Current Trends in Latin America and the Caribbean

Transcription

1 Current Trends in Latin America and the Caribbean Noref Report Compiled by Augusto Varas 1 Introduction The permanent UN Security Council members reactions to the joint Brazilian Turkish initiative aimed at reaching a negotiated agreement with Iran on its uranium enriching programme have been a clear warning against the intrusion of new members in this exclusive club. President Lula s visit to Russia, before visiting Iran, was a goodwill trip to inform President Medvédev of Brazilian intentions. However, the end of US sanctions against four Russian entities involved in illicit weapons trade with Iran and Syria since 1999, dramatically changed the scenario and paved the way to a Security Council agreement to impose additional sanctions on Iran, making visible the heavyhanded US approach vis à vis emerging powers. In this context, Ahmet Davutoglu and Celso Amorim, Turkey s and Brazil s foreign ministers, respectively, in a late May op ed in the The New York Times, insisted that this deal would be a confidencebuilding measure as well as a humanitarian requirement in view of the research reactor s role in the diagnosis and treatment of almost a million patients in Iran. Secretary s Gates trip to Latin America and the US Brazil military agreement the first in 30 years revealed America s carrots and stick policy towards this emerging power. At the same time, Secretary Gates visited Peru, Colombia and Barbados trying to thwart warming Brazil Venezuela relations, signed a military agreement with Brazil to cooperate on defence and peacekeeping related matters. All these international political interactions are heavily politicizing Brazilian foreign policy, particularly in this presidential election year. In this new issue of Current Trends in Latin America and the Caribbean, three foreign relations experts analyze US Brazilian multifaceted relations, agitated by recent Brazilian foreign policy postures. 1 Augusto Varas, Noref consultant, is currently the president of Fundación Equitas, Chile. Latin America and the Caribbean Report 1

2 Stresses and strains in the balance of world power Turkish Brazilian agreement with Iran Mariano Aguirre 2 Profound shifts are taking place in the balance of power that has reigned until now in the international system. The recent Iranian agreement on enriched uranium with Brazil and Turkey, and the sanctions that the United States wishes to impose on the Teheran government through a United Nations resolutions, reveal the deep cracks in the system. A recent editorial in Le Monde noted that countries from the South are now playing a key role in issues such as nuclear proliferation, which used to be left to the powers on the UN Security Council. Turkey and Brazil are both non permanent members of the UN Security Council at present. Last 17 May, they signed an agreement with the government of Teheran whereby part of the uranium enriched at Iranian laboratories will be transferred to Turkey before going on to France and Russia to be processed for peaceful purposes, specifically medical. The material would subsequently be returned to Iran. The three signatories indicated that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) would verify the process. Although the agreement does not envisage that all Iranian enriched uranium would be subject to this process, it does usher in the possibility of a formal agreement with the UN Security Council. US sanctions Washingtonʹs immediate response was to step up negotiations with the permanent and non permanent members of the UN Security Council to impose harsh sanctions on Iran in the next few months. These would include cargo inspections on tankers 2 Mariano Aguirre is managing director of the Norwegian Peacebuilding Centre, Noref. Latin America and the Caribbean Report 2

3 entering and exiting the country, restrictions on diplomatic mobility, freezing the funds of Iranian state employees abroad, and restricting the sale of heavy weapons to Iran. It is not yet clear whether the ten permanent members of the UN Security Council will support such a resolution. Turkey and Brazil seem most inclined to reject it outright. It is unlikely that it could be passed in less than two months, given that Lebanon will hold the presidency of the Security Council in June and it is not going to oppose Iran in the United Nations. The US secretary of state issued a pithy rejection of Teheranʹs agreement with Brasilia and Ankara. Yet only a few months ago, Washington was trying to reach a very similar pact with the Iranian, French and Russian governments. The Turkish government has declared itself deeply dissatisfied with the situation, indicating that the United States requested its help in negotiating with Iran. and US strategic goals However, the swap agreement reached with Brazil and Turkey has highlighted that the United States really wants Iran to shut down its nuclear programme and to cease processing any uranium whatsoever. This is also a strategic goal for Israel. Teheran argues that it cannot be forbidden from developing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes as this is an activity covered by the Nuclear Weapons Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Washingtonʹs attitude disappointed Ankara. The Turkish prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, declared that ʺthis is the moment to discuss if we believe in the supremacy of law or in the law of the supremes and superiorsʺ. He added, ʺwhile they [the US] still have nuclear weapons, where do they get the credibility to ask other countries not to have them?ʺ The NPT establishes that nuclear powers should negotiate disarmament while ensuring that other countries do not develop their own nuclear weapons. However, in reality, neither of these two objectives seems very likely to succeed, even if countries such as Brazil, Argentina and South Africa have explicitly renounced nuclear escalation. Latin America and the Caribbean Report 3

4 UN backing for nuclear swap The American display of force, in rejecting the Brazilian Turkish diplomacy, is under fire. Last Friday in Istanbul, the UN Secretary General, Ban Ki Moon, declared this to be an important initiative. He welcomed the role played by Turkey and Brazil, hoping that ʺthese and other initiatives open the door to a negotiated agreementʺ involving the IAEA. This would seem to suggest that the sanctions that the US seeks are unlikely to be forthcoming. For Turkey, the swap agreement is proof of its growing influence as a regional power in the Middle East and parts of Asia. Ankara has opened 30 Turkish embassies in Africa and Latin America. While the European Union blocks its membership, Ankara is actively pursuing a diplomatic role in non coercive talks with countries caught in a stalemate. An example is its role in facilitating dialogue between Israel and Syria. The tension between Turkey and the US is not easy for Washington. Nor is it very comfortable for London and Paris. Turkey is a key geopolitical ally for Nato in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Lula da Silva s government firmly believes that the UN should not ban any country from developing nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Brasilia also wants to become a permanent member of the UN Security Council and it has now passed the test as a recognised world power. It also plays a key role in relations between Washington and Latin America. Cracks in the sanctions Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, triumphantly announced that the United States has the backing of Russia, China, France and the United Kingdom against the Brazil Turkey agreement. But China has indicated that however much it may agree with the sanctions, it is still interested in an agreement between emerging economies. And both Moscow and Beijing have denied that the gas and oil trade are included in the draft resolution. For Russia, it is not just American credibility, but also the reputation of Moscow that is at stake. The Washington Post reported on Saturday, 22 May, that the draft resolution on sanctions for Iran exempted a set of weapon systems that Russia Latin America and the Caribbean Report 4

5 intends to sell to Iran. In fact, Washington lifted other restrictions constraining official Russian institutions and companies with respect to the arms they may sell to Iran and to Syria. Although the agreement between Iran, Brazil and Turkey may not solve all the tensions with Iran, it is a watershed in the configuration of a new multipolar world. Brazil s foreign policy now a domestic political issue Reginaldo Mattar Nasser 3 Recent events involving President Lula on the Iranian nuclear issue made real what was unthinkable just a few years ago: Brazilian s foreign policy has become a subject of domestic political debate during the presidential election this year. On May 15, Lula visited Russia and Iran generating great expectations in the international community. He tenaciously defended dialogue with Iran, counteracting the policy of the US and its allies on sanctions. Former foreign relations minister during Fernando Henrique Cardoso s administration (FHC), Felipe Lampreia, defined Lula s attitude as an electoral maneuver, trying to give the impression of accepting a very hard mission he went there and did everything possible on an issue that concerns peace and world s security. In some sense his evaluation is correct. A research made by the Brazilian Institute of Public Opinion and Statistics (Ibope) in March 2010, showed an extremely good evaluation of Lula s administration: 75% of those interviewed said that the administration is great or good, and the most interesting fact is that among the most remembered news items are those related to foreign policy (Haiti, Cuba, Obama, and Iran). 3 Reginaldo Mattar Nasser is professor of international relations at the São Paulo s Pontifical Catholic University, and researcher at the National Science and Technology Institute for the study of the United States (INEU) Latin America and the Caribbean Report 5

6 Beyond the natural noises of this year s election run up, it is necessary to understand better the main issues involved in this debate. Scholars and former diplomats connected to the FHC administration s foreign policy are in complete agreement in recognizing and affording great value to Brazil s intervention in the Iran nuclear fuel negotiation, particularly focussing on its peacemaking dimension. However, in a recent debate promoted by the newspaper O Estado de São Paulo (11 May 2010) between the presidents of the Labour Party (PT) and the Social Democratic Party of Brazil (PSDB), it was evident that, despite broad recognition of the government s success on economical and social areas, issues related to foreign policy and social security reform revealed notable differences. Concerns over US objections The main objections to Lula s actions show a mixture of realistic and idealistic assumptions. One argument is that Brazil, when dealing with matters outside its geographical borders, runs the risk of jeopardizing its national interests. In the speeches of former minister, Celso Lafer, former FHC Foreign relations minister (O Estado de São Paulo, 19 April 2010), and former US ambassador, Rubens Barbosa, (O Estado de São Paulo 25 May 2010), implicitly or explicitly, there is a great concern that Lula s moves might challenge the international community, or, in other words, US aims. According to Lafer, who completely agrees with US assumptions, Iran is a rogue state, its nuclear program has military components, and Iran is encouraging international terrorism thus making peace in the Middle East more difficult. On the other hand, according to Barbosa, who expressed a more realistic view, Brazilian diplomacy failed to anticipate Obama s reaction ʺagainst the intrusion of new actors on subjects that are considered exclusively his responsibility.ʺ Not even questioning this policy he stated that ʺSecretary Clintonʹs words, after the Teheran deal, marked where the power was. According to Pinheiro Guimarães, Minister of the Secretariat for Strategic Affairs (O Estado de São Paulo, 26 May 2010), it is possible to presume that for the Lula administration, Iran s nuclear issue is actually inserted in a bigger context in which some procedures of the actual regime of nuclear non proliferation are perceived as suspicious. For this minister, the IAEA s Additional Protocols to the Safeguard Latin America and the Caribbean Report 6

7 Agreement proposed by the US which have not yet been ratified by Brazil authorizing the visit of inspectors to verify the existence of any nuclear activity in the country (research, nuclear plants, and production of equipment), is considered an undue intromission in Brazilian activities ; it might even cause economic damage due to the Brazil s prospects in the production of nuclear fuel in relation to the environmental crisis. It would be an exaggeration to include Brazil at a superpower level, but it would also be a mistake to affirm that it doesn t have enough political stature to mediate in an agreement of this nature. Brazil has a good reception in most powerful countries and is trusted among emerging powers and southern countries, a condition that qualifies it as an exceptional interlocutor. Even in the worst case scenario that the agreement sponsored by Brazil and Turkey did not prosper one of its positive repercussions would be to make visible the deep crisis of legitimacy in today s world power structure. Latin America and the Caribbean Report 7

8 Engagement in search of an agenda: Secretary Gates visits Latin America Adam Isacson 4 Sixteen months in, the Obama administrations Latin America policy is hard to define. Beyond earthquake stricken Haiti, the general drift has been a desire to engage, as long as engagement involves little political or financial cost. This has meant a steady stream of high level visits to the region, including two tours by cabinet secretaries in March and April that have been rather lacking in content. The most recent was that of Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, who travelled to Peru, Colombia and Barbados on April The trip s stated mission was vague: To recognize what has already been achieved in the relationship and explore opportunities for further cooperation, the Secretary said. Left unstated was something the countries he visited have in common: proximity to Venezuela and, in most cases, rather distant relations with Venezuela. Agreements on security Gates began his travels a day after signing, at the Pentagon, a new Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) with Brazil. The Brazil DCA is an 800 word statement of principles and protocols that may ease future exchanges, sales, and other military engagement, but will not change the status of visiting U.S. personnel. It is the second of what may be a series of regional DCAs; the first was signed with Colombia last October. The Colombian agreement is substantially different; it grants immunity to visiting US personnel, pledges cooperation against all common threats to security, and allows US personnel to use seven military installations. While it was being negotiated, both countries secretive handling of the agreement angered many 4 Adam Isaacson is Senior Associate, Security Policy Program, at the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA). Latin America and the Caribbean Report 8

9 of Colombia s South American neighbours. Though Venezuela complained loudest, the damage extended to US relations with Brazil, Argentina and Chile. Gates first stop was Peru, the hemisphere s third largest recipient of US military and police aid (behind Mexico and Colombia though a distant third) with aid levels hovering around $50 million per year for the past decade. When asked why he chose to visit Peru now, Gates surprisingly cited the need to contain Hugo Chávez s regime in Venezuela: [F]rankly, because Peru has been a constructive influence, in our view, in South America in terms of trying to counter some of the propaganda and other things from Venezuela, and in terms of trying to represent what weʹre trying to do in a straightforward manner. Gates also told reporters that he wants the United States to help the military respond to internal challenges. The Peruvian army, as in several other Latin American countries, is trying to restructure itself, and to focus more on the country s internal challenges. It is not clear what internal challenges Gates was referring to in Peru remnants of the Shining Path insurgency? Indigenous groups protests against foreign investments? But the idea of encouraging Peru s military to take on new internal roles is troubling. US support for Colombia Next came Colombia, the part of Gates tour that received the most attention. In this country, by far the largest recipient of military aid in Latin America since 2000, the Obama administration s approach has been unclear. Though the Defense Cooperation Agreement was signed in October, military assistance has been cut by a third since Though the administration duly certified that Colombia s human rights record is improving, it has not pushed Congress to ratify a free trade agreement the Bush administration signed in In this climate, voices in Colombia s military and political class say they feel abandoned by the United States, especially as Venezuela s rhetoric becomes more aggressive. While on a visit to Colombia the week before Gates visit, Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, Arturo Valenzuela, felt compelled to post to Twitter: The United States is completely committed to continuing work with Colombia, as though there was some doubt. Latin America and the Caribbean Report 9

10 Gates was far more effusive in his praise of Colombia, the Latin American country that complies most readily with US priorities, and its deeply conservative president, Álvaro Uribe. He gave a full throated endorsement of the free trade agreement, which remains stalled in Congress with absolutely no hope of passage in this legislative election year. Though the country s internal armed conflict continues to kill thousands each year, Gates called Colombia a linchpin of regional security and an exporter of security on the global stage; he cited Colombia s intention to send troops, mostly demining experts, to Afghanistan. Álvaro Uribe, in Gates view, is a great hero and has been an enormously successful president. Gates had nothing to say about President Uribe s less heroic human rights results, including the army s extrajudicial killings of perhaps thousands of civilians and the wiretapping and intimidation of much of the political opposition, press, and Supreme Court justices. When reporters asked about these scandals, Gates replied, I m not familiar with that issue. Let s hope that the Secretary was in fact a victim of a bad translation. Nonetheless, he should have expressed concerns about the human rights situation without any prompting from the press. US aid for Caribbean Gates final stop was the island of Barbados, where he met with the heads of state of seven small Caribbean nations that pool their defence efforts in what they call the Regional Security System (RSS). These countries, most with very small populations, lie directly in the path of maritime narcotraffickers transporting their illegal cargos between Colombia or Venezuela and the United States. Gates was mainly there to discuss the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CSBI), a counternarcotics and public security aid package for fifteen Caribbean states, which President Obama first proposed at the April 2009 Summit of the Americas. Though it has set aside $45 million for the CSBI in 2010 and another $70 million in 2011 making this, on a per capita basis, an enormous aid effort, the administration is still deciding what aid will go to which countries. Latin America and the Caribbean Report 10

11 The trip got little press coverage in the United States and the secretary stuck to vague, bland messages and announced no new initiatives (other than the Brazil DCA signed in Washington). Underlying US concerns over Venezuela Though Gates mentioned it rarely in public, it is very likely that the trip had a lot to do with concerns about Hugo Chávez s government: its escalating arms purchases, its worsening tensions with Colombia, its ever closer relations with Iran, and evidence that its democracy is eroding. The Secretary chose to visit the two Andean countries (out of five) whose governments are not aligned with Caracas. Although he brought Venezuela up during his stop in Peru, Gates avoided making aggressive public statements. In the same press conference, he noted, I certainly donʹt see Venezuela at this point as a military challenge or threat. Gates visit left little clarity about what, if anything, the United States plans to do about its concerns in Venezuela. But behind closed doors and away from the cameras and microphones, his discussions with regional counterparts probably focused intensely on that very question. Latin America and the Caribbean Report 11