Regional Organizations And The Durability Of Peace

Transcription

1 University of Central Florida Electronic Theses and Dissertations Masters Thesis (Open Access) Regional Organizations And The Durability Of Peace 2013 Juliana Velasco University of Central Florida Find similar works at: University of Central Florida Libraries Part of the International Relations Commons STARS Citation Velasco, Juliana, "Regional Organizations And The Durability Of Peace" (2013). Electronic Theses and Dissertations This Masters Thesis (Open Access) is brought to you for free and open access by STARS. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of STARS. For more information, please contact

2 REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THE DURABILITY OF PEACE by JULIANA VELASCO B.A. University of Central Florida, 2011 A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Masters in Arts in the Department of Political Science in the College of Sciences at the University of Central Florida Orlando, Florida Summer Term 2013

3 ABSTRACT This thesis investigates the role of regional organizations in peacemaking and peacekeeping, particularly on the effects of peace agreement duration. This is important because the United Nations has been traditionally seen as the default international peacekeeping force but recently, more responsibility is being given to regional organizations. This study hypothesizes that regional organizations ability to clear commitment problems, create specific agreements, and willingness to enforce agreements make them the most effective third parties to deal with many conflicts. However, the study also hypothesizes that regional organizations are less fit to mediate conflicts based around ethnicity, identity, or religious disparities. By utilizing a mixture of logistic regression and case studies, the results illustrate that regional organizations are an essential asset to creating agreements that elongate the duration of peace. In testing for the partiality of regional organizations, the specifics of agreements made, the willingness and capabilities of enforcement, the reason for the conflict and the institutionalization of the organization, quantitative and qualitative results illustrate that regional organizations are a valid tool for conflict management. ii

4 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS First of all I d like to thank Dr. Thomas Dolan for his tremendous assistance and guidance during this process. His persistence as thesis chair helped not only put forth my best effort into this work but also not to give up when things became daunting. I d also like to thank Dr. Nikola Mirilovic for his help on the quantitative portion of this thesis and helping to make sense of the results and helping me to explain the results clearly. In addition, I d like to thank Dr. Kurt Young who assisted with the qualitative portion of this thesis and helped me look at my case studies from different points of view and seeing the big picture. I d like to thank my friends and family who have given me unconditional support to go for my degree and pursue my dreams. Finally, I d like to thank caffeine, guarana, taurine, and ginseng for helping me get through late night research, revisions, and formatting. iii

5 TABLE OF CONTENTS LIST OF TABLES... vi LIST OF ACRONYMNS... vii CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION... 1 CHAPTER TWO LITERATURE REVIEW... 5 Background... 5 Hypotheses CHAPTER THREE STUDY DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY Datasets Variables Dependent Variable Independent Variables Control Variables Regressions and Results Hypotheses Results Additional Regression Results Implications iv

6 CHAPTER FOUR CASE STUDIES Variables Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Sierra Leone Guinea-Bissau (1998) Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Summary CHAPTER FIVE - CONCLUSIONS APPENDIX: ADDITIONAL TABLES AND FIGURES REFERENCES v

7 LIST OF TABLES Table 1-3rd party and Conflict Cross-tabulation Table 2: Logistic Regression Analysis of Hypothesis Table 3: Logistic Regression for Hypothesis Table 4: Full Model Logistic Regression Table 5: Logistic Regression - 3rd Party Type and Region Table 6: Logistic Regression: 3rd Party Type and Outstanding Issues Table 7 - Logistic Regression for 3rd Party Type, Outline, and Region Table 8 - Logistic Regression of 3rd Party type, Outstanding Issues, and Battle Deaths vi

8 LIST OF ACRONYMNS AU..African Union AFRC...Armed Forces Revolutionary Council CPLP. Communidade de Países de Língua Franca Portuguesa ECOMOG...Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group ECOWAS.....Economic Community of West African States IGO....Intergovernmental Organization IO..... International Organization NGO... Nongovernmental Organization OAU.. Organization of African Unity OSCE. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe RO.....Regional Organization RUF... Revolutionary United Front SLPP..Sierra Leone s People s Party UN... United Nations UNSC..United Nations Security Council vii

9 CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION After the end of the Cold War, the literature investigating the mechanisms behind conflict and conflict resolution began to grow. While a great body of work has studied conflict prevention and conflict management, less attention has been directed to what makes peace agreements last, whether or not third-party management can ease the peace agreement process and if so, which organizations are most successful. The official international peacekeeping force has traditionally been the United Nations but slowly, more responsibility is being given to regional organizations. Under the United Nations Charter - Chapter VIII, regional organizations can be tasked with a variety of peacekeeping tasks but the definition of regional organizations is purposefully vague, allowing for flexibility. What is fairly clear is that the relationship is meant to be top-down: 1 Article 53 of Chapter VIII states that while the United Nations Security Council may make use of regional organizations where appropriate, these organizations cannot take enforcement action without prior approval of the Security Council. 2 After some time, scholars began measuring the effectiveness of the UN, of these regional arrangements and the relationship between these two. Many works hypothesized that regional organizations should be utilized more often because they are closer to the conflict zones and can portray more legitimacy to the belligerents. They can also alleviate some of the burden from the United Nations since it cannot handle all the world s conflicts. Part of 1 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peace-making and Peace-keeping (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1992) para United Nations, Chapter VIII: Regional Arrangements, Charter of the United Nations, 1

10 this is due to bureaucratic difficulties, such as veto power of various members, 3 but also because of financial burdens. Of course, there are those who believe that it is simply the goal of the UN to buck-pass its responsibilities to regional organizations. 4 There are few works that specifically address the length of peace agreements and what may or may not make them more successful. Even less attention has addressed which organizations may be more effective. The majority of studies of this nature also have focused on intrastate wars. Finally, there are those who are ardently opposed to the use of regional organizations, claiming that the trouble outweighs their benefits, if they have any. This study attempts to breakdown the studies of peace agreements in order to look at them in terms of specific variables and understand not only what aspects of the agreements themselves make them more effective, but what third party, if any, contributes to their success. Regional organizations are theorized to be the most effective third party for a variety of reasons, including their ability to clear commitment problems and their geographical and political proximity to the conflicts under their jurisdiction. Today there are roughly 38 international organizations with a mandate regarding peace and regional security. 5 These practically span the whole globe and can have significant presence and say within their respective spheres of influence. Of course, these organizations may be better at some types of conflict over others; for example, ethnic versus non-ethnic conflicts. 3 Emil J. Kirchner and Roberto Domínguez, Regional Organizations and Security Governance, in The Security Governance of Regional Organizations, edited by Emil J. Kirchner and Roberto Domínguez (New York: Routledge, 2011), 1. 4 Angel Angelov, Regional Involvement in Peace Operations: An Analysis of the Debate within the Security Council, Conflict, Security & Development 10, no. 5 (2012), Rodrigo Tavares, Regional Security: The Capacity of International Organizations (New York: Routledge, 2010), 5. 2

11 The UCDP dataset also defines agreement and Primary Warring Parties, a necessary inclusion. An agreement is a binding mutual deal signed or publically agreed to. Primary Warring Parties are two governments of a state in an interstate armed conflict; or a government and any opposition organization or alliance of organizations that uses armed force to promote its position in the incompatibility in an intrastate armed conflict. 6 The remainder of this research shall be structured fairly simply. Chapter Two will not only cover a short history of regional organizations but examine arguments for and against their usage, improvement strategies, and also what previous studies have been attempted to measure their effectiveness. In Chapter Three, the design of the study will be clarified, followed by the hypotheses and why they are important to test. Next, the variables will be defined. Finally, the logistic regressions will be conducted and the results will be disclosed, accompanied by interpretations and implications of the findings both to general research in academia and to policy making in terms of what assistance should be given to regional organizations. Chapter Four will delve into the case studies with ECOMOG in Sierra Leon and Guinea Bissau and with OSCE in Moldova. ECOMOG and OSCE are examined due to their different histories, approaches to conflict management, and experience in mediation. Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau are studied because while Sierra Leone initially failed, ECOMOG was able to craft a later peace agreement which held. Conversely, it was unable to craft a similar successful agreement in Guinea Bissau. Liberia was not included because of its popularity in case studies regarding Africa. Chapter 5 will 6 Stina Högbladh, Peace agreements Updating the UCDP Peace Agreement dataset, in States in Armed Conflict 2011, eds. Pettersson Therése & Lotta Themnér ( Uppsala University: Department of Peace and Conflict Research Report 99, 2012) 3

12 conclude with an overall summary of the study and its results, a critical look at the implications of the results to academia and research, and suggestions for alternate methods of conducting this study as well as suggestions for future research. 4

13 CHAPTER TWO LITERATURE REVIEW Background A myriad of authors have researched the mechanisms of war and conflict settlement more generally. Arguments arise from all schools of thought, including rationalism, which emphasizes belligerents use of cost-benefit analysis. Fearon and others address why states may be unable to reach a settlement despite their preference to avoid costly conflict. The first issue is informational problems. Leaders are unable to gather private information about their adversaries and, for obvious reasons, are less than willing to offer it. Informational problems are exacerbated because most bargainers have high incentives to misrepresent their capabilities, resolve, and intentions. 7 While this is a significant hurdle facing opposing parties attempting to reach a peaceful settlement, commitment problems also play a large role. Commitment problems state that due to the anarchic nature of the international system, both parties may have the opportunity to renege on an agreement, if they even commit to one in the first place. 8 Indeed, Werner s study finds that agreements break down most often when one party has incentive to renegotiate the terms of settlement 9, perhaps due to a rapid shift in power 10 or 7 Robert Powell, War as a Commitment Problem, International Organization 60, no. 1 (2006):170, doi: /S Powell, War as a Commitment Problem, Suzanne Werner, The Precarious Nature of Peace: Resolving the Issues, Enforcing the Settlement, and Renegotiating the Terms, American Journal of Political Science 43, no.3 (1999): 918, < 10 Powell, War as a Commitment Problem,

14 government. 11 Finally, Fearon suggests that conflict cannot end in peaceful settlement if the issue is indivisible; that is, there is no optimum settlement. 12 Fearon and Powell state that these situations are rare and despite the fact that the issue, such as a territory, may be indivisible, there are still compromises or bargaining spaces that both parties would prefer over conflict. 13 According to Keohane, regimes should be rather successful in handling these issues because they can reduce transaction costs and effective international regimes can ease communications among officials. 14 Since regimes are a set of expectations, rules and regulations, plans, organizations energies and financial commitments, which have been accepted by a group of states, 15 it is appropriate to include regional organizations in this definition. Furthermore, prescriptions are offered on how to enhance the effectiveness of regional bodies. Several studies address these issues and find that conflict will end if there is a stable government as well as institutional arrangements due to civil wars being highly correlated with national poverty 16 and the presence of a third party that can signal resolve and guarantee safety of adversaries. 17 Although specifically addressing civil wars, third parties may be also be able to address the same issues in interstate conflicts; however, even more debate surrounds which third party should handle disputes at all. 11 Werner, The Precarious Nature of Peace, James D. Fearon, Rationalist Explanations for War, International Organization 49, no, 3 (1995): 382, Military & Government Collection, EBSCOhost (accessed November 5, 2012). 13 Fearon, Rationalist Explanations for War, 382; Powell, War as a Commitment Problem, Robert Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984): Keohane, After Hegemony, James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War, American Political Science Review 97, no. 1 (2003): 88, doi: /s Barbara F. Walter, The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement, International Organization 51, no. 3 (1997): 362, doi: /

15 The basis of the argument regarding the nature of the relationship between the United Nations and regional organizations could be similarly framed within the bounds of universalism and regionalism. This division has been debated for over half a century but took new strides near the end of World War II. Though more prominent an argument now, advocates of universalism have hailed the rise of technology and communication as a reason for a universal international organization. The criticisms leveled at regionalism are more of a definitional or perhaps operational issue of what qualifies as a region. Is it merely geography or is it also cultural and other considerations? 18 This debate took further shape post-cold War when many new states were formed and there seemed to be an immediate rise in conflicts. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) began dispatching peacekeepers once more. During this time, although regional organizations existed, the United Nations was still the leader in peacekeeping. 19 In 1992, the UN s Secretary General Boutros-Ghali released An Agenda for Peace, a detailed report to the General Assembly and the Security Council that gave regional organizations a role to play, under Chapter VIII. After the failed missions in Somalia, the nature of United Nations peacekeeping was fundamentally altered. The United States withdrew some of its support and began supporting the idea of creating peacekeepers from within the region of conflict. 20 Though monetary support was not necessarily withdrawn, peacekeepers were rarely dispatched under the United Nations banner. This, in turn, lowered the United 18 Pitman B Potter, Universalism Versus Regionalism in International Organization The American Political Science Review 37, no. 5 (1943): David Quayat, The United Nations and Regional Organizations: A New Paradigm for Peace? Ottawa: Conference of Defense Associations Institute (1999):4, 20 Quayat, The United Nations and Regional Organizations, 5 7

16 Nations capacity to respond to the many conflicts around the globe and offered regional organizations a unique chance to become more involved. Due to the definitional vagueness of Chapter VIII however, there has not been an explicit outline detailing the relationship that the UN and regional organizations should have. The lack of a solid definition has encouraged various research projects regarding the effectiveness of the UN versus regional organizations. The arguments for strengthening regional organizations seem to stem from the assumption that proximity to a conflict zone is better for several reasons. From a boots on the ground perspective, regional organizations can potentially respond much faster to a new conflict than the United Nations not only because they are literally closer but also because they can come to a conclusion regarding their involvement in a shorter span of time. Furthermore, member states of these organizations share a history and, more than likely, a similar culture. This allows for these organizations to better formulate their approach to these sensitive situations and would also portray a higher degree of legitimacy because the organizations are seen as insiders. 21 Finally, regional organizations, because they are in such close proximity, will be more concerned with finding a solution to end the conflict. 22 In more recent history, some scholars are still more adamant than others in strengthening regional 21 Ole Elgström, Jacob Bercovitch, and Carl Skau, Regional Organizations and International Mediation: the Effectiveness of Insider Mediators, African Journal on Conflict Resolution 3, no. 1 (2003):12, 22 Richard Jones and Tamara Duffey, Sharing the Burden of Peacekeeping: The UN & Regional Organizations, Peacekeeping & International Relations 25, no. 3 (1996): 6 (ATT: ); see also Maurice Marnika, Regional Peacekeeping: The Case for Complementary Efforts, Peacekeeping & International Relations 25, no. 3 (1996): 9 (ATT: ). 8

17 organizations, though some claim that much more work needs to be done in order to truly see the effect of the UN and regional organizations. Beginning in 2001, the United Nations began serious talks regarding cooperation with regional organizations. These talks led to high-level meetings, culminating in Resolution 1631 in The resolution laid out steps for furthering cooperation between the UN and regional organizations. In 2006, the United Nations released a report detailing the challenges and opportunities given by partnering with regional organizations. Kofi Annan, then the Secretary General, reported that while regional organizations were well capable of conflict prevention along with the United Nations, there is a lack of coordination between the UN and these organizations when it pertains to peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding. The coordination issue was listed alongside the issue of capacity; clearly some organizations will have better training and finances than others. Annan encourages the United Nations to provide further backing to regional organizations. Though some scholars concur with Annan s push for more complex cooperation, their reasons are not necessarily similar. Some suggested the creation of Regional Security Commissions (RSC s) that would serve as middle-men between the United Nations and regional organizations, being legally and politically accountable to both. 23 The creation of such an entity is based on the experience of the United Nations incapability to quickly react to crises and its need to share its burden an argument shared by those who advocate cooperation. However, while 23 Jon Lunn, The Need for Regional Security Commissions within the UN System, Security Dialogue 24, no. 4 (1993): 371, doi: /

18 the basis of the argument is the same, other authors call for the strengthening of regional organizations instead of a creation of another bureaucratic arm of the United Nations; by strengthening these organizations, they claim, the UN would also become stronger. 24 These arguments are generally framed around the African Union (previously known as the Organization of African Unity) an organization that still pushes to gain more voice within the UN to the modern day. In 2011, South Africa pushed for an initiative that would effectively make regional organizations equal to the UN. Bolstered by the Libyan intervention, South Africa questions the motives of a Security Council that not only excludes members from Africa but all members of the developing world. 25 Some authors also posit that so long as regional organizations do not undermine the norms of the UN, they actually serve to reinforce them, thus making themselves an asset. 26 Conversely, there are scholars who range from reserved to firmly against the use of regional organizations on several grounds. While accepting of the possible advantages of the inclusion of regional organizations, some authors question the impartiality and capacity financial and otherwise of regional organizations 27 as well as their ability to handle the higher tiers (military) of peacekeeping. 28 Other authors include alternate factors of determination, such as the whether the relationship between the UN and regional 24 Christopher J. Bakwesagha, The Need to Strengthen Regional Organizations: A Rejoinder, Security Dialogue 24 (1993): 379, doi: / Stewart M. Patrick, The UN versus Regional Organizations: Who Keeps the Peace? Council on Foreign Relations, March 23, 2012, accessed July 17, 2012, 26 Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, Who s Keeping the Peace? Regionalization and Contemporary Peace Operations, International Security 29, no. 4 (2005): 194, < 27 Marnika, Regional Peacekeeping: The Case for Complementary Efforts, Davidson Black, Widening the Spectrum: Regional Organizations in Peacekeeping Operations, Peacekeeping & International Relations 25, no. 3 (1996):7, (ATT: ). 10

19 organizations is one of partnership (horizontal) or one of subcontracting (vertical) 29 and some find no reason to suggest regional organizations are more effective. 30 Though not a quantitative piece, Oliver examines the role of the UN in several conflicts including, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Oliver also examined the role of CARICOM, a Caribbean organization, in Haiti and the role of NATO in Kosovo. Results suggested that the effectiveness of the United Nations or regional organizations is directly dependent on the level of consent of the parties that are involved. Specifically, the higher level of the consent, the more responsibility should go to the United Nations. 31 Quayat states that previous studies that touted the effectiveness of regional organizations were primarily based on the European experience, namely NATO an example that is commonly used despite NATO not explicitly qualifying as a regional organization. 32 Furthermore, some authors strongly believe that the UN possesses the moral authority of a world body that regional organizations lack. 33 Dorn touches on impartiality and capacity as well but adds that regional organizations are generally run by a hegemon (a bully in his terms), using Nigeria and ECOWAS as an example. 34 Dorn, however, fails to take perception into account. Especially in the developing world, the UN is 29 Hikaru Yamashita, Peacekeeping cooperation between the United Nations and Regional Organisations, Review of International Studies 38 (2012): 168. doi: /S Carolyn M. Shaw, Regional Peacekeeping: An Alternative o the United Nations Operations? Journal of Conflict Studies 15, no. 2 (1995) George F. Oliver, The Other Side of Peacekeeping: Peace Enforcement and Who Should Do It? International Peacekeeping: The Yearbook of International Peace Operations 8 (2002):117, < 32 Quayat, The United Nations and Regional Organizations: A New Paradigm for Peace? 2. See also Walter Dorn, Regional Peacekeeping Is Not the Way, Peacekeeping & International Relations 27, no. 3/4 (1998): 3 33 Dorn, Regional Peacekeeping Is Not the Way, 3 34 Dorn Regional Peacekeeping Is Not the Way, 3. See also Michael Barnett, Partners in peace? The UN, regional organizations, and peace-keeping, Review of International Studies 21(1995):

20 sometimes seen as a bullying entity, especially with none of the developing world being included in the Security Council. 35 In addition, Dorn assumes neutrality is the most effective stance while other studies have shown that partiality may allow for more agreements. 36 In general, these authors contend the disadvantages of regional organizations outweigh the advantages, if there are any. Finally, there are those who disagree with the formation of international institutions a set of rules that stipulate the ways in which state should cooperate and compete with each other 37 - more generally, claiming they do not fulfill their promises of peacemaking because they hold little to no influence on state behavior. 38 However, this argument has been countered by alternate results that show although intergovernmental organizations are not foolproof, they do promote peace when controlling for certain variables. 39 Most scholars also tend to focus on the process of achieving an agreement and how to potentially increase the likelihood of reaching an agreement. The cohesiveness and institutionalizations of regional organizations are generally listed as the most important factors. 40 Other authors include whether or not the mandate of a regional organization 35 Patrick, The UN versus Regional Organizations: Who Keeps the Peace? 36 See Andrew Kydd, Which Side Are You On? Bias, Credibility, and Mediation, American Journal of Political Science 47, no. 4 (2003): 607; Isak Svenson, Who Brings Peace? Journal of Conflict Resolution 53, no. 3 (2009): 463, doi: / ; Patrick M. Regan, Third-Party Interventions and the Duration of Intrastate Conflicts, Journal of Conflict Resolution 46, no. 1 (2002): 72, doi: / ; Walter, The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement, John J. Mearsheimer, The False Promise of International Institutions, International Security 19, no. 3 (1994/95): 6, 38 Mearsheimer, The False Promise of International Institutions, Charles Boehmer, Erik Gartzke and Timothy Nordstrom, Do Intergovernmental Organizations Promote Peace? World Politics 57, no. 1 (2004): 7, < 40 Laurie Nathan, The Peacemaking Effectiveness of Regional Organizations, Crisis States Working Paper No. 2, 81 (2010): 2, ISSN: ; see also Boehmer, Gartzke and Nordstrom, Do Intergovernmental Organizations Promote Peace? 7. 12

21 includes peacekeeping or conflict prevention. 41 For example, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) supports the general consensus of non-interventionism, thus it would generally not involve itself in conflicts among its members even though it is institutionalized and highly cohesive. Wulf and Debeil and Ackermann tend to encourage the building of better conflict prevention mechanisms such as early warning systems, 42 more highly trained mediators, 43 or more effective strategies of intervention. 44 One aspect that pervades much of the literature of peacekeeping and peace agreements is selection bias. Most cases chosen include third-party involvement, leaving only a small number of studies in which no external involvement occurred. 45 However, those authors that do include the latter cases face the problem of counterfactuals; although it is a viable method to explore international relations phenomena, the methodology is complex. 46 This is particularly important given the occurrences of third-party involvements occasionally worsening conflict. 47 Alternatively, many studies fail to consider that there is inherent bias in the study on third party involvement because third parties to not get involved in conflicts at random. For example, there is evidence that peacekeeping missions 41 Nathan, The Peacemaking Effectiveness of Regional Organizations, Herbert Wulf and Tobias Debeil, Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanisms, Crisis States Working Papers Series No. 2, 49 (2009): 24, ISSN: ; Alice Ackerman, The Idea and Practice of Conflict Prevention, Journal of Peace Research 40, no. 3 (2003): William J. Dixon, Third-Party Techniques for Preventing Conflict Escalation and Promoting Peaceful Settlement, International Organization 50, no. 4 (2009): 664, doi: /S Patrick M. Regan, Conditions of Successful Third-Party Intervention in Intrastate Conflicts, Journal of Conflict Resolution 40, no. 2 (1996): Virginia Page Fortna, Does Peacekeeping Keep the Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace after Civil War, International Studies Quarterly 48, no. 2 (2004): 269, 46 James Fearon, Counterfactuals and Hypothesis Testing in Political Science, World Politics 43, no.2 (1991): Dixon, Third-Party Techniques for Preventing Conflict Escalation and Promoting Peaceful Settlement,

22 are more likely if the United Nations or a regional IGO has previously been involved, suggesting more enduring conflict. Though the specific study was primarily concerned with civil conflicts, its findings may be applicable to interstate wars as well. 48 Of those that address the durability of peace, some found that the content of ceasefire agreements has a significant effect on how long peace lasts, as well as the cost and outcome of the war. According to Fortna, if the agreements include high costs for an attack, specify compliance in order to prevent accidents from backsliding into war, and provide credible signals, the peace should hold. 49 This correlates with Werner s findings that the most common reason for a breakdown of peace is the incentive for one party to attempt to renegotiate the terms of settlement. 50 A peace agreement that raises costs for war and provides credible signals should discourage attempts of renegotiation. Walter contends that should agreements allow for all parties to have an effective voice in the government, less military enforcers would be necessary. 51 Although she is referring to civil wars specifically, her argument implies that specific provisions and longer lasting peace are positively correlated. Other research addresses the issue of ripeness of conflict the time frame in which both parties are 48 Virginia Page Fortna and Lise Morjé Howard, Pitfalls and Prospects in the Peacekeeping Literature, Annual Review of Political Science 11 (2008): 290, doi: /annurev.polisci ; see also Mark J. Mullenbach, Deciding to Keep the Peace: An Analysis of International Influences on the Establishment of Third-Party Peacekeeping Missions, International Studies Quarterly 49, no. 3 (2005): 551, < 49 Virginia J. Fortna, Scraps of Paper: Agreements and the Durability of Peace, International Organization 57, no. 2 (2003): 342, doi: /S Werner, The Precarious Nature of Peace Walter, The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement,

23 amenable to the idea of settlement. 52 Establishing when this moment may occur, or if it is occurring, requires not only intimate knowledge of conflict in general, but of the specific conflict and parties involved a task that may be best suited for organizations more entrenched in the region. Finally, Fortna finds that once the non-randomness of third-party involvement specifically the United Nations - is accounted for, the presence of peacekeepers significantly raises durability of peace for both interstate and intrastate wars. 53 Although these scholars delve into the issue of when peace agreements last or fail, there is no systematic research on which organizations achieve success more often. Finally, some authors address the role of state capacity in the success or failure of peace agreements. State capacity, as defined by DeRouen, Jr. et al., is the state s ability to accomplish those goals it pursues, possibly in the face of resistance by actors within the state. 54 While several authors, including Fearon & Laitin and Taydas & Peksen apply state capacity towards a state s probability of experiencing the onset of a civil war 55, Deroun et al., and McBride et al., apply similar arguments to achieving a peace agreement and its durability. 56 Primarily centered around civil wars, several studies find that state capacity is a strong determinant of the duration of peace agreements in civil wars because strong 52 Fen Osler Hampson, Nurturing Peace: Why Peace Settlements Succeed or Fail, (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996), Virginia Page Fortna, Inside and Out: Peacekeeping and the Duration of Peace after Civil and Interstate Wars, International Studies Review 5, no. 4 (2003): Karl DeRouen, Jr. et al., Civil War Peace Agreement Implementation and State Capacity, Journal of Peace Research 47, no. 3 (2010): 335. doi: / See Fearon and Laitin, Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War. and Zeynep Taydas and Dursun Peksen, State capacity, Quality of Governance and Civil War Onset, paper presented at the 48 th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Chicago, ( 56 See Karl DeRouen, Jr. et al., Civil War Peace Agreement Implementation and State Capacity. and McBride et al., Peace and War with Endogenous State Capacity, Journal of Conflict Resolution 55, no. 3 (2011):

24 states are better able to implement agreement provisions 57 and because they ensure the commitment power of the states, particularly when a solution calls for a power-sharing agreement. 58 The investigation of state capacity is outside the scope of this thesis but should be addressed in further research and applied to interstate conflicts to see if the same holds true. Hypotheses It was stated previously that regional organizations should be the most successful at peace agreements because of their ability to clear commitment problems and their greater proximity to conflict or potential conflict areas. They are however, more effective at some conflicts over others. These ideas rest on certain assumptions if they are to be true. First, states are rational actors. Next, war is a means to an end, not the end itself. Finally, third parties are assumed to want to end the conflicts, not begin or exacerbate them. Several testable hypotheses can be extracted from these statements, each with their own value to the end result. Some hypotheses will be tested quantitatively in Chapter Three while some will be examined only qualitatively in Chapter Four; this is either due to too small an n to run regressions or a lack of quantitative measure. 57 DeRouen, Jr. et al., Civil War Peace Agreement Implementation and State Capacity McBride et al., Peace and War with Endogenous State Capacity,

25 H1: Peace agreements negotiated with the assistance of regional organizations should last longer than those without third party involvement or with the assistance of other kinds of third parties. Though much of past researched assumed that neutral outside mediators were best equipped to handle conflicts, new studies have shown that insider mediators tend to produce better results. 59 Specifically, Wehr and Lederach find that an insider-partial mediator produces more trust because they are from within the conflict area and must deal directly with the results. 60 The bias involved is not referring to the desire to see one actor to prevail over another (outcome partiality); instead, it is related to the relationships that the mediator has to all disputants, referred to as relational partiality. 61 Placing this argument on a larger scale, regional organizations can represent insider-partial parties because of their relationship with their member states. 62 The results of the conflict directly affect the organization, more so when considering that conflicts left open ended can potentially spread throughout the region, making the conflict costly to states that are not necessarily primary actors. Therefore, it is in the best interest of the organization to return to the previous status quo: peace. 63 Although there are instances of protracted conflicts between states or parties within the states, regional organizations as a whole benefit more from peace. 59 Kydd, Which Side Are You On? Paul Wehr and John Paul Lederach, Mediating Conflict in Central America, Journal of Peace Research 28, no. 1, Special Issue on International Mediation (1991): 87. < 61 Elgström, Bercovitch and Skau, Regional Organizations and International Mediation, Elgström, Bercovitch and Skau, Regional Organizations and International Mediation, Jacob Bercovitch, "Mediation and Conflict Resolution, in The Sage Handbook of Conflict Resolution, ed. Jacob Bercovitch, Victor Kremenyuk, and I. William Zartman, (London: Sage Publications, 2009),

26 H2: Peace agreements negotiated with the assistance of regional organizations will be more specific than those negotiated without assistance or with the assistance of other kinds of third parties. The literature on bargaining tends to circle around three issues: informational problems, commitment problems, and issue indivisibility. 64 Informational problems occur when parties in a conflict have incentives to misrepresent themselves in order to gain more leverage in a bargaining situation. 65 Third-parties can have the ability to diffuse these informational problems in general. Because regional organizations understand the background, culture, and other factors that may come into play in a negotiation 66, they are better suited to produce a clear but complex agreement that deal with the root causes of the initial conflict and creates binding mechanisms to diffuse them. According to Hansen et al., conflict management that includes binding agreements lead more often to peace agreements. 67 Finally, some authors find that culture may be the strongest factor in reaching the goal of a solid, long-lasting peace agreement. Faure addresses the role of culture, stating that because culture can affect so many aspects involved in negotiations, including behaviors and beliefs, it can influence the outcome of negotiations, especially when stakes are highest Fearon, Rationalist Explanations for War, Powell, War as a Commitment Problem, Elgström, Bercovitch and Skau, Regional Organizations and International Mediation, Holley E. Hansen, Sara McLaughlin Mitchell and Stephen C. Nemeth, IO Mediation of Interstate Conflicts: Moving Beyond the Global versus Regional Dichotomy, Journal of Conflict Resolution 52, no. 2 (2008): 311, < 68 Guy Olivier Faure, Culture and Conflict Resolution, in The Sage Handbook of Conflict Resolution, ed. Jacob Bercovitch, Victor Kremenyuk, and I. William Zartman, (London: Sage Publications, 2009),

27 H3: Regional organizations are more willing to enforce peace agreements than other kinds of third parties. For the same reason that regional organizations are better able to create specific agreements, they are also more willing to enforce the terms of the agreements. Their proximity creates a less burdensome task out of providing peacekeepers to a conflict zone if necessary. Also, utilizing regional capabilities stems the internationalization of the conflict. Considering many third world attitudes towards major international peacekeeping forces, many would prefer to keep conflicts as local as possible. 69 Regional organizations also are aware of what kind of sanctions will create the most effective response from the involved conflict parties. Lastly, members of regional organizations, especially those who have strong economic ties to neighboring nations, are more willing to take the risk of enforcement because they are more likely to have economic stakes in the conflict. H4: Peace agreements negotiated by regional organizations are more likely to resolve tractable issues than intractable ones. H1 stated that the inherent bias that regional organizations portray is favorable because it encourages trust from the conflict parties that in turn, lead parties to perceive their actions and mediation attempts as legitimate. Unfortunately, the same bias backfires when faced with conflicts centered on intractable issues religion, ethnicity, and sometimes territory. 69 Elgström, Bercovitch and Skau, Regional Organizations and International Mediation,

28 Even though several quantitative works show that ethnicity and identity are not significant variables to predict the onset of conflicts 70, some authors claim that these grievances can be produced by civil wars 71 and Collier and Hoeffler show that ethnic dominance can be a predictive factor of civil war onset. 72 Both ethnicity and religion can simplify the image of the other, which can lead to dehumanization and justify violence. 73 Finally, even an issue that literally is divisible territory - can become intractable when infused with symbolic qualities, such as identity or religious chosenness. 74 These types of conflicts can make the bargaining procedure appear as a zerosum game, which contributes to the polarization of positions and to continued escalation 75 of the situation. The insider partiality of regional organization can backfire because the member states are within the conflict zone, the organization as a whole will be subject to a much greater amount of pressure. The trust that is usually associated with regional organizations may either be substituted with suspicion, particularly if many of the members are from the other category or one party of the conflict that may see itself as 70 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, Greed and grievance in civil war, Oxford Economic Papers 56, no 4 (2004): 588, doi: /oep/gpf064, Mearsheimer and Pope 1993, Kaufmann Fearon and Laitin, Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War, 88 see also Chaim Kauffmann, Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars, International Security 20, no. 4 (1996): Collier and Hoeffler, Greed and grievance in civil war, S. Ayse Kadayifci-Orellana, Ethno-Religious Conflicts: Exploring the Role of Religion in Conflict Resolution, in The Sage Handbook of Conflict Resolution, ed. Jacob Bercovitch, Victor Kremenyuk, and I. William Zartman, (London: Sage Publications, 2009), John A. Vasquez and Brandon Valeriano, Territory as a Source of Conflict and a Road to Peace, in The Sage Handbook of Conflict Resolution, ed. Jacob Bercovitch, Victor Kremenyuk, and I. William Zartman, (London: Sage Publications, 2009), Diana Chiagas, Negotiating Intractable Conflicts, in Grasping the Nettle: Analyzing Cases of Intractable Conflict, eds. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (Washington, DC: USIP Press, 2005):

29 closely allied with the organization may have its trust broken. 76 Finally, even if an agreement is reached, civil wars based upon ethnic lines are predisposed to reoccur. 77 H5: Regional organizations that are highly institutionalized will be more successful in creating durable agreements than less institutionalized regional organizations. A portion of the criticism leveled against regional organizations is that they are not independent enough from their member states to police them effectively. The claim is that the stronger states will be able to veto or ignore decisions from regional organizations. Later studies attempted to establish what factors establish independence. Barnett and Finnemore insist that international organizations can become independent of their member states through (1) the legitimacy of the rational-legal authority they embody, and (2) control over technical expertise and information. 78 Haftel and Thompson indicate that life span is the most significant factor in independence of international organizations 79 while Barnett states that collective identity, shared interests, the presence of a hegemon, and agreement of purpose indicates whether or not regional organizations specifically will be willing to act. 80 Finally, Hansen et al., adds to Haftel and Thompson, stating that having sufficient resources are an equally important 76 Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall, Conclusion: From Intractable to Tractable-the Outlook and Implications for Third Parties, in Grasping the Nettle: Analyzing Cases of Intractable Conflict, eds. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (Washington, DC: USIP Press, 2005): Joakim Kreutz, How and when armed conflicts end: Introducing the UCDP Conflict Termination dataset, Journal of Peace Research 47, no. 2 (210): 248. doi: / Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore, The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations, International Organization 53, no. 4 (1999): Haftel and Thompson, The Independence of International Organizations, Barnett, Partners in peace?

30 factor. 81 Although in theory this hypothesis could be tested quantitatively by measuring the number of years since an organization s inception, the n is far too small to produce useable results. Therefore, this hypothesis shall be examined through case studies in Chapter Four. 81 Hansen et al. IO Mediation of Interstate Conflicts,

31 CHAPTER THREE STUDY DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY Datasets A mixture of databases was used in order to include variables that were not available in one dataset. The dependent variable, the region, the incompatibility, ceasefire, outstanding issues, outline and peacekeeping operations were taken from the UCDP Peace Agreements Dataset v In order to measure the dependent variable and incompatibility from the UCDP dataset, certain categories were transformed or added. All other variables were gathered from the PRIO battle deaths dataset. Of the 215 total cases, 125 ended in the dyads return to conflict while in 90 cases, conflict did not begin again for at least five years, if at all; this creates a fairly even and sufficient sample size to apply several variables to. Of those cases, 68 had no third party assistance, 57 had either a state or non-regional ad-hoc groups assist, 21 had assistance from regional organizations or regional ad-hoc groups and 35 had other assistance. Other assistance includes non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or an even group of the other variables. For example, if the United Nations and regional organizations were joint collaborations through mediation and agreement creation, they would be under this category. As seen in Table 1, regional organizations have had more successes than failures. Also, although the UCDP dataset included information on which 3 rd party, if any, was involved in ending the conflict, it was only in text; therefore, a variable coding the information (party3_type) was added. Finally, the UCDP dataset included measures for 82 Stina Högbladh, Peace Agreement Dataset Codebook version 2.0, Uppsala Conflict Data Program, (Upsalla: Department of Peace and Conflict Research, 2012), 23

32 whether a conflict was over territory, government or both. An additional measure for whether a conflict was regarding ethnic, religious, or ideological issues was included, partially based on a previous study. 83 The total number of cases for the final set was 215; when including battle deaths data, cases dropped to 189 due to some missing information. Table 1-3rd party and Conflict Cross-tabulation Conflict in 5 years? * 3rd Party Type Cross-tabulation 3rd Party Type Total None State/s Regional UN Other Org/Ad-hoc Conflict in Conflict Count years? % within 3rd 61.8% 56.1% 47.6% % Party Type % % Absence of Count conflict % within 3rd 38.2% 43.9% 52.4% % Party Type % % Total Count % within 3rd Party Type 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% % % % Because the UCDP dataset did not include conflict deaths, PRIO s Battle Deaths dataset v.3 was included. 84 To combine the two sets of information, each conflict that ended in a peace agreement was found within the PRIO dataset. The best number of deaths between the start of the conflict and the date of the peace agreement was calculated and put into the master dataset. In order to make the regression simpler, the variable was made into a dummy. 83 Nicholas Sambanis, Partition as a Solution to Ethnic War: An Empirical Critique of Theoretical Literature, World Politics 52, no. 4 (2000): Bethany Lacina and Nils Petter Gleditsch, Monitoring Trends in Global Combat: A New Dataset of Battle Deaths, European Journal of Population 21, no. 2 3 (2005):