent with his nuclear posture review last year, the president pledged $85 billion over 10 years for nuclear modernization. To his credit, this was reflected a few months later in the Fiscal Year 2012 budget request. His November 2010 Section 1251 Report to Congress emphasized that, quote, Given the extremely tight budget environment facing the federal government, these increased budget requests to the Congress demonstrate the priority the administration places on maintaining the safety, security and effectiveness of the deterrent. On a bipartisan and bicameral basis, the Congress also got behind the need for increased investment in nuclear modernization. Senator Inouye, Cochran, Feinstein and Alexander wrote to the president in December 2010, expressing their support for full funding of nuclear modernization. This is significant, given the prominent positions these senators hold in supporting and funding the NNSA. [00:10:53]

5 This year s House-passed budget this year s House-passed budget resolution assumes full funding for the modernization of the infrastructure that builds and maintains the nation s nuclear weapons systems. Again, this was a significant act by Budget chairman Ryan, who is under immense pressure to cut spending. And yet, in his budget, it was specifically noted that these modernization programs and processes were to go forward with full funding. This followed a March 23 rd letter signed by all 16 Republican and Democrat members of my subcommittee, urging Chairman Ryan to support the NNSA s Fiscal Year 2012 budget increase. The House Armed Service Committee then marked up its annual defense bill and authorized NNSA s full budget request followed soon after by the Senate Armed Services Committee. Full funding of NSA (sic) is not just a Republican priority. Under Ellen Tauscher s tenure as the subcommittee chair from fiscal years 2008 to 2010, the House Armed Services Committee increased funding for NNSA above the president s request for those years. I was, therefore, extremely disappointed with how NNSA fared in recent House-passed in the recent Housepassed 2012 energy and water appropriations bill. The appropriations bill would reduce overall funding for NNSA by $1.1 billion or more than 10 percent below the president s request. Weapons activities, non-proliferation and naval reactors were all cut. And therefore, I voted against the appropriations bill. [00:12:25] Because NNSA is located within the Department of Energy, it complete it competes every year for the same appropriation dollars that fund water projects. And it s all too easy to overlook its security contributions. Now, the Department of Defense has agreed to transfer 5 billion (dollars) over the next several years to NNSA for nuclear modernization. If history is any guide, my appropriations colleagues would trade away this defense money to fund dams, dredging and other water projects. This is unacceptable. Nuclear weapons should not have to compete with water projects. At the very least, we need to treat NNSA as the same way we treat other security spending. We may even need to reconsider which subcommittee appropriates its funding. Let me very clear on this point. I do not see a path forward for Congress to support further reductions unless the administration s modernization promises are fulfilled and funded at both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue. It is in both Republican and Democrat interest to educate the leadership and pressure our appropriations colleagues to fund modernization. Some of us had concerns about the way New START was rushed through the Senate in the waning days of a lameduck session. But it passed, and the debate is behind us. As everyone knows, New START was ratified only after a significant commitment by the administration to carry out the modernization of our nuclear weapons, our infrastructure and our delivery systems. [00:13:50] We must now focus on implementation of the treaty and follow through on the Senate bargaining link reductions and modernization. In particular, we must address how to sustain the linkage between reductions and nuclear modernization and how to preserve the widespread bipartisan commitment to the path forward.

6 The ink is barely dry on New START. The Congress has yet to see the administration s plan for implementing the force reduction contained in the treaty. The modernization investments have just begun. And yet the narrative coming out of the White House would lead some of us to believe that the administration is rushing yet again toward more reductions. The Fiscal Year 2012 National Defense Authorization Act which passed the House in May contained several nuclear policy provisions to try to address our concerns and to hold the administration accountable to its New START promises: First, the act includes a requirement for Congress to receive a Defense Department plan for New START implementation. Currently, we have not received a plan from the administration as to how New START will be implemented, what are the effects of the reductions and how they will be allocated. Second, a requirement for the president to annually submit a nuclear modernization plan, the so-called 1251 Report: This will give us an ability to understand the gap. What is our need? What is the investment required in order for modernization to go forward? [00:15:14] Third, a section linking progress on modernization to the implementation of the New START treaty to ensure that modernization proceeds as promised in the near term: Since these two issues are tied together and were tied together in the Senate, we need to, as our oversight, tie them together as we proceed both with reductions and funding to ensure that the modernization is proceeding. Fourth, a section limiting reductions to the stockpile hedge until the infrastructure improvements identified in the administration s Nuclear Posture Review and the stockpile s stewardship and management plan are implemented in other words, our capability to be able to respond otherwise if our hedge was not available. Finally, a section requiring the involvement of Congress in the decision-making for any further nuclear force reductions. I must emphasize, the purpose of these provisions is not to slow down implementation of New START, nor to put us into default in the treaty. Rather, it is to ensure that modernization proceeds in tandem with reductions and guards against premature reductions below New START levels. This is not 1991 anymore. We have seen more than 75-percent reduction in the U.S. nuclear stockpile since the Berlin Wall fell in I m going to say that again. We have seen more than 75 percent reduction in the U.S. nuclear stockpile since the Berlin Wall fell in And given how far we have come, future cuts could incur greater risks than those made in the past. [00:16:42] We need to see the administration conduct due diligence in its assessment of the strategic environment, its consideration of future risks and uncertainties, and its understanding of the ramifications and unintended consequences of further reductions. If and when further reductions make sense, it only seems reasonable that this administration and future ones would come back and actually make the case to Congress. My concerns about where the administration may be headed stem from a number of recent quotes by senior administration officials. There are two key reviews, one about to start and another under way, that could lead to significant changes to our stockpile hedge, nuclear triad and our extended deterrence commitment in Europe.

7 The first study involves a supposedly 90-day review of our deterrence requirements. Based on statements from administration officials, some of us are deeply concerned that this review could be used to justify fairly substantial changes to U.S. nuclear force structure by taking whole classes of targets off the table. On March 29 th again, here at Carnegie s podium national security adviser Tom Donilon declared that the president would be directing the Department of Defense to, quote, develop options for further reductions in our current nuclear stockpile. To pave the way for these reductions, they would consider, quote, potential changes in targeting requirements and alert postures that are required for effective deterrence. [00:18:10] Well, the White House has remained rather quiet about this review. In a closed briefing to the House Armed Services Committee earlier this month, Dr. Miller (sp), Undersecretary Tauscher and General Kaylor (sp) provided little information on the review other than to say, it hasn t started yet. For those that have been in D.C. for a while, you know that not a lot gets done or accomplished in merely a 90-day review. One senior Defense official jokingly told my staff that a 10-day review gets accomplished in 90 days. I would there be incredibly wary if such a study would to facilitate dramatic changes in targeting requirements. It s very possible that the conclusions are already predetermined for such a study to have such a huge possible impact on our on our nuclear posture. One thing is clear: Strategy must drive force structure, not the other way around. That is why it s so disturbing to hear administration officials discuss the need for further force cuts and then get around to explaining that they will review our nuclear employment guidance and targeting plans to develop options for these reductions. It s easy to change assumptions to get the answers that you want, but this is a dangerous and irresponsible way to make force decisions that affect our nation s security and that of our allies. [00:19:24] Some of us would be especially apprehensive about any changes in strategy that abandoned the decade-longs commitment to counterforce targeting, by which I mean primarily targeting a potential adversary s military capabilities. Surprisingly enough, that is exactly what some in the arms control community have advocated: deliberately changing our nuclear strategy and shifting away from a counter-force to a counter-value or minimum deterrence posture, which instead targets cities and populations civilians. Such an approach would elicit significant opposition in Congress and make many of us, as well of our as our allies, uneasy about the credibility of the U.S. deterrent. These concerns are not new. Last year, on a bipartisan basis, the Democrat-controlled House of Representatives passed legislation that any reductions below New START levels be contingent upon the U.S. certifying that it would not go to counter-value targeting strategy. This year, when the House passed similar language to require the president to certify that we would not adopt a counter-value strategy, the language touched a nerve, and the administration threatened to veto it. [00:20:34] I want to repeat that again. In the Democrat-controlled House they passed legislation that said that we could not have reductions below New START unless there was certification that we would not go to counter-value targeting.

8 In this bill, we do essentially the same thing, asking for certification that we re not going to counter-value targeting targeting of cities and civilians and the administration has threatened to veto it. We would also proceed with caution on alert posture, another area that Donilon indicated may be changed to justify further cuts. Many steps taken over the past few decades in the way of open-ocean targeting and command and control have produced a situation which is quite stable. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review concluded that current alert postures should remain just as they are. Further, de-alerting for the sake of arms control could have unanticipated consequences for both strategic stability and the survivability of our deterrent. Another area identified for nuclear cuts by administration officials is our reserve force of non-deployed weapons. Both Undersecretary of State Ellen Tauscher and Gary Samore, White House coordinator for arms control and WMD terrorism, has recently confirmed the president s intent to reduce non-deployed nuclear weapons. The reasons we have these non-deployed weapons is to hedge against both technical and geopolitical uncertainties. Should a technical failure affect a class of weapons or should geopolitical events warrant an increased deployment, these hedge weapons could be deployed and uploaded on to our missiles, bombers or submarines to compensate. [00:22:17] Unlike Great Britain, France, Russia and China, the United States does not retain the means to replace old nuclear weapons or create new ones. We are in fact the only nuclear weapon state party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT, in this predicament. As a result we will, for the indefinite future, continue to rely on a stockpile left over from the Cold War. A 2008 report by the Departments of Defense and Energy entitled National Security and Nuclear Weapons in the 21 Century noted, quote, until there is confidence in the infrastructure s demonstrated capability to respond to unexpected developments by producing nuclear weapon components in sufficient quantities, especially plutonium pits, the United States will need to retain more reserve weapons than otherwise would be desired. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review corroborated this conclusion, noting that the numbers of reserved weapons necessary could be diminished with the, quote, implementation of a responsive and capable nuclear infrastructure, including new plutonium and uranium facilities. But merely making some initial progress toward a responsive infrastructure is not enough. In the words of NNSA s administrator Tom D Agostino at a subcommittee hearing this spring, these facilities need to be, quote, up and running, close quote. To this end, the House-passed NDAA would preclude cuts to the non-deployed stockpile until these new facilities are fully operational. I want to be clear: I am open to proposals to reduce our stockpile hedge. But the smart and sustainable way to do this is to modernize the nuclear stockpile, to replace our decrepit infrastructure, and to renew our atrophying nuclear enterprise. [00:24:09] Another area of concern is our nuclear triad of delivery systems. Gary Samore has suggested that, quote, we ve reached the level the in our forces where further reductions will raise questions about whether we can retain the triad, or whether we go to a system that is a dyad. The comment was a bit surprising, given that only last April the Nuclear Posture Review reaffirmed the value of the triad and our commitment to keep it. As the NPR noted, the diversity and survivability of the triad will continue to remain quite salient, even at lower levels.

9 Each leg of the triad ICBMs, SLBMs and bombers provides a unique contribution to our deterrence. The deterrent value of our nuclear weapons is only as credible as our ability to deliver them. A path toward future reductions that retains the triad is likely to be far more palatable than a path without it. And if the administration is considering going to a dyad, there will be a high burden of proof required. The second study effort currently underway is NATO s Deterrence and Defense Posture Review which was called for by NATO s New Strategic Concept released in Lisbon last November. Several administration officials have suggested to members of the Armed Services Committee that one outcome of this review could be unilateral reductions or withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe, which again fits within the larger White House narrative. Dr. Miller testified before my subcommittee earlier this year that the review could recommend reductions. Some officials have even suggested that the U.S. would withdraw its nuclear weapons from Europe in exchange for mere geographic relocation of Russian weapons. [00:25:56] And Gary Samore has commented that the U.S. could do this unilaterally. Administration officials have been quick to cite language in the New START resolution of ratification calling for the president to pursue reductions in Russian tactical nuclear weapons. But the Senate did not give them license to pursue unilateral reductions in U.S. weapons. In fact, the resolution explicitly highlighted concern about the disparity between the tactical nuclear weapon stockpiles of the Russian Federation and the United States. Unclassified reports peg Russian tactical nuclear weapons at over 3800, while the U.S retains less than 500. My concern all along has been the administration s overt willingness to unilaterally reduce or withdraw U.S. weapons from Europe without a substantial and verifiable reduction in Russia s tactical nuclear weapons. This is negotiation 101. If we don t get any meaningful reductions from Russia, we can t give away our bargaining chip at the outset unless the administration intends to put other capabilities such as missile defense or conventional strike on the table. But I can assure you that such agreement would hit a brick wall in Congress. As chairman of the U.S. delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly I ve had many opportunities to discuss extended deterrence with our allies. I believe, and I think many of our NATO friends believe, that U.S. nuclear weapons based in Europe continue to contribute to our extended deterrence, to assuring our allies, to dissuading further proliferation and therefore to strategic stability. The forward basing of nuclear weapons has historically been an essential part of the trans-atlantic nuclear alliance. I worry that the credibility of our deterrent might suffer if some of our European allies or the U.S. executive branch, acting alone, chose to undermine NATO s unified and shared nuclear mission. [00:27:46] Anticipating these developments the House-passed NDAA included a provision to slow down any unilateral withdrawal of the small number of weapons remaining in Europe and clarified that the mere reduction of Russian nuclear weapons would not constitute a reduction. Let me say that again, I think I we wanted to clarify that the mere relocation of Russian nuclear weapons would not constitute a reduction. And that really, I think, is one of the things that we have to be most cautious of. The Senate says that we want we want the administration to go into negotiations to address Russian tactical nukes. If this administration says, fine, we ll reduce ours or take them out merely in exchange for geographical relocation of Russian weapons, we have not at all lessened the risk to Europe or our allies, and we have eliminated our only significant bargaining chip for achieving reduction of those nuclear weapons. This is a process that should be done

10 in concert as we look to try to actually impact the numbers of those weapons and not merely look to reductions of U.S weapons. Our allies are nervous about the risk of proposed reductions. Last July, 22 prominent Central and Eastern European leaders wrote an open letter to President Obama expressing concern. They wrote: We welcome the reset of the American-Russian relations But there is also nervousness in our capitals. We want to ensure that too narrow an understanding of Western interests does not lead to the wrong concessions to Russia. [00:29:11] The nexus between extended deterrence and non-proliferation is still another reason for caution. A credible extended deterrence also supports non-proliferation by reducing the incentives for allies and partners to develop their own nuclear weapons; a deterrent which is not credible could encourage such proliferation, and in these areas perceptions matter. If the U.S. were to withdraw tactical nuclear weapons from Europe or engage in still deeper strategic reductions, would the Turks or the Saudis begin to reevaluate a nuclear capability of their own? Some of our allies were concerned about the retirement of the nuclear capable Tomahawk Missile. If we were to withdraw our forward-deployed weapons from Europe, would the Japanese or South Koreans further doubt our commitment to forward-deployable nuclear weapons in the Pacific in turn? How far back would non-proliferation efforts be set with North Korea and Iran in the face of a nuclear Japan, South Korea, Saudi Arabia or Turkey? And of course, we must avoid reducing our superiority to a level that incentivizes China to build up its nuclear arsenal to seek parity. Here too we must move carefully. Missteps could well have adverse consequences for decades to come. I think my reaction to all these various developments could be characterized as one of caution. Many of us in Congress are now concerned that the administration could be moving a bit too fast on the reduction side, so fast that reductions may outpace the promised modernization. This concern has shaped my subcommittee s oversight agenda in the 112 th Congress. [00:30:36] For example, tomorrow afternoon we are holding a hearing with non-government witnesses to discuss the topics of further reductions, deterrence requirements and extended deterrence. And this is just one in a series of hearings we expect to hold on these topics. We have already told the Department of Defense, the Department of State and STRATCOM that we intend to hold an open hearing later this year with government officials as witnesses. Before we race to the road of zero we need to make sure that we are well along the road to a sustainable deterrent. In terms of the way forward, I would again draw attention to the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review which articulated several prudent criteria for any further reductions. First, among these criteria was that any future nuclear reductions must affirmatively strengthen deterrence, strengthen stability and assurance our allies and partners. Second, the criterion is real progress in nuclear modernization only with the implementation of the stockpiled stewardship program and new nuclear infrastructure will the United States be able to reduce its non-deployed stockpile. Some of this new infrastructure could be a decade away or more, but the implementation must come first before we reduce our hedge. Third, we must remain attentive to Russia s nuclear forces and those of other powers, for both ourselves and our allies. We have been hearing a great deal from the administration about the desire to take further concrete steps

11 toward disarmament. The New START treaty has been in force merely six months. Before we think about going lower, we need to see concrete steps in the way of modernization. The NSA has drawn up all manner of plans for what it will take to implement modernization, but we are far from seeing the implementation of these plans. [00:32:09] The several provisions in the House-passed NDAA this year were designed to put the brakes on further cuts until modernization is implemented. The Authorization Act, reported out of the Senate Armed Services Committee, was much less robust. But notably, there were quite a bit of overlap in the terms of our subject matter. And I take this as a validation of some of our underlying concerns. And we look forward to conferring with the Senate in the coming months. In conclusion, we all hope, as President Reagan did, that one day that there would be an elimination of nuclear weapons. But conditions do not permit the realization of that vision it does not exist. And it is likely to be further in the future than any one of us can foresee. This does not mean that future reductions do not make sense. But the devils and angels will be in the details. In terms of immediate next steps after New START, the burden of proof will be on those who advocate deep reductions to demonstrate that these steps would not contribute to instability, hurt our deterrent, harm our assurances to allies, or undermine non-proliferation. As President Obama said at Prague, and as everyone in this room knows, we are going to need a nuclear deterrent for a long, long time. For now we need to focus on becoming responsible stewards of that deterrence. Thank you. (Applause.) [00:33:47] MR. PERKOVICH: All right, I m going to ask one question to start us off, and then we ll take a series of questions. Thank you for that was comprehensive and put a lot of issues on the table. I guess one question I had, both in looking at some aspects of the Defense Authorization Act and then also, you know, listening to your remarks, is the possibility, both logically but also legislatively, of building contradictions into U.S. policy so that there s some elements that run into each other. So one thought I had, for example, is the concern that you mentioned about in the new guidance taking whole classes of targets off the list and saying that shouldn t be done. And then later, the concern about switching from counter-force to counter-value and that that shouldn t be done the question arises, I think it s very possible that targets that would be taken off the list could be in cities. And so that would be a good thing from the standpoint of not doing counter-value, but it would be a category of target that you re saying you shouldn t and you shouldn t take categories off. So I guess the question is rather than I mean, I could ask, well, you know, what targets should be on? But my broader question is, is this the kind of thing that should be legislated? Because there are so many potential contradictions, and there s and I m trying to imagine how Strategic Command or somebody takes those instructions and their heads don t explode. [00:35:33] REP. TURNER: Well, actually, there s not a contradiction. I mean, this really is an issue of a dialogue, which is why, again, I thank you so much for having this. The I think people as policy discussion goes, counter-force

12 versus counter-value, targeting cities versus targeting military targets, that is a state that we on both sides of the aisle and all aspects of this have been very comfortable with. I mean, people have said that, yes, that there s there are even moral implications as to target someone s military capability as opposed to their civilian population. There s also a military aspect of it because as you target military you have you lessen the ability for continued attack or your vulnerability. Our concern is is that there s some there appears to be, and among the administration, some aspect of acceptance of making that shift if it can result in justification for lowered numbers. Well, that s not really how that s cart before the horse. That s not how you do these. And what we re trying to highlight is that this has been so ingrained and so accepted in our intellectual nuclear policy discussion that it bears a further debate than merely the administration announcing to us one day that they have shifted it and that in this shift less weapons are going to be required. So, I mean, this is not Congress overlooking the shoulder and saying, well, let me see each target. It s a policy issue of how and the process. I think I think if we we re not having this dialogue. If the House had not, in the National Defense Authorization Act, been aggressive at, you know, footnoting and flagging these issues, we ve we very well could have no debate going on in our country as the administration, behind closed doors, could substantially change our policies. [00:37:29] MR. PERKOVICH: Greg and David, yeah. Let s do two and because we ve got time, but I want to I know there re a lot of questions so let s do two and then Q: Greg Thielmann, Arms Control Association. Congressman, you expressed a concern about rushing to reductions and alluded to several administration figures. As far as I know, the administration thinking about reductions has to do with post-new START, what the targets of future negotiations should be. The only specific proposal I ve heard lately for rushing to reductions is conservative Senator Coburn of your party who has called for reductions before New Start. So I m a little puzzled by the timing there of are we talking about post-2020, or are we talking about the next 10 years as Senator Coburn is? But my real question has to do with the reductions to get down to the New START limits. The Russians are already down to the 700 and the 1550 limits. We have seven long years. Have you looked into a way that we can get down to the reductions that we have agreed to in a way that would save the taxpayer money and help in this debt crisis that we re confronting? REP. TURNER: Quick, if you don t mind, can I go ahead and answer that one? MR. PERKOVICH: Oh yeah, go ahead. Yeah. [00:38:47] REP. TURNER: Three real important things then. The first issue on, you know, why would we think that the administration might be doing this? That is why I relatively exhaustively had pages in my speech where we quoted the administration officials. This is not something that we re just sitting in a room thinking, oh my god, they might do this; we re asking their actual statements of what they are saying that they re reviewing, putting it in context of, currently there s a vehicle ongoing the 90-day review at the White House where they re looking at employment strategy and the deterrence review that s going on at NATO for significant policy changes

13 And then from that, backstopping it against the context of, well, why are we where we are? What are the policy issues that cause us to have the structure that we do? And then, what would be the changes that would have to happen? That s why I m so concerned about this. It s not merely just theoretical that an administration might do this. They re in their statements which I gave you in my presentation, specifically stating it. [00:40:05] Now, with respect to savings in the in the you know, in the issue of our debt crisis, you know, I think we all understand that there are not significant savings and reductions of nuclear weapons. You know, if this was a nuclear weapons storage facility and we had one nuclear weapon sitting in the room, the costs are going to be the same if there are 10. Going from 10 to one is not going to significantly change your cost structure. The labs themselves the issue that was identified as the sort of the key that gets turned to allow us to go further in reductions on our hedge, our ability to get our processing facilities up and running that is something that has cost and it s not going to go down regardless of what our numbers are in weapons, both in the hedge or deployed. These are hard costs that we need to proceed on. And the thing is that they go straight to the heart of our ability to have a deterrent. And we have all accepted and all agree even the president in his own comments agree and accept that we need our nuclear deterrent to ensure both our national security and that of our allies. [00:40:50] MR. PERKOVICH: David? Q: David Culp, with the Friends Committee on National Legislation. I want MR. PERKOVICH: David, take the microphone. Q: I want to commend you for the energy and the bipartisan spirit that you brought to your subcommittee. REP. TURNER: Thank you. Q: Should the United States ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty? I realize that that s the Senate s role, but you re going to be one of the voices in that debate, even though the treaty doesn t come to the House. REP. TURNER: Under our current circumstances, I would say no. I don t think we re to a point yet where we can say that and we may some time be at that point if we if we invest in our modernization of our infrastructure, but the current situation that we re in and you heard Secretary Gates himself in his own comments state that without the nuclear modernization, we might have to resort to testing. Now, no one is an advocate for testing, but I think that the circumstances are one of technology and capability before we would we would proceed. [00:41:44] MR. PERKOVICH: Yeah. Let s take Anne and then the one in the back here with a white coat. Q: Thank you. I m Anne Penketh from BASIC, the British American Security Information Council.

14 I d like to ask you about a bit about the tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. How do you define unilateral? I mean, if it if it comes to the end of the DDPR, and NATO itself as a whole asks the Americans to take these weapons out, would that be unilateral REP. TURNER: That s not unilateral, right. I mean, the in our provision, when we in our in the act when we became concerned that the Senate s direction to the administration to put at the top of the to-do list achieving reductions in Russian tactical nuclear weapons was being misused for the administration to look instead at our nuclear weapons that are in Europe, we crafted the provision to basically say, you know, it could occur by treaty, it can occur by NATO coming to an agreement, or it can occur by, you know, a nation stating that they wanted the weapons to be removed. [00:42:58] The concern I have is that you ve got you have this deterrence review ongoing which is undefined. If you go and speak to NATO officials, they can t even tell you what the parameters of the review are, what its outcome is supposed to be. You know, and somebody in a room somewhere has the assignment to produce this deterrence review. And whenever anybody can t tell you what somebody s doing and what the limitations are, you know, obviously you have a concern as to where it may go. I think that it would be an absolute loss of opportunity if we were to remove or reduce our nuclear weapons without achieving the bargaining chip with the Russians of real reductions in their tactical nuclear weapons. MR. PERKOVICH: Can I just want to pick up on that because there are two elements in the authorization act, and you just talked about one of them. And the act says and you said that any geographical relocation or storage of non-strategic nuclear weapons by Russia does not constitute a reduction or elimination of such weapons. Well, then, couldn t one say that the relocation of NATO nuclear weapons also doesn t constitute an elimination or reduction? So what s there to be worried about? REP. TURNER: Well, here s the here s the, I think, the basic premise of this. If the president had come to us and said, I m getting ready to sign New START and we re going to take all the weapons that we have out that are deployed and we re just going to move them to Texas, I think we would all (have?) said, that s not a reduction. And that s just what we re saying in this, is that if Russia comes up and says, OK, we re going to keep the same amount, we re going to keep them actually deployed, we re just going to move them back a bit so that, you know, you can see us move them up if you if you if we move them, that doesn t contribute to the road to zero. I mean, the count is if you re an accountant, that count is still the same over here. So if we re looking for real reductions, there should be reductions. And if you look at our presence in Europe, our tactical weapons that are there as a bargaining chip, you don t spend it on someone saying, I m going to go put it, you know, in a garage farther away. [00:45:09] MR. PERKOVICH: But what I m getting at is, with what you re what the legislation seems to be worried about is NATO reductions. And what I m saying is, if you move if you relocate them you don t eliminate the weapons, you relocate them then that s not a limitation or reduction that you re worried about for the same principle that you re saying to Russia

15 REP. TURNER: Oh, I see, I see (inaudible) no, no, that is MR. PERKOVICH: why doesn t it apply to NATO moving its weapons, which also wouldn t be counted as an elimination or reduction? REP. TURNER: Very clever, but that s not what we mean. MR. PERKOVICH: I know that s not what you mean, but I m under I m trying to understand why. REP. TURNER: The removal of those weapons would, I believe, constitute a and why is because you have you have this one opportunity. Russia has, you know, 3800 or so of these and we have, you know, less than 500. You have this one opportunity for the parties to get together and say, you know, if we re really not adversaries, if we re really not looking at a conflict between us, let s look at reducing these. The world will be safer, Europe will be safer, Russia will be safer. That s where we need to be focused. And anything that takes us away from that is a is a real lost opportunity. MR. PERKOVICH: OK. One more on the on the NATO issue because when you talk about, in the legislation, that it would be OK to limit or reduce if it s requested by one of the governments that host them [00:46:37] REP. TURNER: (And?) I think that recognizes their sovereignty. I mean, you have to do that. MR. PERKOVICH: But also, and (pursuant?) to a treaty REP. TURNER: Senate confirmation. MR. PERKOVICH: and specifically authorized by an act of Congress. So what if the host actually says, we want these out, but there isn t a treaty, or Congress decides, no, we don t want them out either/or. It s either OK, doesn t say that. But the that s why I m wondering about legislating these kinds of things. REP. TURNER: Right. It s and it s highly intuitive. I mean, you think, well, OK, we want to make a statement that says, don t do this. Don t remove these in exchange for merely geographical relocation or don t unilaterally just remove them. Well, then you have to recognize the circumstances of what might occur. If it s certainly, if it s by treaty, then we all say it s OK and the Senate, you know, approves it, ratifies it that would be a process. We re worried about there not having been a process and that occurring. If a if a country, sovereign nation asks for their removal, obviously, that s something you have to respect. And third is NATO. Again, there would have to have been a process. So that s part of all the dialogue that I just greatly appreciate that you guys contribute to. [00:47:47] MR. PERKOVICH: Other questions? Yes, sir? Right here. And is there anybody in the back, just so I get the microphone moving so we save time? Yes, that Q: Hi, Owen Graham, The Heritage Foundation. Thank you, Congressman, for your speech today.

16 I appreciate the spirit of the legislation. I think a lot of people are hoping that the president does fulfill the commitments that he s made. But I think there s reason and cause to be concerned. And I think it s anything we can do to kind of hold them up to his word and hold his feet to the fire is probably a good thing. [00:48:23] But I would point out that during the New START debate, the Senate the president sought to secure commitments for nuclear modernization from the Senate subcommittees on appropriations but didn t engage the House Subcommittee on Energy and Water for appropriations. And that, to me, was a major red flag. And we ve seen what s just happened with the 1.1 billion (dollars), 10-percent reduction. So how can we believe that the commitments to really modernize our arsenal are indeed genuine when we see these kind of red flags? REP. TURNER: Right, because we all don t want to be sitting here saying, thank God for the Senate. The Senate, I believe, has made the commitment. And I do believe that they hopefully will correct what the House Subcommittee on Appropriations for Energy and Water has done. It is a structural problem that needs to be addressed in the appropriations subcommittee because NNSA is under the Department of Energy Department of Energy and Water are together. [00:49:27] Initially, NNSA was not recognized as a defense function. When we went through the discussion of the continuing resolutions for funding for this year, we had H.R. 1 that came out of the House that was trying to restore spending level at the 2008 amounts. They caught NNSA. We were able then to go to leadership, go to the speaker and, you know, go through the education process of, look, this function down here, NNSA, needs to be treated like defense, not like the Department of Energy, for reduction percentages. We won that then, and the continuing resolution when it was ultimately adopted, it fully funded, at the higher level, NNSA. Then again, as we went to put the 2012 budget together, Chairman Ryan, now aware of what had happened with H.R. 1 and the continuing resolution, fully funded NNSA and even put in notation in the budget, I have put enough money in here for fully funding for NNSA. [00:50:23] The fact that it then stumbles as it goes to that subcommittee on Appropriations where portions of the funds are taken to national infrastructure instead of nuclear infrastructure is where the conflict arises. I think people had too much confidence that it would get fixed in the Senate, so it didn t matter. I think it matters; it s why I voted no. And I think it s something that we need to fix. And again, I think that s why it s important for this dialogue because both sides of the aisle, both sides of people on the issue of nuclear policy all agree that this modernization needs to happen. So I think banging the pots and pans and making noise makes sense. MR. PERKOVICH: Yes, in the back.